A Comparative Study of Two Conflict-Affected Ethnic Societies in Myanmar

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Ceasefires and Post-War Democratisation: A Comparative Study of Two Conflict-Affected Ethnic Societies in Myanmar

Khin Maung Yin

A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of New South Wales, Canberra at Australian Defence Force Academy

School of Humanities and Social Sciences

February 2019

b Thesis/Dissertation Sheet Australia's Global University

Surname/Family Name Yin Given Name/s Khin Maung Abbreviation for degree as give in the University calendar PhD University of New South Wales, Canberra at Australian Defence Force Faculty Academy School School of Humanities and Social Sciences Ceasefires an.d Post-War Democratisation: A Comparative Study of Two Thesis Tille Conflict-Affected communities in Myanmar

Abstract 350 words maximum: (PLEASE TYPE)

Ending four decades of all-out civil war, Myanmar's military government during the early 1990s managed to institute ceasefire with most of the major ethnic insurgent groups. Most scholars were critical of the ceasefires, arguing that the failure to reach more lasting political settlements obstructed more fundamental progress in the affected areas. Some even argued that the ceasefires undermined the pressure for democratisation and therefore were detrimental to the country's political broader development. To the contrary, it is the argument of this thesis that the ceasefires serve as a catalyst for important social, political, and economic change processes that in turn improved the "uptake" of democratic opportunities in the relevant areas after the start of the liberalisation process in 2011. This is confirmed by tracing and comparing developments in two conflict-affected ethnic regions of Myanmar from the early 1990s until the present day: Mon-populated areas which benefitted from the ceasefire agreement between the government and the New Mon State Party in 1995, and Karen-populated areas which continued to be affected by armed conflict between the government and Karen National Union until 2012. The thesis is primarily based on primary data, including personal observationsfrom the direct involvement of the author in Myanmar politics over the past three decades, as well as scores of semi-structured interviewswith key informants in the two regions mainly conducted during fieldwork in 2016-17.

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Abstract

Ending four decades of all-out civil war, Myanmar’s military government during the early 1990s managed to institute ceasefires with most of the minority ethnic insurgent groups. Most scholars were critical of the ceasefires, arguing that the failure to reach more lasting political settlements obstructed more fundamental progress in the affected areas. Some even argued that the ceasefires undermined the pressure for democratisation and therefore were detrimental to the country’s political broader development. To the contrary, it is the argument of this thesis that the ceasefires served as a catalyst for important social, political and economic change processes that in turn improved the “uptake” of democratic opportunities in the relevant areas after the start of the liberalisation process in 2011. This is confirmed by tracing and comparing developments in two conflict-affected minority ethnic regions of Myanmar from the early 1990s until the present day: Mon-populated areas which benefitted from the ceasefire agreement between the government and the New Mon State Party in 1995, and Karen populated-areas which continued to be affected by armed conflict between the government and the Karen National Union until 2012. The thesis is primarily based on primary data, including personal observations from the direct involvement of the author in Myanmar politics over the past three decades, as well as scores of semi-structured interviews with key informants in the two regions, mainly conducted during fieldwork in 2016-17.

Acknowledgements

It is impossible to complete a project such as a PhD without accumulating a great deal of debt. This dissertation has been enriched by numerous conversations, consultations, discussions, and correspondences with many people. I would like to acknowledge various kinds of valuable help and generous support of people and organisations. I am indebted to many people for their help, support, trust, and, particularly, courage to participate in this research work.

This doctoral study would not have been possible without the kind-hearted patience, support, and intellectual guidance of my supervisor, Dr Morten B. Pedersen, who has kept his door open for me throughout this whole study. I am deeply grateful and indebted to my supervisor for his unceasing support and the trust he placed in me to do this project. I would also like to express my sincere thanks to Professor William Maley of the Asia- Pacific Collage of Diplomacy, Dr Norman Abjorensen of Crawford School of Public Policy, and Dr Nicholas Farrelly and Dr Nick Cheesman of Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs of the Australian National University; Professor David Lovell, my co- supervisor Professor Toni Erskine, Dr Peter Balint, Dr Christopher Roberts, and Dr Ned Dobos of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, UNSW at Canberra, for their invaluable support both on a personal and academic offering. I would also like to express my sincere thanks to Trevor Wilson, former Australian Ambassador to Myanmar and visiting fellow at the ANU Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs for his valuable advice and help throughout this study.

My sincere thanks also go to Dr Min Nwe Soe for his kind-hearted encouragement to complete this dissertation and helping me getting through to the Cabinet Ministers of Mon State government and the parliamentarians. Particular thanks go to Nai Layehtaw Suvannabhum, who patiently put up with my presence at his home and look after me for months. Special thanks go to Min Min Nwe and Min Aung Ye Htut Tin for their generous help and precious time accompanying me in Yangon, Mawlamyine, Hpa-an, and numerous villages across Karen and Mon-populated areas and introducing me to the knowledgeable key informants and groups. Thanks to my seniors, colleagues, and friends from the New Mon State Party, the civil society entity in Mon State, and Australian Mon Association at Canberra for all their ongoing support to me and my family throughout these long years.

I would also like to express my sincere thanks to my close colleague, James Davies, for his insightful advice on many aspects of this thesis. Thanks to my fellow colleagues at UNSW Canberra: Amy Doffegnies, and Cecile Medial; and the Myanmar team at ANU, Ma Lwin Lwin Aung, Justine Chambers, Gerard McCarthy, and Ko Chit Win for their friendship, support, and encouragement throughout this study. To my fellow post graduate students at the school: Wenze Lu, Oleg Beyda, Rhiannon Nelson, Veasna Var, Dung Thi Le Tran, and Noahlyn Maranan, it has been great and lively with you all.

I am eternally grateful to my parents and sisters who have given me their support and encouragement throughout the time of this study. Above all, I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to my wife, Mi Khin Moe Moe San, for her great patience, encouragement, and personal support to me and for sharing the hardship during these demanding years.

This work is dedicated to my son, Min Win Son Ae, who may have to be part of Myanmar’s uncompleted nation-building and state-building.

Khin Maung Yin August 8, 2018

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Contents Abstract ...... i Acknowledgements ...... ii Contents ...... iv List of Maps...... vi List of Abbreviations ...... vi Chapter 1. Introduction ...... 1 Literature Review ...... 1 1.1.1. On the political implications of the ceasefires ...... 2 1.1.2. On the social and economic implications of the ceasefires ...... 6 1.1.3. Some more positive observations ...... 8 Research Questions ...... 10 Research Methodology ...... 11 Thesis Structure ...... 14 Naming and Romanisation ...... 14 Chapter 2. Analytical Framework ...... 17 Democracy...... 17 Ceasefire ...... 22 Post-Civil War Democratisation ...... 26 Variables of Research Interest ...... 31 2.4.1. Stateness ...... 33 2.4.2. Socioeconomic development ...... 40 2.4.3. Civil society ...... 47 Chapter 3. Background Context ...... 55 A Brief History of Peace and Conflict in Modern Myanmar Politics ...... 55 3.1.1. Protracted civil war ...... 55 3.1.2. Peace initiatives ...... 65 3.1.3. Political liberalisation ...... 67 Background Context of the Ethnic Societies under Scrutiny ...... 69 3.2.1. Karen-populated areas ...... 69 3.2.2. Mon-populated areas ...... 72 Chapter 4. The Effects of Ceasefire on ‘Stateness’ ...... 77 Introduction ...... 77 Measuring Stateness ...... 79 Stateness in Mon- and Karen-Populated Areas during the Civil War ...... 82 4.3.1. Enforcement capacity ...... 82 4.3.2. Administrative capacity ...... 90 4.3.3. Infrastructure capacity ...... 102 Stateness in Mon-Populated Areas Following the NMSP Ceasefire ...... 132 4.4.1. Enforcement capacity ...... 132 4.4.2. Administrative capacity ...... 137 4.4.3. Infrastructure capacity ...... 145 Stateness in Karen-Populated Areas during 1995–2010 ...... 171 4.5.1. Enforcement capacity ...... 171 4.5.2. Administrative capacity ...... 175 4.5.3. Infrastructure capacity ...... 180 Conclusion ...... 198 Chapter 5. The Effects of Ceasefire on Economic Recovery...... 204 iv

Introduction ...... 204 Measuring Post-Conflict Economic Development ...... 204 Livelihood and Employment Conditions under Civil War...... 208 Livelihood and Employment Conditions in Mon-Populated Areas after the Ceasefire ...... 213 Livelihood and Employment Conditions in Karen-Populated Areas under the Continued Civil War ...... 220 Comparison of Urbanisation in the Conflict-Affected Karen- and Mon- Populated Areas ...... 226 Conclusion ...... 232 Chapter 6. The Effects of Ceasefire on Civil Society ...... 235 Introduction ...... 235 Measuring Civil Society ...... 235 Background Context of Civil Society in Myanmar ...... 237 The Effects of Ceasefire on the Context for Civil Society ...... 239 6.4.1. Context for civil society under civil war ...... 239 6.4.2. Context for civil society in Mon-populated areas after the NMSP ceasefire ...... 246 6.4.3. Context for Karen civil society during 1995–2010 ...... 256 The Effects of Ceasefire on the Structure of Civil Society ...... 263 6.5.1. Structure of civil society under civil war ...... 263 6.5.2. The changes in the structure of civil society in the Mon community after the NMSP ceasefire ...... 267 6.5.3. Civil society structure in Karen communities during 1995–2010 ...... 270 The Effects of Ceasefire on the Value Esteemed by Civil Society ...... 273 6.6.1. Value esteemed in civil society under the civil war ...... 273 6.6.2. Value esteemed in Mon civil society after the NMSP ceasefire ...... 277 6.6.3. Value esteemed in Karen civil society during 1995–2010 ...... 282 Conclusion ...... 288 Chapter 7. The Effects of Ceasefire at the Onset of Post-Conflict Democratisation...... 292 Introduction ...... 292 Democratic Uptake of Karen and Mon Societies during the Inception Phase of Myanmar National Liberalisation ...... 296 7.2.1. The political parties ...... 296 7.2.2. The 2010 general elections ...... 313 Development of Basic Civil Liberty ...... 323 7.3.1. Freedom of association ...... 324 7.3.2. The media ...... 329 Local Governance in Transition ...... 335 7.4.1. State parliaments ...... 336 7.4.2. Local government ...... 343 Conclusion ...... 351 Chapter 8. Conclusion ...... 355 Contributions to knowledge ...... 358 Future research ...... 359 Bibliography ...... 367

List of Maps

Map 1: Myanmar States/Regions and Self-Administered Zones/Division ...... xi Map 2: Township Map: Kayin and Mon State ...... xii Map 3: Village Tract of Mon State ...... xiii Map 4: Village Tract of Kayin State ...... xiv

List of Abbreviations

AFPFL Anti-Fascist People Freedom League AMDP All Mon-region Democracy Party ARMA All Ramanya Mon Association BDF Burma Defence Force BGF Border Guard Force BIA Burma Independent Army BMA Burma Medical Association BNI Burma News International BPHWT Back Pack Health Worker Team BSPP Burma Socialist Programme Party CBO Community-Based Organisation CCA Child-Centred Approach CEC Central executive committee CPB Communist Party of Burma CSI Civil Society Index CSO Civil Society Organisations DKBA Democratic Karen Buddhist Army DKBA Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (Kloh Htoo Baw) DKBA-5 Democratic Karen Benevolent Army Brigade-5 DOH Department of Health DOHS Directorate of Health Services DPW Department of Public Work EAO Ethnic Armed Organisations GAD General Administration Department GDP Gross Domestic Product GONGO Government Organised Non-Governmental Organisation HA Health Assistant HCCG Health Convergence Core Group HRW Human Rights Watch HU Health Unlimited HURFOM Human Rights Foundation for Monland IB Infantry Battalion IDP Internally Displaced Person

ILO International Labour Office IMNA Independent Mon News Agency INGO International non-governmental organisation IOM International Organization for Migration IRD Internal Revenue Department IPA Internal Peace Association IRD Internal Revenue Department KCO Karen Central Organization KDC Karen Development Committee KDHW Karen Department of Health and Welfare KDN Karen Development Network KECD Karen Education and Cultural Department KED Karen Education Department KHRG Karen Human Rights Group KLCA Karen Literacy and Cultural Association KLCC Karen Literature and Cultural Committee KNDO Karen National Defence Organisation KNLA Karen National Liberation Army KNU Karen National Union KPC Karen Peace Council KPF Karen Peace Force KPP Karen People’s Party KPMG Karen Peace Mediator Group KPP Kayin People’s Party KRC Karen Refugee Committee KSDDP Kayin State Democracy and Development Party KSEAG Karen State Education Assistant Group KSPP Kachin State Progressive Party KTTC Karen Teacher Training Collage KTWG Karen Teacher Working Group KYO Karen Youth Organisation LAMYO League of All Mon Youth Organisations LIB Light Infantry Battalion LID Light Infantry Division LNGO Local Non-Governmental Organisation MCF Mon Cetanar Foundation MFL Mon Freedom League MI Military Intelligence MLCC Mon Literature and Cultural Committee MMCWA Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association MNDF Mon National Democratic Front MNEC Mon National Education Committee MNED Mon National Education Department MNHC Mon National Health Committee

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MNLA Mon National Liberation Army MNP Mon National Party MNRC Mon National Relief Committee MNS Mon National School MOC Military Operation Command MOE Ministry of Education MOH Ministry of Health MP Member of Parliament MPC Myanmar Peace Centre MPF Mon People’s Front MPSI Myanmar Peace Support Initiative MPT Myanmar Postal and Telecommunication MSDN Mon-region Social Development Network MSLBC Mon Summer Literacy and Buddhist Culture MSF Médecins Sans Frontières MSP Members of State Parliament MSWO Margha Social Welfare Organisation MTB Mother Tongue-Based MTC Mae Tao Clinic MWO Mon Women’s Organisation MYPO Mon Youth Progressive Organisation Na Ta La Ministry for Progress of Border Areas and National Races Development Affairs NCA Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement NGO Non-Governmental organisations NHEC National Health and Education Committee NLD National League for Democracy NMSP New Mon State Party OHCHR Office of the UN High Commisioner for Human Rights PNA Pa-O National Army PNO Pa-O National Organization PNLO Pa-O National Liberation Organization PDC Peace and Development Committee PPF People Police Forec PSDP Palon-Sawaw Democratic Party PSRD Press Scrutiny and Registration Division PVO People’s Veteran Organisation PWD Public Works Department RC Revolutionary Council RHC Rural Health Centres RMC Regional Military Commands RONRO Rebel Organised Non-Rebel Organisation RWCT Reading and writing for critical thinking SAA Self-Administered Area

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SAD Self-Administered Division SAZ Self-Administered Zone SF Shalom Foundation SH Station hospitals SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council SMO Station Medical Officer SMLBCA Summer Mon Literacy and Buddhist Culture Association SPDC State Peace and Development Council SRHC Sub-Rural Health Centre TBBC Thailand Burma Border Consortium TBC The Border Consortium TDAC Township Development Affairs Committee TDSC Township Development Support Committee THO Township Health Officer TOC Technical Operation Command TMC Township Management Committee TMO Township Medical Officer UEC Union Election Commissioner UK United Kingdom UMA United Mon Association UN United Nations UNCT United Nations Country Team UNDP United Nations Development Program UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNOCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime US United States USDA Union Solidarity and Development Association USDP Union Solidarity and Development Party UWSA United Wa State Army UWSP United Wa State Party VTDSC Village Tract or Ward Development Support Committee WDP Wa Democratic Party WHO World Health Organization

Map 1: Myanmar States/Regions and Self-Administered Zones/Division

Map 2: Township Map: Kayin and Mon State

Map 3: Village Tract of Mon State

xii

Map 4: Village Tract of Kayin State

xiii

Chapter 1. Introduction

In the early 1990s, Myanmar’s military regime managed to institute ceasefires with most of the country’s major ethnic armed resistance groups, thus, ending four decades of all- out civil war. Most scholars are critical of these early ceasefires and argue that the failure to reach lasting political settlements obstructed more fundamental progress in the affected areas. Some even argue that the ceasefires undermined the pressure for democratisation and; therefore, were detrimental to the country’s broader political development. However, having observed at close hand the developments in Mon State during the early ceasefire period (1995–2010), I noticed a range of important structural changes that appeared to facilitate a better and quicker uptake of the new democratic opportunities in the region after national political reform commenced in 2010. Contrary to conventional wisdom, this thesis argues that ceasefires may serve as a catalyst for positive social, political and economic change processes that can improve the prospects for successful post-civil war democratisation. This study traces and compares developments in Mon-populated areas that benefited from the 1995 ceasefire between the government and the New Mon State Party (NMSP), with those in Karen-populated areas that continued to be heavily affected by armed conflict between the government and the Karen National Union (KNU) until 2012. It also reflects more tentatively on how the findings from Mon and Karen areas resonate with developments in other conflict-affected areas elsewhere in Myanmar. The thesis focuses on the effect of the early ceasefire period in the 1990s and 2000s (hereafter referred to simply as ‘the Mon ceasefire’, or ‘the ceasefires’ when speaking about the country more generally). It does not consider the later round of ceasefires underway since 2012, which are evolving in a very different political context.

Literature Review

Most Myanmar scholars have either ignored the role of the early ceasefires in Myanmar’s political development or viewed them in a negative light. Hence, none appears to have seriously considered how the social, political, and economic changes that took place in ceasefire areas during the 1990s and 2000s affected the ‘take up’ of new democratic opportunities after the onset of the post-2010 political reform process. In 2008, Ashley South observed that most assessments of Myanmar ceasefires were undertaken by the

1 Chapter 1. Introduction

exiled opposition or international human rights and advocacy groups and generally focused on ongoing problems in the troubled regions rather than positive developments.1 Similarly, in 2006 Thant Myint-U, a renowned Myanmar historian, notes that there was no encouragement nor real offers of mediation for the ceasefires from the international community. Myint-U observes, “No thought [has been given] as to how this tentative peace and move towards a market economy could be made irreversible”.2 The following sections review the literature on the early ceasefires, focusing first on the mainstream, negative assessments before briefly considering some observations made by early revisionist scholars that are more in line with the present thesis, but require further examination.

1.1.1. On the political implications of the ceasefires

Mainstream scholars tend to focus on the ‘apolitical’ nature of the early ceasefires and lament the absence of meaningful political settlements. Dr Alan Smith, a senior expert on Myanmar minority ethnic politics and Director of the Chiang Mai-based Foundation for Local Development, notes that although the ceasefires contained the ethnic armed conflicts “the underlying political issues remain altogether unresolved”.3 Similarly, South argues that, rather than addressing the causes of conflict, the ceasefire agreements have “frozen the structural socio-political issues”.4 He observes that, with the exception of the rudimentary presences of the ethnic armed groups’ political and developmental demands, the ceasefire agreements “generally lack all”.5

Likewise, Jake Sherman notes that because Myanmar’s ceasefires have failed to fulfil the promises of political dialogue and bring about economic development they do not address

1 Ashley South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2008), 121. 2 Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma, 1st ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), 332. 3 Alan Smith, “Burma/Myanmar: The Struggle for Democracy and Ethnic Rights,” in Multiculturalism in Asia, edited by Will Kymlicka and Baogang He (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 263. 4 South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict, 132. 5 Ashley South, “Ceasefires and Civil Society: The Case of the Mon,” in Exploring Ethnic Diversity in Burma, edited by Mikael Gravers (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007), 22.

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the deeper causes of the conflict.6 He is critical that although the expressed aims of ethnic armed insurgencies include achieving the right to self-determination or wider autonomy, none of the ceasefire agreements include any agreement on local autonomy.7 Further, he points out that the Myanmar ceasefire process is not in accordance with the established pattern of ethnic civil war resolution in which ethnic armed groups abandon their armed struggles in exchange for grants of wider local autonomy.8 In addition, because they have failed to fulfil promises of political dialogue, Myanmar’s ceasefires do not address the deep-rooted causes of the conflict9 and thus, cannot lead to a permanent political settlement or democratic transition.10 Similarly, Paul Core’s study on the ceasefire agreement of the Karen Peace Council (KPC)—a splinter group from the KNU—argues that, due to the absence of social and economic development as well as the militarisation and the extraction of natural resources of the areas, the ceasefire agreement failed to result in any political solution to the conflict.11 In the same way, Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke also argue that the lack of a comprehensive and durable settlement means that, at their best, the ceasefires yielded only ‘negative peace,’ characterised by the absence of war hostilities.12

Correspondingly, C. S. Kuppuswamy considers the Myanmar ceasefires merely as an effort by the military regime to freeze the root causes of the long ethnic conflict without providing a way forward for eventual settlement and argues that the ceasefire requires “political and social reforms and rehabilitation measures for the minority ethnic groups if

6 Jake Sherman, “Burma: Lessons from the Cease-Fires,” in The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, edited by Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 241. 7 Ibid., 226. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid., 241. 10 Ibid., 226. 11 Paul Core, “Burma/ Myanmar: Challenges of a Ceasefire Accord in Karen State,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 28, no. 3 (2009): 103. 12 Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons from Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict,” in IPA Policy Report (New York: International Peace Academy, 2003), 11.

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it is to be sustained”.13 Further, Zaw Oo and Win Min, two Western-trained former student activists in exile, suggest that instead of aiming for a possible political settlement, all the ceasefire agreements focused only on issues related to warfare and local administration in the designated minority ethnic areas.14 Describing the ceasefire agreement as “battle-field oriented ceasefires”, the authors argue that Myanmar’s more than 17-year-long ceasefires “have not produced peace or durable political settlements”15 and “have contributed little to [the] peacebuilding and democratisation” processes of the country.16

In addition to criticising the apolitical nature of the ceasefires, many scholars argue that the ceasefires served only to empower the military regime at the expense of the political and ethnic opposition. Scholars tend to focus on the immediate effects of the ceasefires on the struggle for power among elite level actors and typically conclude that they were detrimental to democratisation. Several scholars argue that the ceasefires enabled the military to co-opt armed insurgent groups and gain control of the remote borderlands it was unable to access before. This, they claim, helped the regime escape the looming security threats from the armed opposition groups and overcome the mounting pressure from pro-democracy opposition groups and the international community to begin a process of democratisation. Zaw Oo and Win Min also argue that the ceasefires not only ended the military threats of the ethnic armed groups to the failing military regime, but also helped the military to effectively contain pro-democracy movements by freeing up forces previously engaged in the war zones.17 Similarly, Andrew Selth observes that, by using the newly available resources, the regime enabled the Army to double its size and

13 C. S. Kuppuswamy, “Challenging the Reconciliation Process: Myanmar’s Ethnic Divides and Conflicts,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Issue Brief no. 221 (June, 2013), (New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2013), 7. 14 Zaw Oo and Win Min, Assessing Burma's Ceasefire Accords, Policy Studies, No. 39 (Washington D. C.: East-West Center, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 11. 15 Ibid., 1. 16 Ibid., xiii. 17 Ibid., 42.

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expand its military intelligence apparatus to penetrate and destabilise most of the opposition groups in the legal fold.18

Equally, many scholars argue that the physical presence of the military in minority ethnic areas intensely expanded during the ceasefire periods. Some point to the twofold-to- threefold increase in newly established army bases in the minority ethnic areas.19 Similarly, Curtis Lambrecht notes that the ceasefires enable the regime to capture natural resource bases that were previously rebel strongholds and forcibly relocate rebels’ families and the supporting population, so it can “tax, monitor and micromanage” them all.20 By arguing that the Myanmar ceasefires simply mark “the absence of war, not genuine or lasting peace”, Lee Jones claims the ceasefires benefit the regime in several ways.21 The author points out that through the manipulation of the ceasefires, the Myanmar military was able to crush the pro-democracy movement, penetrate into the remote borderlands and establish permanent garrisons within previous rebel stronghold areas, and hold the territory.22 Moreover, from the exogenous perspective, the author also evidences that the ceasefires help the military to escape the situation of being close to bankruptcy through an influx of foreign investment and trade deals, evade the Western arms embargo, attain large-scale weapons imports,23 and increase pressure from neighbouring countries to the rest of the rebel groups to sign the ceasefire agreements.24

18 Andrew Selth, Burma’s Secret Military Partners (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2000). 19 See, for example, Emily Claire Rudland and Morten B. Pedersen, “Strong Regime, Weak State,” in Burma-Myanmar: Strong Regime, Weak State?, edited by Ronald James May, Emily Claire Rudland, and Morten B. Pedersen (Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2000); Kevin Woods, “Ceasefire Capitalism: Military–Private Partnerships, Resource Concessions and Military–State Building in the Burma–China Borderlands,” Journal of Peasant Studies 38, no. 4 (2011): 750; Ashley South, “Displacement and Dispossession: Forced Migration and Land Rights in Burma” (Geneva: Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions [COHRE], 2007), 40. 20 Curtis Lambrecht, “Oxymoronic Development: The Military as Benefactor in the Border Regions of Burma,” in Civilizing the Margins: Southeast Asian Government Policies for the Development of Minorities, edited by Christopher R. Duncan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 171. 21 Lee Jones, “Explaining Myanmar’s Regime Transition: The Periphery Is Central,” Democratization 21, no. 5 (2014): 792. 22 Lee Jones, “Explaining Myanmar’s Regime Transition: The Periphery Is Central,” Democratization 21, no. 5 (2014): 792. 23 For more details, see J. Mohan Malik, “Myanmar's Role in Regional Security: Pawn or Pivot?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 19, no. 1 (1997): 55. 24 Jones, “Explaining Myanmar's Regime Transition: The Periphery Is Central,” 792.

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1.1.2. On the social and economic implications of the ceasefires

Many researchers argue that although the most serious forms of human rights abuses reduced during the ceasefire periods, rights violations by the Myanmar military continued in the war-torn areas, though on a lesser frequency and scale. For instance, Martin Smith notes the continuation of humanitarian crises that are most serious in the minority ethnic areas and South observes that, although the security situation in much of the country has improved, human and civil rights abuses remain rampant in the ceasefire ethnic regions.25 Similarly, based on data from Wa, Kokang, Kachin, and Mon ceasefire areas, both reports of Global Witness and Transnational Institute evidence that despite the ceasefires curtailing the scale of serious human rights abuses in conflict-torn areas, rights violations such as land confiscation, forced labour and extortion continues, although in less threatening forms.26

A report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) also found that the cessation of armed hostilities did not bring the displacement of civilian populations to an end in Mon and Kachin State, although the causes of displacement might have changed.27 The report argues that when the Myanmar Army expanded into previously contested areas, its acts of land confiscation dramatically increased.28 Some scholars argue that the Myanmar ceasefire agreements create conditions for increasing, rather than decreasing, violent incidents. For example, in pointing to the breakdown of the 17-year-long ceasefire between the regime and KIO in mid-2011 and the more damaging effects of the renewed war, Marte Nilsen argues that “the peace process and the ceasefire talks led to an increase, rather than a decrease, in violent incidents”.29

25 South, “Ceasefires and Civil Society: The Case of the Mon”. For similar arguments, see also Tom Kramer, Neither War Nor Peace: The Future of the Cease-Fire Agreements in Burma (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2009); Oo and Min, Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords. 26 Kramer, Neither War Nor Peace: The Future of the Cease-Fire Agreements in Burma, 20; Global Witness, A Conflict of Interests: The Uncertain Future of Burma’s Forests (London: Global Witness, 2003), 47. 27 Human Rights Watch, “Burma: They Came and Destroyed Our Village Again: The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Karen State” (Washington D. C. : Human Rights Watch, 2005), 12. 28 Ibid. 29 Marte Nilsen, “Will Democracy Bring Peace to Myanmar?,” International Area Studies Review 16, no. 2 (2013): 116. Regarding the effect of the renewed war between the KIO and Myanmar armies on the Kachin community, see also Human Rights Watch, “Untold Miseries: Wartime Abuses and Forced

6 Chapter 1. Introduction

By emphasising the negative economic effects of the Myanmar ceasefires, again with the elitist focus, many scholars argue that the economic privileges that emerged from the ceasefires were diverted to the military regime, ethnic armed groups, local elites, and foreigner investors rather than used to help rebuild the lives of a population that has carried the burden of the lengthy civil war. Zaw Oo and Win Min claim that following the ceasefire agreements, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)/State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) earned an enormous amount of income from the border trading that was previously controlled by the armed ethnic groups.30 Likewise, Kevin Wood argues that the ceasefires create conditions for the military regime to take hold of previously contested territories as well as untouched, rich natural resources and establish what he terms “ceasefire capitalism”.31 The author also claims this further marginalises minority ethnic populations in the ceasefire zones.32

Many studies claim that by giving lucrative business privileges to the ceasefire armed ethnic groups, the military regime weakened the groups’ political and representative positions. They particularly note that the government’s divide and rule strategy paid off by provoking the defection of several rebel factions to the government, sparking inter- group rivalries and undermining rebel groups’ internal coherence.33 Some scholars also point out that the military regime supplemented its counter-insurgency strategy with political and economic incentives aimed at co-opting insurgent groups’ leadership to

Displacement in Burma's Kachin State,” (Washington D. C. : Human Rights Watch, 2012). See also Curtis Lambrecht, “Ongoing Struggles,” in Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor (Online Burma/Myanmar Library, 2013). For its effect on Kachin women, please see Ying Lwin, “The Situation of Kachin Women During the Current Political Crisis,” Asian Jounal of Women Studies 19, no. 2 (2013). 30 Oo and Min, Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords, 43. 31 Woods uses the term “ceasefire capitalism” to denote the intricate interactions between Myanmar military, the ceasefire ethnic armed groups and local elites, the transnational finance capital and the resource-rich borderlands evolving within the ceasefire spaces overtime. See Woods, “Ceasefire Capitalism: Military–Private Partnerships, Resource Concessions and Military–State Building in the Burma–China Borderlands”. Martin Smith termed these ceasefire businesses as “get rich quick” economies and similarly, points to their negative economic effects. See Martin Smith, State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma since Independence, Policy Studies 36 (Southeast Asia) (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 48. 32 Woods, “Ceasefire Capitalism: Military–Private Partnerships, Resource Concessions and Military– State Building in the Burma–China Borderlands”. 33 For example, see Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 11.

7 Chapter 1. Introduction

accept military truces. By granting the leaders of the ceasefire armed groups lucrative business deals such as timber concessions and by tolerating their drug trade (often operated in collusion with the military), these ceasefire agreements proved a useful means for the government to consolidate its power in previously contested border regions. Ballentine and Sherman argue that by initially conceding lucrative, illicit business privileges, the regime used the ceasefires to co-opt ethnic armed opponents and consolidate its control of formerly inaccessible remote peripheries.34

1.1.3. Some more positive observations

A few scholars are more positive about the ceasefires, although none has drawn a direct link between the ceasefires and the later uptake of democratic opportunities in the post- 2010 period.

Some scholars point out that, after decades of all-out civil war, the Myanmar ceasefire agreements were the first time the political elites tried to promote political change through dialogue. This gave the ceasefire groups an opportunity to promote political change as a whole by accentuating the necessity of recognition of minority ethnic rights and an inclusive federalist state structure at the national level. According to South, for example, KIO and NMSP delegations were able to publicly propose several basic principles at the Myanmar National Convention that was held to develop basic principles on which the country’s new constitution is to be drafted, although these were denied.35

Kramer notes that with the creation of government-like institutions such as justice, health, education, agriculture, and other departments, major ceasefire groups were also able to reform or expand their existing governance structures and improve capacity in their controlled regions and, to different extents, create a state within the state.36 For example,

34 Ibid., 226; Woods, “Ceasefire Capitalism: Military–Private Partnerships, Resource Concessions and Military–State Building in the Burma–China Borderlands,” 749; Jones, “Explaining Myanmar’s Regime Transition: The Periphery Is Central,” 792. 35 South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict. 36 Kramer, Neither War Nor Peace: The Future of the Cease-Fire Agreements in Burma, 18.

8 Chapter 1. Introduction

KIO and NMSP decentralised significant decision-making and managerial power to their lower level organisations.37

South further suggests that the ceasefires brought about opportunities for the ceasefire groups “to mobilise among their constituencies in the government-controlled area”.38 South notes that this has benefited most of the population in Mon State including those living in government-controlled areas previously hard to access by the armed nationalist party, the NMSP. 39 Similarly, even during the brief tentative ceasefire period, Karen people from different parts of the country and internationally and from different political, civil, and religious organisations were allowed to meet officially and have discussions about issues relating to Karen people.40

In some ceasefire areas, an embryonic independent civil society emerged.41 South observes that the relatively stable ceasefires in Kachin and Mon States created political space for extensive networks of civil, communal, and religious groups to emerge or re- emerge and offset not just the humanitarian and basic social needs of their recovering societies, but effectively engage in resettlement and livelihood recovery activities.42 As an example, South points to the Mon Women’s Organisation (MWO) and the Department of Education of the NMSP that were successful in extending their developmental activities beyond the party’s base areas since the ceasefire.43

37 Ibid. 38 South, “Ceasefires and Civil Society: The Case of the Mon,” 22. 39 South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict, xiv. 40 Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, “From the ‘Loyal’ to the ‘Revolutionary’ Karen: Looking at Burma's Post-Independent Era,” in Burmese Lives: Ordinary Life Stories under the Burmese Regime, edited by Wen-Chin Chang and Eric Tagliacozzo (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 254. 41 Myanmar Peace Support Initiative (MPSI), Lessons Learned from MPSI’s Work Supporting the Peace Process in Myanmar (Yangon: Myanmar Peace Support Initiative, 2014), 13; Ashley South, Civil Society in Burma: The Development of Democracy Amidst Conflict (Singapore; Washington, D.C. : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; East-West Center, 2008), 24; Charles Petrie and Ashley South, “Development of Civil Society in Myanmar,” in Burma/Myanmar: Where Now?, 90; Oo and Min, Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords, 50–51; Kramer, Neither War Nor Peace: The Future of the Cease-Fire Agreements in Burma, 22. 42 South, Civil Society in Burma: The Development of Democracy Amidst Conflict, 24; South, “Ceasefires and Civil Society: The Case of the Mon,” 13. 43 South, “Ceasefires and Civil Society: The Case of the Mon,” 23.

9 Chapter 1. Introduction

Finally, a number of scholars concur that the ceasefires brought about better lives for the war-shattered communities. According to Smith, the annual battle-related death toll on all sides in the Myanmar civil war significantly decreased after ceasefire agreements were reached in the mid-1990s.44 Although critical of the ceasefires, Zaw Oo and Win Min acknowledge that serious forms of rights violations, such as killings, rapes, and the destruction of villages, significantly decreased in the ceasefire areas.45 Speaking more generally, South finds that the ceasefires significantly improved the lives of the populations that have long been confined in the war zones through significant decreases in levies to both the military and rebel groups, the ability to travel more freely, better access to their farmlands, reductions in predatory taxation, and other measures.46

This thesis builds on the work of these latter scholars, but extends the analysis significantly. In particular, it focuses on the causal links between the ceasefires, the structural changes that take place in the absence of war-related hostilities, and the country’s ongoing democratisation process.

Research Questions

Given the significant, though often overlooked, political, social, and economic changes that occurred in conflict-affected ethnic areas during the early ceasefire period, deeper scholarly attention should be given to identify the possible causal linkages between the ceasefires and the post-2010 process of post-war democratic transition. Specifically, this study asks two related questions:

• Do durable ceasefires facilitate post-war democratisation?

• What are the causal processes involved?

To answer these questions, the thesis examines the social, economic, and political changes that took place in two minority ethnic-populated areas in Myanmar facing

44 Smith, “Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches,” 60; also Kramer, Neither War Nor Peace: The Future of the Cease-Fire Agreements in Burma, 20; Nilsen, “Will Democracy Bring Peace to Myanmar?,” 118;. 45 Oo and Min, Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords. 46 Ashley South, “Update on the Peace Process,” in Burma/Myanmar: Where Now?, edited by Mikael Gravers and Flemming Ytzen (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2014), 253; also Kramer, Neither War Nor Peace: The Future of the Cease-Fire Agreements in Burma, 22–23.

10 Chapter 1. Introduction

different conditions of war and peace between 1990 and 2015. Selected for their comparable sociocultural, geographical, and economic background conditions, it compares and contrasts development in Mon-populated areas that have benefitted from a ceasefire in place since 1995 with Karen-populated areas that have only seen a cessation of war-related hostilities since 2012.

The original plan was to include a third case study of the Wa region that has benefited from a ceasefire even longer than the Mon but has not experienced a similar uptake of democratic opportunities since 2011. This would have made it possible to further explore a third question:

• Under what conditions are durable ceasefires most likely to support post-war democratisation?

However, during the time of my fieldwork the situation between the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Myanmar Army was extremely tense and it was not possible for me to gain access to undertake the required fieldwork. I therefore had to omit that part of the study, although I offer some tentative observations on the relevance of the Wa experience in the Conclusion.

Research Methodology

The “variables of theoretical interest”47 are:

• independent variable—ceasefires

• intervening variables—the various political, social, cultural and economic changes that took place during the ceasefire periods

• dependent variable—the observed effects on the country’s post-civil war democratisation process.

To optimise the value of the findings for more general theorising, three complementary qualitative methodologies are used. In line with a growing consensus that this is the best

47 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, “The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison,” in Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 69.

11 Chapter 1. Introduction

way to draw causal inferences from case studies, the thesis uses of a combination of “within-case analysis”48 of single cases and cross-case comparison within a single research program.49 Since the focus of the project is on the sequential processes within particular cases and tracing the links between possible causes and observed outcomes, the method of process tracing is used in studying individual cases. According to Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, the process tracing method is one of the dominant qualitative research methods that “attempts to identify the intervening causal process— the causal chain and causal mechanism—between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome”.50 Scholars also identified the process tracing method as a valuable research tool to develop and test theory.51

In comparing the empirical experiences of the two individual cases, the method of ‘structured, focused comparison’52 is used. This method was developed in an attempt to offset the perceived weaknesses of individual case studies including their non-scientific and non-cumulative character53 and often essentially descriptive and non-theory oriented approach.54 It involves developing a relevant set of standardised general questions that are grounded and adequately reflect the theoretical orientation and objectives of the study and that are then asked of each case. This helps guide and standardise the data collection of the cases, thus, paving the way for a systematic comparison of findings from the cases examined.

48 Oisn Tansey suggests that robust causal analysis can be carried out through within-case analysis. Oisn Tansey, “Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability Sampling,” Political Science and Politics 40, no. 4 (2007): 765. 49 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 18. 50 Ibid., 206. 51 David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” Political Science and Politics 44, no. 4 (2011); George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 217. 52 Ibid. This method is similar to “the case survey method” developed in Robert K. Yin and Karen A. Heald, “Using the Case Survey Method to Analyze Policy Studies,” Administrative Science Quarterly 20, no. 3 (1975). 53 James N. Rosenau, “Moral Fervor, Systematic Analysis, and Scientific Consciousness in Foreign Policy Research,” in Political Science and Public Policy, edited by Austin Ranney (Chicago: Markham, 1968). 54 Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, 3rd ed. (Homewood, Ill: Dorsey Press, 1968).

12 Chapter 1. Introduction

The unit of analysis of this study is the civil war-affected minority ethnic-populated territories, not the country as a whole. Specifically, the focus is on social, economic, and political change processes that resulted from the cessation of hostilities in previously conflict-affected minority ethnic societies and their contributions to the democratic transition process at the local level. The latter has taken place within the context of national level political reform, but the thesis does not consider how it may have contributed, or not, to the overall democratic transition.

Although the study draws on the existing literature on the topic, due to the relative sparsity of that literature, the primary sources of data are semi-structured interviews, participatory observations, and facilitated focal group discussions. Interview fieldwork was conducted during February to April 2016 and January to April 2017, in several cities and towns in Kayin and Mon States as well as a number of Mon and Karen-populated villages. In some cases, follow-up interviews were conducted through Facebook Messenger, Skype, or telephone. Most of the elite interviews with local political leaders, leaders of ethnic armed groups, government ministers, and parliamentary leaders took place in Yangon, Mawlamyine, and Hpa-an. Other key informant interviews were conducted with political and social activists, civil society leaders, and business personnel from both Karen and Mon communities. Many former and acting village administrators in the Mon and Karen villages were highly informative. Based on their own experiences, many were able to clearly recall the situation before and after the ceasefire. In some cases, informant interviews in villages, in particular, evolved into informal group discussions as curious onlookers voluntarily joined in and complemented or provided different views and information. More formal, facilitated focal group discussions with particular social groups were also often informative. Due to problems with security or transportation, some of the planned interviews in Karen villages had to be cancelled. However, given the nature of these latter areas, it can be assumed that these interviews would have confirmed the main findings. In total, 153 interviewees participated in this research project in 115 interviews and 16 formal and informal group discussions.

Given the specific information needed, interviewees were not selected randomly. However, they were identified with the help of experienced local political and civil society leaders on the basis of age, profession, and involvement in social, political, and economic activities. Access to elite interviewees, in particular, was subject to availability.

13 Chapter 1. Introduction

Interviews in Mon-populated areas were mostly conducted in Mon language and most of the interviews in Yangon and Karen-populated areas were in Bamar language.

Thesis Structure

Chapter 2 develops the analytical framework used in this study. It defines key terms, such as democracy, ceasefire, and post-civil war democratisation, and identifies three democratic fundamentals of particular interest to this study. Chapter 3 provides some brief historical context for the study, focusing in particular on Myanmar’s seven-decades long civil war and the different sets of ceasefires that since the 1990s in particular have helped to reduce armed hostilities. The chapter also gives some background for the two case studies of Mon- and Karen-populated areas. Chapters 4-6 examine the effects of different conditions of war and peace on three key democratic fundamentals – stateness, economic development, and civil society – in Mon- and Karen-populated areas, respectively. Chapter 4 on stateness considers developments in the state’s coercive as well as social and infrastructural capacity. Chapter 5 on economic development focuses on livelihoods, employment opportunities, and urbanisation. And chapter 6 on civil society considers changes in the context, structure, and values espoused by the civil society organisations. Finally, chapter 7 demonstrates how the different development of democratic fundamentals in Mon- and Karen-populated areas at the onset of Myanmar’s national liberation process in 2010 resulted in different uptake of new democratic opportunities. The Conclusion summarises the study’s main findings and reflects on how they resonate with the experience in other conflict-affected areas in Myanmar, focusing on Pa-O, Kachin, and Wa areas. It also briefly reviews the main contributions of this thesis to existing knowledge and offers some thought on further research.

Naming and Romanisation

Alaungpaya, the founder of Myanmar’s last Kaungbaung dynasty, in a letter to the British East India Company after defeating his feudal rivals in the mid-eighteenth century, imprecisely referred to himself as the king of Tampradipa and Thunaparanta, of Ramannadesa (the former Mon kingdoms) and of Kamboza (the former Shan Kingdoms).55 By the mid-nineteenth century, the central Court of Myanmar at Innwa had

55 Thant Myint-U, The Making of Modern Burma (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 83.

14 Chapter 1. Introduction

begun to refer to the Kingdom as Myanmar Naing Ngan with the literal meaning of ‘the Bamar Kingdom’.56 The name of the country in its indigenous language has not changed since then. However, the Mons, an established civilisation of the territory, call the Bamar ‘Bamaue’ in their indigenous language. As the Mons were the first native population that the British officials, scholars, and American missionaries met in the early seventeenth century, the name of the country as well as of cities and other geographical landmarks were adopted as pronounced by the Mons. Thus, for instance, Burman, Ava, Margue, Rangoon, Prome, Irrawaddy and Tenesserim were adopted after the Mons’ pronunciations of Bamaue, Avaue, Mengue, Pronue, Ierrawatoi, and Tanengsoi, although the Bamars pronounce these as Bamar, Innwa, Myeik, Pyi, Ayeyarwaddy, and Taninthayi. King Alaungpaya renamed the city of Yangon from its indigenous Mon name Dagon after his final defeat of the Mons in 1757 (it literally means ‘had clearly wiped out all the enemies’). Mons pronounce the Burmese character ‘ရန္ကုန္’ (Yangon) ‘Rongone’. In June 1989, to highlight its patriotism against Western-leaning pro-democracy forces, Myanmar’s last military regime changed the English name of the country from Burma to its original Myanmar while keeping the indigenous name Myanmar unchanged. Today, the new name of the country, as well as a host of city and geographic names re-Romanised by the junta are widely used in the literature. This study will use ‘Myanmar’ as the country’s name and to denote all the countrymen of Myanmar regardless of their nationalities. Bamar will be used as the name of the majority population. At the same time, to avoid confusion with the names of places, this study will use the geographical names imposed by the ruling government of Myanmar and used by most local and international non-governmental communities. However, as the government itself is inconsistent in its Romanisation, there is no standard for the names of places and geographical landmarks. This is also the case with the Romanised names of the townships, village tracts, and the villages. Thus, this study uses the names most commonly used by local people and the local and international organisations.

Conversely, as it is generally agreed that people have the right to name their ethnicity, this study will use the indigenous names of the nationalities preferred by the individual minority ethnic groups. Regarding the name of the nationality ‘Karen’, most Karen political and civil society leaders prefer the term ‘Karen’ in denoting their nationality in

56 Ibid. 15 Chapter 1. Introduction

English, while conceding that they tend to use the term ကရင္ (pronounced Ka Yin, not Karen) in Bamar language. A conference on ‘Ratifying the Correct Name of Karen Nationality’ held in Hpa-an on May 3, 2017 approved the name ‘Karen’ instead of the term ‘Kayin’ formally used by the Myanmar Government. To respect the suggestion of Karen leaders and the decision made by the representatives from across all the Karen- populated areas in the Karen Conference, the study will use the term ‘Karen’ as ascribed by the Karen Conference and the term ‘Kayin’ will be used to describe the State and institutions of governance as legalised by Myanmar Government. At the same time, under the 1974 Myanmar Constitution, the government divided Kayin State into seven townships: Hpa-an, Kawkareik, Kyainnseikgyi, Myawaddy, Papun, Thandaung, and Hlaingbwe. Meanwhile, as the administrative enclaves of the Karen free state ‘Kawthoolei’, KNU organised the Karen-populated areas into seven administrative districts associated with each of the seven Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) brigades, many of which overlap with the adjacent Mon State and some majority Bamar- populated Regions demarcated in Karen geographic names by the government. For example, the Thaton District (Doo Tha Htoo in Karen) of the KNLA First Brigade overlaps with the Thaton Township of Mon State and most areas of the Nyaunglabin District (Kler Lwee Htoo in Karen) of the Third Brigade are in Bago Region. From the early 1950s, the KNU operated as the de facto government of the Karen people not only in most of Kayin State but also in the areas extending into Mon State and Bago and Tanintharyi Regions. Since the areas that are populated by Karen people and are affected by the armed conflict transcend the boundary of Kayin State, the study will denote them as ‘Karen-populated areas’ instead of Kayin State. Similarly, the Mons are populated in Mon State along the eastern coastal line of the Gulf of Martaban and Andaman Sea, South-Western Kayin State, North-Western Tanintharyi Region. The prolonged armed conflict has extended to all the Mon-populated States and Regions. Thus, the study will use the term Mon-populated areas, instead of Mon State, in describing the conflict- affected Mon territory. The name of the nationality, the Mon, has never changed.

16 Chapter 2: Analytical Framework

Chapter 2. Analytical Framework

A stable and shared understanding of key concepts is generally perceived as the foundation of any academic research.1 This presents a challenge for this study since scholars have not yet agreed on the definition of key variables of interest, including ‘democracy’, ‘democratisation’, and ‘ceasefire’. The thesis thus uses what Laurence Whitehead calls “floating but anchored”2 definitions as outlined below.

Democracy

Since it was first penned down during the Second World War,3 there has been an absence of academic agreement on the concept and meaning of the term ‘democracy’.4 Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning, both leading scholars on democracy and democratisation, suggest that the term and concept of democracy have been the object of disputes and disagreements throughout its lifetime.5 In 1977, Arend Lijphart, a renowned democracy theorist, argued that democracy is “a concept which virtually defies definition”.6 In 1996, when assessing the existing definitions of democracy in the literature to provide a general overview, David Collier and Steven Levitsky found they had to stop counting definitions when they reached 550 modifiers.7

1 David Collier and James E. Mahon, “Conceptual Stretching Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative-Analysis,” American Political Science Review 87, no. 4 (1993): 845. 2 Laurence Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 6. 3 See, for example, Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1974 [1942]); Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944); Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, 5th ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966 [1945]). 4 Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning, Requisites of Democracy: Conceptualization, Measurement, and Explanation (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 115. Also John Dunn, Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy (London: Atlantic Books, 2005). 5 Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning, Democracy and Democratization in Comparative Perspective: Conceptions, Conjunctures, Causes and Consequences (New York: Routledge, 2013), 2. 6 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 4. 7 Collier and Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research”. In support of the authors, Guillermo A. O’Donnell (2001) argues that the assumption that

17 Chapter 2: Analytical Framework

In their ongoing disagreement on the definition of democracy, scholars have come up with various explanations. For instance, Walter Gallie suggests that because the concept of democracy is “multidimensional, internally complex, extremely vague, qualitative, and value-laden, it is difficult to reach a consensual definition”.8 Similarly, Møller and Skaaning suggest that because democracy is an evaluative concept, reaching a unanimous agreement about the definition of the term ‘democracy’ is impossible.9

However, in the wake of the “third wave of democratisation”10 with the collapse of communist regimes across Eastern Europe in the early-1990s, there has been a silent abandonment of adjectives such as ‘popular’, ‘guided’, ‘bourgeois’, and ‘formal’ to modify the term ‘democracy’.11 At the same time, there has been growing agreement about the minimum conditions that society must meet to be merited as a democracy. Thomas Carothers rejects as an insult to the conception of democracy any claims that different models of democracy exist based on individual national traditions of different societies.12 He argues that although each democratic society may have particular features, there have to be shared “basic elements of an underlying liberal democratic model”.13

“there is a clear and consistent corpus of democratic theory is wrong”. See Guillermo A. O’Donnell, “Democracy, Law, and Comparative Politics,” Studies in Comparative International Develoment 36, no. 1 (2001): 7. Similarly, Laurence Whitehead, also concedes that it is difficult to define the term ‘democracy’ with a clear core meaning that is essentially objective and can be applied universally. See, Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience. Robert Dahl, who has tried to produce a consensual perception of democracy, has lamented the lack of academic consensus on how to conceptualise and measure democracy even in such a modern time. Quoted in Gerardo L. Munck and Richard O. Snyder, Passion, Craft, and Method in Comparative Politics (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 145. 8 Walter B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1956): 184. 9 Møller and Skaaning, Requisites of Democracy: Conceptualization, Measurement, and Explanation, 113. See also Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience, 9; Arne Naess, Democracy, Ideology, and Objectivity: Studies in the Semantics and Cognitive Analysis of Ideological Controversy, vol. 1 (Oslo: Published for the Norwegian Research Council for Science and the Humanities [by] University Press, 1956). 10 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 11 Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is … And Is Not,” Journal of Democracy 2, no. 3 (1991): 75. 12 Thomas Carothers, “Democracy,” Foreign Policy, no. 107 (1997): 11. 13 Ibid.

18 Chapter 2: Analytical Framework

Similarly, Møller and Skaaning argue that there does exist systematic patterns of democracy, both conceptually and empirically.14

In defining the term, scholars distinguish the definition and attributes of democracy on both conceptual and empirical bases. From the conceptual basis, most scholars emphasise free and fair elections and broad citizen participation as the essence of democracy. In its earlier days, for instance, Joseph Schumpeter seminally defined democracy as the “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for people’s vote”.15 Likewise, by accentuating ‘political uncertainty’ through free and fair elections as the essence of democracy, Adam Przeworski argues that if the final outcome of an election is unpredictable while all the political parties do their best, then the society is an instance of democracy.16 Elsewhere, he explains ‘ex-ante uncertainty’ and ‘ex-post irreversibility’ as the two major attributes of democracy.17 Similarly, Schmitter and Karl conceptualise democracy as the presence of broadly defined citizenry, acting out through the competition and cooperation of elected representatives.18 The authors argue that it is a unique system of governance for organising relations between rulers and the ruled, to hold the rulers accountable for the decision they make and their actions in their public capacities.19 Similarly, Leonard Wantchekon and Zvika Neeman argue that democracy is an incomplete power-sharing contract in which ultimate or residual power changes hands in a manner of positive probability.20

As the defining conceptual components of democracy are abstract, many scholars try to empirically operationalise the conceptual meanings of democracy with what most term

14 Møller and Skaaning, Requisites of Democracy: Conceptualization, Measurement, and Explanation, xviii. 15 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 269. 16 Adam Przeworski, “Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy,” in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, edited by Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 17 Mike Alvarez et al., “Classifying Political Regimes,” Studies in Comparative International Develoment 31, no. 2 (1996): 50–51. 18 Schmitter and Karl, “What Democracy Is … And Is Not,” 76. 19 Ibid. 20 L. Wantchekon and Z. Neeman, “A Theory of Post-Civil War Democratization,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 14, no. 4 (2002): 440.

19 Chapter 2: Analytical Framework

‘procedural’ conditions. Robert Dahl, for example, highlights “secret balloting, universal adult suffrage, regular elections, partisan competition, associational freedom, executive accountability” as the required minimum conditions for a society to be seen as a democratic polity21 or, as he called it, a ‘polyarchy’.22 Larry Diamond terms this ‘procedural minimum’ (as it is known in the established literature) conception of democracy as ‘electoral democracy’.23 He argues that for election competition and citizen participation to be meaningful, the ‘minimalist’24 conception of democracy must acknowledge the requirement of minimum levels of freedoms including freedom of speech, press, organisation, and assembly.25 In addition to Dahl’s procedural minimum, in 1991 Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl added two more criteria and expanded the minimum criteria. They propose that elected officials must be able to exercise the constitutional power granted by popular balloting independent of any unelected officials, particularly the military, and that the society must be a sovereign polity independent of the influence of any political system outside its territory26 as the additional criteria of the minimalist democracy.

At the same time, there has been an increasing conviction that democracy is not a static concept but can best be described as a process that moves through a continuum of different states that comprise different elements of democracy. Whitehead, for instance, suggests that democracy can be best understood “not as predetermined end-state, but as a long-term and somewhat open-ended outcome”.27 Storm also points out that there is a growing tendency that assumes democracy develops according to a specific set of

21 Carsten Q. Schneider and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation: Measuring the Components of Democratization,” Democratization 11, no. 5 (2004): 63. 22 Robert Alan Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy Vs. Control (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 11. See also Robert Alan Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971). O’Donnell and Schmitter suggest almost the same components of Dahl’s procedural minimum as the necessary elements of political democracy. See Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 8. 23 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 8. 24 Again, O’Donnell termed it ‘processualist’. See O’Donnell, “Democracy, Law, and Comparative Politics,” 7. 25 Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, 8. 26 Schmitter and Karl, “What Democracy Is … And Is Not”. 27 Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience, 3.

