DOCSLIB.ORG

Studying the Privacy Issues of the Incorrect Use of the Feature Policy

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Studying the Privacy Issues of the Incorrect Use of the Feature Policy Studying the Privacy Issues of the Incorrect Use of the Feature Policy Beliz Kaleli Manuel Egele Gianluca Stringhini Boston University Boston University Boston University [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Abstract—In addition to rendering HTML and providing Web parts of a website can access what features, pending user- access, Web browsers offer auxiliary features (e.g., camera, geolo- approval. The Feature Policy is analogous to the Same Origin cation, microphone etc.) that can be used while browsing. Some of Policy [7], in the sense that the website developer and the these features access sensitive information such as camera image, browser developer both need to work together to achieve the microphone, and location data. The common behavior of modern desired protections. browsers when a website tries to access one of these features is to prompt a permission dialog for the user to allow or deny this request. The user’s response may be recorded by the Web In this paper, we show that the use of Web browser features browser and remembered for that website. However, websites may may lead to sensitive data leakage if not handled carefully. include third party resources in the form of HTML iframes. Specifically, embedded iframes in a website can also request Recently, the W3C introduced the Feature Policy to restrict which a feature access through the main website. The sources of these origins contained in a website get access to which features. To iframes may be untrusted third-parties. The responsibility prevent the leakage of sensitive information, both Web developers of the Web browser is to inform users of feature requests and browser developers have to handle feature usage carefully. and what it means to “allow/deny” those requests, whereas the Web developers need to ensure that permissions are only given website developer should limit feature access to third parties to trustworthy websites and Web browser developers have to by using Feature Policy correctly. If the chosen Feature Policy implement the Feature Policy correctly. A wrong implementation from either one of these parties could cause privacy leaks, such is overly-permissive, sensitive user data may also be accessed as an untrusted iframe getting access to the user’s webcam. by untrusted iframe origins. In this paper, we present a study of nine Web browsers Previous studies focused on the adoption of response head- and their behavior regarding feature usage in websites, and ers and their security and privacy implications [8], [9], [10], show that five of them (Chromium based browsers) are open to [11], [12], [13]. In other work [14], [15], researchers proposed social engineering attacks that may lead to sensitive information sandboxing scripts as a countermeasure to data leakage. To the disclosure to untrusted parties. We identify the root causes of this problem as two-fold: Web browsers prompting misleading dialogs best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the adoption when asking for permissions and the wrong use of Feature Policy of the Feature Policy in the wild, and to look at the risks by websites. arising from its incorrect implementation by Web browsers and websites. I. INTRODUCTION To study the extent of the problem, we developed three As technology evolves, new requirements emerge for web- test cases, applied them to 9 different Web browsers, and sites and applications to serve users. While location based ser- observed their behavior. We find that 5 out of 9 Web browsers vices have long enjoyed popularity among mobile applications (Chromium based browsers) are open to social engineering at- (e.g., [1], [2], [3], [4]), commodity browsers started to support tacks that can result in a third party to access sensitive informa- iframes similar APIs and hence allow users to take advantage of the tion from untrusted without the user’s knowledge. location based functionalities on their Web browser. Similarly, We also note that this partial-vulnerability is known by the since most social media apps/websites such as Facebook [5] Chromium developers and was a design choice in response to require camera and microphone access for some functionalities publicly unavailable surveys. (e.g., video-calling), browsers also added support for those features. In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows: To ensure the privacy of user-data, the W3C recently • We present potential security issues arising from an in- proposed the so-called Feature Policy [6] HTTP response correct deployment of the Feature Policy, and develop header, which allows webmasters to precisely control which three use cases that allow us to identify vulnerable Web browsers and websites. Workshop on Measurements, Attacks, and Defenses for the Web (MADWeb) 2020 • We evaluate 9 Web browsers, finding that 5 of the 23 February 2020, San Diego, CA, USA ISBN 1-891562-63-0 browsers (including Google Chrome) are open to https://dx.doi.org/10.14722/madweb.2020.23xxx social engineering attacks which may lead to sensitive www.ndss-symposium.org data leakage. II. BACKGROUND In this section, we provide the pertinent background infor- mation that the remainder of the paper relies upon. First, we introduce browser features and how permissions can be granted to Web origins. Then, we present the recently proposed Feature Policy, which regulates the feature usage by Web browsers. Finally, we present our threat model of how a malicious party could obtain sensitive information from a victim with an example scenario. A. Browser Features Most modern Web browsers offer several features such Fig. 1: A Simple Attack Scenario: 1. Alice serves a website in as geolocation, camera, and microphone, to enable which Feature-Policy is set as a wildcard for camera feature, several functionalities on websites (e.g., video-calling, ge- 2. Eve serves malicious