Wittgenstein and Derrida on the Possibility of Meaning: Hierarchy Or Non-Hierarchy, Simple Or Non-Simple Origin, Deferral Or Non-Deferral
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Preprints (www.preprints.org) | NOT PEER-REVIEWED | Posted: 2 August 2019 doi:10.20944/preprints201908.0016.v1 Wittgenstein and Derrida on the Possibility of Meaning: Hierarchy or Non-Hierarchy, Simple or Non-simple Origin, Deferral or Non-Deferral Neil B MacDonald University of Roehampton London SW15 5PH, UK [email protected] https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6456-1980 Abstract: Meaning understood in terms of teachability and learnability is crucial to Wittgenstein’s later work. As regards the resolution of philosophical problems – and epistemological problems in particular - this approach seems to posit a hierarchy of meaning that excludes endless deferral. This is the basis of Wittgenstein’s attack on philosophical scepticism. Derrida’s approach to language seems to require both non-hierarchy and endless deferral. Consequently fundamental to his concept of origin is identity and difference simultaneously, irreducibly, non-simply. One question is whether it is possible for there to be a compromise between the two philosophers: a hierarchy of meaning that does not in principle exclude endless deferral. Keywords: Wittgenstein; Derrida; Meaning; Hierarchy; Deferral; Learnability; Teachability; Différance; Origin; Identity; Difference INTRODUCTION It cannot be gainsaid that both Wittgenstein and Derrida share a common preoccupation with language. Wittgenstein, especially the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, belongs to a specifically Austrian tradition of 'language-consciousness' traceable back - through one of his own contemporaries Karl Kraus - to the first half of the nineteenth century. This essentially literary tradition was combined in the Tractatus with the language of propositional and predicate logic, a language whose source could be traced back to another Austrian, Gottlieb Frege. (Frege's own intellectual context may be said to be the no less indigenous Austrian scientific tradition of the second half of the same century: the work of Brentano and his successor Ernst Mach at the University of Vienna. Brentano's guiding © 2019 by the author(s). Distributed under a Creative Commons CC BY license. Preprints (www.preprints.org) | NOT PEER-REVIEWED | Posted: 2 August 2019 doi:10.20944/preprints201908.0016.v1 philosophical principle was Vera philosophiae methodus nulla alia nisi scientia naturalis est: the true method of philosophy is none other than that of natural science). If anything, the later Wittgenstein is even more focussed on language: instead of objective scientific language as the only meaningful language, it was now merely one of many. Wittgenstein now affirmed a plurality of 'language- games'. What of Derrida in this respect? Language too is uppermost in his philosophy. His influences have been Nietzsche, Heidegger, and various forms of structuralist thought, especially that of the linguist Ferdinand Saussure. Derrida maintains that both phonetic and conceptual systems are systems of differences. What defines an 'a' as an a in a phonetic system is its difference from other phonemes within the system, rather than intrinsic characters of the sound. Derrida extends this insight to conceptual schemes. A concept is defined by its differences, hence a conceptual system is a system of differences. The concept a is defined in terms of everything else in the system, that which is not a, (a is precisely not-not a). (Though Derrida shares a common legacy with 'objective' structuralists such as Roland Barthes who also stands in the tradition of Saussure, Derrida's attitude to language is - in virtue of the method of deconstruction - commonly defined as post-structuralist. Wittgenstein as will be seen is a form of ‘structuralism’ in the broadest sense of the term.) However, the shared concern Derrida has with Wittgenstein as regards language has seemed to go deeper than a mere common focus on language. It is not only that Wittgenstein affirmed a plurality of 'language-games', it is that he took this to mean that no one 'game' assumed priority over another. Here, it could be said, is a basic affinity with Derrida: Wittgenstein's conception of the relations between language games is decidedly non-hierarchical; Derrida's conception of deconstruction presupposes non-hierarchy in its very performance. It seems to me that it is clear that Wittgenstein affirmed a plurality of language-games; what seems much more doubtful is the claim that he affirmed a non-hierarchical relationship between one language-game and another. Indeed, I would argue that Wittgenstein would have said that, to say that the relation between one language-game and another was either hierarchical or non- hierarchical, did not itself make sense. It was simply not the kind of thing one said of language-games: they could neither be said to justify or not justify each other. This becomes especially evident when we consider the examples of language-games that Wittgenstein actually gave. According to the list outlined in paragraph 23 of the Philosophical Investigations it seems clear that he meant by