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phases.28 Some scholars try to allocate these different states of societies undergoing democratic transition on an orderly scaled continuum or, as Kenneth Bailey termed it, a “simple order scale”.29 Based on Michael Coppedge’s “thinner and thicker”30 definitions of democracy, Møller and Skaaning argue that it is possible to conceptually and empirically scale different states of democracy and suggest this also helps to assess the “causes and correlates of democracy”.31 Similarly, based on what they labelled underlying “conceptual benchmarks”,32 Collier and Levitsky put the different categories of conceptions and definitions of democracies in a continuum with six different states that begin from non-democracy up to the maximalist conceptions of Western liberal democracy.33

According to Collier and Levitsky, a ‘non-democratic society’ is followed ‘minimalist democracy’, meaning a state in which reasonably competitive elections devoid of massive fraud are regularly held with a broad suffrage. Third on the continuum, they place ‘procedural minimum democracy’, meaning a state that additionally assures respect for basic civil liberties such as freedom of speech, assembly, and association. Fourth is the ‘expanded procedural minimum’ in which the elected government has effective power to rule and is not under any control or influence of a non-elected domain. Fifth is what the authors call ‘prototypical conception of established industrial democracy’, meaning a state which comprises additional features associated with an established industrial democracy such as political, social and economic equality. Finally, at the top of the

28 Storm, “An Elemental Definition of Democracy and Its Advantages for Comparing Political Regime Types,” 215. 29 Kenneth D. Bailey, “Monothetic and Polythetic Typologies and Their Relation to Conceptualization, Measurement and Scaling,” American Sociological Review 38, no. 1 (1973). 30 Michael Coppedge, “Thickening Thin Concepts and Theories: Combining Large N and Small in Comparative Politics,” Comparative Politics 31, no. 4 (1999). 31 Møller and Skaaning, Requisites of Democracy: Conceptualization, Measurement, and Explanation, xviii. 32 Collier and Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research”. 33 See Storm, “An Elemental Definition of Democracy and Its Advantages for Comparing Political Regime Types,” 215–16. See also Collier and Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research”. And Schmitter and Karl, “What Democracy Is … And Is Not,” 83.

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continuum, the authors place the ‘maximalist’ conception of ‘Western liberal democracy’.34

Møller and Skaaning introduce a similar ordinal scale of democracy continuum in which they allocate the thinner and thicker definitions of democracy into a systematic conceptual hierarchy.35 Their scale of ‘four-fold typology’ begins with ‘minimalist democracy’ in which electoral rights are the dominant feature. The authors then put ‘electoral democracy’ and ‘polyarchy’ at second and third place on the scale, respectively, and propose political liberties for the former and rules of law for the latter as the additional essential attributes. At the topmost, they place ‘liberal democracy’ in which social rights are institutionalised. The authors characterise liberal democracy as a polity that has “the combination of free and fair elections, political liberties of speech and assembly, and the rule of law”.36

Based on these conceptual and empirical understandings of the term democracy, this study defines any polity that has achieved different elements of democratic fundamentals scattered along and around the democratic continuum as democracies at different stages. Further, any significant movement away from a non-democratic regime towards a more substantive or procedural conception of democracy will be considered a political change towards democracy.

Ceasefire

Similar to the term ‘democracy’, there has been confusion about the meaning of the terms ‘ceasefire’, ‘truce’, and ‘armistice’. Before the UN Charter, war conventions that agreed for an end of warlike hostilities were termed as ‘the suspension of arms’, ‘the truce’, ‘the

34 Møller and Skaaning introduce a similar ordinal scale of democracy continuum on which they transform the thinner and thicker definition of democracy into a systematic hierarchy. Beginning with minimalist democracy, their scale moves on with electoral democracy, followed by polyarchy and, finally, liberal democracy. See Møller and Skaaning, Requisites of Democracy: Conceptualization, Measurement, and Explanation, 1. Regarding the liberal democracy, Fareed Zakaria defines western liberal democracy as “a political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property”. See Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6 (1997): 22. 35 Møller and Skaaning, Requisites of Democracy: Conceptualization, Measurement, and Explanation, 1. 36 Ibid.

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armistice’ and ‘the peace treaty’.37 The term ceasefire was understood to be a military order given by a superior commander to his subordinate troops to stop fighting and held no legal meaning.38 Following the establishment of the UN, whenever it happened to intervene in a war, its subordinate organs (particularly the Security Council) used various terms such as ‘ceasefire’, ‘standstill’, ‘cessation of all acts of armed force’, ‘discontinuance of military operations’, ‘truce’, ‘armistice’, and others to denote the conditions of cessation of war hostilities.39 The term ‘truce’ is reputedly the earliest to mean an end of war hostilities. In his 1625 book ‘On the Law of War and Peace’, Hugo Grotius, used the term ‘truce’ to denote an agreement by which “warlike acts are for a time abstained from, though the state of war continues”.40

In the late nineteenth century after the codification of international law commenced, the term ‘truce’ was defined as the procedure in which the belligerents entered into negotiations and a new term ‘armistice’ was introduced to mean “an actual agreement to suspend military operations”.41 The 1874 Brussels Declaration defines an armistice as the mutual agreement of suspension of military operations between the belligerents and can either be a general suspension of all military operations everywhere or limited agreements applying only to certain belligerent armies and within a fixed radius of the battlefields.42 Similarly, the Hague Regulation of 1907 also defines armistice as “suspensions of military operations by mutual agreement between the belligerent parties”.43 At that time, an armistice was only military in nature and did not aim at resolving any political or

37 Major Fred K. Green (1973), cited in David M. Morriss, “From War to Peace: A Study of Cease- Fire Agreements and the Evolving Role of the United Nations,” Virginia Journal of International Law 36, no. 4 (1996): 809. 38 Ibid., 812. 39 Paul Mohn, “Problems of Truce Supervision,” International Conciliation 29 (1952): 52. 40 Hugo Grotius is a Dutch Jurist and scholar renowned for his effort in establishing the international law on war and peace. See Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace: Three Books, edited by James Brown Scott, trans. Francis W. Kelsey, vol. III, The Classics of International Law (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1925), 832–34. 41 Sydney D. Bailey, “Cease-Fires, Truces, and Armistices in the Practice of the UN Security Council,” The American Journal of International Law 71, no. 3 (1977): 461. 42 Ibid., 462. 43 Cited in Morriss, “From War to Peace: A Study of Cease-Fire Agreements and the Evolving Role of the United Nations,” 810.

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economic issues, but to cease military hostilities for the agreed time duration.44 By the end of the Second World War, the lines of demarcation between the definitions of the terms that denote the cessation of war hostilities were no longer clear. As a controlling regulation of United States Army, Chapter 7, Section VI, Paragraph 479 of 1956 The Law of Land Warfare even uses the term ‘armistice’ and ‘truce’ with the same meaning. The regulation states “An armistice (or truce, as it is sometimes called) is the cessation of active hostilities for a period agreed upon by the belligerents”.45 Moreover, although they bear different characteristics, Paul Mohn notes “the word ceasefire and truce have frequently been used interchangeably”.46

In 1945, with the creation of the UN and the Security Council, the definitions of the terms ‘truce’ and ‘armistice’ were clearly drawn.47 The term ‘truce’ is used when an agreement to end war hostilities is reached between the belligerents as a consequence of an intervention by a third body, usually a subordinate organ of the Security Council. The term ‘armistice’ is used if the agreement is reached as a result of direct negotiations between the warring parties.48 At the same time, the new terms, ‘the call to ceasefire’ and ‘cease-hostilities’ were also introduced to denote the emergency appeals of the Security Council to halt war hostilities, usually followed by the Council’s request to its subsidiary organs and member countries to organise more effective and durable arrangements.49 Mohn suggests that ‘cease-fire’, ‘truce’, and ‘armistice’ are the three most frequently used to denote the cessation of war hostilities and notes that the sequence represents the “three stages of progress from war to peace”.50

44 Sibert (1933), cited in Bailey, “Cease-Fires, Truces, and Armistices in the Practice of the UN Security Council”. See also, Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict: A Treatise on the Dynamics of Disputes and War-Law (New York: Garland Pub., 1973). 45 United States Department of the Army, “The Law of Land Warfare,” United States Department of the Army Field Manual (Washington D. C.: United States Department of the Army, 1956), 172. 46 Mohn, “Problems of Truce Supervision,” 53. 47 Bailey, “Cease-Fires, Truces, and Armistices in the Practice of the UN Security Council,” 463. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Mohn, “Problems of Truce Supervision,” 53.

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However, many scholars have commented on the lack of a precise meaning of the term ‘ceasefire’.51 In 1976, Professor Richard Baxter, whose scholarship significantly contributed to the Law of War, criticised the lack of precision of the term ‘ceasefire’.52 Similarly, although he acclaims their “rich and varied vocabulary,” Mohn also records numerous words used by the different organs of the UN when attempting to intervene in wars to denote a condition of the ceasefire.53 After an analysis of the field of legal scholarships on the terms, Sydney Bailey affirms the linguistic confusion in the definitions of the term ‘ceasefire’.54 Most of the scholarship55 including David Morriss note that pre-Charter terms such as ‘suspension of arms’, ‘truce’, ‘armistice’, and others are collapsing into the term ‘cease-fire’.56 Moreover, it is hypothesised that the decline in the use of the term ‘armistice’ is because it implies large-scale international war or conflict that is out of the capacity of the UN to regulate.57 Baxter attributes the rise of the term ‘ceasefire’ to the current elevated status.58 In summary, the term ‘ceasefire’ has become standard usage in denoting the situation of the cessation of warlike hostilities and, as Morriss points out, can be understood as “an agreed temporary halt to armed hostilities in which belligerent parties suspended their aggressive actions”.59

Throughout this study, the term ‘ceasefire’ is used to mean a situation in which all armed groups, state or non-state, discontinue all kinds of war-related hostilities during an agreed duration, regardless of whether or not a ‘peacebuilding’ process is in progress.

51 Bailey, “Cease-Fires, Truces, and Armistices in the Practice of the UN Security Council,” 467. 52 Quoted in David M. Morriss, “From War to Peace: A Study of Cease-Fire Agreements and the Evolving Role of the United Nations,” 809. See also Richard Baxter, “Armistices and Other Forms of Suspension of Hostilities,” in Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law (The Hague: The Hague Academy of International Law, 1976). 53 Mohn, “Problems of Truce Supervision,” 53. 54 For a detailed analysis, see Bailey, “Cease-Fires, Truces, and Armistices in the Practice of the UN Security Council,” 467–69. 55 To affirm the linguistic confusion Morriss reviews several scholars including Paul Mohn, Vladimir Dedijer, Shabtai Rosenne, Julius Stone, D. W. Bowett, Howard Levie and Suzanne Basti. 56 Morriss, “From War to Peace: A Study of Cease-Fire Agreements and the Evolving Role of the United Nations,” 809. 57 Ibid., 811. 58 Baxter, “Armistices and Other Forms of Suspension of Hostilities,” 358. 59 Morriss, “From War to Peace: A Study of Cease-Fire Agreements and the Evolving Role of the United Nations”.

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Post-Civil War Democratisation

Although democratisation has been a field of academic study since the early 1970s, the scholarship remains in a position to further unfold its erratic and nonlinear nature.60 The Chilean Air Force’s strafing of La Moneda Presidential Palace in Santiago on September 1973 was widely perceived as the turning point that brought comparative democratisation studies into a new field of academic study.61 Inaugurated with the ‘Carnation Revolution’ in Lisbon on April 1974, the “third wave of democratisation”62 gained momentum with subsequent democratisation processes in Greece, Spain, and Peru. Although first considered a marginal phenomenon and a limited academic area of study, scholarship on democratisation has increased over the last decades as processes of democratisation have spread across the world. Most scholars suggest that democratisation is a process rather than a condition.63 Based on the conceptual definition of democracy, scholars generally define democratisation as “the movement from a system of authoritarian rule to one of institutionalised, democratic governance”.64 However, on the basis of the elemental definition of democracy, democratisation is understood as any move along the continuum towards the attainment of more core democratic elements up to the maximalist democracy. It does not necessarily convey the crossing of a threshold of a state of democracy with an adjective, though. To measure the process of democratisation quantitatively, Schneider and Schmitter subdivided the entire process into three components: “the liberalisation of autocracy, the mode of transition, and the consolidation of democracy”.65

60 Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience, 2. 61 Ibid., 1. 62 Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. 63 See, for example, Robert Alan Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 37–38.; Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 269; Charles Tilly, Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 202. Similarly, Laurence Whitehead defines democratisation as “a long-term process of social construction”. See Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience, 6. 64 See, for example, Dan Reiter, “Does Peace Nature Democracy?,” The Journal of Politics 63, no. 03 (2001): 936. 65 Schneider and Schmitter, “Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation: Measuring the Components of Democratization,” 60.

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Historically proven to be more difficult to settle than maintain a settled situation, in the early 2000s civil wars comprised 95 per cent of the world’s armed conflicts.66 During the last few decades, many civil wars in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe have directed violent, devastating, and intractable effects against unarmed civilians.67 For decades, scholars and practitioners alike have tried to seek better ways to address the urgent need to end civil wars and build sustained peace.

During the last decades, as pointed out by Dan Reiter, academics and policy makers alike perceive democracy “as normatively desirable because it is thought to contribute to peace, bolster prosperity, expand trade, stop genocide, and, of course, safeguard freedom”68 and thus, has become the uniquely valued political system of the age.69 In the current global order of uncertainty, inequality, violence, and terror, democratisation is among the few hopeful and positive trends.70 In addition, many leading scholars of post-conflict democratisation point out that there has been a growing believe that democratic governance, together with its robust institutions, is a fundamental condition for achieving sustainable peace settlements and securing stable and legitimate governments in war- shattered societies.71 It is not an uncommon argument that democracies are more effective at defusing violent conflicts than non-democracies.72 At the same time, following the

66 Charles T. Call, “Ending Wars, Building States,” in Building States to Build Peace, edited by Charles T. Call and Vanessa Wyeth (Covent Garden, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), 1. 67 C. Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security 20, no. 4 (1996): 136. 68 Reiter, “Does Peace Nature Democracy?,” 936. See also Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (Farrar, Straus and Giroux: New York, 2014). 69 Stanley I. Benn and Richard S. Peters, Social Principles and the Democratic State (London: Allen & Unwin, 1959), 332; Russell L. Hanson, “Democracy,” in Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, edited by Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 68. 70 Jean Grugel and Matthew Louis Bishop, Democratization (Califonia: Sage, 2012), 1. 71 Mark M. Brown, “Democratic Governance: Toward a Framework for Sustainable Peace,” Global Governance 9, no. 2 (2003): 141–42; T. M. Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,” American Journal of International Law 86, no. 1 (1992): 47; Anna Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk, “Introduction,” in From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding, edited by Anna Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 4; Ben Reilly, “Democratic Levers: An Introduction,” in Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators, edited by Peter Harris and Ben Reilly (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 1998), 136. 72 See, for example, Richard Ponzio, Democratic Peacebuilding: Aiding Afghanistan and Other Fragile States (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 15; Adam Przeworski et al.,

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collapse of the Communist bloc, the post-Cold War world order has generated an enabling environment for the international community to initiate various peacebuilding operations aimed at pursuing democratisation in post-civil war societies.73 Several post-civil war democratic governments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America presented the best prospects for managing deep social division and sustaining settled peace.74 By the end of the last millennium, building sustainable peace by means of democratisation became an integral part of post-civil war settlements in societies in which civil wars were ending.75

However, the world has recently seen various failed or less successful post-civil war democratisation efforts in societies emerging from armed conflicts. There is little evidence that post-civil war efforts to democratise successfully bring about democracy and sustainable peace to war-torn societies. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, despite the unanimity on the expressed aim of bringing “liberal market democracy”76 together with solid support from the international community to war-torn societies, outcomes of post- civil war democratisation efforts have not been encouraging.77 For example, a study of post-civil war democratisation processes in 19 countries from 1989 to 2005 found that after five years of extensive efforts by both domestic and international actors, only two countries, Namibia and Croatia, qualified as ‘liberal democracies’.78 Meanwhile, seven

Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy, edited by Adam Przeworski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 190; Reilly, “Democratic Levers: An Introduction,” 135. 73 Johan Galtung, Peace, War and Defence—Essays in Peace Research, vol. 2 (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1975). 74 Wantchekon and Neeman, “A Theory of Post-Civil War Democratization”. 75 Charles T. Call and Susan E. Cook, “On Democratization and Peacebuilding,” Global Governance 9, no. 2 (2003): 234. 76 Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 5; Christopher Clapham, “Rwanda: The Perils of Peacemaking,” Journal of Peace Research 35, no. 2 (1998): 195; Call and Cook, “On Democratization and Peacebuilding,” 223. 77 See, for example, Pei Minxin, and Sara Kasper, “Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation Building,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/policybrief24.pdf; Sabine Kurtenbach, “Why Is Liberal Peacebuilding So Difficult? Some Lessons from Central America,” European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, no. 88 (2010); Christoph Zürcher et al., Costly Democracy: Peacebuilding and Democratization after War (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2013). 78 According to Larry Diamond, a regime could be qualified as a Liberal democracy when it extends freedom, fairness, transparency, accountability and the rule of law from the electoral process into all other major aspects of governance and interest articulation, competition and representation. See Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, 10.

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post-civil war countries have turned into ‘electoral authoritarians’ and three have become ‘fully closed authoritarian’ societies in accordance with the country rating of Freedom House and Polity IV.79 Although democratic transition processes in some countries were successful, others failed and many more societies became stuck in the category of problematic democracies80 or ‘hybrid regimes’ that have institutionalised political regimes comprised with both democratic and authoritarian elements.81

Further, these failed or less successful democratisation processes in post-civil war societies evidently generate extraordinary uncertainty with a difficult dilemma. Based on the virulent experiences of post-civil war democratisations during the last decades, many scholars and practitioners note the danger of post-civil war democratisation. In the late- 2000s, Anna Jarstad and Timothy Sisk questioned how war-torn societies could simultaneously achieve sustained peace and democratise through democratic competition.82 The authors point out that “democracy and peace do not always move forward hand in hand: sometimes, advances in democratisation threaten peace and the compromise necessary for peace restrict or defer democratisation”.83 Similarly, Roland Paris found that, because of the tensions inherent in the logic of democracy, market economy, and the interaction between these tensions and the weak conditions of war- shattered societies, political, and economic liberalisation in these societies have destabilising effects.84 He also notes that war-torn societies tend to possess vicious “conflict multipliers” that magnify the intensity of existing ethnic or religious divisions. Paris also warns that post-conflict societies rarely have what he calls “conflict dampeners,” or mechanisms such as strong political institutions and tradition of dialogue,

79 Christoph Zürcher et al., Costly Democracy: Peacebuilding and Democratization after War (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2013), 2. 80 Grugel and Bishop, Democratization, 5. 81 Lucan Way and Steven Levitsky, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 82 See Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding, 1. 83 Ibid. Further, Nancy Bermeo claims that steps to open up a country, such as an election and new constitutional arrangements, can threaten vested interest groups and; therefore, potentially destabilise the society in transition. See Nancy Bermeo, “What the Democratization Literature Says—or Doesn’t Say—About Postwar Democratization,” Global Governance 9, no. 2 (2003). See also Jack L. Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 2000). 84 Roland Paris, “Building Peace in War-Shattered States: The Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” edited by Bruce Russett (Ann Arbor: UMI Dissertations Publishing, 1999), 22.

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and compromise among political rivals by which to manage intense social conflicts— mechanisms that prevent contending interests from escalating into violent conflicts.85 Likewise, Richard Ponzio argues that regardless of the form of transition by which they undergo, war-torn societies are normally under unstable and uncertain socio-political situations with fragile rule of law.86 He also warns that post-war democratisation efforts are fraught with risks and, when poorly managed, can lead to instability and even violence and may complicate the political transition to a more stable and participatory governance system.87

In response to the many failures of post-war democratisation, scholars provide numerous explanations and argue from various perspectives ranging from political through to social and economic factors that influence the outcomes of a post-war democratisation process. There is growing scholarly agreement that the preceding build-up of sufficient internal capacity of a war-torn society is crucial for a post-civil war democratic transition to be successful. Some suggest that strengthening capacity to deal with internal tensions and disputes that might emerge from a democratisation process could create conditions for the development of democratic fundamentals and, in turn, help consolidate democratic governance. Moreover, while acknowledging the context dependency of individual societies, there has been a growing conviction on the requirement of “necessary and sufficient conditions”88 for successful democratisation.89 Diamond, for example, convincingly argues for the necessity of providing substantial support for building up political, social, and economic conditions before the commencement of a democratic transition in post-conflict fragile states such as Iraq.90 Although it may not satisfactorily explain the outcomes of democratisation in general, the approach of necessary and sufficient conditions for a successful democratic transition is useful in identifying the

85 Ibid. 86 Ponzio, Democratic Peacebuilding: Aiding Afghanistan and Other Fragile States, 16. 87 Ibid., 3. 88 See, for example, Alistair Edwards, “Democratization and Qualified Explanation,” in Democracy and Democratization, edited by Geraint Parry and Michael Moran (London: Routledge, 1994), 89. 89 See, for example, Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 39; Thomas Carothers, “The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy,” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 1 (2007). 90 Larry Diamond, “Lessons from Iraq,” Journal of Democracy 16 (2005): 13–22.

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conditions, rather than the pre-requisites, without which democracy cannot occur or that enable democracy to be brought about.91

Variables of Research Interest

Scholars of democratisation have proposed numerous conditions that influence the fate of the transition process.92 Based on “institutional and functional”93 characteristics, these conditions can be categorised into political, social, and economic conditions for the success of democratisation. For example, all the interrelated conditions famously postulated by Linz and Stepan (i.e., stateness, free and lively civil society, autonomous political society, the rule of law, usable state bureaucracy, and institutionalised economic society)94could be regrouped as political, social, and economic conditions that are favourable for a democratisation process. In summary, as suggested by some leading scholars, conditions such as stateness,95 stable public order, effective government, the rule of law, and strong political institutions96 are important political conditions required for a post-civil war democratisation process to be successful. Among social conditions, the literature suggests factors such as national unity,97 social cohesion,98 higher literacy rate

91 Edwards, “Democratization and Qualified Explanation,” 89; Carothers, “The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy” 24–25. 92 For example, Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2, no. 3 (1970); Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict. 93 Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results,” European Journal of Sociology 25, no. 2 (1984): 187. 94 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 2 (1996): 17. 95 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). Larry Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States: Lessons and Challenges,” in The National Policy Forum on Terrorism, Security, and America’s Purpose (Washington D. C. : Stanford University, 2005). 96 Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict; Huntington suggests political stability as a precondition for political liberty and argues that there must be an effective political institution to maintain the political stability. See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 8; Carothers, “The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy,” 13. 97 Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” 350–51. 98 It is widely considered harder for democratisation to occur in ethnically and religiously divisive societies. See Donald L. Horowitz, “Democracy in Divided Societies,” Journal of Democracy 4, no. 4 (1993); Carothers, “The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy”; Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars”.

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and urbanisation,99 a ‘civic culture’ of reaching a consensus based on common belief,100 citizens’ capacity and willingness to participate,101 civil society and networks of social support for liberal institutions and values102 are crucial for a post-civil war democratisation. Finally, economic factors include the level of economic development103 and distribution of sources of national wealth.104

In this research project, all of the conditions mentioned above constitute potential intervening variables between the independent variable of ‘ceasefire’ and the dependent variable of ‘post-civil war democratisation’. However, as Alistair Edwards points out, since democratisation involves complex conjunctional causations within an open system,105 trying to explain these with general phenomena would not be plausible. Edwards notes that the infinite variety of such conditions that may facilitate or impede a democratisation process can only produce bewilderment and suggests a focus on narrower qualified questions.106 Moreover, among these numerous intervening variables, there are fundamental conditions that are conducive to the development of other conditions necessary for a democratisation process. For example, an improvement in stateness could create conditions for the development of other democratic fundamentals such as stable public order and the rule of law. Similarly, economic recovery in societies emerging from civil war could create conditions for higher literacy rates and urbanisation—conditions

99 S. M. Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic-Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959). 100 Ernest Barker, Reflections on Government (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), 63. 101 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958), 60; Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (London: Heinemann, 1960), 88; David Bicknell Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York: Knopf, 1951), 514. 102 Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. 103 Seymour Martin Lipset, Philips Cutright and others note that successful democratisation requires certain economic and social background conditions such as high per capita income, widespread literacy and prevalent urban residence. See Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” 337; Carothers, “The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy,” 24. However, some argue that there is no positive effect of economic development on the outcomes of a post-war democratisation. See Nicholas Sambanis, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature,” World Politics 52, no. 04 (2000); and, Mehmet Gurses and T. David Mason, “Democracy out of Anarchy: The Prospects for Post-Civil-War Democracy,” Social Science Quarterly 89, no. 2 (2008). 104 Carothers, “The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy,” 24; Paul Collier, Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places (New York: HarperCollins, 2009). 105 Alistair Edwards, “Democratization and Qualified Explanation,” 93. 106 Ibid., 101.

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that are also necessary for successful democratisation. Crucially, this study is only concerned with conditions of democratisation that are responsive to ceasefires.

Based on the above considerations, this thesis focuses, first, on ‘stateness’, which is also crucial for other necessary political conditions such as a stable public order, the rule of law, and efficient government; second, on socioeconomic recovery which is closely related to also income levels, literacy rates, and urbanisation; and third, on ‘civil society’, which in turn may facilitate social cohesion, civic culture, citizen participation, and social support for liberal institutions and values. Through these selected analytical lenses, the study investigates and analyses the changes that have taken place in Myanmar’s conflict- affected minority ethnic-populated areas during periods of war and peace and attempts to identify the possible causal linkages between these changes and the local uptake of democratic opportunities after the onset of the post-2010 national liberalisation process.

2.4.1. Stateness

The role of stateness in post-civil war democratisation

Although some scholars argue against its importance,107 since the mid-1990s the notion of stateness has increasingly gained the attention of scholars of state-centred empirical research on democratic transition.108 For example, Linz and Stepan argue that “no modern polity can become democratically consolidated unless it is first a state”.109 The authors point out that without adequate ‘capacities of the state’ or stateness, there cannot be democratic governance in the five major ‘arenas’ of a consolidated democracy—civil society, political society, the rule of law, economic society, and state bureaucracy.110

107 See, for example, Sebastián L. Mazzuca and Gerardo L. Munck, “State or Democracy First? Alternative Perspectives on the State-Democracy Nexus,” Democratization (2014). 108 For example, see David D. E. Andersen, “Stateness and Democratic Stability” (PhD diss., Aarhus University, 2017), 34; Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in Bringing the State Back In, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Jessica Fortin, “Is There a Necessary Condition for Democracy? The Role of State Capacity in Postcommunist Countries,” Comparative Political Studies 45, no. 7 (2012): 904. 109 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, 7. 110 Ibid. See also David Andersen, Jørgen Møller, and Svend-Erik Skaaning, “The State–Democracy Nexus: Conceptual Distinctions, Theoretical Perspectives, and Comparative Approaches,” Democratization 21, no. 7 (2014): 1203.

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There is also broad agreement that the status of stateness in a given society has a strong causal relationship with the level of success of democratic transition. For example, by defining the term ‘state’ as “a set of political institutions that exercise authority over a territory, make and execute policies, extract and distribute revenue, produce public goods, and maintain order by wielding an effective monopoly over the means of violence,” Diamond argues that “before a country can have a democratic state, it must first have a state”.111 Similarly, in operationalising the major task of state-building as the creation of a government that is capable of monopolising the use of legitimate power and enforcing rules throughout the territory of a country, Francis Fukuyama acknowledges the necessity of a ‘legitimate and durable state’ before it can become a democratic state.112 Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning suggest that stateness is an indispensable condition for democracy to be established, retained, and become ‘thicker’.113 Likewise, while proving the positive and powerful relationship between stateness and level of democracy, Michael Bratton and Eric Chang also concede that a legitimate and capable state is a precondition for a successful democratic transition.114

Defining the state and stateness

Even though the concept of the ‘state’ is centuries old and established, the concept of ‘stateness’ was introduced only in 1968 by John Peter Nettl. The concept of the state in a modern sense was introduced by Thomas Hobbes in his 1651 book, The Leviathan,115 but

111 Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States: Lessons and Challenges”. 112 Francis Fukuyama, “ ‘Stateness’ First,” Journal of Democracy 16, no. 1 (2005): 21. 113 Møller and Skaaning suggest that stateness is an essential requisite to achieve the major attributes of democracy: the electoral rights, political liberties, rule of law and social rights. Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning, “Stateness First?,” Democratization 18, no. 1 (2011): 16–17. 114 Michael Bratton and Eric Chang, “State Building and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Forwards, Backwards, or Together?,” Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 9 (2006): 1061. See also See also Valerie Bunce, “Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations,” ibid. 33, no. 6 (2000); Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies; Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens, “The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory, and Social Dimensions,” Comparative Politics 29, no. 3 (1997); Robert R. Kaufman, “Approaches to the Study of State Reform in Latin American and Postsocialist Countries,” ibid. 31 (1999); Adam Przeworski, Sustainable Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Tilly, Democracy; Fortin, “Is There a Necessary Condition for Democracy? The Role of State Capacity in Postcommunist Countries”; Jessica Fortin-Rittberger, “Exploring the Relationship between Infrastructural and Coercive State Capacity,” Democratization 21, no. 7 (2014): 1245. 115 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, edited by John Plamenatz (London: Collins, 1962), 5.

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without a clear definition. It was only in 1920 that Max Weber seminally defined the state as a system of administrative and legal order that is legitimised and regulated by legislation that has binding authority over both the members of the state and the overall actions that take place within the territory of its jurisdiction.116 Importantly, Weber more specifically delineates the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”.117 Nonetheless, although the definition of the state is still an object of continuing academic debate,118 most scholars accept and adhere to the established Weberian conception. While scholars continue to contribute important elaborations to the definition, most are obliged to use it as a frame of reference.119 For instance, in trying to elaborate the underspecified characteristics of the Weberian conception of the state for the purpose of a study, Guillermo O’Donnell defines the state as:

[A] territorially based association, consisting of sets of institutions and social relations (most of them sanctioned and backed by the legal system of that state), that normally penetrates and controls the territory and the inhabitants it delimits. Those institutions claim a monopoly in the legitimate authorisation of the use of physical coercion, and normally have, as the ultimate resource for implementing the decisions they make, supremacy in the control of the means of coercion over the population and the territory that the state delimits.120

Similarly, in capturing the central features of the Weberian definition, Stepan also elaborates on the definition of the state by arguing that “[i]t is the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic, and coercive systems that attempt not only to structure relationships between civil society and public authority in a polity but also to structure

116 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, edited by Talcott Parsons and A. M. Henderson (New York: Free Press, 1964), 156. 117 Hans Heinrich Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), 78. 118 See, for example, Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results,” 187–88. 119 Andersen, Møller, and Skaaning, “The State–Democracy Nexus: Conceptual Distinctions, Theoretical Perspectives, and Comparative Approaches,” 1205. See also Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” 7; and Guillermo A. O’Donnell, Democracy, Agency, and the State: Theory with Comparative Intent (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 51–53. 120 O’Donnell, Democracy, Agency, and the State: Theory with Comparative Intent, 51–52.

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many crucial relationships within civil society as well”.121 Likewise, Diamond defines the state as “a set of political institutions that exercise authority over a territory, make and execute policies, extract and distribute revenue, produce public goods, and maintain order by wielding an effective monopoly over the means of violence”.122

Likewise, scholars define stateness in a wide variety of ways and from numerous aspects and dimensions.123 Many scholars approach stateness in terms of its ‘capacity’,124 while some define it from the perspective of its ‘legitimacy’125 and many others subsume various aspects of both the capacity and the legitimacy of the state.126 For example, from the basis of capacity, David Andersen summarises the attributes of stateness into monopoly on violence and administrative effectiveness as two closely connected sets of coercive functions of the state that “must be carried out with a certain degree of effectiveness”.127

121 Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), xii. 122 Larry Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States: Lessons and Challenges,” Taiwan Journal of Democracy 2, no. 2 (2006): 94. 123 Andersen et al. counted and reviewed 20 definitions. See Andersen, Møller, and Skaaning, “The State–Democracy Nexus: Conceptual Distinctions, Theoretical Perspectives, and Comparative Approaches,” 1206. 124 See, for example, Peter B. Evans, “The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization,” World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997): 62; and Hanna Bäck and Axel Hadenius, “Democracy and State Capacity: Exploring a J-Shaped Relationship,” Governance 21, no. 1 (2008): 3. 125 Andersen termed it the “citizenship agreement”. See Andersen, “Stateness and Democratic Stability,” 35. See also Zachary Elkins and John Sides, “Seeking Stateness” (2008); Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post- Communist Europe; and O’Donnell, Democracy, Agency, and the State: Theory with Comparative Intent. 126 See, for example, Bratton and Chang, “State Building and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Forwards, Backwards, or Together?,” 1060. 127 Andersen, “Stateness and Democratic Stability,” 37. Fukuyama conceives the state’s monopoly on violence as the de facto authority of the state to use force to make citizens comply with its laws and administrative effectiveness as the ability of the state to formulate and execute policies. See Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century (London: Profile Books, 2004), 6–7. Similarly, based on their definition of stateness as “the ability of state institutions to effectively implement official goals”, Hanson and Sigman identify “extractive capacity, coercive capacity, and administrative capacity” as the three core dimensions of state capacity. See Jonathan K. Hanson and Rachel Sigman, “Leviathan’s Latent Dimensions: Measuring State Capacity for Comparative Political Research,” in The World Bank Political Economy Brown Bag Lunch Series (The World Bank, 2013). See also Hillel Soifer and Matthias vom Hau, “Unpacking the Strength of the State: The Utility of State Infrastructural Power,” Studies in Comparative International Development 43, no. 3 (2008): 232.

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Similarly, largely based on capacity, Joel S. Migdal defines stateness as a state’s “capacities to penetrate society, regulate social relations, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways”.128 Along similar lines, by differentiating the capacity of the state into ‘despotic power’ and ‘infrastructural power,’ Michael Mann defines stateness as a state’s “ability to provide a territorially centralised form of organisation”.129 For those who based their definitions on its capacity, it could thus be summed up that stateness means the strength and reach of coercive institutions of the state, such as the military and police forces, and the effectiveness of the set of administrative functioning institutions, such as cabinet ministries and taxation agencies, and municipal public service provisions.130 Equally important, on the basis of legitimacy, stateness is the extent of popular acceptance or citizen agreement on the monopoly on the use of force or, as Zachary Elkins and John Sides simplify it, the level of attachment of citizens towards the state.131 The authors argue that “understanding stateness therefore entails attention to the attitudes and identities of citizens, in particular, their attachment to the state”.132

Complementary to this, by arguing that the relationship between the capacity and legitimacy of a state is not a simple, one way linear one, Matthias vom Hau suggests that the infrastructural power of the state may equally produce “the legitimacy of the central state”.133 Meanwhile, after a comprehensive investigation of the state–democracy

128 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State–Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton, N. J. : Princeton University Press, 1988), 4. Similarly, Hanson and Sigman define stateness as “the ability of state institutions to effectively implement official goals”. See Hanson and Sigman, “Leviathan’s Latent Dimensions: Measuring State Capacity for Comparative Political Research,” 2. 129 Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results,” 185. Similarly, focusing on the autonomy of the state, Skocpol defines stateness as the ability of “organisations claiming control over territories and people may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society”. See Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” 9. 130 See also Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 29–31; Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, 2nd ed. (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995); and Charles Tilly, As Sociology Meets History (New York: Academic Press, 1981). 131 Elkins and Sides, “Seeking Stateness,” 2. 132 Ibid. 133 Matthias vom Hau, “State Infrastructural Power and Nationalism: Comparative Lessons from Mexico and Argentina,” Studies in Comparative International Development 43, no. 3 (2008): 335.

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relationship on the basis of both capacity and legitimacy, Andersen et al. define stateness as “the state’s degree of capacity to impose law and order within its territory, to construct and implement policies, and the degree to which it claims legitimacy as a political unit”.134 Conversely, since Linz and Stepan introduced the concept, many scholars of democratisation, particularly those who engage in ethnically diverse and divided societies, perceive citizenship agreement as one of the core attributes of stateness.135 However, some scholars have since avoided including citizenship agreement-related legitimacy as an aspect of the stateness.136 In summary, as suggested by Andersen, after mapping all the existing 20 definitions of stateness ranging from Nettl in 1968 through UNDP in 2004137 to Carbone and Memoli in 2015,138 the three major attributes of stateness common to most dominant definitions could be monopoly on violence, administrative effectiveness, and citizenship agreement.139

However, particularly as is the case in Myanmar, an autocratic, predatory state can hardly possess legitimacy regarding citizen agreement. Achieving such popular agreement from the population in historically and ethnically irredenta areas that have long been under the control or contestation of non-state armed organisations, has imposed historical challenges that continue today. Muthiah Alagappa notes “[t]he legitimation of power relies on the conviction of the governed that their government (whether democratic, monarchic, communist, theocratic, or authoritarian) is morally right and they are duty-

134 Andersen, Møller, and Skaaning, “The State–Democracy Nexus: Conceptual Distinctions, Theoretical Perspectives, and Comparative Approaches”. Similarly, by subsuming both the capacity and legitimacy aspects of stateness, Bratton and Chang define stateness as “the bone structure of the body politic or the set of administrative institutions that claim a legitimate command over a bounded territory”. See Bratton and Chang, “State Building and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Forwards, Backwards, or Together?,” 1060. 135 Andersen, “Stateness and Democratic Stability,” 37. 136 See, for example, Evans, “The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization”; and Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century. 137 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens’ Democracy (Buenos Aires: UNDP, 2004). 138 Giovanni Carbone and Vincenzo Memoli, “Does Democratization Foster State Consolidation? Democratic Rule, Political Order, and Administrative Capacity,” Governance 28, no. 1 (2015). 139 Andersen, “Stateness and Democratic Stability,” 35. Bratton and Chang also argue along the lines of the three attributes of stateness. See Bratton and Chang, “State Building and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Forwards, Backwards, or Together?,” 1066–69. However, Hanson and Sigman identify extractive capacity, coercive capacity and administrative capacity as the three core dimensions of state capacity.

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bound to obey it. In the absence of such conviction, there can only be relations of power, not authority”.140 In such a contested irredenta area, stateness could be weak or non- existent, as most of the people feel that they are not or do not want to become citizens of the repressive, predatory state.

In the case of the warring minority ethnic periphery areas under scrutiny in this project, the ephemeral presence of parallel coercive, administrative and infrastructural non-state power structures means achieving popular agreement towards a particular authority poses severe challenges. Moreover, before resolving the root causes of armed conflicts, most of which are deeply entrenched, popular attitudes towards the militarised, hostile state would hardly be responsive to a ceasefire. Thus, in such a situation, to observe the legitimacy of the state with respect to popular agreement could be difficult, if not impossible. Conversely, while arguing that the relationship between the capacity and legitimacy of a state is not a simple, one way linear one, vom Hau suggests that the infrastructural power141 of the state equally produces “the legitimacy of the central state”.142 This means that the legitimacy of the state at the centre is also dependent on citizen agreement that is principally justified by the capacity of the attributes of the state (i.e., coercive power, administrative reaches, and infrastructural capability143). In summary, in reflecting on all its defining characteristics, enforcement capacity, administrative capacity, and infrastructure capacity are the three main dimensions of stateness attributive to a post- civil war democratisation process.

140 Muthiah Alagappa, “The Bases of Legitimacy,” in Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 2. 141 For details on infrastructure capacity, see Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results”; Michael Mann, “Infrastructural Power Revisited,” Studies in Comparative International Development 43, no. 3 (2008); Fortin, “Is There a Necessary Condition for Democracy? The Role of State Capacity in Postcommunist Countries”. 142 vom Hau, “State Infrastructural Power and Nationalism: Comparative Lessons from Mexico and Argentina,” 335. 143 David Beetham argues that performance legitimacy is the only means of legitimation open to a military regime. See David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1991), 253.

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2.4.2. Socioeconomic development

The role of socioeconomic development in post-civil war democratisation

Studies on the effects of the economy on a democratisation process are inconclusive.144 While many advocate the role of economic development as an essential pre-requisite for a successful democratisation, some are critical of the hypothesised causal relationship.145 By using time series observation, panel data analysis, survival investigation, structural equation model and other advanced research methodologies, scholars have studied the economy–democracy nexus in both national and cross-country contexts. However, although scholars have not yet agreed on the causal relationship between economic condition and democracy,146 there is increasing agreement on the proposition that higher levels of economic conditions could be conducive for democracy to take place or, at least, prevent it from sliding back to a non-democracy.147 Among the proponents, Seymour Martin Lipset seminally proposes what has been called ‘modernisation theory’ and suggests that economic development is conducive to democratisation.148 This proposal has been echoed by Dahl, who also observes that countries with higher economic levels are more likely to become democracies.149 Similarly, Samuel P. Huntington also suggests

144 Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990, 79. 145 See, for example, Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World; and Guillermo O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic– Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973). 146 Some scholars argue that there is no causal effect of economic conditions on the outcome of the democratisation process. For example, see Sambanis, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature”. 147 See, for example, Seymour Martin Lipset, Kyoung-Ryung Soong, and John Charles Torres, “A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy,” International Social Science Journal 136 (1993); Seymour Martin Lipset, “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisisted,” American Sociological Review 59, no. 1 (1994); Robert Alan Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Edward N. Muller, “Economic Determinants of Democracy,” American Sociological Review 60, no. 6 (1995); Yi Feng and Paul J. Zak, “The Determinants of Democratic Transitions,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 2 (1999). 148 Lipset suggests that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy”. See Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic-Development and Political Legitimacy,” 75. 149 Dahl, Polyarchy, 65. Similarly, Carothers also argues that “the wealthier a country is, the better will be its chances of consolidating a democratic transition”. See Carothers, “The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy,” 24. Likewise, James Smoot Coleman also argues for “a positive correlation between economic development and political competitiveness”. See James Smoot Coleman, “Conclusion,” in

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that “a highly developed, industrialised economy and the complex economy that it implies cannot be governed efficiently by authoritarian means. Decision-making is necessarily dispersed and, hence power is shared and rule must be based on consent”.150

Similarly, many leading scholars acknowledge that successful democratisation requires certain economic conditions. Diamond calls these “classic facilitating conditions”,151 such as high per capita income, widespread literacy, and prevalent urban residency. Lipset famously argues that “[t]he more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy”.152 He elucidates that growth in the economy will increase the education level of the society and, consequently, broaden the perception of people on the political and social actions and even deny radical doctrines.153 Emphasising the important role of the preconditions that are attributive to the outcomes of a democratisation process, Georg Sørensen argues that even if a higher level of economic development does not always bring about democracy, the prospects for a successful democratic transition are better at the higher, rather than lower, levels of the country’s economy.154 Moreover,

The Politics of the Developing Areas, edited by Gabriel A. Almond and James Smoot Coleman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). Linz and Stepan also argue that an ‘institutionalised economic society’ is necessary for the democratisation process to be successful. See Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post- Communist Europe, 7. 150 Samuel P. Huntington, “Will More Countries Become Democratic?,” Political Science Quarterly 99, no. 2 (1984): 119. 151 Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States: Lessons and Challenges,” 93–94. See also, Phillips Cutright, “National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis,” American Sociological Review 28, no. 2 (1963); Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model’, 337; Kenneth A. Bollen, “Political Democracy and the Timing of Development,” American Sociological Review 44, no. 4 (August, 1979): 584; Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990, 88; and Carothers, ‘The “Sequencing” Fallacy’, 24. 152 Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic-Development and Political Legitimacy,” 75. 153 Ibid. Based on the discussions of Lipset and Diamond, Graeme Gill details the aspects of economic development that have causal linkages with the emergence of democracies. See, Graeme J. Gill, “The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process” (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 3–5. See also Lipset, Political Man; and Larry Diamond, “Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered,” The American Behavioral Scientist 35, no. 4 (1992). 154 Georg Sørensen, Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008), 33. See also Bunce, “Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations”; and Virginia Page Fortna and Reyko Huang, “Democratization after Civil War: A Brush-Clearing Exercise,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 4 (2012).

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although some scholars question its simplistic structural-functionalist perceptions,155 proponents of modernisation theory convincingly argue that economic development and the resulting modernisation generates factors that are favourable to democracy including higher rates of literacy, better education, urbanisation and the presence of mass media communication. Modernisation theory states that growth in the economy could result in the emergence of complex social institutions that are required for a functioning modernised economy and, consequently, transform the social structure of the society. This change in social classes and masses could mobilise new social movements to compete for political power and improve the overall level of democratic fundamentals.156 Huntington argues for the importance of industrialisation, urbanisation, and development of the middle class in the post-Franco Spanish economic growth that was conducive to the success of the Spanish democratisation in the mid-1970s.157

Similarly, since economic development could transform the class structure and facilitate self-organisation of the expanding working and middle classes and, thus, the power relation of the social classes, Ruschmeyer et al. argue that “the level of economic development is causally related to the development of political democracy”.158 Equally, Barrington Moore also infers that for the establishment of parliamentary democracy, a “vigorous and independent class of town dwellers play an indispensable role”.159

In addition, scholars also recognise that an improved economy can also produce the resources needed to mitigate the tensions that can be generated by post-conflict democratic political contestations.160 Post-civil war, a deteriorated economic environment

155 See, for example, Renske Doorenspleet, “Development, Class and Democracy: Is There a Relationship?,” in Development and Democracy—What Have We Learned and How?, edited by Ole Elgström and Goran Hyden (London: Routledge, 2002); Carles Boix, Democracy and Redistribution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 156 See for example, Balaev, “Improving Models of Democracy: The Example of Lagged Effects of Economic Development, Education, and Gender Equality,” 173. 157 Huntington, “Will More Countries Become Democratic?,” 200. 158 Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John Stephens, “The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 7, no. 3 (1993): 83–84. 159 Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, 418. 160 See, for example, Huntington, “Will More Countries Become Democratic?,” 199.

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can often spur a society to relapse into violent conflict,161 thus, post-conflict recovery has increasingly gained academic attention in recent decades. Scholars and organisations of the international humanitarian and development community agree that without economic hope, it will be hard for peace to take hold.162 Some even argue that economic recovery substantially contributes to reducing the risk of reversion to conflict.163 Huntington suggests that by providing alternative opportunities to unsuccessful political leaders, “[a] wealthy economy also moderates the tensions of political conflict”.164 The author points out that a more developed economy produces greater economic resources that generally enable accommodation and compromise to take place among the contenders.165

Hence, to investigate the possible causal inference between ceasefire and socioeconomic development, which is also an intervening attribute to the outcome of post-civil war democratisation, this study examines the effects of ceasefires on socioeconomic conditions in conflict-affected minority ethnic societies with different war and peace conditions.

Defining post-conflict economic recovery

While civil wars cause detrimental effects in many respects,166 the economic consequences of a protracted civil war are enormous. War-torn societies are often left with devastated economic conditions and, particularly, debilitated economic infrastructures. In addition to the immense loss of lives, a United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report encapsulates the most tragic consequences of war:

Violent conflict invariably generates widespread destruction and degradation of physical capital and infrastructure; reduced levels of human capital due to deaths, disease and displacement; capital flight and the collapse of economic

161 See, for example, Paul Collier et al., “Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy” (Washington, D. C.: World Bank, 2003), 83; Paul Collier, “Post-Conflict Recovery: How Should Strategies Be Distinctive?,” Journal of African Economies 18, no. supplement 1 (2009): 101. 162 See, for example, Johanna Mendelson Forman, “Achieving Socio-Economic Well-Being in Post- Conflict Settings,” The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 4 (2002): 125. 163 Paul Collier et al., “Post-Conflict Risks,” Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 4 (2008). 164 Huntington, “Will More Countries Become Democratic?,” 199. 165 Ibid., 119. 166 Paul Collier, “On the Economic Consequences of Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 51, no. 1 (1999): 168.

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growth; loss of jobs, employment opportunities and livelihoods; weakened institutions; and a decline of social capital, particularly the ‘bridging’ type of networks that reach across ethnic or communal divides.167

The destruction of economic capital and infrastructure constitute deterioration in the economic conditions of war-affected societies. This is the case in Myanmar, as most civil wars were fought in bounded peripheral territories168 rather than across the entire country the erosion in economic infrastructure often leads to the deterioration of the economic environment of the conflict-affected local communities. After prolonged conflicts, the economic conditions of the war-affected communities often stagnate and they were unable to establish fundamentals for self-sustaining economic progress and development, unlike the country’s other areas that were without violent conflict. Extensive unemployment and widespread poverty are the typical legacies of prolonged civil wars. The deteriorated public order, destruction of physical infrastructure and productive resources, diversion of human and financial capital, and distorted economic inducements often lead to the loss of livelihoods, employment, and incomes.

Moreover, although some of these destructive effects of a civil war could ameliorate following the cessation of war hostilities,169 many aspects of the worsened economic conditions require a longer time to restore. Civil war-affected communities are usually left with extraordinary constraints in mobilising the human and physical resources that are required for economic recovery. The communities often face difficult challenges in reconstructing social and economic infrastructures, revitalising livelihoods, persuading human resources and flight capitals to return, and generating employment opportunities. In the aftermath of violent conflict, societies face difficult challenges in “reconstructing social and economic infrastructures, generating employment and livelihoods, reintegrating ex-combatants, reconstituting institutions and social capital, and mobilising financing for recovery”.170

167 UNDP, Post-Conflict Economic Recovery: Enabling Local Ingenuity (New York: Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, 2008), xviii. 168 See also John F. E. Ohiorhenuan, “Post-Conflict Recovery: Approaches, Policies and Partnerships,” CRPD Working Paper No. 4 (Leuven, Belgium: Centre for Research on Peace and Development, 2011), 6. 169 Collier, “On the Economic Consequences of Civil War,” 169. 170 UNDP, Post-Conflict Economic Recovery: Enabling Local Ingenuity, xx.

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As societies emerging from violent civil wars face high risk of reversion to conflict,171 scholars agree that post-conflict economic recovery could significantly reduce the risk.172 However, many scholars, practitioners and international governmental and non- governmental organisations define post-conflict economic recovery and development in different scopes and focus. While some pay attention only to the economic conditions, many scholars additionally count the social well-being of conflict-affected societies in their observation of post-conflict recovery. In a strict economic sense, scholars argue post-conflict economic recovery is the return to the level of economic output and employment in place before the civil war. Flores and Nooruddin, in focusing mainly on the commitment of the political actors involved and the conditions of post-conflict political institutions even narrowly define post-conflict economic recovery as the return to, and the ability to maintain, the highest level of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of the society in the last five years before the war.173 Conversely, some scholars describe post-war economic recovery as the establishment of the socioeconomic well- being of the conflict-affected country and define it in a much broader perspective and scope. For example, Forman describes post-conflict recovery as the reinstatement of economic hopes and social well-being and suggests the reassurance of “food security, public health, shelter, educational systems and a social safety net for all citizens. An economic strategy for assistance must be designed to ensure the reconstruction of physical infrastructure, to generate employment, to open markets, to create legal and regulatory reforms, to lay the foundation for international trade and investment and to establish transparent banking and financial institutions”.174

However, since economic conditions and the growth level of a society could be shallow before the outbreak of civil war, some argue that it is not always desirable to return to the pre-war GDP level. Ohiorhenuan observes that “developmental pathologies, such as extreme inequality, poverty, corruption, exclusion, institutional decay and poor economic

171 Collier, “Post-Conflict Recovery: How Should Strategies Be Distinctive?,” i101. 172 See, for example, Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom, “Post-Conflict Risks,” Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 4 (2008). 173 Thomas Edward Flores and Irfan Nooruddin, “Democracy under the Gun: Understanding Postconflict Economic Recovery,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 1 (2009): 9–10. 174 Forman, “Achieving Socio-Economic Well-Being in Post-Conflict Settings,” 126.

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management” could be the typical economic conditions in the years preceding the war.175 He observes that, in many cases, pre-war GDP growth rate could be very low or even negative.176 These deteriorating economic conditions could have contributed to the outbreak of conflict and been further aggravated during the course of the war. Moreover, many scholars and practitioners also suggest that underscoring only on growth would be inadequate when managing the devastating economic consequences of a prolonged civil war and could further exacerbate grievances and increase incentives for the reversion to violence.177 Although it is an essential component of economic development, growth in economic level alone does not define the recovery of a post-civil war economy. Because the legacy of violent conflict often constitutes “massive destruction of assets, the disruption of social networks and the distortion of signals and incentives”, Ohiorhenuan argues that the post-conflict transition or recovery process requires proper attention on both economic and social policies.178 Conversely, scholars and practitioners also reject maximalist definitions of post-conflict recovery as an unrealistic approach that conflates post-conflict socioeconomic recovery with the process of overcoming underdevelopment and building up a developmental state.179

International development community organisations also define post-conflict recovery in different ways. For example, The World Bank defines post-conflict reconstruction as “the rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework of society” and “the reconstruction of the enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime society, explicitly including governance and rule of law as essential components”.180 In emphasising the return to a normal development trajectory, UNDP defines post-conflict economic recovery as the

175 Ohiorhenuan, “Post-Conflict Recovery: Approaches, Policies and Partnerships”. 176 Ibid. 177 Tony Addison, “Africa’s Recovery from Conflict: Making Peace Work for the Poor” (WIDER Policy Brief No. 6, United Nations University–World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, 2003), https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/PB2003-006.pdf 178 John F. E. Ohiorhenuan, “Post-Conflict Recovery: Approaches, Policies and Partnerships,” 2. 179 See, for example, UNDP, Post-Conflict Economic Recovery: Enabling Local Ingenuity, 4. 180 The World Bank, Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of The World Bank (Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1998). Based on Nepalese experience, Subedi similarly defines post-conflict economic recovery and development as the recovery of “a conflict-affected state from the economic damages of conflict and lay foundation for inclusive development”. See D. B. Subedi, “Economic Dimension of Peacebuilding: Insights into Post-Conflict Economic Recovery and Development in Nepal,” South Asia Economic Journal 13, no. 2 (2012): 314.

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reacquiring of the “capability to make and implement economic policy as part of a largely self-sustaining process of economic governance”.181 In a post-conflict local setting, the International Labour Office (ILO) sees post-conflict local economic recovery (LER) as “an area-based approach stimulating both the demand and supply sides of affected markets. In the short-run, LER aims at gradually reducing the dependency on external aid through temporary jobs and income generation. In the long-run, LER aims at creating the endogenous conditions for the local economies to reactivate and create job opportunities”.182

While it ought to avoid maximalist conceptions, post-civil war economic recovery cannot simply be the restoration of economic conditions or the return to the optimum growth rate and income level achieved a few years before the outbreak of war. As suggested by scholars and practitioners, rather than a mere restoration of the past structural dynamic of the economy, post-civil war economic recovery is a process of transformation that assures the establishment of economic capitals and infrastructure that is conducive to sustainable economic growth and, in the long-run, development.183 Thus, this thesis perceives post- civil war economic development as the transformation of economic infrastructure that is conducive to the war-affected communities in achieving conditions for a self-sustaining development.

2.4.3. Civil society

The role of civil society in post-civil war democratisation

Since the early 1980s, civil society has gained scholastic interest as an important attribute of democratisation by virtue of the indispensable role it plays in building up of necessary social conditions in transitioning democracies. However, while many scholars argue for the democratising role of civil society, especially as an important driving force to instigate

181 UNDP, “Sustaining Post-Conflict Economic Recovery: Lessons and Challenges” (BCPR Occasional Paper No. 1, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, New York, 2005). 182 International Labour Office, Local Economic Recovery in Post-Conflict: Guidelines (Geneva: ILO Programme for Crisis Response and Reconstruction, 2010), 1. 183 Ohiorhenuan suggests that post-conflict recovery usually involves substantial socioeconomic transformation and requires institutional and policy reforms that “allow war-torn countries to re- establish the foundations for self-sustaining development”. See Ohiorhenuan, “Post-Conflict Recovery: Approaches, Policies and Partnerships,” 3.

