sign in sign up
<<
Home , 37 INK, Desilu Productions, Hawaiian Eye, October 1959, Richard Schickel, Sugarfoot

ABC and the Destruction of American Television, 1953-1961 d•mes LewisBaughman versityof Wisconsin-Madison

THE INTRODUCTION of televisionin the late 1940s and involvedmore than a strugglefor audiences.Through the fifties,the three national networksoffered sharplycontrasting models of programming. And TV arguablywas more diversebecause of this rivalry. Almostfrom the beginningof regularlyscheduled telecasts in 1947, nationalnetworks determinedthe programmingof TV, especiallyin the evenings,when most consumersused their receivers.One of the chains,National Broadcasting Company,included managerswho believed TV could be a form of mass amusement,suitable for experimentation.Columbia Broadcasting Systemrelied on radio in lookingfor programmingideas and transferred successfulradio showsto TV. A third chain, the American Broadcasting Company,by succeedingin the late 1950s with a different philosophyof programming,eventually imposed the industry'sstandards onto nightly entertainment. As audiences turned to ABC, the other networks followed. Televisiontook on a standardized,movieland quality for the next twenty- five years [33, 99, 100]. Ironically,the federal overseerof television,the Federal Communi- cationsCommission (FCC), had anticipateda differentoutcome. The FCC historicallychampioned "diverse" programming;that is, licenseesand networksshould offer differenttypes of programsso consumers had a true choiceamong the limited number of radio and TV frequenciesavailable [91, 93]. • In 1941, the FCC had forced NBC to divest itself of its second radio chain, the Blue Network [9, 120]. This weak systembecame ABC. Twelve yearslater, the Commissionpermitted the financiallyailing network to be acquiredby United ParamountTheatres (UPT). The agencyhad determined that ABC's continued operation would enhance American television. With little attention to the economicsof broadcasting,the Commissionconcluded that Americanswould be better served by three

56 rather than two networks[18; 19; 29; 30; 73; 121, pp. 264, 319, 333]. Yet by creatingABC out of the Blue and then keepingthat systemalive by agreeingto the UPT merger,the Commissionultimately lessened the diversityof networktelevision. The FCC promotednew rivalries that came to havea deleteriousimpact on the mostpopular cultural form in postwar America. The Commission'sFebruary 1953 approvalof the UPT-ABC merger had little immediateeffect on networkcompetition. TV networkingthen for all practicalpurposes was a duopoly,with the National Broadcasting Companyand the ColumbiaBroadcasting System, dominant. ABC and a fourth chain,the Du Mont network,were way behind. At the time of the merger,ABC wasin a very weakposition. With thirteenaffiliate stations (lessthan 10 percent of either CBS'sor NBC's chain),ABC programs couldonly be seenin one-thirdof the nation,compared to virtualnational coveragefor CBS and NBC. The network had two mildly popular series (Ozzieand Harriet and Beulah) and wasexperiencing difficulty persuading advertisersto sponsoranything else offered. The networkproduced twelve and one-halfhours of programminga week. "We weren't a network," recalled one executivein 1961 [60, 68].2 Indeed, ABC was so far behind that two yearsafter the mergerNBC wasable to blackmailWestinghouse into switchingownership of TV stationsby exchangingits desirable Philadelphia-ownedoutlet for one in Cleveland,owned by NBC. Westing- houseotherwise would have lost its NBC affiliation,and its Philadelphia stationwould have had to becomeand ABC affiliated station[35; 83; 122, pp. 427, 432; 133]. Within six years,however, ABC was not only challengingNBC and Columbiafor the ratingsleadership, but leadingthe older networksin programmingtrends, which arguablylessened the diversityof television. ABC led in shifts to filmed series, increases in the number of and detectivedramas. As CBSand NBC followed,they in the processcanceled many live and dramatic programsidentified with the massmedium's "Golden Age." ABC, in fact, proved sufficientlysuccessful that by late 1959,both CBS and NBC hadformer ABC executivesserving as presidents of their TV networks.In 1961, Martin Mayer, a journalist who had followedTV from the beginning,observed, ABC has become,in a surprisinglyshort time, the industryleader in mattersof programming,selling and dealingwith affiliatedstations. In eacharea, the rival networks,most of the advertisingagencies, and the staffof the FCC believe,rightly or wrongly,that the ABC influencehas tendedto destroywhat integritythe networkbusiness had [68, p. 59]. A few TV criticsnoted thistransformation with horror.John Crosby of theHerald-Tribune, who in 1952had bemoaned the "dominantduopoly"

57 of CBSand NBC, wassix years later termingABC a "pernicious"influence on the medium [72, 113]. Differencesin managementexperience at the three networkspartly explain ABC's role in fifties television.At the beginningof network telecasting,CBS was run by figurestested in radio broadcasting.They dreaded,perhaps to excess,the possibilityof governmentintervention [ 13, 54]. Programmersat NBC includedold radio handsand a former adver- tising executive,Sylvester L. Weaver.Chief programmerbetween 1949 and 1956, Weaver was determined to make TV distinctive, not the imitator of radio or film. And in 1953, Weaverdeveloped the 60-to-120 minute "spectacular,"a special live musicalor dramaticproduction aired monthly [31, 69, 136]. At ABC, in contrast,the merger with UPT wassoon followed by a slowstruggle to bring Hollywood'sstandards and productto television. ABC President Robert Kintrier and UPT-ABC Chairman Leonard Gold- enson,despite promises to the FCC that the new ABC team wouldadhere to broadcasttraditions,"were soon in seekingfilm companies to produceseries for their network.Most motionpicture makers had been boycottingTV. But Kintrier,a gruff, chain-smokingformer journalist, was an especiallyforceful presencein the movie colony.Indeed, he was reputedlya matchfor the notoriouslyrough-hewn Harry Cohnof Columbia Pictures.4 Goldenson,a graduateof the Universityof Pennsylvaniaand Harvard law school,also used his pre-merger contacts as the UPT executive to negotiate[97]. 5Late in 1954, ABC broke the Hollywoodquarantine of TV. Wait DisneyStudios agreed to produceprograms for ABC after the networkagreed to help financeDisney's planned amusement park, Disneyland[1, 22, 95]. A year later, Warner Brothers,one of the largest film makers,crossed the lineand signed a dealwith ABC. Others,including MoG-Mand Fox,soon followed [2, p. 15; 75; 101].6 Both the Warnersand Disneyprograms proved extraordinarily suc- cessful.Indeed, the first hour-longDisney show was such an immediate hit with childrenthat evenstations unaffiliated with ABC soughtto pick it up. At ABC's New York headquarters,secretaries wore Mickey Mouse ears. Congressmenreported of constituentsangry over certain stations airingthe programpast youngsters' bedtime. Three differentDisney hours about the life of Davy Crockett touchedoff a coonskincap craze so widespreadthat SenatorEstes Kefauver abandoned that headgearas his politicaltrademark. The coonskincap, his daughter averred, had become too muchidentified with little boys[32, 41, 53, 74, 78, 123]. For ABC, Warners,too, enjoyedsuccess in televisionby producing Westernseries. Efforts to adapt into seriesold feature , King'sRow andCasablanca, failed, while ones involving the frontier,including Cheyenne, ,and Maverick,drew large audiencesto the third network. Soon,