the term ‘language-game’, simple everyday activities such as: giving orders, and Preprints (www.preprints.org) | NOT PEER-REVIEWED | Posted: 2 August 2019 doi:10.20944/preprints201908.0016.v1 obeying them, reporting an event, forming and testing a hypothesis, etc.1 He did not mean that science was one language-game, religion another, politics another, and so on, all existing in a non-hierarchical relationship.2 I am not saying that this position is not valid; I am simply saying that it is unlikely that Wittgenstein held it. That the above most accurately reflects Wittgenstein’s conception of language-games - language-games can neither be said to be hierarchical or non- hierarchical as regards each other - does not rule out, and indeed allows for, a very interesting possibility. The way is open to argue that in the arguments of the later Wittgenstein there is, precisely, the pervasive presence of hierarchy. This is what I intend to do in what follows. I will suggest that there is a fundamental dissimilarity between Wittgenstein and Derrida on the question of hierarchy. Specifically, I wish to demonstrate that the later Wittgenstein's and Derrida's respective accounts of language - their respective philosophies of language if you will - cannot be rendered compatible. I will argue that one cannot without inconsistency affirm both Wittgenstein's critique of Cartesian scepticism and Derrida's deconstructive approach to language. The fundamental reason is that Derrida rejects hierarchy, Wittgenstein not. The reason for this is that the latter’s dialectic employs a teachability-learnability criterion that is at the heart of his approach both to scepticism and to meaning per se. The paper essentially comprises of three sections. I first examine Wittgenstein's critique of Cartesian scepticism. Then I juxtapose Derrida’s concept of différance and deconstruction. Following this I discuss the implications of Wittgenstein's critique of Descartes for his relation to Derrida. In the course of these sections I hope to show that: Wittgenstein's critique of Cartesian scepticism presupposes hierarchy; Derrida's deconstructive critique of language affirms non-hierarchy. I conclude from this that Wittgenstein and Derrida cannot be reconciled on the question of hierarchy. On the wider issue of whether the later Wittgenstein necessarily rejected the Derridian notion of endless deferral on the grounds that it precluded teachability and learnability of meaning per se I propose an ‘agnostic’ answer. I conclude that, while his position on matters epistemological in On Certainty appears to do so, the evidence in, for example, Zettel, on the question of language-learning per se is not necessarily clear-cut. This remains so even if the resources constituting teachability and learnability criteria necessarily originate in what Wittgenstein calls ‘forms of life.’ In a concluding section I explore the implications of my 1 Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations, edited by G E M Anscombe, (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1953). 2 For a summary of the literature on this point, see Fergus Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1999), 64-66. Preprints (www.preprints.org) | NOT PEER-REVIEWED | Posted: 2 August 2019 doi:10.20944/preprints201908.0016.v1 framework for understanding the relation between Wittgenstein, Derrida and Descartes in the context of the history of ideas. WITTGENSTEIN'S CRITIQUE OF CARTESIAN SCEPTICISM Let me start with Descartes. Descartes' 'project of pure enquiry' was motivated by a desire to put the science of his day on a firm foundation.3 As if in anticipation of the later Enlightenment philosophers who drew extensively from the legacy of the Greek and Roman ideals of classical antiquity,4 Descartes' Meditations was influenced by the arguments of the ancient Sceptics and Sextus Empiricus in particular.5 Descartes sought to establish - as against the Sceptics - truths about which there could not be the slightest doubt.6 To this end, he began by rejecting as absolutely false everything which he should have the slightest cause to doubt. He 'doubts everything' until he reaches a proposition about which he cannot have the slightest doubt: a truth that is indubitable or absolutely certain. For Descartes, to say that one should only accept that about which one has not the slightest cause to doubt entails that one might be not be certain about anything: one might not know anything at all. It is precisely on this point that Wittgenstein takes issue in the posthumously published On Certainty.7 In order to conceive of the possibility of the meaningfulness of doubt one has to have a criterion of non-doubt - certainty - against which to measure what it is one conceives as doubt. "If you tried to doubt everything you would not get so far as doubting anything. The game of doubting 3 Descartes, Discourse on Method and the Meditations (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1968), 95. See also J. L. Watling, "Descartes", in D. J. O'Connor (ed.), A Critical History of Western Philosophy (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 171. 4 Peter Gay, The Enlightenment vol i (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1969), 9-10; 31- 203.