Keeping America Safe: Why U.S. Bases in Remain Vital

SPECIAL REPORT No. 111 | JULY 11, 2012 from THE MARGARET THATCHER CENTER for FREEDOM Keeping America Safe: Why U.S. Bases in Europe Remain Vital Luke Coffey

SR-111 About the Author Luke Coffey is the Margaret Thatcher Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.

The author is grateful to Brian Slattery for his assistance in preparing this study.

Photos on the Cover— © Jan Rysavy

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at: http://report.heritage.org/sr111

Produced by the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002–4999 (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. SPECIAL REPORT | NO. 111 July 11, 2012

Keeping America Safe: Why U.S. Bases in Europe Remain Vital

Luke Coffey

Executive Summary

s part of a policy that is shrink- later this year. It will East regions. From the Arctic to the Aing America’s military pres- not return to Europe. Levant, from the Maghreb to the ence in the world, the Obama Caucasus, Europe is at one of the Administration’s recent defense cuts ■■ Inactivation of the 170th most important crossroads of the heavily impact the U.S. military foot- Combat Team (BCT) in 2013 and world. U.S. military bases in Europe print in Europe. These cuts are send- the 172nd BCT in 2014—a reduc- provide American leaders with ing the wrong signal on America’s tion of more than 8,000 soldiers. increased flexibility, resilience, and commitment to transatlantic secu- options in a dangerous world. The rity and will embolden U.S. adversar- ■■ An additional reduction of approx- garrisons of American service per- ies in the Euro–Atlantic region. Most imately 2,500 soldiers in enabling sonnel in Europe are no longer the importantly, the cuts will reduce the units of the U.S. Army in Europe fortresses of the Cold War, but the ability and flexibility of the U.S. to over the next five years. forward operating bases of the 21st react to the unexpected in Eurasia century. and the Middle East. U.S. Forces in Europe. Today, America’s Interests. A safe A Shrinking Force Posture. the U.S. has approximately 80,000 and secure Europe is in America’s On January 26, 2012, military personnel in 28 main oper- financial interest. Regional security announced reductions of U.S. mili- ating bases in Europe, primarily in means economic viability. The econ- tary forces in Europe as part of the , Italy, the United Kingdom, omies of the 27 member states of the latest round of defense cuts: and Spain. These forces include four European Union, along with the U.S. BCTs, which form the backbone of economy, account for approximately ■■ Inactivation of one A-10 squad- U.S. ground capability in Europe. half of the global economy. ron at , Some believe that basing U.S. A relevant and strong NATO Germany, in 2013. troops in Europe is a Cold War is also in America’s interest. U.S. anachronism, but forward basing U.S. forces play a major role in the capac- ■■ Inactivation of the 603rd Air troops in Europe is just as important ity building of key European allies. Control Squadron at Aviano Air today as it was during the Cold War, This has huge benefits for the United Base, Italy, in 2013. albeit for different reasons. The U.S. States. In 2010, the U.S. carried out military presence in Europe helps 33 major multinational training ■■ Reduction of V Corps headquar- to achieve American policy aims exercises involving 50,000 troops ters structure after deployment to in the broader Eurasia and Middle from 40 countries in Europe. U.S.

1 KEEPING AMERICA SAFE: WHY U.S. BASES IN EUROPE REMAIN VITAL forces also help European allies to Administration’s recent decision. transforms for the 21st century, it prepare for missions such as the This is dangerous, shortsighted, and needs American leadership and one in Afghanistan. For example, based on the false assumption that commitment. a Georgian infantry is the U.S. can project the same degree fighting alongside U.S. Marines in of power with rotational forces as ■■ Be honest and open with Helmand Province, one of the most it currently does with troops per- European allies. The Obama dangerous parts of Afghanistan. The manently based in Europe. Under Administration needs to consult more America trains its allies to current plans, more than 10,000 with key European allies and with carry out challenging missions, the soldiers will leave Europe and be the broader NATO alliance before more they can share the burden. replaced by a maximum of one bat- making decisions on U.S. troop Cost-Driven Reductions. talion rotating through Europe for reductions in Europe. Perceived financial savings, not training. Furthermore, most savings an empirical or strategic review of estimates exclude the cost of building ■■ Reward key U.S. allies with U.S. force requirements, appear to new infrastructure in the U.S. for any closer defense cooperation. have driven the decision to reduce returning units, the up-front cost of Instead of reducing the numbers the U.S. military footprint in closing down facilities in Europe, the of U.S. military bases in Europe, Europe. On April 8, 2011, the Obama cost of rotating units between the U.S. the U.S. should consider establish- Administration announced that it and Europe, and the strain this would ing new bases in Europe, especial- was modifying a 2004 decision to exert on the smaller army that the ly on the periphery and with allies remove two of the four BCTs from Obama Administration is proposing. who have demonstrated a strong Europe and would bring only one Time for U.S. Leadership. commitment to Euro–Atlantic BCT back to the . In Instead, the White House should: security, such as Georgia. January 2012, the Administration reversed itself, stating that two BCTs ■■ Put America’s national secu- Conclusion. The U.S. military would return from Europe. However, rity interests ahead of defense presence in Europe deters American the Administration did not explain cuts. Important decisions, such adversaries, strengthens allies, and what had changed in the geostrategic as the number of bases and the protects U.S. interests. Whether picture of Europe or in the advice troop strength, should follow from preparing U.S. and allied troops from U.S. allies since last April to a strategic review of U.S. interests for Afghanistan or responding to a prompt this reversal. This indicates in Europe, not the desire to slash humanitarian crisis in the region, that defense cuts, not strategy, are the defense budget to find savings. the U.S. can project power and react driving the decision. to the unexpected because of its The Red Herring of Perceived ■■ Show U.S. commitment to forward-based military capabilities Financial Savings. Proponents cite NATO and Euro–Atlantic secu- in Europe. Reducing these capabili- savings as the main reason to reduce rity. The U.S. troop presence in ties will only weaken America on the U.S. bases in Europe. This is clearly Europe is the most visible sign of world stage. the rationale behind the Obama U.S. support to NATO. As NATO

2 SPECIAL REPORT | NO. 111 July 11, 2012

Keeping America Safe: Why U.S. Bases in Europe Remain Vital

Luke Coffey

Abstract The Obama Administration’s latest rounds of cuts will significantly reduce the U.S. force posture in Europe. Budgetary considerations, not changes in the strategic environment, appear to be driving these cuts. These reductions will limit America’s ability to project power into Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. The Administration’s policy is sending the wrong signal on America’s commitment to transatlantic security and will embolden U.S. adversaries in the Euro–Atlantic region.

ince the end of the Cold War, the jeopardizing the future of the U.S. that can promote U.S. interests in SU.S. military presence in Europe military presence in Europe. the region without creating a culture has been viewed as low-hanging As part of the recent tranche of dependency on the U.S. security fruit for those seeking savings in the of defense cuts, the Obama umbrella among America’s European defense budget. At its peak in 1953, Administration announced the with- allies. The commonly held belief that the U.S. had approximately 400,000 drawal of at least two brigade com- U.S. forces are in Europe to protect troops in Europe. Due to the Soviet bat teams (BCTs)2 totaling approxi- European allies from a threat that no threat to Western Europe, the U.S. mately 8,000 soldiers and 2,200 longer exists is wrong. In fact, for- had good reason to base a high num- combat service and support soldiers ward basing U.S. troops in Europe is ber of U.S. troops in Europe. During from Europe by 2014. In addition, just as important now as it was dur- the early 1990s, as part of the “peace the Administration announced ing the Cold War, albeit for different dividend,” U.S. troop numbers in that key aviation assets would be reasons. Europe were slashed. Paradoxically, removed from their permanent The Cold War world was defined in the early 1990s, use of U.S. troops bases in Europe. These cuts have by its bipolarity. The two centers of based in Europe increased while been supported by some Members of power were the United States and the their numbers were being reduced.1 Congress and media commentators Soviet Union. Today, the post–Cold Today, approximately 80,000 who believe that basing U.S. troops in War world is defined by its multipo- U.S. troops are permanently based Europe is a Cold War anachronism. larity with various centers of power in Europe. Of these, roughly 11,000 However, basing American around the world, which is more akin service personnel are deployed troops in Europe directly serves U.S. to the late 19th century than to any- outside Europe at any given time. national security interests. Of course, thing experienced during the Cold Maintaining a robust and capable the presence of U.S. forces in Europe War. However, the 19th century and military presence in Europe is in contributes to the collective defense today differ in the way that globaliza- America’s interest. The Obama of U.S. allies on the continent, but tion has empowered nonstate actors Administration’s attempt to “pivot” this is a consequence of, not the rea- and individuals to become centers its defense focus to Asia, while simul- son for, maintaining a robust pres- of power competing against nation- taneously cutting defense expendi- ence. The challenge for U.S. decision states in their own right. For example, ture to its lowest level in decades, is makers is to keep a military force Hezbollah, a terrorist organization