58 all three networkswere offering more westerns.And in , one fifth of all eveningseries were westerns [4, 7, 102, 109, 115 128].7 The westwardmovement -- initiatedby ABC -- wasquickly followed by an emphasisat Americanon the detectiveseries. Mass produced by Warners,each had a regularcast of unknown,younger actors who a decade earlier would have been featuredin a . Serieslike 77 SunsetStrip andSurfside 6 were distinguished only by theirlocale. A privateinvestigation firm of two or more handsome men aided the beautiful and the damned, weekin, weekout. And just as Cheyennehad provedpopular in Bayonne, programslike HawaiianEye won the heartsof viewersfrom Portland to Portland. With such popularity came still more young detectives.As Warnersincreased its output of detectiveseries into the 1959-1960 season, a San Franciscocritic wrote, "The Warner Brothersare turning out so many private eyesthis seasonthey ought to be forced to take out an optometrist'slicense." [64, 94, 137] The detectiveand westernprograms have been commonlyclassified by communicationresearchers as "action/adventure"series. Gunplay, not wordsor humoroussituations, ordinarily resolved an episode's"crisis." Leadswere set,week in, weekout. And criticshad somedifficulty praising any of them. 77 SunsetStrip, wrote one, proved"principally that Warner Brotherscan still make a B movie" [45; 65; 68, pp. 61, 62; 130, 131].8 But then Goldensonof ABC, wrote Martin Mayer in 1961, "believesthat the B-picture is the correct televisionshow as it was the correct show in the neighborhoodmovie house" [68, pp. 59, 61, 62; 105, p. 6]. The action/adventureseries had a specialappeal to an audienceABC coveted.Well behindCBS and NBC at the outset,ABC soldprograms to advertiserson the basisof the qualityrather thanthe sheerquantity of the network'saudiences. Most ABC westernsand detectiveseries regularly featuredyoung adult maleswho in turn were found to attract young families.Kintner's successor, Oliver Treyz, presidentof ABC TV between 1956 and 1962, skillfullyused such demographic data in sellingprograms to advertisers.The 18-to-49-year-oldcluster of viewers,many with families, frequentlypreferred ABC programs.They werealso more likely to spend moneyon a widerange of consumeritems. ABC, Treyz argued,appealed to the "get set" [21; 23; 88; 97, p. 391; 105, p. 6].0 Then, too, most of ABC's action/adventureprograms succeeded becauseof the network's"counter-programming" philosophy. Counter- programmingcalled for the networkscheduler to locatevulnerable pro- gramson his rival'sschedules and then offer in contrasta very different type of show.This practiceowed something to the moviehouse managers of the 1940slooking for a differenttype of film (western)the weeka rival ran anothertype (musical). Mayer observed,"If Clausewitzsaw war asthe continuationof politicsby other means,Goldenson has seen network

59 televisionas the continuationof the movietheatre business by other means"[21; 23; 88; 97, p. 391; 105,p. 6].9 In thecase ofABC TV, Treyz determinedthat if NBC andColumbia aired live variety programs, as they eachdid at 8 p.m. (ET) on Sundaysin the fall 1957 season,then a filmed Western(Maverick) might win audiencesto American.Similarly, the next season,a CBS anthology,Lux Playhouse,might be vulnerableto the detectivesworking at 77 SunsetStrip; in the fall 1959 season,ABC set Adventuresin Paradiseagainst Alcoa/Goodyear Playhouse (NBC). ABC also scheduledpotentially popular sixty-minute series one half-hourahead of the competitions'hour-long programs [23, p. 28; 68, p. 59, 62; 88, p. 561. Counter-programmingproved profitable for American. By the 1958-1959season, ABC couldboast for the firsttime of beingcompetitive in thoselarger urban markets where it had affiliatescompeting directly with CBS and NBC stations. Advertisers like Procter & Gamble, which had heretoforeshunned the third network,now answeredTreyz's calls. "Respectfor ABC hasincreased," one underwritercommented. "ABC has programmedmuch 'junk' and a substantialpart of its scheduleis 'still junk' but neverthelessABC isa seriouscontender and no onecan dispute that" [23, p. 28; 25; 34; 40; 55; 92; 103; 110; 129]. Treyz and Goldensondefended counter-programming by contending it actuallyincreased the diversityof programmingavailable to viewers.If ABC offereda westernto varietyprograms on NBC andCBS, the consumer had a choice. Moreover, ABC executives insisted that the total network TV schedule,not just American's,be consideredin calculatingdiversity. "We do not believethat ABC- or any network- can be all thingsto all people,"Treyz told a Cincinnatiaudience in , "It is not a networkbut all thenetworks collectively which should be in balance"[80; 128]? This contentionwas not then in keepingwith FCC practice.By offeringlittle otherthan standardized entertainment programming, ABC left to Columbiaand NBC the burdenof lesspopular informational and culturalprogramming, even though the FCC neverdefined diversity by typesof entertainmentprogramming alone. The fall 1958 Tuesdayevening schedule,for example,consisted of three westernsand a detectiveshow [97, p. 308]. A criticfor the ChristianScience Monitor poring over the 1961-1962 schedulefound, "Take awaythe action-adventurefilms, ani- matedcartoons and situation comedies, and all the AmericanBroadcasting Company'sother [evening]programs could be telecastbetween 7 and 11 o'clock on a single evening" [37]. ABC concurred.In its 1962 annual report, ABC describedthe addition of two World War II series,Combat! andMcHale's Navy, one an actiondrama, the othera comedy,as examples of the network'sefforts to bring diversityto programming([6]; compare

