Supporting Material for Chapter 5: Meta-ethics Section 1: Non-cognitivism, prescriptivism and projectivism: summary z Moral non-cognitivism is the claim that moral judgements are neither true nor false (in any significant sense), and therefore cannot be known; instead they are taken to express emotions or prescriptions. z G. E. Moore’s argument for the naturalistic fallacy unintentionally prepared the way for non-cognitivist theories of ethics, although Moore himself was a cognitivist. z This argument assumed its own conclusion, and thus failed to establish that ‘good’ cannot be defined, or that naturalism is fallacious. z Nor can it be used to support the view that an ‘ought’ cannot be derived from an ‘is’. z Emotivism claimed that moral language does not make statements but has ‘emotive meaning’, expressing the speaker’s emotions and generating emotions in others. z But emotivism has difficulty in making provision for moral reasoning, and its the- ory of emotive meaning faces further problems. z Prescriptivism requires that the makers of moral judgements be committed to act- ing in line with the implicit prescriptions of their judgements, which are implicitly universal. z While the universalisability of moral judgements is an important recognition, their alleged prescriptivity fails to account for many cases of weakness of will. z Nor is the combination of universalisability and prescriptivity a sufficient condition of judgements being moral ones; such judgements require a recognizable content. z Projectivism holds that moral judgements result from people projecting their emo- tions onto features of the world, and that moral beliefs depend for their existence on such projections. z Simon Blackburn seeks to secure for projectivism entitlement to appropriate the language of moral realism (his project of quasi-realism). Realism treats moral prop- erties as independent of the mental states of speakers and hearers. z But projectivism encounters some of the same problems as emotivism, and implies that nothing would be valuable if there were no valuers. Also quasi-realism, if suc- cessful, collapses into realism. http://philosophy.attfield.continuumbooks.com © Robin Attfield (2012) Ethics London: Continuum Books 005_META-ETHICS5_META-ETHICS WWEBSITE.inddEBSITE.indd 1 11/14/2012/14/2012 112:36:232:36:23 AAMM Meta-Ethics Learning objectives z Through studying this Section, you should be able to discover the origins of non- cognitivism in reactions to Moore, and be able to explain and appraise Moore’s aims and central argument. z You should also be able to characterise the most prominent forms of non-cogni- tivism: emotivism, prescriptivism and projectivism, and what makes them forms of non-cognitivism. z You should be able to specify the three main problems confronted by emotivism. z You should be able to express the second and third of these problems in J.L. Austin’s terminology of illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. z You should be able to explain why, according to emotivists and prescriptivists, moral claims cannot be derived from factual statements. z You should be able to recognise how weakness of will presents a problem for Hare’s prescriptivism, and how universal prescriptivism seems not to supply suf- ficient conditions for judgments being moral ones. z You should be able to specify which of the problems confronted by emotivism are also problems for projectivism, and why. z You should be able to explain why conditional moral sentences comprise an appar- ent problem for non-cognitivists, and to form a view on whether any of them can surmount this problem. Moore’s ‘Open Question’ argument NB ‘C’ is here used of any proposed definition of ‘good’. Are C things good?’ is always an open question. If C were a successful definition of ‘good’, this would not be an open question. Therefore C is not a successful definition of ‘good’. So Moore is concluding that no definition of ‘good’ is or will ever be a successful one. Exercise Consider the following argument: Stealing is wrong. If stealing is wrong, then teaching your little brother to steal is wrong. Therefore teaching your little brother to steal is wrong. Is the above argument a valid argument? http://philosophy.attfield.continuumbooks.com © Robin Attfield (2012) Ethics London: Continuum Books 005_META-ETHICS5_META-ETHICS WWEBSITE.inddEBSITE.indd 2 11/14/2012/14/2012 112:36:242:36:24 AAMM Meta-Ethics Is ‘wrong’ used in the same sense in the first premise, in the ‘if’ clause of the sec- ond premise, and also in the conclusion? (If not, then the argument is invalid.) How would either a prescriptivist or a projectivist explain the sense of ‘wrong’ used in the first premise and in the conclusion? Can the same theorist use the same explanation of the use of ‘wrong’ in the ‘if’ clause of the second premise (in which the speaker is apparently not pre- scribing and not projecting emotions either)? If not, can you think of anything that this theorist can say to reconcile this argument with their theory? Essay titles and reading 1. Is there a naturalistic fallacy? Attfield, Robin, Value, Obligation and Meta-Ethics, Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Éditions Rodopi, 1995, pp. 208–11. Frankena, W. K., ‘The Naturalistic Fallacy’, in Philippa Foot (ed.), Theories of Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 50–63. Hare, R. M., The Language of Morals, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952, ch. 5 (‘Naturalism’), pp. 79–93. Mitchell, Dorothy, ‘Must We Talk about “Is” and “Ought”?’, Mind, 77, 1968, pp. 543–9. Moore, G. E., Principia Ethica, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1903. 