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and sustain the process of democratisation, some are critical of it. In arguing the perception of the conducive role of civil society in the process of democratisation has generally been assumed with little theoretical and empirical evidence, some scholars question the practical role that civil society plays in the process of democratisation.184 Some even argue the reverse is true—rather than civil society cultivating democracy, it is the process of democratisation that opens up space for civil society to step in while former tyrants retract their reach during democratic liberalisation and transition.185

Nevertheless, there has been increasing unanimity among scholars on the conducive role of civil society in the democratisation process. A remarkable consensus has been reached on the Tocquevillian proposition that “the virtues and viability of a democracy depend on the robustness of its associational life”.186 At the same time, the established literature on democratisation agrees that civil society is an integral part of a democratic society. Among the proponents, Robert Putnam suggests that the concept of civil society can be traced back to the works of Alexis De Tocqueville and argues that civil society is “the sphere of associational life that promotes democratic values and increases social capital”.187 Some scholars also suggest that, same as the democratic institutional

184 See, for example, Lorenzo Fioramonti, “Civil Societies and Democratization: Assumptions, Dilemmas and the South African Experience,” Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory, no. 107 (2005): 66. 185 For example, Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); and Thomas Carothers, “Civil Society,” Foreign Policy, no. 117 (1999): 19. While conceiving the valuable role civil society played in helping advance democracy, Carothers argues for the role of a capable and competent state in developing a healthy civil society. Ibid., 26. Some scholars also note the vulnerability of civil society organisations by the co-optation and opression of government. See, for example, Philip Oxhorn, “Conceptualtizing Civil Society from the Bottom Up: A Political Economy Perspective,” in Civil Society and Democracy in Latin America, edited by Richard Feinberg, Carlos Waisman, and Leon Zamosc (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 186 Mark Warren, Democracy and Association (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 3. The ‘New-Left’ also share certain aspects of the neo-Tocquevillean perspective of civil society. See also Laurence Whitehead, “Bowling in the Bronx: The Uncivil Interstices between Civil and Political Society,” Democratization 4, no. 1 (1997): 98–99. 187 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York and London: Simon & Schuster, 2000). Some also suggests the term emerges in the liberal thought tradition dating back to John Locke to differentiate society from the state. See Michael Windfuhr, “The Promotion of Civil Society in Developing Countries: The Example of European Development Cooperation” (Bonn: German Development Institute, 1999), 2. Jack Snyder even argues for civil society as an essential requisite for the democratisation process. See Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict, 316.

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arrangements, civil society is equally essential for a democratic society.188 For instance, Schmitter and Karl note that by remaining autonomous of the state, civil society “not only can restrain the arbitrary actions of rulers, but can also contribute to forming better citizens who are more aware of the preferences of others, more self-confident in their actions, and more civic-minded in their willingness to sacrifice for the common good”.189 Diamond also suggests that civil society can generate a distinctive public that is “organised for democracy, socialised to its norms and values, and committed not just to its myriad narrow interests but to larger, common ‘civic’ ends” that are indispensable for a healthy liberal democracy.190 Moreover, under non-democratic, suppressive governments, effective civil society groups could respond to the desperate needs of the community.191

Some scholars argue for the supportive role of civil society in the transitioning and consolidation processes of post-conflict democratisation. Since almost all of the social conditions of democracy that took centuries to take root in Western democracies rarely emerge and institutionalise in war-shattered communities, some scholars argue that post- civil war democratisation is unreasonable and an impossible dream.192 Further, for post- civil war societies with diverse and divided ethnicity, some scholars suggest the need to acknowledge the cultural pluralism and establish “arrangements that induce inclusionary politics and create structural incentives for intercommunal cooperation”.193 Many suggest

188 For example, see David Beetham, Democracy: A Beginner's Guide (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006), 36. And Carlos Waisman, Richard Feinberg, and Leon Zamosc, “Civil Society and Democracy: The Latin American Case,” in Civil Society and Democracy in Latin America, edited by Carlos Waisman, Richard Feinberg, and Leon Zamosc (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 2. 189 Schmitter and Karl, “What Democracy Is … And Is Not,” 79–80. In his seminal work, Robert Putnam argues for the ability of a vibrant civil society to foster a good government. See Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 190 Larry Diamond, “Toward Democratic Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy 5, no. 3 (1994). 191 For example, see Julie Fisher, Nongovernments: NGOs and the Political Development of the Third World (West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1998); Diamond, “Toward Democratic Consolidation,” 5–6; and Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Burma: Civil Society Skirting Regime Rules,” in Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space, edited by Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004). 192 For example, see M. Barnett, “Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War,” International Security 30, no. 4 (2006), 89; Seth D. Kaplan, Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008). 193 Crawford Young, “Africa: An Interim Balance Sheet,” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 3 (1996): 65.

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civil society can play a conducive role in bringing about these inclusionary politics as well as social capital and, thus, help to establish and consolidate favourable conditions for a successful post-conflict democratic transition. For instance, by pointing to the ongoing capacity of civil society to mobilise mass movements against military or autocratic regimes around the world, Linz and Stepan claim that “there must be a free and lively civil society” for the completion of a process of democratisation.194 Nancy Bermeo also suggests that such incentives for intercommunal cooperation can be expected from ‘heterogeneous groups’ in civil society.195 The author notes that in such post-conflict societies, successful democratisation requires “a civil society that is tolerant and non- violent and thus, supportive of democracy”.196 Further, Julie Fisher suggests that civil society in authoritarian states can expand in inverse proportions and usually in response to the basic needs of neglected and marginalised communities.197 Similarly, some leading scholars suggest civil society can generate several social conditions for a successful democratisation such as national unity,198 social cohesion,199 a ‘civic culture’ of reaching a consensus based on common belief,200 citizens’ capacity and willingness to participate201 and networks of social supports for liberal institutions and values.202 In summary, scholars agree that civil society can help overcome structural barriers to articulate and raise the concerns of marginalised groups and; therefore, limit the power

194 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, 7. See also E. Remi Aiyede, “The Dynamics of Civil Society and the Democratization Process in Nigeria,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 37, no. 1 (2003): 2. 195 Bermeo, “What the Democratization Literature Says—or Doesn’t Say—About Postwar Democratization,” 161. Larry Diamond suggests the importance of the “mass democratic attitude and values” as a classic facilitating condition for democracy. See Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States: Lessons and Challenges”. 196 Ibid. 197 Julie Fisher, The Road from Rio: Sustainable Development and the Nongovernmental Movement in the Third World (Westport: Praeger, 1993). 198 Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” 350–51. 199 Without social cohesion, it is widely considered harder for democratisation to occur in ethnically and religiously divisive societies. See Horowitz, ‘Democracy in Divided Societies’; Thomas Carothers, “The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy,” ibid. 18, no. 1 (2007); Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars”. 200 Barker, Reflections on Government, 63. 201 Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, 60; Lipset, Political Man, 88; Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion, 514. 202 Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict.

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of the state. At the same time, it could enable communities to monitor the activities of governments and, thus, promote political participation that is conducive to the success of a process of democratisation.

Defining civil society

As ‘civil society’ has a wide range of definitions, there has been confusion about the meaning of the term.203 Indeed, scholars often use the term without elucidation. Although during the Enlightenment, civil society was equally perceived as political society,204 scholars later used the term to refer to all polities beyond political, family, and private entities.205 Initially conceived as “a commonwealth of the politically organised citizens” during the Greco-Roman period,206 the concept of civil society in a political sense re- emerged in the 1970s when opposition groups in several Eastern Europe and Latin American countries organised against long-standing dictatorships.207 For example, when the communist regimes in Eastern Europe were in crises in the late-1980s, civil society was perceived as a parallel political sphere in which an alternative public entity could emerge.208 Nonetheless, based on its conceptual components as suggested by Anheier, most scholars agree with the statement that “the sum of institutions, organisations and individuals located between the family, the state, and the market in which people associate

203 John Keane, Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); Mary Kaldor, “Global Civil Society: An Answer to War” (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003). 204 M. W. Sullivan, “Making Civil Society Work: Democracy as a Problem of Civic Cooperation,” in Civil Society, Democracy and Civic Renewal, edited by Robert K. Fullinwider (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 2. 205 C. Pateman, “The Fraternal Social Contract,” in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology, edited by Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (Oxford; Cambridge: Blackwell, 1997). 206 John Ehrenberg, Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 3. Terrell Carver, “Civil Society and Class: Centrality and Occlusion in Discourse and Practice,” in Globality, Democracy & Civil Society, edited by Terrell Carver and Jens Bartelson (London: Routledge, 2011); Ehrenberg, Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea. It was even equated with the state in its classical usage: see, for example, Carothers, “Civil Society”. 207 Volkhart F. Heinrich, ed. CIVICUS Global Survey of the State of Civil Society: Country Profiles 2vols., vol. 1 (Boulder: Kumarian Press, 2008), 1171. See also Lee Hock Guan, “Introduction: Civil Society in Southeast Asia,” in Civil Society in Southeast Asia, edited by Lee Hock Guan (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), 2–3. 208 For example, Sullivan, “Making Civil Society Work: Democracy as a Problem of Civic Cooperation,” 36; Keane, Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions; Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994); John R. Hall, Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison (Hoboken: Wiley, 2013).

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voluntarily to advance common interests”209 is the defining feature of civil society. Gordon White defines civil society as “an intermediate associational realm between the state and individuals, populated by organisations and groups that are separated from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state, and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or advance their interests or values”.210 Similarly, Lucan Way also describes civil society as “the network of voluntary and autonomous organisations and institutions that exist outside the state, market, and family, and which are difficult for state leaders to eliminate or control”.211 Diamond concisely summarised the defining features of civil society as “the realm of organised social life that is voluntary, self- generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by legal order or set of shared rules”.212 In a global effort to measure the conditions of civil societies at the country level, CIVICUS (the World Alliance for Citizen Participation) defines civil society as “the arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market where people associate to advance common interests”.213 As can be seen in the established literature, although scholars and practitioners alike define the term ‘civil society’ from different

209 Helmut K. Anheier, Civil Society: Measurement, Evaluation, Policy (London: Earthscan Publications, 2004), 20. 210 Gordon White, “Civil Society, Democratization and Development,” in Democratization in the South: The Jagged Wave, edited by Gordon White and Robin Luckam (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996); A. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society (New York and Toronto: Free Press and Maxwell Macmillan, 1992), 3. See also Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). 211 Way, “Civil Society and Democratization,” 36. In addition to ‘not for profit’, Alagappa adds the use of non-violent means as a major characteristic of civil society. See Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Civil Society and Political Change in Asia Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004). 212 Diamond, “Toward Democratic Consolidation,” 5. Similarly, Mark R. Duffield, a public policy academic, describes it as “an ill-defined space between the family and state in which plural civic institutions holds sway”: Mark R. Duffield, “Evaluating Conflict Resolution: Context, Models and Methodology” (Burgen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute, Development Studies and Human Rights, 1997), 6. Likewise, Robert Putnam uses the term ‘civic community’ to refer civil society as “a community of political equality, solidarity, trust and tolerance”. Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). Similarly, Linz and Stepan describe civil society as the polity in which self-organising groups, movements and individuals who are relatively autonomous from the state attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities and advance their interests. See Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. See also Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens, “The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy,” 73–74. 213 Volkhartf Finn Heinrich and Lorenzo Fioramonti, eds., CIVICUS Global Survey of the State of Civil Society: Comparative Perspectives, vol. 2 (Bloomsfield: Kumarian Press, 2008), 7.

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perspectives and ideologies in different ways, its apolitical, civil, independent, impartial, voluntary, and non-profit nature are commonly included in those definitions.

The main purpose of this study is to observe the changes that occur in the sphere of civil society during different conditions of war and peace in war-torn communities and will focus on the ceasefire responsive attributes of civil society. Therefore, as an operational definition, the term ‘civil society’ is defined as the organised associational arena that is civil, voluntary, and independent from family, market and the state. In addition, based on these widely agreed defining features and attributes of civil society, this study perceives the major entities of civil society to be a broad range of non-governmental social movements, organisations and networks such as social welfare, civic education, gender, environmental, as well as media groups, professional associations, and identity and rights- based ethnic social and communal movements. This study also counts non–party-based political activist groups and movements that are not seeking to assume state power as civil society organisations and movements.214

214 Diamond, “Toward Democratic Consolidation,” 6.

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54 Chapter 4: Background Context

Chapter 3. Background Context

A Brief History of Peace and Conflict in Modern Myanmar Politics

3.1.1. Protracted civil war

Myanmar has long been troubled with armed struggles for self-determination by the non- Bamar ethnic nationalities and political strife in the search for the restoration of democratic rule.1 These parallel political conflicts have existed through all government eras of post-colonial Myanmar.2 Most Myanmar scholars agree that the root causes of ethnic conflicts in the country cannot be explained by ‘greed and grievance’, which is otherwise widely seen as the cause of “new wars”.3 Rather, it is the incomplete process of ‘nation-building’ that began at the turn of the first millennium of the leading national races living in the territory of current Myanmar that has set the stage for one of the world’s longest violent ethnic conflicts. The history of modern Myanmar is fraught with violent conflict, much of which is inspired by the notion of ethnicity.4 A full account of the causes, factors, and actors of this protracted domestic conflict is outside the scope of this study. However, a brief history is necessary to effectively assess and correctly interpret the key developments and their properties throughout the course of the entire conflict.

Myanmar should have been a land of unified peoples.5 It consists of enclosed valleys of a few river systems sealed off from the wider world by thick forested mountain ranges in the upper north frontier and thousands of kilometres of coastline in the lower south. Myanmar recognises 135 different national races6 and is one of the world’s most

1 Smith, State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma since Independence, 1. 2 Ibid. 3 Mark R. Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (London: Zed Books, 2001). 4 South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict, 4. 5 G. E. Harvey, History of Burma: From the Earliest Times to 10 March 1824, the Beginning of the English Conquest (London: Frank Cass, 1967), 3. 6 For a detailed explanation, see Callahan, “Language Policy in Modern Burma,” 148; Mikael Gravers, Nationalism as Political Paranoia in Burma: An Essay on the Historical Practice of Power, 2nd ed. (Richmond: Curzon, 1999), 109.

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ethnically and linguistically diverse countries. Comprising at least one-third of the total population, the area populated by the minority ethnic states covers more than half of the country’s total land area.

Thousands of square kilometres of rugged hill tracts demarcating the north-western, northern, and north-eastern boundary of the country were the homeland of several loosely independent indigenous national races. As a Wa leader claims, the deeply forested north- eastern Wa region was virtually an independent sovereign territory of the Wa nationality until the invasion of the CPB in the mid-1960s.7 Likewise, the country’s lowland Ayeyarwady, Sittaung, and Thanlwin river basins, the coastline Gulf of Martaban and the Andaman Sea were the homelands of loosely federated kingdoms of the Mons8 and is one of the earliest established civilisations and urban settlements of mainland Southeast Asia.9 The hill land south-east was the land of independent Karen as well as other smaller indigenous national races. Similarly, the south-western coastline, which is naturally carved out from the Bamar central plain by a rugged mountain range 3,000 metres high, was where the Rakhine kingdoms established another renowned Southeast Asian civilisation. The miscellany of the races and rivalry for political dominance among the leading national races dates back from the country’s pre-modern history. Accordingly, violent inter-ethnic conflicts have been the governing feature of the country throughout the second millennium.

Until the British annexed the territory in the late nineteenth century, the leading national races of the country—the Bamar, Mon, Shan, and Rakhine—had been contending for political leadership of the country. Moreover, though the last ruling Bamar Konbaung dynasty defeated all its rivalries in the late eighteenth century, geographical hindrances and the persisting resistance of the defeated nationalities prevented successive Bamar

7 Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (London: Zed Books, 1991), 27. 8 John Nisbet, Burma under British Rule—and Before (London: Constable and Co., 1901), 3. 9 Harvey, History of Burma: From the Earliest Times to 10 March 1824, the Beginning of the English Conquest, xix; South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict, 4. D. G. E. Hall, Burma (London: AMS Press, 1974); Patrick McCormick, “Mon Histories: Between Translation and Retelling” (PhD diss., University of Washington, 2010), 1, https://search.proquest.com/docview/808258621?pq- origsite=primo.

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rulers from completing their process of nation-building.10 The power contests between the leading Shan feudal lords, Sawbwas (lord of the sky) and the Bamar kings, for instance, raged both in the lowland central dry zone and in the north-eastern hill land regions until early nineteenth century. Although defeated by the Bamars in the late eighteenth century, the Shan princely states never lost their autonomy.11 After being brought into a unified Shan State by the British in 1887, the Sawbwas still claimed the status of autonomous rulers of the loosely federated Shan States that resemble the political status of the Indian princely states or that of the Malay Sultans in the 1930s.12 Except in a geographical sense, most of these upland minority ethnic areas have never truly been a part of the Myanmar State.13 Likewise, although the Mon kingdoms were defeated in the mid-eighteenth century, occasional uprisings of the Mons against the rule of Bamar kings continued until into the nineteenth century.14

Similar to the malicious fate of the Mons, Rakhine urban settlements were destroyed by the Bamar kings in the late eighteenth century.15 However, efforts to restore the Rakhine sovereignty continued throughout the nineteenth century. They were the first national race to take up arms in revolt against the preliminary Myanmar rule before the country’s independence in 1947.16 In addition, Karenni State people have never been the subjects of Bamar kings nor of the imperialist British and were independent until Myanmar regained its independence in 1948.17

10 Thant Myint-U, The Making of Modern Burma (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 25; Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 38. 11 Myint-U, The Making of Modern Burma, 24. See also, Robert H. Taylor, The State in Burma (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 22. 12 Robert H. Taylor, “British Policy Towards Myanmar and the Creation of the ‘Burma Problem’,” in Myanmar: State, Society and Ethnicity, edited by N. Ganesan and K. Hlaing (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2007), 77. 13 Rudland and Pedersen, “Strong Regime, Weak State,” 9; Myint-U, The Making of Modern Burma, 4. South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict, 8. 14 Brian Foster, “Ethnicity and Economy: The Case of the Mons in Thailand” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 1972), 9, https://search.proquest.com/docview/302620620/?pq-origsite=primo; Nisbet, Burma under British Rule—and Before, 10; Victor B. Lieberman, “Ethnic Politics in Eighteenth- Century Burma,” Modern Asian Study 12, no. 3 (1978): 456–58. 15 Nisbet, Burma under British Rule—and Before, 1. 16 Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 80–81. 17 Jake Sherman argues that Myanmar resembles cases of incomplete state formation, in which the minority ethnic groups successfully resisted the central authority imposed by the majority. See

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On January 1, 1886, after three Anglo–Bamar wars, the territory of the now Myanmar was annexed into the British Empire. However, it was not as an independent new colony, but as a Province of British India. The Bamar kingdom was integrated with its former imperial possessions that it lost in the first and second Anglo–Bamar wars including the Mon, Taninthayee, and Rakhine regions in the country’s south and the thick forested lands of the loosely independent hill tribe peoples in the north. None of the subjects, including the Bamar themselves, were given a chance to express their will about the fate of their individual homelands in this process of the mandatory making of modern Myanmar. Myanmar’s renowned historian Thant Myint-U argues that the border of Myanmar as a province of British India was drawn without clear criteria and included areas. It was “home to hundreds of languages and mutually unintelligible dialects and independent cultures” that had never been part of the administration of feudal Myanmar.18

Further, the colonial rulers never helped establish a shared sense of ‘nation’ among the diverse and divided ethnic populations of Myanmar as they did in India by inventing the notion of ‘India as a nation’ at the beginning of their colonial rule.19 Instead of helping to complete the process of nation-building, the British created administrative territorial units that further divided the peoples living within the territory of the current Myanmar. The politically worthwhile central plains of the Bamar and economically viable lowland delta regions and southern littoral lines were integrated into British India with full status of a colonial administration and termed ‘Burma Proper’.20 However, the rugged hill lands termed the ‘Frontier Areas’ were largely left neglected and excluded from the ministerial

Sherman, “Burma: Lessons from the Cease-Fires”. Regarding the Karenni State, both British and Bamar King Mindon conceived the independence of the Karenni state in 1875. See South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict, 8; and Robert H. Taylor, “British Policy Towards Myanmar and the Creation of the ‘Burma Problem’,” in Myanmar: State, Society and Ethnicity, edited by N. Ganesan and K. Hlaing (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2007), 76–77. 18 Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma, 200. 19 During its colonial rule, the British invented the notion of ‘India’ as a nation-state from the hodgepodge of loosely independent princely states, languages, ethnic groups, and religions sprawling under the mountain chain of the Himalaya. See Sunil Khilnani, The Idea of India (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1998). Francis Fukuyama also argues that the unique legacy of British colonialism in India has helped in the invention of a sense of a single, unified political space and building up of a common language, civil service and bureaucratic tradition, an army and other institutions critical for India to evolve as a democratic nation. See Francis Fukuyama, “Introduction: Nation-Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory,” in Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, edited by Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 3. 20 Taylor, The State in Burma, 160.

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administration of the then-Government of Burma. For example, the Kachin Hill-Tribes Regulation 1895, the Chin Hills Regulation 1896, and the Act of Federated Shan States 1919 were apparently intended to administratively separate the hill land ethnic areas from the lowland Myanmar territory. Further, even when the British introduced a process of political representation under The Government of Burma Act 1935, the Legislature of Burma did not include jurisdictions for the Shan States, the Rakhine Hill Tracts, the Chin Hills District, or the Kachin Hill Tracts.21 Myint-U claims that although the British executed formal control in the minority ethnic periphery hill lands, day-to-day government was primarily left in the hands of the local elites, landlords or tribal chiefs.22 However, in the lowland valleys, the colonial rulers imposed direct bureaucratic control from the Chief Commissioner through to township officers and village headmen.23 Thus, the ‘Government of Burma’ did not have any authority in those minority ethnic areas. Consequently, as argued by some scholars, the Highlanders’ sense of independence deepened,24 while the established civilisation of the Mons was further assimilated into that of the Bamars.25

The British found the Bamars as the former power holders and authorities of the old order to be rebellious and a potential threat to colonial control. Therefore, they turned to the hill land ethnic nationalities who had been the beneficiaries of British and American Christian Missionaries, particularly for educational services, for the new recruits for policing and maintain order in the colony.26 According to J. S. Furnivall, in 1931 the hill land minority ethnic Kachin, Karen, and Chin who together represented 13 per cent of the country’s total population formed 83 per cent of the British Indian indigenous troops, whereas the

21 Laura Grenfell, Promoting the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 22 Myint-U, The Making of Modern Burma, 4. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid.; Taylor, “British Policy Towards Myanmar and the Creation of the ‘Burma Problem’,”; Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. 25 South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict, 9–10. Taylor, “British Policy Towards Myanmar and the Creation of the ‘Burma Problem’,” 73. 26 Taylor, “British Policy Towards Myanmar and the Creation of the ‘Burma Problem’,” 75. Robert H. Taylor, “Colonial Forces in British Burma: A National Army Postponed,” in Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia, edited by Karl Hack and Tobial Rettig (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 189; Mary Callahan, “The Origins of Military Rule in Burma” (PhD diss., Cornell Univeristy, 1996), 110, https://search.proquest.com/docview/304252639?pq-origsite=primo

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majority Bamar, who made up of 75 per cent of the population, composed a mere 12 per cent of troops.27 In 1939, at the outbreak of the Second World War, the Burma Defence Force (the British indigenous armed force in Myanmar) comprised of 3,197 Karen, Kachin, and Chin, but only 472 Bamars.28 Myint-U argues that although this was a “cheap and easy way to rule”,29 a sense of colonial divide and rule developed among the Myanmar political elites. This heightened the ethnic divides within and among the minority ethnic societies.

Similarly, the Second World War further intensified ethnic differences and heightened racial discontent between the Bamar and non-Bamar populations. At the beginning of the war, the British and American armies recruited non-Bamar hill land people as regular and irregular anti-Japanese guerrilla forces. Conversely, as the prospective defeat of the imperialist British became obvious, urban-based political activists of the country (who were predominantly Bamar) sought help to establish an anti-imperialist army and form alliance with China or Japan, the then regional powers. After failing to contact Chinese communists, Japanese fascist spies caught and diverted the young Bamar activists to Japan and trained them to lead an anti-British force. After they completed brief military training, the Burma Independent Army (BIA), the origin of the now ‘Myanma Tatmadaw,’ was founded at the end of 1941. In early 1942, the BIA followed the Japanese invasion of Myanmar along the Thai-Myanmar border. Consequently, numerous clashes were reported between the Bamar-dominated BIA backed by the Axis Japanese Imperial Army and loosely organised ethnic armed groups backed by the Allied forces during the war against colonial British at the beginning of the war and against the Japanese at the end.30 Perceived as renegades loyal to the British, the hill land ethnic peoples, particularly the Karen who comprised the principal mass of the European-led anti-Japanese resistance forces, faced horrific atrocities committed by the loosely controlled BIA recruits during the war.

27 J. Sydenham Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948), 184. See also Hall, Burma, 167. 28 See Hall, Burma, 167. 29 Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma. 30 U. Ba Maw, Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs of a Revolution, 1939–1946 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

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Moreover, the brief wartime Japanese rule exposed the hidden character of “nationalist in the narrowest sense”31 of most Bamar leaders towards the other minority ethnic nationalities. After the British withdrawal, the Japanese assembled the different administrative units of British Burma together under a single administration and assigned the BIA commanders and prominent pre-war Bamar politicians to form a fictional government and rule of the nominal Independent Myanmar. With the backing of fascist Japanese, Dr Ba Maw’s regime tried to apply feudal style, coercive nation-building to develop an ethnically unitary nation-state.32 A national-socialist slogan of “One blood, One voice, One leader” was raised and kept the country under an authoritarian rule similar to pre-war Germany, Italy, and Japan.33 The Bamar-centred unitary and assimilationist idea of nationhood re-emerged, and ethnicity was further politicised with the practising of culture and the teaching of minority ethnic languages outlawed.

The origin of representative institutions in Myanmar can be traced back to the municipal committees first set up in 1874, before the country was fully annexed into British India. However, when the British instigated the political transformation, the colonial rulers invested in security-related and economically viable sectors with skeletal institutions.34 After the 1909 Morley-Minto Reforms, the Legislative Councils of Provinces in British India were upgraded to include substantial elected representatives. However, although Myanmar was a province under the same status in British India, its Legislative Council

31 Professor Robert Taylor explains the narrowly nationalist basis and social origin of the BIA Officer Corps in detail. See Taylor, The State in Burma, 232–33. 32 To form a political mass that operates parallel to the Japanese military and under an effective civilian control, Dr Ba Maw founded the Dobama Sinyetha Asiayone (We the Poor-men Association) in 1942, and later transformed it into the Mahabama Party. The name of the Party also means ‘a chauvinistic Bamar’ to the other minority ethnic political leaders. Dr Ba Maw claims that his party is “a common melting pot for the native races of Bamar from which will arise the Greater Bamar nation. Our past tribal history has closed, tribal accounts are settled, and a new nation and history now begins. In the past, parties overshadowed peoples. Now we are unifying from the right end, from the people”. For details, see Ba Maw, Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs of a Revolution, 1939–1946, 279–80. 33 Professor Robert Taylor described the slogan as “One blood, One voice, One nation”. See Taylor, The State in Burma, 284. However, Dr Ba Maw, then the Chancellor of Japanese-ruled Myanmar Government, referred to “One blood, One voice, One leader” in his 1968 memoirs. See Ba Maw, Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs of a Revolution, 1939–1946, 280. 34 Although the first Legislative Council of Myanmar was formed in 1897 with nine nominated members, none of the members were Myanmar. The regime was virtually comprised of nominated officials and remained autocratic until 1922. See Hugh Tinker, The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Years of Independence, 4th ed. (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, 1967), 1.

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had only one elected representative out of 17 members.35 Further, this candidate had to be chosen by the Burma Chamber of Commerce, a body entirely comprised of Europeans.36 In 1917, the British government decided to introduce representative institutions in its colonies. It announced the establishment of “responsible self- government through the gradual development of self-governing institutions” based on the unreasonably assumed recommendation of the 1917 Montagu-Chelmsford report.37 Myanmar was excluded from this process of constitutional reform. Only in 1921, when The Government of Burma Act was passed in British Parliament did Myanmar become a separate Province of British India. In 1923, against the will of the General Council of Burman Association, the leading political organisation of Myanmar, the country became a Governor’s Province and administrative reforms began to take place. However, the Shan States, Karenni, and other tribal hill areas were excluded from these newly established administrative operations.38 Regarding political participation in lowland Burma Proper, the proposed Mon representation was denied by Bamar representatives, while the British reserved representation for the Karen and Indians.39 This further heightened the Karen political elites’ sense of autonomy and intensified the existing ethnic cleavages between the Mons and the Bamars.

The incomplete feudal nation-building and minimalist state-building of the British colonial rule set the stage in Myanmar for the longest-running civil war in the contemporary world. In rebuilding a post-colonial Myanmar State, Bamar leaders failed to reach an agreement on whether to create a communist society or a socialist state within a parliamentary framework. Spurred by the controversial conceptions of post-colonial state-rebuilding among Bamar political elites, armed insurgencies sprung up within three months of the country’s independence to begin one of Southeast Asia’s longest-running

35 Ba Maw, Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs of a Revolution, 1939–1946, 1. 36 Ibid. 37 Without visiting Myanmar, the Montagu-Chelmsford report states that “the desire for elective institutions has not developed in Burma”. Quoted in Tinker, The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Years of Independence, 2. 38 Hall, Burma, 150. 39 U. Maung Maung, Burma’s Constitution (Hague: Nijhoff, 1959), 10–12.

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civil wars.40 At the same time, when Myanmar’s independence was imminent, there were totally different expectations between the majority Bamar leaders and the ethnic minorities. While Bamar leaders wanted independence immediately together with all ethnic territories, the main objectives of the ethnic national political forces were the right to self-determination and autonomy to safeguard their position in the future Union of Myanmar.41 Although the leading minority ethnic leaders demanded a federal union, the ruling Bamar politicians decided to establish a unitary state with a ‘semi-Union’ framework. Among the major ethnic nationalities, the Mon and Rakhine felt they were marginalised, the Karen were faced with discrimination, and the signatories of the Panglon Agreement—Chin, Kachin, Karenni, and Shan—struggled with the broken promises. In 1948, the year of independence, the ethnic political forces who were not signatories of the country’s founding Panglong Agreement were ready to start a civil war in an attempt to achieve political power.42

In the early years of independence, the country was in an all-out civil war after major ethnic nationalities fighting for secession or the right to self-determination sprung up throughout the periphery ethnic areas. Although there have been variations in terms of claimed ideologies and goals, numbers of groups at war and intensity of the conflicts, ethnic armed conflicts have continued uninterrupted throughout the history of post- colonial Myanmar. Ethnic conflict in Myanmar is extremely complex, as there are many actors involved. Apart from the ruling military regimes and the recently formed semi- civilian government and its competing legislative, executive, and military factions, a myriad of non-state armies and militias have involved in Myanmar’s ethnic conflict.

By effectively thwarting the fragmented democratic civilian government from sorting out the issues of the nation-building and state-building, the situation somewhat militarised the entire society. Myanmar civilian leaders were unable to pursue their agendas of political reform to resolve ethnic discontent. Instead, in trying to prevent the country from disintegrating, the democratically elected Myanmar parliamentary government brought the military into the country’s developing political arena. During the late 1950s, the

40 See Callahan, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma; Smith, State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma since Independence, 3; Susanne Prager Nyein, “Ethnic Conflict and State Building in Burma,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 39, no. 1 (14 January, 2009): 127. 41 Kramer, Neither War Nor Peace: The Future of the Cease-Fire Agreements in Burma, 5. 42 Taylor, The State in Burma, 228.

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military took control of the barely functioning state apparatus and gradually assumed itself into the position of the only institution responsible for all state functioning institutions, ranging from lawmaking and enforcement through to policy formulation and the execution of the economy, to the provision of social services and media information. The militarisation of the state turned military officers into state builders and crowded out reform-minded civilian officials from the democratically formed governments. Although more than a dozen ceasefire agreements between Myanmar military and the majority of ethnic armed groups were held for more than two decades, the direct military rule of Myanmar military junta in 1988–2011 deepened the conflicts. Violent conflicts are still raging in several ethnic areas of the country even under the post-2010 rule of semi-civilian government.

Regardless of the claimed objectives of the leading protagonists involved in the conflict, the effects of Myanmar’s more than six-decade-long political stasis and violent conflicts have seen the country suffer prolonged political instability and its people become among the world’s poorest. In particular, the suffering of minority ethnic populations in conflict- affected areas was profoundly devastating. Given the diverse extent and long durability of the violent struggles, the conduct of ethnic conflict has become well-structured between the key stakeholders and socio-political elites involved in the conflict.43 The militarisation of society by both the ruling regimes and the opposition has made insurgency a way of life and has dominated the politics of the ruling governments as well as the opposition movements of the Bamar majority and the ethnic rebellions.44 Thus, as Mary Callahan laments, warfare has been further embedded as the condition under which Myanmar’s elites and its social forces “negotiate, create, revitalise, recognise and rethink patterns and practice of governance”.45 Although this does not mean the post-colonial state of Myanmar is disintegrating, nation-state-building has been severely debilitated. As Smith observes, this has resulted in a state with various elements of a failed, weak, and shadow state.46 Further, violent conflicts have not only resulted in human cost, but have also severely damaged the inter-societal relationships of the ethnically,

43 Smith, State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma since Independence, 2. 44 Ibid., 1. 45 Callahan, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma, 3. 46 Smith, State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma since Independence, x.

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linguistically, and conscientiously divisive society. Although Myanmar was widely regarded as one of the promising economies of post-colonial Southeast Asia, the country has declined to become one of the world’s most miserable and, since the 1987 UN Conference on Trade and Development, it has held a Least Developed Country status.47 Human rights records from political repression and humanitarian issues such as refugees, IDPs and poverty have been the predominant feature of the country. Moreover, international criminal activities, including human trafficking, illicit narcotic drug production and trafficking, illegal migrant labouring and the spread of preventable diseases, particularly HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, has continually intensified in the country. In 2006, survey work conducted by the Myanmar United Nations Country Team (UNCT) concluded that the humanitarian situation in Myanmar was worse than that of Cambodia.48

3.1.2. Peace initiatives

Successive Myanmar ruling regimes reached ceasefire agreements with several ethnic armed resistance groups. Although seven sets of ceasefires and peace talks took place along the course of the six-decade-long civil war, violent conflicts still rage in some ethnic areas. During the first four decades of the civil war, 1948–1988, Myanmar’s ruling regimes and the armed opposition groups reached five sets of ceasefire agreements. Both the brief civilian governments (1948–1958, 1960–1962) and military regimes (1958– 1960, 1962–1988) forced armed resistance groups to surrender or, as wickedly paraphrased by the democratically elected Anti-Fascist People Freedom League (AFPFL) government in the late 1950s, ‘exchange of arms for democracy’. All five sets of ceasefire agreements between the ruling regimes and armed opposition groups during the first four decades of Myanmar civil war (1948–1988) were short-lived and failed to yield any tangible outcomes.

However, in 1989, after a series of secret negotiations and conceding unprecedented deals, the Myanmar military regime successfully instated ceasefire agreements with the

47 United Nations General Assembly, Decisions Adopted on the Reports of the Second Committee (Geneva: United Nations, 1987), 315. 48 Charles Petrie, “An Understanding of the Humanitarian Situation in Myanmar,” in Burma Forum (Brussels: Burma Forum, 2006).

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mutinied subservient ethnic armies of the CPB.49 These armies included the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang), the United Wa State Army (Wa), the Nation Democratic Alliance Army (Shan and Akha), and the New Democratic Army- Kachin (Kachin). In the same year, the Shan State Army also reached a ceasefire agreement with the government. During 1991–1992, the government military also reached ceasefire agreements with the Kachin Defense Army (the splintered fourth Brigade of the Kachin Independent Army), the Pa-O National Organisation, Plaung State Liberation Party, and the Kayan National Guard (a splintered armed faction of Kayan New Land Party). In 1994, the Kachin Independent Organisation/Army (KIO/A), the Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front, the Kayan New Land Party, and the Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organisation negotiated and struck agreements with the government. In 1995, the government successfully managed to reach ceasefire agreements with the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (a breakaway faction of the KNU), the NMSP, and the Shan State National Army (a splinter army from the Mong Tai Army of the opium warlord Khun Sa). In 1997, the Mong Tai Army and the Karen Peace Force (the former Battalion No. 16 of the KNLA Sixth Brigade) surrendered to the government. At the same time, several local militia groups also agreed to unofficial truces with the military. Despite widespread suspicion from the rest of the ethnic armed groups, the State Law and Order Restoration Council/State Peace and Development Council (SLORC/SPDC)50 reached ceasefire agreements with 28 ethnic armed groups51 before the

49 ေမ ွ္ န္န ွနသ နဥင္ ငန္ြန္႔ (ဗုိလ္ဥခ်ဳ္္က နေ ွင္န)၊ ္က်ဳံေတငြဥခဲရ ကၽငန္ေတွဲ့ ၀ေေငေေင၊ (ရန္ကုန္၊ ဳန္နမခ်ိနတတ္ရွဳုဳံ밶 ိဳ္တုိက္၊ိ ္၊၂၀၁၅)၊ 밶 ွိွ -၈ ။ [U. Khin Nyunt, My Lifelong Memoirs (Yangon: Pann Myo Tayar (Hundred Flowers), 2015), 230–80]; Min Zaw Oo, “Understanding Myanmar’s Peace Process: Ceasefire Agreements,” Catalyzing Reflection (Yangon: Swiss Peace Foundation, 2013), 8; Oo and Min, Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords, 12. 50 Claiming the central task of the coup d’état had been fulfilled and the new task of building a peaceful and prosperous society commenced, the ruling military regime morphed into the State Peace and Development Council on November 15, 1997. 51 Following several splits and defections from major armed groups during the ceasefire period, the number of ethnic armed organisations, including those in the form of militia groups, increased extensively. The Myanmar National Convention, resumed in 2004, recognised 28 armed ethnic ceasefire groups and invited each of them to represent their individual de facto constituencies. See Smith, State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma Since Independence, 48. For a detailed breakdown of the major and splinter ceasefire groups that were invited to the National Convention, see Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 of Smith, “Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches,” 78–79. However, Ashley South tabled 15 main ceasefire groups and 19 other ceasefire groups as of 2006. See South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict, 122–23, 26–27.

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end of the last millennium. However, although the ceasefire agreements52 between the ruling SLORC/SPDC and many ethnic armed resistance groups were held for more than two decades, like the past five sets no meaningful political settlement was achieved. As correctly argued by many scholars, direct military rule has deepened the root causes of the conflicts.

In August 2011, along with imposed democratic reform agendas, the semi-civilian government of Myanmar formally launched a peace process and reached bilateral ceasefire agreements with the majority ethnic armed groups. In this seventh set of ceasefire agreements the government renewed and formalised the mostly verbal ceasefire agreements with the ethnic armed resistance parties. By February 2012, unlike the previous verbal ‘gentlemen’s agreements’, the government reached formal initial ceasefire agreements with most of the ethnic armed resistance groups, and this was considered a signal of significant change in the ethnic policies of the government. Through the newly established Myanmar Peace Centre, the government institutionalised the ceasefire process and developed and agreed on a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) that could be a fundamental principle for widely demanded constitutional change. However, the ongoing armed conflict with some groups, the denial by the Myanmar military to include specific groups and the military’s inflexible stand on its unitary nation- state-building objectives and the continually shifting positions of some ethnic armed parties have been difficult challenges for the fledgling semi-civilian government. Again, although the initial success of the Myanmar semi-civilian government in reaching bilateral ceasefire agreements with 17 out of the 21 ethnic armed groups has been widely praised, the prospect of achieving sustainable peace in the country remains unpredictable. Violent armed conflicts have continued to rage in numerous ethnic areas.

3.1.3. Political liberalisation

After a long wait, Myanmar is now undergoing a parallel political transition process—a peacebuilding process from all-out civil war and a democratic transition process from an entrenched autocratic rule. The Myanmar military has formally dissolved the ruling military regime and handed over state power to a new government of semi-civilian

52 All the previous ceasefire agreements were verbal except that with the KIO.

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parliamentary governing system. As the Union Legislative Assembly called its first session on March 31, 2011, the 2008 Constitution came into effect and fundamentally reshaped the political landscape of the country. Although virtually all the top authorities of all governance institutions were former high-ranking military officers, a new bicameral parliament at the centre, 14 unicameral legislative assemblies at the peripheries, a new semi-civilian administration, and a new judiciary body have come into existence. The changes have engendered a viable context of governance and created an enabling environment for at least incremental reform towards a greater democratic and plural society. In his inaugural speech, President Thein Sein talked about the need for widespread changes in the country and for national reconciliation between the state and Burma’s diverse ethnic groups. Over the following months, the government implemented a series of reforms, including the functioning of parliament, the release of political prisoners and reaching a political ‘understanding’ with the main opposition (i.e., with Daw Aung San Su Kyi). The response of the government to social action, such as the suspension of the Ayeyarwaddy Confluence Dam project, also improved. At the same time, the government also liquidated the long-standing press censorship and relaxed controls on freedom of expression and association. These changes were symbolised by the National League for Democracy’s participation in by-elections on April 1, 2012, in which the opposition party won all but two of the seats contested.

However, the question remains as to whether the pace and scope of reforms are sustainable and can be translated into real changes in policies and outcomes that affect people’s lives.53 Moreover, the reform processes in Myanmar was hardly a success story with regard to the expectations of the population and the international community. In many respects, the Myanmar military group remained a decisive political actor in the processes of change and the prospect of achieving sustained peace and democracy was not ascertained. Since the military had been dictating the reform processes from a position of strength, rather than weakness, and deliberately setting up a new governing system that

53 Ashley South and Marie Lall, Education, Conflict and Identity: Non-State Education Regimes in Burma (The Education Support Program, The Open Society Foundation, 2013), 11.

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limits the changes,54 the election, the new government, the legislature, and the new judicial institutions have brought neither democracy nor peace to the country.

As these setbacks impose stringent obstacles, the country’s conflicting processes of building sustainable peace and post-civil war democratic marketisation could be complicated, bumpy, and lengthy. Moreover, the process of ‘nation-building’55 of the country that began at the beginning of the first Millennium has yet to be completed, while the contesting ‘state-building’ conception among Myanmar military and civilian elites requires a compromise. Violent conflicts still rage in some ethnic areas of the country even under the rule of a semi-civilian government and the greater semi-civilian government of the State Councillor Daw Aung San Su Kyi.

Background Context of the Ethnic Societies under Scrutiny

3.2.1. Karen-populated areas

The term ‘Karen’ represents seven56 sub-nationalities of the Karen-speaking peoples who are diverse in religious and sociocultural characteristics and speak non-intelligible dialects.57 Among the groups, the Pwo, who are mostly lowland Buddhist and the Sagaw, who are mostly Christian and animists and live in the hill regions, account for 80 per cent to 85 per cent of the total Karen population.58 Most of the Karen population are Buddhists, with about 20 per cent Christian and about 10 per cent animists.59 While the exact size of

54 Morten B. Pedersen, “The Politics of Burma’s ‘Democratic’ Transition,” Critical Asian Studies 43, no. 1 (April13, 2011): 57. 55 Francis Fukuyama, “The Imperative of State-Building,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2 (2004). 56 Although the Myanmar government schema recognised 11 Karen sub-national groups, the Karen Conference approved only seven, namely, Sagaw, Pwo, Bwe, Paku, Mobwa, Gabar, and White Karen. Many scholars suggest there are 20 to 25 different dialects. See, for example, Nick Cheesman, “Seeing ‘Karen’ in the Union of Myanmar,” Asian Ethnicity 3, no. 2 (2002): 203; Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, The Karen Revolution in Burma: Diverse Voices, Uncertain Ends (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 3; Martin Smith, “Burma: The Karen Conflict,” in Encyclopedia of Modern Ethnic Conflicts, edited by Joseph R. Rudolph (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2003), 10–11. 57 Thawnghmung, The Karen Revolution in Burma: Diverse Voices, Uncertain Ends, 3; Ashley South, “Burma’s Longest War: Anatomy of the Karen Conflict” (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute; Burma Center Netherlands, 2011), 2. 58 Thawnghmung, The Karen Revolution in Burma: Diverse Voices, Uncertain Ends, 3. 59 South, “Burma’s Longest War: Anatomy of the Karen Conflict,” 2; Thawnghmung, The Karen Revolution in Burma: Diverse Voices, Uncertain Ends, 3; Mikael Gravers, ed. Exploring Ethnic

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the Karen population is unknown, many estimate there are between three million to seven million.60 Less than one-quarter of the Karen population live within the territory of Kayin State that was established in 1952.61 The Karen peoples live across lower Myanmar in Kayin State and Mon State and some parts of Yangon, Ayeyarwaddy Delta, the eastern Bago mountain ranges, and Tanintharyi Region.

The strong desire of the post-colonial Karen leadership to remain outside the “national Burmese structure”62 with the aim of promoting Karen identity and culture and protecting the Karen population from a renewal of the violence faced during the Second World War63 resulted in the Karen armed rebellion in 1949. For some years, the Karen armed organisation held a large expanse of Bago, Ayeyarwaddy, and Tanintharyi Regions, and Mon and Kayin States. The party even briefly besieged Innsein town, about 16 km north- west of the downtown capital city Yangon. From the 1950s to 1970s, the KNU was the most powerful ethnic armed organisation in Myanmar, in part due to increased revenue from taxing the black market border crossing trades and income from the abundant natural resources in its control areas, especially logging deals. As a de facto authority, the party also earned revenue from the regular taxation of Karen villages in its stronghold and contested areas. Until the mid-1990s, the KNLA was the strongest and most well- equipped ethnic armed resistance army in the country. Although the government military could drive the KNU troops from the Bago mountain ranges and the Ayeyarwaddy Delta regions in the 1970s and take over a few of its military bases in the Karen hill tracts in the late-1980s, the KNU retained control of most of the south-eastern part of the country’s borderlands. For decades, much of the Karen-populated areas remained outside the control of successive Myanmar governments.

However, by the mid-1990s, the KNU lost control of a large part of its stronghold areas and even its headquarters in Manerplaw close to Thai border because of the defection of thousands of battle-hardened Karen soldiers in protest at the Christian domination of the

Diversity in Burma, vol. 39, NIAS Studies in Asian Topics Series (Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2007), 228. 60 See, for example, Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 30–31, fn–5. 61 See, for example, South, “Governance and Legitimacy in Karen State,” 65; Thawnghmung, The Karen Revolution in Burma: Diverse Voices, Uncertain Ends, 4. 62 Rene Peritz, “History of Burma,” Current History 56, no. 000330 (1969): 106. 63 Thawnghmung, The Karen Revolution in Burma: Diverse Voices, Uncertain Ends, ix.

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organisation. The splinter groups founded the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) at the end of 1994 and allied with the Myanmar Army. In the following decades, with the support of Myanmar military, the DKBA became the most militarily and economically powerful Karen armed group. Further, in 1997, another major faction of the KNLA defected and surrendered to the Myanmar military. The group founded the Karen Peace Force (KPF) in its stronghold in the Hongthayaw Region in southern Kayin State.

At the same time, two smaller groups, the Thandaung North Group and the Thandaung Special Region group in northern Kayin State entered into a ceasefire agreement with the government. A year later in 1998, another faction led by a senior Karen leader, P’doh Aung San, changed sides and entered into ceasefire with the government military. The group also formed ‘Payarkone Nyeinchanye Myothit Group’ (literally the New Peace Town) in Hpa-an area. In 2007, another battle-hardened Karen senior leader, together with the Army Brigade under his command, defected from the KNU and signed a ceasefire agreement with the government military. The group formed the KNU–KNLA Peace Council in central Kayin State. However, although KNU lost many of its stronghold areas and military bases in the mid-1990s, the party still had influence over most of the Karen-populated rural villages and the hill land areas and resisted the permanent presence of the government military until 2012 when it entered into a ceasefire with the government. Guerrilla operations by the KNLA troops had been active across most of the Karen-populated areas and the government strongholds. For decades, the KNLA troops, various Karen armed factions splintered from the KNU and the government military actively contested across all the Karen-populated areas in Kayin and Mon States and Bago and Tanintharyi Regions.

In the meantime, although some splintered factions of the KNU/KNLA surrendered or reached ceasefire agreements with the government military in the 1990s, peace talks between the main Karen armed resistance group KNU and the government failed repeatedly and the KNU remained at war for decades. After a new round of talks in late 2011, the KNU and Myanmar semi-civilian government reached a preliminary ceasefire agreement on January 12, 2012 and, along with other seven ceasefire ethnic armed groups, the KNU became a signatory of the NCA on October 15, 2015.

As in the other conflict-affected ethnic territories across the country, many of the Karen- populated areas have been affected by the armed conflict, with often horrendous

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government counter-insurgency military operations since the KNU launched an armed revolution for an independent Karen State in 1949. The over-50-year-long armed resistance of the Karen armed groups severely affected most Karen-populated areas. Even after years of KNU ceasefire, many of the Karen-populated areas remained under intense militarisation and insecurity. These have had profound effects on political, social, and economic conditions and have had vast humanitarian effects in many of the Karen- populated areas. Many people faced systematic terror, including arbitrary arrest and intimidation, sexual abuse, extra-judiciary killings, and forced relocation. Hundreds of thousands of Karen people have been displaced, mutilated, and killed as both direct and indirect effects of the prolonged civil war. Thousands were forced to escape into the mountainous jungles and roam around without adequate food, shelter, or reliable medical attention. Many struggled to make their way to the refugee camps at the Myanmar-Thai border. From the early-1980s, over 150,000 Karen refugees fled into Thailand in successive waves. According to data from The Border Consortium (TBC) in 2012,64 an estimated over 400,000 Karen peoples were internally displaced in the mountainous hill tracts in south-eastern Kayin State and along the Myanmar-Thai borderland.

3.2.2. Mon-populated areas

The population of the Mons who are located along the eastern coastal line of the Gulf of Martaban and Andaman Sea, south-western Kayin State, north-western Tanintharyi Region, and neighbouring Thailand, is currently estimated to be between one-and-a-half million to two million.65 The Myanmar military regime carved out the current Mon State from the Tanintharyi Region (then the Tenasserim Division) in 1974. The Mon civilisation was established in the first millennium Common Era66 in Southern Myanmar

64 The Border Consortium (TBC), Changing Realities: Poverty and Displacement in South East Burma/Myanmar, accessed July 31, 2016, http://www.theborderconsortium.org/media/10374/report- 2012-idp-en-1-.pdf 65 Scholars estimate the population of the Mons at one million to two million people. See, for example, Ashley South, “Mon Nationalist Movements: Insurgency, Ceasefire and Political Struggle,” in Seminar on Discovery of Ramanndesa: Mon History, Identity, Language and Performing Arts (Bangkok, Thailand: The Mon Unity League, 2007). In 2013, the Government Administration Department of Mon State counted 1.9 million people. 66 See, for example, Emmanuel Guillon, The Mons: A Civilization of Southeast Asia (Bangkok, Thailand: The Siam Society, 1999); C. O. Blagden, “The Chronicles of Pegu: A Text in the Mon Language,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland (1907); Lieberman,

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and Thailand and played a principal role in the transmission of Theravada Buddhism and Indianised political culture to mainland Southeast Asia.67 However, mainly due to the negligence of the colonial administration, the established Mon culture and language significantly eroded during more than a century of British rule.68

Contemporary Mon nationalism began to ferment in the late 1930s and culminated into social and political associations through which the armed insurrection of the Mons originated. At the onset of Myanmar’s independence from Britain, grievances over political discrimination, violent repression and sociocultural exclusion saw the League of Mon National Affairs led an armed revolution in August 1948, within eight months of the country’s independence.69 While factionalism impaired the early years of armed struggle, the group mobilised and organised the dacoits and rural peasantry as its fighting forces. In 1954, as senior politicians joined the group and connected with Mon communities in Thailand, the Mon armed group eventually formed into the revolutionary organisation the Mon People’s Front (MPF). The party became the first armed ethnic organisation to explicitly demand the independent sovereign state of the Mons. In July 1958, the MPF signed a ceasefire with the AFPFL government and surrendered its arms together with over 1,000 fighting forces under the name of ‘arms in exchange for democracy’. However, one of its leaders, Nai Shwe Kyin, rejected the decision and re-established a new Mon armed resistance organisation, the NMSP, soon after the capitulation of MPF.

The NMSP adopted a separatist stance and formed the Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA) in 1971 as many of the surrendered leaders of the MPF re-joined the party. While the party was struggling with the tumultuous internal divisions, with the broad support of the Mon communities it was able to control and contest in the large sections of Mon-populated areas in Mon State, Kayin State, and Tanintharyi Region. The 1970s

“Ethnic Politics in Eighteenth-Century Burma”; Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 32. 67 George Cœdès, The Indianized States of Southeast Asia (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1968); South, “Mon Nationalist Movements: Insurgency, Ceasefire and Political Struggle,” 283; Patrick McCormick, “The Position of the Rājāvaṁsa Katnā in Mon History-Telling,” Journal of Burma Studies 15, no. 2 (2011): 283. 68 See, for example, Ashley South, Mon Nationalism and Civil War in Burma: The Golden Sheldrake (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2005).

69 See also, နုိင္ ဳံ ွ၊ မငန္၀မခ်ိန ွနလငတ္ေနမွက္မ္ေတွ္လ န္ေရနန တ္တသ္ မုိင္န၊ (ရန္ကုန္၊ ဳန္နေ ေ ၊ ိ ္၄)၊ ွ၄-ွ၈။ [Nai Hanthar, History of Mon National Liberation [in Bamar] (Yangon, Panwaiwai, 2014), 34–38.]

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armed insurgency of the Parliament Democracy Party led by the ousted Prime Minister U Nu that operated in the Karen- and Mon-controlled areas was also a significant support to the Mon armed party.70 Throughout the early 1990s, despite an increase in military activity by the government Army, the NMSP still controlled most of the rural Mon- populated areas and contested the major roads in Mon State and Northern Tanintharyi Region even after the fall of its Headquarters at Three Pagoda Pass area in 1990. NMSP reached the ceasefire agreement with the SPDC regime in June 29, 1995. The ceasefire granted the party 12 cantonments in its former stronghold Mon-populated areas in Mon State, Kayin State, and Tanintharyi Region. Although the relationship between the government and Myanmar Army and the NMSP was, at times, troublesome, the ceasefire has held for over 20 years. Conversely, since after the ceasefire, some splinter groups splintered from NMSP, including the Mon Army Myeik District, Mon Peace Group and the Honsawatoi Restoration Party. Most of the splinter groups concentrated in the remote Ye and Yebyu Townships entered into separate ceasefire agreements after a few clashes with the Myanmar Army. There were also some small anti-ceasefire groups that turned into local militia groups. However, none of the groups was in the position of holding specific base areas and engaging in active armed conflict in the areas. Similar to the Karen society, as the conflict-affected areas of Mon population transcended beyond the territory of Mon State, this study uses the term Mon-populated areas to denote them.