6O [40, p. 5]). A prominent TV producer told the FCC in 1961, "ABC is beneath discussion. It seems to me to be a combination of Wild West Magazineand True Storyand Real Mysteries.I think it shouldbe taken to task,soon and severely"[59, p. 20].TM FCC commissionersand staff did recognizeABC's programming philosophyand part in the declineof television.When, in , Dwight Macdonaldinterviewed FCC ChairmanNewton Minow and Com- missionerFrederick W. Ford, one a Democrat, the other a Republican, both acknowledgedABC's role in ending the Golden Age? FCC staff members similarly saw ABC acceleratingthe shift to standardization, forcing the competitionto discardsome diverse programming [125]? Yet the Commissiondid nothing.Once, during a hearingon program- ming in early 1962, Minow lost his temper at Treyz. Otherwise, the chairmanand his colleaguespreferred to avoid any hint of berating a particular network or censoringa specificprogram by groupingall the networkstogether and indictingwhat Minowdubbed "the vastwasteland" of television. 14 The Commissionwas also guilt-ridden. Although sanctioning the UPT acquisitionin February 1953, the agencyhad not createdenough Very High Frequency (VHF) stations(channels 2-13) for a true, three-way network rivalry. As a result, becauseof its slow start, ABC found it had fewer stationswith which to affiliate;a disproportionatenumber of ABC's stationslay in the weaker Ultra High Frequencyband (UHF) (Channels 14-83). Even thoughABC programssometimes proved popular in larger markets where it had strong affiliates, many advertisersdiscriminated againstthe network.ABC lacked"comparable coverage" in smallermarkets lackinga third VHF station[47, 81, 119, 124, 135].15 Nevertheless,in no area did ABC continuallydisappoint more critics and regulatorsthan nonentertainmentprogramming. ABC, despitethe FCC's enthusiasmfor informational fare, was decidedly weak in programming.Unlike NBC and Columbia, the network did air live the Army-McCarthySenate hearings of 1954. But this decisionhad more to do with the network'snonexistent daytime schedule than altruisticpro- grammingvalues [20, 138]? That sameyear, Kintner deliberately counter- programmedentertainment against the CBS and NBC nightly newscasts, whichwere then comingon at 7:30 (ET). Kintner'sactions drove both to an earlier hour with smaller potential audiences[52]. Despite greatly increasedrevenues several years later, ABC actuallyreduced its evening newsprogramming between the 1957-1958 and 1958-1959 seasons,even as CBS and especiallyNBC augumentedtheir publicservice fare [97, p. 243; 111]. A TV seasonlater, NBC aired 95 hours of newsand public affairsprogramming; CBS 85 hours.ABC telecast49 hours."The incon- trovertible fact of the past few years," wrote the New YorkTimes TV

61 columnistin 1961, "is that ABC concentratedalmost exclusively on the most popular money-makingformats without bearing a proportionate shareof the burden of maintainingdiversity or publicservice in TV" [80; 105, p. 6; 114]. Two departuresat ABC offer furtherproof of the network'sinattention to radio'straditions or thoseof its rivals.In 1955, Chet Huntley,then a -basedABC newscaster,whom WestCoast critics compared to CBS's Edward R. Murrow, left the network. He had been asked to deliver the morningnews in a milkman'suniform [11, 76, 77]. Five yearslater, John CharlesDaly, the network'schief anchor,quit after Treyz decided to curtail coverageof the 1960 presidentialelection returns in favor of showingThe Rifleman and TheBugs Bunny Show [70, 79, 116]? CBS and NBC had devotedthe whole eveningto democracy'ssweepstakes. Subse- quent efforts to upgradethe ABC newsdivision in the wake of Daly's resignationproved merely cosmetic [26, 132].18 In additionto neglectingnews programming, ABC disappointedthe FCC twiceregarding voluntary programming arrangements. Early in 1960, FCC ChairmanJohn C. Doerfer persuadedthe networksto devote six hoursof programminga weekto nonentertainment,news programming. Under the Doerfer Plan, eachnetwork would schedulein eveningprime time two hoursof publicaffairs fare per week.But whenABC subsequently refused to obey the guidelinesof Doerfer's agreement,NBC and CBS withdrew their commitmentand the plan died. A year and a half later, FCC Chairman Newton Minow negotiateda "children's hour" treaty, whereby each network would, in the interestsof enriching children's television,simultaneously telecast an hour of educationalprogramming for the young. The preadolescentconsumer would be compelledto view programming"good" for him or her. Again, however,ABC reconsidered its participationand abandonedMinow. His agreementcollapsed [14, pp. 116-17, 121, 214-15; 90] Suchattitudes might be dismissedwere it not for ABC's influenceon advertisersand the other networks.ABC's rise strengthenedthe hand of more demandingsponsors. With that network finally presentingpopular programming,some advertisersnow had a place to go if CBS or NBC resistedtheir programmingideas or to schedulingmore popular programs at the expenseof "GoldenAge" offerings[104]. 19 Executives at CBSlater denied that their decisions were so affected, and there were some instances of advertisershaving to carryout their threat and takea programconcept to American? ø NBC President Robert Sarnoff, however, confessed in , "There's no questionthat [ABC's]program schedule has causedboth us and CBS to make a number of changes."By then, NBC had eliminatedWeaver's spectaculars and virtually all of its anthology dramasin favor of westernsand other action series[23, p. 34; 106].21

