UC San Diego UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
UC San Diego UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title China's post-reform policy implementation gaps and governmental vs. non-governmental fire alarm solutions Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/62p9r4mx Author Hart, Melanie M. Publication Date 2010 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO China‟s Post-Reform Policy Implementation Gaps and Governmental vs. Non-Governmental Fire Alarm Solutions A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Melanie M. Hart Committee in Charge: Professor Susan L. Shirk, Co-Chair Professor Stephan M. Haggard, Co-Chair Professor Peter F. Cowhey Professor Mathew D. McCubbins Professor Barry J. Naughton 2010 Copyright Melanie M. Hart, 2010 All Rights Reserved. This Dissertation of Melanie M. Hart is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically: Co-Chair Co-Chair University of California, San Diego 2010 iii To my parents, Iva and Margie Hart, and to my husband, Yi Yang, for their love and support. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Signature Page…………..…………………………………………………………… iii Dedication………………………...………………………………………………….. iv Table of Contents……………………………...……………………………………… v List of Abbreviations…………………………………………………………...……. x List of Tables……………………………………………………………………… xii Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………….. xiii Vita…………………………………………………………………………….…… xv Abstract……………………………………………………………………..………. xvi Chapter 1 – China‟s Post-Reform Oversight Problems and Governmental vs. Non-Governmental Fire Alarm Solutions………………………………………..… 1 1.1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………...… 1 1.2. Chinese Governance Problems and Authoritarian Institutional Studies……...… 5 1.3. The Fire Alarm Model: Using Citizen Input to Overcome Principal-Agent Information Asymmetries……………………………………………………..... 8 1.4. Fire Alarm Institutions in China: Authoritarian Regime Constraints and the Governmental vs. Non-Governmental Divide……………………………….... 12 1.5. Cross-Sector Variation in Malfeasance-Induced Social Instability Risks…….. 22 1.6. Regime Reputational Risks from Official Malfeasance……………………….. 25 1.7. Protest Risks from Official Malfeasance……………………………………… 28 1.8. Malfeasance-Induced Social Instability Risks (IV) and v Fire Alarm Policy (DV)….................................................................................. 36 1.9. Limited Fire Alarms, Unfilled Oversight Gaps and Persistent Policy Implementation Problems……………………………………………………... 40 1.10. Hypothesis Testing and Case Studies…………………………………………. 46 1.11. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….. 52 Chapter 2 – Reform-Era Shocks to China‟s Traditional Police Patrol Oversight System...................................................................................................…. 55 2.1. Introduction ………………………………………………………………….... 55 2.2. China‟s Political Hierarchy……………………………………………………. 56 2.3. China‟s Traditional “Police Patrol” System for Principal-Agent Oversight………………………………………………………………………. 61 2.4. Economic Reform, Decentralization and New Principal-Agent Problems……. 72 2.5. Increasing Corruption in the Post-Reform Era……………………………...… 81 2.6. Limited Recentralization: Not an Effective Oversight Fix……...…………….. 83 2.7. Conclusion………………………………………………………..…………… 86 Chapter 3 – Rural Land Expropriation: Official Malfeasance and Fire Alarm Policy in a High-Risk Sector..................................................................................... 88 3.1. Introduction………………………………………………………………….… 88 3.2. Institutional Background…………………………………………………….… 91 3.3. Land Conversion Spirals Out of Control…………………………………...…. 95 3.4. Fire Alarm Policy in China‟s Land Sector……………………………….…... 104 3.5. Governmental Fire Alarms………………………………………………..….. 105 vi 3.6. Non-Governmental Fire Alarms………………………………………...…… 115 3.7. Fire Alarm Limitations Spur Continued Institutional Innovation…………..... 124 3.8. Conclusion………………………………….................................................... 128 Chapter 4 – Rural Land Expropriation: Case Narratives from a High-Risk Policy Sector……………………………………………………………………..... 130 4.1. Introduction………………………………………………………………...… 130 4.2. Changting Village Land Expropriation Case……………………………….... 131 4.3. Hanyuan County Land Expropriation Case ……………………………...….. 151 4.4. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………… 171 Chapter 5 – Food and Drug Safety: Official Malfeasance and Fire Alarm Policy in a Low-Risk Sector…………………………………………………………..….. 172 5.1. Introduction………………………………………………………………..…. 172 5.2. Institutional Background……………………………………………………... 175 5.3. Fire Alarm Policy in the Food and Drug Sector……………………………... 187 5.4. Governmental Fire Alarms………………………………………………….... 