Although it was mostly low in intensity, civil war in Mon-populated areas resulted in a devastating human cost and severely damaged socioeconomic conditions. Rights violations, refugees, IDPs, and cross-border criminal activities such as human trafficking, illegal migrant labouring, illicit drug production, and trafficking were rampant in the areas. The spread of preventable diseases such as tuberculosis, malaria and HIV/AIDS intensified during the period of intense fighting. From the late 1980s, the displacement of civilians in Mon-populated areas began. By 1990, approximately 10,000 refugees fled to Thailand and some 35,000 were displaced in the NMSP-controlled areas in eastern Ye Township. Moreover, because of the continued militarisation of the Myanmar Army, some 20,000 more were displaced in the area even after the ceasefire of NMSP. One year

70 Nai Layehtaw Suvannabhum (former NMSP leader), interview by the author, June 30, 2017, Canberra, Australia; Nai Pe Thein Hzil (former NMSP leader), interview by the author, October 28, 2017, Canberra, Australia.

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after the NMSP ceasefire, most of the refugees living in camps in Thailand returned; however, it was in a less voluntary manner. For some years, many of the returnees remained displaced in the three NMSP-controlled areas near the Thai border, eastern Ye Township, and northern Yebyu Township. As both sides could manage to avoid an outright armed clash, most Mon IDPs gradually resettled in towns and larger villages, while some chose to resettle permanently at their displaced areas

Chapter 4: The Effects of Ceasefire on ‘Stateness’

Chapter 4. The Effects of Ceasefire on ‘Stateness’

Introduction

The analytical framework in Chapter 2 demonstrate that, after the concept of ‘stateness’ received academic attention in the 1990s, most scholars focusing on state-centred, empirical research on democratisation observed that a robust and functioning state is an indispensable condition for the process of democratisation to be successful. Many argue that a capable and legitimate state or a state with an adequate stateness is a necessary condition for democratisation, as it is evidently essential in developing the major arenas of democratic governance such as the rule of law, political society, civil society, and economic society.1 Similarly, some also suggest that stateness is an essential requisite to achieve the major attributes of democracy (i.e., electoral rights, political liberties, the rule of law, and social rights).2 There has also been increasing academic agreement on the positive causal relationship between the stateness and outcome of a democratisation process. Although the exact definition of stateness remains contested, there is broad agreement among scholars that the degree of stateness has a strong positive causal relationship with the level of success of democratic transition.3

1 See, for example, Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, 7, 18. 2 See, for example, Møller and Skaaning, “Stateness First?,” 16; Andersen, Møller, and Skaaning, “The State–Democracy Nexus: Conceptual Distinctions, Theoretical Perspectives, and Comparative Approaches,” 1203. 3 While proving the positive and powerful relationship between stateness and the level of democracy, Michael Bratton and Eric Chang also concede that a legitimate and capable state is a precondition for a successful democratic transition. Defining the term ‘state’ as ‘a set of political institutions that exercise authority over a territory, make and execute policies, extract and distribute revenue, produce public goods, and maintain order by wielding an effective monopoly over the means of violence’, Larry Diamond argues that “[b]efore a country can have a democratic state, it must first have a state”. Likewise, operationalising the major task of state-building as the creation of a government that is capable of monopolising the use of legitimate power and enforcing rules throughout the territory of a country, Francis Fukuyama also acknowledges the necessity of a ‘legitimate and durable state’ before it can become a democratic state. Bunce, “Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations”; Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies; Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens, “The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory, and Social Dimensions”; Robert R. Kaufman, “Approaches to the Study of State Reform in Latin American and Postsocialist Countries,” ibid.31 (1999); Przeworski, Sustainable Democracy; Tilly, Democracy;

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This chapter traces the historical development of stateness in Mon- and Karen-populated areas. The first section sets the stage by describing the situation of stateness in both Karen- and Mon-populated areas during the all-out civil war. The second and third sections compare and contrast the relevant changes in Mon- and Karen-populated areas from 1995 to beyond the national liberalisation process of the country in 2011 when the NMSP had a stable ceasefire with the government, while the KNU did not. In line with dominant definitions, the thesis considers three main dimensions of stateness: 1) enforcement capacity, measured in the presence of security forces; 2) administrative capacity, measured as the reach, functionality, and efficacy of the administration and taxation institutions, and 3) infrastructure capacity measured as the capability of both social infrastructure (particularly State health care and education services) and physical infrastructure (especially transportation, electrification, and telecommunication facilities) of Myanmar State.

In doing so, this chapter first investigates the changes that took place in the presence of security forces as the enforcement capacity of the state and, second, the stability and effectiveness of the local administrative institutions and the effectiveness of the local taxation system as the administrative capacity of the state. Finally, it examines the changes in social infrastructure and physical infrastructure as the infrastructure capacity of the state of Myanmar in the societies under the study. The chapter traces the changing situations of these defining characteristics of the stateness in Karen- and Mon-populated areas during times of conflict, after the ceasefire agreement was reached between the NMSP and the government in 1995, and the stateness in Karen-populated areas before the KNU reach the ceasefire agreement with the government in 2012.

Larry Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States: Lessons and Challenges,” in The National Policy Forum on Terrorism, Security, and America’s Purpose (Washington D. C. : Stanford University, 2005); Fortin, “Is There a Necessary Condition for Democracy? The Role of State Capacity in Postcommunist Countries”.

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Measuring Stateness

Ever since Nettl introduced the concept in 1968, the task of measuring stateness has been laborious and controversial.4 It is evident that there is no commonly agreed standard to measure its different dimensions. During the past decades, scholars and international private, governmental, and non-governmental organisations5 have developed a wide variety of indicators from various aspects and dimensions of a state to measure different parameters of the stateness. The existing state-centred democratisation literature produces numerous attributes that claim to be related to the defining features of the state. Based on the agreed definitions, ‘enforcement capacity’6 can be operationalised as the strength and ‘reach’7 of the state’s institutions of coercion such as the military, police forces, courts, and prisons to make and maintain public order and enforce citizens to comply with the laws throughout the territory.8

Many scholars of stateness agree on the condition of ‘presence of security forces’ as an indicator of stateness9 and, at the same time, it is evidently responsive to the different situations of war and peace. The indicator also explains the fluctuating capacity of the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of force under different security situations, at war times and during the ceasefire periods. To investigate the effects of a ceasefire on the ‘enforcement capacity’, the thesis first examines the changes in ‘the presence of security

4 See also Giovanni Carbone and Vincenzo Memoli, “Does Democratization Foster State Consolidation? Democratic Rule, Political Order, and Administrative Capacity,” Governance 28, no. 1 (2015). 5 These include the list of basic state functions and the Worldwide Governance Indicators of The World Bank, the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, Human Development Index of United Nations Development Programme, the Indicators for the Fragile States of the Fund for Peace, the privately examined International Country Risk Guide and many others. 6 Elsewhere, Michael Mann calls it ‘despotic power’. 7 See Hillel Soifer, “Authority over Distance: Explaining Variation in State Infrastructural Power in Latin America” (Harvard University, 2006), 5; Vivienne Shue, The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). 8 Francis Fukuyama even emphasises that “the essence of stateness is enforcement”. Fukuyama, “The Imperative of State-Building,” 21. Andersen suggests that to be a capable state, the state must possess “superiority in strength relative to all other societal groups combined”. Andersen, “Stateness and Democratic Stability,” 40. 9 See, for example, Bäck and Hadenius, “Democracy and State Capacity: Exploring a J-Shaped Relationship,” 3. See also Soifer, “Authority over Distance: Explaining Variation in State Infrastructural Power in Latin America”.

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forces’ in the conflict-affected communities under scrutiny. Moreover, scholars agree that the aptitude of administrative bodies to execute day-to-day administrative functions is an essential element of stateness.10 This administrative capacity is vital in exercising operative administration and providing public goods, human development, and the economic growth of a state. As succinctly operationalised by Francis Fukuyama, the capability of administrative institutions to penetrate and rule on regulations and formulate and implement policies corresponding to the public goods within the territory is its ‘administrative capacity’.11 In this sense, many consider an aspect of administrative capacity to be the capability of the civil administration to formulate and execute policies to provide social services responsively and efficiently across the country’s territory.12 Hence, the study will next observe the functionality of local administrative institutions, particularly village administrations.

From the capacity-related conception, scholars suggest that ‘extractive capacity’ or the ability for revenue extraction is also an element of coercive power of the state. 13 This ability to collect taxes “in a sustained and efficient manner” could be accomplished only when the state has effective control over the territory.14 The key feature of taxation of a sovereign state is not just a source of major revenue for governments, it is also an indication of stateness that delineates the relationship between the government and its citizens such as enforcement capacity and dignity of the government.15 Since this function

10 See, for example, Fortin-Rittberger, “Exploring the Relationship between Infrastructural and Coercive State Capacity,” 1249. 11 Fukuyama defines the administrative capacity of the state as “the strength of state power, which has to do with the ability of states to plan and execute policies, and to enforce laws cleanly and transparently”. See Fukuyama, “The Imperative of State-Building,” 21. 12 For example, Bäck and Hadenius, “Democracy and State Capacity: Exploring a J-Shaped Relationship,” 3. See also Andersen, “Stateness and Democratic Stability,” 42. 13 Fortin-Rittberger, “Exploring the Relationship between Infrastructural and Coercive State Capacity,” 1248. 14 Ibid. See also Jeffrey Ira Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 15 See, for example, W. Elliot Brownlee, Federal Taxation in America: A Short History (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1996); Joel S. Migdal, Vivienne Shue, and Atul Kohli, State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Jose Antonio Cheibub, “Political Regimes and the Extractive Capacity of Governments: Taxation in Democracies and Dictatorships,” World Politics 50, no. 3 (1998); and “Tax System in Burma (Myanmar),” Asia Trade Hub, accessed 11 May, 2017, http:// www.asiatradehub.com/burma/general.asp

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of the state has to be administered by local administrative bodies, this study also examines the capacity of taxation of the state at the local entities16.

Complementary to the coercive power of the state, the established literature on democratisation agrees that ‘infrastructure capacity’ of a state is an integral part of stateness.17 In measuring the infrastructural capacity of the state, the quality and effectiveness of public goods provision is often used.18 At the same time, the capability, reach, and performance of state infrastructures in delivering public goods are visibly responsive to the different situations of war and peace, particularly in communities affected by civil war. Therefore, this study investigates the capacity of ‘social infrastructures’ and ‘physical infrastructures’ separately. Among numerous public goods, health, and education are the most noticeable social infrastructure and public transportation, electrification, and communication are the most visible physical infrastructure of a state. Thus, this thesis observes the changes that take place in these sectors in the conflict-affected Karen- and Mon-populated areas.

Nevertheless, during the period of this study, since various dimensions of the state of Myanmar were oppressive, exploitative, predatory, and militarised, the improvement in stateness during the ceasefire period did not bring about better public order to conflict- affected communities. In most of the government-controlled areas under ceasefire, other non-state armed groups (at least a few small splinter groups in the case of Mon-populated areas) are still at war and the draconian counter-insurgency strategy and predatory acts of the state military and administrative agencies have increased. The security forces of the state often treated the populations in the areas as hostages and harshly forced them to provide military porters, free labour, cash, and foodstuffs. With no other alternative, in many cases, a significant proportion of the population fled the state in desperation even

16 See, for example, Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” in The Formation of National States in Western Europe, edited by Charles Tilly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 50. 17 See, for example, Fortin-Rittberger, “Exploring the Relationship between Infrastructural and Coercive State Capacity,” 1245. See also, Michael Mann, “Infrastructural Power Revisited,” Studies in Comparative International Development 43, no. 3 (2008); and, The Sources of Social Power Volume 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760–1914 (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 59. 18 See, for example, Fortin-Rittberger, “Exploring the Relationship between Infrastructural and Coercive State Capacity,” 1248; Sebastián L. Mazzuca and Gerardo L. Munck, “State or Democracy First? Alternative Perspectives on the State–Democracy Nexus,” ibid.

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during the ceasefire periods. Nonetheless, as will be shown in the following sessions, the improvement in stateness of even such a repressive, predatory state is a necessary condition for the other aspects of stateness, particularly effective administrative and infrastructural capability. Similarly, the increased coverage and reach of the government’s social and physical infrastructures in many areas under ceasefire did not necessarily improve the accessibility and quality of the services. The public goods provision system of the state of Myanmar as a whole remained ineffectual, inadequate, corrupt, and predatory. Conversely, for decades, for the populations living in conflict- affected areas, the parallel social service systems of non-state service providers have been the only locally available humanitarian and basic social services. At the same time, as was the case in Mon communities in the ceasefire zones, social services provided by the state of Myanmar were minimal and ineffectual. Thus, the replacement of services provided by non-state actors with that of the ineffectual and deprived state service provision system could not be perceived as an improvement in the capacity of social infrastructure. Hence, the thesis perceives the prospects for the convergence and synergism of the state and non-state social service provision systems as the progress.

Stateness in Mon- and Karen-Populated Areas during the Civil War

4.3.1. Enforcement capacity

(a) The military

Throughout the civil war, the presence of the Myanmar military in the conflict-affected ethnic-populated areas had been apparently weak. Fractured by racial and political affiliations, the Myanmar security forces at the onset of civil war were “weak, small and disunited”.19 Because various ideological and ethnic separatist groups took up arms against the state20 and a significant proportion of the government Army battalions

19 Maung Aung Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forced Since 1948 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 47. In the beginning, the Myanmar military had only 15 infantry battalions operating under the command of two regional military commands, an infantry division and an infantry brigade. Ibid., 76. 20 Between mid-1948 and the late-1950s, the Communists, PVO, Army mutineers, KNDO, and other ethnic rebels captured 31 cities and towns in the central lowland and the ethnic populated peripheries. See Hugh Tinker, The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Years of Independence, 4th ed. (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, 1967), 45.

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mutinied simultaneously,21 the presence of the government security force was largely limited to the urban areas of cities and large towns in central lowland Myanmar. The presence of government security forces in both Karen- and Mon-populated areas was, as described by Andrew Selth, “essentially a lightly armed infantry forces configured for regime protection and the conduct of counter-insurgency operations”.22 In 1949, even after the troops of Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO) and Mon National Defence Organisation (MNDO)23 occupied most of the cities and towns24 in Karen, Mon, and Tanintharyi regions, there was no permanent military base in the areas. Only a year later, in 1950, the No. 3 Infantry Brigade of the earlier Myanmar Army was established to protect both Bago, the city located 90 km north-east of the capital city Yangon and Hpa-an, the largest town in Karen-populated area, which became the capital city of Kayin State in 1952. The setting up of No. 5 Infantry Brigade in Mawlamyine, the third-largest provincial city of the country, was only completed in 1951. Moreover, because most of the recruits came from the inexperienced and unruly veterans of the anti-Japanese fascist movement at the end of the Second World War, the hasty formation of the Union Military Police and Sitwundans Corps (the territorial military units) did not help to improve the enforcement capacity of the state in the areas. Even when the government military completed the establishment of all 13 infantry brigades in 1957, the presence of the military in Karen- and Mon-populated areas remained significantly low.

Since the early-1960s, when the central state of Myanmar restored order at the centre and started asserting controls towards the periphery ethnic minority areas, most of the towns in both Kayin and Mon States began seeing the permanent presence of the government military. However, until additional counter-insurgency striking forces were set up in the towns surrounded by the rebel-controlled or contested areas in the early 1980s, the presence of government military in both Mon- and Karen-populated areas remained insufficient. In October 1961, along with four other regional commands, the Southeast Command was established in suburban Mawlamyine as one of the country’s reconstituted

21 Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since 1948, 47. 22 See, for example, Andrew Selth, “Known Knowns and Known Unknowns: Measuring Myanmar’s Military Capabilities,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 31, no. 2 (2009): 286. 23 The earlier Karen and Mon armed separatist armies. 24 The KNDO troops occupied Papun, Hlaingbwe, and Kawkareik towns until 1953 and, together with the MNDO, briefly captured Malamyine the capital city of the then Tanintharyi Division.

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Regional Military Commands (RMCs).25 For almost two decades, it was the only regional military command to cover both Karen- and Mon-populated areas in the south-eastern Myanmar.26 Although the RMC was supposed to command 10 Infantry Battalions (IBs), the Mon-populated area had only three IBs (No. 62, No. 31, and No. 61 IBs), stationed at Mudon, Thanbyuzayat, and Ye Town that were located 29 km, 66 km, and over 150 km, respectively, to the south of Mawlamyine. Until the early 1980s, there has been no permanent military base or outpost to the south of Thanbyuzayat Town. Almost two decades later in 1979, the Light Infantry Division (LID) No. 44, as an additional counter- insurgency striking force, was established at Thaton, the second district-level capital of Mon State. LID No. 22 was set up in Hpa-an in 1987, almost a decade later. The areas of operation of both LIDs were mainly the rebel-controlled and contested areas in Kayin State. In the lowland Mon- and Karen-populated areas, the affiliated IBs of the Southeast RMC were stationed in the cities and towns of government strongholds and the additional counter-insurgency LIBs of the No. 44 and No. 22 LIDs were based in the smaller towns that were under perpetual contestation or threat by rebel troops.27

Until the early-1990s, the troops of the KNU and NMSP effectively controlled most of the rural villages and suburbs of the cities and towns in Karen- and Mon-populated areas. While the IBs of the Southeast RMC were usually attentive on the consolidation of the base areas, protecting urban areas, and providing security to the government authorities, the LIBs under the command of the LID mainly operated around the outskirts of their base towns and villages as counter-insurgency striking forces. For instance, while No. 2 Kachin Rifle was the only infantry battalion stationed at Hpa-an and provided security for the government authorities until the mid-1970s, the No. 44 LID was able to establish

25 The RMC was reconstituted in 1961 by reorganising the No. 3 Brigade (Bago/Hpa-an), No. 5 Brigade (Mawlamyine) and No. 13 Brigade (Pyay) into the Infantry Battalions. 26 Karen State was established by a constitutional amendment during the parliamentary democracy rule of the AFPFL government in 1951. Mon State was created by the BSPP Government of General Ne Win in 1974 by carving out the northern portion of the Tanintharyi Division. Before then, the majority of the current Mon State was administratively under the Tanintharyi Division. 27 As with the other six Divisions of the Myanmar Army, both LIDs consisted of 10 LIBs as basic manoeuvring and fighting units with around 500 or fewer men each, despite the fact all infantry battalions were supposed to be manned with 777 army personnel. Regarding the structure, order of battle and other information on Myanmar military, see Tin Maung Maung Than, “Burma’s National Security and Defence Posture,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 11, no. 1 (1989); and Andrew Selth, “Transforming the Tatmadaw: The Burmese Armed Forces Since 1988” (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1996).

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its No. 28 LIB in Hlaingbwe Town, 48 km southeast of Hpa-an only two decades later. For decades, local cities, towns, and villages in the government-controlled areas rarely saw the Myanmar military in its combatant form, whereas the populations living in the government rebel-contested and rebel-controlled villages annually saw the so-called ‘open season offensive’ of the government military in post-monsoon harvesting times. Further, although the LIBs were able to operate around the outskirts of their base towns, for decades, the rural suburbs remained under the perpetual contestation from rebel troops.28 Until the late 1980s, there were no permanent military bases or outposts in any of the other five towns of Kayin State nor in the thousands of villages dotted around the countryside.

In addition, the ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) benefited from the economic mismanagement of the Myanmar Socialist government and this resulted in the significant expansion of the reach of rebel troops. As Fearon and Laitin argue, because the successive military regimes were “badly financed, organisationally inept, corrupt, politically divided, and poorly informed about goings-on”, the EAOs survived and prospered.29 Until the early 1990s, all the towns in Karen-populated areas including the capital city Hpa-an were under continuous threat from KNLA forces. The troops of KNLA were active not only in the rural villages but also around the suburbs of all the Karen towns, often intruding into the towns and the capital city, Hpa-an. KNLA artillery units also bombarded cities and towns from afar and often burned them down. KNLA artillery forces repeatedly shelled the Karen capital city in 1976, 1978, 1985 and 1987, although often without accuracy.30 Further, in response to the government’s notorious scorched

28 For example, while the population in Kayin State had rarely seen the military operation of the Kachin Rifles, the maximum reach of the army companies of the No. 28 LIB was limited to the outskirts of its base town Hlaingbwe. A country director of an INGO (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, January 21, 2017, Yangon; Village elders and mid-career villagers, in discussion with the author, March 10, 2016, Hlaingbwe Town, Kayin State. Similarly, villagers rarely saw the combat activity of the military outpost at Ahnankwin Village, Kyarinnseikgyi Township, a contested area of both KNLA and MNLA troops. Nai Layehtaw Suvannabhum (former NMSP leader), interview by the author, June 30, 2017, Canberra, Australia. 29 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 80. 30 In 1985, for instance, instead of hitting the targeted garrison of the government military base, most of the KNLA shelling landed inside the adjacent farmyard and Hpa-an College campus, killing a few civilians including the Dean of the College. A country director of an INGO (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, January 21, 2017, Yangon; a leader of Karen political party, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State.

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earth counter-insurgency strategy of ‘four cuts’, or hpyart-lay-hpyart,31 the KNLA imposed the ‘five kills’, or thart-ngar-thart,32 policy and threatened the government military, officials of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), and members of administrative councils, paramilitary, and civilian staff. In 1983, the KNLA forces bombarded and burned down Hlaingbwe Town in the presence of the LIB No. 28 and threatened to bombard the capital city Hpa-an in the following weeks.33

At the same time, most of the government’s efforts to increase the presence of security forces in rebel-contested and -controlled areas through large-scale military offensives had been proven unproductive. Most military offensives during the 1970s to the early 1980s were unsuccessful, while some were aborted. Moreover, these major offensives also drained the scarce resources of the Myanmar Socialist government, while maintaining the occupied rebel bases was difficult and, in many cases, these were lost back to the rebel forces in a short period. For instance, after establishing the LID No. 44 and its affiliated LIBs, the Myanmar Socialist government launched a major offensive against the KNU in 1983–84. With the highly propagated massive anti-insurgency mass movement of the BSPP and the forced order by the People’s Council (the local administrative branch of the BSPP government) for each household to contribute one man, the military offensive involved tens of thousands of civilians, mainly as military porters.34 In 1984, through orchestrated infantry and artillery strikes the government troops eventually expelled the

31 The ‘four cut’ or hpyat-lay-hpyat in Bamar language was a counter-guerrilla warfare strategy used by the Myanmar military in connection with the so called ‘people’s war doctrine’ since 1968. It included cutting the food supply, funds, information (intelligence) to rebel organisations and cutting off the heads of the insurgents. Regarding the fourth cut, most scholars suggest the new recruits of the rebel organisations. However, based on a document of the Directorate of Defence Service Intelligence, Maung Aung Myoe explains the people’s participation in the counter-insurgency campaigns, particularly in the encirclement of insurgent forces. See Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forced Since 1948, 25–26. 32 KNU’s five kills includes killing high-ranking officials and members of BSPP, People’s Council, the Police force, People’s Militia, and government civil servants. A country director of an INGO (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, January 21, 2017, Yangon. 33 Many Hpa-an city dwellers reportedly abandoned their hometown at that time. A director of a Strategic Study Institute (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon; A leader of Karen political party, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 34 A country director of an INGO (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, January 21, 2017, Yangon.

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KNLA troops from their Wakha and Maethawal base camps.35 However, the occupying troops found themselves encircled by the rebel troops as soon as the highly coordinated and publicised offensive was over. Left alone to continue their military operations, the persisting guerrilla attacks and unidentifiable improvised landmines strictly constrained the government troops from finding food sources in the resource-rich Karen tropical jungle. As the KNLA troops could effectively cut off the government military’s supply lines, the government soldiers in the occupied camps had to collect wild plants around their camps for food and drink water collected by towels soaked with snow at night.36 The logistics capability of the Myanmar military was notoriously problematic.37 A year later, the government troops had to withdraw from the occupied KNU base camps.

Similarly, all the military offensives launched in 1972, 1980, and 1984 to occupy the Wereru Headquarters of NMSP at Namtkake near the Thai border never reached the targeted area.38 Similarly, many of the government military’s major offensives in the aftermath of the 1988 pro-democracy uprising also cost exorbitant resources, while sustaining the occupied rebel strongholds proved difficult under the unrelenting infiltration and attacks by the defeated rebels. In 1994, after serious fighting for months and with a massive loss of men, arms, ammunition, and civilian lives, the government military eventually occupied the Kyaikdon Base camp of KNLA 6th Brigade in Kyarinnseikgyi Township. Although the military was able to set up a frontline Strategic Command that coordinated a few IBs, maintaining the base cost the Army massive resources. While the military command had to rely only on the heavily guarded supply line for its food, arms and ammunition, its military activities were severely restricted by the surrounding KNLA forces.39 As most of the highways, railways, waterways, and village connecting routes were under continual attack by the rebel troops, all military

35 A former Myanmar Army Battalion Commander, interview by the author, March 24, 2017, Mawlamyine. 36 A former Myanmar Army Lieutenant (who was at the camp until the retreat), interview by the author, April 1, 2017, Yangon. 37 For a more detailed description on the logistic capability of the military, see Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forced Since 1948, 201. 38 The 1980 offensive was aborted on 28 April after 28 days of guerrilla resistance by the MNLA troops. Nai Layehtaw Suvannabhum (former NMSP leader), interview by the author, June 30, 2017, Canberra, Australia. 39 A former Myanmar Army Battalion Commander, interview by the author, March 24, 2017, Mawlamyine .

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movements required extensive security arrangements. On the mostly deserted 160 km, single-lane Mawlamyine-Ye road, people rarely saw the heavily guarded military convoys that were the only supply line for the government troops deployed at the war front of insurgent areas, crawling from one remote town to another.40

During periods of intense fighting, although government troops often attacked villages along their marching routes and committed war atrocities and human rights violations against the civilian populations, they rarely stayed in the villages for long. Village elders from formerly contested areas of the NMSP interviewed for this project unanimously stated that, until the ceasefire, there were no permanent military outposts in their villages. Many said that even during the yearly open season military operations, the villagers only needed to hide their paddy and livestock and vacate to an adjacent village or jungle for a few days, until the government troops moved on.41 Moreover, even at the peak of the massive modernisation and expansion of the Myanmar armed forces during the first half of the 1990s,42 the armed resistance of KNU and NMSP effectively deterred most new military establishment in their contested areas. As a result, while a few new battalions were garrisoned in the government stronghold cities and towns, the government military could not establish new military bases close to the rebel-contested or -controlled areas. Before the ceasefire, no new military battalion was set up in the rebel-controlled and - contested Karen- and Mon-populated areas and the presence of the government military remained significantly low.

(b) Police force

Meanwhile, due to improvised resources and being poorly organised and unprofessional in the execution of its civilian protection and law enforcement duties, the Myanmar Police Force played only a trivial role in maintaining internal security and largely failed to

40 Former village heads and elders, interview by and in discussion with the author, March 12–20, 2017, Sonatha, Tmawtkaning, Lamine, Arutoung village, and Ye Town, Ye Township, Mon State. 41 This could be because the military wanted to keep information about their movements secret and complete their seasonal counter-insurgency operations on time or earlier. In some cases, commanders of the government troops even secretly contacted and often reached an informal ‘understanding’ with the rebel commanders active in their operation areas to vacate during the period of their operation so that both sides could avoid armed confrontation and battle casualties. Former Sergeant Major of MNLA Battalion No. 333, interviewed by the author, February 27, 2016, Ying Dein village, Ye Township, Mon State. 42 For further details, see Andrew Selth, “The Myanmar Army Since 1988: Acquisitions and Adjustments,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 17, no. 3 (1995).

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deliver its obligations as a government enforcement institution of law and order. As a subordinate organisation of the military, the Myanmar Police Force virtually lost the status of an independent state apparatus of coercion. Established by the British colonial as the ‘Burma Police’ in 1891, the Myanmar Police Force was a major state apparatus of coercion during the colonial time and the initial years of the country’s independence. However, as the country’s armed forces became stronger and better organised in the first decades of the post-independence civil war, the military became increasingly dominant in the management of the country’s domestic affairs and, effectually took over the major responsibilities of the civilian police force. Further, following the military coup d’état in 1962, the Myanmar military became increasingly involved in enforcing the law, maintaining order and suppressing civil unrest in both urban and rural centres. For more than half a century, references about the coercive state apparatus of Myanmar State were naturally understood to mean the Myanmar military forces.43 Despite being reformed as the ‘People Police Force’ in 1964, it has continued to be a separate armed institution answering to the military.

Although the police force was involved in fighting crime in the cities and towns of the government stronghold lowland central Myanmar, the Karen and Mon populations living in the rebel-contested and -controlled areas rarely saw such activities. Since the major operational areas of the police force were largely limited to cities and towns, the presence of the police force in its capacity of domestic security and law enforcement institution in Mon and Karen villages were limited. Moreover, even after it was renamed as the ‘Myanmar Police Force’ and assigned to more important responsibilities in the country’s domestic affairs in 1995, the public presence of the police force in the rural Mon- and Karen-populated areas was limited to around the township-level courtyards. Throughout the prolonged civil war, there was only one police station in each of the 10 towns of Mon State, some of which dated back to the colonial time.44 The successive Myanmar Government could only deploy a few police sub-stations and outposts manned with police personnel and low rankers in a few large villages. Until the late 1990s, there were few

43 Andrew Selth, “Myanmar's Police Forces: Coercion, Continuity and Change,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 34, no. 1 (2012): 54. 44 The police station at Mudon Town has been the only police station in the township since the colonial period in 1902.

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police outposts even in the villages in the government stronghold Mon-populated areas and no such police outposts in Karen villages in the war-affected areas.

In addition, being poorly manned and equipped, the Myanmar Police Force was in a vulnerable position in the areas under insurgencies and, thus, was rarely involved in maintaining order in the conflict-affected zones. After being attacked in several locations in Mon and Kayin States in the 1970s and 1980s, the Ministry of Home Affairs repositioned virtually all the police stations and outposts inside the towns or villages proper, mostly inside or near the compounds of the combined township offices or close to a military establishment. For example, in most of the towns in the contested areas in Kayin and Mon States, such as Ye, Paung, Beelinn, and Kawkareik, all the police stations were situated inside the compound of the combined government offices. The Kamarwet Village police outpost was moved to adjacent the garrison town of the LIB No. 209 after the attack of MNLA troops in the late 1980s. Throughout the civil war, the presence of the police force remained weak and ineffectual as a security force of the Myanmar state across the contested and rebel-controlled Karen- and Mon-populated areas.

4.3.2. Administrative capacity

(a) Administration

Throughout the civil war, the functionality and effectiveness of the state administrative organs in the conflict-affected Karen- and Mon-populated areas remained unstable. The presence of the state security forces was weak in the rebel-contested and stronghold areas; hence, the central state of Myanmar could not establish stable administrative set-ups in most areas. Along with the township sectorial departments of the Cabinet Ministries, the government General Administration Department (GAD) under the Ministry of Home Affairs forms the backbone of administration from Central through to States or Division/Regions, to Districts and Townships. The GAD mainly oversees the administrative functions and delivers public services in government-controlled areas, although these are mostly under-resourced. The lowest level of government administration accountable to the chain of command of the central authority is Township. The township-level administration acts as management and coordination hubs of government public service delivery and administers the decisions and policies of the government. At the same time, together with the enforcement of the armed forces, they

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also collect a few types of taxes and fulfil the demands of central and sub-national authorities. At the bottom level of the administrative hierarchy, the head of village tracts (a group or cluster of three to six villages) and the individual villages are the most important agents acting as the interface between the state of Myanmar and citizens at the community level. Although they are not staff of the government GAD, the village heads or administrators are effectually an extension of the township-level administration, because they operate under the direct supervision of the department. Throughout the military rule, state authorities were appointing village administrators on a patron–client basis.

Given the temporary presence and deployment of government troops and the virtual lack of police forces in the rebel-contested and stronghold areas, the government’s local administrative authorities refrained from implementing their duties in the areas. The government-installed village heads rarely ruled the villages in the absence of adequate military presence. The township officials appeared in such jurisdictions only along with the Army columns, particularly during the annual open season operations. This was mainly for the in-kind tax collection of the newly harvested crops or recollecting farming credits. Because government village heads worry about their security after the departure of the military and the township authorities, they neither dare to provide security nor community needs-related information to their higher-level officials. In reality, the village head could only implement the non-security-related instructions of their superiors, such as requesting assistance for the village school or repairing village roads. Besides, the government administrative authorities of both townships and village tracts could not effectively exert their rules on the population supposed to be under their jurisdictions. In addition, given the inconsistent presence of security forces, rebel troops often attacked and interrupted the activities of the township-level departmental officials. Throughout the 1980s, for instance, MNLA troops often attacked the paddy-collecting stations of the government’s Myanmar Agriculture Produces Trading Corporation in their contested areas and sometimes even in the government-controlled areas.45

45 Village elders and farmers, interview by the author, March 14–16, 2017, Kamarwett, Nyaunggon, Hinnsone, Htinnyue, Arutoung Villages, Mudon and Ye Township, Mon State. As the villagers used to know ahead through their traditional sentinel networks and signalling systems the movements of army columns, they were mostly able to hide their agriculture produces and livestock and elude the forced crop buying of the government agencies. Ibid.

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Although the official title of ‘village head’ has changed from the colonial time to semi- civilian government, its roles and responsibilities have not changed much. The major responsibilities of village heads were to maintain and enforce law and order and, most importantly, to fulfil the demands of the higher-level authorities at war times, particularly those of the armed forces. The village headmen were the ones who had to collect taxes, recruit forced labourers, and military porters and report and identify anti-state activities and elements. Moreover, in addition to their primary tasks, the village heads also had to help, support, and organise service delivery of the government sectorial departments in their local jurisdictions, although they did not have the responsibility to deliver public services. In times of peace or low intensity conflicts, the village heads’ power to police, hear civil matters, mediate interpersonal disputes, and settle administrative and political matters with authority and respect, provided them power and prestige together with opportunities for economic and political privileges. However, as Christina Fink correctly puts it, whenever civil war becomes intense, the task of a village head becomes “a dangerous and thankless job”.46 The duty of managing different and, sometimes conflicting, demands of various rebel and government armies and persuading the villagers to comply with unpredictably volatile situations was never an easy task. In addition, the village heads themselves often become victims of war atrocities.

With the emergence of a patchwork of ethnic armed insurgencies following independence, the reach of the central state of Myanmar was largely limited to the urban propers of the country’s central lowland regions. By exploiting the weak presence and the lack of coordination among the Army battalions, the troops of EAOs were persistently active in the vacant areas in which the government security forces were unable to synchronise their presence.47 EAOs gained better access to their respective communities in the contested areas and operated as de facto governments and administered large swathes of territories across the ethnic-populated areas. Based on their personal charisma, incentives and violence, leaders of the EAOs organised their pocket armies and established parallel administrative systems in the local enclaves under their control.48

46 Christina Fink, “Militarization in Burma’s Ethnic States: Causes and Consequences,” Contemporary Politics 14, no. 4 (2008): 454. 47 Until the early 1980s, due to a lack of coordination and cooperation among the government RMCs and LIDs, cooperation was rare between the battalions on the ground. See Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forced Since 1948, 20. 48 See also South, “Burma’s Longest War: Anatomy of the Karen Conflict,” 22.

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Like the government administration, the EAOs developed a single-party-state style civil administration and established similar sectorial departments that deliver basic public services, such as education and healthcare. Both KNU and NMSP installed their hierarchy of administrations at central, district, township and village levels with administrators and committees. For example, the KNU established a modern bureaucratic state with a multi- layer administration and set up a government-like service delivering departments such as health, education, agriculture, forestry and mining.49

Similarly, the Administrative Department of the NMSP also oversees eight departments, including Revenue, Agriculture, Forestry, Education, and Health.50 In their strongholds and some of the contested areas, EAOs elected the administrators and associated committees for central to township levels in party conferences. However, the village chairperson or the ‘headman’ at the lowest layer of the one-party administration was normally appointed, although they were often selected with the agreement of the majority of the villagers.51 The rebel-appointed village heads also act as state-like authorities and collect taxes, recruit porters, assign the sentinels, and provide information to their patrons. However, unlike the government-appointed village heads, the village heads in the rebel- controlled areas rarely have to become involved in public service delivery. Through their local administrators, the KNU and NMSP also claimed the de facto legitimate authority and rights to extract taxes on the subjects living in their controlled and contested areas.52 Consequently, with numerous armed actors claiming the legitimate monopoly over the use of violence, exercising administrative functions, collecting taxes, and providing social services to the populations, the administrations in conflict-affected ethnic peripheries were confused and destabilised.

49 Mahn Nyein Maung, a top-level leader of KNU, interview by the author, January 19, 2017, Yangon; see also Kim Jolliffe, “Ethnic Armed Conflict and Territorial Administration in Myanmar” (Yangon: The Asia Foundation, 2015), 46–47. See also Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 391. 50 Nai Win Hla (member of CEC, NMSP), interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 51 Ibid. 52 For details of the administrative structure of the Karen free state of Kawthoolei of the KNU, see Ashley South, “Governance and Legitimacy in Karen State,” in Ruling Myanmar: From Cyclone Nargis to National Elections, edited by Nick Cheesman, Trevor Wilson, and Monique Skidmore (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 63.

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During the intensified periods of the war in the early 1990s, while the troops of MNLA and the KNLA exercised a regular presence in the government-controlled areas, various troops of government military also amplified their counter-insurgency operations and sustained their presence in the rebel-contested and -controlled areas. The striking reality was, although typically described as government-controlled, government-rebel-contested and rebel-controlled areas in the classification of the conflict-affected ethnic peripheries, the lines of territorial demarcation on the ground were rarely clear. Since all the government and different EAOs used to install a village head of their own in every single enclave within their reaches that were mostly overlapping,53 many villages in the areas had multiple authorities. As a result, under the vastly patrimonial wartime administrative system, village heads accused as acting as the agents or supporters of the others were arrested, tortured and killed by either side. Since the government military used to perceive all male villagers in the contested and rebel-based areas as rebel supporters, whenever the military operations intensified and the presence of military was prolonged, it was increasingly dangerous for villagers to take on the role of a village head.

At the same time, the village headmen, who tyrannised the villages and reported treacherous information to their superiors or government military were also removed or killed by the EAOs. In an attempt to resolve such issues of administrative instability, some village communities chose the village headman who could be accepted by all the different armed groups as well as the government military. At times of low intensity conflicts (i.e., the 1970s to the late 1980s), most of the government-appointed village headmen had either personal or family ties with the EAOs active in their areas.54 In some villages in the conflict zones in Kayin state, the villagers even selected women as their village heads riskily relying on the fact that it is culturally hard for a soldier to commit violence towards an elderly woman and the superiority of the feminine ability to plead.55

53 For a detailed explanation regarding the overlapping controlled areas of the armed groups, see ibid., 68–70. 54 A village elder (former village head), interview by the author, February 27, 2016, Kalawt Village, Ye Township, Mon State; Former village head, interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State; A local party leader of AMDP, interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Thanbyuzayart, Mon State. See also Susanne Kempel and Aung Thu Nyein, “Local Governance Dynamics in South East Myanmar” (Yangon: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation [SDC], 2014), 27. 55 Karen Human Rights Group, Dignity in the Shadow of Oppression: The Abuse and Agency of Karen Women under Militarisation (Mae Sot: Karen Human Rights Group, 2006), 66. Many Karen villagers

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However, although this strategy of the wise villagers temporarily helped to resolve the issue, whenever the war became intensified, the village headmen become the principal victims and this sabotaged the stability of the village communities. In many cases, the strategies of the village communities did not result as expected and the villages were left without a village head. Like the villages in the conflict-affected Mon villages, they were eventually destroyed or abandoned.56 The war between many armies caused the village headmen difficulties in ruling the community and, at the same time, satisfying the demands of all sides.57 Multiple authorities destabilised the administration and, thus, most of the village heads inevitably had to leave the villages over which they were presiding.

The instability in the village administration effectively weakened the lowest tier of the administrative authority and often totally exterminated the existence of the state at the community level. With the lack of even a skeletal administration, tens of thousands of villagers in the conflict-affected areas had to abandon their villages and take refuge in the mountainous jungles areas or escape towards the Thai-Myanmar borderland. A former village headman in Kyarinnseikgyi Township that was under the partial control of the NMSP troops, said that he did try to stay with the villagers until only five families of the original 160 households were left in the village and was organising to fulfil the demands of the government troops. However, in February 1990, while he was trying to collect the demanded rice from the households, a government soldier shot a terrified and escaping boy on sight and burned down the family’s house. The village was deserted soon after the troops passed over.58 Similarly, a former village head turned refugee who is re- establishing his abandoned farmland59 said the village he was presiding over was located in the area contested by all the government, KNU and NMSP troops and he tried to meet the demands of all the different armies. He also openly informed all the armies that he

in Papun Township had to move as much as 20 times during the years of the Dragon King Operation. Village elders and mid-career villagers, in discussion with the author, February 4, 2017, Htilon Village, Hlaingbwe Township, Kayin State. 56 Karen Women Organization, State of Terror (Mae Sariang, Thailand: 2007), 19–20. 57 Former village heads, interview by the author, February 24-27, 2016 and March 18-19, 2017, Kalawt, Chaungtaung, Koemile, Kawtdut, Kmawtkanin villages and Lamine Town, Ye Township, Mon State and Kawtbein, Taranar, and Dammasat villages in Kayin State. 58 A former village head, interview by the author, February 24, 2016, xxx Village, Kyarinnseikkyi Township, Kayin State (village name omitted for security reason). 59 A former village head, interview by the author, February 27, 2016, xxx Village, Yebyu Township, Tanintharyi Region (village name omitted for security reason).

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had to deal with all the parties and fulfil their demands. However, a government troop commander baselessly accused him of being a township-level administrator of the NMSP, mainly because he was a Mon national. They arrested him in 1993 and ruthlessly tortured him so he would confess his guilt. After paying ransom-like cash and bags of rice, he was released and inevitably left the contested area of multiple armed groups and escaped towards the Thai borderland. His village was left without a village headman as nobody dared to take on his role, because none of the troops of all sides was able to control the area exclusively. A month later, the village was deserted.

The decades-longed civil war that fought among the government military and multiple armed organisations also destabilised local customary administrative mechanisms and weakened administrative effectiveness in the community. The presence of multiple authorities as agents of different armed factions in a single village often sabotaged trust among the villagers, as well as between the villagers and the village headmen and damaged the long existed social cohesion and social capital of the community. As the village authorities of all sides had to operate under the instructions dictated by their higher-level authorities rather than responding to the needs of the citizens under their rule, relationships between the village heads and its citizens became inimical. Under the civil war, the village heads were the one who has to implement the forced taxations, assign forced labourer, recruit military porters, and identify the agents or suspected supporters of the other sides in the communities. Thus, the communities mostly perceived the village heads as extractive, corrupt and traitorous.

(b) Taxation

The prolonged civil war not only hampered the tax collecting capacity of the Myanmar state, it also effectually weakened the symbolic dignity of the state to exercise legitimate authority over the citizens inhabiting recognised territory. Officially, the Internal Revenue Department (IRD) of the Myanmar Ministry of Finance and Revenue administers four major taxes: income tax, commercial tax, stamp duty, and the state lottery.60 The Myanmar taxation authority officially collects 14 kinds of taxes, some of which predate

60 Internal Revenue Department, “Types of Taxes and Relevant Laws,” Internal Revenue Department, Ministry of Finance, accessed May 16, 2017, http://www.mof.gov.mm/en/content/internal-revenue- department

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the colonial time.61 In the government stronghold, the GAD and the village administrators as the agents of the state formally collect land taxes (mainly on cultivated land), water tax and embankment tax (for the use of water from dams and reservoirs), mineral extraction tax and excise duty.62 Sean Turnell, a leading scholar on the Myanmar economy, observes taxation in Myanmar, until recently, was “disordered, in large part out of the control of central authorities and inefficient in either collecting sufficient tax revenues or in imposing reasonable and least-distortionary costs on productive enterprise”.63 Further, the official tax ratio in Myanmar was considerably low and the operational efficiency and effectiveness of tax administration was largely ineffectual and wasteful. There is adequate evidence to verify the limited relationship between the statutory taxation system and actual taxation practice, particularly in the conflict-affected ethnic peripheries areas.64

In most civil war-affected Karen and Mon-populated areas, as very few village authorities dared to act openly as government tax collectors, populations living in the rebel-

61 Internal Revenue Department, “Types of Taxes and Relevant Laws.” See also The World Bank, Myanmar: Public Expenditure Review (Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 2015), 30. 62 Ibid. See also Giles Dickenson-Jones, S. Kanay De, and Andrea Smurra, “State and Region Public Finances in Myanmar” (Yangon: MDRI-CESD, International Growth Centre, and The Asia Foundation, 2015), 14–16. And, Saw, Kyi Pya Chit and Matthew Arnold, “Administering the State in Myanmar: An Overview of the General Administration Department,” (Discussion paper No. 6, MDRI- CESD and The Asia Foundation, Yangon, 2014), 26–34. 63 Sean Turnell, “Fundamentals of Myanmar’s Macroeconomy: A Political Economy Perspective,” Asian Economic Policy Review 6, no. 1 (2011): 141. At the onset of the civil war, the land taxation system was no longer functional. Traditionally, it formed the backbone of the national income and was an important indication of the authority of the state,. The land revenue that amounted to 33 per cent of the national income under the colonial administration in 1938–39, shrunk to 2.3 per cent in the1952–53 fiscal year. Ministry of Finance and Revenue, Myanmar, Economic Survey of Burma (Rangoon: Government Printing and Stationary, 1954), 33. The country earned the lowest tax revenue in percentage of GDP compared to other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. The statistics show, in 2012 the tax revenue of Myanmar in percentage of GDP was far smaller than that of Cambodia and Laos. See Zaw Oo et al., “Fiscal Management in Myanmar” (ADB Economics Working Paper Series, No. 434, Asian Development Bank, Manila, June 2015), 17. 64 Alison Vicary, “The Actual System of Taxation in Burma's Ethnic Minority States,” ResearchGate, Accessed May 28, 2016. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269223491_The_Actual_System_of_Taxation_in_Burma %27s_Ethnic_Minority_States. Moreover, the tax efforts of the state of Myanmar have lagged behind its neighbouring member countries of ASEAN. Recent official statistics show that up to 30 per cent of the Myanmar population is estimated to payofficial taxes. Asian Development Bank, “Asian Development Outlook 2010: Macroeconomic Management and Beyond the Crisis” (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2010), 259–60.

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government-contested areas rarely paid tax to government authorities.65 Throughout the prolonged civil war, the capacity to collect tax revenue and have it reach the national budget of the state of Myanmar was limited. Following the outbreak of civil war, taxation authorities of the state of Myanmar were unable to collect taxes in rebel-controlled and contested ethnic areas, due to the weak presence of security forces and ineffectual administrative bureaucracy. Although the IRD had the legislated power and was responsible for collecting taxes, it was unable to levy any tax in the areas. Until some years following the NMSP ceasefire, the population in NMSP-contested Kyaikmaraw, Kyarinnseikkyi, Mudon, Thanbyuzayart and Ye Townships did not recall paying any tax to a government tax collector.66 Some did not even know of the existence of land tax, property tax, income tax or others.67

Further, even in a few government rebel-contested areas, in which the officials of the government agencies and administrative departments were sometimes able to collect a few types of taxes, the central state of Myanmar had very limited control on the tax administration system. The tax administration system, particularly its methods of assessment and collection, was arbitrarily unorthodox and the operational efficiency and effectiveness of taxation of the Myanmar state were largely weak and wasteful. As the major portion of taxation during the civil war was unofficial, arbitrary and levied on a lump sum basis, there were few mechanisms to enforce the accountability of taxing agencies and agents. At the same time, because the financial development of the country remained underdeveloped and very few had access to a formal banking system, virtually all kinds of official and unofficial taxes were levied by individual agents associated with a plethora of agencies of the Myanmar military state. The most common fee in the government-controlled and a few contested Karen- and Mon-populated areas was the compulsory monthly ‘porter fee’ that every household had to pay to be free from straying

65 Village elders and farmers, in discussion with the author, March 14–16, 2017, Kamarwett, Nyaunggon, Hinnsone, Htinnyue, Arutoung Villages, Mudon and Ye Township, Mon State. 66 A farmer (former Health Worker of MNHC), interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State; farmers, interviewed by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State; a village elder (former village head of NMSP), interview by the author, March 20, 2017, Khawzar Town, Ye Township, Mon State. 67 Ibid; farmers, interviewed by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State.

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vigilantes and escape capture by government soldiers.68 Those who fell into the hands of the soldiers had to work as war porters, carrying food, arms and ammunition along the military columns and even as human shields and landmine clearers at war fronts. The porter fee amounted to 10 to 15 days earnings of an average hard labourer. Further, because they were unofficial in nature and mostly levied on an ad hoc basis, a significant percentage of the taxes levied from the population hardly reached the budget of the government and were easily diverted to the private incomes of the village headmen as well as that of higher-level authorities.69 Unofficial and ad hoc taxation essentially creates conditions for the agents of various agencies who levy taxes, fees and charges to divert a significant amount of collected taxes as personal income, although the exact percentage is not known.

Under the weak and ineffective wartime administration of the Myanmar state, conducting a comprehensive assessment of the household income, expenditure and implications for the official taxation system was virtually impossible.70 In practice, the tax administration system was arbitrary, particularly in its method of assessment and collection in the rebel- contested areas. The methods of tax extraction by all local authorities, as portrayed by Turnell, “tend to be informal, opportunistic, random, and all too often via force of arms”.71 Taxation in the areas did not follow prescribed schedules and was highly dependent on the relationship, negotiation and bribery between the individual tax collector and taxpayer.72 Moreover, as they were unable to directly administer taxation activities in the conflicting areas, the government taxation authorities inevitably had to rely on village

68 Those who were captured by the soldiers were forced to work as military porters, carrying food, arms and ammunition along the military columns, and even act as human shields and landmine clearers at the war front. The porters were poorly fed, often beaten and killed or left behind to die if they could not keep up with the troops due to illness or being wounded in fighting or by landmines. 69 Village elders and community leaders, in discussion with the author, February–March 2016 and February 2017, Mudon, Thanbyuzart, and Chaungzon Townships, Mon State and Yebyu Town, Tanintharyi Region. 70 A former township revenue officer, interview by the author, January 29, 2016, Mawlamyine. 71 Turnell, “Fundamentals of Myanmar’s Macroeconomy: A Political Economy Perspective,” 142. 72 Jared Bissinger and Linn Maung Maung, “Subnational Governments and Business in Myanmar,” (Yangon: MDRI-CESD and The Asia Foundation, 2014), 22. Many independent reports suggest that the Myanmar taxation system is neither fair nor does it comply with recognised taxation norms. See, for example, A. Vicary, and T. Walentyna, “ ‘We Have to Give Them So Much That Our Stomachs Are Empty of Food’: The Hidden Impact of Burma’s Arbitrary and Corrupt Taxation” (Chiang Mai: Network for Human Rights Documentation–Burma, 2010).

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administrators who also had a relationship with the EAOs and were able to rule the communities in conflict-affected areas.73 In many cases, as the village heads had a deep understanding of the real condition of village households, they became the ones to assess the income, expenditure and assets of households and determine the amount of taxes to levy.74 Consequently, in the stead of qualified government taxation officials, the village headmen who were taking part in the extortion and control of the populations and their properties, also assessed, decided, and collected all kinds of taxes at the community level.75 Such method of taxation resulted in the violation of an important taxation principle of “horizontal equity”76 under which households with similar incomes and assets should be treated equally. Throughout the prolonged civil war, village authorities usually undertook most of the taxes levied on the households in the rural ethnic communities with very little supervision by the official taxation authorities.77 Village headmen taxed households and domestic enterprises at unequal rates depending on the conditions of their relationship with them.

In addition, given the oppressive, corrupt and predatory nature of the state during wartime, the populations living in the contested areas normally tried to avoid or minimise interaction with the state.78 At the same time, because the economy in rural Karen- and Mon-populated areas was largely agricultural based79 and most economic activities took

73 A former township revenue officer, interview by the author, January 29, 2016, Mawlamyine. 74 Ibid; Former village heads and elders, interviewed by the author, March 12–20, 2017, Sonatha, Tmawtkaning, Lamine, Arutoung village, and Ye Town, Ye Township, Mon State. 75 Village elders and former village heads, in discussion with the author, January 2016, xxx village, Mudon Town, Mon State (village name omitted for security reason); A former township revenue officer, interview by the author, January 29, 2016, Mawlamyine. 76 See David Elkins, “Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory,” Yale Law & Policy Review 24, no. 1 (2006). 77 A former township revenue officer, interview by the author, 29 January, 2016, Mawlamyine; former and acting village heads, in discussion with the author, January 28–29, 2017 and March 20–21, 2017, Zingyaik village, Paung township; Mawlamyine; Kamarwet, Nyaunggone, Klawthawt, Kroatpi, and Kaikywe village, Mudon Township; Welkhami village in Thanbyuzayart Township; and Leinmawgyan and Arutoung villages, and Lamine town in Ye Township. 78 Former smugglers and traders, in discussion with the author, February–March 2017, Lamine and Ye Town, Mon State and Kyarinnseikgyi Town, Kawtbein village, Kyondoe village, Karen State. 79 M. H. Khan, “Agricultural Taxation in Developing Countries: A Survey of Issues and Policy,” Agricultural Economics 24, no. 3 (2001).

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place in the informal sector, it was difficult for the state to impose a tax.80 Across the conflict-affected ethnic periphery there were very few formalised business activities, as the majority preferred to engage in informal, black market production and trading in the rebel-controlled and -contested borderlines. For example, locally run small-scale domestic paddy de-husking mills or sawmills rarely had government licences, but they paid excise taxes to the relevant rebel organisations.81 Most local goods producers including the farmers, horticulturists and fishermen, as well as small-scale business owners and local service providers, such as private land and water transportation and local rice millers, rarely paid tax to the government authorities, whereas they paid fees to the tax collectors of EAOs.

Equally important, this weakened aspect of stateness was aggravated by the EAOs, who exercised state-like authority and imposed various kinds of tax on the population living in the areas under their control and influence. In their stronghold and contested areas, agents of the KNU governance system collected several registered taxes82 and the administrative branches of NMSP also levied taxes including household income tax, land tax and farming tool tax.83 In addition, most locally operated business owners engaging in lucrative smuggling business activities only paid tax to the EAOs.84 Consequently, the ones collecting taxes in the areas were the agents and village heads representing the EAOs that were active in the areas. Further, as the populations in the Karen- and Mon-populated areas across Karen State, Mon State and Tanintharyi Region had easy access to the Thai border and the offshore Bay of Bengal, most of the business activities took place there in informal settings. Although some smuggler boats were caught by the patrolling gunships

80 It is widely agreed that an agriculture-based economy is typically difficult to tax. See Asian Development Bank, “Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2009” (The Phillippines: Asian Development Bank, 2009). See also, David Dapice, Tom Vallely, and Ben Wilkinson, “Assessment of the Myanmar Agricultural Economy” (Yangon: International Development Enterprises, 2009); and Richard M. Bird, “Administrative Dimensions of Tax Reform,” Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin (March, 2004): 134. 81 Former smugglers and traders, in discussion with the author, February–March 2017, Lamine and Ye Town, Mon State. 82 Kim Jolliffe, “Ceasefires, Governance and Development: The Karen National Union in Times of Change” (Yangon: The Asia Foundation, 2016), 4–5. 83 Nai Win Hla (member of CEC, NMSP), interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 84 Ibid.

