Supporting Material for Chapter 5, Meta Ethics

Supporting Material for Chapter 5: Meta-ethics

Section 1: Non-cognitivism, prescriptivism and projectivism: summary

z Moral non-cognitivism is the claim that moral judgements are neither true nor false (in any significant sense), and therefore cannot be known; instead they are taken to express emotions or prescriptions. z G. E. Moore’s argument for the naturalistic fallacy unintentionally prepared the way for non-cognitivist theories of ethics, although Moore himself was a cognitivist. z This argument assumed its own conclusion, and thus failed to establish that ‘good’ cannot be defined, or that naturalism is fallacious. z Nor can it be used to support the view that an ‘ought’ cannot be derived from an ‘is’. z Emotivism claimed that moral language does not make statements but has ‘emotive meaning’, expressing the speaker’s emotions and generating emotions in others. z But emotivism has difficulty in making provision for moral reasoning, and its theory of emotive meaning faces further problems. z Prescriptivism requires that the makers of moral judgements be committed to act- ing in line with the implicit prescriptions of their judgements, which are implicitly universal. z While the universalisability of moral judgements is an important recognition, their alleged prescriptivity fails to account for many cases of weakness of will. z Nor is the combination of universalisability and prescriptivity a sufficient condition of judgements being moral ones; such judgements require a recognizable content. z Projectivism holds that moral judgements result from people projecting their emotions onto features of the world, and that moral beliefs depend for their existence on such projections. z Simon Blackburn seeks to secure for projectivism entitlement to appropriate the language of moral realism (his project of quasi-realism). Realism treats moral properties as independent of the mental states of speakers and hearers. z But projectivism encounters some of the same problems as emotivism, and implies that nothing would be valuable if there were no valuers. Also quasi-realism, if successful, collapses into realism.

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Learning objectives

z Through studying this Section, you should be able to discover the origins of non- cognitivism in reactions to Moore, and be able to explain and appraise Moore’s aims and central argument. z You should also be able to characterise the most prominent forms of non-cognitivism: emotivism, prescriptivism and projectivism, and what makes them forms of non-cognitivism. z You should be able to specify the three main problems confronted by emotivism. z You should be able to express the second and third of these problems in J.L. Austin’s terminology of illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. z You should be able to explain why, according to emotivists and prescriptivists, moral claims cannot be derived from factual statements. z You should be able to recognise how weakness of will presents a problem for Hare’s prescriptivism, and how universal prescriptivism seems not to supply sufficient conditions for judgments being moral ones. z You should be able to specify which of the problems confronted by emotivism are also problems for projectivism, and why. z You should be able to explain why conditional moral sentences comprise an apparent problem for non-cognitivists, and to form a view on whether any of them can surmount this problem.

Moore’s ‘Open Question’ argument

NB ‘C’ is here used of any proposed definition of ‘good’. Are C things good?’ is always an open question. If C were a successful definition of ‘good’, this would not be an open question. Therefore C is not a successful definition of ‘good’. So Moore is concluding that no definition of ‘good’ is or will ever be a successful one.

Exercise Consider the following argument:

Stealing is wrong. If stealing is wrong, then teaching your little brother to steal is wrong. Therefore teaching your little brother to steal is wrong. Is the above argument a valid argument?

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Is ‘wrong’ used in the same sense in the first premise, in the ‘if’ clause of the second premise, and also in the conclusion? (If not, then the argument is invalid.) How would either a prescriptivist or a projectivist explain the sense of ‘wrong’ used in the first premise and in the conclusion? Can the same theorist use the same explanation of the use of ‘wrong’ in the ‘if’ clause of the second premise (in which the speaker is apparently not pre- scribing and not projecting emotions either)? If not, can you think of anything that this theorist can say to reconcile this argument with their theory?

Essay titles and reading 1. Is there a naturalistic fallacy? Attfield, Robin, Value, Obligation and Meta-Ethics, Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Éditions Rodopi, 1995, pp. 208–11. Frankena, W. K., ‘The Naturalistic Fallacy’, in Philippa Foot (ed.), Theories of Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 50–63. Hare, R. M., The Language of Morals, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952, ch. 5 (‘Naturalism’), pp. 79–93. Mitchell, Dorothy, ‘Must We Talk about “Is” and “Ought”?’, Mind, 77, 1968, pp. 543–9. Moore, G. E., Principia Ethica, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1903.

2. Does the action-guiding role of moral language require a non-cognitivist theory? Attfield, Robin, Value, Obligation and Meta-Ethics, Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Éditions Rodopi, 1995, ch. 12, pp. 193–212. Ayer, A. J., Language, Truth and Logic, London: Gollancz, 1936, ch. 6. Searle, John R., ‘How to Derive an “Ought” from an “Is” ’, in Foot, Theories of Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 101–14. Stevenson, C. L., Ethics and Language, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1944. Urmson, J. O., The Emotive Theory of Ethics, London: Hutchinson University Library, 1968. Warnock, G. J., Contemporary Moral Philosophy, London: Macmillan and New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1967, ch. 3, pp. 18–29.