2. Does the action-guiding role of moral language require a non-cognitivist theory? Attfield, Robin, Value, Obligation and Meta-Ethics, Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Éditions Rodopi, 1995, ch. 12, pp. 193–212. Ayer, A. J., Language, Truth and Logic, London: Gollancz, 1936, ch. 6. Searle, John R., ‘How to Derive an “Ought” from an “Is” ’, in Foot, Theories of Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 101–14. Stevenson, C. L., Ethics and Language, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1944. Urmson, J. O., The Emotive Theory of Ethics, London: Hutchinson University Library, 1968. Warnock, G. J., Contemporary Moral Philosophy, London: Macmillan and New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1967, ch. 3, pp. 18–29. 3. How cogent is the universal prescriptivism of Richard Hare? Attfield, Robin, Value, Obligation and Meta-Ethics, Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Éditions Rodopi, 1995, pp. 205–12. Geach, P., ‘Assertion’, Philosophical Review, 15, 1965, pp. 449–65. Hare, R. M., Freedom and Reason, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963. —, Moral Thinking, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981. Mitchell, Dorothy, ‘Must We Talk about “Is” and “Ought”?’, Mind, 77, 1968, pp. 543–9. Taylor, C. C. W., Review of R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, Mind, 74, 1965, pp. 280–98. http://philosophy.attfield.continuumbooks.com © Robin Attfield (2012) Ethics London: Continuum Books 005_META-ETHICS5_META-ETHICS WWEBSITE.inddEBSITE.indd 3 11/14/2012/14/2012 112:36:242:36:24 AAMM Meta-Ethics Section 2: ‘Good’, ‘ought’ and morality: summary z The apparent subjectivity and ‘evaluative’ nature of the language of ‘good’ and of ‘ought’ sometimes inclines people to regard moral claims as neither truth-apt nor knowable. z However, ‘good’ is a logically attributive term, of which the meaning varies with the kind of thing it is used of, and not with the speaker’s attitudes. z Being chosen or commended is neither necessary nor sufficient for something to be good of its kind. The theory that ‘good’ has an ‘evaluative meaning’ (any more than other language) is misguided. z The common relation between ‘good’ and the kind in question may be that of a thing performing its function well or of its flourishing as a member of that kind. z But when a special perspective is in question, being a good member of a kind is being desirable as a member of that kind from the perspective (or point of view) in question. z ‘Is good’ is also sometimes used to affirm something’s intrinsic value, meaning ‘is desirable intrinsically’. z ‘Ought’ seems mysterious because it is an incomplete expression, until it is equipped with an explanatory adverb like ‘prudentially’ or ‘morally’. z As Hobbes showed, we can move from facts to ‘oughts’ if we are clear which kind of ‘ought’ is in question. z Moral principles and judgements are ones that either would or could be justified in a certain way. z Such a justification is one that characterises the acts involved as generating or as instantiating intrinsic value. z Morally good qualities are ones which are desirable because of their overall ten- dency to generate intrinsic value, and correspond to the virtues. Good motives are to be understood in much the same way. z Morally good persons are ones who behave, react, feel and think in ways that are desirable from the moral point of view, ways that have intrinsic value as such or which generate such value overall. z ‘X ought’ means, roughly, ‘X has reason to’. ‘Oughts’ are moral ‘oughts’ when they would or could be justified by reference to intrinsic value generated or exemplified by the deeds in question. z Moral claims are thus often decidable on the basis of facts and meanings. Learning objectives z Through studying this section, you will be enabled to appraise the view that claims involving ‘good’ and ‘ought’ depend for their meaning on speakers’ attitudes, and are neither truth-apt nor knowable. http://philosophy.attfield.continuumbooks.com © Robin Attfield (2012) Ethics London: Continuum Books 005_META-ETHICS5_META-ETHICS WWEBSITE.inddEBSITE.indd 4 11/14/2012/14/2012 112:36:242:36:24 AAMM Meta-Ethics z You will also be enabled to distinguish between logically attributive adjectives, such as ‘good’, and logically predicative adjectives.