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of the government’s navy, they were mostly allowed to go after paying outright bribes or ‘negotiated fines’ to the owners at the naval base in Mawlamyine.85 In some cases, well- connected smugglers were able to negotiate the rates before their boats slipped out towards international waters.86 Those who engaged in the illicit cross-border economy only paid a bribe when government security forces unexpectedly caught them on their trading routes.87 Many recall that it was quick and easy to negotiate and be inspected by a rebel commander or rebel-appointed village head acting as the taxation officer for the EAOs for a range of commodities, goods and products.88

4.3.3. Infrastructure capacity

(a) Social infrastructure

Healthcare services

In 1953, with the aim of reorganising and expanding the reach of government health care services to the rural areas and integrating the existing separate directorates of the colonial health services, the Myanmar parliamentary democracy government formed the Directorate of Health Services (DOHS).89 Following the 1962 military coup d’état, the Revolutionary Council reinstituted the DOHS into the Department of Health (DOH) in 1965 and tasked it with the administration, management, implementation, supervision, monitoring and evaluation of health care related activities, especially for rural areas.90

85 A formerly well-connected large-scale smuggler who is now running a number of registered companies, interview by the author, February 13, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 86 Business owners and traders, in discussion with the author, February 25, 2016, Lamine Town, Mon State. 87 Ibid. 88 The smuggled exports included local products such as hardwood, crumb rubber and rice and cross- country and internationally smuggled merchandise such as US dollars, gemstones and illegal drugs. Black market imports included consumer foods, household appliances, construction materials, as well as electronics and machinery; ibid. 89 Ministry of Health, Myanmar, Health in Myanmar 1999 (Yangon: Myanmar Ministry of Health, 1999). See also Emily Claire Rudland, Political Triage: Health and the State in Myanmar (Burma) (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University, 2003), 195. See also Than Tun Sein et al., “The Republic of the Union of Myanmar Health System Review,” in Health Systems in Transition, edited by Viroj Tangcharoensathien and Walaiporn Patcharanarumol (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2014). 90 The ‘Station Health Units’ together with 16-bed hospitals were introduced under this health service reform by the Revolutionary Council.

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The DOH, one of seven subordinate departments of the Ministry of Health (MOH), has been the major provider of comprehensive healthcare services of the government.91 In all States and Regions, under the direct supervision of the provincial-level and district-level DOHs, the Township Department of Health has been the basic unit of the government healthcare system, and Township Medical Officers are responsible for all health functions including providing curative and preventive health care services.92 At the village tract level, depending on the population density and accessibility, there were a range of rural health centres (RHCs) and sub-RHCs, staffed with public health supervisors, midwives, ‘lady health visitors’ and vaccinators directly providing primary health care services.93 Patients who required more specialist care were referred to the station hospitals (SHs), township hospitals and Specialist Hospitals as necessary.94 In addition, in the remote villages community health volunteers comprised of trained community health workers and auxiliary midwives also provided primary health services to the rural communities.95

However, since the country’s independence, prolonged civil war has caused incapability and failure in health care service delivery in the state of Myanmar in conflict-affected Karen- and Mon-populated areas. The war effectually restrained the efforts of successive governments to increase the capacity of the public health system and expand its coverage to the populations in the areas. Because the government could establish offices only in areas under its firm control, the DOH in Mawlamyine is the only provincial-level health authority for Kayin State, Mon State and Tanintharyi Region, and administers all health service related activities. However, although successive Myanmar governments claimed

91 Ministry of Health, Health in Myanmar 1999; Sein et al.; Nyi Nyi Latt et al., “Healthcare in Myanmar,” Nagoya Journal of Medical Science 78, no. 2 (2016). 92 Ministry of Health, Myanmar, Health in Myanmar 2005 (Yangon: Ministry of Health, 2005); Sein et al., “The Republic of the Union of Myanmar Health System Review”. The TDOH, comprised of the TMO, Township Health Officers (THOs), and Station Medical Officers (SMOs), manage the THs, SHs, RHCs and SRHCs or sub-centre RHCs (sub-RHCs) across the country. Dr Min Nwe Soe (former Director of Mon State Health Department), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Dr Soe Naing, (Director, Department of Health, Mon State), interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. See also Kim Jolliffe and Bill Davis, “Achieving Health Equity in Contested Areas of Southeast Myanmar” (Yangon: The Asia Foundation, 2016), 16. In almost all rural townships, there was normally a TH with 25–100 bed capacity and one to two SHs with 16–25 bed capacity. See Ministry of Health, Health in Myanmar 2005, 27; 5–6. 93 Ministry of Health, Myanmar, Health in Myanmar 2005, 27. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid., 5–6.

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that DOH is the major provider of comprehensive health care services across the country,96 this was not the case in conflict-affected Karen- and Mon-populated villages. The coverage of the government health care system was limited—its services continually deteriorated across the contested areas and were non-existent in Karen and Mon villages in the rebel-controlled territories. For example, there were no government health care services in most villages in southern Thandaung Township, southern Phapun Township, south-eastern Kayarinnseikgyi Township and eastern Hpa-an Township in Kayin State.97 Similarly, there were very few government health care facilities in south-eastern Kyaikmaraw and Mudon Townships and most of the Thanbyuzayart and Ye Townships in Mon State until after the 1995 cessation of war hostilities in the areas.98

Meanwhile, armed conflict in the areas continually disrupted the objectives of most of the government’s health policies and plans to increase the reach of the state’s social infrastructure. In much of the conflict-affected Karen and Mon-populated areas, government authorities and staff on the ground could not implement the 1951 ‘Rural Health Scheme’ that aimed at increasing the number of trained health personnel in the rural health service provision.99 Likewise, the National Health Program of the government with its aim of ‘ensuring full health of the people’ that was to be implemented under the highly proclaimed 1954 ‘Pyidawtha’ plan100 never reached the communities in the warring peripheries.101 Equally, the aims of the Revolutionary Council (RC), BSPP

96 Ministry of Health, Health in Myanmar 2011 (Naypyidaw: Ministry of Health, 2011), 45. See also, Latt et al., “Healthcare in Myanmar,” 124; 27, and Sein et al., “The Republic of the Union of Myanmar Health System Review,” 30. 97 A former State health authority (Mon State), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Villge elders and mid-career villagers, in discussion with the author, February 4, 2017, Htilon Village, Hlaingbwe Township, Kayin State; a village elder (former auxiliary midwife), interview by the author, March 9, 2016, Hlaingbwe Town, Kayin State. 98 A former state health authority (Department of Health, Mon State), interview by the author, January 24, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; a village elder (former village head of NMSP), interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Khawzar Town, Ye Township, Mon State; a farmer (former health worker of MNHC), interview by the author, March 18, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 99 A former state health authority (Department of Health, Mon State), interview by the author, January 24, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 100 Burma Economic and Social Board, Pyidawtha: The New Burma, a Report from the Government to the People of the Union of Burma on Our Long-Term Programme for Economic and Social Development (Rangoon: The Government of the Union of Burma, 1954), 141–47. 101 A leader of Karen political party, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State; A former State health authority (Mon State), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State.

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government and SLORC/SPDC military regimes to strengthen the capacity and expand the reach of the health care system did not succeed in meeting their ambitious obligations. For instance, the series of four-year ‘People’s Health Plans’ (1978–98) with the rhetoric of ‘Health for All 2000’102 obviously failed to extend its reach.103 Similarly, the administrative reforms of the State health care system, such as the 1975 readjustment of the intermediate level health administration and deconcentration of authority to the provincial (state, division and region) and township-level health departments also did not increase the efficiency and quality of government health services in the rebel-contested areas.104 Similarly, the health promotion projects implemented with the technical and financial support of international organisations such as the 1978 ‘Promotion of Primary Health Care’ project supported by World Health Organization (WHO)105 and the 1981 ‘Upgrading of Hospitals’ project106 funded by ADB failed to improve the health conditions of the conflict-affected areas.

Throughout the civil war, the government authorities could not build or repair the physical infrastructure of the health care system or replenish necessary supplies and equipment for basic health services in the rebel-contested Karen- and Mon-populated areas.107 Moreover, most of the trained medical personnel posted to the villages in the conflict areas rarely assume their postings.108 As a result, there were very few functioning RHC

102 This slogan was adopted from the WHO’s campaign of ‘Health for All’ popularised in the 1970s. 103 The SLORC regime stopped the Plan in 1991. 104 Also, the 1993 ‘National Health Policy’ aiming at raising the health status of the country through the primary health care approach did not produce tangible effects on the communities in the conflict zones. Regarding the 1993 ‘National Health Policy’, see Ministry of Health, Myanmar, Health in Myanmar 1999 (Yangon: Myanmar Ministry of Health, 1999). 105 World Health Organization (WHO), Thirty-Third Annual Report of the Regional Director to the Regional Committee for South-East Asia 1980–81 (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1981); Ministry of Health, Health in Myanmar 1999. 106 Asian Development Bank, “Country Synthesis of Postevalutation Findings in Myanmar” (Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 1996), 11–12. 107 Former village administrators, in discussion with the author, January 29, 2017, Nyaunggone Village, Mudon Township, Mon State; Village elders and community leaders, in discussion with the author, February 24, 2016, Lamine Town, Mon State; village elders and mid-career villagers, in discussion with the author, March 10, 2016, Hlaingbwe Twon, Kayin State. 108 A former state health authority (Department of Health, Mon State), interview by the author, January 24, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; retired health authorities, in discussion with the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State; village elders, in an informal discussion with the author, March 7, 2016, Kamamoung, Kayin State; a farmer (former KNLA health practitioner), interview by the author, March 7, 2016, Kamamoung, Kayin State; a community leader (a veterinary surgeon), interview by

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or sub-RHCs in the contested villages in Mudon, Thanbyuzayart and Ye Townships until the mid-1990s.109 The few RHCs that were set up in the government-controlled large villages were typically just small improvised buildings without reliable basic supplies, medication, equipment or health care personnel.110 For instance, the RHC in Kawtbein Village was set up in 1978. However, it was without basic medical staff or medicine until only recently.111

At the same time, because most medical doctors were based in urban centres and the ratio of doctors to the population was very low, people living in the villages inevitably had to rely on a few village health personnel with limited training, traditional healers and fraudulent doctors. In most villages in the conflict-affected Karen and Mon areas, the DOH was unable to allocate any of its trained midwives or auxiliary midwives, let alone a government medical doctor or Public Health Supervisor.112 Moreover, most of the trained medical personnel posted to the villages in the conflict-affected areas hardly assume their postings.113 Even when the DOH posted health personnel to the areas, the trained nurses and midwives were perpetually absent soon after taking up their positions or, in most cases, did not assume their postings at all.114 Throughout the civil war, women

the author, January 29, 2017, Mudon, Mon State; a community leader (private school teacher), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Kamarwet Village, Mon State. 109 A community leader (former government school teacher), interview by the author, February 20, 2016, xxx village, Thanbyuzayart Township, Mon State (village name omitted for security reason); a village elder (a retired high school principal), interview by the author, March 17, 2017, Arutoung Village, Ye Township, Mon State; a community leader (private school teacher), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State. 110 Town elders and members of Kyaikkami Pagoda Trusteeship, in discussion with the author, February 19, 2016, Kyaikkami Town, Thanbyuzayart Township, Mon State; A Community Leader (private school teacher), interview wby the author, January 31, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State; former village and ward heads, in discussion with the author, January 29, 2017, Nyaunggone Village, Mudon Township, Mon State; village elders and community leaders, in discussion with the author, February 24, 2016, Lamine Town, Mon State. 111 Town elders and members of Kyaikkami Pagoda Trusteeship, in discussion with the author, February 19, 2016, Kyaikkami Town, Thanbyuzayart Township, Mon State. 112 A former State health authority (Mon State), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; retired health authorities, in discussion with the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa- an, Kayin State. 113 A former State health authority (Mon State), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; village elders, in an informal discussion with the author, March 7, 2016, Kamamoung, Kayin State; a farmer (former KNLA health practitioner), interview by the author, March 7, 2016, Kamamoung, Kayin State. 114 Village elders, in an informal discussion with the author, March 7, 2016, Kamamoung, Kayin State.

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in the areas had to rely on traditional birth attendants or family members for assistance.115 In addition, for medication people had to rely on drug vendors without proper pharmaceutical knowledge or licences. Roadside ‘betel quid’ shops116 in both urban cities and rural villages have long been the drug vendors for the majority of the country. Further, there has been no social or voluntary health insurance system.117

Besides, government public health programs for disease control and prevention were impossible to implement in the civil war-affected areas. The eradication programs of the DOH (mostly supported by UN agencies and the international governmental and non- governmental organisations) never took place in the conflict-affected Mon and Karen- populated areas. Although various reports of successive Myanmar governments claimed the governments considered major communicable diseases such as AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria as a national concern and prioritised the fight against these diseases, the preventive healthcare services provided by the government did not reach beyond the government stronghold urban enclaves. For example, the government’s ‘Expanded Programme on Immunisation’ in the early 1990s provided with the funding and technical assistance of UN agencies and INGOs did not extend beyond the government stronghold towns and large villages.118 Consequently, throughout the warring period, the prevalence of major communicable disease were seriously high in Karen and Mon villages in the conflict zones.119 Populations in the conflict-affected Karen and Mon areas continually

115 Director of a local NGO (a retired male nurse), interview with the author, January 27, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State; community leaders, interview by the author, March 17, 2017, Arutoung Village, Ye Township, Mon State; Former village heads, in discussion with the author, February 24, 2016, Lamine Town, Mon State; a medical practitioner, interview by the author, March 13, 2016, Kawtbein village, Kawtkareik township, Kayin State. 116 A betel quid is an additive chewable potent parcel that includes areca nuts, tobacco and often other tobacco-related products, wrapped in a lime-coated kava leaf (commonly known as betel leaf). All the wards, roads and streets of the cities and towns as well as villages across the country have these small, improvised betel quid shops where people would obtain drugs and, sometimes, even medication. 117 A former State health authority (Mon State), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 118 Ibid; A medical practitioner, interview by the author, March 13, 2016, Kawtbein village, Kawtkareik township, Kayin State; a farmer (former KNLA health practitioner), interview by the author, March 7, 2016, Kamamoung Town, Papun Township, Kayin State. 119 During the early 1960s to 1980s, several annual reports of the WHO Regional Director for South- east Asia reported a high prevalence of preventable and infectious diseases and death rates in the country. Based on the data provided by the government, a 1980 WHO Report found cholera and malaria continued to be widespread in rural Myanmar and there were still cases and deaths due to plague, an infectious disease globally considered inactive at the time. In 1978, the Myanmar government reported 3,351 cases of cholera with 372 deaths, while India and Bangladesh,

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faced death and illness from diseases that were preventable and treatable in neighbouring countries. Although the central state of Myanmar continued to deny the prevalence of HIV/AIDS,120 the rate of transmission, related morbidity and mortality in the conflict- affected Karen and Mon areas were uncontrollable in the late 1980s.121

A lack of understanding of the nature of the disease and the effects of discrimination, saw the Hnitkayin Village in the NMSP-contested Ye Township divide the cemetery for those afflicted by HIV/AIDS and marginalised the family for years.122 Similarly, despite substantial help from WHO and other UN agencies, the problem of multi-drug resistant Plasmodium falciparum, a deadly malaria disease, was on the rise in the ethnic peripheries and the conflicting Karen- and Mon-populated areas recorded the highest number of malaria deaths from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s.123 Hundreds of thousands of people living in the conflict-affected Karen and Mon areas were left without access to reliable health care services and statistics show significant health outcomes. As numerous reports of local and international organisations claim, because the majority of birth deliveries were at home alone, or with the help of untrained traditional birth attendants,124 the infant

neighbouring countries with much larger populations, reported 10,585 cases with 246 deaths and 5,576 cases with 81 deaths, respectively. Myanmar was the only country in the region that reported 171 cases of plague with six deaths in the same year. See WHO, Thirty-Third Annual Report of the Regional Director to the Regional Committee for South-East Asia 1980–81. 120 MOH only admitted it had the first HIV/AIDS case in 1992, although a government report published in 2011 reports the HIV prevalence level was at its peak in the late 1990s. See Ministry of Health, Health in Myanmar 2011, 75. 121 Director of a local NGO (A retired male nurse), interview with the author, January 27, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State; A Medical Practitioner, interview by the author, March 13, 2016, Kawtbein village, Kawtkareik township, Kayin State; A village elder (former auxiliary midwife), interview by the author, March 9, 2016, Hlaingbwe Town, Kayin State. 122 A senior journalist (former village leader of Hnitkayin Village), interview by the author, 28 January, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State; a head-monk, interview by the author, March 16, 2016, Hnitkayin Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 123 See, for example, WHO, Twenty-Seventh Annual Report of the Regional Director to the Regional Committee for South-East Asia (Geneva: Regional Office for South-East Asia, World Health Organization, 1975). See also WHO, Thirty-Third Annual Report. 124 A village elder (former auxiliary midwife), interview by the author, March 9, 2016, Hlaingbwe Town, Kayin State.

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and maternal mortality rate in the conflict-affected areas were among the highest in the South-East Asian region.125

At the same time, due to prolonged community distrust of the government authorities and staff and the corrupt and poor quality government health facilities, the community’s avoidance of government public health care services in the contested areas has been a common phenomenon.126 People in the areas did not even expect that the state would provide such social services to them. The majority of the population in the conflict zones had continued to rely on the lesser qualified traditional health practitioners, fraudulent healers and, at worst, quack doctors.127 Consequently, infant and maternal mortality rates in Karen and Mon areas were among the highest in the South-East Asian region.128

Given the absence of State health infrastructure, the EAOs established alternative health care service provision systems, not only as a deed of legitimising and maintaining their status as patrons of the population living in their controlled areas, but also to fulfil desperately needed services to the populations living in their controlled areas.129 Since the early 1980s, the health departments of the EAOs active in the areas have provided primary health care services to tens of thousands of vulnerable and hard-to-reach populations in the rebel-contested and -controlled areas. The Karen Department of Health and Welfare (KDHW) of the KNU, founded in 1956, and Mon National Health Committee (MNHC) of the NMSP, established in 1972, are examples of the EAO line departments delivering health services to the population in conflict-affected areas. Moreover, with the influx of students and activist medical professionals into the rebel

125 Katherine C. Teela et al., “Community-Based Delivery of Maternal Care in Conflict-Affected Areas of Eastern Burma: Perspectives from Lay Maternal Health Workers,” Social Science & Medicine 68, no. 7 (2009): 1332–33. 126 See Rudland, Political Triage: Health and the State in Myanmar (Burma), 273. 127 The indigenous traditional medical practitioners who learned or trained in the Ayurvedic tradition, an ancient Indian system of medicine, were deprived of status since the colonial time in 1886. However, the SLORC/SPDC government retrieved and upgraded the tradition in the mid-1990s. See Tinker, The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Years of Independence. 128 Teela et al., “Community-Based Delivery of Maternal Care in Conflict-Affected Areas of Eastern Burma: Perspectives from Lay Maternal Health Workers,”1332–33. 129 Former and serving EAO leaders, interview by the author, March 28, 2016, Ye Town and January 29, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. See also Steven Lanjouw and Nwe Nwe Aye, SDC Health Assessment in Southeast Region in Myanmar (Yangon: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, 2013).

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stronghold border areas following the crackdown on the mass protest in 1988, the standard of parallel health systems improved in the periphery borderlands. Within a few years, private non-for-profit organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and community-based organisations such as Mae Taw Clinic, founded by a Karen medical practitioner in 1989, and Burma Medical Association (BMA), founded by the activists in exile in 1991, started providing basic health service in the areas.130 With support from cross-border training and supply centres operating along the Myanmar-Thai border, the KDHW, with over 1,000 health workers, was overseeing numerous village tract health centres of the KNU.131

At the same time, as the humanitarian response to the absence of government services and the austerity of the health situation in the areas, Western governments, UN agencies and many INGOs prioritised humanitarian relief for the refugees, IDPs and the populations in the ethnic borderlands where armed conflicts were continually intensifying.132 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), for instance, even promoted support for international aid and conflict resolution in the early 1990s under the slogan of “Myanmar’s Silent Emergency”.133 These evolving exogenous opportunities further boosted the standard and quality of health care services of the EAOs in the area. With financial support and technical assistance from the UN agencies and the international community, the EAOs developed standardised treatment protocols and training curricula for the health staff who rarely had the chance to attend formal training.134 Over the years,

130 See, for example, Health Information System Working Group, The Long Road to Recovery: Ethnic and Community-Based Health Organizations Leading the Way to Better Health in Eastern Burma, (Mae Sot, Thailand: Health Information System Working Group, 2015); and C. I. Lee et al., “Internally Displaced Human Resources for Health: Villager Health Worker Partnerships to Scale up a Malaria Control Programme in Active Conflict Areas of Eastern Burma,” Global Public Health 4, no. 3 (2009). 131 During the intense fighting, the VTHCs delivered health care services in the conflict areas mostly in the form of mobile clinics designed to cope with the volatile situation of the village communities and particularly able to maintain service provisions even when villages were displaced. A high-level KNU leader, interview by the author, January 22, 2017, Yangon. 132 Shoklo Malaria Research Unit, Myanmar: Health Care in a Changing National Landscape_Lessons, Challenges and Aspirations on the Way Forward (Mae Sot, Thailand: Mahidol- Oxford Tropical Medicine Research Unit, 2017). 133 Ibid. 134 This training largely resolved serious issues such as the lack of skilled health personnel and providing common medical treatments on an ad hoc basis.

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the EAOs and the non-state community organisations have built up their health care infrastructures as a major provider of social services in the conflict-affected areas.

However, the services provided by the NSAs were inadequate, often inconsistent and delivered mostly in the form of poor quality mobile clinics that were under-resourced.135 Moreover, during the intense fighting, along with other basic social services, health care was frequently under attack in the conflict-affected ethnic Karen and Mon areas. Neither the government nor the rebel troops could protect the health care services from the hostilities of the other. Thus, delivery of the service by the government and the EAOs became improvised and inconsistent as the government and EAO troops used to disrupt the service delivery of the other by attacking infrastructural facilities, commandeering the resources and threatening or killing health care personnel. As testified in numerous reports from the field, because the ‘shoot on sight’ order of the government military was in place in most of the contested and rebel strongholds, health workers of the non-state actors providing the health care services were at unlimited risk of arrest, torture and killing.136At the same time, based on the experience of enduring scepticisms of meddling and spying, the EAOs also imposed threats to the government health personnel in the contested areas.137

The insecurity and war atrocities in the warring areas had a serious effect on the health status of the population in the conflict zones. Because the health infrastructure of the state was weak or, in many areas, did not exist, there was a greater prevalence of preventable diseases in most of the conflict-affected areas. As the rights and capacity to provide social services are a centuries-old indication of authority and legitimacy, the existence of numerous parallel health care systems across the territory was a sign of the weak health infrastructure of the state of Myanmar. Although the services provided by the NSAs were in short supply, the existence of parallel health care systems was irrefutable evidence of

135 See, for example, Tara M. Sullivan, Cynthia Maung, and Naw Sophia, “Using Evidence to Improve Reproductive Health Quality Along the Thailand‐Burma Border,” Disasters 28, no. 3 (2004): 260. Lanjouw and Aye, SDC Health Assessment in Southeast Region in Myanmar; and Thomas J. Lee et al., “Mortality Rates in Conflict Zones in Karen, Karenni, and Mon States in Eastern Burma,” Tropical Medicine & International Health 11, no. 7 (2006). 136 See also Katherine H. A. Footer et al., “On the Frontline of Eastern Burma’s Chronic Conflict— Listening to the Voices of Local Health Workers,” Social Science and Medicine 120 (2014); Lanjouw and Aye, SDC Health Assessment in Southeast Region in Myanmar. 137 Lee et al., “Mortality Rates in Conflict Zones in Karen, Karenni, and Mon States in Eastern Burma”.

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the incapacity of the Myanmar state. These parallel health service provisions systems of the NSAs also exposed the failure of the state to uphold its responsibility and ability of legitimate hegemony over social service provision in the areas.

Education Services

Historically, successive Myanmar governments have tried to centralise delivering education services and monopolise the service provision to prove the capability of state social infrastructure. At the onset of the country’s independence, the democratically elected Myanmar Government reinstituted the national education system with ambitious objectives of providing basic education for all.138 Following the 1962 military coup d’état, successive military juntas repeatedly reformed and restructured the country’s education system.139 Further, by outlawing monastic- and church-based education systems and nationalising all mission schools, successive Myanmar authoritarian governments tried to monopolise the provision of education services.140 This included the long-standing community and monastic as well as church-based informal education services in Karen-

138 The U Nu administration in 1948 described colonial education as “ineffectual for the country’s political, social and economic development”. Burma Economic and Social Board, Pyidawtha: The New Burma, a Report from the Government to the People of the Union of Burma on Our Long-Term Programme for Economic and Social Development, 149. The government education program under the highly anticipated Pyidawtha Plan included building at least one better quality primary school in each village and additional professional and technical high schools together with long-term and short- term arrangements for teacher training. Ibid., 149–52. 139 The RC ruled on the 1966 Basic Education Law and 1973 Union of Burma Education Law and restructured the entire education system to suits its authoritarian rule. Among the newly formed five departments under the Ministry of Education (MOE), the Department of Basic Education, the Myanmar Examination Board and the Myanmar Education Research Bureau mainly govern the basic education system of the country. In April 2015, President U Thein Sein’s government reinstituted these into seven departments including the Department of Higher Education, Department of Teacher Training, Department of Human Resources and Education Project, Basic Education Department, Myanmar Research Department of Education, Myanmar Examiner Department and the Department of Language Education. See Ministry of Education, Myanmar, The Government of the Union of Myanmar, Ministry of Education, http://www.moe.gov.mm/en/ 140 Similarly, in the early 1990s the SLORC aggressively suppressed the efforts of the opposition party NLD and student groups to provide a bridging education service while the government closed schools and universities across the country for years. After the student-led nationwide pro-democracy protest in 1988, all universities were closed for over two years. To offset the possible prolonged period of school closures, the NLD and student groups tried to provide bridging education services in 1990. The SLORC regime responded with hash repression together with massive arrests and imprisonment. Similarly, after the student protests in 1996 and 1998, the regime again closed the schools for three years.

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and Mon-populated areas.141 However, the prolonged civil war effectively restrained efforts by Myanmar governments to provide education services in the conflict-affected ethnic areas. The war did not allow for the state-building agenda of the short-lived democratically elected government. Many of the conflict-affected Karen and Mon villages did not see ‘Pyidawtha School’ until the culmination of the rule of the parliamentary democracy government.142

Moreover, throughout the rule of the military juntas, the education service of the state of Myanmar was in a continual decline and sporadic or non-existent in most conflict- affected Karen- and Mon-populated areas.143 Primarily because of the lack of security, the reach and coverage of the government education system remained limited throughout the civil war.144 The civil war effectively degenerated the quality of the state education service in terms of physical resources, course curricula, teaching methodology, teaching and learning materials, equipment and capacity of government educators. Although a few public schools were built in some government stronghold Karen- and Mon-populated villages, the standard of government education services was very limited. Even when the government was able to restore order in the urban areas in the early 1980s, most of the few government school buildings in the conflict-affected Karen and Mon areas remained typically improvised small buildings directly erected on the ground with wooden and bamboo structures and thatch roofing.145 Further, until the ceasefire agreements were in

141 A leader of Karen Affairs Committee, interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. See also Thein Lwin, “Languages, Identities, and Education—in Relation to Burma/Myanmar,” Thinking Classroom Foundation, accessed 31 January, 2018, http://www.thinkingclassroom.org/uploads/4/3/9/0/43900311/2._dr._thein_lwin_language_article_en glish_15thoct11.pdf 142 Former education official of Mon State, interview by the author, February 13, 2017, Mawlamyine Mon State. 143 Ibid; A former State health authority (Mon State), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 144 Conversely, some scholars argue that the Myanmar military regimes deliberately left the education system weakened to prolong their authoritarian reign. In an article published in 2008, Marie Lall, a scholar on Myanmar education, concluded that “[t]he regime has let institutions decay and has not provided the resources needed to build a strong state education system”. See Marie Lall, “Evolving Education in Myanmar: The Interplay of State, Business and the Community,” in Dictatorship, Disorder and Decline in Myanmar, edited by Monique Skidmore and Trevor Wilson (Canberra, Australia: ANU Press, 2008), 143. 145 A senior official of an INGO (a former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon; a director of an INGO (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, January 21, 2017, Yangon; Former education official of Mon State, interview by the author, February 13, 2017,

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place, most of the rebel-contested Karen- and Mon-populated areas rarely saw the government’s educational infrastructure. The schooling system of the Ministry of Education (MOE) never reached rebel strongholds and areas under their resilient influence.146 For many children living in the conflict-affected Karen and Mon areas, accessibility to primary education, secondary and beyond appeared pathetic.

There were state-run primary schools in a few Karen and Mon villages and some larger villages had a middle school, in which all the children from the 20 to 34 surrounding villages who completed primary education could continue their lower secondary education.147 For instance, until the late 1980s, the community-managed Affiliated Middle School in Lamine village, Ye Township, was the only state recognised affiliated middle school for the students from 24 surrounding villages.148 Until the early 1980s, Mudon State High School was the only government high school in the whole Township of over 880 km2 with a population of around 160,000.149 Many children in the area were hardly able to matriculate their higher secondary level and very few proceeded to tertiary education.150 According to various reports, the dropout rates in the government schooling system was high.151 More than 70 per cent of the children left school before they

Mawlamyine, Mon State; A senior journalist (former village leader of Hnitkayin Village), interview by the author, January 27, 2017 Mawlamyine, Mon State. 146 A Mon social worker (former MNED staff), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Klawt Thawt Village, Mudon Township, Mon State; a community leader, interview by the author, February 23, 2016, Three-Pagoda Town, Kayin State. 147 Normally, the Myanmar education authority divided the basic education system into five, four and two years in primary, middle (lower secondary) and high school (higher secondary), respectively. Throughout the 11 years of basic education, Myanmar children had to sit for and pass the national matriculation examinations at the end of each level of schooling—at the fourth standard, eighth standard and tenth standard to complete primary, middle, and high school, respectively and proceed to a higher level. 148 A senior journalist (former village leader of Hnitkayin Village), interview by the author, January 28, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 149 Nai Layehtaw Suvannabhum, (former NMSP leader, native of Naihlon Village, Mudon Township), interview by the author, June 30, 2017, Canberra, Australia. 150 A former State health authority (Mon State), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Nai Layehtaw Suvannabhum, (former NMSP leader, native of Naihlon Village, Mudon Township), interview by the author, June 30, 2017, Canberra, Australia. The United Nations Country Team in Myanmar in 2007 also reports that half of children did not complete primary school. See United Nations Country Team (UNCT), Statement of the United Nations Country Team in Myanmar on the Occasion of United Nations Day (Yangon: Office of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, 2007). 151 See, for example, South and Lall, Education, Conflict and Identity: Non-State Education Regimes in Burma, 15; and Jessica Aumann, and U Thet Naing, “Working with Non-State Groups to Help All Children Get an Education,” UNICEF Myanmar blog, April 8, 2015,

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completed primary level.152 For instance, out of 52 children enrolled in Hnitkayin primary school in Ye Township in 1967, 12 completed their fourth standard and three reached Thanbyuzayart and Mudon State High School.153 One graduated from the Rangoon Institute of Economics and another from Mawlamyine Collage, in Mon State.154

While the education service of the state of Myanmar was once the most successful state social infrastructures in the mainland Southeast Asia in the 1950s,155 prolonged civil war and the resulting decades of insecurity and socioeconomic underdevelopment severely weakened the system and it “has never recovered”.156 For decades, the education outcomes were dissipated in the state of Myanmar in the conflict-affected Karen and Mon-populated areas. Obliged to prioritise inexorable military expenses, the government’s expenditure on education was among the lowest, compared to its comparable neighbouring countries and consistently fell until the semi-civilian government inaugurated the national liberalisation process in 2011.157 Consequently, throughout the civil war, by any standards the state education services in the conflict- affected areas were destitute. Even in a few government stronghold villages in Karen and Mon villages, the typical infrastructure of the state schools was mostly improvised and school supplies and teaching materials were rudimentary and inferior in quality. Virtually http://unicefmyanmar.blogspot.com/2015/04/working-with-non-state-groups-to-help.html 152 Even according to the overstated statistics of the government MOE, the primary school completion rate in 2007 was just slightly over 70 per cent. See also ibid. 153 Nai Layehtaw Suvannabhum, (former NMSP leader, native of Naihlon Village, Mudon Township), interview by the author, June 30, 2017, Canberra, Australia. A 1995 UNICEF report states that only 27 per cent of children completed their primary education, while 1.8 per cent of those who enrolled in primary schools completed secondary school. See UNICEF, Children and Women in Myanmar: A Situation Analysis (Yangon: UNICEF, 1995). 154 A senior journalist (former village leader of Hnitkayin Village), interview by the author, January 27, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 155 At the country’s independence, Myanmar had the highest literacy rate among former British colonial entities and, for years, maintained a high level of education quality in Asia. See Nick Cheesman, “School, State and Sangha in Burma,” Comparative Education 39, no. 1 (2003). 156 Lall, “Evolving Education in Myanmar: The Interplay of State, Business and the Community,” 128. 157 It was 3.3 per cent of GDP in 1973–74 and 0.7 per cent of GDP in 2009–10. See The World Bank, Realigning the Union Budget to Myanmar’s Development Priorities: Myanmar Public Expenditure Review 2015 (Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 2015), 48–49. See also Khin Maung Kyi et al., Economic Development of Burma: A Vision and a Strategy (Stockholm and Singapore: Olof Palme International Center and Singapore University Press, 2000). From 1993 to 2004, while the defence budget accounted for over 30 per cent of the total government spending, the budget for education never reached eight per cent. UNICEF, The State of the World’s Children 2006: Excluded and Invisible (New York: UNICEF, 2005), 124.

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all the few government schools in the areas were poorly equipped and most were without proper teaching resources. The state schools in the areas usually lacked necessary teaching materials and classroom resources such as tables, benches, books, and other teaching and learning aids.158 Meanwhile, inside most of these dilapidated school buildings, the makeshift classrooms were overcrowded with children of different ages.159

In addition, although successive Myanmar governments claimed that basic education in the country was compulsory and free, this was not true in the conflict-affected Karen- and Mon-populated areas and Mon and Karen parents had to bear various costs for their children’s education. The MOE could only supply rudimentary school materials to a few schools in the conflict-affected Karen and Mon villages. Further, most state school principals and school support committees, largely led by the village administrative authorities, had to collect various unofficial fees and charges from the parents to meet the basic needs of the schools.160

Most schools in the areas could best be described as ‘community schools’, because the schools were built, funded, maintained and managed by the local communities.161 The costs for the school buildings, furniture, books and stationery, and compensatory salary,162 accommodation and basic foodstuffs for the low-paid teachers were troublesome for families in the conflict-affected areas.163 Despite facing numerous challenges, the ethnic communities in the conflict-affected areas demonstrated their

158 Director of a local NGO (a retired male nurse), interview by the author, January 27, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Village elders, in informal discussion with the author, January 30, 2017, Nyaunggone Village, Mudon Township, Mon State; A community leader (private school teacher), interview with the author, January 31, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State. 159 A village elder (a retired high school head), interview by the author, March 17, 2017, Arutoung Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 160 Since none of the government education inspectors and auditors could visit the schools in the conflict-affected Karen and Mon areas, some local education authorities abused the government’s nominal yearly budget allocation for the schools and cheated expenditures for the schools that were not functioning at all. Former education official of Mon State, interview by the author, February 13, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 161 See also Jasmin Lorch, “The (Re)-Emergence of Civil Society in Areas of State Weakness: The Case Ofeducation in Burma/Myanmar,” in Dictatorship, Disorder and Decline in Myanmar, edited by Monique Skidmore and Trevor Wilson (Acton, Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008), 162–63. 162 Most communities had to provide a matching amount to the teacher’s salary and other basic living needs to attract the teacher to stay the academic year and longer. 163 See also South and Lall, Education, Conflict and Identity: Non-State Education Regimes in Burma, 39.

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determination and commitment to education for their children even under difficult circumstances. During the period of intense fighting in the 1970s, in the rural Mudon Township many primary schools were built by the village communities that were under perpetual insecurity and in poverty due to the civil war.164 Besides, in some contested areas, with the expectation that the government MOE would sanction the schools and send teachers together with necessary schooling resources, many village communities built school buildings at their own expense.165 Further, whenever a village community wanted to upgrade their schools to a higher level (e.g., from a primary to a middle school), the village community had to bear all the costs and wait as an affiliated school for several years before attaining the sanction from MOE.166 In 1982, parents in Kalawtthawt Village in Mudon Township of Mon State enthusiastically contributed all the necessary resources ranging from the school building and furniture to salary and accommodation for teachers they recruited to upgrade the state primary school in their village to an affiliated middle school.167

At the same time, mainly because of insecurity and poor physical infrastructure, most of the government-appointed teachers declined to go to the conflict-affected areas. In the few state schools in the conflict-affected Mon and Karen villages, there were often school buildings without teachers.168 The resulted high pupil–teacher ratios in a few schools in Mon and Karen villages in the rebel-contested areas were burdensome for those teachers willing to assume the postings. For example, in the mid-1980s, the three teachers in the state primary school in the NMSP-contested Thaungbyin Village in Ye Township had to

164 A Community Leader (private school teacher), interview with the author, January 31, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State; A Mon social worker (former MNED staff), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Klawt Thawt Village, Mudon Township, Mon State. 165 Nai Layehtaw Suvannabhum, (former NMSP leader, native of Naihlon Village, Mudon Township), interview by the author, June 30, 2017, Canberra, Australia. 166 Mark R. Duffield, On the Edge of “No Man’s Land”: Chronic Emergency in Myanmar (Bristol: University of Bristol, 2008), 32. 167 It took the village communities almost two decades for their school to become a state middle school. A ward administrator (Kamarwet Town), interview by the author, February 1, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State; a social worker (former MNED staff), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Klawtthawt Village, Mudon Township, Mon State. 168 See, for example, Duffield, On the Edge of “No Man’s Land”: Chronic Emergency in Myanmar, 32.

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manage over 200 children and teach all the subjects for all the five grades.169 In addition, as most government teachers working at the schools in the conflict-affected villages lacked the appropriate qualifications and skills, as well as teaching aid materials to motivate the children, students were inattentive and uninterested in their learning.170

Across all the different political eras, Myanmar’s governments used the delivery of education services for political purposes: above all, unitary nation-building with an agenda of forced assimilation of ethnic minorities. This use of the education service as a political tool severely hindered the educational career of ethnic minority children in conflict-affected ethnic-populated areas. Since the country’s independence, all the governments have promoted the Bamar language as the language of the majority171 and produced Bamar-centric school textbooks that emphasise Bamar-led nation-building. This marginalised the history and culture of the ethnic minorities.172

Since 1962 military coup, successive military regimes imposed the Bamar language as the only classroom language for all state schools and banned the use of other ethnic languages.173 Further, the curricula in the state schooling system was distinctly Bamar- centric.174 Like other ethnic minority children, this new rule imposed another difficult

169 Wholesalers and traders, in discussion with the author, February 25, 2016, Lamine Town, Mon State; A senior journalist (former village leader of Hnitkayin Village), interview by the author, January 27, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 170 A report of MOE even admits that not all the teachers attended a teacher training course, while some did not have academic qualifications. See Ministry of Education, Myanmar, EFA Implementation in Myanmar (Yangon: Myanmar Ministry of Education, 2006). The lack of standard and quality in the government teacher training institutions was evident from the outdated teacher- centred, repetitive teaching method that compelled students to learn the overloaded school curricula by rote. 171 Mary P. Callahan, “Language Policy in Modern Burma,” in Fighting Words: Language Policy and Ethnic Relations in Asia, edited by Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly (Cambridge: Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2003), 144. 172 This could be because, at the centre, Myanmar governments want to suppress instead of resolving one of the root causes of the armed ethnic conflicts across the periphery areas. See, for example, Pon Nya Mon, “Education Reform and National Reconciliation in Burma” (paper peresented at the 2014 Western Conference Association for Asian Studies, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, October 03-04, 2014). 173 Lorch, “The (Re)-Emergence of Civil Society in Areas of State Weakness: The Case Of Education in Burma/Myanmar,” 163. 174 Nicolas Salem-Gervais and Rosalie Metro, “A Textbook Case of Nation-Building: The Evolution of History Curricula in Myanmar,” Journal of Burma Studies 16, no. 1 (2012): 30.

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barrier for Karen and Mon children. Unable to properly understand what they were learning, the children’s primary education began through rote-learning to pass each standard, while many ended up not completing their primary education. The way in which a second standard school child in a Mon village solved his numeracy homework proved the extent of language barrier children faced. The child explained that if the digit in the question increased, he multiplied or added the given numbers and if the digit decreased, he subtracted or divided them.175 Because he could not understand the meaning of the words in the question, his decisions were random-based, although the child could read out the text in the question correctly. Many teachers did not speak Mon and all used Bamar language for classroom instruction. Children, perhaps whose Mon parents were government servants and had knowledge of the Bamar language, could guess the clues of the lessons and shared their elementary comprehension with their classmates.176 Parents in the conflict-affected Karen and Mon areas were mostly illiterate in the Bamar language and often unable to provide guidance and help to explain the subjects to the children.177

Given the ineffectual or absence of state education infrastructure in the civil war-affected areas, the EAOs established parallel education systems and defied the legitimacy of the Myanmar state. This helped to consolidate their legitimate governance over the population in the areas under their control. Across the conflict-affected Karen and Mon- populated areas, ethnic political, communal and religious organisations provided basic literacy and numeracy to the children.178 In the mid-1960s, KNU established its education system and provided basic social services to the communities living under their jurisdiction.179 Similarly, on a lesser scale, NMSP also established a Mon national education system in 1971 and provided primary education to the population living in its jurisdictions. Predominantly based on political objectives and motivation for the retention

175 A second standard (year 3) student, informal talk with the author, March 18, 2017, Kalawt village, Ye Townhsip, Mon State. The father of the child also said he sometimes did not understand the question. 176 A senior journalist (former village leader of Hnitkayin Village), interview by the author, January 27, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 177 Ibid. 178 See, for example, Cheesman, “School, State and Sangha in Burma”; Pon Nya Mon, “Identity, Image and Ethnic Conflict in Burma: A Case Study of Mon People” (PhD diss., Washington State University, 2010), https://search.proquest.com/docview/860947010?pq-origsite=primo 179 Mahn Nyein Maung, a top-level leader of KNU, interview by the author, January 19, 2017, Yangon.

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of national identity, both KNU and NMSP developed “ethno-nationalist-oriented”180 education systems and administered schooling systems accessible to the communities in their controlled areas.181 As the revenues were significant enough, KNU could provide basic education service to the population under its rule. In the early 1970s, KNU founded the Karen Education Department (KED)182 and established a standardised education system. It set up numerous schools in its stronghold and most of the contested areas. In 1987, the KED managed 36 schools, including three high schools and provided much- needed education services to 2,026 students in the Mergui-Tavoy District, one of the seven localities of the Kawthoolei State of the KNU.183

Similarly, in 1972 the NMSP instituted the Mon National Education Department (MNED) as the central education authority of the party and standardised its basic education service delivery system.184 In 1992, in partnership with community groups from both inside the government-controlled areas and those on the borderland including the National Health and Education Committee of the country’s pro-democracy exile groups, the NMSP fundamentally reformed the party’s education department.185 While maintaining MNED as the party’s line department for education service delivery, together with the community-based organisations and experts, the party’s leadership initiated the formation of the Mon National Education Committee (MNEC) and reduced control of the party on

180 Marie Lall and Ashley South, “Comparing Models of Non-State Ethnic Education in Myanmar: The Mon and Karen National Education Regimes,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 44, no. 2 (2014): 298. 181 However, in the beginning of the 1960s, many schools lacked basic teaching materials and other resources, particularly proper school buildings. Even in the early 1980s, very small, thatch-roofed huts with children of different ages and a few teachers were typical features of KED schools. In many of its improvised schools under the trees, KED was barely able to afford more than a few bamboo benches, sometimes without textbooks and other basic stationery. See Naw Rebecca, “Karen Education: Children on the Front Line,” Cultural Survival Quarterly, December 1989; Human Rights Watch, “Burma: They Came and Destroyed Our Village Again: The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Karen State” (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2005). 182 KED is formally known as the Karen Education and Culture Department. See South and Lall, Education, Conflict and Identity: Non-State Education Regimes in Burma, 16. Mahn Nyein Maung, a top-level leader of KNU, interview by the author, January 19, 2017, Yangon; Saw Shie She, (KNU/KNLA liaison officer), interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 183 Rebecca, “Karen Education: Children on the Front Line”. 184 However, it was without a related infrastructure such as systematic school curricular and evaluation systems. Mi Sar Dar (Head of education Department of NMSP), interviewed by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 185 Ibid.

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the education service provision.186 As it became an NGO, the MNEC could detach itself from an armed resistant political party and expand its reach into a few Mon-populated areas beyond NMSP control.187 This separation allowed the MNEC to secure support from international donors, community groups and individual experts to modify curricula for the whole Mon national education system and funding from abroad and within the country. MNED remained the administrative body of the entire school network under the direct management of MNEC, while virtually all the community schools became much more independent of the armed party.188 In the same year, through the negotiations of some influential religious and community leaders, MNEC also gained an understanding with a few government education authorities and was able to introduce a ‘mixed school’ system in which MNEC teachers taught the Mon language and History as extracurricular in state primary schools in the areas under the influence of MNLA.189 In 1995, together with the schools under the Mon community groups, MNEC administered 76 schools, including four middle schools and one high school in Mon refugee camps on the borderline, NMSP stronghold, and contested areas.190

Although, neither the KED nor MNED schools received much donor support until the mid-1990s, through the primary support of the communities, both the KNU and NMSP continued to provide education services to the communities in their control areas. For decades, the civil war challenged the legitimacy of the state from the perspective of citizenship agreement through such a parallel social infrastructure. This phenomenon of

186 Nai Win Hla (Member of CEC, NMSP), interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 187 Mi Kun Chan Non (a leader of Mon Women Organisation), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Mi Lwi Han, (former MNED official), interview by the author, February 16, 2016, Mawlamyine. 188 Mi Sar Dar (Head of education Department of NMSP), interviewed by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 189 A village elder (a retired High School Head), interview by the author, March 17, 2017, Arutoung Village, Ye Township, Mon State; Mi Sar Dar, interview. In partnership with MNEC, MNED established the first Mon National High School in Nyisar, the headquarters of NMSP in the mountainous headwater area of Ye River in the same year. Ibid. 190 With the support of international donors and the communities, to accommodate students from the government-controlled areas, MNEC even provided student hostels for some of its high school students. Ibid.

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incapacity in the stateness of Myanmar state persisted until the cessation of war-related hostilities following the ceasefire agreements between the state and non-state EAOs.

At the same time, the leadership of both Karen and Mon armed parties used the education service provision as a vehicle to articulate ethno-nationalist sentimentality among the younger generation. The ethnic-nationalist politics, rights to and responsibility for social service provision and the retention of ethnic identity were the underlying driving force in the establishment of the parallel education systems.191 In the education systems of the EAOs, to reproduce ethnic national culture and identity teachers taught subjects such as history and the ethnic languages of their respective nationalities as extracurricular, in addition to the standard curricula for basic education.192

More importantly, by using indigenous languages as the classroom medium of instruction, ethnic educators promoted the use of the marginalised languages and helped students begin their primary education in their mother tongue, rather than the foreign Bamar language. However, as the curricula for such subjects were mostly based on the republicanism belief of the leaders of the EAOs, they typically contained nationalist, separatist content. For some KNU leaders, it was hard to adapt the contents of the state education system, especially the Bamar history imposed by the successive Myanmar military regimes that were obviously aiming at ‘Burmanisation’ and destroying the national identity of the Karen people.193 Thus, some of the KED textbooks and teachers’ guidebooks, such as the Karen history and Teaching Karen People Issues produced in the late 1970s, contained Karen republicanism and separatist sentimentalities. At the same time, under the prolonged cruelty of the Myanmar military, many Karen children had fearful and bitter experiences of war atrocities including the destruction of their villages, killing of their parents, raping of their mothers and sisters and having to flee for their lives.194 The education systems of the EAOs often strengthened separatist sentiment among the generations of ethnic children in the areas under their control and influence.

191 Nai Chan Toit, (former CEC of NMSP), interview by the author, February 26, 2016, Ye Town, Mon State; Nai Win Hla, interview. 192 Mi Sar Dar, interview. 193 A KNU high-ranking official, interview by the author, January 19, 2017, Yangon; A leader of Karen Affairs Committee, interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 194 Ibid; Director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State.

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Throughout the intense fighting periods, both KNU and NMSP were unable to provide standard education services to the population living in their control and contested areas.

Small, thatch-roofed huts overcrowded with children of different ages and a few teachers were the typical features of a school of the EAO. Many schools even lacked the most basic teaching materials and resources, including appropriate buildings. For instance, in many of its improvised schools, many of which were under the trees, the KED was barely able to afford more than a few bamboo benches and there were sometimes no textbooks or other essential stationery.195 Similarly, with the expansion of its reach, MNEC faced difficulties in providing standard education in its MNS. There were only a few MNSs in the MNLA-controlled areas and villages in the government administrative areas under the strong influence of NMSP. The student–teacher ratios, teaching standards and qualification of the teachers across the MNS schooling system varied considerably, with most of them being poor. Many MNS teachers had to teach a variety of subjects across different grades.196

While many schools under the direct administration of MNED in the NMSP stronghold were overcrowded, given the predominant insecurity and poverty and the resulting routine absence of students, some schools in the government-contested areas often saw few children compared to the number of teachers working there. For example, in 1987 to 1990, two teachers taught 35 to 60 students in all grades in a community school in Welbing village, eastern Ye Township.197 In addition, many MNED teachers, particularly those who were teaching at the primary schools in the government-contested areas, had not completed their lower secondary education and did not receive proper teaching training.198 It was highly risky for both the children and the parents to access the MNS schooling system in the rebel strongholds or at the borderland. Although some had took the risk for their education by going to the NMSP schools or, later, even to the refugee camps on the borderline, the education service provided by the armed party was also

195 Human Rights Watch, “Burma: They Came and Destroyed Our Village Again: The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Karen State”. 196 Director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State; An NGO worker (former Mon National School teacher), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 197 Ibid. 198 Ibid; Mi Sar Dar, interview.

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inimical.199 Meanwhile, very few girls enrolled in the available education systems, and most dropped out early from the schools due to difficult access, security reasons or fear of harassment by the soldiers.200 Through to the late 1970s, most children from low- income families in the ethnic-populated areas had to rely on informal education services provided by the Buddhist monasteries and Christian churches for their basic literacy and numeracy. Children whose parents were unable to afford the cost, overcome the language barrier or travel to a state school had to go to the monasteries, where Buddhist monks provided basic literacy and numeracy, although this was mostly without a systematic curriculum.201 Most children in the contested areas had to rely on the non-formal education system outside the government structure, such as the Buddhist monasteries and Christian churches, in which they could access basic education in their mother tongue free of charge, together with safer sanctuary.202 For tens of thousands of children displaced with their families in the forest or temporary settlements, access to even such a rudimentary schooling system was virtually impossible.203 Children who had to escape war-related atrocities into the displaced villages in the deep mountainous tropical jungles had no other alternative and had to forgo their education altogether.204

(b) Physical infrastructure

Transportation

In both Karen and Mon States, the transportation facilities that were built since the early colonial time were scant. Prolonged conflict destroyed the essential physical infrastructure and the only available meagre facilities in the areas. In trying to interrupt the communication and supply lines of the government military, armed resistance groups often targeted physical infrastructures such as bridges, overpass, roads and port facilities.

199 An NGO worker (former Mon National School teacher), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 200 Ibid. 201 The military regimes outlawed monastic education schools from 1962 to 1992 to secure the political objectives of the government and centralise the service provision. 202 A director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 203 Ibid. 204 Ibid; Director of a Strategic Study Institute (former Hpa-an native close to Taungkalay Abbot), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon.

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In fact, physical infrastructure in Kayin and Mon States did not only deteriorate because of direct damage from the civil war but also because successive Myanmar governments also shifted expenditure towards military expansion. The few kilometres of sealed roads that connected the cities and towns dated from the late colonial time and were not maintained and there were only a few dirt roads that connected the villages and small towns across Karen- and Mon-populated areas. Until after the ceasefire in Karen- and Mon-populated areas, the military government continually reduced public investment and expenditure in physical infrastructure, leaving roads and bridges in the conflict-affected Karen and Mon areas damaged and without maintenance.

Moreover, while there were no newly built roads or other physical infrastructure, the already poor infrastructure in the conflict-affected zones was virtually paralysed throughout the periods of intense fighting. For instance, as it was left without maintenance since the country’s independence, the 160 km long, single-lane Mawlamyine-Ye highway turned into a rutted track full of potholes. Trucks had to travel at least three days, or sometimes weeks, to reach the destination. There were only a few narrow dirt roads and footpaths connecting the villages scattered across the mountainous areas and along the narrow plain between the mountain ranges and the Gulf of Martaban. As they were routed across and on the narrow embankments of paddy fields, many of the connecting routes in the flat land appeared only in dry season. For those in the mountainous areas, the confusing footpaths of hunters with hard-to-identify forest marking symbols were the only route for inter-village communication and villagers would become lost in the thick tropical jungles while the routes were totally unusable in the raining seasons. Further south, the single-lane Ye-Dawei highway from the colonial time became utterly unusable throughout the civil war.

Similarly, the colonial time Kawtkareik-Myawaddy 62 km upland road to the Thai border was also single lane with few vehicles climbing up or down on specific days205 in the dry season, while it was completely unusable in the rainy season. Whenever fighting broke out on or around the unmaintained roads, or roads were damaged by a natural disaster such as a landslide or torrential rain, transportation through the route came to a total halt, sometimes for months. As the road was mainly used for border trading with Thailand,

205 The even days of the months were for vehicles climbing up and odd days were for driving down.

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most of which was illegal, and did not connect many of the villages scattered in the area, it was hardly useful as a means of public transportation. Karen State had over 30,000 km2 land area and only 220 km tarred road and 25 km railroad.206 In Mon State, there was less than 600 km tarred road and 312 km railroad across over 12,000 km2 land area with more flatlands.207 Consequently, despite smallness in area, access to many parts of both Karen- and Mon-populated areas was poor, mainly due to the underdeveloped and deprived condition of the road network and the deficiencies of the existed transportation service systems. Many Karen and Mon villages were not linked to any road network.