3. How cogent is the universal prescriptivism of Richard Hare? Attfield, Robin, Value, Obligation and Meta-Ethics, Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Éditions Rodopi, 1995, pp. 205–12. Geach, P., ‘Assertion’, Philosophical Review, 15, 1965, pp. 449–65. Hare, R. M., Freedom and Reason, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963. —, Moral Thinking, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981. Mitchell, Dorothy, ‘Must We Talk about “Is” and “Ought”?’, Mind, 77, 1968, pp. 543–9. Taylor, C. C. W., Review of R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, Mind, 74, 1965, pp. 280–98.

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z The apparent subjectivity and ‘evaluative’ nature of the language of ‘good’ and of ‘ought’ sometimes inclines people to regard moral claims as neither truth-apt nor knowable. z However, ‘good’ is a logically attributive term, of which the meaning varies with the kind of thing it is used of, and not with the speaker’s attitudes. z Being chosen or commended is neither necessary nor sufficient for something to be good of its kind. The theory that ‘good’ has an ‘evaluative meaning’ (any more than other language) is misguided. z The common relation between ‘good’ and the kind in question may be that of a thing performing its function well or of its flourishing as a member of that kind. z But when a special perspective is in question, being a good member of a kind is being desirable as a member of that kind from the perspective (or point of view) in question. z ‘Is good’ is also sometimes used to affirm something’s intrinsic value, meaning ‘is desirable intrinsically’. z ‘Ought’ seems mysterious because it is an incomplete expression, until it is equipped with an explanatory adverb like ‘prudentially’ or ‘morally’. z As Hobbes showed, we can move from facts to ‘oughts’ if we are clear which kind of ‘ought’ is in question. z Moral principles and judgements are ones that either would or could be justified in a certain way. z Such a justification is one that characterises the acts involved as generating or as instantiating intrinsic value. z Morally good qualities are ones which are desirable because of their overall ten- dency to generate intrinsic value, and correspond to the virtues. Good motives are to be understood in much the same way. z Morally good persons are ones who behave, react, feel and think in ways that are desirable from the moral point of view, ways that have intrinsic value as such or which generate such value overall. z ‘X ought’ means, roughly, ‘X has reason to’. ‘Oughts’ are moral ‘oughts’ when they would or could be justified by reference to intrinsic value generated or exemplified by the deeds in question. z Moral claims are thus often decidable on the basis of facts and meanings.

Learning objectives

z Through studying this section, you will be enabled to appraise the view that claims involving ‘good’ and ‘ought’ depend for their meaning on speakers’ attitudes, and are neither truth-apt nor knowable.

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z You will also be enabled to distinguish between logically attributive adjectives, such as ‘good’, and logically predicative adjectives. z You will be able to form a view about the relation between kinds of things and good members of those kinds, and on the difference made to this when a special point of view or perspective is present. z You will be able to distinguish different completions of ‘ought’ claims, and to grasp how such claims can be grounded in reasoning. z You will be in a position to form a view about what makes moral principles and judgements moral ones, and what kind of justification is appropriate to principles and judgements of this kind. z You will further be able to apply the meaning of ‘moral’ to what makes some traits, motives and persons morally good ones. z You will similarly be able to apply the meaning of ‘moral’ to what makes some ‘oughts’ moral ‘oughts’.

Essay title and reading Explain the stance of Peter Geach about the meaning of ‘good’. To what extent does he persuade you of his case?

Reading Attfield, Robin, Value, Obligation and Meta-Ethics, Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Éditions Rodopi, 1995, pp. 236–8. Foot, Philippa, Virtues and Vices, Oxford: Blackwell, 1978, chapters 7–9. —, ‘Introduction’ to Philippa Foot (ed.), Theories of Ethics, (see below), pp. 1–15. Geach, Peter, ‘Good and Evil’, Analysis, 17, 1956, pp. 33–42; also in Philippa Foot (ed.), Theories of Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 64–73. Hare, R. M., ‘Geach: Good and Evil’, Analysis, 18, 1957, pp. 103–12; also in Philippa Foot (ed.), Theories of Ethics (see above), pp. 74–82. Zimmerman, Michael J., ‘In Defense of the Concept of Intrinsic Value’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 29, 1999, pp. 389–410. Section 3: Moral realism: summary

z Realism is defined and distinguished from its rivals, non-cognitivism, the error theory and subjectivism. z Unlike its rivals, moral realism holds that moral properties are both real and independent of people’s states of mind. z The rival theories are reviewed and found to be problematic. For example, the action-guiding role of moral language can be reconciled with realism, and does not require resort to non-cognitivism.