3 KEEPING AMERICA SAFE: WHY U.S. BASES IN EUROPE REMAIN VITAL and nonstate actor, has an arsenal The History of 1923, and the U.S. did not again base of rockets and missiles that “dwarfs U.S. Forces in Europe large numbers of troops in Europe on the inventory of many nation-states,” U.S. troops are stationed in a permanent basis until after World according to former U.S. Secretary Europe for good security and politi- War II.6 of Defense Robert Gates.3 Bands of cal reasons. The role, disposition, At the end of World War II in 1945, Somali pirates have turned piracy and configuration of the troops large numbers of U.S. troops were into a multi-million-dollar business. have changed with the global secu- permanently based in Europe as According to the BBC, the pirates rity circumstances. The presence of part of the occupation force. In 1952, earned $146 million from ransom U.S. troops in Europe should not be U.S. European Command (EUCOM) payments in 2011.4 This is equivalent viewed through the narrow lens of was created to better organize the to the annual nominal gross domes- defending the Fulda Gap, but as part U.S. military presence, bringing U.S. tic product of Kiribati, an island of an evolving process designed to Navy, Air Force, and Army elements nation-state in the Pacific.5 Many meet U.S. security needs. Therefore, under one unified command. of these nonstate actors and terror- it is folly to view the end of the Cold During the Cold War, EUCOM ist groups operate on the periphery War as the end of the need for U.S. focused mainly on providing peace of Europe, and some operate inside troops in Europe. It is important to in Europe and deterring and pre- Europe itself. They can directly or recall the reasoning behind station- paring to defeat Soviet and Warsaw indirectly affect U.S. security. ing large numbers of U.S. troops in Pact forces. At its peak, more than From the Arctic to the Levant, Europe after World War II to better 400,000 U.S. troops were sta- from the Maghreb to the Caucasus, understand the situation today. tioned in Western Europe. Initially, Europe is at one of the most impor- EUCOM’s area of responsibility also tant crossroads of the world. U.S. A ROBUST AND CAPABLE PRESENCE included all of Africa and the Middle bases in Europe provide American OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE East. leaders with flexibility, resilience, Between 1950 and 1953, the and options in a dangerous mul- IS JUST AS IMPORTANT TODAY AS IT U.S. presence in Europe grew from tipolar world. The huge garrisons WAS DURING THE COLD WAR. 120,000 troops to 400,000. Given of American service personnel in that the U.S. was fighting in Korea Europe are no longer the fortresses The first instance of basing signif- at the time, this troop increase was of the Cold War, but the forward icant numbers of U.S. troops in con- relatively fast, markedly impressive, operating bases of the 21st cen- tinental Europe dates back to the end and desperately needed to counter tury. The U.S. needs to have the of World War I, when approximately the emerging threat from the Soviet tools available to react to events in 15,000 soldiers of the newly formed Union. America’s interests. Hence, a robust Third Army occupied the Koblenz However, the Vietnam War took a and capable presence of U.S. military region between Luxumbourg and the toll on U.S. troop numbers in Europe, forces in Europe is just as important Rhine River. The last of these occu- which fell below 265,000 by 1970. today as it was during the Cold War. pation force troops departed in early Troop numbers in Europe did not

1. For example, between 1990 and 1993 the number of U.S. soldiers in Europe decreased from 213,000 in 1990 to 122,000 in 1993, and the number of U.S. Army installations across Europe dropped from 858 to 415. However, during this time the U.S. Army in Europe command supported 42 deployments that required 95,579 personnel. U.S. Army Europe, “History,” http://www.eur.army.mil/organization/history.htm (accessed April 12, 2012). 2. A brigade combat team is a self-contained combined arms formation and the basic deployable maneuver unit in the U.S Army. There are three types of combat : heavy brigade combat teams, infantry brigade combat teams, and brigade combat teams. 3. Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 1 (January/February 2009), http://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/63717/robert-m-gates/a-balanced-strategy (accessed April 11, 2012). 4. Frank Gardner, “Seeking Somali Pirates, from the Air,” BBC News, February 21 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17095887 (accessed April 11, 2012). 5. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, Reports for Selected Countries and Subjects: Kiribati, April 2011, http://www.imf.org/ external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2008&ey=2011&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=826&s=NGDPD%2CNGDPDPC% 2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC%2CLP&grp=0&a=&pr.x=59&pr.y=4 (accessed April 13, 2012). 6. U.S. Army Europe, “History.”

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British Prime Minister Margaret interests. Since 1952, U.S. troops U.S. Forces in Europe, Thatcher’s support of the proposal, based in Europe have participated in 1950–1953 once again highlighting the strength or supported more than 200 named of the Anglo–American Special operations varying from humanitar- U.S. Air Forces in Europe Relationship.8 ian and natural disaster relief efforts grew from three groups with With the creation of Central to peacekeeping, anti-terrorism, and 35,000 personnel in 1950 to 11 Command (CENTCOM) in 1983 the force protection operations—many of wings with 136,000 personnel Middle East, except Israel, Lebanon them outside continental Europe.9 in 1953. The U.S. Navy operating and Syria, was transferred out of Three examples from the Cold in the Mediterranean doubled to EUCOM’s area of responsibility. War demonstrate the policy advan- more than 40 warships. The U.S. The creation of Africa Command tages of having U.S. military forces Army grew from one infantry (AFRICOM) in 2008 transferred prepositioned in Europe: division and three constabulary EUCOM’s Africa responsibilities regiments to two corps with five to the new combatant command. ■■ Operation Blue Bat: The U.S. divisions, including two mobi- Today, Israel is the only area outside military response to the 1958 lized National Guard divisions. Europe that remains in EUCOM’s Lebanon Crisis. In 1958, the In 1953, the Army also relo- area of responsibility. However, U.S. Navy deployed 45,000 men, cated the 10th Special Forces EUCOM continues to regularly sup- including 5,000 marines, to the Group from Fort Bragg, North port CENTCOM and AFRICOM. In Middle East from Sixth Fleet in Carolina, to Bad Töltz, Germany, fact, AFRICOM almost completely Naples, Italy.10 U.S. Army Europe for unconventional warfare mis- depends on support from EUCOM. deployed one infantry unit from 7 sions behind the Iron Curtain. Germany to Turkey, and then to 11 SINCE 1952, U.S. TROOPS BASED IN Beirut. Throughout the duration EUROPE HAVE PARTICIPATED IN OR of the mission, four U.S. airbases recover until the 1980s under the in Europe provided logistical and Reagan Administration. However, SUPPORTED MORE THAN 200 NAMED lifesaving capabilities.12 U.S. troops in Europe only topped OPERATIONS — MANY OF THEM 350,000 troops, never again reaching OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL EUROPE. ■■ The multinational force in the Cold War peak of 400,000. Lebanon, 1982. In the midst of During the late 1970s and in Even during the Cold War, the Lebanon’s civil war, Israel invaded the 1980s, the U.S. responded to U.S. military presence in Europe Lebanon in response to an assas- the Soviet deployment of SS-20 did much more than the tradition- sination attempt on Shlomo Argov, intermediate-range ballistic mis- al Cold War mission of defending Israeli ambassador to the U.K.13 siles in Eastern Europe by deploy- Western Europe. There are countless The United States and European ing similar Pershing II and ground- examples of the U.S. using its for- allies brokered a cessation of launched cruise missiles in Western ward-deployed presence in Europe hostilities. After the Palestinian Europe. This was made possible by to project power for America’s Liberation Organization and

7. U.S. European Command, Headquarters, Directorate of Public Affairs, “Fact Sheet: History,” http://www.eucom.mil/doc/22823/history-of-eucom.pdf (accessed April 11, 2012). 8. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), pp. 236–263. 9. U.S. European Command, “History of EUCOM,” http://www.eucom.mil/mission/background/history-of-eucom (accessed April 13, 2012). 10. Lieutenant Mark A. Olinger, “Airlift Operations During the Lebanon Crisis,” Army Logistician, May–June 2005, http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/ MayJun05/airlift.html (accessed March 9, 2012). 11. Lieutenant Colonel Gary H. Wade, “Rapid Deployment Logistics: Lebanon, 1958,” U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute Research Survey No. 3, October 1984, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/resources/csi/Wade/wade.asp (accessed March 9, 2012). 12. Olinger, “Airlift Operations During the Lebanon Crisis.” 13. Lawrence Joffe, “Shlomo Argov,”The Guardian, February 24, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/25/israelandthepalestinians.lebanon (accessed March 9, 2012).

5 KEEPING AMERICA SAFE: WHY U.S. BASES IN EUROPE REMAIN VITAL

Syrian forces had withdrawn from KC-135s flying from bases in the combat vehicles, 650 pieces of artil- Beirut, the U.S., France, and Italy U.K. and Italy. On the return flight, lery, and 325 Army aviation aircraft deployed a multinational force one aircraft made an emergency to support Operations Desert Shield in Lebanon to maintain stabil- landing at a U.S. Air Base in Rota, and Desert Storm.20 ity.14 EUCOM played a key role in Spain.19 Bosnia. After Yugoslavia dis- providing command and control solved in 1992, war broke out and logistical support for the U.S. After the fall of the Berlin Wall across ethnic and national lines contingent deployed to Lebanon. and the end of the Cold War, the in Bosnia–Herzegovina. As part of U.S. drastically reduced its troop U.N. humanitarian efforts, the U.S. ■■ Operation El Dorado Canyon: presence in Europe. However, the Army rapidly mobilized the 212th Libyan air strikes, 1986. In U.S. troops that remained in Europe Mobile Army Surgical Hospital 1986, U.S. intelligence connected a have been more active than ever based in Wiesbaden Army Airfield, terrorist bombing of a nightclub in before. In all of these post–Cold War Germany,21 and deployed it to West Germany to the Libyan gov- operations, the forward deployed and . The unit set up a 60-bed ernment.15 On April 15, 1986, the prepositioned military capabilities hospital within days, and U.S. medi- U.S. Air Force in Europe struck a located in Europe enabled the U.S. cal staff treated more than 9,700 number of Libyan military assets to respond in a timely manner. It is casualties from more than 31 coun- in retaliation for this and other worth examining notable operations tries during the conflict.22 Escalation terrorist actions traced back to to which U.S. forces based in Europe in the region prompted the U.N. to the rogue state.16 U.S. fighter- have contributed since the fall of the declare a no-fly zone over Bosnian bombers flew from airbases in the Berlin Wall. air space on April 12, 1993, and U.S. U.K. to carry out the airstrikes The First Gulf War. When air assets primarily from U.S. bases in Libya.17 Because France, Spain, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in in Italy executed this mission.23 The and Italy prohibited use of their August 1990, U.S. troops in Europe ability to fly from Italy saved the U.S. airspace due to political concerns, supported Central Command by aircraft valuable time and fuel by the U.S. aircraft flew around providing the bulk of the U.S. ground reducing transit time. the Iberian Peninsula, which troops used to liberate Kuwait. The Kosovo. In 1999, the U.S. partici- required multiple in-flight refu- first troops from Europe deployed pated in the NATO Operation Allied elings.18 Even so, the flight path to Saudi Arabia later that month. By Force to suppress violence in Kosovo from the U.K. to Libya was much September, the entire 12th Aviation committed by Serbian military shorter than flying from airbases Brigade was in the Gulf. The U.S. forces. In preparation for this mis- in the United States. The strike Army in Europe deployed 75,000 sion, U.S. Air Force Europe moved 64 force was refueled by KC-10s and soldiers, 1,200 tanks, 1,700 armored fighter jets from bases in Lakenheath,