During periods of intense fighting, transportation in the areas was crippled by insecurity and the deplorable condition of the facilities. Until the late 1970s, there were no public road transport services in the areas. For decades, a few privately owned, revamped trucks leftover from the Second World War were the only means of transportation for people and household goods from the state capital Mawlamyine to the smaller towns and large villages.208 A few peoples with talent, skills and resources brought the damaged and abandoned vehicles, mostly Chevrolets, and repaired or reconstructed them with available or handmade spare parts and wooden bodies. It required massive skill to operate these improvised motor vehicles. Moreover, because the required gasoline was only available for the government military and the authorities, owners of the ‘old Chevrolets’ also needed to have a good relationship with both local military commanders and authorities.209 Moreover, along with the crippling route, both the vehicle and goods owners had to pay the government-backed local militia groups, the Kar Kwe Ye, for the security of their trips.

206 Ministry of Information, Myanmar. Chronicle of National Development: Comparison Between Period Preceding 1988 and After (Up to 31-12-2005) (Naypyitaw: Ministry of Information, 2005), 61. 207 ျ ပန္ၾကားေ ာရပန ၾႀာီကပာန၊ “တ နမးေတကန အစုာ ိၾနလၾန ႏုိစု န းေတကနတ ာ္တ ုာတစုာတၾနမႈ မွတနတမနာ ၁၉၈၈-၃၁ာန၊၁၂ာန၊၂ရရ၉ာန၊” (းေပျ ပနးေတကနာန၊ ျ ပန္ၾကားေ ာရပန ၾႀာီကပ)ာန၊ ႏုိွက-၆၃ာန၊ ၁ရ၂။ [Ministry of Information, Myanmar. Chronicle of National Development: Comparison Between Period Preceding 1988 and after (up to 31-12-2009) (Naypyitaw: Ministry of Information, 2009), 63, 102.] The insurgency in Mon State was much less than that in Kayin State and most of the Mon-populated areas were flat lands that were urbanised to some extent since the early colonial time. 208 The villagers from smaller villages had to come to the larger villages for groceries and household goods. 209 Nai Sein Ti, Director of a local NGO, interview with the author, January 27, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State.

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However, this once or twice a week transportation service that sometimes took two to three days was rarely available for even some small towns, such as Kyaikhami and Ye located 48 km and 160 km south, respectively, of Mawlamyine. A former vehicle owner210 explained that together with the militiamen, the first Chevrolet from Thanbyuzayard would begin its journey after the sun had fully risen. The others from larger villages and Mudon Town along the main road towards Mawlamyine had to wait for it at designated meeting points and form a convoy of three to six vehicles. The security militiamen were dropped off at each end of their respective nominated segments of the route and waited for the return of the Chevrolets. After the meeting point at Kamarwett village, the largest village in the middle of Thanbyuzayart and Mudon Town, the convoy vehicles had to risk rebel taxation, dacoits and kidnapping through the rest of the journey to the regional capital city. The militia were not allowed to guard the portion of the road close to towns even though government security forces could not provide adequate security.211 Mainly because of the wartime insecurity and the condition of the road, people hardly used the Thanbyuzayart-Ye portion of the highway, although people sometimes saw old lorries carrying goods moving slowly along.212

Given that neither the government military nor rebel armies could secure these public transportation routes, robbery and dacoits were widespread along the highways. Most of the population living in the conflict-affected southern part of Mon State had to rely solely on the single-lane Mawlamyine-Ye railroad. However, the number of locomotive fleet and trains was gradually shrinking and the rail tracks and supporting sleepers and granite had become rusty after years of under-maintenance.213 The ‘Ye Yahtar,’ as it is locally known, was well known for its crowded, slow, and bumpy rides. At the same time, the train service required permanent, massive security arrangements including heavy guard by the government military along with anti-mine carriages in the front and the rear of the train. Further, due intense fighting in the mid-1980s, it took almost 10 years for the authority to complete the last 15 km of the railway from Taungbon to the Ye Town end

210 Ibid. 211 Ibid. 212 Wholesalers and traders, in discussion with the author, February 25, 2016, Lamine Town, Mon State. 213 An MSP (former native of Ye Town), interview by the author, March 24, 2017, Mawlamyine; A farmer (former member of Mon Young Monk Organisation), interview by the author, February 26, 2016, Ye Town, Mon State.

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station. Again, this less than 100 mile railway took the train at least one to three days, often a week, to reach Ye Town. There were no other public road transportation facilities, road or railroad, for Karen and Mon populations living further south towards Tanintharyi Region. At the same time, the majority of the population living in Kayin State had very limited land transportation facilities and the majority of the population had to rely on the waterway provided by the government Department of Inland Water Transportation and a few locally owned private motorboat transportation services. Passengers travelling along the Thanlwin River on a bunker-like small ferryboat occasionally faced attacks from armed groups.214

Until the late 1980s, Karen State did not have a single kilometre of railroad. The first railroad, 25 km long, was built in the mid-1980s essentially as the production route for the cement factory in Myaingkalay. Only a small percentage of the population living in Kayin State had access to a railway service through Mawlamyine, Mon State, after taking at least six hours of motorboat trips.215 Much of the passenger and goods traffic in Mon- populated areas was by road and railroads and in Karen areas by waterways. With the lack of, or poor, transportation facilities, for over four decades the populations in the conflict-affected Karen and Mon areas faced difficult challenges in accessing employment opportunities, markets, and basic social services.

Electrification

As described in numerous reports of international financial institutions, the electrification rate of Myanmar, particularly in the suburban and rural periphery areas, where the majority of the population lives, has been among the lowest in the world.216 Since the outbreak of civil war, the constraint in supply and inefficiencies in generating, transmission and distribution of electricity have severely suppressed the consumption of electric power in both Karen- and Mon-populated areas. Until the mid-1990s, most of the conflict-affected Karen- and Mon-populated areas remained off-grid from the country’s

214 A country director of an INGO (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, January 21, 2017, Yangon. 215 A director of a Strategic Study Institute (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon; A country director of an INGO (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, January 21, 2017, Yangon. 216 See, for example, The World Bank, Myanmar: Energy Sector Investment and Policy Review Study (Washington, D. C. : The World Bank, 1992).

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national electrical power rollout and electricity in both Karen and Mon States was in extremely short supply. While the population in the conflict-affected rural areas had no access to electricity, brownouts and blackouts in the power systems were frequent in all heavily guarded Karen and Mon urban cities and towns. The urban population had to rely on the off-grid electrical power supply generated by imported fuels such as petrol, diesel, or furnace oil. For decades, the capital city Mawlamyine of Mon State persistently faced brownouts, blackouts and severe voltage fluctuations. For example, until after the NMSP ceasefire in the mid-1990s, most villages in Mudon Township did not have any electrical power supply line.217

Most cities and towns in the areas, such as Kawtkareik and Hlaingbwe towns in Karen State and Thanbyuzayart and Ye Towns in Mon State had very limited residential electricity for one to three hours a day, from six o’clock to nine o’clock at night, two to three days a week, although it could blackout at any time for days or brownout with low strength.218 Having no other alternative sources of energy, rural and urban households in the areas had to rely on solid fuels such as firewood and charcoal as the primary source of energy for cooking. Kerosene lamps and lanterns or wax light were the only sources of household lighting. On average, households in both Karen- and Mon-populated areas spent USD1.50 to USD3.50 per month for household illumination for, at most, three hours a day.219 Virtually all the rural households in the conflict-affected areas depended on kerosene or diesel lamps or lanterns for home illumination. In the late 1980s, a few households with means started using small battery-powered fluorescent lamps in some government stronghold suburban and large villages in which battery recharging services were available.220

217 Village elders, interview by the author, February 3, 2017, Naihlon Village, Mudon Township, Mon State. 218 A township health officer, interview by the author, February 27, 2017, Ye Town, Mon State; a village elder (former auxiliary midwife), interview by the author, March 9, 2016, Hlaingbwe Town, Kayin State; a medical practitioner, interview by the author, March 13, 2016, Kawtbein village, Kawtkareik township, Karen State. 219 A former village administrator, interview by the author, March 7, 2016, Kataingti Village, Papun Township, Kayin State; a village elder (former auxiliary midwife), interview by the author, March 9, 2016, Hlaingbwe Town, Kayin State; a local grocery shop owner (former alcohol producer), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Klawtthawt Village, Mudon Township, Mon State. 220 A community leader (private school teacher), interview with the author, January 31, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State;

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Throughout the warring period, people in the areas faced difficult challenges in enhancing their livelihood requirements. The short electricity supply often resulted in increased in local market prices and, consequently, contributed to trapping many low-income families in poverty. When the government stopped its subsidy of kerosene in the early 1980s, households, not only in the rural villages but also in the urban areas, had to rely on fuel wood and charcoal due to no other alternative source of energy.221

Without electrical power, people in the areas had less light for study, work and socialising after dark. The inadequate energy supply cost households extra expense for candles and kerosene for night time lighting. Moreover, the shortage of power supply was also a major hindrance for the nascent manufacturing industry in the Mon-populated area. Even in the contested areas closer to the government stronghold, the lack of electricity created difficult challenges for local manufacturers in doing business, as they were unable to mechanise their production lines.

Manual production was mostly labour intensive and increased the cost of production and kept the quality of goods lower, leading to lesser compatibility and the eventual closure of the enterprises. Because the small-scale oil mills, sawmills, and paddy huskers in the conflict-affected areas had to generate the required electrical power from imported fuels, the cost of processing and production for farmers and goods producers in the areas was much higher than that of other areas.222 For instance, the lack of reliable electricity meant the leading petty Mon weaving loom enterprises in Mudon Town and other villages were unable to mechanise into large-scale manufacturing industry and had to move out of the conflict-affected areas, although they possessed the necessary skills, technology, equipment, machines, and market potential.223 The promising Mon textile industry totally collapsed in the early 1980s as many resettled their businesses in Bago and Monywa in central Myanmar, where security conditions were more stable and better electrified.224

221 Nai Layehtaw Suvannabhum (former NMSP leader), interview by the author, January 27, 2017, Canberra, Australia. 222 A village elder (a former loom enterprise owner), interview by the author, February 1, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State; a village political leader (former tax collector of NMSP), interview with the author, January 31, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State. 223 Former village administrators, in discussion with the author, January 29, 2017, Nyaunggone Village, Mudon Township, Mon State. 224 Nai Tun Kyaing, (a former owner a local loom enterprise), interview by the author, February 1, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State.

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Communication

Myanmar has enjoyed the benefits of telecommunication since the British introduced the postal service and the use of telephones in late colonial times. However, until recently, the telecommunication sector of the country, especially in the civil war-affected periphery areas, was outmoded with the continued use of obsolete equipment and technology. Throughout the warring periods, the communication infrastructure in both urban and rural Karen- and Mon-populated areas was hardly sufficient. While telecommunication facilities in the cities and large towns in the government stronghold areas were largely obsolete, basic telecommunication services were non-existent in all the conflict-affected villages until the mid-1990s.

There were no telephones or telegram services for public use in remote towns and villages in the contested Karen- and Mon-populated areas. At best, there were a few sub-post offices staffed with one or two low-ranker mail carriers in the government stronghold large villages. For instance, the Kamarwet Village sub-post office was the only available communication service for over 20 villages in the southern part of Mudon Township.225 There was no post office even in many large villages in the areas such as Nainghlon, Takhundaing, and Kalawtthawt. Similarly, Kyaikkhami Town, the former district capital of British Burma and the second town in the current Thanbyuzayart Township did not have government telecommunication service until the early 2000s.226

There were strict regulations for the communication of international phone and fax calls. At the same time, while access to internet service was strictly prohibited, the government’s telecommunication law required stringent licensing for the private installation of international telephones, fax machines, computer modems, and satellite receiver dishes. In the meantime, telephone services in both Mon and Karen areas were extremely insufficient with a few landlines operating over the traditional dedicated physical cable. Only high-ranking authorities and officials in the government stronghold cities and towns had access to the voice-grade telephone service that used analogue signal

225 Nai Pe Thein Hzil (former NMSP leader), interview by the author, October 28, 2017, Canberra, Australia. 226 Town elders and members of Kyaikkami Pagoda Trusteeship, in discussion with the author, February19, 2016, Kyaikkami Town, Thanbyuzayart Township, Mon State.

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transmission over copper loops.227 Until the mid-1990s, even such an obsolete telephone service was not accessible for the population living in the conflict-affected Karen and Mon-populated areas.228 Those who have relatives or contacts in Yangon could have a three-minute-long telephone conversation from abroad, after travelling to Yangon and waiting two to three days in the Yangon Central Post Office. For example, in 1994, it took a medical practitioner from Kawtbein Village, a Mon village in Karen State, over a week to speak with his brother working in Singapore for three minutes.229 The medical doctor had to travel to and from Yangon, stayed at a friend’s apartment and waited for three days at the Central Post Office to have a brief conservation with his brother working abroad.

Stateness in Mon-Populated Areas Following the NMSP Ceasefire

4.4.1. Enforcement capacity

(a) The military

After the 1995 ceasefire between the government and the NMSP, non-combatant military activities immediately increased throughout the Mon-populated areas. The government military hurriedly established numerous IBs and other supporting units at bases across the newly demarcated government-controlled Mon-populated areas. Convoys of military personnel, armoured vehicles and transporter trucks carrying soldiers, armoury, and big guns flooded the main highway, inter-cities, and village roads. The military significantly extended its presence in Mon-populated areas with a near fourfold increase in battalions within less than 10 years and made major inroads into previously inaccessible rebel stronghold areas including permanent military deployments. For instance, Ye Township, which had been at the centre of the fighting for many years saw a massive surge of military deployment.

227 A leader of Karen political party, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State; a former township administrator, interview by the author, January 17, 2017, Kyaikmaraw town, Mon State. 228 A township health officer, interview by the author, February 27, 2017, Ye Town, Mon State. 229 A Medical Practitioner, interview by the author, March 13, 2016, Kawtbein village, Kawtkareik township, Kayin State.

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Before the NMSP ceasefire, there were only two battalions to provide security and conduct counter-insurgency operations throughout the township.230 The military had been unable to implement most of its planned military expansion projects during the first half of the 1990s.231 However, in the 10 years since the NMSP ceasefire, a massive military build-up has occurred across the small Township. For instance, from 1996 the Tmawtkaning area hosts another battalion, LIB No. 588. In 2004, the deployment of the first artillery battalion, No. 317 Field Artillery Battery, was completed in Ywathit village, north of Ye Town.232 Most significantly, in the same year, the small remote town saw the establishment of No. 19 Military Operation Command (MOC), a new structure of military command that was introduced in 1997 and is equivalent to an LID.233 In total, the remote small town of Mon State now hosts one MOC, four IBs, six LIBs, two Artillery Battalions, a Technical Operation Command (TOC), and one of the Sector Operation Centres of the country’s six Air Defence Sectors.234

Similar post-ceasefire military expansions took place across most townships in Mon State. Even Belugyun Island, which had never seen any real fighting, became host to a navy base. By 2013, the government had deployed nine IBs, 15 LIBs, one Missile Battalion, one Air Defence Command with two Air Defence Battalions, one Artillery Operation Command with 11 Artillery Battalions, one Armoured Combat Battalion and a wide range of training, signal, medical, engineering, and supply and transport corps throughout Mon State.

However, in the following years of the ceasefire, although the military build-up in previously NMSP-controlled areas was still in the beginning stages, the security forces of

230 The only military battalions garrisoned in Ye Town were IB No. 61, deployed in 1980 and LIB No. 343, established in 1986. 231 During the period of the national military expansion, IB No. 106 was the only expanded battalion established at Tmawtkaning village a short distance north of Ye Town in 1989. 232 At the same time, the relocation project of LIB No. 343 to Arutoung village east of Ye Town, to provide space for a larger military establishment in Ye Town, was finalised in 2005 and construction works for the new IB No. 586 in the same village were completed in 2008. IB No. 587 at Kreinpawt village in northern Ye Township and LIB No. 31 (relocated from Thanbyuzayart) at Hkaw Za village tract at the far south of Ye Township were accomplished in early 2008. 233 The No. 19 MOC is established at the place of LIB No. 343, which had been in Ye Town since the late 1980s as a counter-insurgency striking force. 234 A former Myanmar Army Battalion Commander, interview by the author, 24 March, 2017, Mawlamyine.

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the oppressive, predatory state had already shown their muscle to the population newly under the solitary rule of the state of Myanmar. In 1997, before settling at the military base in the outskirt of Mudon Town, tens of armoured vehicles of No. 7011 Armour Infantry Battalion in full battle arrangements rambled through the streets of Mudon Town and the surrounding villages demonstrating their might for months.235 Along the main highways and at every significant bridge throughout the Mon-populated areas, military checkpoints were established, mainly to collect taxes from travellers.236 Moreover, although there were no more battles between the MNLA troops and the government military, combat-ready Army platoons continued to patrol the highways and village connecting routes for years.237 At the same time, as the government tried to fast-track its infrastructure build-up in the newly agreed ceasefire zones, the presence of the military in its non-combatant form also increased across the formerly rebel-controlled Mon- populated areas. The populations in the previously rebel-controlled areas began seeing the government military provide security to the higher-level military and state officials visiting the communities or inspecting the infrastructure project sites.238

Moreover, without any consultation or compensation, the government military forced numerous landowners off their land and confiscated vast swathes of agriculture, horticulture, fruits, and perennial crop plantations together with all their farming produce for the military build-ups. By claiming constitutional rights that declare that the State owns all the air, land, and water, military authorities confiscated between three and 10 times more than the actual land areas needed for the military use.239 In addition, the military used excess force in fending off the farmers and communities from any form of

235 A youth leader (freelance lawyer), interviewed by the author, February 18, 2016, Mudon, Mon State; a former private telephone service provider, interview by the author, January 30, 2017, Mudon Town, Mon State. 236 A local CSO leader (former member of NMSP underground movement), interview by the author, February 27, 2016, Ye Town, Mon State; a village elder (former KNU village head), interview by the author, March 21, 2017, Kyaungywa, Ye Township. 237 Village administrator, interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Koemai Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 238 A village elder (former village head of NMSP), interview by the author, March 20, 2017, Khawzar Town, Ye Township, Mon State. 239 Community leaders, in discussion with the author, March 17, 2017, Arutoung Village, Ye Township, Mon State; a village elder (former village head of NMSP), interview by the author, March 20, 2017, Khawzar Town, Ye Township, Mon State.

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appeal or protest against such confiscation. In 2001, a group of farmers from Arutoung Village, Ye Township, who tried to reclaim their land that had been left idle or re-rented to others by the LIB were arrested, tortured, and imprisoned.240 In some cases, the original owners of the land were forced to work on their own farmland as farm workers, sometimes as forced labourers.241

Moreover, the increase in the presence of the military became an effective enforcement for local authorities in implementing their day-to-day tasks, government policies, and infrastructure development projects. As the NMSP ceasefire came at a later stage of the regime’s ceasefire-making process, most of these projects were inadequately funded and required substantial contributions such as land, fund, materials, logistics and hard labour from the poverty-stricken local populations. In doing so, the local military showed its strength in backing up local administrators and the staff of the government line agency to force the local communities to comply. For instance, in the late 1990s the battalions stationed in Ye Town closely provided enforcement to the local civilian authorities in forcing thousands of villagers to contribute construction materials such as sand, gravel, and bamboo and hard labour, cash, and logistics to transport the materials for the Ye- Dawel railroad project.242

Similarly, at the beginning or completion of an infrastructure project, such as a bridge or hospital, high-ranking government officials would lay the foundation stone or cut opening ribbons and provide speeches to forcefully convened government civilian staff and villagers. Depending on the level of the official and the accompanied team, the local military as the backing force of the government departmental staff and village administrators would compel the population to provide materials, funds, and free labour for such occasions. For years, there were various infrastructure development projects

240 Ibid; a village elder (former KNU village head), interview by the author, March 21, 2017, Kyaungywa, Ye Township, Mon State. 241 Ibid; Community Leaders, in discussion with the author, March 17, 2017, Arutoung Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 242 A village elder (former village head), interview by the author, February 27, 2016, Kalawt Village, Ye Township, Mon State; A government school teacher, interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State; Former Village Head, interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State.

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underway in previously NMSP-controlled areas and the communities that had emerged from the war atrocities had to face the show of muscle by the government military.

(b) Police force

Similarly, the NMSP ceasefire created conditions for the previously subordinate Myanmar Police Force to become a vital apparatus of the Myanmar State in its monopoly over the legitimate use of force, at least in the rural Mon areas. In addition to the government upgrades of the existing police establishments, the number of police stations, sub-stations and police outposts increased in both urban and rural Mon State. At the same time, with the increased military presence, police activities against crime and anti- narcotics operations visibly increased in Mon villages.243 As the institution became better resourced and organised in the mid-1990s, it became more professional in executing its role and responsibilities.244

More importantly, as the government upgraded several formerly rebel-controlled or - contested large villages into towns in the mid-2000s, the presence of police force also increased. For instance, the government MOH established new town-level police sub- stations at the newly upgraded Lamine Town and Khawzar Town in Ye Township and Zingyaik Town in Paung Township.245 The Kamarwet Village police outpost was upgraded into a town-level police sub-station when the village tract became a town in 2009.246 Consequently, the police presence in rural Mon villages has noticeably increased and the Myanmar Police Force has expanded its role as an apparatus of the Myanmar State on the legitimate monopoly use of force. Criminals or fugitives can no longer easily escape from police arrests by taking refuge in the rebel-government-contested areas as

243 A village elder (former village head of NMSP), interview by the author, March 20, 2017, Khawzar Town, Ye Township, Mon State. 244 Selth, “Myanmar’s Police Forces: Coercion, Continuity and Change,” 53–79. At the same time, with the liquidation of the notorious military intelligence units in 2004, the units of Police Special Branch took over the task of interrogating and detaining political dissidents both in towns and rural villages and became a more powerful state apparatus, although the organisation itself was still a subordinate institution of the military. The role of the Myanmar Police Force in the country’s national security has improved as the institution has developed a new system of gathering intelligence information not only on criminals and unlawful activities, but also on the development of political, social and economic situations in broader areas. 245 A ward administrator, interview by the author, February 25, 2016, Lamine Town, Mon State. 246 A ward administrator, interview by the author, February 1, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State.

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they have done in the past.247 Further, one of 16 active Combat Police Battalions, the paramilitary capacity of the Myanmar Police Force, was established in Mawlamyine in the aftermath of the ceasefire agreement.

4.4.2. Administrative capacity

(a) Administration

Since after the ceasefire, security in most of the previously contested areas of the NMSP in both Kayin and Mon States has significantly improved, except in a few places in which security vacancies have unexpectedly occurred after the new demarcations of control areas between the government troops and the NMSP armies were redrawn.248 As the government security forces increased their presences and amplified the security build-up in the ceasefire territories, the state of Myanmar has been able to expand its administration into many areas that were never under its rule.249

At the same time, in addition to the right to retain arms, permission to extract natural resources and other economic privileges, the military regime also recognised the de facto autonomy of the newly agreed rebel-controlled territories as the ‘special (administrative) region’ of NMSP.250 As conceded in the verbal ceasefire agreement, all the MNLA troops have withdrawn to the eastern side of the Mawlamyine-Ye-Dawei highway that demarcates the eastern and western parts of Mon State.251 The government military battalions took over control of all the formerly NMSP-controlled and -contested areas in the western part of Mon State. As both the government and rebel troops were required to inform and receive prior agreement to travel or trespass the control areas of the other,252

247 Ibid. 248 For example, a few small splinter groups and former combatants of MNLA continued to be active in the newly demarcated government-controlled areas. The coastal areas at the border of Ye Township in Mon State and Yebyu Township of Tanintharyi Region remained unstable for years. A village elder (former village head of NMSP), interview by the author, March 20, 2017, Khawzar Town, Ye Township, Mon State. 249 See also Kim Jolliffe, “Ethnic Conflict and Social Services in Myanmar's Contested Regions” (Yangon: The Asia Foundation, 2014), 1. 250 An NMSP leader, interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 251 Ibid.; An MNLA commander, interview by the author, January 27, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 252 An NMSP leader, interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State.

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the issue of multiple village administrators in a single village was largely resolved. The local administration in the newly demarcated government and rebel-controlled areas became increasingly stable. Many Mon villages in the government-controlled areas now have new village administrators together with village Peace and Development Committees (PDCs). Villagers who were better educated became involved in village administration, and some villages now have relatively better village administrators compared to the previous agents that were loyal to the higher authorities. For instance, some village chairpersons in western Mudon Township, including Naunggone, Dagondaing, Naihlon, Kamarwet, Gonnyindan, and many others were university graduates.253 Some of the village authorities also extended their consultation with the village citizens in some decision-making processes on issues noticeably related to their daily public lives.254 However, in many cases, those who had some connection with the local military commanders became village authorities.

Most village heads were able to regain their primary duties of village administration, especially land registration, settling civil disputes, collecting land and excise revenues and reporting demographics in their jurisdictions.255 At the same time, as the ceasefire has made it clear who held the power to rule in a particular village, the villagers began to accept the resolution of the new village administrators over their disputes, although some continued to go to the improvised courts of NMSP.256 Some of the village administrators also started conveying the needs of the villages they were presiding over to higher-level authorities and, in a few cases, to the Commanders of the Regional Command, the highest provincial authority in the government-controlled areas.257 For instance, in the late 1990s the village administrator in Hangam village who had a personal connection with the

253 Former village administrators, in discussion with the author, January 29, 2017, Nyaunggone Village, Mudon Township, Mon State; a Mon social worker (former MNED staff), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Klawtthawt Village, Mudon Township, Mon State; a ward administrator, interview by the author, February 1, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State. 254 Kempel and Nyein, “Local Governance Dynamics in South East Myanmar,” 28. 255 A ward administrator, interview by the author, February 1, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State. 256 A local grocery shop owner (former alcohol producer), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Klawtthawt Village, Mudon Township, Mon State. 257 A ward administrator, interview by the author, February 1, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State; a ward administrator, interview by the author, February 25, 2016, Lamine Town, Mon State.

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regional commander in Mawlamyine brought about state funds to redesign the structural settlement of the village and implement various infrastructure development projects.258 With matching funds from the government’s Na Ta La, the village PDC constructed a 180 foot-long bridge on the Khawzar-Ye road, a primary school and an RHC for the village.259 In addition, the village authorities managed to build a modernised village market at the centre of the village in 1999.260 Some even helped the villagers to effectively bring their issues and concerns to higher-level administrative authorities.261

Moreover, as the burden to collect forced taxes, recruit forced labourers, and military porters gradually decreased and, importantly, there was no longer the need to point to somebody as a rebel or government agent, the villagers gradually perceived their village heads as their representatives and less as the agents of the enemy Bamar State.262 Trust between the village administrators and the population has gradually returned in some of the villages in the formerly contested areas in Mon State.

Meanwhile, the administrative staff of different ranks of NMSP have also begun to hold community consultancy meetings on a bi-annual basis in larger villages in which all the villagers from the adjacent areas attend and raise their issues.263 Virtually all the village headmen in NMSP-controlled areas were selected with better community consultation or indirectly re-elected by the villagers, although the authoritative tradition of top-down appointments or nominations still prevailed.264 Many younger villagers have also become

258 Former village head, interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State; a government school teacher, interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 259 Ibid. Similarly, with his close connection to the commander of the RMC, another powerful village administrator in Asin Village in southern Ye Township also successfully upgraded his fishing village into a marine product trade hub. A marine product trader, interview by the author, February 26, 2016, Asin Village, Ye Township, Mon State; a local restaurant owner, interview by the author, February 27, 2016, Annawar Ward, Ye Town, Mon State. 260 A Mon businessman (former contractor), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 261 A head monk, interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State; a government school teacher, interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 262 A Head Monk, interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 263 A Mon political party leader (former high-ranking official of NMSP), interview by the author, February 26, 2016, Ye Town, Mon State. 264 An NMSP leader, interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State; a leader of Mon rights group (border based), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine; a local

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involved in village administration, now they no longer have to face the threat of the government military or meet the arbitrary demands of multiple armed forces.265

Conversely, with the expanded presence of security personnel, local government authorities, particularly those from GAD, have expanded their reach and increased the power of their administration. The township and village administrative authorities could exert unprecedented control over the population with stronger enforcement for their orders and decisions. In many areas, township and village tract authorities became tenacious and were able to implement their duties more authoritatively. Villagers in the government-controlled areas could no longer avoid or escape the order or demand of the authorities, since a disobedient act required the person concerned to permanently move into a NMSP-controlled area or further towards the borderlands.266 For instance, referring to the forced labourers recruited for the notorious construction Ye-Dawei railroad project, a villager from Hangam village in Southern Ye Township lamented that ‘whenever the village head or an officer from Ye Town ask you to come, you must go. Otherwise, a group of soldiers will soon be in your courtyard’.267 Similarly, a mid-career professional from Kamarwet Village affirmed that all the grocery stores including the small domestic grocery shops could no longer evade the demands of village authorities for donations, contributions, or fees under various titles and paid arbitrarily imposed sale tax and income tax for their small shops.268

(b) Taxation

As the presence of security forces increased and the capacity and reach of the state administration expanded following the ceasefire of NMSP, the taxation capacity of the Myanmar state in the formerly conflict-affected Mon-populated areas significantly increased, although it was arbitrary in nature and corruption persisted. Unlike during the

CSO leader (former member of NMSP underground movement), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 265 Village administrator, interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Koemai Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 266 A ward administrator, interview by the author, February 25, 2016, Lamine Town, Mon State. 267 A villager, interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 268 A ward administrator, interview by the author, February 1, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State.

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warring periods, staff from the township IRD instead of village headmen flooded all the Mon villages subject to the NMSP ceasefire agreement and began assessing, imposing, and directly collecting various kinds of tax. These included household income tax, property tax (including residential properties, newly constructed houses, and stamp duty for the transfer of property), land tax, and tax on farming instruments (such as bullock carts, tractors and tillers, water pumps, and boats).269 Although there were limited records of actual household incomes, in collaboration with the village administrators, IRD officials started levying income taxes with progressive rates and varying percentages.270 The department also imposed taxes on farming produce such as crumb rubber, fruit, and marine products mostly on an ad hoc, lump sum basis.271

At the same time, the IRD started collecting sale tax and profit tax with continually aggregating rates on domestic, small-scale businesses, and local and external trading.272 Since township-level officials became involved in both assessment and collection, even a small local grocery shop could no longer avoid the sale tax and profit tax.273 In some areas, the government authorities also levied taxes on satellite receiver discs, television sets, and Karaoke systems used by the local shops.274 Restaurants and local food stalls, especially those that sell alcohol, have become major prey for the armed forces, sometimes in collaboration with the village-level bureaucracy.275 Although it was meant to be levied in accordance with the 1976 Profit Tax Law, the profit tax and sale tax levied in the areas were typically high and barely linked to the amount of income of households

269 Ibid; a ward administrator, interview by the author, February 25, 2016, Lamine Town, Mon State. 270 A local grocery shop owner (former alcohol producer), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Klawtthawt Village, Mudon Township, Mon State. 271 A farmer, interview by the author, March 23, 2017, Angding Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 272 A local grocery shop owner (former alcohol producer), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Klawtthawt Village, Mudon Township, Mon State; a ward administrator, interview by the author, February 1, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State. 273 Former village administrators, in discussion with the author, January 29, 2017, Nyaunggone Village, Mudon Township, Mon State; a local grocery shop owner (former alcohol producer), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Klawtthawt Village, Mudon Township, Mon State; a ward administrator, interview by the author, February 1, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State. 274 Ibid; a Municipal official, interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Thanbyuzayart, Mon State. 275 A village elder (former village head of NMSP), interview by the author, March 20, 2017, Khawzar Town, Ye Township, Mon State; a village elder (former village head), interview by the author, February 27, 2016, Kalawt Village, Ye Township, Mon State.

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and profit made by the businesses, most of which were small-scale and domestic.276 Most of the taxes levied on such businesses hardly followed prescribed schedules and, instead, depended on the relationship, negotiation, and bribes made to the individual taxation officer.277

Moreover, government GAD and ministerial line agencies also started levying and collecting various kinds of tax and fees from the households and individuals. Since 1996, the Mudon Township GAD charged substantial fees for licences to operate local businesses such as rice mills, goldsmiths, and land and waterway transportation services.278 The district and township-level GADs also earned a considerable amount of revenue from auctions of lucrative business licences such as alcohol production and fishing rights in inland water.279 Similarly, the village administrations earned daily licence fees from village market stalls.280 The village tract administrators also collected numerous fees for high-level visits, mass rallies that were convened by the government or government organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs) and instructed phoney village development projects. At the same time, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) and Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association (MMCWA) also collected compulsory donations for their activities.281 Since the ceasefire, the village-level GAD could also impose various fines to the households under their jurisdiction. For example, when forced labourers failed to turn up at the Kalawt-Hangam road construction site, the village authorities in Kalawt and Hangam villages summoned the absentees to the village administrator offices and fined them MMK 1,600 for each day of absence.282

276 A local grocery shop owner (former alcohol producer), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Klawtthawt Village, Mudon Township, Mon State. See also Bissinger and Maung, “Subnational Governments and Business in Myanmar,” 22. 277 Ibid. 278 A local grocery shop owner (former alcohol producer), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Klawtthawt Village, Mudon Township, Mon State. 279 A ward administrator, interview by the author, February 25, 2016, Lamine Town, Mon State. 280 Ibid. 281 Ibid. 282 A former village head, interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State; a village elder (former village head), interview by the author, February 27, 2016, Kalawt Village, Ye Township, Mon State; a farmer (former member of Mon Young Monk Organisation), interview with the author, February 26, 2016, Ye Town, Mon State.

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In the same way, the authorities of state and state-backed organisation, particularly the local military intelligence units and armed forces, were able to extract a raft of taxes from informal businesses even in the border towns and villages, although not mandated in the legislation. An extraordinary example was the way in which various government agencies and government-backed organisations exerted multiple taxes on a family-run informal telephone service in Kyaungywa Village, Ye Township. Since, there was no communication service in the area, the household head, who was a member of village PDC, managed to install a Thai satellite telephone in the village by paying a large informal licence fee to the local military intelligent unit. As the service could reach Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore, the service provided by the family became vital for the international communication and remittance transfer of the population in the area. However, to run the business, the family had to pay a host of taxes to various government agencies. The monthly fees included payment of MMK 36,000 to the local military intelligence unit, MMK 5,000 to the local military battalion, MMK 6,000 to the township PDC, MMK 12,000 to the township postal and telecommunication department, and MMK 5,000 to the village PDC.283 The government administrators even levied taxes for the specific purpose of infrastructure construction such as roads, railroads, bridge, schools, and health centres. In many cases, a higher taxing agency decided the size of tax to levy on the village as a whole, and the village administrator determined the amount due from individual households.284

Moreover, as there were armies of security personnel living off the poor citizens in the ethnic areas, the methods of tax extraction used by all the local authorities were, as Turnell describes, “informal, opportunistic, random and all too often via force of arms”.285 While the households in the ceasefire areas were devastated by the disproportionately high taxes,

283 At the time, USD 1 was equivalent to MMK 800 to 900. A village elder (former satellite phone owner), interview by the author, March 21, 2017, Kyaungywa Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 284 A ward administrator, interview by the author, February 1, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State; former village heads, in discussion with the author, February 24, 2016, Lamine Town, Mon State. Villages in the infrastructure projects areas also had to provide free labour and construction materials such as wood, bamboo, gravel shingle, and sand. Villagers from Koemai Village in Ye Township, for instance, had to provide river sand, gravel stones, and boulders for years for the Ye-Dawel railroad project in the late 1990s. Mid-career villagers, in discussion with the author, March 22, 2017, Koemai Village, Ye Township, Mon State; village administrator, interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Koemai Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 285 Turnell, “Fundamentals of Myanmar's Macroeconomy: A Political Economy Perspective,” 142.

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they were also required to pay a range of other forced payments imposed by the military and government-backed local militia groups.286 The populations also had to make numerous kinds of forced donations under innumerable headings. Through the village heads, the government military and police forces commonly used extortion as the method of tax collection, both in kind and in cash, across the newly demarcated government- controlled areas.

Further, along major roads and at medium- and large-size bridges, the government military, police forces, and several civilian authorities erected checkpoints, inspection gates, and toll-gates and collected fees and charges under various titles. The road users, regardless of whether they were a passenger in a boat, motor vehicle, or motorbike, had to pay a fee when passing a military checkpoint, garrison, guarded bridge, gate on a waterway, or town entrance, while the vehicle and boat drivers were also arbitrarily levied.287 At the same time, local government armed forces forced village authorities to demand arbitrary taxes, often in large amounts, giving the reasons of village security and expenses for high-level visits to the areas.288 In addition, the military battalions started demanding cash and in kind support for their military activities. The villagers had to pay for the construction of military bases, provide hard labour, tractors, trucks, and motor vehicles, as well as additional ration supplies including livestock such as cows, pigs, chicken, and agriculture produces such as vegetables, rice, and other crops.289

Fines were also a common form of raising funds for a host of state agencies, although a substantial portion of the revenue was diverted to the personal income of the officials. Different state agencies imposed various fines on individuals and households for non- compliance of offences, many of which are unpredictable. Many fines were related to

286 See, for example, Human Rights Foundation for Monland (HURFOM), “I Have No More Left in My Hand,” The Mon Forum, no. 11 (2008). 287 Boat operators, interview by the author, March 18, Chaungtaung Village, Ye Township, Mon State; a vehicle owner, interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Koemai Village, Ye Township, Mon State; a bus service operator (Hangam-Ye Bus Services), interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangan Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 288 HURFOM, “Arbitrary Taxation Increasing in Mudon Township,” Rhemonnya.org, September 14, 2009. http://rehmonnya.org/archives/1060 289 See also KHRG, “Report from the Field,” (Mae Sot: Karen Human Rights Group, 2005), p. 83

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political reasons such as absence from a state- or GONGO-convened mass rally,290 while some were security related such as falling asleep while on night sentry duty.291 By abusing the detention power of the state, local police forces were heavily involved in imposing fines and Scottish-style poll taxes to extort money in Ye and Yebyu Township in the mid- 2000s.292

4.4.3. Infrastructure capacity

(a) Social infrastructure

Healthcare services

Soon after the ceasefire agreement in 1995, the government DOH, under the initiatives of the Na Ta La, began to build infrastructure for the government health care system in the ceasefire Mon-populated areas. Buildings for RHCs and sub-RHCs were erected across the newly demarcated government-controlled Mon-populated areas. By 2010, the government had built an additional two SHs, six RHCs, and 35 sub-RHCs in the previously highly contested Ye Township.293 The government DOH also built a new Maternal and Child Health Centre in all 10 townships in Mon State.294 Instead of upgrading the existing sub-RHC or RHC in the NMSP stronghold villages, the government built new SHs. The government department of Border Area and National Races Development built a 16-bed SH in Khaw Zar Village in 1997, previously there had never been a government health care facility in the village or its neighbouring areas.295

290 A community leader (private school teacher), interview with the author, January 31, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State; a village political leader (former tax collector of NMSP), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State. 291 A village elder (former village head of NMSP), interview by the author, March 20, 2017, Khawzar Town, Ye Township, Mon State; a village elder (a retired High School Principal), interview by the author, March 17, 2017, Arutoung Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 292 A village elder (former MNEC teacher, Khawzar), interview by the author, March 20, 2017, Khawzar Town, Ye Township, Mon State; village administrator, interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Koemai Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 293 A former State health official (Mon State), interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State; a township health officer, interview by the author, February 27, 2017, Ye Town, Mon State. 294 A former State health official (Mon State), interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 295 A Mon political party leader (former high-ranking official of NMSP), interview by the author, February 26, 2016, Ye Town, Mon State; a village elder (former MNEC teacher, Khawzar), interview

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At the same time, by speeding up the sanctioning of hospitals and health centres, the MOH also tried to establish an extensive network of rural health centre and expand health care services in the government- and NMSP-administered areas. A former Mon State health authority advised that the ceasefire of NMSP brought about more hospitals and health centres than the DOH could allocate according to the nationally set rules, population density, and geographical location.296

Moreover, replenishment of government health supplies to the government health centres in the areas gradually became more regular, although it remained under-resourced.297 The DOH began to increase the replenishment of medicine, medical tools and equipment and improve facilities in the government health centres in the areas.298 These increases in replenishments and improved facilities also resolved the issues discouraging medical doctors and health personnel from taking up and remaining in their assigned postings in the ceasefire areas. Consequently, although the ratio of doctors to the population in the areas remained low, the number of doctors in the township and SHs visibly increased.299 Moreover, while the trained government health personnel were at first reluctant to assume their postings in the newly demarcated ceasefire territories, in the following years most health staff gradually took their assigned positions.300 Whereas the government health personnel used to request for a transfer in a few weeks upon arriving at a remote ceasefire village, many began to stay longer as security and infrastructural facilities in the areas improved. The government DOH also tried to resolve the issue of insufficient government

by the author, March 19, 2017, Khawzar Town, Ye Township, Mon State; a Mon businessman (former contractor), interview by the author, January 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 296 A former State health authority (Mon State), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. The increase in government health facilities was also due to the demands of NMSP leaders whenever they met with high-level government authorities. A Mon political party leader (former high-ranking official of NMSP), interview by the author, February 26, 2016, Ye Town, Mon State. 297 A former State health authority (Mon State), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 298 A former village head, interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 299 A community leader (private school teacher), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State; a community leader, interview by the author, 23 February, 2016, Three-Pagoda Town, Kayin State. 300 A village elder (former MNEC teacher, Khawzar), interview by the author, March 20, 2017, Khawzar Town, Ye Township, Mon State.

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health personnel by lowering the qualification requirements for entrants into government health training institutions such as health assistants, nurses, and midwives, especially those from remote ceasefire zones. For example, the Department of Health Professional Resource Development and Management lowered the educational requirement for entrants to midwifery training from the completion of higher secondary (Year 10) to lower secondary (Year 8).301 At the same time, with the recommendation of NMSP, the department also admitted applicants from the ceasefire areas without the obligatory entrance examination.302 As a result, trained health authorities including nurses, midwives, and vaccinators gradually filled the vacant postings in most existing or newly built hospitals, RHCs and sub-RHCs across Mon-populated area, although they often held lower qualifications. For instance, in the early 2000s Hangam RHC, which was built in 1997, became functional with reasonable medical replenishment and health personnel who were mostly local residents.303

Further, in the years following the ceasefire, for the first time the preventive health care programs of the government reached previously rebel-contested and -controlled areas. As it was politically popular and straightforward to implement, the DOH quickly expanded immunisation programs to the ceasefire zones. The ceasefire created an enabling environment for such public health activities as mass immunisation and foreign governments and international organisations began providing fund and technical assistance for the programs. For example, the Japanese government paid for measles vaccines and UNICEF provided most of the other vaccines and technical assistance together with the required training.304 As it is also relatively inexpensive and simple to implement, the DOH also attempted to expand the state immunisation programs to reach as many as it could and immunised children in the previously inaccessible Mon-populated areas against six communicable diseases including polio, tetanus, measles, and

301 Hla Myint, “The Role of the Health Sector Contribution to National Consolidation,” in Socio- Economic Factors Contributing to National Consolidation, edited by the Office of Strategic Studies (Yangon: Myanmar Ministry of Defence, 1996), 135. 302 Ibid. 303 A former village head, interview by the author, March 18, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State; a farmer (former health worker of MNHC), interview by the author, March 18, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 304 Miriam Bianco, “Myanmar Midwives Deliver Vaccines as Well as Babies” (UNICEF, 1996), 3. Cited in Rudland, Political Triage: Health and the State in Myanmar (Burma), 323.

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tuberculosis.305 The government immunisation programs of the Ye Township DOH began reaching the populations in the Kyaungywa Village tract that was previously under the rule of NMSP and KNU in 1999.306 The programs also provided immunisation for pregnant women against tetanus.307 In some village tracts such as Hangam in Ye Township and Ahnin in Thanbyuzayart Township basic health staff, particularly vaccinators and midwives, with the assistance of the volunteer health workers, were assigned to take over the immunisation activities as their regular work.308 In some villages in previously conflict-affected zones, the DOH was able to immunise over 50 per cent of targeted children against most of the preventable diseases.309 However, due to poor transportation facilities and the lack of adequate human resources, many preventive health services continue to face difficulties in achieving full implementation across all the ceasefire areas.310

Similarly, by upholding the concept of community volunteerism (alhough it was actually a sham), the government has provided the necessary conditions and encouragement for closely vetted state-sponsored NGOs to take part in health service delivery to the communities in government stronghold Mon-populated areas. The MMCWA, the Myanmar Medical Association, and the Myanmar Red Cross Society are some examples of this. With privileges and solid state support, the GONGOs have been the only non- state formal organisation with permission to directly deliver health care services to

305 A former State health authority (Mon State), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 306 A village elder (former KNU village head), interview by the author, March 21, 2017, Kyaungywa Village, Ye Township, Mon State; village elders (former NMSP village heads and administrative committee members), in discussion with the author, March 21, 2017, Kyaungywa Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 307 Ibid. 308 A former State health authority (Mon State), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; a village elder (former sawmill owner), interview by the author, March 21, 2017, Kyaungywa, Ye Township, Mon State; a farmer (former Health Worker of MNHC), interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State; a township health officer, interview by the author, March 18, 2017, Ye Town, Mon State. See also Bianco, “Myanmar Midwives Deliver Vaccines as Well as Babies”. 309 A former State health authority (Mon State), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; a state health official (Mon State), interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 310 Ibid; See also UNICEF, Master Plan of Operation: Myanmar–UNICEF Country Program of Cooperation 1996–2000 (Yangon: UNICEF, 1995), 37.

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grassroots communities. Since the NMSP ceasefire, many Mon-populated villages in the former conflict zones have seen the township- or village-level organisations of the GONGOs delivering various primary health care activities. For instance, as a GONGO that is highly indulged by the government with funds donated by well-connected cronies, local business oligarchs, UN agencies and INGOs, the MMCWA expanded its branches not only into the towns, but also the previously NMSP-controlled Mon villages.311 Local communities perceive the GONGOs as a kind of government agency with authority; therefore, the involvement of the GONGOs in public health activities has equally extended the social infrastructure of the government into previously inaccessible remote Mon communities.

The ceasefire has also created enabling conditions for international and local humanitarian and development organisations as the partner agencies of the government MOH to reach previously highly restricted conflict areas. In 1996, UN agencies such as UNICEF and WHO entered Mon areas as the partner organisations of government MOH and delivered some preventive health care programs.312 The increased presence of local and international community organisations has also benefited the MNHC and its affiliated health organisations. At the same time, since MNHC has remained connected with the border-based health regimes and the health-related international community, health staff of the organisation, and its affiliated groups gained access to cross-border health care resources including training, equipment, funding and medication. As travel restrictions in the NMSP ceasefire areas have eased, MNHC staff can travel to both the government- controlled areas and the border areas under continued fighting and communicate with the non-state local and international health regimes. Together with KDHW, the Karenni Mobile Health Committee, or health branch of the Karenni armed Party, the MNHC participated as a stakeholder in the formation of the Back Pack Health Worker Team

311 In high-profile public health care activities such as Sanitation Weeks and National Immunisation Days, the authorities of the GONGOs (most of whom are the female spouses of the commanders of the local military, officials from government administrative and line agencies and government staff, particularly teachers) played major roles. With its widespread network, infrastructure, privileges and resources, the organisation is widely involved in health and welfare activities such as childcare, nutrition, health education and even micro-credit projects and complements the insufficient capacity of the DOH in the village communities across Mon State. 312 A former State health authority (Mon State), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State.

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(BPHWT) in August 1998.313 These cross-border supports largely resolved the issues that resulted from the withdrawal of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) as the leading trainer and source of expertise for the health workers of MNHC following the NMSP ceasefire in 1996.314 In the early-2000s, health staff of MNHC and its affiliated groups had the chance to attend clinically oriented training programs as well as courses for public health, pharmacy, laboratory and health administrators, some of which took place in universities in Thailand.

However, because the capacity of the health infrastructure of the autocratic state of Myanmar is still inadequate and underperforming, it could be difficult for the ruling regime to take over all the different health care services of the NSAs that have been in place for several decades.315 While the health personnel of the MNHC are familiar with the local context, geography, language, culture, nature of prevalent diseases, and, most importantly, retain the long-term trust of the communities the health care services they provide possess significant advantages;316 some newly arrived DOH health practitioners reportedly misdiagnosed the causes of illness and prescribed inappropriate medication. For instance, a lack of experience with the nature of prevalent malaria in the areas caused a medical practitioner of Hangam RHC to mistakenly diagnose the cause of illness and prescribe wrong medication to some malaria-infected villagers.317 Moreover, although a cost-sharing health care policy of the state is in place, health services in some village RHCs and sub-RHC required patients to fund 100 per cent of out-of-pocket health financing at excessive prices, while some even had to pay overhead costs such as fuel

313 A community librarian (former head of MNHC hospital), interview by the author, January 18, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 314 The MSF has been providing a comprehensive health care service, including training, in the NMSP areas since the early 1970s. A former medic of MNHC, interview by the author, May 27, 2017, Canberra, Australia. 315 A state health official (Mon State), interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 316 A local NGO leader (former official of MNHC), interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State; a community librarian (former head of MNHC hospital), interview by the author, 18 January, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 317 A farmer (former health worker of MNHC), interview by the author, March 18, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State.

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costs for running the hospital generator.318 Losing trust in the quality of the service, patients in some villages stopped attending health services in the newly established government RHC and returned to the mobile health team of MNHC.

Some communities in the previously MNLA-controlled areas continue to prefer the health care service of the MNHC.319 For some of the recipient populations in the previously conflict-affected areas, time is required for them to become familiar with and trust the services provided by the government health care personnel and attend the offered health care services. Consequently, although the government has tried to upgrade and expand basic health care services in the ceasefire areas, the MNHC continues to operate many of its stationary and mobile clinics in both the new government-administered and NMSP- controlled areas.320 With strong community support and funding and technical assistance from local and international humanitarian and development organisations inside the country, rather than cross-border, MNHC has continued to provide health care services to the population.

Aiming for sustainability in the following years, MNHC detached and helped to reform its affiliated health care groups into independent community-based groups and civil society organisations.321 The Mon Medical Practitioner Association and Mon Maternal and Child Welfare Association are some examples of these.322 Since the early 2000s, MNHC has continued to provide health services in the newly demarcated government- administered areas through these organisations.323 Thus, replacing or annihilating the parallel social service provision of the NSAs could result in worsening the already

318 A former village head, interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State; three former patients, in discussion with the author, March 22, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township. 319 Three former patients, in discussion with the author, March 22, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township; a former village head, interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 320 An NMSP leader, interview by the author, January 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 321 Ibid; a high-ranking education official (Member of NMSP Central Committee), interviewed by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 322 A Mon social activist (former MNED official), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 323 Ibid; a Mon civil society organisation leader (former MNED official), interview by the author, January 16, 2017, Mawlamyine; a community librarian (former Head of MNHC hospital), interview by the author, February 14, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State.

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pathetic health status of the communities in the previously rebel-controlled and -contested areas.

As suggested by many academic experts and practitioners, the main elements of the different health systems such as service delivery, governance, health personnel, and information of both the state and NSAs need to be aligned, incorporated, and unified to achieve better health outcomes and equity in post-conflict societies.324 Eliminating the established health care systems of the NSAs may not strengthen the capacity of the social infrastructure in the areas emerging from armed conflict, although it is true that a capable state must be able to establish and solely deliver a universal social service system. As argued by David and Jolliffe, while the state has the absolute responsibility to ensure every citizen living within the country boundary has access to adequate health care services, it “is not –and needs not be—the only provider of healthcare”.325 Rather, as the authors suggest “the state needs to create the right policy and legal framework to ensure that people have access to services of the highest quality, and as affordable as possible”.326 Therefore, movement towards the convergence of the different health care systems of the state and the NSAs could better serve the community and, thus, increase the capacity and efficiency of the overall State health care infrastructure.

Following the ceasefire, vast spaces opened for cooperation and coordination between the MNHC and the government DOH, especially at the township level, in previously conflicting Mon-populated areas. Meetings between the MNHC and the government DOH led to the recognition of the service delivery of the health workers of MNHC in the government-controlled areas and cooperation between the two parties has increased in areas such as training, service delivery, and information sharing.327 In 1997, NMSP successfully negotiated a quota for nurses and other health workers of MNHC to be trained in government training institutions with lower entry requirements.328 In addition,

324 See, for example, Jolliffe and Davis, “Achieving Health Equity in Contested Areas of Southeast Myanmar”. 325 Ibid, 2. 326 Ibid. 327 A CEC member of NMSP, interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 328 An NMSP leader, interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State; A senior researcher of MDRI-CESD, interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon; A local NGO leader (former official of MNHC), interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State.

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although the primary purpose of the liaison officers was to communicate with the government military and authorities, they often enabled coordination between the MNHC and government DOH.329 This has increased mutual recognition by the health staff of each party and cooperation in the service delivery in both the newly agreed government- controlled and those remaining rebel stronghold areas. In recent years, the parties have jointly implemented a few health-related projects in some selected ceasefire zones. This kind of coordination enables the government DOH to reach previously inaccessible rebel- controlled areas. Such post-conflict developments have continued throughout the ceasefire period and created conditions for a possible convergence of the parallel health service delivery systems of the state and non-state actors operating in the ceasefire Mon areas.

Education Services

Following the ceasefire, the government Na Ta La hastened the construction of schools in the previously warring Mon areas. Within a few years, the number of state-run schools in the newly demarcated government-administered Mon-populated areas increased. For instance, in 1997, the Na Ta La built primary school buildings in almost all the former NMSP stronghold villages in Southern Ye Township, including Kalawt, Hangam, Yindein, Yinyae, Kabyar, Danikyar, and Mihtawhla villages.330 At the same time, unlike the community-built self-help schools, MOE also tried to extend its reach by sanctioning the schools without delay.331 In some areas close to government military bases, MOE provided support to the communities by setting up branch schools and affiliated schools attached to a host state school in towns or the more secure large villages.332 Further, by directly taking over the community-owned schools or giving sanctions to the long-term community-managed affiliated schools, MOE also increased the density of state schools

329 An NMSP leader, interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 330 A former village administrator, interview by the author, February 28, 2016, Yingdein Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 331 Former education official of Mon State, interview by the author, February 13, 2017, Mawlamyine Mon State. 332 If teachers from the host school came and taught, the community school then became a ‘branch school’. If no teacher from the host school was teaching in it, it was called an ‘affiliated school’. However, students from both types of schools could sit for examinations from the host school.