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z The main standard objection to realism is the prevalence of radical moral disagreement. z Moral realists can explain such disagreement and can maintain (contrary to Hume) that moral judgements are amenable to the resources of reason. z The objection from the relation of moral language to motivation (as presented by J. L. Mackie) is briefly considered, but is considered more fully in the Section on Internalism and Externalism. z In defence of cognitivism, which holds that some moral claims amount to knowledge, some suggested examples of such knowledge are considered. z Some moral beliefs are more securely held than any ground for questioning them could be. z The grounds supportive of moral cognitivism and of moral realism are mutually supportive.

Learning objectives

z Through studying this section, you will be able to explain the differences between moral realism, non-cognitivism, subjectivism and the error-theory. z You will also be able to appraise each of these theories. z You will be able to form a view about whether the action-guiding role of moral language requires adoption of a non-cognitivist theory. z You will be able to appraise the objection to moral realism grounded in moral disagreement. z You will be able to appraise Hume’s argument that moral judgements (and thus moral disagreements too) lie beyond the scope of reason. z You will be able to form a preliminary view about the argument against moral realism from motivation. z You will be able to cite and discuss suggested examples of moral knowledge. z You will be able to relate the argument for moral cognitivism from such examples to the case for moral realism.

Exercise Discuss how cogent Renford Bambrough’s suggested example (the child who needs an anaesthetic) is of moral knowledge. See the Section of his book on Moral Realism. If possible, see also Bambrough’s chapter ‘Proof’ in his book Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge, London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979, pp. 11–36. This chapter is reprinted in Russ Shafer-Landau, Ethical Theory: An Anthology, Oxford, UK and Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007, pp. 103–10.

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Essay title and readings Compare the merits of moral realism and any one rival theory.

Reading Attfield, Robin, Value, Obligation and Meta-Ethics, Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Éditions Rodopi, 1995. Bambrough, Renford, Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge, London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979. Brink, David O., Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Kupperman, Joel J., Ethical Knowledge, London: Allen & Unwin and New York: Humanities Press, 1970. Mackie, J. L., Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1977. Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey, ‘Moral Realism’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.seop. leeds.ac.uk/entries/moral-realism. Section 4: Internalism, externalism and practicality Summary

z Internalism is the theory that moral considerations necessarily either motivate action in line with moral judgements and principles, or provide reasons for such action. z Externalism denies this, and holds that the relation of moral considerations to motivation or to reasons for action is contingent. z The practicality of moral language consists in its capacity to motivate or provide reasons for action. z Internalism is often argued to conflict with realism, since factual language is held to lack the practicality that characterises moral language. z Internalism about the relation of moral language to motivation is argued to be misguided, whether it concerns agents or appraisers. z Internalism about the relation of moral language to reasons for action is argued to be misguided where it concerns explanatory reasons. z Mackie’s anti-realist argument can be construed as concerning either motivation or reasons for action in the sense of explanatory reasons, but establishes its conclusion in neither of these forms. z Internalism about the relation of moral language to reasons for action in the sense of justificatory reasons is argued to be plausible, but is compatible with realism and does not support Mackie’s conclusion.

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z The extent and limits of the necessary commitment of adherents of moral judgements or principles lie in their having to judge relevant cases (including their own) in line with their judgements or principles. z Realism can not only be reconciled with internalism about the relation of moral language to reasons for action in the sense of justificatory reasons, but can also explain the practicality of such language. z Realism thus overcomes the challenge from internalism, and in view of the positive case for realism and its replies to other objections should be accepted.

Learning objectives

z Through studying this Section, you should be enabled to understand and explain what internalism, externalism and practicality are. z You should also grasp why some philosophers believe that internalism is incompat- ible with moral realism. z You should be able to differentiate between internalism about motivation and internalism about reasons for action. z You should be in a position to appraise both these varieties of internalism. z You should be in a position to appraise Mackie’s argument against moral realism. z You should be able to differentiate between reasons for action in the sense of explanatory reasons and in the sense of justificatory reasons. z You should be in a position to appraise internalism about the relation of moral language to reasons for action in the sense of justificatory reasons. z You should thus be in a position to judge whether the argument from internalism (in any of its forms) poses problems for moral realism. z You should be able to grasp how moral realism explains the practicality of moral language. z You should thus, through studying this and the previous Section, be in a position to appraise the acceptability of moral realism.

Essay title and reading Does the practicality of moral language require an anti-realist theory of such language?