14. John H. Kelly, “Lebanon: 1982–1984,” chap. 6, in Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin, eds., U.S. and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1996), http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF129 (accessed March 9, 2012). 15. Nathalie Malinarich, “Flashback: The Berlin Disco Bombing,” BBC News, November 13, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1653848.stm (accessed March 9, 2012). 16. Ibid. 17. Global Security, “Operation El Dorado Canyon,” May 7, 2011, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/el_dorado_canyon.htm (accessed March 19, 2012). 18. Jaglavaksoldier, “Operation El Dorado Canyon 1986 Libya,” YouTube, September 16, 2008, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pgqDT2mlENo (accessed April 13, 2012). 19. Ibid. 20. U.S. Army Europe, “History.” 21. Mary T. Sarnecky, A Contemporary History of the U.S. Army Nurse Corps (Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon/General Borden Institute, 2010), p. 505, http:// www.bordeninstitute.army.mil/other_pub/nurse/NurseCorpsch22.pdf (accessed April 11, 2012). 22. Lieutenant General Michael L. Dodson and Gary C. Miller, “Military Operations: The U.S. Army in ,” in Europe, AE Pamphlet No. 525-100, October 7, 2003, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ae-pam-525-100.pdf (accessed April 13, 2012). 23. Kurt F. Miller, “Deny Flight and Deliberate Force: An Effective Use of Airpower?” master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1997, p. 36, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada331766 (accessed April 11, 2012).

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U.K., and Spangdahlem, Germany, to American air bases in Italy. The Training European Allies Army V Corps, based in Germany, deployed a squadron of Apache heli- A capable and militarily strong NATO is in America’s interest. NATO is copters closer to the region. With only as strong as its member states, which is why joint training between full support, this included 31 support U.S. forces and its allies is vital to keeping NATO a strong alliance. Preparing aircraft, two infantry , one the militaries of European allies to deploy outside NATO’s borders offers signal battalion, and 5,000 sup- huge benefits for the United States. In 2010, the U.S. carried out 33 major porting personnel, which travelled multinational training exercises involving 50,000 troops from 40 countries from Germany to Kosovo’s border in in Europe. Many of these training exercises were to prepare European allies Albania.24 for deployments to Afghanistan. Approximately 80 percent of the coun- 27 Operations After Desert tries with forces deployed in Afghanistan are European. If these European Storm. In the wake of Operation troops were not in Afghanistan, the U.S. would have needed to deploy more Desert Storm, U.S. and Coalition troops. 28 forces were concerned for the safety For example, a Georgian infantry battalion is fighting alongside and well-being of Kurdish refugees U.S. Marines in Helmand Province, one of the most dangerous parts of in northern Iraq. U.S. European Afghanistan. The more America trains its allies to carry out challenging mis- Command led a number of humani- sions, such as in Afghanistan, the more they can share the burden carried tarian missions called Operation by the U.S. Provide Comfort to relocate dis- However, former EUCOM commander General Bantz Craddock told placed Kurds and provide stability in the House and Senate Armed Services Committees in 2007 that wartime the region.25 At its peak, more than deployments left him without the forces needed for exercises and other 5,300 soldiers from U.S. bases in security cooperation in his area. Removing two more brigade combat teams, Europe were deployed into northern as the Obama Administration is planning, will exacerbate this already dif- 29 Iraq to protect the Kurdish popula- ficult situation. tion. During this period, U.S. bases in Turkey, primarily at Incirlik, proved invaluable. Over time Operation relied on U.S. airbases close to the dropped food and medical aid to Provide Comfort became the basis region. Afghans.26 Since combat operations of a no-fly zone mission called Afghanistan 2001. U.S. Military began in October 2001, tens of thou- Operation Northern Watch. U.S. Air Forces in Europe continue to play sands of troops based in Europe have Force units based in Europe also an important role in the ongoing deployed in support of Operation participated in Operation Southern campaign in Afghanistan. Within 45 Enduring Freedom. Furthermore, Watch, the no-fly zone over southern minutes of the first U.S. airstrikes in U.S. forces based in Europe trained Iraq established to protect the Shia Afghanistan in October 2001, C-17s tens of thousands of NATO troops population. Once again, this mission from , Germany, who deployed to Afghanistan.

24. Colonel Gary P. Shaw, “Operation Allied Force: Case Studies in Expeditionary Aviation—USAF, USA, USN, and USMC,” Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 2002, pp. 12–13, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA404537 (accessed May 15, 2012). 25. John P. Cavanaugh, “Operation Provide Comfort: A Model for Future NATO Operations,” U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Studies, 1992, p. 34, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA254123 (accessed April 11, 2012). 26. Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), p. 81, http:// www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG166-1.pdf (accessed April 11, 2012). 27. Admiral James G. Stavridis, “European Command Posture Statement,” testimony before Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, and Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, March 30, 2011, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/postures/posture_eucom_30mar2011.pdf (accessed April 11, 2012). 28. This commitment from Georgia will be doubled in autumn 2012, making Georgia ISAF’s largest troop contributor per capita in Afghanistan. 29. General Bantz J. Craddock, statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 15, 2007, http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/ olc/docs/TestCraddock070315.pdf (accessed April 11, 2012).

7 KEEPING AMERICA SAFE: WHY U.S. BASES IN EUROPE REMAIN VITAL

Iraq 2003. When combat opera- stabilized Monrovia, Liberia’s capital, critical basing and logistical sup- tions in Iraq started in March 2003, and then withdrew from the country port to support NATO operations the U.S. Army V Corps had already by September 30 of that year.33 over Libya.35 deployed a number of divisions Libya. On March 18, 2011, the from headquarters in Germany U.N. Security Council passed U.S. Forces in Europe Today to Kuwait.30 As part of the initial Resolution 1973 which called for Approximately 80,000 U.S. ser- invasion, the V Corps crossed the a cease-fire in Libya. Muammar vice personnel from all branches Iraq border led by the 3rd Infantry Qadhafi failed to comply with the of the military are based in Europe. Division with 20,000 soldiers and resolution, and NATO and U.S. forces The U.S. has three different types of 10,000 vehicles.31 A few days later enforced a no-fly zone to protect military installations in the EUCOM on March 26, the 173rd Airborne civilians from the dictator’s military area of responsibility: Brigade based in Vicenza, Italy, took attacks. On March 20, 2011, F-15Es off from in north- based at Lakenheath; F-16CJs from ■■ Main operating bases are the ern Italy and parachuted around Spangdahlem; KC-135s from RAF large U.S. military installations 1,000 troops into northern Iraq to Mildenhall, U.K.; and C-130Js from with a relatively large number of open a northern front, a mere five- Ramstein34 began enforcing the no- permanently based troops and hour flight from Italy.32 Since 2003, fly zone with ease, and U.S. involve- well-established infrastructure. tens of thousands of troops based in ment tipped the scales against Europe have deployed in support of Qadhafi. ■■ Forward-operating sites are Operation Iraqi Freedom. As EUCOM commander Admiral intended for rotational forces Liberia. After years of violence James Stavridis summarized in his rather than permanently based and corruption in Liberia, EUCOM 2012 written report to Congress: forces. These installations tend to initiated a peacekeeping and human- be scalable and adaptable depend- itarian mission in August 2003. Indeed, we witnessed last year ing on the circumstances. Due to its proximity, the Southern how rapidly the installations European Task Force (SETAF) along the Mediterranean— ■■ Cooperative security locations based in Vicenza was chosen as Moron Air Base, Spain; Aviano have little or no permanent U.S. the headquarters for the joint task Air Base, Italy; Naval Air Station military presence and are usually force. Under SETAF’s command, Sigonella, Italy; and Naval maintained by contractor or host- special operations forces and the Support Activity Souda Bay, nation support. 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit —were able to provide

30. Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Annapolis, MD: First Naval Institute Press, 2005), p. 86, http://books.google.com/books/ (accessed April 11, 2012). 31. Associated Press, “U.S. Troops Make Last-Minute War Preparations,” Fox News, March 19, 2003, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,81503,00.html (accessed April 13, 2012). 32. Catherine Dale, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, April 2, 2009, p. 49, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34387.pdf (accessed April 11, 2012). 33. Colonel Blair A. Ross Jr. “The U.S. Joint Task Force Experience in Liberia,” Military Review, May–June 2005, p. 60, http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/ milreview/download/English/MayJun05/ross.pdf (accessed April 11, 2012). 34. Jeremiah Gertler, “ (Libya): Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, March 30, 2011, pp. 11–12, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41725.pdf (accessed April 11, 2012). 35. Admiral James G. Stavridis, “European Command: 2012 Posture Statement,” U.S. European Command, p. 71, http://www.eucom.mil/doc/23162/2012-high-res- posture-statement.pdf (accessed May 15, 2012).