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across the newly demarcated government-administered areas.333 Meanwhile, a few state schools in the areas also started to receive state funding to upgrade or expand school buildings and replenish school materials.334 The government also upgraded the teacher training colleges in Mawlamyine into Education Colleges and doubled the number of new intakes.335

However, although there was progress in some respects, with meagre support from the government the state education service in the ceasefire Mon-populated areas remained weak and ineffectual. For years, state support for many schools in Mon ceasefire areas ebbed and flowed. A lack of proper oversight and management meant most newly built government primary schools were small rudimentary bamboo structures with thatch roofs and earthen floors.336 In addition, while the number of in-service and pre-service trained teachers has increased in recent years, the student–teacher ratio in state schools in the previously conflict-affected areas remains disproportionate. The qualification of government teachers in the areas also remains low.337 Further, Bamar was reaffirmed as the only language of classroom instruction and indigenous language was prohibited in the classroom.338 MOE imposes a Bamar-centric curricular and teaching programs in the state

333 For example, some community-managed schools, such as the Lamine and Kawtbein affiliated high schools, became state high schools and were entirely managed by the state within a few years of the ceasefire. Some schools also received textbooks and other essential materials from MOE. Since the 2001–2002 academic year, MOE also introduced a post-primary school system in a few primary schools with facilities, in which students could continue their education up to Year 5, the first year for lower secondary education. A former high school principal, interview by the author, March 18, 2017, Ye Town, Mon State; a village elder (a retired high school principal), interview by the author, March 17, 2017, Arutoung Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 334 A former village head, interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State; a village elder (former MNEC teacher, Khawzar), interview by the author, March 20, 2017, Khawzar Town, Ye Township, Mon State. 335 The college introduced a Pre-Service Teacher Training Program and provided one-year courses for primary school teachers and two-year courses for lower secondary school teachers. For details, see Ministry of Education, Myanmar, Development of Education in Myanmar (Yangon: Ministry of Education, 2004). 336 A former village administrator, interview by the author, February 28, 2016, Yingdein Village, Ye Township, Mon State; a former village administrator, interview by the author, March 20, 2017, Danikyar Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 337 Former education official of Mon State, interview by the author, February 13, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 338 Ibid.

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schools that use Bamar and Buddhist conceptions and historical development.339 Consequently, the language barrier, combined with nominally trained teachers, mean Mon students are slow learners and feel inferior in state schools and leads to early dropout rates.340 Until recently, these so-called state schools were abandoned structures and the Mon communities who were emerging from war atrocities struggled to fulfil the basic education needs of their children with the support of non-state education actors.341

Conversely, the ceasefire created conditions for local communities to openly form community school committees and manage schools of their own, not only in the NMSP ceasefire zones and beyond but also in the government stronghold areas. Within a few years, MNED, MNEC, and various Mon community groups have expanded the network of MNSs into most Mon-populated areas including government-administered areas and the semi-permanent settlements of refugees and IDPs in the mountainous jungles.342 In this time, MNEC has become the major education service provider in the previously conflict-affected Mon-populated areas.343 Within a few years of the ceasefire, MNSs became available in parallel with state-run schools in the government-controlled areas as well. By the mid-2000s, MNEC established Mon National Schools in the government stronghold Thanbyuzayart, Mundon, and Mawlamyine Townships.344 In 2010, statistics showed that MNEC administered 156 Mon National schools and 116 mixed schools and, with over 800 teachers, provided education services to over 36,000 students.345 Through

339 Ibid; A former high school principal, interview by the author, March 18, 2017, Ye Town, Mon State; see also Salem-Gervais and Metro, “A Textbook Case of Nation-Building: The Evolution of History Curricula in Myanmar,” 34. 340 A high-ranking education official (Member of NMSP Central Committee), interview by the author, 13 January, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; an NGO worker (former Mon National School teacher), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; a Mon civil society organisation leader (former MNED official), interview by the author, February 16, 2016, Mawlamyine. 341 A Headmonk, interview by the author, March 23, 2017, Angding Village, Ye Township, Mon State; a government school teacher, interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 342 A high-ranking education official (Member of NMSP Central Committee), interview by the author, January 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 343 Ibid; an NGO worker (former Mon National School teacher), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. See also South and Lall, Education, Conflict and Identity: Non-State Education Regimes in Burma, 35. 344 A high-ranking education official (Member of NMSP Central Committee), interview by the author, January 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 345 The organisation also provides two-year post-Year 10 courses for high school graduates to meet the entry requirements for tertiary education in Thailand and abroad. A high-ranking education official

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fundraising, donations of well-wishers, patrons of harvesting season,346 community fetes and student fees, many community schools gradually become self-reliant.347

In addition, the ceasefire also significantly improved the quantity as well as the quality of MNS teachers.348 After the ceasefire, along with better overall safety and security, restrictions on movements become lessened in the previous conflict-affected areas. Since then, Mon teachers have been able to travel to and from the NMSP-controlled areas more freely and advise the soldiers at checkpoints whom they work for and where they are going, although some harassment and extortion persists.349 Moreover, while MNEC was able to establish a formal relationship with the government education authorities in the government-controlled Mon-populated areas, the organisation simultaneously maintained a connection with the border-based non-state education organisations and participated in educational activities. Following the ceasefire, many administration staff, trainers, and teachers from the MNS system received better access to internationally-funded training programs and higher quality education opportunities. Some MNEC teachers received training from international educational organisations across the border in Thailand.350 UN and international aid agencies such as UNICEF and Japan International Cooperation Agency also gained access to the previously warring Mon areas and provided training to

(Member of NMSP Central Committee), interview by the author, January 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. According to statistics provided by MNEC, in the 2017–2018 academic year, MNEC managed 132 MNS with 631 teachers and 92 mixed schools with 156 teachers. 346 Such patrons donated in kind goods to resell, such as rice, crumb rubber, betel nuts, and marine products at harvesting time. 347 In some areas, with the preliminary support and arrangements initiated by MNEC, some community groups took over the schools built and run by MNEC. In some cases, NMSP local authorities helped communities to build the schools by securing land, construction materials and seed funds for the school establishment and asked the communities to contribute labour and matching funds to run the schools. A high-ranking education official (Member of NMSP Central Committee), interview by the author, January 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; an NMSP leader, interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 348 Similar to the education services of the other EAOs, many teachers in the wartime MNS system held lower educational qualifications and rarely received appropriate teaching training. Some had not completed their lower secondary education. A Mon social worker (former MNED staff), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Klawt Thawt Village, Mudon Township, Mon State. 349 A Mon civil society organisation leader (former MNED official), interview; an NGO worker (former Mon National School teacher), interview. 350 A high-ranking education official (Member of NMSP Central Committee), interview by the author, January 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; a Mon social worker (former MNED staff), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Klawtthawt Village, Mudon Township, Mon State.

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some MNS teachers.351 Meanwhile, local NGOs such as Shalom Foundation have provided continual child-centred approach (CCA) training for the teachers of MNED and MNEC since after the NMSP ceasefire, through funding from international governments and donor agencies.352 Over the years, most MNEC teachers have received better teaching training, although many still have a lower basic educational qualification. By 2007, most of the Mon primary school teachers completed CCA training and those teaching in MNS middle schools and high schools received reading and writing for critical thinking (RWCT) training, while others have been trained as CCA and RWCT trainers.353

Further, as the schooling services provided by the MNSs were free at the point of access they became accessible to most of the Mon communities in the ceasefire areas, particularly the rural poor. Although the MNS system mainly relied on community support both for its physical needs and teachers, within a few years of the ceasefire the schools were able to absorb virtually all the children in the areas thanks to local NGOs and CBOs together with the strong support of the parents and individual well-wishers. While it can be often burdensome for the parents and community members, most households expressed satisfaction with the service that was available to them.354 Unlike the state schools, parents in the government-controlled areas described their contentment at no longer needing to pay bothersome unofficial costs and extra tuition fees to the teachers, while the students enjoyed better quality teaching aid materials and the mother tongue classroom language.355

Meanwhile, the ceasefire also created an intervening interval for all Mon nationalists with authority to review the principle aims of the education service they were providing to the Mon population in their control areas. This reviewing process produced new school curricula that contributed to better education outcomes and the continuation of the

351 Ibid. 352 Ibid. 353 Ibid. 354 A village elder (a retired high school principal), interview by the author, March 17, 2017, Arutoung Village, Ye Township, Mon State; a village elder (former MNEC teacher, Khawzar), interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Khawzar Town, Ye Township, Mon State. 355 Ibid.

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education careers of the students. 356 In the beginning, as a social service delivery wing of an identity-based ethnic armed resistance party, MNED established the Mon national education system principally on the strong desire of the NMSP leaders to preserve the Mon national identity.357 However, following the ceasefire, instead of the previously predominant Mon national identity, culture, history, and language proficiency, some NMSP top-level leaders and the authorities of MNED/MNEC began to prioritise wisdom, skills, and socialising as the aims of Mon national education.358

In a post-ceasefire fundamental reform, MNEC further revised the Mon national education curricula to offer better education outcomes for the children and prepare them to continue their education careers.359 In this system, MNSs provided a three-language education system to Mon students.360 At the primary level, teachers used Mon as the medium of classroom language for all classes. All MNEC textbooks in the lower primary level (from kindergarten to Year 2) were in Mon language and the teachers introduced the Bamar language in the upper primary classes (Year 3 and Year 4), together with Bamar language as a subject. At the lower secondary or middle school classes (Year 5 to Year 8), while the teachers still maintained Mon as the principle classroom language,

356 A Mon social worker (former MNED staff), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Klawt Thawt Village, Mudon Township, Mon State. 357 Since the colonial time, throughout the history of the national struggle for the Mon national identity, through legal politics and violent means Mon leaders persistently demanded and fought for the preservation of Mon language in both secular and religious entities. By outlawing the teaching of the Mon language in the formal education system and perpetually threatening religious and community- based informal Mon literacy programs, the Revolutionary Council and successive military regimes agitated Mon nationalists to convey the separatist ideology through education. Thus, teaching the Mon language became an integral part of the struggle for Mon national self-determination. Mon Buddhist monasteries have long taught the Mon language under various forms of assimilationist suppression and Mon political and societal communities have tried to educate the broader majority of younger generations through formal schooling or informal literacy programs in summer school holidays. A senior Mon political leader, interview by the author, 13 February, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. See also ပကာဲယွ ာဲုးေၾ ပနာန၊ သမၷု န တုၾန (ဍ နမတနမိစႀာန၊ ီကပ းေ နအပနဒၾနာန၊ းေဗကနဍ နမပနတ္ုာန၊ သၷကဳံတၾန္တာ-ဟ ါ) [Nai Shwe Kyin, The Shadows of the Past [in Mon language] (Mawlamyine: Department of Organization, NMSP, n.d.)]; and ႏုိစု နဟ သကာန၊ မပန မ ုာသကာိတနးေျမကၾနမႈးေတကနိွပနးေ ာျတအနအနသမစု နာ ( ပနၾစပနာန၊ ပနားေရးေရအကးေ ာန၊ ၂ရ၁၄)။ [Nai Hanthar, The History of Mon National Liberation Struggle [in Bamar language] (Yangon: Pan Wai Wai, 2014).] See also South, Mon Nationalism and Civil War in Burma: The Golden Sheldrake. 358 A Mon social activist (former MNED official), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; a high-ranking education official (Member of NMSP Central Committee), interviewed by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; a Mon social worker (former MNED staff), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Klawtthawt Village, Mudon Township, Mon State. 359 Ibid. 360 Ibid.

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Bamar incrementally became the language of instruction. At this level, teachers also taught Mon language, history, and culture as extra modules. Subjects such as History and Geography were taught in the Bamar language, although the teachers explained them in Mon language. At the upper secondary or high school (Year 9 and Year 10), MNSs used the curricular of state high schools, with Mon language and Mon history as extra modules. In high schools, MNEC teachers taught all subjects in Bamar language, however, they explained them in both Mon and Bamar as necessary. MNSs taught English as a subject from kindergarten through secondary to post-secondary classes. Thus, while maintaining the language, history, and culture of the Mons, the MNS system simultaneously prepared students to be integrated into the national education system at every level.

The NMSP ceasefire also helped to ease government restrictions on the international community to assist and support improving its education services in the previously conflict-affected Mon areas. With the arrival of large-scale international support in the late 1990s, MNED/MNEC improved its teaching standards and quality of teaching and learning aid materials for the MNSs and mixed schools. From across the border, UN agencies, INGOs, and individual experts provided invaluable help to MNEC in developing new learning materials, modernising the curricular, and teaching methodologies, particularly the CCA and RWCT.

The ceasefire also created conditions for UN, international humanitarian, development and donor agencies to gain government permission to visit, support, monitor, and evaluate their activities and project sites in most of the previously prohibited Mon areas. Since the late 1990s, a consortium of international donors, humanitarian and development agencies have provided funding as well as basic teaching materials and equipment to the MNS system. Further, many have started to provide funding, technical assistance, and oversight of education-related projects in Mon areas from inside the country, instead of across the borderline and from Thailand, as in the past. For example, in the late 1990s, officials from Thabyay Education Foundation, a Chiang Mai-based education support program, have visited the education project sites in Thanbyuzayart, Ye, even in the villages under the administration of the NMSP that were strictly prohibited to foreigners.361 Similarly,

361 A former international staff member (Thapyay Education), interview by the author, June 25, 2017, Canberra, Australia.

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officials from the Yangon-based Pyoe Pin Programme of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, including diplomats from the British and Swedish Embassies, visited their project sites in the previously prohibited, war-torn Mon ceasefire zones.362 Such conditions have encouraged both international and local humanitarian and development NGOs and community groups to launch programs and projects to help the MNEC education service systems to become more efficient and sustainable. Many of the Mon community schools often received various forms of support from external actors and groups, including funds, teachers, teaching training, and schooling materials as well, although these were not consistent.363 MNEC has become the primary provider of schooling resources for all community schools and typically provides administrative oversight, assessments, quality control, textbooks, stationery, and other teaching materials, teacher recruitment and training, and teacher salaries.364

Over the years, the mother tongue-based (MTB) teaching of MNEC, which applies CCA approaches, has achieved significant success. Moreover, the recently revised curricular of MNEC has also narrowed the differences between the Mon national education system and that of the state. By pragmatically modifying its nationalist curricular, MNEC has developed a unique indigenous education system that provides primary education in its native language while preparing students to matriculate and qualify for the state national higher education system. By the late 1990s, with the combined advantages of the MTB and CCA together with course content that congregated towards the state curricular, MNSs improved the educational outcomes of students in its system. For example, even under uncertain security conditions resulting from the unpredictability of the ceasefire, school enrolment rates in the MNSs continued to increase and the dropout rate was low. According to the 2009 statistics of MNEC, almost 80 per cent of children living in the NMSP-controlled and -influenced Kyarinnseikgyi Township enrolled in the primary

362 A local journalist (former MSDN director), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 363 Ibid. 364 A high-ranking education official (Member of NMSP Central Committee), interviewed by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State.

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school in Wangsapore Mon National School and the dropout rate in the year was 13.89 per cent (16.67 per cent male and 11.11 per cent female).365

These factors could be favourable conditions that have provided opportunities for a possible convergence of the state education system and the MNEC system. Following up the informal relationship that has existed since the years of low intensity civil war, MNEC authorities have developed a formal relationship with provincial-level state education authorities. In the late 1990s, MNEC officials successfully negotiated with several state- run schools in the areas under NMSP influence to adopt parts of the MNEC curricular and teaching methodology and allow Mon teachers to teach Mon language and history as extra modules.366 Although some school authorities have declined, many have accepted teachers from MNEC to teach Mon language and Mon history as extracurricular subjects in government-run schools.367 At the beginning there was some discrimination against MNEC teachers in the government-run mixed schools; however, as the ceasefire has remained more or less stable and the qualifications of Mon teachers have improved, they gradually gained formalisation of their roles in MOE-administered schools.368 For years, the number of state-run schools that converted into mixed schools continued to increase in Mon villages in government-controlled areas. In the 2017–2018 academic year, MNEC provided 92 MOE-administered mixed schools with 156 Mon teachers to teach Mon

365 In 2017, the dropout rate fell to 5 per cent in Plaingjaparn MNS in Three-Pagoda-Pass Township and 10 per cent in Taungpawt MNS in Mudon Township. A Mon social worker (former MNED staff), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Klawtthawt Village, Mudon Township, Mon State. 366 An NMSP leader, interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State; a Mon social worker (former MNED staff), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Klawtthawt Village, Mudon Township, Mon State; a high-ranking education official (Member of NMSP Central Committee), interviewed by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. See also South and Lall, Education, Conflict and Identity: Non-State Education Regimes in Burma, 35–36. 367 Some scholars argue that this discrete, limited relationship between government local education authorities and rebel education departments was mainly based on the empathy of individual school principals, most of whom were Mon nationals. However, since connection or collaboration with any armed rebel group is a crime against the state, for any school authority to adopt the curricular and allow teachers from a rebel education system could hardly be possible. For instance, the government authority ordered the closure of some mixed schools in 2003 when the relationship between NMSP and the government was under strain. Moreover, given the occasional military presence and inspection by higher level education authorities, particularly those at the township levels, it would be very difficult to conceal such collaboration. While the lower level of the Myanmar state might concede the imposition of a parallel education system by non-state actors in exchange for security, this would be an informal arrangement. 368 Ibid.

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language and history as part of the formal curricula.369 This kind of cooperation allowed MNEC to enable its students to formally enter for the highest matriculation examination of the state secondary education system and assure opportunities to continue their tertiary education in the union or abroad. Since 1996, students from Mon national high schools have been admitted to sit for the government matriculation examination and able to continue their higher education in the government educational institutions and internationally.370 From 1996–2018, 382 students from Mon national schools completed the standard 10 and achieved official school diplomas from the government MOE, although they were still weak in subjects such as Bamar language and Bamar history.371 Some proceeded on to government universities and professional institutes, while many others attended tertiary education institutions in other countries.372

In addition, the NMSP ceasefire created a broader space in which the government education service and the non-state Mon national education system could complement to each other and synergised the infrastructure capacity of the education service accessible to the whole Mon population. Despite there being occasional strains in the post-ceasefire relationship between the government military and NMSP, the ceasefire has resulted in higher collaboration among local-level government education officials and MNEC in many areas. This improved relationship provides the opportunity for a growing convergence between the state and Mon education system, with the latter adopted into the state service delivery system. During the past few decades, coordination and cooperation between the government MOE and MNEC has gained momentum.373 The two parties have coordinated the distribution of textbooks and shared curricula and the accomplishment certificates either party would award.374 Conversely, the strength and

369 Ibid; a Mon social activist (former MNED official), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 370 A high-ranking education official (Member of NMSP Central Committee), interviewed by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 371 Ibid; a Mon social activist (former MNED official), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 372 Ibid. 373 A high-ranking education official (Member of NMSP Central Committee), interviewed by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; an NGO worker (former Mon National School teacher), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 374 A high-ranking education official (Member of NMSP Central Committee), interviewed by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State.

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effectiveness of both MOE and MNEC have been directly dependent on the political relationship, especially the ceasefire, between the government military and NMSP. For instance, when the ceasefire deteriorated in the late 1990s, the early 2000s, and late 2010, the MNS system in both the government-controlled and NMSP stronghold areas was under serious threat, whereas both sides reaffirmed the ceasefire after NMSP renewed the agreement in 2012.375 In the meantime, many state-run schools in the MNLA-contested areas also faced the same threats and challenges as the populations revived their vigilantes for a possible relapse of war. Thus, it is evident that the continued ceasefire has narrowed the differences between the education service provision systems of the state and that of a non-state actor and created conditions for a possible aggregation of the two systems that, consequently, delivers a basic social service with better accessibility and quality.

Although in the beginning, parents in the government stronghold areas were dubious of the educational standard of MNSs, within a few years the post-ceasefire improvements in both quality and accessibility in the Mon national education system have convinced the majority of the population in the areas. At first, many parents in the government- controlled areas looked down upon the MNSs given the limited educational qualifications and teaching training of the teachers.376 However, in the following years of the ceasefire, many considered that MNSs provided a good standard of education and offered better opportunities for further studies abroad or through the state education system.377 Based on the better outcomes of the MNEC education system, MNSs attracted students not only in the NMSP stronghold, but also those living in the government’s administrative jurisdictions. Even in some government stronghold areas, many Mon parents preferred to send their children to the MNSs over state-run schools. For instance, while there was a state high school in Arutong Village, Ye Township, most of the children in the village enrolled in the Mon National High School.378 In 2000, nearly 70 per cent of the students

375 However, the authorities no longer allow the mixed schools in the government stronghold Mudon, Thanbyuzayrt and Yebyu townships of Mon-populated areas. A high-ranking education official (Member of NMSP Central Committee), interviewed by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 376 A Mon social activist (former MNED official), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 377 An NGO worker (former Mon National School teacher), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 378 Ibid.

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enrolled in the MNS schooling system were from families living in government stronghold areas.379 Over the years, many Mon children have transferred to MNSs and received the education service provided by MNEC. The most practical reasons for such transfer could be that MNS networks provide better access for the Mon communities living in hard-to-access territories and the MTB indigenous curricular that also prepares the students to integrate and continue their education within the mainstream state education system. With the government’s formal recognition of MNSs and the increased accessibility of the Mon national education system, the population facing difficulty in accessing the state education service gained an alternative education service for their children. As it becomes less risky to enrol in an MNS, parents can also choose their preferred education service (e.g., a state school, MNEC supervised community school or a mixed school) in either the government- or NMSP-administered areas.

(b) Physical infrastructure

Road transportation

As soon as the ceasefire was confirmed and the demarcation of areas of authority between the government and NMSP clarified, the military and government line agencies began building up physical infrastructure in the areas. The newly formed Ministry for the Progress of the Border Areas and National Races Development Affairs and its department, along with the government’s military engineering battalions and the Ministry of Construction’s Department of Public Work (DPW) began infrastructure development projects in the previously contested areas. The DPW, the primary government line agency responsible for road building and maintenance, began constructing roads and bridges on the principal highways and increased the maintenance and upgrading of deteriorated main roads across the ceasefire Mon-populated areas. As a result, local people started seeing heavy-duty government road building machines in some previous warring areas. In the first dry season after the ceasefire agreement, the DPW’s road and bridge construction teams built several short and long bridges, particularly on the abandoned southern portion of the Mawlamyine-Ye road in the previously rebel-controlled and contested areas. Later, DPW also simultaneously built several bridges, including the over 290 km-long

379 A high-ranking education official (Member of NMSP Central Committee), interviewed by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State.

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Winphanon Bridge and Depadaw Bridges in Thanbyuzayart Township and Koemai Bridge and Kyoedan Bridge in Ye Township in the late 1990s. The Ministry of Construction’s Special Construction Project Team completed the 2,270 km-long Attran River Bridge and 18,520 km-long rail–road Thanlwin River Bridge in the early 2000s in the government stronghold Mawlamyine Township. In 2003, the government’s special project teams completed the 1,360 km-long rail–road Ye Creek Bridge in the previously NMSP-controlled Ye Township.

The military government was not particularly interested in improving infrastructure in Mon areas, as they were not strategically important for military build-up. However, in line with the terms of the verbal ceasefire agreement between the government and NMSP, it did provide some assistance for infrastructure developments and conflict-affected populations. Accordingly, the newly formed Department of Development of NMSP planned, proposed and implemented some infrastructure construction projects in the ceasefire areas.380 In the following years, although the government military rejected many proposed infrastructure development projects, the Department of Development of NMSP commenced construction of some inter-village connecting roads in the ceasefire areas. With the technical and financial assistance of relevant government line departments, NMSP began construction works of Khayongu-Minywa-Kawtbein sealed road in its control areas in both Mon and Kayin States. The road not only connects virtually all the Mon villages in the area but also merges into the Mawlamyine-Zarthabyin-Hpa-an highway. For the first time, many Mon villages in southern Hpa-an Township of Kayin State gained land access (previously only accessible by waterway) to the capital city Mawlamyine and connection with other trade centres nationally.

At the same time, with the support of NMSP, some local traders were able to rebuild the Thanbyuzayart-Three Pagodas Pass road, a border trading route in the highly contested area controlled by the government military, NMSP and KNU troops. Although NMSP withdrew from construction of the controversial highway,381 with its facilitation some

380 NMSP officials, interview by the author, January 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 381 Respecting the objections of the KNU, NMSP withdrew from the project in 1998. An NMSP leader, interview by the author, January 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; a community leader (government school teacher), interview by the author, February 20, 2016, xxx village, Thanbyuzayart Township, Mon State (village name omitted for security reson).

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well-connected local border traders successfully negotiated with the government military, KNLA and MNLA troops to reopen the vital trade route.382 The KNU leadership initially objected to upgrading the old wartime railroad into a modernised highway, as they saw this as part of a military plan to pressure KNU troops in the area.383 However, as it was also a potential source of taxation for the KNU, they eventually agreed to allow the traders to upgrade it to a viable dirt road.384 This significantly complemented the transportation capacity of Mon State and boosted border trading and, to some extent, brought long- standing smuggling activities into formal trading that was taxable to all the armed parties that controlled a portion of the route.385

The new infrastructure building also had significant benefits for the local population. This was particularly the case as new roads and river-crossing bridges started linking isolated rural villages to the urban centres. For instance, following the completion of the Attaran River Bridge in Mawlamyine in 1998, the Mawlamyine-Zarthabyin-Hpa-an road connected many villages in both Karen and Mon States with major towns and trade centres in the early 2000s. Similarly, the completion of the 160 km railroad connecting Ye Town and Dawei Town of Tanintharyi Region in 2003 increased the physical infrastructure in Mon-populated areas under ceasefire. Although these infrastructure projects also exposed the civilian population to a range of human security-related threats, such as extortion and forced labouring, they helped to provide linkages within and between the communities previously isolated from each other.

Electricity

Compared to the previous decades of civil war, the government’s electrification infrastructure improved to some extent in Mon-populated areas. With the completion of the gas pipeline installation from the Kanbout offshore gas field and the launch of the natural gas power plant in Thaton in the early 2000s, the capital city of Mon State,

382 A wholesaler and traders, interview by the author, February 25, 2016, Lamine Town, Mon State; a community leader (former Upper House MP), interview by the author, February 23, 2016, Three- Pagoda Town, Kayin State; a large-scale trader (former well-connected goods smuggler), interview by the author, February 20, 2016, Thanbyuzayart Town, Mon State. 383 An NMSP leader, interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 384 Ibid. 385 Ibid; Wholesalers and traders, in discussion with the author, February 25, 2016, Lamine Town, Mon State.

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Mawlamyine, was connected with the national gridline for the first time. Some urban wards started receiving residential electricity although blackout, brownout, and wild voltage fluctuation remained for years. Until recently, although the government allowed the private sector to be involved in the electrification of the country under the newly established open market economic policies, no private business organisations invested in large-scale electrical power generation and transmission infrastructure in the post-conflict Mon-populated areas.

However, various small-scale, private electricity providers were quick to take advantage of the lack of proper government rules and the corrupt and dysfunctional regulatory oversight system. Through these private service providers, electrification (mostly for early night lighting) rapidly increased in many Mon-populated villages and newly developing peri-urban. Small-scale portable electrification works expanded from the suburban and peri-urban wards of small remote towns, such as Thanbyuzayart and Ye, to many Mon villages across the ceasefire areas.386 As the government lifted the over 40- year-long dark-to-dawn curfew in the areas, demand for electricity significantly increased.387 Some well-connected local elites and private individuals, including the newly installed wards and village authorities, started small-scale electric lighting services for a few hours in the early night hours in many newly expanded peri-urban and large villages.388

Many private individuals engaged in the small-scale electrification enterprises, as there were no specific rules and regulations for ward-based or village-based electricity provision works and the required investment was relatively low. Many generated electricity through diesel engine-driven small-to-medium-range electric generators and wired power to client households through improvised transmitting lines. In some villages, villagers could choose distribution lines of different providers with different fees and

386 a local CSO leader (former member of NMSP underground movement), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; a Municipal official, interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Thanbyuzayart, Mon State. 387 A LNGO Director (former member of NMSP underground movement), interview by the author, February 26, 2016, Ye Town, Mon State. 388 A marine product trader, interview by the author, February 26, 2016, Asin Village, Ye Township, Mon State; a government school teacher, interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State.

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services. Each private power provider supplied around 100 to 200 households and charged USD3 to USD6 to power two 15W compact fluorescent lamps or light bulbs for three hours (usually from 6.00 pm to 9.00 pm).389

Until recently, as with the majority of the populations living in suburban and rural areas, only a few households had access to electricity provided by the government.390 Successive Myanmar military governments could not bring electricity to most ethnic communities in the conflict-affected areas until after the country’s liberalisation process of the semi-civilian government in the early 2010s. Virtually all the cities and towns in Mon-populated areas relied on off-grid electricity and non-electric forms of solid fuel. Improvement in government electrification was correspondingly slow in the ceasefire Mon-populated areas. The weak governance capacity of the government also severely affected the efficacy of both the existing and newly installed electrification infrastructure in Mon areas.

During the country’s national liberalisation in 2012, The World Bank provided substantial assistance for the extension of the Thaton gas turbine. In 2011, as the ceasefire proved stable and security improved, the Myanmar Lighting Company (a locally-based private company) invested in large-scale electricity generation. The company installed a 150 mW gas turbine operating generator in the outskirts of Mawlamyine.391 Moreover, with the support of international governmental and NGOs, many Mon-populated rural areas produced more power and installed more off-grid transmission lines. In general, across all the Mon-populated areas, the ceasefire brought about better access to electricity and better opportunities to become connected with the slowly expanding national electricity grid.

389 Ibid; a local restaurant owner, interview by the author, February 27, 2016, Annawar Ward, Ye Town, Mon State. 390 A report by The World Bank suggests that only 33 per cent of the country’s population had access to electricity in 2014. See The World Bank, Powering up Myanmar: More Than 7 Million New Electricty Connections Needed by 2030, accessed March 15, 2018, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/10/08/powering-up-myanmar-more-than-7-million- new-electricity-connections-needed-by-2030 391 Min Min Nwe (Journalist), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State.

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Telecommunication

As suggested by many scholars and practitioners, improving the communication sector could strengthen government operations, transparency, security, and economic activities.392 The ceasefire in Mon-populated areas also created conditions for government communication agencies and private citizens to install and improve public communication facilities and services that could reach previous conflict-affected remote areas for the first time. With the newly available technology (particularly cellular and radio wave systems) and changes in the regulatory management of the regime, telecommunication services in the area have relatively improved. The satellite and microwave system replaced the low-efficiency cable networks. The Myanmar Postal and Telecommunication Enterprise (MPT) installed microwave stations and erected mobile phone towers in a few cities in Mon State. The government’s telecommunication agency also set up rural telephone exchange stations in a few villages.

While these improvements increased communication in many Mon villages, they also came with considerable inconvenience due to the ongoing rampant corruption and by government security and departmental officials. After the ceasefire, although the newly available government postal and telegram services and automatic and manual landline telephone services were outdated and incompetent, these improvements in accessibility and the quantity of the government telecommunication sector helped in the recovery of socioeconomic conditions in many post-conflict Mon-populated areas.

As security conditions in the areas became stable, the government’s postal service department also installed a few new telegram and post offices and offered, albeit limited, communication services across Mon State. In the early 2000s, Kalawtthawt and Tagundaing villages in Mudon Township received their first post offices, although the service was outmoded with very few users.393 Moreover, because many of the newly installed government telephone exchange stations in the small towns were fixed landlines

392 See, for example, Ernest J. Wilson, The Information Revolution and Developing Countries (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004); and T. Unwin, ICT4D: Information and Communication Technology for Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 393 A Mon social worker (former MNED staff), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Klawt Thawt Village, Mudon Township, Mon State; a community leader (private school teacher), interview with the author, January 31, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State.

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with an obsolescent manual operation system, the newly available government telecommunication service was inadequate and inferior in quality.394 However, compared to the situation of wartime communication services, many locally-based traders and goods producers agreed that post-conflict communication in areas such as Ye Township significantly improved and contributed to the revival of the local socioeconomic condition.395

While the local population in the ceasefire areas could gain access, at least indirectly, to available telecommunication services, these were only accessible to a few local elites. The GSM sim cards offered by the MPT could cost from MMK3.2 million to MMK4.8 million (approximately USD2,500 to USD3,800). Until the late 2000s, very few people owned mobile phones in Mon-populated areas. However, through these few available mobile communication devices, many Mon-populated areas gained access to telecommunication services and communicated with those living locally, regionally, and abroad.

By the early 2000s, as the ceasefire was relatively stable, through the talented innovation of some local private entrepreneurs many villages in the previously conflict-affected zones began to receive mobile telephone services. Although providing telecommunication services to the public remained under strict control and illegal, with the ceasefire in place it was no longer limited to communication- and security-related government offices.396 Because mobile phone connectivity, both cellular and radio wave systems, was only available in the cities and towns, some well-connected private individuals managed to obtain informal permission from local military and administrative authorities to provide mobile phone services. By covertly installing relaying repeaters between the host units in the capital city and the recipient units in the destination towns

394 People had to wait for many hours, sometimes days, in long queues for a few minutes of poor voice quality telephone conversation. For example, people in Ye Town had to wait at least half a day or, sometimes, two to three days to make a call to Mawlamyine or Yangon. A local CSO leader (former member of NMSP underground movement), interview by the author, February 27, 2016, Ye Town, Mon State. 395 A Mon businessman (former contractor), interview by the author, January 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; a local CSO leader (former member of NMSP underground movement), interview by the author, February 27, 2016, Ye Town, Mon State. 396 A former private telephone service provider, interview by the author, January 30, 2017, Mudon Town, Mon State; a village elder (former satellite phone service provider), interview by the author, March 21, 2017, Kyaungywa, Ye Township, Mon State.

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and villages, the service providers brought telecommunication services to the previously conflict-affected Mon areas for the first time.397 As there was no armed conflict in the government-controlled and NMSP ceasefire areas, possessing or providing telecommunication services to the public in the previously conflict-affected areas was no longer a security-related business. Even authorities from local military intelligence units and some local battalions issued permission to private telephone service providers for mobile phone services.398 Through these operators, some villages close to the Thai border could even use international telephone services provided by Thailand operators, as the ceasefire eased the security-related seriousness of using foreign telephone services. Thus, many Mon villages and newly established peri-urban wards gained access to telecommunication services. Many private individuals in Mudon Town and most villages in the township provided telephone services together with international money hundi.399

The telecommunication service, both legal and illegal, supported the families of migrant labourers working in the neighbouring countries and the diaspora resettled in the Western developed countries. Some private telephone service providers, who also provided money hundi services, even provided mobile phone services into workplaces such as rubber plantations and rice fields by bringing the mobile device to the users.

Stateness in Karen-Populated Areas during 1995–2010

4.5.1. Enforcement capacity

(a) The military

Throughout the year of ceasefire in Mon-populated areas, after a series of preliminary talks for a ceasefire agreement between the government and KNU failed, civil war in most Karen-populated areas continued and the presence of security forces in the areas remained

397 A former private telephone service provider, interview by the author, January 30, 2017, Mudon Town, Mon State. 398 A local CSO leader (former member of NMSP underground movement), interview by the author, February 27, 2016, Ye Town, Mon State; a former private telephone service provider, interview by the author, January 30, 2017, Mudon Town, Mon State. 399 Ibid; Former village administrators, in discussion with the author, January 29, 2017, Nyaunggone Village, Mudon Township, Mon State; a former satellite phone service provider, interview by the author, March 21, 2017, Kyaungywa, Ye Township, Mon State.

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weak and patchy. Although DKBA and various other smaller Karen armed groups reached ceasefire agreements with the government, violent fighting rarely ceased. The military could not establish a sustained presence in many Karen-populated areas until early 2012, when the KNU reached a ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar semi-civilian government. Following the breakaway of DKBA and other splinter groups, the government military gained the upper hand in conventional warfare across the warring Karen-populated territories.400 However, as the areas were the long-time bases of KNU, KNLA troops continued to intrude into the enclaves occupied by the government military, DKBA and other Karen splinter groups until the ceasefire in 2012.401 Mainly relying on guerrilla tactics, KNLA troops used ambushes and landmines to disrupt the government military from establishing a stable presence in the areas.402

In some of the areas controlled by non-KNU ceasefire groups, the Myanmar military increased its build-up by hastily setting up permanent military bases and outposts. By 2009, the military had set up 13 IBs and 26 LIBs across Kayin State together with numerous military outposts.403 However, the government military was only able to establish military base camps for its battalions in the government stronghold cities and towns and virtually all military outposts were deployed along the existing or newly built major roads.404 Some experts on Myanmar military observe that the newly established battalions had much less strength than they were supposed to hold.405 Moreover, there were no permanent military outposts or battalion base camps in the thousands of villages

400 A high-level KNU leader, interview by the author, January 22, 2017, Yangon. 401 The 1998 KNLA military conference formally adopted the guerrilla tactics as a form of resistance. Ibid. see also South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict, 56. 402 Ibid. 403 Thailand Burma Border Consortium, Protracted Displacement and Militrisation in Eastern Burma (Bangkok: Thailand Burma Border Consortium, 2009), 54–55. 404 A KNU/KNLA liaison officer, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 405 Many agreed that, instead of the standard 777 troops, most newly established battalions have less than 200 troops. See for example, Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forced Since 1948. See also, Selth, “Known Knowns and Known Unknowns: Measuring Myanmar's Military Capabilities”.

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spread across the Karen-populated areas outside the heavily guarded towns and major roads.406

Further, fighting in most KNU-contested and stronghold areas had intensified and continued even into the devastating tropical monsoon season. In 2005–2008, at the peak of counter-insurgency operations, military offensives in some Karen hill land districts including several townships in Taungoo, Nyaunglebin, and northern Papun Districts continued into the devastating rainy season,407 a period in which military operations typically discontinued.408 As was mostly the case in the past, the government military could not maintain or continually occupy the formerly rebel-controlled or contested areas arduously gained from battles, because the areas were under persistent threat from defeated rebel forces.409 Besides, most of the government military regiments stationed in these occupied KNU bases were faced with various forms of military encirclements by the KNLA forces. The government troops deployed at the occupied rebel base camps relied heavily on supply lines from their headquarters for arms and ammunition and the Army rations and these required substantial security arrangements.410 For example, in late September 2005, government troops violated an agreed temporary truce and attacked the headquarters of the KNLA 9th Brigade and eventually occupied the rebel base camps along the banks of the Shwegyin River in Taunggoo Township, Bago Region. However, surrounded by explosive minefields, continual guerrilla attacks and occasional shelling by KNLA forces, the government troops inevitably had to withdraw in early November.411

406 A director of a Karen local NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 407 Karen Human Rights Group, Less Than Human: Convict Porters in the 2005–2006 Northern Kayin State Offensive (Mae Sot: Karen Human Rights Group, 2006), 5. The Myanmar military usually closes its military operations and offensives during the rainy season, as the almost daily torrential rains often wash away roads, turn footpaths muddy, flood rivers so they are impassable, hinder making fires, damage food, arms and ammunition and cause serious illness. 408 A former Myanmar Army Battalion Commander, interview by the author, March 24, 2017, Mawlamyine. 409 Ibid; A KNU/KNLA liaison officer, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 410 A former Myanmar Army battalion commander, interview by the author, March 24, 2017, Mawlamyine. 411 Karen Human Rights Group, Report from the Field (Mae Sot: Karen Human Rights Group, 2005).

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Similarly, in December 2008, when the government ended the three-year-long multi- battalion, coordinated offensives against the KNU, the military withdrew from many of its battalion bases and outposts across the KNU-contested northern Karen State.412 In Papun Township alone, the government military withdrew the battalion base camps of IB No. 68 and No. 34 and LIB No. 354 and No. 522 together with 13 military outposts.413 All the remaining four battalions were based in and around Papun Town, while the sprawling expanse of the areas beyond the town proper remained under the perpetual contestation and influence of KNLA troops.414 Further, the government military could not implement its expansion and modernisation projects in most of Kayin State that was under the contestation of the KNLA forces. Although there was widespread land confiscation by the military in the government-controlled areas in Kayin State, in many cases very few military bases were practically built and much of the land taken for the military build-up was reportedly left idle.415 For instance, a 44-year-old former landowner said although her farmland of 11 acres (approximately equal to four-and-a-half hectares) was confiscated in the early 1990s, no military establishment was erected until recently.416

(b) Police force

Equally important, the presence of the police force in rural Karen State continued to be very low. In many smaller towns and large villages, the Karen State Myanmar Police Force was unable to even continue as an affiliate of the state’s judiciary system.417 Before the KNU ceasefire, the population in most villages in the KNU-contested townships hardly saw the police force. While all the police stations across the war-affected Karen areas remained inside the combined compounds of government offices, the department was unable to build virtually no police stations, sub-stations or police outposts in the warring areas.418 In addition, although Kayin State borders with Thailand along an

412 Karen Human Rights Group, Self-Protection Under Strain: Targeting of Civilians and Local Responses in Northern Karen State (Mae Sot: Karen Human Rights Group, 2010), 20. 413 A KNU/KNLA liaison officer, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 414 Ibid. 415 Karen Human Rights Group, Report from the Field (Mae Sot: Karen Human Rights Group, 2005). 416 A confiscated land owner, interview by the author, March 9, 2016, Hlaingbwe Town, Kayin State. 417 A director of Kayin Information Centre, interview by the author, February 7, 2017, Hpa-an, Kayin State; A director of a Karen local NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 418 A KNU/KNLA liaison officer, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State.

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extended borderline, the authorities were unable to deploy a Police Border Control Force until the KNU and Myanmar military reached a ceasefire. Until after the KNU ceasefire, the Myanmar military, instead of the police force, dominated all the border checkpoints and various gates along the route to and in the border town Three Pagodas Pass.

4.5.2. Administrative capacity

(a) Administration

Unlike the areas in the ceasefire zones of NMSP, the weak presence of security forces in the conflict-affected Karen-populated areas could not help to establish stable local administration nor could they enforce their authority across the areas. While the government could establish local administrative agencies in many villages in the NMSP ceasefire zones, thousands of Karen villages in the continued war zones remained under the unstable rules of the agents of multiple armies. In fact, armies of the government military, KNLA troops and the other ceasefire Karen armed organisations roamed around the areas exercising their governance in an impromptu way. Whereas the government armies and troops of KNU splinter groups had defeated and expelled KNLA forces from many of their military base camps, neither the government military nor any of the Karen splinter army could fully fend off the KNLA troops from entering the areas.419 Moreover, since the presence of the government military was limited in the towns and along the fortified major roads, the ceasefire Karen armed factions and militia groups became the dominant governance actors in villages across the lowland areas a short distance from the towns and main roads.420 However, since most of non-KNU Karen armed organisations rarely had a proper administrative structure421 their relations with the village communities gradually reduced to ad hoc taxation and demand for other resources.422

419 A country director of an INGO (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, January 21, 2017, Yangon. 420 A senior Karen community leader, interview by the author, January 18, 2017, Yangon; A director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 421 Village elders (Kataingti), discussion. See also Jolliffe, “Ethnic Armed Conflict and Territorial Administration in Myanmar,” 50. 422 A former village head and villagers, interview by the author, February 4, 2017, Saw Thu Khee Village, Kyaikhto Township, Mon State; A director of Kayin Information Centre, interview by the author, February 7, 2017, Hpa-an, Kayin State. See also Jolliffe, “Ethnic Armed Conflict and Territorial Administration in Myanmar,” 51.

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As none of the armies could control any of the areas exclusively, the lines of demarcation between the contested and control areas of the different armies operating in the areas have been exceedingly fluid and overlapped.423 In volatile and insecure areas where the indecisive civil war continued, it was highly risky and dangerous for a government administrative agent or the staff of line agencies to intervene in administrative matters, levy taxation or deliver social services. Across the areas, none of the administrative structures of the government or armed groups were functional, while many villagers, often as a whole group, tried to move into deeper forested jungle away from the armed authorities.424 The unstable presence of different armies and ever-changing territorial demarcations continually created confusion among the local administrators and placed a great burden on the communities. The communities in many villages across the mountainous Karen areas remained subject to the unpredictable administrative systems of multiple authorities and faced difficult challenges in managing relations with the authorities contending with each other.425 War-related atrocities and rights violations committed by the armies continued until 2012, when the KNU reached a ceasefire agreement with the government.426

In the meantime, the government faced various challenges in installing its administrative apparatus in most of newly occupied Karen-populated areas. Under the continual intrusion and guerrilla attacks of KNLA troops, military subjugation, land confiscation, and forced relocation failed to seal off the areas and prevent the population from fleeing into deep jungles and towards the borderland. For years, the villagers caught in the open terrain of central Kyarinnseikgyi Township escaped into deeper mountainous areas and towards the Myanmar-Thai border areas.427 At the same time, the GAD’s forced registration of villagers and detailed documentation of households in government

423 Village Elders, in discussion with the author, March 7, 2016, Kataingti Village, Papun Township, Kayin State. 424 A former village head, interview by the author, February 4, 2017, Saw Thu Khee Village, Kyaikhto Township, Mon State. 425 Village elders, in discussion with the author, March 7, 2016, Kataingti Village, Papun Township, Kayin State; A Farmer (former KNLA health practitioner), interview by the author, March 7, 2016, Kamamoung Town, Papun Township, Kayin State. 426 Villge elders and mid-career villagers, in discussion with the author, February 4, 2017, Htilon Village, Hlaingbwe Township, Kayin State. 427 A former village head of NMSP, interview by the author, February 4, 2017, Kyarinnseikgyi Town, Kayin State.

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stronghold areas faced difficulties as the settling households remained unstable and many did not provide correct data.428 Moreover, while the government military built many fortified military bases around the towns, large villages, and well-escorted roads, it was unable to control the mountainous regions and areas on the border further afield. Accordingly, the GAD could force the establishment of village administrations only in a few enclaves in which the military had firm control, such as town proper, villages along the major roads and those that were close to the large military garrisons (most of which were forcefully relocated).429 Even in the late 2000s, many relocated villages in Kawkareik Township did not have a stable village administrative body of the GAD.430 Being surrounded by the territories held by the KNU and the ceasefire Karen armed organisations, the administration of the GAD mostly remained unstable and did not take root among the subject population.

Conversely, although the KNU lost a large expanse of stronghold territories to its splinter groups and the government military, the established civilian administration departments of KNU were able to maintain secure relations with the local communities in the areas in which the organisation no longer had firm military control. As the presence of the government military remained weak in areas that were away from towns and main roads, the Karen communities continued to maintain established relations with the administrative organs of the KNU. At the same time, by providing basic social services including health care and education and imposing a state-like monopoly over the use of force, the KNU maintained a close relationship with the Karen communities in the areas. Hence, most village communities continued to consult Karen officials from the KNU Department of Interior and Religious Affairs or Department of Justice for civil disputes and justice issues, rather than the GAD.431 Many verdicts of government administrators on civil disputes in these villages would reach to the courts of KNU and were mostly

428 The GAD registration included data on household inhabitants and the belongings of the families such as household properties, land, farming instruments and livestock. CSO leaders, in discussion with the author, March 7, 2016, Kamamoung Town, Kayin State. 429 A former village head and villagers, interview by the author, February 4, 2017, Saw Thu Khee Village, Kyaikhto Township, Mon State. 430 An NGO worker (former KED teacher), interview by the author, March 11, 2016, Kawtkareik Town, Kayin State; a former MSP, interview by the author, March 11, 2016, xxx Town, Kayin State (village name omitted for security reason). 431 A KNU/KNLA liaison officer, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State.

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revised.432 For years, relations remained antagonistic between the state and villagers in the continued warring Karen areas.

(b) Taxation

Unlike in the ceasefire areas in Mon-populated areas, the taxation capacity of the state of Myanmar remained limited and ineffectual in most Karen-populated areas where fighting continued between the government military, troops of Karen ceasefire groups and the KNLA. The continued insecurity effectually deterred civilian government authorities from conducting their legally assigned duties without the accompaniment of security forces. The ongoing armed conflict and the unpredictable presence of multiple armies meant that Karen village headmen did not collect any tax without the physical presence of a government army.433 The government’s administrative agents and departmental line agencies were hardly able to be present in highly contested Karen areas.434 Although the compulsory registration and detailed documentation activities by GAD in forcefully relocated Karen villages provided baseline data to the government military for cash and in kind extortion, both the government administrative and taxation authorities could not levy most of the taxes from the villagers.435

Conversely, most government military commanders demanded various kinds of taxes and fees in areas where the presence of military forces was strong. The government military even converted the taxation from legitimate functions of government into a form of extortion and a major source of private income. Although it was illegal, the villagers had to pay in kind and cash fees and charges to the military battalions garrisoned in the area close to their village. In Karen-populated areas under strong military control, both the military commanders and the military-backed village administrators arbitrarily demanded

432 An NGO worker (former KED teacher), interview by the author, March 11, 2016, Kawtkareik Town, Kayin State; a CBO leader, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hlaingbwe Town, Kayin State. 433 A former village head, interview by the author, February 4, 2017, Saw Thu Khee Village, Kyaikhto Township, Mon State. 434 Until KNU entered into a ceasefire, all the government departmental officials were strictly banned from travelling into KNU-contested areas. A former Minister (Kayin-1), interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State; a medical practitioner (Kamamoung SH), interview by the author, March 7, 2016, Kama Moung Town, Papun Township, Kayin State. 435 A former village administrator, interview by the author, March 7, 2016, Kataingti Village, Papun Township, Kayin State.

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a range of taxes, fees, and fines from households and, at times, from an entire village.436 The monthly compulsory porter fee remained the most common fee collected by the village headmen, while they also decided the amount of taxes each household must pay whenever the government military demanded an amount of tax for entire villages.437 Further, many government military commanders demanded various ‘compensatory fees’ from the villagers for damages to their military vehicles and other property caused by rebel ambushes or landmines. Depending on the distance from the place of incident, the villagers had to pay varying fines ranging from MMK150, 000 to MMK50, 000.438 In some cases, villagers even had to pay compensation for the military’s security land mines that their grazing farm animals accidentally exploded.439

Meanwhile, the staff and agents of the KNU Finance and Revenue Department in most of the contested villages continued their administration of taxes and fees in coordination with the officials from the relevant line departments of the liberated state of Kawthooley. Because the taxation officials of the organisation could travel discretely and in camouflage as ordinary Karen villagers, most could continue regular taxation on agriculture, forestry, and breeding produces in the villages.440 Those taxes levied by KNU included taxes for betel nut, charcoal moulds, automobiles, plain farms, fish traps, conical fishing net, muskets, sawmills, chainsaws, rice mills, logging, and stone mining.441 Even during intensified warring periods, village tract-level authorities exercised taxation on behalf of the KNU taxation authorities.442 At the same time, while the internal and cross- border checkpoints of the KNU remained active in many places, the KNU district-level

436 A former village head of NMSP, interview by the author, February 4, 2017, Kyarinnseikgyi Town, Kayin State; an NGO worker (former KED teacher), interview by the author, March 11, 2016, Kawtkareik Town, Kayin State; a former village head, interview by the author, February 4, 2017, Saw Thu Khee Village, Kyaikhto Township, Mon State. 437 Ibid. 438 A former village administrator, interview by the author, March 7, 2016, Kataingti Village, Papun Township, Kayin State; A former village head, interview by the author, February 4, 2017, Saw Thu Khee Village, Kyaikhto Township, Mon State. See also Karen Human Rights Group, Report from the Field. 439 a former village head, interview by the author, February 4, 2017, Saw Thu Khee Village, Kyaikhto Township, Mon State. 440 A KNU/KNLA liaison officer, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 441 Ibid. 442 Ibid.

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authorities also continued their taxation on large companies and projects operating in their control areas.443

4.5.3. Infrastructure capacity

(a) Social infrastructure

Health care services

Given the lack of security and poor physical infrastructure, the government DOH could not provide health services to the conflict-affected Karen-populated areas, although there was some progress in a few stable ceasefire enclaves of the Karen armed organisations. In the late 1990s, the DOH built and sanctioned some physical infrastructure for health facilities in the stronghold territories of the Karen ceasefire groups such as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and KPC. However, in the areas still under KNU contestation, the State health care service was largely limited to large government stronghold villages located along the newly built main roads. Because the armed conflict between the KNLA troops and the troops of government and other Karen ceasefire groups continued, the DOH could not expand its health care services to many Karen ceasefire villages. Until the early 2010s, there was no new government health infrastructure in most KNU-contested areas.444 For instance, while the government DBANRD was able to build an SH and an RHC in the DKBA stronghold Myaing Gyi Ngu, the department was unable to upgrade the Kamamoung RHC in the DKBA- and KNLA-contested area into an SH until after the KNU ceasefire in 2012.445

At the same time, to hinder and suppress the parallel infrastructure of health care services of the non-state groups, the government military continued the use of its notorious four cuts strategy in warring Karen-populated areas. In most KNU-contested areas, the ‘shoot on sight’ orders of the government military remained in place.446 The authorities tightened

443 Ibid. 444 A KNU/KNLA liaison officer, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 445 A former State health authority (Mon State), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; A medical practitioner (Kamamoung SH), interview by the author, March 7, 2016, Kama Moung Town, Papun Township, Kayin State. 446 A director of a local NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State.

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travel restrictions and attacked the stationary clinics and health care personnel of the KDHW and the other community groups.447 Health workers of KNU and other NSAs had to provide essential health services to Karen communities under high risk of arrest, torture and killing.448 The government military also punished the recipients of health services of NSAs by threats, beatings, and often burning down their houses.449 However, rather than improving the irrevocability of the government health services, such intensifying war atrocities further damaged the already debilitated trust of the Karen community in the social services provided by the state. In 2009, as a tragic instance, worrying for the severity of the illness of a child, a government health staff member from Mea Pali sub- RHC, a remote Karen village in Papun Township, referred and arranged the mother and child to the nearest government SH. However, due to her lack of trust in the government medical staff and worrying her child would be poisoned, the mother denied treatment for her ailing child and pleaded to let her return to her village.450

Moreover, the ongoing fighting in the areas caused the government military to enact numerous restrictions on international humanitarian and development organisations from providing basic and essential health care services.451 These restrictions led to the withdrawal of some UN agencies and international organisations as the partner organisations of the government DOH. In 2005, the Global Fund, an international partnership organisation that focused on the eradication of AIDS, tuberculosis and

447 There were reports of the arrest, torture and killing of Karen back pack medics during 1998 and 2010. See, for example, Karen News, “Burma Army Arrest Health Workers,” Karen News, 10 November, 2011. 448 Back Pack Health Worker Team, Annual Report 2001 (Mae Sot: Back Pack Health Worker Team, 2001). 449 Ibid. 450 Some Karen medics allegedly told the Karen people in the areas not to accept medical treatment and medication from government heath personnel, as it could be poisonous. A medical practitioner (xxx Station Hospital), interview by the author, March 7, 2016, xxx, Papun Township, Karen State (exact location of the SH and names omitted for security reason). 451 Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, “Guidelines for UN Agencies, International Organizations and NGOs/INGOs on Cooperation Programme in Myanmar” (Yangon: Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, 2008). See also, Eric Stover et al., The Gathering Storm: Infectious Diseases and Human Rights in Burma (Berkeley: Human Rights Centre, University of California and Center for Public Health and Human Rights, John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 2007); Chris Beyrer and Thomas Lee, “Responding to Infectious Diseases in Burma and Her Border Regions,” Conflict and Health 2, no. 1 (2008); and Chris Beyrer et al., “Responding to AIDS, Tuberculosis, Malaria, and Emerging Infectious Diseases in Burma: Dilemmas of Policy and Practice,” PLoS Medicine 3, no. 10 (2006): 1733.