Reading Attfield, Robin, Value, Obligation and Meta-Ethics, Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Éditions Rodopi, 1995, pp. 30–1 and 203–5. Brink, David O., Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Cohen, Mendel F., ‘The Practicality of Moral Reasoning’, Mind, 78, 1969, pp. 534–49.

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Lenman, James, ‘Reasons for Action: Justification versus Explanation’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/. Smith, Michael , ‘Realism’, in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Ethical Theory, Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007, pp. 72–6; also in Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics, Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993, pp. 399–410. Section 5: Naturalism and non- naturalism Summary

z Naturalism and non-naturalism are theories that aspire to supply the basis or grounds for the moral truths claimed by moral realism and the moral knowledge claimed to be sometimes possible by moral cognitivism. z Non-naturalism claims that these truths can be known not by reasoning from definitions or experience but intuitively. This claim makes it hard to see how such truths could ever be learned. z Ethical naturalism needs to be distinguished from ontological naturalism and from methodological naturalism. z Ontological naturalism is a general metaphysical thesis about the nature of facts, while methodological naturalism concerns how we may properly investigate them. z Both these kinds of naturalism are consistent with ethical naturalism where they grant that moral propositions can supervene upon, and by underpinned by, natural facts. z Restrictive versions of both these kinds of naturalism, however, preclude ethical naturalism by denying that there are truths about desirability or about reasons for action. Moral realists need to reject these versions. z While non-naturalism has to regard the supervenience of ethical truths on natural ones as mysterious, naturalists hold that (certain) natural ones constitute ethical ones, and are thus related to them necessarily. z Philippa Foot has cogently argued that facts about causing harm are necessarily related to ethical conclusions. z But facts about human harm and well-being are not the only kinds of facts relevant to such conclusions; animal suffering and welfare are among other examples. z John Searle has shown how facts about words spoken can generate obligations, in the context of human institutions. z Institutional obligations are not always moral obligations, but obligations to keep promises (as illustrated in Searle’s example) arguably are such. z However, it is the implicit benefits to human welfare of (some) institutions that makes the related obligations moral ones.

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z Non-naturalism is attractive when (and perhaps only when) naturalism is inter- preted restrictively, since such naturalism precludes ethical truths. But ethical naturalists need not endorse such restrictive interpretations. z The naturalism supported in this section is shown to cohere with the accounts of moral ‘oughts’, intrinsic value, moral motivation and moral goodness presented elsewhere in this book.

Learning objectives

z Through studying this Section, you will be enabled to grasp what ethical naturalism and non-naturalism are, and why they are important. z You will also be able to distinguish ethical naturalism from other kinds of naturalism such as ontological and methodological naturalism, and restrictive versions of those kinds of naturalism from less restrictive kinds. z You will be in a position to grasp what the supervenience of ethical properties on natural ones is, and how different theories relate to it. z You will be in a position to understand some proposed ways of reasoning from facts to moral conclusions, such as that of Philippa Foot, and to appraise whether they succeed. z You will further be in a position to appraise whether John Searle’s argument from an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’ establishes a moral conclusion. z You will be able to understand how non-naturalism is sometimes adopted in response to restrictive forms of naturalism, but that less restrictive kinds of naturalism recognizing truths about reasons for action make non-naturalism unnecessary. z You will further be able to grasp how ethical naturalism can be seen to cohere with the accounts of moral ‘oughts’, moral motivation and moral goodness presented in this Chapter, and with accounts of intrinsic value, moral rightness and moral obligation presented elsewhere in this book.

Essay titles and readings To what extent does Philippa Foot succeed in showing that moral judgements have conceptual limits and can be derived from facts? Foot, Philippa, ‘Moral Arguments’, Mind, 67, 1958, pp. 502–13. —, ‘Moral Beliefs’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59, 1958–9, pp. 83–104. —, ‘Introduction’, in Foot (ed.), Theories of Ethics, London: Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 1–15. —, ‘Moral Beliefs’, in Foot (ed.), Theories of Ethics, London: Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 83–100. —, ‘Moral Arguments’, in G. Wallace and A. D. M. Walker (eds), The Definition of Morality, London: Methuen, 1970, pp. 174–87. —, Virtues and Vices, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978 (see chapters VII, VIII, IX and XI).

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Wallace, G. and A. D. M. Walker, ‘Introduction’, in Wallace and Walker (eds), The Definition of Morality, 1977, pp. 1–20.

Does John R. Searle succeed in deriving a moral ‘ought’ from an ‘is’? Foot, Philippa, ‘Introduction’, in Foot (ed.), Theories of Ethics, London: Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 1–15. Midgley, Mary, ‘The Game Game’, Philosophy, 49, 1974, pp. 231–53. Searle, John R., ‘How to Derive and “Ought” from an “Is” ’, in Foot (ed.), Theories of Ethics, 1967. —, Speech Acts, London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969

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