62 The fate of one program, The Untouchables,is revealing. Sometime in the late 1958 season, offered CBS a violent action drama concerningUS prohibitionagents. For somereason, CBS Chairman William S. Paleyrejected it on the adviceof networkvice president Hubbell Robinson[24]. 22 ABC then agreed to Desilu'sterms. The Untouchables subsequentlyproved to be not only an immenselypopular entry in the 1959-1960 seasonbut, as two TV historiansobserved, "perhaps the most mindlesslyviolent program ever seenon TV to that time." For his poor intuition, Robinson,though an architectof TV's GoldenAge, waspassed over for the CBS TV presidencyin December1959. Instead,Paley named a former ABC vicepresident and Treyz protege,James Aubrey. Of ABC's rise, Aubrey confessed,"Ollie Treyz and I did it all" [28; 60, p. 68; 67; 111, p. 7; 117; 138, p. 264]. Aubrey'spromotion over Robinsonmarked a peculiartriumph for American. With his elevation,the chief programmersat Columbiaand NBC both had worked at ABC. In 1957, Robert Kintner had become an NBC vice presidentshortly after being dismissedat ABC. Soonpresident of the network, Kintner had imposedhis philosophyof film and action onto the NBC scheduleand canceledthe network's anthologiesand spectaculars.By all accounts,he oversawall schedulingdecisions at NBC between 1957 and 1966 [106]? s At Columbia,former ABC Vice PresidentAubrey becamepresident of CBS TV in . Aubrey shared his past employer's enthusiasmfor standardization.Although having to share somedecision- makingwith CBS ownerWilliam Paley,Aubrey nevertheless exercised the greatestauthority in decidingwhat went on Columbiatelevision. Aubrey had alreadydeveloped the western,Have Gun, Will Travel,and aspresident workedon the actionseries, Route 66. He went on to promotea number of new situationcomedies in rural settings,beginning with The Beverly Hillbillies.These seriescame to replace the action dramasas the most watchedgenre on TV after 1961. Beforehis ouster, Aubrey had removed the lastanthologies still aired by Columbia[46, 54, 82, 84]. The ruthlessnessof Aubreyand Kintnershould not be underestimated. Internalnetwork memoranda (subpoenaed by a Senatecommittee in 1961) conclusivelyshowed both men and their underlingsordering producers to infuseviolence and sexinto their networks'programs [97, p. 329; 126]?4 Their designswere all too apparent:ABC programs,especially the pol•ular Untouchables,were breaking viewers' resistanceto the third network. Somethinghad to be done to checkABC's growth.Life editorializedin . A sort of Gresham'slaw alsooperates to drive good programsout by bad.The worstoffender in network'wasteland' programming, American

63 BroadcastingCo., which devotesabout half its prime eveninghours to adventureshows or gangsterbloodbaths like TheUntouchables, has been taking both sponsors,viewers and outlets [sic] away from its rivals. If the publictaste is so shoddyand sponsorsso servile to it, how canbetter qualityemerge out of suchruthless and irresponsiblecompetition [62, 134]?5 Althoughboth CBS and NBC continuedto spendtwo to three times as much moneyon their newsdivisions, each wasprepared to sacrifice eveningprime time hoursto keep aheadof ABC. Counter-programming lessenedthe resolve,left from radio, to "balance"the eveningschedule. Before counter-programming,anthologies might commandgood ratings [10], becauseviewers had only two choicesand might risk art over Milton Berle. With twolight entertainmentsto choosefrom, the networkstanding by an anthologyor informationalseries was risking far smalleraudience sharesand more disappointedsponsors. And by the 1959-1960 season,this wasa risk that ABC's rivalswere no longerprepared to take.The three-network1959-1960 seasonincluded twenty-eightwesterns and thirteen crime shows.Almost all of the anthol- ogieswere gone.The B-film TV seriespredominated on all three chains. And later studiesby communicationresearchers confirmed what a few discerningcritics had noticedin the late 1950s:ABC destroyedAmerican television. "Ferociouscompetition," observed one reporter, "drove the older networksonce able to indulgethemselves in an occasionalstretch of quality into programmingthat made the showson all three networkslook interchangeable"[44; 45; 51; 56; 57; 58; 59, p. 18; 98]?6 One writer for the departinganthologies bitterly remarked in 1961that the threenetworks were now "satisfiedto becomemainly a purveyorof the worstkind of HollywoodC-picture junk" [8]. Of coursethe "interchangeable"series had precededABC's produc- tions,just as someprograms had been on film from the very beginning of network telecasting.But the differencesin the extent of filmed, action seriesbefore and after ABC'srise are telling.In June 1953, 81.5 percent of all networkprogramming came over live. Six yearslater, 49.1 percent waslive. Eachyear, ABC led in the shiftaway from live transmission:52.2 percentlive in June 1953, 38.0 percentin (for CBS, 86.7 percentto 54.0 percent;NBC, 81.9 percentto 52.0 percent)[27, 112]. Each year in the late 1950s, ABC led in the move to action/adventure programs.Wrote two communicationresearchers, The ABC networkled the wayin the early growthof thisprogramming, showingan increaseof 800 percent from 1955 to 1960. As ABC escalated,it wasfollowed in turn by NBC, whichincreased its action/

