Turkish-Egyptian Relations: Nowhere to Go but Up

Charles Dunne

May 30, 2017 Turkish-Egyptian Relations: Nowhere to Go but Up Charles Dunne

Egypt and Turkey, both staunch US allies, have United States pursues a complicated regional found themselves locked in a war of words— agenda. and worse—for nearly four years since the overthrow of President Mohammed Morsi by Roots of the Conflict then-Defense Minister Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi. The cool relationship and enmity threaten to The current tensions began in the aftermath of complicate the Trump Administration’s Middle the “Arab Spring” revolts that brought about East strategy as it tries to organize an anti-ISIL political upheaval throughout the region and front, takes a harder line on , and is talking the downfall of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s long- up new efforts toward Arab-Israeli serving president. Erdoğan welcomed the peacemaking. Despite the advent of a new US development, becoming one of Egypt’s leading leadership determined to put its own stamp on international supporters, particularly after the region, however, Turkey and Egypt appear Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood’s as far from reconciliation as ever. Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) was elected president in 2012. Erdoğan and his Justice and Neither side has spared the other. Last July, Development (or AK) party had a natural Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ideological affinity with the Muslim accused President Sisi of being a “putschist” Brotherhood, both in terms of their shared who led a coup “against Mohammed Morsi— views on the role of in politics and from the president elected by the people”—just as the having come to power in democratic elections. coup plotters in Turkey attempted to do against Erdoğan seemed to view this as a validation of him. He further doubted how could anyone his own rise and the coming future of Middle “respect Sisi when he has killed thousands of East politics, in which Turkey might emerge as his own people? This man has nothing to do the leader of post-Arab Spring states under the with democracy.” banner of . Turkey pledged $2 billion in loans; Egypt promised $8 billion in From its side, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign investment opportunities for Turkish business. Affairs issued a response the next day attacking The two countries explored other avenues of Erdoğan for “continuing to confuse matters and expanding relations, including joint naval lose the compass of sound judgement— exercises. Erdoğan’s triumphant visit to Cairo in something that reflects through the tough times 2011, during which he attempted to seize the he is passing through.” For the Trump mantle of Sunni Arab leadership and pro- Administration, this particular problem has Palestinian international activism, proved the come with minimal costs so far. But getting the high-water mark of his popularity and two countries on the same page may become influence in Egypt. more of a priority at some point, if only to minimize political static from this quarter as the

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Arab Center Washington DC May 2017

Erdoğan’s message, and the adulation with outrage and revulsion in Turkey (and indeed which he was received by overwhelmingly pro- around the world). Erdoğan lashed out at the Brotherhood crowds, was arguably deeply Egyptian military and its supporters, saying unsettling for the Egyptian military and its that “either Bashar [al-Asad of Syria] or Sisi, allies among the crony capitalists and “deep there is no difference between them … State state” security apparatchiks, who feared the loss terrorism is currently underway in Egypt." of power, control, and money to the populist Morsi and his supporters took to flashing the Morsi and his FJP. four-fingered “rab’a” sign associated with the protests as a public display of solidarity with Morsi—and Turkish-Egyptian Relations— the Muslim Brotherhood and the slain Come Crashing Down demonstrators. Egypt ejected the Turkish ambassador and withdrew its own from Eventually the Morsi government’s well- Ankara. established record of misrule, characterized by creeping authoritarianism and an inability to Turkey’s public criticism of the coup was soon deliver much-needed economic improvements, backed by practical action to support the eroded the president’s base of support and led Muslim Brotherhood in exile. Erdoğan offered to rising tensions with the military. The asylum to hundreds—if not thousands—of eventual overthrow of the Morsi government by members of the Muslim Brotherhood and their Defense Minister Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi in early families who were forced to flee the country in July 2013, ostensibly in response to the massive the Egyptian military’s ensuing roundup of anti-Morsi protests organized by the Brotherhood members. (Tens of thousands of “Tamarod” movement, provoked harsh political prisoners remain without charge in denunciations from Ankara and a sharp Egyptian jails and prisons. Morsi and 102 downturn in bilateral relations. others, including many Muslim Brotherhood leaders, were sentenced to death in 2015.) The killing of over 1,500 largely unarmed Ankara permits a number of different Muslim protesters by the Egyptian security forces Brotherhood outlets to broadcast freely from during the chaos that followed especially Turkey, and has rebuffed efforts by Cairo and provoked Turkey’s anger. The most notorious its supporters in the Gulf to rein them in. The of these were two August 14, 2013 assaults on Turkish government has rejected a campaign by pro-Morsi protest camps at Rab’a al-Adawiya Egypt and other states to brand the Brotherhood Square in Cairo’s Nasr City and at al-Nahda as a terrorist organization. square in Giza, which killed over 1,000 Egyptians, mostly Brotherhood supporters. The Failed Turkish Coup These attacks, termed “crimes against A coup attempt against Erdoğan in 2016 humanity” by Human Rights Watch, provoked allowed Egypt to return the favor. The effort to Turkish-Egyptian Relations: Nowhere to Go but Up Charles Dunne

