DOI 10.1515/apeiron-2012-0016 Apeiron 2013; aop Brooke Holmes Causality, Agency, and the Limits of Medicine1 Abstract: The difference between ancient Greek medicine and ancient Greek philosophy has often been seen by scholars in terms of two targets of expertise: the body and the soul. In this paper, I argue that we can better understand the boundaries between medicine and philosophy in antiquity by focusing instead on the difference between causes and motivations (or causes and desires). The reason is this. It is not the case that the writers of the Hippocratic Corpus are uninterested in the soul (psychē). They are, however, reluctant to address their therapies to expressions of the patient’s own agency, despite tacitly ac- knowledging such agency as a causal force that cannot be reduced to the auto- matic behavior of the body. I go on to show how thinkers like Plato and Demo- critus zero in on the problem of perverted desires as part of a strategy of establishing a new domain of therapy, a domain that comes to be classified as the therapy of the soul. Keywords: Medicine, Hippocratic Corpus, ethics, Plato, desire Brooke Holmes: Princeton University – Classics 141 East Pyne, Princeton, New Jersey 08544 United States, E-mail:
[email protected] 1 Introduction In recent decades, scholars of the Hippocratic Corpus have become increasingly sensitive to how the classical medical writers establish authority through the rhetoric of self-presentation. The authority to be established is often not simply the writers’ own but that of the medical tekhnē as a whole in the face of rivals and detractors.