64 adventuretime by approximately1,200 percent from 1956 to 1960. CBS also followed suit, although not as drastically,by increasingits action/adventuretime by 100 percent from 1956 to 1959 [38; 42; 50, p. 75]. In the process,various elements identified with the GoldenAge were lost.Evening programming hours are finite. If a westernwas added to the schedule,something had to go. What went were costlyprograms drawing smalleraudience shares. Some of thisprogramming remained on TV, but on Sundayafternoons, not eveningprime time. More often,these programs left the air altogether. No programform wasa greatercasualty of Hollywood'sascendancy thanthe weeklyoriginal and live teleplays,usually made in New York and relyingheavily on the talentsof writers,producers, and directors connected with legitimate theatre. Called "dramatic anthologies,"most of these programswere sacrificedas a consequenceof the late fiftiesconcentration on California-made action serials. In 1961, commented one who had written someof the anthologyscripts, "When most of televisionmoved to Hollywood,one of the mostsignal changes, it seemsto me, that took place was that immediatelyeverybody started trying to make television look like movies? 7 "Drama [on TV] hasbeen narrowed down and down," saidanother writer four yearslater, "until drama is really no longer on television. Melodrama is."•8 Sucha developmentneed hardly be regardedas the blow to art that, say,the recentdecline of the novelhas been. Many of the mostpraised GoldenAge productionswere decidedlymiddle brow. Individual efforts like Marty and Bangthe Drum Slowlystand out. Others are best forgotten. Someof Weaver'sspectaculars were spectacularlyunrewarding. And not surprisingly,industry leaders and figurestied to the new, standardized television,like Ronald Regan,host of GE Theatre,later dismissedthe idea that TV "declined"in the late fiftiesand early sixties[66]. Nevertheless,the GoldenAge wasmore in keepingwith the FCC's encouragementof diversity.Programming in 1953 wasmore likely to be producedin citiesother than LosAngeles than in 1959. Productionvalues (notably,live telecasting) were less uniform in 1953.More types of programs were availableto consumersprior to the emergenceof ABC. Yetmost of thesechanges undoubtedly would have occurred regardless of ABC's situationin the late 1950s. The declinein live productioncan be attributedin part to the developmentof tape, the major film studios' lifting of their boycottof TV, and the financialadvantages of syndicating or rentingfor retelecastingfilmed series[118]. Then, too, the sizeof the nationalTV audiencegrew, though mainly by regionas opposedto class or education.Many more viewersin southernand westernareas finally

65 had TV in 1959-1960 and were perhaps more enthusiasticabout a Hollywood-madethan a New York product[16; 49; 86; 96]. Finally,more product advertisersentered TV and demandedmore time and larger, massaudiences compared to the early,institutional sponsors like US Steel and Alcoa [43]. ABC alonecannot be accusedof "destroying"TV. Furthermore,many students of broadcasthistory see the fate of the medium as "inevitable," the result of market forces that rewarded the managerable to find the largestshare of the massaudience. This successful operatornormally promoted programming that, thoughpopular, appalled better-educatedAmericans. The real problemhere, many maintain,was consumerpreference: popular taste was not often good taste.Put differ- ently,it is a grave error in reasoning,as GeorgeStigler wrote, to blame a waiterfor obesity[12, 108]. As Alfred Chandler and others have shown, however, the twentieth century managerhad choices.To regard the entertainmentindustry as nothingmore than the captiveof consumerdecisions would contradict the work of thoseseeing business executives exercising real power in other areasof enterprise.Studies of the BritishBroadcasting Corporation suggest that the evolutionof that systemowed much to the characterand determinationof one figure, Lord Reith, the first BBC chairman [36, 39].29 Similarly, historians of massunionism often forget to notehow much labor strife in Americawas avoided in the late 1930swhen certainlarge corporations,notably US Steel,accepeted outside labor organization while othersliterally took to the trenches.The "inevitability"of a changenever explainswhy a transformationoccurred when it did, or whoslowed or accelerated the shift. Different managers,different regulators, might have made for a differenttelevision in the late 1950s.A morediscerning FCC, for example, mighthave insisted in 1953 that ABC be acquiredby a companywith an establishedrecord in broadcasting.Mindful of federal overseers,network radio had developeda standardof servicethrough the 1930s and 1940s; schedulesincluded not only massentertainment but programsfor opera enthusiastsand thoseseeking headlines and opinions.In contrast,the motionpicture industry, not subjectto nationalregulation, had only to contend with private groups or local governmentsthat might censor featuresfor their inclusionof excessivesex and crime.Otherwise, Holly- wood was under no pressureto produce anything but entertainment. "Balance"or diversityof output wasdefined differently at eachstudio, with somemaking more of an effort than othersto createdifferent types of films. TV's future was all but sealed when Goldenson of UPT-ABC, he told a friend,chose , which specialized in B films,as the modelfor his TV network[68, p. 61]. UPT's record and Goldenson's intentions did concern the FCC's staff

66 and dissentingcommissioners in 1952-1953, though apparentlyfor the wrongreasons. During the hearingspreceeding the Commission'sdecision, FCC lawyerspursued UPT's role in the antitrustviolations of the large film companies.There were alsoquestions about UPT's interestin a pay TV systemusing theaters. But relativelylittle attentionwent to the very substantialgulf separatingSunset Boulevard from Radio Row [17]? At the time of the merger,the Commissionmight havemore closely examinedUPT's financialresources. Although capable of absorbingABC, United Paramountwithin three years after the mergerfound itself seeking financialassistance. Both UPT and the FCC had underestimatedthe heavy costsof TV networking.Only an eleventh-hourloan from Metropolitan Insurancein 1956 savedABC-UPT from embarrassingencounters with bill collectors[3; 60, p.64]. Yet evenafter the Metropolitanadvance, ABC- UPT only had enoughmoney, apparently, to investin entertainment programming.The then unprofitablenews division was chronicallyun- derfinanced.Into the sixties,ABC found itself groping for cash[21, p. 60; 89]. Weighingnone of thesefactors, the Commissionin 1953 held up a shopworntheory of competitionas a socialand politicaladvantage to consumers,and contraryresults followed. "• The Commission'sexpectation that ABC's strengtheningwould foster more diversetypes of programs wasfrustrated. If anything,the numberof differenttypes of programson the air declinedbetween 1953 and 1959; oneform, the dramaticanthology, virtuallydisappeared. The greater "choice"at decade'send waslimited to the specificcity in whichthe detectivewas based. The seriesitself was manufacturedin LosAngeles. Finally ABC ignoreda long-heldCommission preferencefor newsand informationalprogramming. Whether measured by ABC'sown performanceor its effectson CBSand NBC, the Commis- sion's wish for three networks had calamitous results for American tele- vision.