advertisements, 3. Alice publishes olocation). To use these features, websites ask the user for Eve’s ads on alice.com by embedding an iframe, 4. permission to access every feature they need. When a website Bob visits alice.com. Browser prompts a permission dialog tries to access a feature, the Web browser prompts a permission that contains misleading information which says feature re- dialog box to the user. The purpose of this dialog box is to quest is coming from alice.com whereas it originates from inform the user of the access request, and it typically contains eve.com. Bob clicks “allow” on the dialog box, 5. Eve uses the name of the feature and the origin of the website that the feature and steals sensitive data. requested it, together with “allow” and “block” options. The browser may then record the response to that prompt, which causes a permanent permission, or may alternatively not record the user’s decision and prompt the permission request every own origin. If a developer wants to enable the feature for time. their own website or a third-party websites, they will specify Websites may have embedded iframes in them. These the URI of that website as the value of the allowlist. The iframes may also need to use browser features. In that case “self” keyword and specific URLs can be used together. The the embedded iframes will contain a script in which they wildcard option allows the feature to be accessed in the ask the browser for permission to access one or more features. document, and all nested browsing contexts regardless of their Depending on the Feature Policy configuration, the main origin. For example, the following configuration will allow the website could prevent iframes from requesting permissions camera feature to be used by both the main website and all for features, as discussed next. nested iframes while blocking the microphone usage in all browsing contexts: “Feature-Policy: camera *; microphone ’none’. iframes B. Feature Policy ” If the website contains , the wildcard configuration can be vulnerable since third-party Website developers may want to control access to certain contexts will also be able to access the camera feature. As browser features within their websites as a security or perfor- a result, that third-party will have access to the user’s camera mance precaution. The Feature Policy addresses this issue by and hence record her and steal sensitive data. offering the ability to selectively enable/disable the access to the browser features in its own frame, and in content within C. Threat Model any iframe elements in the document. The HTTP Feature Policy header is used with a directive and an allowlist for Browser features can be requested by both benign and mali- that directive. The directive is the feature to be restricted and cious websites. An educated user will only give permission for may take the values in Table I. using their browser features to trustworthy websites. However, if the Feature Policy is not properly configured by the website The allowlist can take different values. By specifying developer, these permission requests may be coming from the “none” keyword for the list, the specified features will be third-party embedded iframes. For example, advertisements disabled for all browsing contexts, regardless of their origin. are an important constituent of the Web. Many websites publish The “self” keyword will disable the use of the specified feature ads to generate revenue. One possible way to publish an ad within all browsing contexts except for the main website’s is to embed iframes into the main website. The content of this iframe will be provided by the advertisement network “ambient-light-sensor” “autoplay” “accelerometer” or the landing page for the advertisement [16]. “camera” “display-capture” “document-domain” Figure 1 provides an example attack scenario for the type “encrypted-media” “fullscreen” “geolocation” of vulnerability studied in this paper. First, Alice sets her “gyroscope” “magnetometer” “microphone” site’s Feature Policy as a wildcard for the camera browser “midi” “payment” “picture-in-picture” “speaker” “sync-xhr” “usb” feature (Step 1).
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Move Beyond Passwords Index
    Move Beyond Passwords Index The quest to move beyond passwords 4 Evaluation of current authentication method 6 Getting started with passwordless authentication 8 Early results to going passwordless 9 Common approaches to going passwordless 11 Email magic links 11 Factor sequencing 12 Webauthn 14 Planning for a passwordless future 16 Move Beyond Passwords 2 Introduction Traditional authentication using a username and password has been the foundation of digital identity and security for over 50 years. But with the ever-growing number of user accounts, there are a number of new issues: the burden on end users to remember multiple passwords, support costs, and most importantly, the security risks posed by compromised credentials. These new challenges are now outweighing the usefulness of passwords. The case for eliminating passwords from the authentication experience is getting more compelling every day. Emerging passwordless security standards, elevated consumer and consumer-like experience expectations, and ballooning costs have moved eliminating passwords from a theoretical concept to a real possibility. In this whitepaper, we will explore the case for going passwordless for both customer and employee authentication, and map out steps that organizations can take on their journey to true passwordless authentication. Move Beyond Passwords 3 The quest to move beyond passwords Understanding the need for passwordless authentication starts with understanding the challenges presented by passwords. The core challenges with passwords can be broken down into the following areas: Poor Account Security Passwords have spawned a whole category of security/identity-driven attacks — compromised passwords due to credential breaches, phishing, password spraying attacks, or poor password hygiene can result in account takeover attacks (ATO).