8 SPECIAL REPORT | NO. 111 July 11, 2012

NETHERLANDS U.K. MAP 1 29 POLAND SWEDEN 23 The U.S. NORWAY GERMANY European Command 21 22 1 16 2 25 13 12 The bulk of the U.S. 6 3 North BELGIUM 10 8 military presence in Sea 11 5 9 Europe is concentrated 4 24 30 in Germany and the 7 AUSTRIA U.K. Other key posts SWITZ. 28 stretch across the U.K. GERMANY FRANCE 15 length of the IRELAND Mediterranean Sea, BELGIUM ITALY well within reach of hot spots in the 14 Middle East. Ligurian Bay FRANCE Sea of ITALY Biscay 31 TURKEY PORTUGAL 19 GREECE 27 SPAIN Tyrrhenian Atlantic Sea Ionian Ocean Sea 18 CYPRUS 17 20

200 MILES TUNISIA Mediterranean Sea 26 ALGERIA MOROCCO LIBYA EGYPT

U.S. ARMY—16 key bases U.S. NAVY—4 U.S. AIR FORCE—8 OTHER BELGIUM GREECE U.K. NORWAY 1. Benelux 17. U.S. Naval Support Activity, 21. RAF Lakenheath 29. Marine Corps Prepositioning 2. Brussels Souda Bay, Crete, Greece 22. RAF Mildenhall Program in the Trondheim GERMANY ITALY 23. RAF Alconbury Region 3. Ansbach 18. Naval Air Station Sigonella GERMANY GERMANY 4. Baden Wuerttemburg 19. Naples Naval Support 24. Ramstein Air Base 30. Landstuhl Regional Medical 5. Bamberg Activity 25. Spangdahlem Air Base Center in Landstuhl 6. Baumholder SPAIN PORTUGAL TURKEY 7. Garmisch 20. Rota Naval Station 26. (Azores) 31. U.S. X-band radar as part of 8. Grafenwoehr TURKEY missile defense in Kürecik 9. Hohenfels 27. Incirlik Air Base (eastern Turkey) 10. Kaiserslautern ITALY 11. Stuttgart 28. Aviano Air Base 12. Schweinfurt 13. Wiesbaden ITALY 14. Livorno 15. Vicenza Source: Heritage Foundation research. NETHERLANDS 16. Schinnen SR 111 heritage.org

9 KEEPING AMERICA SAFE: WHY U.S. BASES IN EUROPE REMAIN VITAL

The U.S. has 28 main operating stability and to provide for their more than 67 percent of the Earth’s bases, primarily in Germany, Italy, own security; coastline.38 the United Kingdom, Turkey, and This command is currently pro- Spain. The number of U.S. installa- ■■ Nurture strategic relationships vided by the U.S. Sixth Fleet based tions in Europe has declined steadily and necessary force posture to in Naples and brings critical U.S. since the Cold War. For example, enable continued access, thereby maritime combat capability into in 1990, the U.S. Army had more ensuring U.S. freedom of action an important region of the world. than 850 sites in Europe, but today and global reach; Some of the more notable U.S. naval the total number for all services is bases in Europe include the Naval approximately 350.36 ■■ Prevent violent extremist organi- Air Station in Sigonella; the Naval EUCOM’s stated mission is to zations from obtaining and using Support Activity Base in Souda Bay, conduct military operations, inter- weapons of mass destruction; Greece; and the Naval Station at national military engagement, and Rota. Naval Station Rota will soon be interagency partnering to enhance ■■ Advance NATO European ballistic home to four capable Aegis-equipped transatlantic security and defend missile defense through an inte- destroyers. In addition, the USS the United States as part of a for- grated approach built on balanced Mount Whitney, a Blue Ridge-class ward defensive posture. This mission contributions; and command ship, is permanently based statement is supported by a number in the region. This ship provides a of objectives. According to the 2012 ■■ Prevent the evolution of local key command-and-control platform, EUCOM Posture Statement submit- crises into regional conflicts, which was successfully employed ted to Congress, the objectives are to: particularly in the Balkans and during the early days of the recent Caucasus. Libyan operation. ■■ Ensure high readiness to execute The U.S. Navy also keeps a num- EUCOM’s contingency plans; EUCOM is supported by four ber of submarines in the area which service component commands and contribute greatly to EUCOM’s ■■ Posture EUCOM forces to support one subordinate unified command: intelligence, surveillance, and recon- NATO Article V response, while U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR), naissance (ISR) capacity. Admiral focusing on allied and partner U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), Stavridis has pointed out, “These training designed to maintain U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), [submarine] capabilities are increas- interoperability; U.S. Marine Forces Europe ingly important as the Russian (MARFOREUR), and U.S. Special Federation Navy increases the pace, ■■ Assist the International Security Operations Command Europe scope and sophistication of its sub- Assistance Force (ISAF) tran- (SOCEUR). marine fleet.”39 The U.S. Navy also sition through the continued U.S. Naval Forces Europe. has a fleet of P-3 Maritime Patrol generation and training of ample NAVEUR is responsible for provid- Aircraft and EP-3 Reconnaissance coalition forces; ing overall command, operational Aircraft operating from U.S. bases control, and coordination for mari- in Italy, Greece, Spain, and Turkey. ■■ Sustain NATO and capable time assets in the EUCOM and They complement the ISR capabili- partner nations’ expeditionary AFRICOM37 areas of responsibility. ties of U.S. submarines. capabilities, while reinforcing This includes more than 20 million U.S. Army Europe. USAREUR their ability to maintain regional square nautical miles of ocean and was established in 1952. Like today,

36. U.S. Government Accountability Office,Defense Management: Additional Information and Stakeholder Input Needed to Assess Military Posture in Europe, GAO–11– 131, February 2011, p. 6, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11131.pdf (accessed May 15, 2012). 37. The commander of NAVEUR is also the commander of U.S. Naval Force Africa (NAVAF). 38. Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe–U.S. Naval Forces Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet, “Area of Responsibility,” http://www.c6f.navy.mil/AORPAGE.html (accessed April 13, 2012). 39. Stavridis, “European Command,” p. 23.

10 SPECIAL REPORT | NO. 111 July 11, 2012 the U.S. Army formed the bulk of Since 2003, 75,000 USAREUR theater and globally. The airbases in U.S. forces in Europe during the Cold soldiers have deployed to Iraq and Europe were particularly effective War. At the height of the Cold War, Afghanistan including 18,000 in in enabling a timely response to the 277,000 soldiers40 and thousands of 2010.42 Libya crisis. The forward presence tanks, armored personnel carriers, U.S. Air Forces in Europe. of U.S. Air Force assets in Europe and tactical nuclear weapons were USAFE provides a forward-based air also allows U.S. leaders to respond positioned in the Army’s European capability that can support a wide quickly to emerging humanitarian bases. USAREUR also contributed range of contingency operations crises. For example, in 2011, USAFE to U.S. operations in the broader ranging from direct combat opera- delivered nine tons of aid within 48 region, such as the U.S. intervention tions in Afghanistan and Libya to hours to Tunisia45 and rapidly pro- in Lebanon in 1958, when it deployed humanitarian assistance in Tunisia vided aid to Turkey after the devas- 8,000 soldiers for four months from and Israel. USAFE originated as tating magnitude 7.2 earthquake in bases in Europe.41 In the 1990s after the 8th Air Force in 1942 and flew October 2011.46 the fall of the Berlin Wall, USAREUR strategic bombing missions over the U.S. Marine Forces Europe. continued to play a vital role in pro- European continent during World MARFOREUR was established in moting U.S. interest in the region, War II. In August 1945, the 8th Air 1980 to support the U.S. Navy better. especially in the Balkans. Force was redesignated USAFE It was originally a “designate” com- with 17,000 airplanes and 450,000 ponent command, meaning that it 43 SINCE 2003, 75,000 USAREUR personnel. Today, USAFE has eight was only a shell during peacetime, SOLDIERS HAVE DEPLOYED TO IRAQ main operating bases along with but could bolster its forces dur- 114 geographically separated loca- ing wartime.47 Its initial staff was AND AFGHANISTAN INCLUDING tions. The main operating bases 40 personnel based in London. By 18,000 IN 2010. are the RAF bases Lakenheath, 1989, it had more than 180 marines Mildenhall, and Alconbury in the in 45 separate locations in 19 coun- Today USAREUR is headquar- U.K.; Ramstein and Spangdahlem tries throughout the European tered in Heidelberg, but will move Air Bases in Germany; Lajes Field theater. Today, the command is to Wiesbaden, Germany, by the end in the Azores; Incirlik Air Base in based in Boeblingen, Germany, and of 2014. The core of USAREUR is Turkey; and Aviano Air Base in Italy. has approximately 1,500 marines formed around four brigade combat Approximately 39,000 active-duty, assigned to support EUCOM, NATO, teams and an aviation brigade locat- reserve, and civilian personnel are and other operations, such as ed in Germany and Italy. In addi- assigned to USAFE.44 Operation Enduring Freedom. It was tion, the U.S. Army’s 21st Theater USAFE supports operations also duel-hatted as the Marine Corps Transport Command has helped the around the world. In 2011, elements Forces, Africa (MARFORAF) under U.S. military presence in Europe of USAFE flew more than 26,000 Africa Command in 2008.48 become an important logistics hub combat hours in support of ongoing In the past, MARFOREUR in support of Central Command. military operations in the European has supported U.S. Marine units

40. U.S. Army Europe, “History.” 41. U.S. Army, “The Lebanon Operation (15 July–25 October 1958),” http://www.history.army.mil/documents/AbnOps/TABD.htm (accessed April 13, 2012). 42. U.S. Army Europe, Headquarters, Directorate of Public Affairs, “U.S. Army in Europe by the Numbers,” March 2012, http://www.eur.army.mil/pdf/ USAREURBytheNumbers.pdf (accessed April 11, 2012). 43. U. S. Air Forces in Europe, Public Affairs Office, “United States Air Forces in Europe,” April 23, 2012, http://www.usafe.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet. asp?id=13320 (accessed April 11, 2012). 44. U.S. Air Forces in Europe, “Units,” http://www.usafe.af.mil/units/index.asp (accessed April 13, 2012). 45. Stavridis, “European Command.” 46. Captain William Russell, “U.S. Assists with Turkish Earthquake Relief,” U.S. Air Force, November 15, 2011, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123280037 (accessed April 11, 2012). 47. In fact, the only time that MARFOREUR lost its “designate” status was during the war in Kosovo. 48. Brigadier General Tracy L. Garrett and General William E. Ward, “Marine Corps Forces, Africa Officially Established,” U.S. Africa Command, November 14, 2008, http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=2252 (accessed April 11, 2012).