NOTES

*The author thanksthe LincolnEducational Foundation and the Universityof Wis- consin-MadisonGraduate School for supporting the research for this paper. He also appreciatesthe effortsof thoseat the meetingand William B. Blankenburgwho endeavored to dissuadehim from makingthe argumentherein. 1. NBC vs. US, 319 (1942), p. 190, 218-19. 2. Docket 10031, Vol. 10, Proc., Vol. 35, p. 5405, FCC MSS, Record Group 173, National Archives. 3. CompareGoldenson's comments in Docket 10031, Vol. 12, Proc.,Vol. 44, p. 6866, with thosein [71]. 4. Notes of interviewwith Kintner, n.d. [late 1950s],Martin Mayer MSS, Columbia University,Box 68. 5. Docket 10031, Vol. 9, Proc.,Vol. 33, pp. 4981-85.

67 6. Docket 12782, Vol. 11, Proc.,Vol. 21, p. 3917, FCC MSS, CommissionDockets Room. 7. Beforethe FCC in 1962,ABC presidentOliver Treyz delightedin creditinghis network for the late fifties trend to westernsand, later, detective series.Docket 12782, Vol. 21, Proc.,Vol. 61, p. 9365. 8. Docket12782, Vol. 14, Proc.,Vol. 37, p. 5671, Vol. 15, Proc.,Vol. 42, pp. 6418, 6558. See also [48 and 50]. 9. Pressrelease ABC News,8 May 1961, copyin Mayer MSS,Box 68; Docket12782, Vol. 9, Proc.,Vol. 19, p. 3696. 10. Docket 12782, Vol. 9, Proc.,Vol. 19, pp. 3690, 3697, 3700, 3718, Vol. 21, Proc., Vol. 61, p. 9428. 11. David Susskindin Docket 12782, Vol. 14, Proc.,Vol. 37, p. 5627. 12. Notes of interviewswith Ford and Minow,ca. February1962, MacDonaldMSS, ,Box 124. 13. Memorandum,L. P. B. Emersonto John S. Cross,18 January1962, copyin E. William Henry MSS, StateHistorical Society of Wisconsin(hereafter, SHSW), Box 53. 14. Docket 12782, Vol. 21, Proc.,Vol. 61, pp. 9426-9428. 15. Memorandum,James Sheridan to Commission,29 ; handwrittenmem- orandum,E. William Henry, n.d. [ca. August-September1964], Henry MSS, Box 53. Docket12782, Vol. 21, Proc.,pp. 9356ff., 9664ff. 16. AT&T chargedthe networksa flat rate regardlessof whetherthe afternoonhours were used.Docket 16828, Vol. 34, Proc,Vol. 14, p. 3315, FCC Records,General Services Administration. 17. F. N. Littlejohn to John Daly, 25 November1958, Daly MSS, SHSW,Box 23. 18. ABC waitedthree years after CBS and NBC to expandits nightly newscast to thirty minutes. 19. Docket 12782, Vol. 2 Proc.,Vol. 5, pp. 619, 620, Vol. 6, pp. 767, 768, 858-59. 20. Docket 12782, Vol. 19, Proc.,Vol. 54, p. 8363; Interview with MichaelDann, 14 June 1979, ColumbiaUniversity Oral History Collection(hereafter COHC) pp. 8-9. 21. Docket 12782, Vol. 2, Proc.,Vol. 6, pp. 855-56. 22. Dann interview. 23. Unabridgednotes of interviewwith NBC executives,28-29 October1959, p. 51, Office of Network Study,FCC, FCC Records,General Services Administration, Inv. No. 72A1986, Box 12; Docket 12782, Vol. 14, Proc.,Vol. 38, p. 5878; William S. Shirer to MorrisL. Ernst,9 , ErnstMSS, Universityof Texas,Box 542. 24. Seealso the novel written by former NBC Vice PresidentDavid Levy [61]. 25. Clipping in Newton Minow MSS, SHSW, Box 52. 26. Docket 12782, Vol. 14, Proc.,Vol. 37, pp. 5526-27. 27. Docket 12782, Vol. 14, Proc.,Vol. 37, p. 5466. 28. "WCBS RadioLooks at Television,"transcript of an interviewwith ErnestKinoy, 16 August 1965, WCBS Radio MSS, SHSW. 29. Becausenewspapers like TV networkscombined to enjoya naturalmonopoly (or haveuntil the adventof cableTV), it couldbe arguedthat networkexecutives could have agreedamong themselves to air anything(that is, qualityprogramming) without fear of lost audiencesand revenues.See [15]. 30. Interviewwith FrederickW. Ford, 19June 1978;Exception of CurtisB. Plummer, Chief of BroadcastBureau, to Initial Decisionof 13 November 1952, separatebrief accompanying...ofFrederick W. Ford, et al., in Docket 10031, Vol. 41. 31. The Commissionapparently had no trainedeconomists at the time of the UPT- ABC decision.An economistat the agencymight haveread PeterO. Steiner'swarning againstmoving from a two-wayto three-waycompetitive model. Steinerpostulated that

68 diversitywould decline as a result[107]. Commissionersand staffmembers apparently read administrativelaw journals, if anything.Subsequently, Steiner's thesis has been supported and attackedin numerousstudies, including Stewart L. Long [63], Bruce M. Owen [85], and DavidPerry [87].