    [Show full text]
  • Cybersecurity in a Digital Era.Pdf
    Digital McKinsey and Global Risk Practice Cybersecurity in a Digital Era June 2020 Introduction Even before the advent of a global pandemic, executive teams faced a challenging and dynamic environ- ment as they sought to protect their institutions from cyberattack, without degrading their ability to innovate and extract value from technology investments. CISOs and their partners in business and IT functions have had to think through how to protect increasingly valuable digital assets, how to assess threats related to an increasingly fraught geopolitical environment, how to meet increasingly stringent customer and regulatory expectations and how to navigate disruptions to existing cybersecurity models as companies adopt agile development and cloud computing. We believe there are five areas for CIOs, CISOs, CROs and other business leaders to address in particular: 1. Get a strategy in place that will activate the organization. Even more than in the past cybersecurity is a business issue – and cybersecurity effectiveness means action not only from the CISO organiza- tion, but also from application development, infrastructure, product development, customer care, finance, human resources, procurement and risk. A successful cybersecurity strategy supports the business, highlights the actions required from across the enterprise – and perhaps most importantly captures the imagination of the executive in how it can manage risk and also enable business innovation. 2. Create granular, analytic risk management capabilities. There will always be more vulnerabilities to address and more protections you can consider than you will have capacity to implement. Even companies with large and increasing cybersecurity budgets face constraints in how much change the organization can absorb.
    [Show full text]
  • Implementing a Web Application for W3C Webauthn Protocol Testing †
    proceedings Proceedings Implementing a Web Application for W3C WebAuthn Protocol Testing † Martiño Rivera Dourado 1,* , Marcos Gestal 1,2 and José M. Vázquez-Naya 1,2 1 Grupo RNASA-IMEDIR, Departamento de Computación, Facultade de Informática, Universidade da Coruña, Elviña, 15071 A Coruña, Spain; [email protected] (M.G.); [email protected] (J.M.V.-N.) 2 Centro de Investigación CITIC, Universidade da Coruña, Elviña, 15071 A Coruña, Spain * Correspondence: [email protected] † Presented at the 3rd XoveTIC Conference, A Coruña, Spain, 8–9 October 2020. Published: 18 August 2020 Abstract: During the last few years, the FIDO Alliance and the W3C have been working on a new standard called WebAuthn that aims to substitute the obsolete password as an authentication method by using physical security keys instead. Due to its recent design, the standard is still changing and so are the needs for protocol testing. This research has driven the development of a web application that supports the standard and gives extensive information to the user. This tool can be used by WebAuthn developers and researchers, helping them to debug concrete use cases with no need for an ad hoc implementation. Keywords: WebAuthn; authentication; testing 1. Introduction Authentication is one of the most critical parts of an application. It is a security service that aims to guarantee the authenticity of an identity. This can be done by using several security mechanisms but currently, without a doubt, the most common is the username and password method. Although this method is easy for a user to conceptually understand, it constitutes many security problems.
    [Show full text]
  • 8 Steps for Effectively Deploying
    8 Steps for Effectively Deploying MFA Table of Contents The value of MFA 3 1. Educate your users 4 2. Consider your MFA policies 5 3. Plan and provide for a variety of access needs 7 4. Think twice about using SMS for OTP 10 5. Check compliance requirements carefully 11 6. Plan for lost devices 12 7. Plan to deploy MFA to remote workers 14 8. Phase your deployment: Be prepared to review and revise 16 8 Steps for Effectively Deploying MFA 2 The value of MFA Multi-factor authentication (MFA) has never been more important. With the growing number of data breaches and cybersecurity threats—and the steep financial and reputational costs that come with them—organizations need to prioritize MFA deployment for their workforce and customers alike. Not doing so could spell disaster; an invitation for bad actors to compromise accounts and breach your systems. Adopting modern MFA means implementing a secure, simple, and context-aware solution that ensures that only the right people have access to the right resources. It adds a layer of security, giving your security team, your employees, and your customers peace of mind. Unfortunately, while the benefits are clear, implementing MFA can be a complex project. In our Multi-factor Authentication Deployment Guide, we’ve outlined eight steps that you can take to better enable your MFA deployment: Educate your users Consider your MFA policies Plan and provide for a variety of access needs Think twice about using SMS for OTP Check compliance requirements carefully Plan for lost devices Plan to deploy MFA to remote workers Phase your deployment: be prepared to review and revise In this eBook, we’ll take a deeper dive into each of these elements, giving you tactical advice and best practices for how to implement each step as you get ready to roll out Okta MFA.