189 5.5. Non-Governmental Fire Alarms……………………………………………... 207 5.6. Fire Alarm Limitations Spur Continued Institutional Innovation………...….. 223 5.7. Conclusion………………………………………………………………...…. 227 Chapter 6 – Food and Drug Safety: Case Narratives from a Low-Risk Policy Sector………………………………………………………………………………. 229 6.1. Introduction…………………………………………………………….…….. 229 6.2. The Fuyang Infant Milk Powder Scandal……………………………….…… 230 vii 6.3. The Qiqihar „Armillarisin A‟ Pharmaceutical Scandal……………….…….... 245 6.4. Conclusion……………………………………………………………......….. 259 Chapter 7 – Environmental Protection: Official Malfeasance and Fire Alarm Policy in a Medium-Risk Sector…………………………………………...…….. 261 7.1. Introduction……………………………………………………………..…… 261 7.2. Institutional Background…………………………………………………..… 264 7.3. Escalating Pollution Crisis Forces Chinese Leaders to Change Course…..… 270 7.4. Fire Alarm Policy in the Environmental Protection Sector…………….....… 273 7.5. China‟s Environmental Information Control Policies …………………..….. 274 7.6. Governmental Fire Alarms…………………………………………………… 280 7.7. Non-Governmental Fire Alarms………………………………………...…… 300 7.8. Environmental Fire Alarm Limitations Spur Continued Institutional Innovation……………………………………………………………………. 314 7.9. Conclusion……………………………………………………………...……. 320 Chapter 8 – Environmental Protection: Case Studies from a Medium-Risk Policy Sector…………………………………………………………………….… 322 8.1. Introduction…………………………………………………………...……… 322 8.2. Beiwangjia Village Air Pollution Case………………………………...…….. 324 8.3. Fengxiang County Lead Poisoning Case ……………………………….…… 342 8.4. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………… 369 Chapter 9 – Conclusion……………………………………………………...…… 371 9.1. Empirical Findings………………………………………………………...…. 373 viii 9.2. Principal-Agent Problems and Democratization in China………………...…. 376 General References………………………………………………………………...384 ix LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ACEF All China Environmental Federation AQSIQ General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine CASS China Academy of Social Sciences CCA China Consumers‟ Association CCP Chinese Communist Party CDC Center for Disease Control and Prevention CDIC Central Discipline Inspection Commission CENRP Commission for Environmental and Natural Resource Protection CLAPV Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims CPD Central Propaganda Department CSBTS China State Bureau of Technical Supervision DIC Discipline Inspection Commission DRC (Sub-National) Development and Reform Committee EIA Environmental Impact Assessment ENGO Environmental Non-Governmental Organization EPB Environmental Protection Bureau EPTRS Environmental Protection Target Responsibility System FDA Food and Drug Administration (United States) GGDP Green GDP LAL Land Administration Law x LRB Land and Resources Bureau MEP Ministry of Environmental Protection MLR Ministry of Land and Resources MOA Ministry of Agriculture MOH Ministry of Health MOS Ministry of Supervision NAO National Audit Office NBS National Bureau of Statistics NDA New Drug Approval (Certificate) NEPA National Environmental Protection Agency NEPO National Environmental Protection Office NGO Non-Governmental Organization NPC National People‟s Congress SAIC State Administration for Industry and Commerce SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome SDA State Drug Administration SEPA State Environmental Protection Agency SFDA State Food and Drug Administration SLAB State Land Administration Bureau SLS State Land Supervision System SOE State-Owned Enterprise SPA State Pharmaceutical Administration xi LIST OF TABLES Table 1.1.: Malfeasance-Induced Social Instability Risks (IV) and Fire Alarm Policy (DV) in Three Critical Sectors: Rural Land Expropriation, Environmental Protection and Food and Drug Safety ……………………………………………………….…. 48 Table 7.1. Comparative Governmental Fire Alarm Use in China‟s Environmental Protection Sector: Administrative Reconsideration, Administrative Lawsuits and Xinfang Petitions …………………………………………………………………... 282 xii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I owe special thanks to Professor Susan Shirk (Co-Chair) and to Professor Stephan Haggard (Co-Chair), for their consistent guidance and support throughout this project. Professor Shirk has been an excellent advisor and mentor throughout my graduate career. As a budding China scholar, I benefited immensely from her expertise, and her comments always broadened my understanding of Chinese politics and Chinese perspectives. Professor Haggard offered guidance at many critical junctures, and his perspective sharpened my arguments and helped me to find the theoretical focus I was searching for. He was very generous with his time, and his detailed comments were invaluable for revising and strengthening many chapter drafts. I thank Professors