REFERENCES

1. ABC-UPT, AnnualReport, 1954, pp. 17, 21. 2. , Annual Report,1955. 3. ., Annual Report,1956, p. 8. 4. ., AnnualReport, 1957, p. 3. 5. , AnnualReport, 1961, p. 5. 6. ., Annual Report,1962, p. 8. 7. AdvertisingAge, 9 February1959, p. 67. 8. Robert Alan Arthur, "CreativeRating -- ZeroI" TV Guide,17 , p. 27. 9. Oren G. Barber, "Competition, Free Speech,and FCC Radio Regulation,"George WashingtonLaw Review,Vol. 12 (May 1943), pp. 34-53. 10. Erik Barnouw,The Sponsor: Notes on a ModernPotentate (New York: Oxford University Press,1978), pp. 105-06. 11. Joan Barthel, "When Will They Say their Final Good Nights?"TV Guide,1 July 1967, pp. 17-18. 12. JamesBaughman, "The National Purposeand the NewestMedium: Liberal Critics of Television,1958-60;' Mid-America,Vol. 64 (April-July 1983), pp. 41-55. 13. , "The StrangeBirth of CBSReports Revisited," Historical Journal of Film, Radioand Television,Vol. 2 (March 1982),pp. 29-34. 14. , "Warriors in the Wasteland: The Federal Communications Commission and AmericanTelevision, 1958-1967," Ph.D. dissertation,Columbia University, 1981. 15. William B. Blankenburg,"Structural Determination of Circulation,"Journalism Quarterly,Vol. 58 (Winter 1981). 16. Leo Bogart,The Age of Televisionjrev. ed. (New York: Unger, 1958), Chapter1. 17. Broadcasting,12 January1953, pp. 68-69. 18. ., 16 February1953, p. 122. 19. ., 16 March 1953, p. 54. 20. • 4 February1957, p. 50. 21. ., 10 January1977, pp. 60-61. 22. ., 14 July 1958, p. 83. 23. ., 17 August1959, pp. 28, 30, 34. 24. ., 28 September1959, p. 50. 25. ., 25 , p. 28. 26. , 31 , p. 5. 27. BroadcastingYearbook 1963, p. 20. 28. Tim Brooksand Erie Marsh, TheComplete Directory to Prime Time Network TV Shows, 1946-thePresent (New York:Ballantine, 1979), p. 653. 29. BusinessWeek, 17 February1953, p. 31. 30. , 14 March 1953, pp. 82, 84. 31. , 21 , pp. 43-44. 32. ß27 November1954, p. 114. 33. , 10 , p. 80. 34. , 9 , p. 44. 35. EmmanuelCeller, "Antitrust Problems in the TelevisionBroadcasting Industry," Law and ContemporaryProblems, Vol. 22 (Autumn1957), pp. 556-57.

69 36. Alfred D. Chandler,Jr., The VisibleHand: TheManagerial Revolution in American Business(Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1977). 37. ChristianScience Monitor, 29 . 38. DavidG. Clarkand WilliamB. Blankenburg,"Trends in ViolentContent in Selected MassMedia," in George A. Comstockand Eli A. Rubenstein,eds., Televisionand Social Behavior:Reports and Papers,6 Vols.(Rockville, MD: NIMH, 1972), Vol. I, p. 198. 39. R. H. Coase,British Broadcasting.' A Study in Monopoly(Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1950). 40. ColumbiaBroadcasting System, Annual Report, 1961. 41. ., NetworkPractices (New York: CBS, 1956), p. 98. 42. GeorgeComstock, et al., Televisionand HumanBehavior (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1978), p. 80. 43. Robert W. Crandall, "The EconomicEffect of TelevisionNetwork Program 'Ownership;"Journal of Law and Economics,Vol. 14 (October197 l), pp. 394-96. 44. John Crosby,"What You Can Do to Make Poor TV Better,"Ladies Home Journal, Vol. 77 (), p. 74. 45. Robert Cunniff, "Mediocrity'sMahatma," Show Business Illustrated, Vol. 1 (19 September1961), p. 48. 46. JamesJ. Daily,"The SponsorWas the Lastto Know,"TV Guide,1 , pp. 18-21. 47. "The Darkened Channels: UHF Television and the FCC," Harvard Law Review, Vol. 75/),pp. 1578-1607. 48. CharlesW. Day, "The TelevisionAdult Western:A Pilot Study,"M.A. thesis, Universityof ,1958. 49. ThomasE Dernburg,"Consumer Responses to Innovation,"in Dernburget al., Studiesin HouseholdEconomic Behavior (New Haven, CN: Yale UniversityPress, 1958), pp. 1-50. 50. JosephR. Dominickand Millard C. Pearce,"Trends in Network Prime-Time Programming,"Journal of Communications,Vol. 26 (Winter 1976). 51. Robert Eck, "The Real Mastersof Television,"Harpers, Vol. 234 (March 1967), p. 49. 52. EdwardJ. Epstein,News from Nowhere:Television and theNews (New York: ,1973), pp. 84-86. 53. CharlesL. Fontenay,Estes Kefauver, A Biography(Nashville: University of Tennessee Press). 54. Forbes,15 , pp. 20-25. 55.Armon Glenn, "Distorted Picture," Barron's, Vol. 39 (26 October 1959), p. 11. 56. JackGould, "Reappraisal of the TV Picture,"New York Times Magazine (14 ), p. 82. 57. BradleyS. Greenberg,"The Contentand Context of Violencein the MassMedia," in RobertK. Bakerand SandraJ. Ball, eds.,Mass Media and Violence:A Report to the National Commissionon the Causesand Preventionof Violence(Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 448. 58. LawrenceK. Grossman,"Arguing Against History," Channels of Communication,Vol. 1 (October/November1981), pp. 16, 56. 59. Robert W. Horton, "The EconomicSqueeze on MassTV," Reporter,Vol. 22 (28 ). 60. Albert R. Kroeger,"Miracle Worker of West66th Street,"Television Magazine, Vol. 18 (February1961). 61. DavidLevy, The Chameleons (New York:Dodd, Mead, 1964). 62. Life, 19 May 1961.

70 63. Stewart L. Long, "A Fourth TelevisionNetwork and Diversity:Some Historical Evidence,"Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 56 (Summer1979), pp. 341-45. 64. LosAngeles Times, 3 . 65. ., 4 October 1960. 66. Willard G. Manningand BruceM. Owen, "TelevisionRivalry and Network Power," PublicPolicy, Vol. 24 (Winter 1976), pp. 33-57. 67. John Bartlow Martin, "Battle of the Big Three," SaturdayEvening Post, Vol. 234 (28 ), p. 60. 68. Martin Mayer,"ABC: Portrait of a Network,"Show, Vol. 1 (October1961). 69. ., "Television'sLords of Creation,"Harper's, Vol. 213 (November 1956), pp. 25ff. 70. HaroldMehling, The Great Time Killer (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1962), p. 120. 71. Thomas B. Morgan, "Leonard H. Goldensonof ABC," TV Guide(8 ), pp. 6-9. 72. New YorkHerald Tribune, 26 March 1952. 73. ., 10 February1953. 74. ., 18 . 75. NewYork Times, 12 . 76. 18 . 77. ., 6 January1956. 78. ., 8 . 79. , 18 November 1960. 80. ., 23 April 1961. 81. , 29 September1963. 82. ., 1 . 83. ., 30 . 84. ., 2 March 1965.

