Operation Enduring Freedom An Assessment RAND RESEARCH AREAS he attacks of September 11, 2001, thrust THE ARTS CHILD POLICY the United States into a no-notice war Abstract CIVIL JUSTICE against Osama bin Laden, his al Qaeda ter- The United States conducted Operation EDUCATION rorist network, and transnational terrorism ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Enduring Freedom from land bases and air- Tacross the board. Th e fi rst round of this war was HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE craft carriers positioned far away from the INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Operation Enduring Freedom, an air-dominated landlocked combat zone. Yet, al Qaeda’s NATIONAL SECURITY off ensive conducted by U.S. Central Command infrastructure and the supporting Taliban POPULATION AND AGING (CENTCOM) against al Qaeda forces in Afghani- PUBLIC SAFETY regime in Afghanistan were destroyed. stan and against the Taliban theocracy that SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Global communications connectivity and the SUBSTANCE ABUSE provided them safe haven. In less than a month common operating picture that was made TERRORISM AND and from a standing start, the United States com- HOMELAND SECURITY possible by linking the inputs of unmanned TRANSPORTATION AND menced combat operations in a landlocked country INFRASTRUCTURE aerial vehicles and other sensors enabled a half the world away. How did we do? A RAND WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE close partnership between airmen and U.S. Corporation study for U.S. Central Command Special Operations Forces on the ground. Air Forces (CENTAF) assessed the planning and Such networked operations are now the cut- initial execution of the war, from October 2001 ting edge of an ongoing shift in American through March 2002. Th e study was conducted combat style. within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute. Highlights of Enduring Freedom arrived. Fixed-wing air power had been largely Th e plan was to rely on air power and precision excluded from Anaconda planning, but it was weapons, aided on the ground by U.S. Special summoned at the eleventh hour when the plan was Operations Forces (SOF), who would work along- in danger of failing. Ultimately, after several days This product is part of the side indigenous Afghan groups opposed to the of nonstop bombing, the remaining al Qaeda and RAND Corporation research brief series. RAND research Taliban and identify and validate targets for allied Taliban fi ghters were dispersed and the operation briefs present policy-oriented summaries of individual aircrews. Th e war began on October 7, 2001, with ended successfully, even though eight U.S. mili- published, peer-reviewed nighttime air strikes against preplanned targets tary personnel lost their lives to enemy fi re. Hun- documents or of a body of published work. such as Taliban airfi elds and headquarters facili- dreds of al Qaeda and Taliban fugitives escaped ties. By December, many campaign goals had been into Pakistan, and bin Laden was never captured Corporate Headquarters 1776 Main Street achieved and combat moved to the high-mountain or killed. However, al Qaeda’s infrastructure in P.O. B ox 2138 caves at Tora Bora, where dispersed al Qaeda and Afghanistan was destroyed, and the Taliban regime Santa Monica, California 90407-2138 Taliban fi ghters had fl ed. In pursuit of Osama bin was brought down only 102 days after the terrorist TEL 310.393.0411 Laden and fearing that the fi ghters might threaten attacks of September 11. FAX 310.393.4818 the still-fragile interim government of Hamid Kar- © RAND 2005 zai, CENTCOM planned an initiative to capture Distinctive Achievements or kill any enemy fi ghters who might be in the In all, Operation Enduring Freedom earned far area. Th at initiative—Operation Anaconda—was more deserved accolades than demerits. First, never led by conventional U.S. ground forces supported before in modern times had the United States by SOF teams and friendly Afghans, who encoun- fought a war from land bases and aircraft carriers www.rand.org tered unexpected enemy resistance as soon as they positioned so far away from a combat zone. Distance required endurance: One B-2 mission lasted 44 hours Operation Southern Watch (OSW) that enforced the no-fl y zone from takeoff to landing, becoming the longest air combat mission over southern Iraq. It was predictable that the OSW model’s strict fl own in history. Th e logistics achievement of the campaign should rules of engagement would clash with the needs of the Afghan war also not be underestimated. Until the United States gained land for innovation and adaptability in attacking time-sensitive targets. access to Afghanistan through Uzbekistan, everything the military Also signifi cant was the fact that target selection and approval was used had to be airlifted. done at CENTCOM headquarters