11 KEEPING AMERICA SAFE: WHY U.S. BASES IN EUROPE REMAIN VITAL deployed in the Balkans and the out of RAF Mildenhall.51 In 1982, it I think there is still good value Middle East. MARFOREUR also was redesignated for a fourth time as in a presence in Europe because supports the Norway Air Landed U.S. Special Operations Command of the geographic importance. Marine Air Ground Task Force, the Europe. It’s not just Europe. It supports Marine Corps’s only land-based Due to the sensitive nature of Carter Ham in Africa. It supports prepositioned stock. The Marine Special Forces operations, pub- Jim Mattis in CENTCOM. It’s Corps has enough prepositioned licly available information is scarce. a strategic platform that allows stock in Norway to support a force of However, it has been documented us access in and around the 13,000 marines for 30 days,49 and the that SOCEUR elements participated region.53 Norwegian government covers half in various capacity-building mis- of the costs of the prepositioned stor- sions and civilian evacuation opera- In addition to CENTCOM and age.50 The prepositioned stock’s prox- tions in Africa; took an active role AFRICOM, U.S. troops in Europe imity to the Arctic region makes it of in the Balkans in the mid-1990s and also support Cyber Command particular geostrategic importance. combat operations in the Iraq and (CYBERCOM) and Transportation U.S. Special Operations Afghanistan wars; and most recently Command (TRANSCOM). For exam- Command Europe. SOCEUR is the provided support to AFRICOM’s ple, EUCOM supports TRANSCOM only subordinate unified command Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya. with its array of airbases and under EUCOM. Its origins are in SOCEUR also plays an important access to ports throughout Europe the Support Operations Command role in joint training with European and through its development and Europe, and it was initially based in allies. In 2011 alone, SOCEUR car- enhancement of the multimodal Paris. This headquarters provided ried out 67 training events with distribution capabilities center at peacetime planning and operational European allies on various degrees Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base on control of special operations forces and scales.52 This scale of training the Black Sea in . This is during unconventional warfare in with European allies could not be an important capacity initiative for EUCOM’s area of responsibility. In replicated by rotational forces. ongoing theater and global logistical 1955, the headquarters was reconfig- missions in a key part of the world.54 ured as a joint task force, and it was Supporting Other EUCOM also supports renamed Support Operations Task Combatant Commands TRANSCOM with the work on the Force Europe (SOTFE) and then Perhaps resulting more from Northern Distribution Network later Special Operations Task Force geography than its shared history, (NDN), which supplies U.S. troops Europe. When French President EUCOM has played an important in Afghanistan. In 2011, EUCOM’s Charles de Gaulle forced American role in supporting other combat- Deployment and Distribution troops out of France in 1966, SOTFE ant commands, such as CENTCOM Operations Center moved 21,574 con- relocated to its current headquarters and AFRICOM. Admiral Stavridis, tainers and 32,206 tons of equipment in Panzer Kaserne near Stuttgart, EUCOM’s commander, recently told through Europe to Afghanistan over Germany, in 1967. It also operates the Senate: the NDN.55 The NDN’s success has

49. The prepositioned stock is actually stored in seven locations in Norway totaling more than 900,000 square feet of storage, including 471,445 square feet in caves. The caves are climate-controlled storage, with humidity maintained between 45 percent and 55 percent and temperature between 45 degrees and 50 degrees. This precise regulation allows safe long-term storage of tents, vehicle tires, and other climate-sensitive equipment. 50. Sergeant Matt Lyman, “US Ambassador, MFE Marines Tour Supply Caves in Norway,” U.S. Marine Forces, January 9, 2012, http://www.marines.mil/unit/ marforeur/Pages/USAmbassador,MFEMarinestoursupplycavesinNorway.aspx (accessed April 11, 2012). 51. Stavridis, “European Command.” 52. Ibid. 53. Admiral James Stavridis, testimony, in Hearing to Receive Testimony on U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2013 and the Future Years Defense Program, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 112th Cong., 1st Sess., March 1, 2012, http://armed- services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2012/03%20March/12-05%20-%203-1-12.pdf (accessed April 17, 2012). 54. Stavridis, “European Command.” 55. Ibid.

12 SPECIAL REPORT | NO. 111 July 11, 2012 been a game changer in Afghanistan. designed for use with U.S. and allied NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept EUCOM could not support these dual-capable aircraft. stated that “the supreme guarantee TRANSCOM initiatives without the remains a potent of the security of the Allies is provid- infrastructure and relationships nuclear weapons power, which ed by the strategic nuclear forces of established by the permanent U.S. should concern both the U.S. and the Alliance.”57 NATO should remain military presence in Europe. Europe. Encouraged by the Obama a nuclear alliance as long as the West EUCOM also works closely Administration’s policy of unilateral faces any nuclear threat from any with CYBERCOM to implement nuclear disarmament, some in NATO part of the world. of Department of Defense cyber- have suggested that American tacti- policy in Europe and to bolster cal nuclear weapons in Europe are a The Case for the cyberdefense capabilities of Cold War anachronism and should U.S. Troops in Europe Today America’s European partners. This be removed from the continent. There are strong economic, politi- has included hosting a number of Inside the alliance, there has been an cal, and geographical reasons to keep cyber-relayed conferences and joint ongoing debate on the future of these large, robust, and capable U.S. mili- exercises with European partners. weapons. This debate as been carried tary forces in Europe. Furthermore, EUCOM has supported out under the auspices of NATO’s The Geographical Case: CYBERCOM’s work inside NATO by Deterrence and Defense Posture Emerging Threats from a becoming a full member in the NATO Review (DDPR). Dangerous Region. The geogra- Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of phy of the U.S. European Command Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia. NATO SHOULD REMAIN A NUCLEAR shows why the region matters. The NATO’s cyberdefense capability is ALLIANCE AS LONG AS THE WEST 51 countries in EUCOM’s area of only as strong as its weakest member responsibility include approximately state. Considering that NATO mem- FACES ANY NUCLEAR THREAT FROM one-fifth of the world’s population bers Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania ANY PART OF THE WORLD. inside 10.7 million square miles of and NATO ally Georgia have been land and 13 million square miles of targeted by cyber-attacks, U.S. inter- The 2010 Lisbon Summit ocean.58 EUCOM has physical bor- ests are best served by ensuring Declaration stated that the alli- ders with Russia, the Arctic, , that EUCOM and CYBERCOM work ance “agreed to continue to review Asia Minor, the Caspian Sea, and closely with NATO on this issue. NATO’s overall defense and deter- North Africa. Most of these areas rence posture” and decided to delay have long histories of instability and U.S. Nuclear a final decision regarding the future a potential for future instability that Weapons in Europe of these weapons. The 2012 Chicago could directly impact the security In addition to the French and Summit declared that NATO would interests and economic well-being of British nuclear capabilities, the U.S. maintain its U.S. tactical nuclear the United States. maintains tactical nuclear weap- weapons in Europe, but left the One of the most obvious benefits ons in Europe. Until the end of the details vague. Behind closed doors of having U.S. troops in Europe is its Cold War, the U.S. is believed to have there is still skepticism by some geographical proximity to some of maintained around 2,500 nuclear European allies on the need for such the most dangerous and contested warheads in Europe. Unofficial weapons. regions of the world. This proximity estimates put the current figure The U.S. needs to ensure that tac- of U.S. forces gives policymakers the at between 150 and 200 warheads, tical nuclear weapons remain part of ability to respond quickly to a crisis. based in Italy, Turkey, Germany, the alliance’s nuclear strategy. This To the south of Europe, from the Belgium, and the Netherlands.56 All is an important and often overlooked eastern Atlantic Ocean to the Middle of these are free-fall gravity bombs part of alliance burden sharing. East and up to the Caucasus, is an arc

56. Malcolm Chalmers and Simon Lunn, “NATO’s Tactical Nuclear Dilemma,” Royal United Services Institute Occasional Paper, March 2012, p. 1, http://www.rusi. org/downloads/assets/NATOs_Nuclear_Dilemma.pdf (accessed March 23, 2012). 57. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence,” November 19, 2010, http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng. pdf (accessed April 30, 2012). 58. Stavridis, “European Command.”

