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Russia in the Middle East ______ RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST __________________________________________________ Theodore Karasik and Stephen Blank, Editors Washington, DC December 2018 THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION Published in the United States by The Jamestown Foundation 1310 L Street NW Suite 810 Washington, DC 20005 http://www.jamestown.org Copyright © 2018 The Jamestown Foundation All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this book may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written consent. For copyright and permissions information, contact The Jamestown Foundation, 1310 L Street NW, Suite 810, Washington, DC 20005. The views expressed in the book are those of the authors and not necessarily those of The Jamestown Foundation. For more information on this book of The Jamestown Foundation, email [email protected]. ISBN: 978-0-9986660-3-7 Cover art provided by Peggy Archambault of Peggy Archambault Design. Jamestown’s Mission The Jamestown Foundation’s mission is to inform and educate policy makers and the broader community about events and trends in those societies which are strategically or tactically important to the United States and which frequently restrict access to such information. Utilizing indigenous and primary sources, Jamestown’s material is delivered without political bias, filter or agenda. It is often the only source of information which should be, but is not always, available through official or intelligence channels, especially in regard to Eurasia and terrorism. Origins Founded in 1984 by William Geimer, The Jamestown Foundation made a direct contribution to the downfall of Communism through its dissemination of information about the closed totalitarian societies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. William Geimer worked with Arkady Shevchenko, the highest- ranking Soviet official ever to defect when he left his position as undersecretary general of the United Nations. Shevchenko’s memoir Breaking With Moscow revealed the details of Soviet superpower diplomacy, arms control strategy and tactics in the Third World, at the height of the Cold War. Through its work with Shevchenko, Jamestown rapidly became the leading source of information about the inner workings of the captive nations of the former Communist Bloc. In addition to Shevchenko, Jamestown assisted the former top Romanian intelligence officer Ion Pacepa in writing his memoirs. Jamestown ensured that both men published their insights and experience in what became bestselling books. Even today, several decades later, some credit Pacepa’s revelations about Ceausescu’s regime in his bestselling book Red Horizons with the fall of that government and the freeing of Romania. The Jamestown Foundation has emerged as a leading provider of information about Eurasia. Our research and analysis on conflict and instability in Eurasia enabled Jamestown to become one of the most reliable sources of information on the post-Soviet space, the Caucasus and Central Asia as well as China. Furthermore, since 9/11, Jamestown has utilized its network of indigenous experts in more than 50 different countries to conduct research and analysis on terrorism and the growth of al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda offshoots throughout the globe. By drawing on our ever-growing global network of experts, Jamestown has become a vital source of unfiltered, open-source information about major conflict zones around the world—from the Black Sea to Siberia, from the Persian Gulf to Latin America and the Pacific. Our core of intellectual talent includes former high-ranking government officials and military officers, political scientists, journalists, scholars and economists. Their insight contributes significantly to policymakers engaged in addressing today’s newly emerging global threats in the post 9/11 world. iii Table of Contents About ‘Russia in the Middle East’ Project……………………vi 1. Introduction Stephen Blank…………………………………………………...1 2. The Foundations of Russian Policy in the Middle East Stephen Blank………………………………………………….28 3. The Arab View of Russia’s Role in the MENA: Changing Arab Perceptions of Russia, and the Implications for US Policy Shehab Al Makahleh…………………………………………..61 4. Iran’s Russian Conundrum Alex Vatanka…………………………………………………..87 5. Russia’s Policies in the Middle East and the Pendulum of Turkish-Russian Relations Mitat Çelikpala……………………………………………….105 6. European Assessments and Concerns About Russia’s Policies in the Middle East Pavel K. Baev…………………………………………………131 Cont. on next page… iv …Contents cont. from previous page. 7. Imperial Strategies: Russia’s Exploitation of Ethnic Issues and Policy in the Middle East Stephen Blank………………………………………………...154 8. The Tactical Side of Russia’s Arms Sales to the Middle East Anna Borshchevskaya………………………………………...183 9. Russia in the Middle East: Energy Forever? Rauf Mammadov……………………………………………..212 10. Russia’s Financial Tactics in the Middle East Theodore Karasik……………………………………………..240 11. Russia in the Middle East: A New Front in the Information War? Donald N. Jensen……………………………………………...265 12. ‘Continuing War by Other Means’: The Case of Wagner, Russia’s Premier Private Military Company in the Middle East Sergey Sukhankin……………………………………………..290 13. Demography’s Pull on Russian Mideast Policy Ilan Berman…………………………………………………..319 14. Russia in the Middle East Until 2024: From Hard Power to Sustainable Influence Yuri Barmin…………………………………………………..338 v 15. Russia’s Middle Eastern Position in 2025 Stephen Blank………………………………………………...367 16. Implications and Policy Recommendations Theodore Karasik……………………………………………..414 Author Biographies…………………………………………441 vi About ‘Russia in the Middle East’ Project There is an outpouring of reporting on Russian activities in Syria, and to a lesser degree other countries in the Middle East and North Africa. But until mid-2017, there was no single effort to analyze the totality of Russian objectives, instruments of power, tactics, and strategy in the greater Middle East and their implications for US foreign policy. The Jamestown Foundation’s “Russia in the Middle East” project, headed by Dr. Theodore Karasik and Dr. Stephen Blank, was launched to rectify this gap by providing the basis and material for a multi-dimensional analysis of Russian strategy and tactics in the Middle East, bringing into sharp relief the depth and scope of Moscow’s strategy. Unfortunately, Western analyses have long missed the bigger picture: Russia seeks to capture the entire Middle East market across several multi-dimensional issues. These include Russian arms sales; the formation of a working coalition or bloc with Iran, Iraq and Bashar al-Assad’s Syria; the insertion of Russia as a broker in the Palestinian- Israeli conflict, efforts to regain major influence over Middle Eastern and Eastern Mediterranean gas sales, especially liquefied natural gas (LNG), to Europe; and using its newly established position in the Middle East to augment its military-economic-political influence regionally and upon Europe. Tragically, given this absence of analysis of Russia’s Middle Eastern strategy, there is a lacunae in knowledge regarding how far advanced the Kremlin’s program for the Middle East really is and the metrics of such a robust Russian advance. vii Approach This book is based on the conclusions and insights arrived at over the past year in a series of expert workshops, published papers, briefings and public events within the scope of the “Russia in the Middle East” project. Our analysis bases Russia’s current trajectory on Yevgeny Primakov’s activities as foreign and prime minister in 1996–1999. He may truly be described as the moving spirit and soul of the Russian policy reorientation that has come to its fullest fruition under Vladimir Putin, particularly regarding the Middle East. Putin has used Primakov’s ideas and activities as a springboard for his own and continues to use them as the basis of his vision of Russia’s role in the Middle East and its actions there. Backed by the military, energy firms, arms sellers, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the security services with their advances in information warfare, Russia has successfully reduced Western and US influence in the Levant and created a new strategic equation in the Middle East, Mediterranean, and Europe. Policy Implications Russia’s intervention in Syria and the ensuing dramatic expansion of its overall Middle Eastern profile have substantive and serious implications for the US. First, both these processes betoken Moscow’s determination to force Washington to acknowledge the legitimacy of its aims and status as an equal global superpower to the US. Although Putin has long sought to augment Russia’s influence in the Middle East, our failure in Syria and the ensuing vacuum in Washington’s policy toward the broader region—due in part to our worsening ties with Israel and the effort to pursue reconciliation with Iran—have opened up opportunities for Moscow. As a result, Russia now seeks a status comparable to the one it had in the 1970s regionally if not viii globally—namely, a status where, as Foreign Minister Gromyko said in 1971, no world issue can be decided without or against it. Second, in line with centuries-old Russian strategic imperatives, it seeks to challenge the US and NATO militarily in the Levant and the Mediterranean. Russia has acquired bases in Syria, seeks them in Egypt and Cyprus, and, should its Libyan client, General Khalifa Halter, come to power in Libya, it will seek bases there. In all these cases, too, it has positioned itself advantageously to make major arms deals and arms sales with the governments in question. Similarly it has done so with both the government of Iraq and the Iraqi Kurds. And it is acquiring and demonstrating military capabilities that we had not expected it to have in these theaters. At the same time, thanks to numerous intersecting developments, Moscow is making great strides in detaching Turkey from a pro-Western orientation and from its status as an active member of NATO. Given Turkey’s overall strategic position in Europe and the Middle East, that denouement would have profoundly negative international consequences. Third, Moscow has forged a working partnership if not alliance with Iran against the US and its allies in the Middle East.
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