    [Show full text]
  • Mfaproxy: a Reverse Proxy for Multi-Factor Authentication
    Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Creative Components Dissertations Fall 2019 MFAProxy: A reverse proxy for multi-factor authentication Alan Schmitz Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/creativecomponents Part of the Digital Communications and Networking Commons Recommended Citation Schmitz, Alan, "MFAProxy: A reverse proxy for multi-factor authentication" (2019). Creative Components. 425. https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/creativecomponents/425 This Creative Component is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Creative Components by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MFAProxy: A reverse proxy for multi-factor authentication by Alan Schmitz A Creative Component submitted to the graduate faculty in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE Major: Information Assurance Program of Study Committee: Doug Jacobson, Major Professor The student author, whose presentation of the scholarship herein was approved by the program of study committee, is solely responsible for the content of this Creative Component. The Graduate College will ensure this Creative Component is globally accessible and will not permit alterations after a degree is conferred. Iowa State University Ames, Iowa 2019 Copyright c Alan Schmitz, 2019. All rights reserved. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF FIGURES . iii ABSTRACT . iv CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION . .1 CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND . .3 2.1 Passwords and PINs . .3 2.2 Short Message Service . .4 2.3 One-Time Passwords . .5 2.4 U2F and WebAuthn .
    [Show full text]
  • Strong Authentication Based on Mobile Application
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Helsingin yliopiston digitaalinen arkisto STRONG AUTHENTICATION BASED ON MOBILE APPLICATION Helsingin yliopisto Faculty of Science Department of Computer Science Master's thesis Spring 2020 Harri Salminen Supervisor: Valtteri Niemi Tiedekunta - Fakultet - Faculty Osasto - Avdelning - Department Faculty of Science The Department of Computer Science Tekijä - Författare - Author Harri Salminen Työn nimi - Arbetets titel Title STRONG AUTHENTICATION BASED ON MOBILE APPLICATION Oppiaine - Läroämne – Subject Computer Science Työn laji/ Ohjaaja - Arbetets art/Handledare - Aika - Datum - Month and Sivumäärä - Sidoantal - Number of Level/Instructor year pages Master's thesis / Valtteri Niemi June, 2020 58 Tiivistelmä - Referat - Abstract The user authentication in online services has evolved over time from the old username and password-based approaches to current strong authentication methodologies. Especially, the smartphone app has become one of the most important forms to perform the authentication. This thesis describes various authentication methods used previously and discusses about possible factors that generated the demand for the current strong authentication approach. We present the concepts and architectures of mobile application based authentication systems. Furthermore, we take closer look into the security of the mobile application based authentication approach. Mobile apps have various attack vectors that need to be taken under consideration when designing an authentication system. Fortunately, various generic software protection mechanisms have been developed during the last decades. We discuss how these mechanisms can be utilized in mobile app environment and in the authentication context. The main idea of this thesis is to gather relevant information about the authentication history and to be able to build a view of strong authentication evolution.