13 KEEPING AMERICA SAFE: WHY U.S. BASES IN EUROPE REMAIN VITAL

dramatically in this region, there is Landstuhl Regional Medical Center still a potential for more violence. On a positive note, Albania, Montenegro, Geographical proximity to areas where U.S. troops will likely operate is and Croatia have joined NATO, and also beneficial for medical care. Germany is home to Landstuhl Regional Croatia will soon join the EU. The sit- Medical Center (LRMC), the largest U.S. military hospital outside the conti- uation in Kosovo still remains fragile. nental United States. However, the LRMC does not exist simply as a conse- As recently as August 2011, elements quence of the huge U.S. troop presence in Europe during the Cold War, but of the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade to provide timely medical care to troops operating in some of the world’s were deployed to reinforce NATO’s most dangerous places. Multinational Brigade East in The LRMC has often played a key role in U.S. military interventions in the Kosovo after conflicts arose at border region. For example, during the Cold War the LRMC treated U.S. Marines control points.59 The security situa- injured during the attempted rescue of American hostages in Iran in 1980 tion in the Balkans is far from settled. and in the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. Since the Cold War, the hospital has served as a repatriation point RECENT INSTABILITY IN NORTH for more than 4,000 American casualties during the first Gulf War, and more than 800 U.S. military personnel deployed to Somalia were treated AFRICA AFTER THE POPULAR there.61 The LRMC also played an important role in providing medical care UPRISINGS IN 2011 HAVE SHOWN during the various Balkan operations. THE UTILITY OF BASING ROBUST During recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the LRMC’s proximity U.S. MILITARY CAPABILITIES NEAR to the battlefield has literally saved lives. Since January 1, 2004, the earliest date for which information is readily available, the LMRC has treated almost POTENTIAL GLOBAL HOT SPOTS. 65,000 wounded service personnel from Iraq and Afghanistan. For obvious reasons, the time between injury on the battlefield and arrival at the LRMC To the north, the Arctic or the varies greatly. In rare cases, the LRMC has received patients in about 10 High North is becoming more con- 62 hours after injury in Iraq. Transporting a patient to the East Coast of the tested than ever before. During United States adds an extra nine hours of flying time. summer months, Arctic ice has been decreasing in size and new shipping lanes to Asia are opening as a result. of instability. This region is experi- Recent instability in North Africa Even if the recent reduction in Arctic encing increasing instability from after the popular uprisings in 2011 ice is a cyclic phenomenon, it poses demographic pressures, increased have shown the utility of basing security challenges in the present. commodity prices, interstate and robust U.S. military capabilities Of course, the U.S. has an interest in intrastate conflict, tribal politics, near potential global hot spots. For stability and security in the Arctic competition over water and other example, when ordered to inter- because the U.S. is an Arctic nation. natural resources, religious tension, vene in Libya, U.S. commanders in The American commitment to NATO revolutionary tendencies, terror- Europe were able to act effectively is also relevant because four of the ism, nuclear proliferation, and frozen and promptly because of the well- five Arctic powers are in NATO.60 conflicts. This region also has some established and mature U.S. military Geography also plays an impor- of the world’s most vital shipping footprint in southern Europe. tant role in missile defense, especial- lanes, energy resources, and trade Inside Europe itself, the Balkans ly against medium-range and long- choke points. This is a recipe for have a potential for future instabil- range missile threats from countries instability. ity. Although security has improved such as Iran. Locating major missile

59. News release, “U.S. Army Europe Looks Back at a Busy, Productive 2011,” U.S. Army Europe, January 5, 2011, http://www.eur.army.mil/news/ archive2011/2012-01-05_YIR2011text.htm (accessed April 11, 2012). 60. U.S., Canada, Norway, and Denmark (Greenland). The non-NATO Arctic Sea power is Russia. 61. News release, “LRMC History,” Landstuhl Regional Medical Center Public Affairs Office, June 2009, http://ermc.amedd.army.mil/landstuhl/factsheets/ LRMCHistory.pdf (accessed April 11, 2012). 62. The flight from Baghdad to LRMC takes about seven hours.

14 SPECIAL REPORT | NO. 111 July 11, 2012 defense assets in Poland, Romania, We have adopted and are imple- account for approximately half of the Spain, and Turkey would help to menting unprecedented pro- global economy. protect U.S. interests and European grams to develop our armed The potential impact of the cur- NATO allies. forces and modernize Russia’s rent eurozone crisis on the U.S. Russia is also important to the defense industry. We will allo- makes European economic stabil- U.S. troop presence in Europe. With cate around 23 trillion rubles ity more important than ever before. the Cold War over, Russia no lon- [$775 billion] for these purposes The eurozone crisis could turn into ger poses a direct military threat to over the next decade.63 a security crisis. For example, any Western Europe, but Russia’s future instability or civil unrest resulting is uncertain. For some NATO mem- Putin has also linked strength- from Greece defaulting or leaving bers, Russia is still a force driver in ening the Russian economy with the eurozone could spill over into military planning. For other U.S. modernizing its armed forces. In the the Balkans. Nobody can predict the allies, such as Georgia, Russia contin- same article Putin suggested that security effects of the current euro- ues to be an aggressor. financial investment in moderniz- zone crisis. Nothing indicates that Russia is ing the Russian Armed Forces must The economic case also illus- on a path to reform. Its economy is in “serve as fuel to feed the engines trates the importance of the greater tatters, its demographics and aging of modernization in our economy, European region to energy security population are putting pressures creating real growth and a situa- and the free flow of trade. Some of on the state, and its government is tion where government expenditure the most important energy secu- best described as a thugocracy. In funds new jobs, supports market rity and trade corridors are on the Russia democratic freedoms are in demand, and facilitates scientific periphery of Europe as are some retreat, corruption is endemic, and research.”64 of the world’s most dangerous and the future is bleak. The same failings Although Russia by itself should unstable regions. European econo- of the Soviet Union a quarter of a not drive the U.S. military presence mies depend on oil and gas trans- century ago are starting to reappear in Europe, the second-order effects ported through the volatile Caucasus in Putin’s Russia. of Russian-induced instability in the and several maritime choke points. Even with Russia’s current eco- region should be an ongoing NATO As Arctic sea lanes start to open, nomic difficulties, concern. The collapse of the Soviet shipping is increasing in that region, clearly indicated during his presi- Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall creating new security challenges. dential campaign that he will invest caught many by surprise. Western The Political Case: Relations heavily in Russia’s military. In an leaders should not allow a resurgent with European Allies Are Best article for Rossiiskaya Gazeta, Putin Russia to catch them by surprise, too. Done Through NATO. The U.S. stated: The Economic Case: Stability troop presence in Europe is the Equals Prosperity. A stable, secure, strongest signal of American support Under these circumstances, and economically viable Europe is in for NATO. Regardless of its insti- Russia cannot rely on diplomatic America’s financial interest. Regional tutional shortcomings, NATO has and economic methods alone security means economic viability anchored the U.S. inside Europe for to resolve conflicts. Our coun- and prosperity. For more than 60 the past 63 years. It is important for try faces the task of sufficiently years, the U.S. military presence in the U.S. to engage its European allies developing its military potential Europe has contributed to European through NATO, especially with the as part of a deterrence strategy. stability, which has economically EU looking fractured and weak. This is an indispensable condi- benefited both Europeans and Since the EU’s failed 2004 tion for Russia to feel secure and Americans. The economies of the Constitutional Treaty, the politi- for our partners to listen to our 27 member states of the European cal situation among EU member country’s arguments. Union,65 along with United States, states has become more fragile

63. Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong,” Foreign Policy, February 21, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/21/being_strong (accessed April 11, 2012). 64. Ibid. 65. Any further mention of the European Union in this document refers to the 27 independent and sovereign nation-states that collectively form the European Union.

15 KEEPING AMERICA SAFE: WHY U.S. BASES IN EUROPE REMAIN VITAL and incoherent. Recognizing this multilateral political engagement in ■■ Inactivation of one A-10 squadron in 2005, the U.S. Overseas Basing Europe through NATO. Maintaining at Spangdahlem Air Base in 2013. Commission stated that the French full participation in NATO allows and Dutch referendums rejecting the the U.S. to maintain a leadership role ■■ Inactivation of the 603rd Air EU Constitutional Treaty “high- in European affairs in a way the EU Control Squadron at Aviano Air lighted the continued weakness of would prevent. With all of the prob- Base in 2013. the [European] Union and thus the lems and the uncertain future, NATO importance of NATO to our relation- should continue to be the primary ■■ Reduction of V Corps headquar- ship with Europe.”66 interlocutor for U.S. engagement in ters structure after deployment to The 2009 Lisbon Treaty, which Europe. Afghanistan later this year. It will replaced the failed Constitutional not return to Europe. Treaty, was finally ratified by all EU SOME OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ■■ member states after great political ENERGY SECURITY AND TRADE Inactivation of the 170th Brigade cost and controversy. Ireland initial- Combat Team in 2013 and the ly rejected the Lisbon Treaty in the CORRIDORS ARE ON THE PERIPHERY 172nd BCT in 2014—a reduction June 2008 referendum, but passed it OF EUROPE AS ARE SOME OF THE of more than 8,000 soldiers that in a second referendum in October WORLD’S MOST DANGEROUS AND completely eliminates the U.S. 2009. Lingering political fallout UNSTABLE REGIONS. Army’s mechanized capability in from the Constitutional and Lisbon Europe. Treaties, coupled with the current eurozone crisis and the new and con- A Shrinking U.S. ■■ An additional reduction of approx- troversial Financial Stability Treaty, Force Posture in Europe imately 2,500 soldiers in enabling has increased the risk of political As part of a broader policy that is units of the U.S. Army in Europe instability in Europe. shrinking the U.S. forces around the over the next five years. The current economic and politi- world, the Obama Administration’s cal situation has also made the EU most recent defense cuts will deeply Air Force Cuts. The inactivation unpopular among Europeans. impact the U.S. military footprint in of the 81st Fighter Squadron and the However, NATO still enjoys a high Europe. These cuts send the wrong Air Control Squadron will create sig- degree of increasing popular sup- signal about America’s commitment nificant gaps in U.S. aviation capabil- port. A recent Eurobarometer to transatlantic security and will ity in Europe. poll found that only 31 percent of embolden U.S. adversaries in the Disbanding the 81st Fighter Europeans have a positive image Euro–Atlantic region. Most impor- Squadron also means retiring its 20 of the EU,67 compared to the most tantly, the move will reduce the abil- A-10 and removing recent German Marshall Fund on ity and flexibility of the U.S. to react this capability from Europe.68 The Transatlantic Trends, which report- to the unexpected in Eurasia and the 81st Fighter Squadron first arrived ed that 62 percent of Europeans Middle East. in Germany in 1973. Since then it thought that NATO was an essential On January 26, 2012, the has played a key role in U.S.-led organization. Pentagon announced reductions in operations in the region and beyond, Considering the EU’s bleak the U.S. military force posture in including the first Gulf War, Bosnia, future, the U.S. needs to continue Europe: Kosovo, the no-fly zone in Iraq in the

66. Judy Dempsey, “Questioning EU’s Will, U.S. Panel Backs NATO,” The New York Times, September 13, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/12/world/ europe/12iht-nato.html (accessed February 22, 2012). 67. European Commission, “Eurobarometer 76: Public Opinion in the European Union,” December 2011, p. 20, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/ eb76/eb76_first_en.pdf (accessed April 11, 2012). 68. U.S. Air Forces in Europe Public Affairs, “FY2013 Budget Cuts to Impact U.S. Air Forces in Europe,” Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, February 22, 2012, http:// www.spangdahlem.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123290946 (accessed April 11, 2012).