85. Bruce M. Owen, "RegulatingDiversity: The Caseof Radio Formats,"Journal of Broadcasting,Vol. 21 (Summer1977), pp. 305-19. 86. Alfred Oxenfeldt,"A DynamicElement in Consumption:The TV Industry,"in Lincoln H. Clark, ed., ConsumerBehavior: Research on ConsumerReactions (New York: Harper, 1958), pp. 420-41. 87. David Perry, "Diversityand the Demand for TelevisionBroadcasting," Ph.D. dissertation,University of Pennsylvania,1974, pp. 148, 152, and passim. 88. PrintersInk, 20 June 1958, pp. 51, 54, 56. 89. Stirling Quinlan, InsideABC: AmericanBroadcasting Company's Rise to Power(New York: HastingsHouse, 1979), pp. 89-90. 90. Byron Reevesand JamesL. Baughman,"'Fraught with SuchGreat Possibilities': The HistoricalRelationship of CommunicationResearch to MassMedia Regulation,"in OscarGandy, Jr., et al., Proceedingsof the Tenth Annual Telecommunications Research Conference (forthcoming). 91. "Regulationof ProgramContent by the FCC," HarvardLaw Review,Vol. 77 (February1964), pp. 701-16. 92. Yale Roe, The TelevisionDilemma: Search for a Solution(New York: HastingsHouse, 1962), pp. 95-96. 93. Joel Rosenbloom,"Authority of the FederalCommunication Commission," in John E. Coons, ed., Freedomand Responsibilityin Broadcasting(Evanston, IL: Northwestern UniversityPress, 1961), pp. 96-170. 94. San FranciscoChronicle, 9 October 1959.

71 95. Richard Schickel,The DisneyVersion (New York: Simon & Schuster,1968), pp. 266-67. 96. Wilbur Schramm,et al., Televisionin theLives of Our Children(Stanford, CA: Stanford UniversityPress, 1960), Ch. 1. 97. Fred Silverman,"An Analysisof ABC TelevisionNetwork Programmingfrom February1953 to October 1959, MA thesis,The Ohio StateUniversity, 1959. 98. BernardB. Smith, "A New Weaponto Get Better TV," Harper's,Vol. 225 (), p. 30. 99. RichardAustin Smith, "TV: The ComingShowdown," Fortune, Vol. 52 (), pp. 138-39, 164. 100 , "TV: The Light that Failed,"Fortune, Vol. 58 (December1958), pp. 78-81. 101. Sponsor,17 , pp. 31-32. 102 ., 11 November1956, p. 11. 103 , 21 , pp. 50-51. 104. , 11 April 1959, p. 19. 105. Bob Stahl, "ABC -- Young,Ambitious, Brash," TV Guide,1 August 1959. 106. ., Five Men Who Are Taking a Giant Step at NBC," TV Guide,10 October 1959, p. 10. 107. Peter O. Steiner,Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol. 66 (May 1952), pp. 114-223. 108. GeorgeJ. Stigler,The Intellectual and theMarket Place and OtherEssays (New York: Free Pressof Glencoe,1963), pp. 87-91. 109. TelevisionAge, 8 February1960, pp. 26-29, 72. 110. , 4 April 1960, pp. 4, 110. 111. TelevisionDigest, 9 , p. 14. 112. , 13 July 1959, p. 6. 113 , 9 November1959, p. 6. 114. TelevisionMagazine, Vol. 18 (), p. 60. 115. Time,10 March 1959, pp. 52-53, 60. 116. , 28 November1960, pp. 62, 64. 117. TV Guide,21 , pp. 21-23. 118. , 27 May 1961, p. 9. 119. DonaldFred Ungarait,"An HistoricalAnalysis of RegularlyScheduled, Prime- Time, NetworkTelevision Programming Costs (1948-1949 to 1967-1968);' Ph.D. disser- tation, Universityof Wisconsin,1968, pp. 105, 215-19. 120. US FederalCommunication Commission, Report on Chain Broadcasting, Commission Order No. 37. 121. , Reports,Vol. 17 (1953). 122. , Reports,Vol. 37 (1964). 123. US Houseof Representatives,Judiciary Committee, Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries,pt. 2. 124. , NetworkBroadcasting, Report 1297, 85th Congress,2nd session, 1958, p. 224. 125. ., TelevisionNetwork Program Procurement, Report 281, 88th Congress, 1stsession, 1963, pp. 86-87. 126. US Senate,Judiciary Committee, Juvenile Delinquency, hearings, 87th Congress, 2nd session,1958, p. 224. 127. Variety,1 January 1959, p. 99. 128. , 7 January1959, p. 99. 129. , 25 March 1959, p. 29. 130. , 30 September1959, p. 29.

72 131. , 7 October 1959, p. 31. 132. , 3 March 1965, p. 30. 133. Wall StreetJournal, 30 July 1964. 134. , 12 May 1961. 135. DouglasWilliam Webbink,"The All-ChannelReceiver Law and the Future of Ultra-High FrequencyTelevision," Ph.D. dissertation,Duke University,1968, p. 23 etpassim. 136. Thomas Whiteside, "The Communicator,"The New Yorker,Vol. 30 (16 ), pp. 37-38; (23 October 1954), pp. 43-44. 137. Dwight Whitney,"The ProducerAssembles His Products,"TV Guide,31 October 1959, pp. 21-23. 138. Max Wilk, The GoldenAge of Television:Notes from theSurvivors (New York: Dell, 1976), pp. 257-58.

73