    [Show full text]
  • HTML5 Cheatsheet 2019
    CHEAT SHEET HTML5 WEB DEVELOPMENT Created by @Manz ( https://twitter.com/Manz ) https://lenguajehtml.com/ S HTML Syntax Tag structure C Comment Syntax Dev annotations S Social metadata For social networks HTML TAG/ATTRIBUTE SYNTAX HTML COMMENT SYNTAX FACEBOOK OPEN GRAPH <tag attribute="value"> content </tag> <!-- text without effects on webpage --> <meta> metadata tag for open graph property metadata type open graph D Document tags HTML main structure H Head tags Header & document metadata content metadata value open graph MAIN TAGS RELATIONS REQUIRED METADATA PROPERTIES <!DOCTYPE html> HTML5 document <link> document relation og:title title of your object <html> document content root tag href link to related document og:type type of your object <head> metadata header related docs hreflang code doc language en, es... music video article book <body> page content visible content type mime hint type for browser profile website title set title to stylesheet set og:image image url for preview G Global Attributes for all elements sizes hint size for favicon 64x64, 96x96 og:url canonical & absolute url DOM / STYLE ATTRIBUTES rel relation type with other document OPTIONAL METADATA PROPERTIES id element identifier unique per page BASIC RELATION og:audio complementary audio url class element class multiple per page alternate link to alternate version og:description 1-2 sentence descr. slot element slot reference to <slot> author link to author URL og:determiner word auto, the, a, an, ... style inline CSS styles css properties help link to help URL
    [Show full text]
  • EL PASSO: Efficient and Lightweight Privacy-Preserving Single Sign On
    Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies ; 2021 (2):70–87 Zhiyi Zhang, Michał Król, Alberto Sonnino, Lixia Zhang, and Etienne Rivière EL PASSO: Efficient and Lightweight Privacy-preserving Single Sign On Abstract: Anonymous credentials are a solid founda- 1 Introduction tion for privacy-preserving Single Sign-On (SSO). They enable unlinkable authentication across domains and al- Single Sign-On (SSO) is an answer to the complexity low users to prove their identity without revealing more and fragility of using individual passwords on the web, than necessary. Unfortunately, anonymous credentials i.e., leading to reuse and leaks [1]. SSO enables the use schemes remain difficult to use and complex to deploy. of a unique identity provided by an Identity Provider They require installation and use of complex software at (IdP). Users authenticate themselves to services (called the user side, suffer from poor performance, and do not Relying Parties–RP) with tokens provided by their IdP. support security features that are now common, such SSO improves overall web security [2] and enables the as two-factor authentication, secret recovery, or sup- generalization of good security practices such as the use port for multiple devices. In contrast, Open ID Con- of 2-factor authentication (2FA) [3]. nect (OIDC), the de facto standard for SSO is widely deployed and used despite its lack of concern for users’ Limitations of OpenID Connect. OpenID Connect privacy. We present EL PASSO, a privacy-preserving (OIDC) is a dominant SSO solution used by over a mil- SSO system based on anonymous credentials that does lion websites in 2020 [4].
    [Show full text]
  • Zero-Knowledge User Authentication: an Old Idea Whose Time Has Come
    Zero-Knowledge User Authentication: An Old Idea Whose Time Has Come Laurent Chuat, Sarah Plocher, and Adrian Perrig ETH Zurich Abstract User authentication can rely on various factors (e.g., a pass- word, a cryptographic key, and/or biometric data) but should not re- veal any secret information held by the user. This seemingly paradoxical feat can be achieved through zero-knowledge proofs. Unfortunately, naive password-based approaches still prevail on the web. Multi-factor authen- tication schemes address some of the weaknesses of the traditional login process, but generally have deployability issues or degrade usability even further as they assume users do not possess adequate hardware. This as- sumption no longer holds: smartphones with biometric sensors, cameras, short-range communication capabilities, and unlimited data plans have become ubiquitous. In this paper, we show that, assuming the user has such a device, both security and usability can be drastically improved using an augmented password-authenticated key agreement (PAKE) pro- tocol and message authentication codes. 1 Introduction User authentication still typically involves transmitting a plaintext password to the web server, which is problematic for many reasons. First, an attacker could obtain the user’s password using malware, a keystroke logger, phishing, or a man-in-the-middle attack. Second, the user might be using the same password on different websites, allowing a malicious server operator to impersonate the user. Third, if the website’s database is breached, although passwords may be protected by a hash function, a brute-force attack could reveal low-entropy pass- words. Fourth, as password-reuse and low-entropy passwords are problematic, users are constantly advised to pick new, long, complicated passwords.