16 SPECIAL REPORT | NO. 111 July 11, 2012 late 1990s, Operation Iraqi Freedom, more opposite. Therefore, the asser- warning, the Obama Administration Operation Enduring Freedom,69 and tion that V-22s can replace the A-10s is removing both heavy BCTs. most recently over Libya as part of is misleading. In his testimony to the House and Operation Unified Protector.70 Senate Armed Services Committees, The Defense Department has BECAUSE THEY CONSTITUTE Admiral Stavridis justified this move offered little public explanation U.S. ARMY IN EUROPE’S PRIMARY by stating that the loss of these two of the logic of removing this capa- BCTs will be mitigated by a dedicated bility from Europe. During his ARMORED FORCE, CUTTING THE BCT based in the U.S. that will rotate 2012 testimony to the House and TWO HEAVY BCTS WILL LEAVE A its battalions to Europe for joint Senate Armed Services Committees, SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY GAP IN THE training. However, a single infantry Admiral Stavridis justified the deci- U.S. GROUND FORCES. battalion rotating through Europe sion by saying said that “even though cannot provide the same capabil- we’re taking out some aircraft, we’re ity as two permanently based heavy going to bring some new aircraft Army Cuts. The U.S. Army in BCTs provide. Admiral Stavridis and (sic) including the V-22 which is Europe has two heavy BCTs (the told Congress that the current BCT optimized for special operations.”71 170th and 172nd Brigade Combat structure is “static and essentially Nobody disputes the combat effec- Teams in Germany), one infantry parked in Germany.” He went on tiveness of the V-22, which has BCT (the 173rd Airborne Brigade to say that dedicating a BCT in the proved itself in Iraq and Afghanistan. in Italy), and one Stryker BCT (the United States to focus on Europe The V-22 is a very welcome addition 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment in would allow its battalions to rotate to USAFE and will provide U.S. com- Germany) permanently based in to places like the Balkans, the Baltics, manders in Europe an additional Europe. The 170th BCT is slated to or other places in Eastern Europe.74 A capability, especially U.S. Special be cut in 2013, and the 172nd BCT renewed U.S. focus on these regions Forces in Europe. in 2014. In addition, the U.S. Army is welcome, but a single BCT based However, the V-22 is not a substi- in Europe will see a further reduc- permanently in the United States tute for the A-10. The A-10 is a ground tion of approximately 2,500 soldiers cannot properly meet this ambition attack aircraft that can destroy a from enabling units over the next by occasionally rotating one of its main battle tank at a range of 6,500 five years. In all, more than 10,000 battalions to Europe for joint train- meters using a cannon capable of soldiers will return from Europe. ing. Furthermore, elements of the firing up to 4,200 rounds a minute.72 Because they constitute U.S. BCTs based in Germany and Italy The V-22 Osprey is a vertical take- Army in Europe’s primary armored already deploy to Eastern Europe off and landing tiltrotor aircraft force, cutting the two heavy BCTs when they are not deployed on com- that can carry up to 32 troops. As will leave a significant capability bat operations overseas. For exam- Admiral Stavridis pointed out in his gap in the U.S. ground forces. This ple, elements of the 173rd Airborne statement, the V-22 is optimized echoes the analysis of the 2005 Brigade carried out exercises in for special operations, not ground Overseas Basing Commission, which Ukraine and Poland in 2011.75 attack. The capabilities offered by warned against removing a heavy The decision to reduce the num- the A-10 and the V-22 could not be BCT from Europe.73 Despite this ber of BCTs in Europe appears

69. Spangdahlem Air Base, “81st Fighter Squadron,” October 21, 2010, http://www.spangdahlem.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=7910 (accessed April 13, 2012). 70. Joe Pappalardo, “Air War over Libya, in the Pilots’ Words,” Popular Mechanics, March 31, 2011, http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/planes- uavs/air-war-over-libya-in-the-pilots-words-5486669 (accessed April 12, 2012). 71. Stavridis, testimony. 72. Airforce Technology, “A-10 Thunderbolt (Warthog), United States of America,” http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/a-10/ (accessed April 13, 2012). 73. Dempsey, “Questioning EU’s Will, U.S. Panel Backs NATO.” 74. Admiral James Stavridis, testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 1, 2012, http://armedservices.house.gov/ index.cfm/2012/2/fiscal-year-2013-national-defense-authorization-budget-request-from-u-s-european-command-and-u-s-africa-command (accessed April 17, 2012). 75. News release, “U.S. Army Europe Looks Back at a Busy, Productive 2011.”

17 KEEPING AMERICA SAFE: WHY U.S. BASES IN EUROPE REMAIN VITAL to have been based on perceived A mere nine months later on capability to Europe that they are financial savings, not an empirical or January 25, 2012, the Obama removing. Instead of two BCTs, only strategic review of U.S. force require- Administration changed the pol- one infantry battalion will rotate to ments. On April 8, 2011, the Obama icy, announcing that two BCTs Europe at a time. This is dangerous, Administration initially announced will return back to the U.S. from shortsighted, and based on the false that it was reversing the 2004 deci- Europe no later than 2014. The assumption that the U.S. can project sion to remove two of the four BCTs Administration has not explained the same degree of power with rota- from Europe and would instead only what changed in the geostrategic tional forces as it does with troops bring one BCT back to the United picture of Europe since April 2011 so permanently based in Europe. States. The Department of Defense it can only be assumed that perceived Most savings estimates exclude provided the following justification: cost savings, not strategic rationale, the cost of building new infrastruc- drove this decision. ture in the U.S. for any returning Based on the administration’s units, the up-front cost of closing review, consultations with allies MOST SAVINGS ESTIMATES EXCLUDE down facilities in Europe, the cost and the findings of NATO’s new THE COST OF BUILDING NEW of rotating units between the U.S. Strategic Concept, the depart- and Europe, and the strain this INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE U.S. FOR ment will retain three Brigade imposes on the smaller army that Combat Teams in Europe to ANY RETURNING UNITS, THE UP- the Obama Administration is pro- maintain a flexible and rapidly FRONT COST OF CLOSING DOWN posing. For example, even if the deployable ground force to fulfill FACILITIES IN EUROPE, THE COST OF Obama Administration wanted to the United States’ commitments match the capability it is removing ROTATING UNITS BETWEEN THE U.S. to NATO, to engage effectively with rotational forces, U.S. Army with allies and partners, and to AND EUROPE, AND THE STRAIN THIS analysis states that it could poten- meet the broad range of 21st cen- IMPOSES ON THE SMALLER ARMY. tially cost approximately $1 billion tury challenges.76 over ten years to rotate two BCTs to The main reason usually given by Europe twice annually.77 Considering In fact, former Defense Secretary proponents of reducing U.S. mili- the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Robert Gates said that no U.S. troops tary bases in Europe is the percep- history of underestimating the cost would be brought back from Europe tion of saving money. This is appar- of programs, there is no reason to until after 2015, when NATO leaders ently the rationale for the Obama assume this figure will not increase. had agreed to complete the hando- Administration’s recent decision. Even the Government Accountability ver of security responsibilities to However, the facts do not support Office expressed concerns about the the Afghans and end combat opera- this argument. First, reducing U.S. DOD’s inability to properly esti- tions. Gates implicitly acknowledged troops from Europe and achiev- mate its European force structure the importance of U.S. forces in ing the same capability by regularly strategy: Europe in supporting expedition- rotating units from the United States ary campaigns, such as the one in is not economically viable because DOD has taken steps to align Afghanistan. It also highlighted the deploying two mechanized BCTs and posture initiatives with strategy strain on EUCOM, which was trying their equipment overseas to Europe and cost, but continues to lack to carry out joint training operations would incur huge costs. comprehensive and consistent in Europe while supporting opera- The Obama Administration has cost estimates of initiatives.… tions in Iraq and Afghanistan with demonstrated this point with its Until these cost data are compre- only four BCTs. unwillingness to rotate the same hensively compiled and reported,

76. News Release, “DOD Announced U.S. Force Posture Revision in Europe,” U.S. Department of Defense, April 8, 2011, http://www.defense.gov/releases/release. aspx?releaseid=14397 (accessed February 23, 2012). 77. U.S. Government Accountability Office,Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Force Structure: Improved Cost Information and Analysis Needed to Guide Overseas Posture Decisions, June 2012, p.15, http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591398.pdf (accessed June 9, 2012).