rather than in the CAOC. A Th e war saw a further improvement of some important trends target-approval bottleneck resulted partly from stringent procedures that began during the Gulf War a decade earlier. Precision weapons designed to avoid targeting mishaps. Th e CAOC accepted this con- accounted for only 9 percent of the munitions expended during straint, but many airmen felt that it hampered their fl exibility and Desert Storm but nearly 70 percent in Operation Enduring Free- allowed enemy leaders to escape as a result. dom. Th e war saw the fi rst combat use of the new Global Hawk high-altitude, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the fi rst operational The Big Picture use of Predator UAVs armed with Hellfi re missiles, and the fi rst Global communications connectivity and the common operating combat use of the highly accurate, all-weather Joint Direct Attack picture that was made possible by linking the inputs of UAVs and Munition (JDAM) by the B-1 and B-52. For the fi rst time in mod- other sensors enabled a close partnership between airmen and SOF ern warfare, airborne and space-based sensors provided a constant units and shortened the time from identifi cation to successful tar- fl ow of information about enemy force dispositions and activity. get attacks. Such networked operations are now the cutting edge of Th e greatest tactical innovation of the war was a unique air-land an ongoing shift in American combat style that may be of greater partnership that featured unprecedented mutual support between revolutionary potential than was the introduction of the tank at the allied air power and ground-based SOF teams. Unlike traditional beginning of the 20th century. close air support that entails concurrent air and ground schemes of On the other hand, the nation’s expanded global communica- maneuver, SOF units in Afghanistan enabled precision air strikes tions connectivity has also allowed senior leadership to involve against enemy ground forces even when there were no friendly itself directly in the fi nest details of force employment. Politically ground forces in direct contact. Th is highly improvised partnership sensitive wars like Operation Enduring Freedom may continue to added up to a new way of war for the United States. require both stringent rules of engagement and centralized execu- tion. However, there is an inherent tension between the impera- Problems in Execution tives of political control and effi ciency in execution. Decentralized Operation Enduring Freedom also had ineffi ciencies. A distance execution remains the preeminent virtue of American military covering eight time zones separated the two main facilities respon- culture because it constitutes the bedrock of fl exibility. Doctrine sible for conducting the war: CENTCOM’s headquarters in Florida and practice must fi nd ways to manage the downside eff ects of and the forward-based Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) improved information fusion lest the recent tendency toward cen- in Saudi Arabia maintained by CENTCOM’s air component. More tralized execution as the rule rather than the exception be allowed important, CENTCOM chose a familiar but arguably inappropri- to undermine operational and tactical fl exibility, one of the nation’s ate template for conducting the war—that of the very diff erent most precious military advantages. This research brief describes work done for the RAND National Defense Research Institute documented in Air Power Against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom, by Benjamin S. Lambeth, MG-166-CENTAF, 2005, 456 pp., $35, ISBN: 0-8330-3724-2, available at http://www.rand.org/publications/MG/MG166/. Also available from RAND Distribution Services (phone: 310.451.7002; toll free 877.584.8642; or email: [email protected]). The RAND Corporation is a nonprofi t research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily refl ect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. RAND Offi ces Santa Monica • Washington • Pittsburgh • Doha • Berlin • Cambridge • Leiden RB-9148-CENTAF (2005) THE ARTS This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as a public CHILD POLICY service of the RAND Corporation. CIVIL JUSTICE EDUCATION This product is part of the RAND Corporation ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE research brief series. RAND research briefs present INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS policy-oriented summaries of individual published, peer- NATIONAL SECURITY reviewed documents or of a body of published work. POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research SUBSTANCE ABUSE organization providing objective analysis and effective TERRORISM AND solutions that address the challenges facing the public HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND and private sectors around the world. 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