    [Show full text]
  • Privacy-Preserving Messaging Formal Verification
    NEXt generation Techno-social Legal Encryption Access and Privacy nextleap.eu Grant No. 688722. Project started 2016-01-01. Duration 36 months. DELIVERABLE D4.3 PRIVACY PRESERVING MESSAGING FORMAL MODELLING Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Bruno Blanchet, Iness Ben Guirat, Harry Halpin, Benjamin Lipp, Nadim Kobeissi (INRIA) Beneficiaries: INRIA (lead) Workpackage:4 Description: Models of messaging protocols from WP2 with respect to a number of possible primitives for properties related to decentralization,privacy, security, and anonymity. Version: 1.0 Nature: Report (R) Dissemination level: Public (PU) Pages: 107 Date: 2018-12-31 Project co-funded by the European Commission within the Horizon 2020 Programme. D4.2 NEXTLEAP Grant No. 688722 Contents Executive Summary 3 1 Introduction 4 2 W3C Web Authentication (Authentication) 5 3 Signal Protocol (Synchronous Messaging) 22 4 Noise (Network-level Encryption) 58 5 Wireguard (VPN) 83 2 D4.2 NEXTLEAP Grant No. 688722 Executive Summary In this deliverable, we present the results of formally verifying various protocols relevant to privacy-preserving messaging. In general, we verify their security properties, although consideration is taken if possible on privacy and anonymity although these two latter properties are hard to verify with the current toolset. We focus on ProVerif, veriying under the Dolev-Yao symbolic model in order to discover if a protocol is secure, and we also present some new work using CryptoVerif, which creates computational proofs. We detail the verificaton of the W3C Web Authentication
    [Show full text]
  • The Webauthn Standard: Why It Should Matter to the Public Sector and How It Works Executive Summary
    WEBAUTHN WHITE PAPER SERIES: MAY 2020 The WebAuthn Standard: Why It Should Matter to the Public Sector and How It Works Executive Summary This paper is the second in a series of WebAuthn whitepapers published by Yubico. For an introduction to WebAuthn and why it is both more secure and easier to use, see the first paper, Introducing WebAuthn: Enabling a Streamlined and More Secure User Authentication Experience. Most websites, services, and applications have difficulty providing secure, convenient authentication for users. Passwords are the problem. They tend to be either so simple they are easily guessed by hackers or so complex they are hard for users to remember. And all passwords, regardless of their complexity, are vulnerable to phishing and data breaches. Fortunately, WebAuthn, a new web authentication standard approved in March 2019 by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), makes it easy for websites, services, and applications to offer strong authenti- cation without relying on passwords. By replacing passwords with strong authentication based on public key cryptography, in which the private key never leaves the user’s device, WebAuthn makes authentication both easier to use and more secure, benefitting users and service providers alike. The WebAuthn standard is already supported by all major browsers and most platforms including: ● Windows 10 ● Android ● Google Chrome ● Mozilla Firefox ● Microsoft Edge ● Apple Safari ● Apple iOS WebAuthn supports various models for account authentication, leveraging both external roaming authenticators, such as hardware security keys, and authenticators built into computing and mobile devices, such as fingerprint readers and facial recognition technology. Applications and web services can choose to implement WebAuthn for passwordless authentication, two-factor authentication (2FA), and multi-factor authentication (MFA).
    [Show full text]
  • UCAN — Coding Earth Berlin:Remote April 2020
    AUTHORIZING USERS WITHOUT A BACKEND …AND UCAN TOO � AUTHORIZING USERS WITHOUT A BACKEND BROOKLYN ZELENKA, @expede AUTHORIZING USERS WITHOUT A BACKEND BROOKLYN ZELENKA, @expede • Cofounder/CTO at Fission • https://fission.codes • PLT & VMs • Previously an Ethereum Core Dev • EIPs 615, 902, 1066, 1444 • ECIP 1050 • VanFP, Code & Cofee YVR • Witchcraft, Algae, Exceptional, & others WE HAVE STICKERS! WE HAVE STICKERS! PING ME AND WE’LL MAIL SOME SOME BACKGROUND CONTEXT SOME BACKGROUND CONTEXT WHAT SET OF PROBLEMS IS FISSION SOLVING? SOME BACKGROUND CONTEXT SHIPPING A WEB APP IN 2020 IS TOO HARD! Backends DevOps • Multi-tenant • Expensive & complex • Increasingly sharded • Very much its specialty • Highly concurrent • We’re close to peak Kubernetes • Data leaks everywhere � • ACL complexity & GDPR SOME BACKGROUND CONTEXT SHIPPING A WEB APP IN 2020 IS TOO HARD! Backends DevOps • Multi-tenant • Expensive & complex • Increasingly sharded • Very much its specialty • Highly concurrent • We’re close to peak Kubernetes • Data leaks everywhere � • ACL complexity & GDPR SOME BACKGROUND CONTEXT FRONTEND IS EATING THE BACKEND � � • Frontend is never going away • Browsers keep getting more powerful (e.g. WebAssembly, WebAuthN) • Trend to more granular edge — Cloudflare Workers / Fastly Edge Cloud • Empower front end devs / full stack web apps for the 20’s and beyond � LAMP CONTAINERS SERVERLESS WEB NATIVE ☁λ � SOME BACKGROUND CONTEXT CONSTRAINTS SOME BACKGROUND CONTEXT CONSTRAINTS • Everything for a modern web app directly in the browser • Vanilla browsers
    [Show full text]