18 SPECIAL REPORT | NO. 111 July 11, 2012

DOD and congressional deci- Given General Jones’s criteria, the permanent aviation detachment at sion makers will be unable to U.S. should consider increasing and the 32nd Tactical Air Base in Łask, assess the true cost of posture making permanent its military pres- Poland. The initial plans call for a initiatives.78 ence in three areas. permanent detachment of only 10 Georgia. A small detachment of Air Force personnel. No planes will Finally, morale and welfare of U.S. Marines located at the Krtsanisi be permanently based in Poland. the troops and their dependants National Training Center outside The detachment will host periodic need to be considered in such deci- Tbilisi prepares Georgian soldiers for rotations of U.S. F-16 fighter jets sions. After experiencing such a high combat operations in Afghanistan. and C-130 cargo aircraft.81 The U.S. operational tempo for the past 10 In addition, elements of the U.S. should consider permanently bas- years, military families do not need Marine Corps Black Sea Rotational ing F-16 fighter jets in Poland and another strain resulting from loved Force80 and U.S. National Guard and increasing the size of the permanent ones “deploying” to Europe for unac- Reserve units visit Georgia for joint detachment to demonstrate a firm companied tours. In this regard, the training missions. U.S. commitment to Poland, NATO, current structure of accompanied Georgia has been one of America’s and the region. Furthermore, it tours in Europe, however costly, best allies in Europe. Georgia is com- would fill, albeit only partially, the contributes to family stability and mitting more troops to the mission in capability gap created by withdraw- troop welfare during a period of high Afghanistan this year, doubling their ing the A-10s from Europe. operational tempo. The importance contribution in Helmand Province. A permanent U.S. airbase in of this should not be underestimated. As a result, Georgia will contribute Poland would reassure the Baltic more troops per capita than any States through increased U.S. par- Defending American other nation in ISAF. When Russia ticipation in NATO’s Baltic Air Interests in Eurasia invaded Georgia in 2008, Georgia Policing and ensure that the U.S. Far from reducing the U.S. mili- was the second-largest troop con- maintains a critical air capability tary presence in Europe, the Obama tributor in Iraq, second only to the in Eastern Europe. Finally, it would Administration should examine ways United States. send a signal of enduring support to to increase the U.S. presence, espe- First, the U.S. should rotate infan- the Poles, especially after the Obama cially on Europe’s periphery and try battalions through Georgia to Administration betrayed them by with allies who have been committed ensure that at least one battalion and cancelling plans to base ballistic mis- to Euro–Atlantic security. In 2004, its required support elements are sile interceptors in Poland. General Jim Jones, EUCOM com- always in Georgia at any given time. Finally, there is a political aspect mander, told Congress that any “new Over time, aviation assets could be to consider. The Polish Foreign bases should have a transformational added. This would place U.S. forces Minister Radosław Sikorski has footprint, be geo-strategically placed at the heart of a region with deep U.S. vocally supported deeper EU defense in areas where presence yields the interests and reward the Georgians integration.82 A more visible U.S. highest return on investment, be for their committed contribution to commitment to the U.S.–Polish able to both contract and expand as U.S. and NATO operations. defense relationship would also required and should … take advan- Poland. The U.S. and Poland have send the right political messages to tage of our developing ability to rota- enjoyed a strong bilateral defense Poland that a U.S. anchored to NATO, tionally base our forces.”79 His advice training relationship. In early 2012, not the EU, best serves Europe’s and still applies today. the U.S. Air Force will establish a Poland’s defense requirements.

78. Ibid., p. 2. 79. General James L. Jones, statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, September 23, 2004, http://armed-services.senate.gov/ statemnt/2006/March/Jones%2003-07-06.pdf (accessed May 25, 2012). 80. U.S. Marine Corps Black Sea Rotational Force is a special-purpose Marine air-ground task force, which deployed to the region to enhance interoperability, promote regional stability, and build camaraderie among the forces. The six-month deployment includes training exercises with countries in the Black Sea, Balkan, and Caucasus regions. 81. This is most likely a reflection of Poland’s recent acquisition of F-16 and C-130 aircraft from the U.S. in 2009. 82. Andrew Rettman, “Polish Minister: EU and Nato Might Fall Apart,” EU Observer, March 30, 2012, http://euobserver.com/24/115758 (accessed April 12, 2012).

19 KEEPING AMERICA SAFE: WHY U.S. BASES IN EUROPE REMAIN VITAL

Romania and . The U.S. Selo Training Area should be com- in Europe, in addition to main- defense relationship with Romania pleted in 2012.84 taining four BCTs in Europe. and Bulgaria is maintained under In addition to considering increas- Task Force East, which EUCOM cre- ing the number of permanent U.S. ■■ Reverse the decision to remove ated to better engage with Eastern military bases in Eastern Europe the A-10s or replace them with an European allies through joint train- and the Caucasus, the White House equivalent capability. ing and capacity building. The U.S. should also: should consider making a more ■■ Reaffirm the U.S. commit- robust and permanent contribution ■■ Put America’s national secu- ment to NATO as America’s key to Task Force East. The U.S. should rity interests ahead of defense interlocutor for U.S. relations also examine opportunities to bring cuts. A strategic review of U.S. with European allies. other services to the task force, mak- interests in Europe, not a desire to ing it joint as it was previously. slash the defense budget, should ■■ Review U.S. strategic sea- EUCOM quickly learned that guide the important decisions, lift and airlift require- Romania and Bulgaria’s proximity such as the number of bases and ments that are affected by the to the Middle East and Central Asia the distribution of troops in Administration’s decision to provides many benefits. Bulgaria Europe. remove the two heavy BCTs from opened its Burgas airfield to U.S. Europe. tanker aircraft during the campaign ■■ Conduct a full reassessment in Afghanistan in late 2001. Romania of U.S. interests in Eurasia to ■■ Review the U.S. military’s allowed U.S. forces to use its Black identify how EUCOM can support prepositioned stock require- Sea port of Constanta and nearby U.S. objectives in the region. ments in Europe in light of the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base as Administration’s decision to logistical centers for U.S. forces ■■ Demonstrate U.S. commitment remove two heavy BCTs from deploying to the Middle East in the to NATO and Euro–Atlantic Europe. run up to the 2003 Iraq War. security. The U.S. troop pres- Today, Task Force East includes ence in Europe is the most vis- Conclusion a small permanent headquarters of ible sign of U.S. support for Some believe that the European approximately 100–300 personnel, NATO. As NATO is transforming region is yesterday’s news and that who oversee rotations of U.S. Army itself for the 21st century, it will the U.S. should focus on defense and units. However, the initial ambition need American leadership and security issues in Asia. Indeed, the of a dedicated BCT rotating through commitment. U.S. and its allies are facing emerg- has been scaled down to a battalion. ing security challenges in the Asia– The U.S. has already made signifi- ■■ Be honest and open with the Pacific region. Furthermore, the cant investments in infrastructure European allies. The U.S. should world’s economic interdependency to make the bases more permanent.83 consult with key European allies means that factors that affect the Romania has a new 1,600-troop and the NATO alliance before security situation in Asia will often capacity facility at the Romanian making any decisions on U.S. directly affect Europe. U.S. force pos- Land Forces Administrative Center troop numbers in Europe. ture in Asia and U.S. force posture in in Mihail Kogălniceanu, which Europe are complementary. It is not should become operational very soon. ■■ Earmark a U.S.-based brigade a zero-sum game. A 2,500-troop-capacity facility under combat team solely for rota- Some believe that the U.S. should construction of the Bulgarian Novo tional joint training exercises not have a robust military presence

83. U.S. Army Europe Public Affairs, “Task Force East in Romania/Bulgaria Changes Command,” U.S. European Command, June 3, 2010, http://www.eucom.mil/ Article/19788/task-force-east-in-romania-bulgaria-changes-command (accessed April 12, 2012). 84. Seth Robson, “USAREUR Cuts Back Summer Training Exercises in Eastern Europe,” Stars and Stripes, April 18, 2010, http://www.stripes.com/news/usareur- cuts-back-summer-training-exercises-in-eastern-europe-1.100987 (accessed April 12, 2012).

20 SPECIAL REPORT | NO. 111 July 11, 2012 in Europe because the Europeans two heavy BCTs permanently based to a humanitarian crisis in the should defend themselves and that in Europe. region, the U.S. can more quickly and the U.S. should not be providing a The Administration’s cuts in the effectively project power and react security umbrella at the expense of U.S. force posture in Europe are part to the unexpected using its forward- the American taxpayer. However, the of a large array of defense cuts that based military capabilities in Europe. primary objective of U.S. forces in will weaken America and its allies. Reducing this capability will only Europe is to provide a forward-based The decision to remove a large num- make America weaker on the world military capability that gives U.S. ber of U.S. troops and their associat- stage. decision makers timely and flex- ed military capabilities from Europe In the past 90 years, the U.S. has ible military options in defending and the Administration’s disgraceful disengaged from Europe on two America and promoting American treatment of Poland and the Czech occasions: during the early 1920s interests in the broader European Republic over missile defense plans when the U.S. occupation force left region. The U.S. contribution to the send the signal to European allies the Rhineland and during the huge collective defense of Europe is simply that America no longer cares about troop drawdown in the early 1990s. a positive side effect. Europe. Both cases ushered in new eras of The Administration’s justifica- The U.S. military presence in instability and warfare on the conti- tions for cuts in U.S. military capa- Europe deters American adversar- nent. America’s economic and secu- bility in Europe do not add up. No ies, strengthens allies, and protects rity interests require a stable Europe, matter how it is spun, V-22s are not a U.S. interests. Whether preparing and the U.S. military presence in replacement for A-10s, and a rotating U.S. and Allied troops and deploying Europe contributes to this. infantry battalion is not the same as them to Afghanistan or responding

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