overthrow the Turkish president, despite its could help strengthen its role as broker) were almost immediate failure, was hailed by the likewise disappointed. state-controlled Egyptian media and greeted with glee by the government. The Egyptian Disputes have flared up with some regularity. reaction stemmed not only from Cairo’s Turkey lashed out at Egypt for allegedly contempt for Erdoğan but from the need to cooperating with Israel in the Gaza war of 2014 reinforce the government’s legitimacy by and blocking humanitarian aid to the portraying the Turkish military’s attempted Palestinians during the conflict; Egypt and overthrow of the authoritarian Erdoğan as the Turkey presented rival peace plans; and the highest expression of the will of the people, just Egyptians felt Turkey was trying to use Gaza to as Cairo portrayed el-Sisi’s overthrow of Morsi. undermine them. Egypt and Turkey backed Egypt helped block a UN Security Council dueling parties in Libya’s internal struggle, with statement that would have called for all parties Egypt and the United Arab Emirates backing to “respect” Turkey’s democratically elected Gen. Khalifa Haftar in his battle against Islamist government, on the suspect (and high self- militias, which Turkey reportedly supported. serving) grounds that the Council could not The two countries became embroiled in a determine whether a government was dispute and a subsequent multilateral democratically elected or not. On his diplomatic scramble over natural gas page, el-Sisi accused the Erdoğan government production and export in the eastern of exporting terrorism and insisted that Mediterranean, which at one point involved the Turkey’s military “is the only guardian and dispatch of Turkish naval forces to guard protector of the main principles of the Turkish Turkey’s exploration projects in the area. State.” (The comments were later taken down.) Overall bilateral economic ties have suffered as well. Turkey’s investments in Egypt were The Fallout from the Feud frozen, many Turkish factories there closed, and the Egyptian Chamber of Commerce called for The growing enmity between the two the government to review economic pacts with governments has played out on the diplomatic Ankara, including the two countries’ free-trade and economic stages, and the problems seem to agreement. have fallen disproportionately on Turkey. Morsi’s fall dashed Turkey’s hope for a closer The increasingly bitter war of words between regional partnership between Ankara and the two countries following the Turkish coup Cairo, with Turkey as the senior partner. In attempt also short-circuited signals from addition, its outreach to the Arab world and Ankara in the summer of 2016 suggesting it was hope for playing a stronger role in effecting finally ready to seek improved relations with Arab-Israeli peace (based in part on the belief Egypt. that Turkey’s strong relations with Hamas

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The Egypt-Turkey spat has cost Ankara in terms efforts to broker a rapprochement between of its relationship with the GCC states, too. Turkey and Egypt. Ankara’s steadfast support for the Brotherhood after the military coup and subsequent Prospects for Improvement crackdown by the Cairo government helped alienate Turkey from Saudi Arabia and other One bright spot is the apparent interest on the key Gulf states, most of whom shared Cairo’s part of the Turkish and Egyptian governments view that the Muslim Brotherhood was a in improving economic relations. The visit of a terrorist group and a threat to established senior Turkish business delegation to Cairo in regimes. Erdoğan’s attempts to achieve January 2017 for the Egyptian-Turkish Business reconciliation with the Gulf in 2015 came to Forum was the first high-level visit since June little, and Saudi Arabia lost interest in 2013. The exchange was seen by participants as mediating between Cairo and Ankara given the a vital step in restoring not just trade and continued war of words between the two. investment ties, which were considerable, but in Turkey wound up more isolated than ever in advancing the overall relationship. the region. At the moment, however, little possibility for Over the course of last year, the GCC-Turkey improvement appears to exist while Erdoğan dynamic has shifted somewhat as the new and Sisi remain at the helm, given their visceral Saudi leadership under King Salman has begun dislike of each other and the conditions that to prioritize containment of the Iranian threat each has insisted on for improving relations. and the defeat of ISIL over regional grudge Turkey is not likely to recognize the legitimacy matches and certain former political concerns, of Sisi’s government; in fact, it continues to displaying, for example, some signs of easing its consider Morsi the legitimate president. The stance on the Muslim Brotherhood. Riyadh Turks have demanded new presidential views Ankara, for all its past transgressions elections and the release of political prisoners as against Saudi sensibilities, as an important the price of doing business. Egypt remains firm element in its efforts to counter Iran and ISIL that Ankara must abandon its support for the politically and diplomatically, and to shape the Muslim Brotherhood and acknowledge that the nascent Islamic Military Alliance to Fight military takeover constitutes a legitimate Terrorism (IMAFT), of which both Egypt and expression of the will of the people. Even as Turkey are members, into a credible military conditions for gradual warming in the force. Erdoğan traveled to Saudi Arabia, economic relationship take shape, conditions Bahrain, and Qatar in February 2017 for a visit for improvements in political ties are not likely largely focused on security issues. Nevertheless, to advance. this has not betokened any major new Saudi

Turkish-Egyptian Relations: Nowhere to Go but Up Charles Dunne

Implications for the United States The US Administration has established some So far, the estrangement between these two early goodwill between the United States and major American allies has had little cost for the the governments of Egypt and Turkey through Trump Administration and its emerging President Trump’s words of praise for both Middle East agenda. But as the United States leaders and their authoritarian styles, as well as seeks broader and more effective regional his own willingness to ignore their human efforts to combat ISIL and contain Iran, the rights records in favor of gaining close ongoing tensions between Cairo and Ankara are cooperation in the struggle against terrorism. unhelpful, at the very least. As in Libya and the This alone may not be enough to push Erdoğan eastern Mediterranean, Egyptian-Turkish and Sisi to mend their differences, but it may differences could arise at inopportune times provide a useful entry point should the Trump and complicate, for example, efforts to develop Administration decide it is worthwhile to try to effective regional security structures or crisis push a reconciliation. A successful effort here coordination, efforts to which Egypt and might provide the Trump Administration with Turkey could prove vital (indeed, both a small “win” in a region that is painfully short militaries rank among the region’s ten most of them right now.Current powerful).

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