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malaria had to terminate its USD98.4 million countrywide project,452 while MSF withdrew its modest malaria programs in the government-controlled Karen-populated remote areas.453 As a result, the coverage, utilisation and technical quality of health care services remained deficient in the conflicting Karen areas.454

Consequently, health indicators for the Karen-populated areas under continued fighting remained dire, while those in the ceasefire Mon areas gradually improved. The continued fighting not only destabilised the community, it also produced devastating health implications. While there was virtually no access to any form of health care services for those displaced in the deep jungles, the government health care service in the relocated villages was inimical or, in many cases, did not exist at all.455 Hence, the Karen population in the areas faced with detrimental health outcomes such as high prevalence rates of malaria and severe malnutrition, particularly among the children.456 According to data provided by the BPHWT in 2006, the risk of mortality while giving birth in the warring Karen areas was 1 in 12,457 a comparable rate to that of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia.458 The mortality rate of under-five-year-old children in the conflicting Karen areas was 221 out of 1,000, while that of Myanmar at the national level was 106 out of 1,000 and in Thailand it was 21 out of 1,000.459 While prevalence of malaria and

452 The Global Fund, “Termination of Grants to Myanmar” (The Global Fund, 18 August, 2005). See also Beyrer et al., “Responding to AIDS, Tuberculosis, Malaria, and Emerging Infectious Diseases in Burma: Dilemmas of Policy and Practice,” 1733. 453 Lee et al., “Internally Displaced Human Resources for Health: Villager Health Worker Partnerships to Scale up a Malaria Control Programme in Active Conflict Areas of Eastern Burma,” 230. 454 Sullivan, Maung, and Sophia, “Using Evidence to Improve Reproductive Health Quality Along the Thailand‐Burma Border”. 455 Karen Human Rights Group, Dignity in the Shadow of Oppression: The Abuse and Agency of Karen Women under Militarisation. 456 Mahn Mahn et al., “Health Security among Internally Displaced and Vulnerable Populations in Eastern Burma,” in Dictatorship, Disorder and Decline in Myanmar, edited by Monique Skidmore and Trevor Wilson (Canberra: ANU Press, 2008), 211. 457 Back Pack Health Worker Team, Chronic Emergency: Health and Human Rights in Eastern Burma (Mae Sot: Back Pack Health Worker Team, 2006), 41. 458 Fink, “Militarization in Burma’s Ethnic States: Causes and Consequences,” 453. 459 Back Pack Health Worker Team, Chronic Emergency, 32–33.

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mortality rates were persistently high,460 the coverage of basic maternal health intervention was woefully inadequate and among the lowest in the region.461

Again, KNU expanded its health care service provision to the community under its control to offset the continued absence of health care services of Myanmar State, deal with the serious health conditions in the Karen-populated areas and expose the continued weak infrastructure capacity of the state. The KDHW, local community organisations and the international community had to offset the service void left by the Myanmar state in the areas. During the years of continued fighting, KDHW established several stationary clinics in areas that were under the KNU’s firm control and were relatively stable.462 By 2006, KDHW operated 33 mobile clinics that provided various health care services to 3,500–5,000 people in the remote Karen-populated areas.463 To address the increasingly deteriorating health conditions in the warring Karen areas and borderlands, the KDHW, Karen health practitioners, the health departments of the other EAOs in the borderland, together with exiled health specialists formed the BPHWT in 1998.464 Since then, mobile teams of three to five medics and supervisors of the BPHWT have travelled around providing primary health care services, reproductive health care and medical care for injuries and communicable and infectious diseases.465 The team has also provided standardised training to community health workers to enable them to deliver consistent primary health care. Despite increasing insecurity and risks, the health care branch of the KNU and the medic teams of the BPHWT expanded their coverage of basic health care service provisions to the communities that remained in the conflicting zones. For instance, while the malaria program of KDHW expanded from its coverage of 1,868 people in four conflicting areas in 2003 to 40,859 people in 53 areas in 2007,466 the BPHWT expanded

460 Stover et al., The Gathering Storm: Infectious Diseases and Human Rights in Burma. 461 Luke C. Mullany et al., “Access to Essential Maternal Health Interventions and Human Rights Violations among Vulnerable Communities in Eastern Burma (Maternal Health and Human Rights in Burma),” PLoS Medicine 5, no. 12 (2008). 462 Mahn Mahn et al., “Health Security among Internally Displaced and Vulnerable Populations in Eastern Burma,” 215. 463 Ibid. 464 Ibid., 213. 465 Ibid. 466 Ibid., 218.

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its teams from 32 in 2003 to 76 teams in 2007, covering 17 conflict-affected Karen- populated areas.467

Similarly, although originally established as a small clinic to provide basic curative health services, the Mae Taw Clinic expanded into a large health care facility providing comprehensive health care services as well as a training centre offering standardising health care courses for the health workers of non-state actors.468 The clinic even operated a network in the remote government-controlled and contested Karen State.469 The BMA also expanded its service programs and began to provide specialised health care programs such as maternal and child health care services.470 In addition, the community organisation expanded its coverage during the continued fighting in Karen-populated areas.471 At the same time, while the cross-border international funding for the NSAs providing health care services in ceasefire Mon areas significantly decreased, funding for the KDHW and Karen community groups as well as the international actors continued to increase over the years. 472 The increase in cross-border funding and technical assistance, including skills- and management-related training significantly improved the capacity of the health personnel of the KDHW and other community organisations. As Mahn et al. argue, the health care services of the EAOs and border-based community organisations continued to gain trust and credibility among the communities that remained in the conflict areas and along the Myanmar-Thai borderlands.473

While the MNHC of the NMSP was merging its coverage areas and preparing to converge its health care services with that of the state, the parallel health care system of the KNU and its partner organisations in the Karen areas that remained in the conflict zones

467 Ibid., 217. 468 Jolliffe and Davis, “Achieving Health Equity in Contested Areas of Southeast Myanmar,” 10. 469 Ibid. 470 Ibid. 471 Ibid. 472 See, for example, Mahn Mahn et al., “Health Security among Internally Displaced and Vulnerable Populations in Eastern Burma”. 473 Ibid. Even the population living in the government-controlled areas preferred the border-based health care services when these services become accessible after security improved following the KNU ceasefire in 2012. A medical practitioner (Kamamoung SH), interview by the author, March 7, 2016, Kama Moung Town, Papun Township, Kayin State.

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continued to strengthen and expand. The capacity and reach of the health service infrastructure of the Myanmar state remained weak and ineffectual in the Karen- populated areas under the continued armed conflict.

Education services

The continued warlike hostilities had profound effects on the education service provisions of both the state and non-state education regimes in affected Karen communities. The prevailing insecurity meant neither the government Na Ta La nor MOE could expand the state educational infrastructure into Karen villages that were under the continued contestation and control of KNU.474 Until the ceasefire of KNU, thousands of Karen villagers across the south-eastern mountain ranges did not receive state education services.475 From the late 1990s, KNU significantly expanded the capacity of its education service provision to offset the continued lack of state educational infrastructure and the influx of locally displaced population and refugees into its controlled and contested areas.476 During the past few decades, the KED of the KNU administered a wide network of schooling systems that were accessible to the conflict-affected Karen communities, including Karen refugees in border areas.477 Showing great commitment to the education of their children, numerous Karen communities have endured burdens to complement the often rudimentary education services provided by the non-state armed groups and community organisations.478

Throughout the continued civil war, these Karen community schools were the only available education service to provide basic schooling and revitalised elements of Karen

474 A high-level KNU leader, interview by the author, January 22, 2017, Yangon. 475 Ibid. 476 By 2011, before KNU entered a ceasefire agreement with the semi-civilian government of President U Thein Sein, KED, together with the local communities and the support of border-based INGOs and community organisations, administered over 1,000 Karen schools including 24 high schools and provided schooling to over 100,000 Karen students in the conflict-affected Karen areas. For details, see South and Lall, Education, Conflict and Identity: Non-State Education Regimes in Burma, 8. 477 Ibid. See also Kim Jolliffe and Emily Speers Mears, Strength in Diversity: Towards Universal Education in Myanmar’s Ethnic Areas (Yangon: The Asia Foundation, 2016), 9. 478 For Karen communities under continued armed conflict, the increasing insecurity and social and economic hardship severely limited their capacity to contribute the required matching resources to the education services provided by the KED and other community-based education organisations. A director of Kayin Information Centre, interview.

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culture and identity for children in conflict-affected zones.479 Moreover, in some areas outside the control of Karen armed groups, local communities also established their own community schooling system, sometimes with the financial and technical support of KED and the border-based education communities.480 Since the late 1990s, many community schools in the areas have received schooling resources including funding, teachers, standardised curricula and teaching materials from KED and other community-based education regimes. For example, Partners Relief and Development, a border-based INGO focused on education, provided funds and other support to both Karen community schools and those under the direct management of KED.481 Further, the Karen Teacher Working Group (KTWG), established in 1997 to strengthen the Karen national education system, along with other community-based and religious-based education organisations provided teachers’ salaries, training and other support to the communities in need.482 In addition, the host communities also contributed towards the basic and long-term needs of the schools such as land, building, furniture and complementary teachers’ salaries and accommodation.483

Meanwhile, as the government military was able to expand its presence and the KNU splinter groups could consolidate their military positions in some of the previously KNU- controlled areas, the government Na Ta La and MOE started expanding the reach of its education service provision. Together with speeding up infrastructural construction, Na Ta La quickly constructed school buildings across all the areas newly positioned by the government military and Karen proxy forces.484 In a concerted effort, MOE sanctioned most of the schools and provided teachers and schooling materials.485 In the areas where there were already Karen community schools administered by KED or its networks, MOE would take over the schools and overrule the school curricula and administration, while

479 Ibid. 480 South and Lall, Education, Conflict and Identity: Non-State Education Regimes in Burma, 15. 481 A director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 482 Ibid. 483 Ibid. 484 A director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 485 Former education official of Mon State, interview by the author, February 13, 2017, Mawlamyine Mon State.

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stealthily allowing the community to receive material support from the Karen community-based education regimes.486 The takeover of this kind of community school led to the emergence of a distinct type of Karen mixed school system in the Karen ceasefire areas. Unlike the mixed schools in Mon ceasefire areas, MOE neither accepted the teachers nor adopted the curricula established by the KED, church-based organisations or other Karen community education providers.487 While such mixed schools in the Karen ceasefire areas could accept funding support and other schooling needs from community groups such as KSEAG and KTWG, the schools were strictly prohibited from connecting with KED, the main Karen education provider.488 The Na Ta La sometimes provided funds to upgrade school buildings and MOE offered rudimentary teaching supplies to these schools.489 However, while the children in the Karen ceasefire zones and relocated villages gained better access to the state education service, the standard and accessibility of the service remained limited. According to a study in 2000, the ratio of government primary schools in the minority ethnic border areas was as low as one school for 25 villages.490 Schooling materials were mostly in limited supply and usually of poor quality.491

Moreover, under the continued war-related rights violations and suppression, the elementary education service provided by the state largely remained a tool for minority ethnic assimilation. All the MOE and Karen-type mixed schools managed by the Karen ceasefire groups were required to use the Bamar-centric, assimilationist state curricula. 492 The language of classroom instruction in these schools was essentially Bamar. The practice of MTB education, together with the teaching of Sgaw Karen literacy, was discontinued in the schools that the MOE took over.493 Further, as as in the case of state

486 A prominent Kayin community leader, interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 487 Ibid. 488 Ibid. 489 A CSO leader (a leader of the Karen Affairs Committee), interview with the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Karen State. See also Jolliffe, “Ethnic Conflict and Social Services in Myanmar’s Contested Regions,” 16. 490 Kyi et al., Economic Development of Burma: A Vision and a Strategy, 145. 491 A senior Karen community leader, interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 492 See, for example, Core, “Burma/ Myanmar: Challenges of a Ceasefire Accord in Karen State,” 101. 493 A leader of Karen Affairs Committee, interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State.

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schools in Mon ceasefire areas, many of the newly appointed teachers were from the towns and often Bamar and did not speak Karen.494 Most of the teachers were arbitrarily recruited daily-wage teachers with a month-long training at the township level.495 Consequently, while the teaching quality was extremely poor, many of the teachers were unable to interpret the Bamar language course curricular for Karen students. The parents had to bear the various schooling costs, most of which were unofficial, while Karen children could no longer study in their mother language and, instead, faced the challenge of instruction through the Bamar language.496 The way in which the MOE took over the Karen community schools often raised tensions between the school committees and government authorities, as well as the teachers and parents.497 Further, war-related impediments, particularly insecurity, subsequent poverty and poor health conditions, contributed to the poor classroom performance of the children and exacerbated the children’s absence from schools.498 Early dropout rates were persistently high among Karen children in the government schooling system in the areas.499 Most of the Karen parents in the areas under control of the Karen ceasefire groups increasingly tried to send their children to the Karen national schools that were under the administration of the KED.500

The continued fighting and resulted war atrocities compelled the KNU leadership to strengthen the separatist identity among the younger generation living in the areas under its control. This separatist sentimentality was reflected in the development of a distinct Karen education system that is attributive to the armed struggle of the Karen people against the militarised Myanmar state. The education systems of various Karen education regimes being intimately linked with the concept of national identity and the resilient struggle for nation-building, have played an important role in the strengthening of the nationalist sentiment among the younger generations over the years. Since the education

494 Ibid. 495 Ibid. 496 A prominent Kayin community leader (Hpa-an), interview. 497 Ibid. 498 Karen State Education Assistance Group, Karen State Education Assistance Group Report, (Thailand: Karen State Education Assistance Group, 2009). 499 A senior Karen community leader, interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 500 Ibid.

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authorities of the KNU perceived the Karen education system as a distinct undertaking of the state of Kawthoolei, some scholars and practitioners have suggested that the mainstream Karen education system helped to strengthen the notion of separatist nationalism.501 Although the authorities of KED have considerably revised the curricula of the Karen education system over the past decades, many aspects of its curriculum still reflected the influential notions of Karen national identity and its prolonged resilient struggle.502 Consequently, as the curricula in the education system of the KED emphasised Karen languages and English, the Bamar language became a minor, foreign language in the Karen schooling system. Moreover, as the number of secondary schools in the KED system has been small and access to the schools was often difficult and risky, the children in the continued conflicting Karen areas had limited options to continue their education upon completing primary education in the KED system.503 Although education- related support from both the international and local communities was plentiful throughout the years of intense fighting, KED and the other Karen education regimes faced difficult challenges in establishing more complicated and resource consuming secondary education facilities that were accessible to the population in the areas.504 Many pointed to the lack of security and basic infrastructure as well as the destabilised Karen communities sprawling across the width and vastness of mountainous Karen areas as insurmountable difficulties.505

Meanwhile, as correctly argued by South and Lall, the competing nationalist agenda and systems of governance between the Myanmar Government and the KNU had profound effects on the capacity and effectiveness of the education services provided by both state and non-state actors.506 As the war continued, the education authorities of different Karen armed organisations could not come together to reach a compromise on a standardised

501 See, for example, South and Lall, Education, Conflict and Identity: Non-State Education Regimes in Burma, 27. 502 A director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State; a leader of Karen Affairs Committee, interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State; a social worker (former MNED staff), Kalawtthawt, informal discussion. See also ibid., 28. 503 Ibid., 47. 504 A leader of Karen Affairs Committee, interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 505 Ibid. 506 South and Lall, Education, Conflict and Identity: Non-State Education Regimes in Burma, 8.

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and unified schooling system for all Karen children.507 Depending on varying military and political status, different Karen armed groups undertook different education initiatives in areas under their control or influence.508 Across the conflict-affected Karen- populated areas, different education service providers used different curricula, teaching methodology and evaluation systems in their schools. While the KED was the major education service provider in most of the conflict-affected Karen communities, the different Karen ceasefire organisations also provided diverse education services in the enclaves under their control.509 For instance, all the KED schools provided education services based on the curricula developed by the KNU that was developed with the support from cross-border international and local education regimes and Karen education experts.510

However, most of the ceasefire Karen armed factions provided education services mainly based on the curriculum and teaching materials used in the state schools.511 In these schools, the administrative presence of MOE was so strong that only the Bamar-centric curricular and language of classroom instruction were allowed.512 In addition, the majority of Karen community schools, including Karen-type mixed schools, usually used the curricula of the state school together with teaching and learning resources provided by the local and external community, religious-based organisations, and cross-border education agencies.513 Moreover, while the KED schooling system mainly applied the

507 Although Karen scholars and practitioners claimed the existence of 12 different and uncommunicable dialects in Karen society, all these dialects could regroup into Pwo (or Phlon) and Sgaw (or Swaw) for schooling purposes, especially curricula design. The racial-based feud between the Pwo (predominantly Buddhist) and Sgaw (Christian) had yet achieved proper resolution. A prominent Karen community leader, interview by the author, 18 January, 2017, Yangon; a community leader (director of a LNGO), interview by the author, 6 March, 2016, Hpa-an, Karen State; A leader of Karen Affairs Committee, interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 508 An NGO worker (former KED teacher), interview by the author, March 11, 2016, Kawtkareik Town, Kayin State. 509 South and Lall, Education, Conflict and Identity: Non-State Education Regimes in Burma, 15–16. 510 See Human Rights Watch, “Burma: They Came and Destroyed Our Village Again: The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Karen State,” 54; South and Lall, Education, Conflict and Identity: Non-State Education Regimes in Burma. 511 Core, “Burma/ Myanmar: Challenges of a Ceasefire Accord in Karen State”. 512 Ibid. 513 See, for example, South and Lall, Education, Conflict and Identity: Non-State Education Regimes in Burma, 27.

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CCA teaching methodology, the schooling system of the Karen ceasefire groups and that of the communities in the government-controlled areas used the teacher centred, rote- learning approach.514

Conversely, as the curricula of KED was the most influential across all the different Karen schooling systems, including some of those under the authority of the Karen ceasefire groups and the Karen communities in the government strongholds, many Karen schools continued to produce the educated partisan of Karen nationalist identity. However, most students educated in various non-state Karen education systems have a very limited connection with the government education system. The KED curricular does not prepare students to integrate with and proceed their education career in the state education system.515 Because they had only limited mastery of the Bamar language and subjects that must be learned through Bamar language, many graduates from the KED schools faced challenges in integrating with the higher education system of the Myanmar state.516 Consequently, although many students graduated from Karen education systems qualified for employment in the border-based aid agencies, international NGOs, local civil society, and community organisations, many were unable to matriculate the government examinations.517 Thus, most were unable to join the state’s higher education system or take up as other educational opportunities in the country and abroad.

Given the continued fighting and general suppression of the Myanmar state on the Karen population, the leadership of KNU as well as KED did not think this was a major concern, although some acknowledged the ineptitude in Myanmar language of the KED graduates.518 For the leaders, upholding the spirit of Karen national identity and separatist sentimentality among the younger Karen generations was crucial under such a continued violent civil war. Some Karen education officials conceived that it was difficult to

514 A leader of Karen Affairs Committee, interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 515 An NGO worker (former KED teacher), interview by the author, March 11, 2016, Kawtkareik Town, Kayin State. 516 A director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State; A leader of Karen Affairs Committee, interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 517 A leader of Karen Affairs Committee, interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State; an NGO worker (former KED teacher), interview by the author, March 11, 2016, Kawtkareik Town, Kayin State. 518 A senior Karen community leader, interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State.

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integrate the education system of the KNU with an agreed education system of the state of Myanmar that could probably emerge in an unpredictable future.519

Although there were collisions and an often informal connection between the social service provision of KED and MOE, the continued war made it impossible for both sides to come together and work towards a better way to consort and complement the services provided by each other for citizens in devastating need. Consequently, even after a ceasefire agreement was reached between KNU and the Myanmar semi-civilian government in 2012, the mainstream education system of the Karen non-state actor remained idiosyncratically diverge from that of the Myanmar state. The minority ethnic- nationalist-oriented curricular, the language of classroom instruction, course content and the teaching approaches of the KED education systems continued to be totally different from the government system.520 For the state, conceding to such a separatist social service delivery system would be very difficult, if not impossible. The existence of confronting parallel social service delivery systems not only validated the incapacity of the social infrastructure of Myanmar State, but also caused the service that was provided by both sides to be ineffectual.

(b) Physical infrastructure

Road transportation

The continued fighting hindered efforts by the government to improve physical infrastructure in the conflict-affected Karen areas. Although the government increased national spending on physical infrastructure at average five per cent of GDP since the early 1990s,521 Karen-populated areas under the continued armed conflict saw very few physical infrastructure projects. For instance, although the government Public Works Department (PWD) of the Ministry of Construction was able to implement prioritised ‘special projects’ such as the Thanlwin River Bridge (Hpa-an) and the Gyaing River Bridge (Zarthabyin) construction projects in the government stronghold areas in 1997,

519 A high-level KNU leader, interview by the author, January 22, 2017, Yangon; a senior Karen community leader, interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 520 An NGO worker (former KED teacher), interview by the author, March 11, 2016, Kawtkareik Town, Kayin State. 521 Kyi et al., Economic Development of Burma: A Vision and a Strategy, 167.

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the PWD could not start construction on Paingkyon Bridge in the area that remained contested in Hlaingbwe Township until the mid-2000s. In the area, although the entire KNLA 7th Brigade that controlled the area entered into a ceasefire with the government, the government military and the splinter ceasefire army were unable to control the area solely.522

Moreover, although there was growth in roads, railroads and irrigation in the government stronghold central lowland areas, development in the ceasefire Karen areas was largely lagging behind. Since the ceasefire of the DKBA, the government military and its line agencies tried to build roads and other infrastructure projects in government stronghold areas and in the ceasefire Karen armed factions. However, the government border area development department and the locally garrisoned military engineering battalions could not implement many of the infrastructure projects in Karen-populated areas under the continued armed conflict. As fighting hardly ceased in the DKBA-controlled area of Hpapun Township, both the government PWD and the military Engineering Battalion No. 943 could not implement the Hpapun-Kamamoung and Hpapun-Kyaukhnyat road construction projects until the KNU ceasefire in 2012 and had to repeatedly return the allotted government budgets.523 Similarly, the Kawtkareik-Myawaddy road from the colonial time remained unmaintained and hardly useful for local and border trading, while the already inadequate road transportation networks were speedily deteriorating.524

At the same time, the government tried to build several roads connecting the previously ungovernable border peripheries with the principal roads inside the government strongholds. This was mainly to gain more control of the border areas and tighten control over border trading. However, the continued armed conflict in the KNU-controlled and contested areas effectively hindered many such projects. For example, the 100 km Three Pagodas Pass to the Thanbyuzayart road construction project was a development project

522 A high-level KNU leader, interview by the author, January 22, 2017, Yangon; An official of an international peace organisation (a former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 523 A former minister (Kayin-1), interview by the author, 6 March, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Karen State; a medical practitioner (Kamamoung SH), interview by the author, 7 March, 2016, Kamamoung Town, Hpapun Township, Karen State. 524 A country director of an INGO (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, January 21, 2017, Yangon; A large-scale trader (former well-connected goods smuggler), interview by the author, February 20, 2016, Thanbyuzayart Town, Mon State.

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with mainly military objectives. While the government military was able to construct the groundworks of the project in the ceasefire NMSP-controlled Thanbyuzayart Township, the repeatedly failed ceasefire talks with the KNU held up the implementation of the project in KNU-controlled areas in Kyarinseikgyi and Three Pagoda Pass townships.525 Until the ceasefire of KNU in 2012, both the DPW and government military engineering battalions could not carry out construction works and the road remained as it was during the Second World War, with bombarded bridges full of sinkholes and swallow holes, although there were a few improvised reparations of local traders engaged in border trading.526

Moreover, in the early years of the ceasefire, whenever they became controversial between the troops, KNLA troops forcefully stopped the road building projects of the government or ceasefire KNU splinter groups and, sometimes, destroyed completed roads in the areas that remained contested. In 2010, troops of KNLA Brigade 5 deterred the construction of Beelin-Nattgyi-Maepali road within their contested area and mined a portion of the completed road as a response to the continuation of the project.527 Further, even after the KNU ceasefire, beyond the national highway connecting Karen State to Yangon, travel restrictions applied on most main roads in the continued conflict-affected Karen areas including Belin-Papun, Myaingkalay-Papun and Hpa-an-Hlaingbwe.528 Moreover, the situation of major roads in Karen State lagged far behind those in Mon State. For example, while the road linking Hpa-an to Mawlamyine and Yangon in Mon State were upgraded and in good repair, an important major trading road linking Hpa-an to the border town Myawaddy was left unmaintained for decades.529 A propaganda document of the SPDC government published in 2009 barely claims the government built

525 Ibid. 526 Ibid. 527 Dr HLa Oo (former Minister of Social Welfare-Mon State), interview by the author, February 14, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 528 A former Minister (Kayin-1), interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State; A former village administrator, interview by the author, March 7, 2016, Kataingti Village, Papun Township, Kayin State; a CBO leader, interview by the author, March 9, 2016, Hlaingbwe Town, Kayin State. 529 A former minister (Kayin-6), interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State; A director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State.

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240 km additional tarred road all over Kayin State during over 20 years of its rule.530 On a per capita and geographical density basis, this was a very small percentage per year for development in road transportation and virtually no progress was made in railway miles during the last half-century in the conflict-affected Karen-populated areas. Under the rampant corruption and patrimonial oversight that was exacerbated due to insecurity, the quality and reliability of the newly built infrastructure facilities were poor in the conflict- affected Karen areas. Given the poor state and deficiency of most roads in Karen- populated areas, rivers and creeks remain the important source of transportation. Moreover, with the continued civil war, the newly built infrastructure did not support the socioeconomic improvement of the areas and was burdensome for the population living there. Most of the newly built infrastructure involved military objectives and it became a double-edged sword for the population. As convincingly argued by many scholars, with the newly built infrastructure, Myanmar military regime ominously increased the size and presence of its armed forces and expanded its control over the previously ungovernable Karen-populated areas.531

Electricity

Until the ceasefire of KNU, the electrification rate in Karen-populated areas was the lowest in periphery Myanmar. Apart from inside a few garrisoned towns, Karen suburbs and forcefully built peri-urban areas, most Karen-populated areas faced uneven electricity supply and chronic electricity shortage. While blackouts and brownouts frequently occurred in Karen urban towns, the populations in rural villages remained without access to electricity, unlike the ceasefire Mon areas.

In the mid-2000s, although some small-scale private providers had started to provide independently generated electricity to villages in the newly built so-called towns and villages in the ceasefire areas of the KNU splinter groups, many households could not afford the cost. Many could not revive their livelihoods and achieve viable incomes;

530 ျ ပန္ၾကားေ ာရပန ၾႀာီကပာန၊ “တ နမးေတကန အစုာ ိၾနလၾနႏုိစု န းေတကနတ ံ္တ ုာတစုာတၾနမႈမွတနတမနာ-၂ရရ၉”ာန၊ (းေပျ ပနးေတကနာန၊ ျ ပန္ၾကားေ ာ ရပန ၾႀာီကပာန၊ 2009)ာန၊ ၇၈။ [Ministry of Information, Myanmar, “Chronicle of National Development: Comparison between Period Preceding 1988 and after (up to 31-12-2009),” 78.] 531 See, for example, Fink, “Militarization in Burma’s Ethnic States: Causes and Consequences,” 447; Oo and Min, Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords.

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therefore, the local private electricity providers faced difficulties in collecting fees from the end users to maintain their power generators and transmission lines.532 Many households could not regularly pay the fees for two electric lighting points, usually one 15W bulb and one compact fluorescent lamp, which may cost from USD3 to USD4.50 per month.533 Candlelight, kerosene lamps and lanterns were the main source of household illumination in peri-urban and rural Karen areas.534 At best, a few households close to the government stronghold suburban and garrison towns where battery recharging services were available could use battery-powered lamps.535 Most of the households in both urban and rural Karen areas relied on solid fuel such as firewood for cooking.536 Many Karen villagers had to spend hours, or sometimes days, every month collecting fuelwood in the nearby forests.537 In recent decades, this fuelwood collection has extended into the unclassified forests further afield.538 In addition, inefficient charcoal production in the improvised kilns supplied the increasing charcoal demand in Karen urban cities and towns, contributing to scarcity and deforestation in the post-conflict Karen-populated areas.539 Low energy security has continued to be a serious issue and present difficulties for Karen populations in both urban and rural areas in reviving their lives.

532 A former village administrator, interview by the author, March 7, 2016, Kataingti Village, Papun Township, Kayin State; A former villge administrator, interview by the author, February 4, 2017, Htilon Village, Hlaingbwe Township, Kayin State. 533 Most households could afford only two bulbs for early night time lighting. A village private electric lighting privider, in discussion with the author, February 4–6, 2017, Htilon Village, Hlaingbwe Township, Karen State; CSO leaders, in discussion with the author, March 7, 2016, Kamamoung, Karen State. 534 A former village administrator, interview by the author, March 7, 2016, Kataingti Village, Papun Township, Kayin State; A former villge administrator, interview by the author, February 4, 2017, Htilon Village, Hlaingbwe Township, Kayin State. 535 Ibid. 536 A senior official of an INGO (a former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon; A director of a Strategic Study Institute (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 537 A director of Kayin Information Centre, interview by the author, February 7, 2017, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 538 Ibid. 539 A country director of an INGO (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, January 21, 2017, Yangon.

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At the onset of national liberalisation in 2010, while the electrification rate was gradually improving in many towns and villages in Mon-populated areas with low potential power resources, those in Kayin State continued to lack access to electricity despite a much higher source of power potential.540 Most ceasefire Karen-populated areas faced acute electricity shortages. As the authorities lifted the dawn-to-dusk curfew in most post- conflict areas, many villages began trying to obtain access to electricity. However, as the national grid lines were unlikely to expand into the rural Karen areas for decades, many Karen villages emerging from the armed conflict remained without electricity.

Communication

Until the ceasefire of the KNU, the communication infrastructure remained insufficient in both urban and rural Karen-populated areas. The telecommunication service in the cities and towns in the government stronghold areas was limited and none of the villages in the continued conflict-affected areas had access to basic telecommunication services. Although the government postal service department installed a few telegram and post offices in the newly occupied government stronghold areas, the department was unable to provide communication services to all the remote small towns and villages in the continued contested areas. Even when the government expanded telecommunication services across the country in the early 2000s, cell phone coverage in the areas remained limited to the urban area proper.

By 2009, the government’s Postal and Telecommunication Enterprise had installed a few more postal and telegram offices and automatic and manual telephone exchange centres in the government stronghold cities and towns as well as in newly constructed urban towns such as Myaing Gyi Ngu that were under the secure control of DKBA.541 Although the government’s telecommunications department established mobile phone networks in the cities and towns in the government stronghold and under the control of Karen ceasefire groups, the government’s line agency was unable to construct

540 For electrical power resource potential, see Thurain Win. “The Electrification of Myanmar,” accessed February 16, 2018, http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/publications/2014-win-the-electrification- of-myanmar.pdf 541 A director of Kayin Information Centre, interview by the author, February 7, 2017, Hpa-an, Kayin State.

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telecommunication towers in the areas controlled or contested by the KNLA troops.542 Consequently, even after the KNU ceasefire, Kayin State had very few WCDMA and GSM signalling towers.543 Mobile phone signal strength was weak in the capital city Hpa- an and often lost from street to street, while many small Karen towns did not have mobile phone services, even during the national liberalisation of mobile networking.544 In some villages in Mon State, the six newly installed government rural telephone exchange centres with manually operated fixed landlines were not much use.545 Although there were privately provided telephone services in the areas under the government stronghold and stable control of the ceasefire Karen armed groups, there was no telephone service in the continued warring and contested Karen areas.546 In the KNU stronghold and contested areas, most Karen villages remained without access to any telecommunication services. In many villages close to the Thai border in the stronghold areas of KNU or ceasefire Karen armed groups, private individuals provided telephone services through various Thai mobile telephone service operators with the support of relaying repeaters.

Conclusion

Throughout the civil war, the three major aspects of stateness—enforcement, administrative, and infrastructural capacity—of the state of Myanmar was weak in civil war-affected Karen and Mon-populated areas. At the same time, in defying the capacity of Myanmar State, EAOs and their security, administrative, and social service delivering agencies operated in the areas in parallel to the state functioning institutions. As reaffirmed by findings from conflict-affected Mon- and Karen-populated areas, the presence of government security forces in the warring areas was weak and incompetent until the ceasefire agreements. Consequently, the administrative and taxation capacity

542 The authorities of KNU and KNLA troops used the satellite phone system. Saw Shie She, (KNU/KNLA liaison officer), interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 543 A leader of Karen political party, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 544 A director of a Strategic Study Institute (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 545 A former village administrator, interview by the author, March 7, 2016, Kataingti Village, Papun Township, Kayin State; A CBO leader, interview by the author, March 9, 2016, Hlaingbwe Town, Kayin State. 546 A former villge administrator, interview by the author, February 4, 2017, Htilon Village, Hlaingbwe Township, Kayin State; A CBO leader, interview by the author, March 9, 2016, Hlaingbwe Town, Kayin State.

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and efficacy of the state remained limited. Despite decades of militarised authoritarian rule, Myanmar State could not constitute a legitimate monopoly over the use of force and was unable to exercise effective administration of the state in conflict-affected territories. Meanwhile, the infrastructure capacity of the state also remained weak and largely improvised and barely reached the conflict-affected Karen and Mon-populated areas. The insecurity and war-related atrocities in the warring areas debilitated the infrastructural capacity of the State health services and produced severe effects on the health status of the population in the conflict-affected zones. Similarly, the state education system was degenerated and never reached rebel strongholds. For decades, education outcomes were dissipated in warring Karen- and Mon-populated areas. At the same time, the existence of parallel administrative and taxation authorities of Karen and Mon armed resistance organisations exposed the weak legitimacy of the state of Myanmar in the areas. The EAOs established their social service provision systems and provided health care and education services to the population, superseding the legitimate role of the state. These parallel social infrastructures not only increased the legitimacy of the EAOs and strengthened their status as patrons, they also offset desperately needed services to the populations living in their control areas. This is irrefutable evidence of the incapacity of the Myanmar state. In addition, throughout the prolonged civil war, all existing physical infrastructure in the conflict-affected Karen and Mon areas were severely damaged or deteriorated and not maintained. Until the the ceasefires, physical infrastructure, particularly road transportation, electrification and telecommunication, remained poor in the conflict-affected areas.

However, following the ceasefire agreement between NMSP and the government, significant changes took place in the enforcement, administrative and infrastructural capacity of the state in Mon-populated areas where the war-related hostilities had ended. Non-combatant military activities increased and the presence of the military across the ceasefire Mon-populated areas became permanent. The government military deployed numerous army battalions not only in the cities and towns, but also in the villages across all the previously contested areas. With the favourable conditions created by the ceasefire, the Myanmar Police Force was able to rejuvenate its role as the apparatus of coercion of the Myanmar state. The police force presence extended to the previously NMSP- controlled villages and it expanded its activities against crime and narcotics operations. Following the increased presence of security forces in the ceasefire territories, the

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administrative institutions of the state of Myanmar expanded into areas that were not previously under its rule. Local administration became stable and the administrative effectiveness of the state was significantly augmented in the newly demarcated government-controlled areas, as well as in the villages that remained under NMSP rule. Subsequently, the officials of the government administrative bodies, especially township- and village-level administrators, could exert unprecedented control and enforce orders and decisions. With the increased presence of security forces and improvement in the capacity of the state administration after the ceasefire, the effectiveness of the tax administration system of the Myanmar state in the formerly conflict-affected Mon- populated areas significantly improved. In addition to the township and village administrators of the GAD, the township-level authorities of the government line departments were also able to levy the taxation in the areas.

The ceasefire also strengthened the infrastructure capacity of both state and non-state armed groups and brought about better basic social services to a society that was emerging from a devastating civil war. The cessation of war hostilities in the formerly conflict- affected Mon-populated areas created conditions for the Myanmar state to expand coverage of State health care and education service provision systems into previously inaccessible territories. The physical infrastructure, human resources, instruments and replenishment of the government health care system improved to a certain extent. When government health personnel gradually assumed previously unwanted postings in the ceasefire villages, the replenishment by the central DOH to the areas became more regular. In the years following the ceasefire, the state’s preventive health programs also reached the population in the ceasefire zones. At the same time, the ceasefire created favourable conditions for non-State health care service providers, especially the MNHC of the NMSP, to standardise and improve its healthcare service provisions to the community. Similarly, the relatively stable and secure conditions in Mon-populated areas also improved the accessibility and quality of the state education service. The physical infrastructure of state education services including the number of schools increased to some extent, while more teachers received better teaching training and gradually reached the conflict-affected Mon villages. The ceasefire also improved the quality and coverage of the child-centred, MTB education service of non-state education service providers, particularly the MNEC. The MNEC expanded its Mon National School system and integrated students into the mainstream state education system for their secondary and

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tertiary education. The ceasefire also created opportunities for international humanitarian and development communities to help, support and facilitate better social services to the populations living in the areas emerging from the civil war. The international community was able to play a formal role in standardising and improving the basic social services of both state and non-state actors operating in the ceasefire zones.

Most importantly, the ceasefire of NMSP opened up considerable opportunities for cooperation and coordination between the social service provision systems of state and non-state actors, especially at the local level. This was significantly important in improving the accessibility and quality of basic social services in previously war-affected Mon communities. At the same time, physical infrastructure in Mon-populated areas noticeably increased, although the full benefits were not realised because the state remained corrupt and predatory. The government implemented some infrastructure projects with prioritised budgeting and higher-level coordination under the category of special projects. The NMSP also implemented some infrastructure development projects in the areas under their control. The improved availability of transportation, electrical power sources and telecommunication services was a notable feature of the post-ceasefire environment and played a role in strengthening the infrastructure capacity of the Myanmar state. Since the ceasefire, it is obvious that the major aspects of the stateness, including the enforcement capacity, administrative capacity and infrastructure capacity of the state have significantly improved in the conflict-affected Mon-populated areas.

Conversely, as civil war continued in the Karen-populated areas, the presence of security forces, administrative capacity and infrastructure capacity of the state remained weak and patchy. The presence of government security forces in most Karen-populated areas under the influence of the KNU remained limited until the government military and KNU reached a ceasefire agreement. Because fighting continued between KNLA troops and the government, as well as Karen militia groups, the military establishment in the continued highly contested areas could hardly be perceived as the presence of state security forces enforcing a monopoly over the legitimate use of force by the state. Rather, the security force presence could be best described as a counter-insurgency operation for control of areas in which the troops of a non-state armed group remained active. Although the government military, in collaboration with KNU splinter groups, could occupy a large portion of the warring areas, most of the military offensives came at a very high price. The persistent infantry and guerrilla resistance of the KNLA troops forced the 201 Chapter 4: The Effects of Ceasefire on ‘Stateness’

government military to spend massive resources to maintain its hard-earned military positions in the areas. Despite prolonged military offensives, together with widespread human rights abuses, the government military was unable to maintain or continuously control most of the villages in the KNU-contested areas. Until the KNU entered into a ceasefire agreement, the thousands of Karen villages that sprawled across the large swathes of the mountainous regions remained under the control of the KNU and, consequently, the presence of government military in the areas was limited. Moreover, as the KNLA troops continued to intrude into the areas occupied by the government military, government security forces could not consolidate their presence.

Similarly, the presence of the police force remained limited in most Karen-populated areas, although there were a few new police outposts created in the ceasefire areas of the KNU splinter groups. Until the KNU ceasefire, villagers in Karen-populated areas rarely saw the Myanmar Police Force in its law enforcing capacity. Consequently, unlike in the ceasefire zones in Mon-populated areas, government security forces could not help to establish local administrations or enforce their authority. The insecure presence of different armies meant the communities in the areas were under the rule of multiple administrative systems and faced difficult challenges in managing relationships with the authorities contending to each other. Meanwhile, the taxation capacity of the state of Myanmar remained limited and ineffectual. Extorted taxation was rampant by military personnel across the ceasefire areas of the KNU splinter groups where military build-ups had taken place. The forcefully relocated Karen villages have to bear the burden of a variety of cash and in-kind taxes imposed by the Army battalions in the areas. At the same time, given the lack of security, the state of Myanmar could not expand and improve its infrastructure capacity in the areas. Although there was some progress in the ceasefire enclaves of the KNU splinter groups, Myanmar State could not exert its social infrastructure to deliver basic social services to the Karen-populated areas that were under conflict.

The continued fighting also produced devastating health implications for the community. There was virtually no access to health care services for those who were displaced in the deep jungles and the government health care service in the relocated villages was inimical. Similarly, the continued fighting had profound effects on the education service provided by state and non-state education regimes to the war-affected Karen communities. Whereas KNU and non-state actors tried to offset the education service, the 202 Chapter 4: The Effects of Ceasefire on ‘Stateness’

continued insecurity and lack of basic physical infrastructure hindered their efforts to provide the needed social services. At the same time, the continued civil war obliged the non-state education authority to continue the ethnocentric, separatist school curricula. To offset the absence of a basic social service from the state and manage dire social needs, KNU and its affiliated organisations, as well as international and local humanitarian organisations, strengthened and increased the existing improvised parallel social service delivery systems to fill the service void. Until the cessation of warlike hostilities, the accessibility and quality of education services remained limited in Karen-populated areas. The capacity of major physical infrastructure, particularly road transportation, electrification and telecommunication, in the conflict-affected Karen-populated areas remained weak and ineffectual and presented a major hindrance for the population in trying to revive their livelihoods.

In summary, the enforcement capacity, administrative capacity, and infrastructure capacity of the Myanmar state remained weak across the Karen-populated areas where the war between the state and KNU continued. Although it did not lead to a political settlement, the ceasefire between the government and NMSP could be an example of creating enabling conditions for changes that are conducive to post-civil war democratisation. This uneven development in stateness in the ceasefire Mon-populated areas and Karen-populated areas under continued civil war has attributed differently to the Myanmar democratic transition process launched by the semi-civilian government in 2010.

203 Chapter 5: The Effects of Ceasefire on Economic Recovery

Chapter 5. The Effects of Ceasefire on Economic Recovery

Introduction

As detailed in the analytical framework (Chapter 2), there has been increasing academic agreement that higher-level economic conditions generate better democratic fundamentals that are conducive to a successful democratic transition. In recent decades, scholars of democratisation acknowledge the necessity of certain economic background conditions for a democratisation process to be successful. Some even argue for economic development to be a precondition before instating a democratic transition process.1 At the same time, scholars of post-conflict democratisation also agree on the importance of an improved economy and economic hope not only for maintaining peace, but also in mitigating the tensions generated by political contestations that are the necessary conditions for the success of a post-conflict democratic transition.2 To investigate the causal inferences between ceasefire and the resulted changes in the economy as an intervening attribute to a post-civil war democratic transition, this chapter examines the economic conditions in the conflict-affected Karen and Mon societies during the periods of war and ceasefire.

Measuring Post-Conflict Economic Development

Based on different conceptual perceptions and approaches, scholars, practitioners, and international peacebuilding and development regimes operationalise and measure post- civil war economic condition through a wide variety of indicators. Many scholars and organisations of the international peacebuilding and development community such as the UNDP, The World Bank, and the United States Agency for International Development,

1 See, for example, Seymour Martin Lipset, Kyoung-Ryung Soong, and John Charles Torres, “A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy,” Interanational Social Science Journal 136 (1993); Seymour Martin Lipset, “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited,” American Sociological Review 59, no. 1 (1994); Robert Alan Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Muller, “Economic Determinants of Democracy”; Feng and Zak, “The Determinants of Democratic Transitions”. 2 See, for example, Huntington, “Will More Countries Become Democratic?,” 199; Paul Collier et al., “Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy” (Washington, D. C. : World Bank, 2003), 83.

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commonly observe macro-economic indicators such as growth rates of per capita incomes and GDP, budgetary deficits, and inflation.3 However, some scholars argue that macro- economic conditions, especially economic growth and development, are the second-order indications of an economy that can be observed only in the long-term.4 Moreover, studies also point to the fact that focusing on macro-economic reforms towards neo-liberal norms in conflict-affected societies could lead to a disabling environment for the recovery of the post-conflict local economy.5

At the same time, under the dynamic and fluid circumstances of war and peace, observing macro-economic indicators could undermine the developments in economic realities that are evolving in conflict-affected societies, particularly at the bounded peripheral enclaves of minority ethnic communities. As it usually requires substantial transformation and a long time to improve the performance or outcomes of post-conflict economic functions, it is difficult to observe visible progress or developments in the early years of ceasefire. The wars in Karen- and Mon-populated areas, as in most conflict-affected societies, were lengthy, ruthless, and continued to negatively affect the societies long after the termination of war hostilities.6 Reinvigorating a viable economy in Karen and Mon

3 See, for example, Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom, “Post-Conflict Risks,” Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 4 (2008): 462; Agni Kalfagianni, “Ethics and Politics on Human Development,” in the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association (San Francisco, California 2008), 2; Anke Hoeffler, Syeda Shahbano Ijaz, and Sarah Von Billerbeck, “World Development Report 2011: Post-Conflict Recovery and Peacebuilding” (Washington D. C. : The World Bank, 2010); Collier, “On the Economic Consequences of Civil War”; Thomas Edward Flores and Irfan Nooruddin, “Democracy under the Gun: Understanding Postconflict Economic Recovery,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 1 (2009); Ohiorhenuan, “Post-Conflict Recovery: Approaches, Policies and Partnerships,” 6; Hoeffler, Ijaz, and Billerbeck, “World Development Report 2011: Post- Conflict Recovery and Peacebuilding”. 4 See, for example, Claude Berrebi and Sarah Olmstead, “Establishing Desirable Economic Conditions,” in Dilemmas of Intervention, edited by Paul K. Davis, Social Science for Stabilization and Reconstruction (RAND Corporation, 2011), 247; Graciana del Castillo, Rebuilding War-Torn States: The Challenge of Post-Conflict Economic Reconstruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 290. 5 See, for example, Ralph Sprenkels and Chris van der Borgh, “Precarious Itineraries: The ‘Longue Duree’ of Recovery and Livelihoods in a Post-War Salvadoran Village,” in People, Aid and Institutions in Socio-Economic Recovery: Facing Fragilities, edited bt Gemma van der Haar, Dorothea Hilhorst, and Bart Weijs (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2017), 64. See also Leigh Binford, “A Perfect Storm of Neglect and Failure: Postwar Capitalist Restoration in Northern Morazán, El Salvador,” The Journal of Peasant Studies 37, no. 3 (2010). 6 See, for example, Collier, “On the Economic Consequences of Civil War” and R. Mallett, J. Hagen- Zanker, R. Slater, and G. Sturge, “Surveying Livelihoods, Service Delivery and Governance: Baseline Evidence from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uganda,” (Working Paper No. 31, Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, London, 2015).

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communities has been a challenging task. In practice, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to obtain reliable economic data in most conflict-affected minority ethnic communities along the periphery borderlands of Myanmar. In most cases, as in the civil war-affected Karen and Mon-populated areas, such data did not exist. Thus, rather than trying to measure the macro- and micro-economic indicators, this study investigates the measurable elements of the post-conflict economic conditions that took place in the conflict-affected Karen and Mon societies under different war and ceasefire situations.

Conversely, in measuring the post-conflict economy, scholars and practitioners consider the developments in the fundamental elements of the economy and pay greater attention to the situation of economic infrastructure rebuilding, livelihood,7 market, and employment that are responsive in the short- to medium-term.8 For example, to achieve social and economic well-being in post-conflict settings, Johanna Mendelson Forman suggests ensuring the reconstruction of physical infrastructure, the stabilisation of livelihoods and the creation of employment opportunities.9 Similarly, for the short-term, in aiming to re-establish “a minimum of productive and commercial functions within local markets that have been damaged by the conflict”, the ILO focuses on the stabilisation of local livelihoods by creating immediate job opportunities through small- scale economic activities.10 Thus, instead of observing the developments in the local

7 The term ‘livelihood’ can be understood as a “system comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living”. Quoted in Leo J. De Haan, “The Livelihood Approach: A Critical Exploration,” Erdkunde 66, no. 4 (2012): 347. Stephen Morse and Nora McNamara define livelihood as the “imminent development (what people are doing anyway)”. See Stephen Morse and Nora McNamara, “Sustainable Livelihood Approach: A Critique of Theory and Practice” (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2013), 21. Moreover, as reminded by J. C. Gaillard et al., “livelihoods rarely refer to a singly activity. It includes complex, contextual, diverse and dynamic strategies developed by households to meet their needs”. J. C. Gaillard et al., “Sustainable Livelihoods and People’s Vulnerability in the Face of Coastal Hazards,” Planning and Management 13, no. 2 (2009): 121. 8 See, for example, Berrebi and Olmstead, “Establishing Desirable Economic Conditions,” 247; Castillo, Rebuilding War-Torn States: The Challenge of Post-Conflict Economic Reconstruction, 290; International Labour Office, Local Economic Recovery in Post-Conflict: Guidelines (Geneva: ILO Programme for Crisis Response and Reconstruction, 2010). See also R. Mallet and R. Slater, “Growth and Livelihoods in Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations,” Working Paper 9, Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, London, 2012. 9 Forman, “Achieving Socio-Economic Well-Being in Post-Conflict Settings,” 126. See also D. B. Subedi, “Economic Dimension of Peacebuilding: Insights into Post-Conflict Economic Recovery and Development in Nepal,” South Asia Economic Journal 13, no. 2 (2012). 10 International Labour Office, Local Economic Recovery in Post-Conflict: Guidelines, 1. For the medium-term, the organisation suggests pursuing the restoration of regular functions of productive

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economies through macro-economic indicators based on the availability of reliable data, this chapter traces and compares the developments in local livelihoods and employment opportunities in the conflict-affected Karen and Mon communities.

Urbanisation usually takes place rapidly in most post-conflict societies, as a result of post- civil war developments in the capacity of state functioning organs, social and physical infrastructure, market and trade, and income and employment opportunities.11 In the conflict-affected Karen and Mon areas, although the decision of the Myanmar military government played a decisive role, the changes in human security, economic environment and physical infrastructures during the ceasefire and under the continued civil war had imperative effects in the urbanisation processes in conflict-affected Karen and Mon areas. The urbanisation developments in Karen- and Mon-populated areas were an obvious reflection of the developments in the local economies under different war and peace situations. Thus, the thesis will also compare and contrast the situation of urbanisation in the ceasefire Mon-populated areas and Karen-populated areas under continued civil war.

Nevertheless, as the state of Myanmar remained autocratic and predatory, military authorities exploited the situation generated by the ceasefire agreements instead of trying to improve conflict-prone economic conditions to mitigate the recurrence of the armed conflict. For example, while the rehabilitated key public institutions were corrupt and predatory, some of the rebuilt or newly constructed essential infrastructures were frail and complicated by the objectives of military expansion. Similarly, rather than appropriately resettling IDPs and returning refugees, the military authorities abused the distressed populations as an inexhaustible source for their needs including military portering, forced labouring, and arbitrary taxation. Moreover, rather than tackling horizontal inequalities12 and rampant rent-seeking, military officials violated the rule of law and committed illicit acts. At the same time, while some factions or splinter groups of the non-state armies resisted giving up control over the communities previously under their rule, criminal

and commercial activities that might re-activate the local labour markets and sustain local job opportunities. Ibid., 13. 11 See, for example, Sara Pantuliano et al., City Limits: Urbanisation and Vulnerability in Sudan (London: Overseas Development Institute, January, 2011). 12 Frances Stewart defines horizontal inequalities as the “severe inequalities between culturally defined groups”. See Frances Stewart, “Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development,” (CRISE Working Paper No. 1, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford, Oxford, 2002).

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gangs, often involving ex-combatants of the armed groups, plundered the already damaged resources of the populations by exploiting volatile post-conflict circumstances. However, even under such a corrupt and predatory state, compared to the situation in Karen communities under continued civil war, the enduring ceasefire created better conditions for the post-conflict economy to recover and more developed urbanisation in conflict-affected Mon-populated areas.

Livelihood and Employment Conditions under Civil War

Civilians used to be the primary victims in armed conflicts and the non-combatant populations living in and around the warring areas continually faced the devastating consequences of the prolonged civil war. In addition to direct battle deaths, war- exacerbated displacements, disease, malnutrition, and deprivation of shelter cost substantial human lives. Whereas only a few returning IDPs and refugee families claimed loss of family members as direct battle casualties, many mentioned non-direct battle losses of household members and relatives during the decades of intense fighting.13 Although it is hard to know the exact figure, many returnees agree that the numbers of non-battle deaths in both Karen and Mon communities during the war could be much higher than that of direct battle fatalities. The death and permanent disability of working- age family members reduced family livelihoods and depleted the incomes of Karen and Mon households in the conflict-affected areas and pushed already poor families into extreme forms of poverty.14

Moreover, throughout the civil war, the military continued to force Karen villages both in the flatlands and rugged mountain ranges to move into relocation sites close to the military bases. These forced relocations effectively isolated villagers from their livelihoods and forced them out of employment. Since the early 1980s, as part of the scorched earth, or four-cut strategy as it is notoriously known, the government military

13 A former village administrator, interview by the author, February 28, 2016, Yingdein Village, Ye Township, Mon State; returning IDPs and refugees, in discussion with the author, March 20, 2017, Khawzar Town, Ye Township, Mon State; returning IDPs and refugees, in discussion with the author, March 20, 2017, Danikyar Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 14 A village elder (former sawmill owner), interview by the author, March 21, 2017, Kyaungywa, Ye Township, Mon State; returning IDPs and refugees, in discussion with the author, March 20, 2017, Khawzar Town, Ye Township, Mon State; returning IDPs and refugees, in discussion with the author, March 20, 2017, Danikyar Village, Ye Township, Mon State.

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forcibly ordered many Karen villagers from the mountainous areas to move down to designated relocation sites in flatlands where the military could closely watch them.15 At the same time, many suspected Karen villages in the flatlands were also forced to move near the garrison towns of the military battalions and heavily guarded main roads.16 Further, whenever fighting broke out in these areas the government troops punished the surrounding villages by ordering them to move to new relocation sites that were situated near the military base camps.17 In many cases, these forced relocations entirely isolated the Karen and Mon populations from their traditional livelihoods such as hillside rice cultivation and livestock raising.18 Because they could not obtain a piece of land to work on or were not allowed to move freely, many could not set up stable livelihoods and, consequently, faced difficulties in maintaining a living.19

In addition, whenever government troops intensified their military operations and prolonged their presence, military authorities imposed various restrictions on the movements and livelihood activities of the villagers. During such period of intense military operations, villagers were not allowed to go and work, stay at their farms, or trade farming produce. For example, in late 1993 when stocked rice began running out under the prolonged military offensive, government military commanders operating in the areas became sceptical of support for KNLA troops and restricted the movements of Karen villagers from going to their farms in several villages in Kyaikhto Township.20 None of the farmers were allowed to go to their paddy fields and grow rice—their staple food for

15 Saw Shie She, a KNU/KNLA liaison officer, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State; a former village head, interview by the author, February 4, 2017, Saw Thu Khee Village, Kyaikhto Township, Mon State. See also Burma Issues, “Operation Dragon King: The Forced Relocation of Burma’s Village Peasants” (Bangkok, Thailand: Burma Issues, 1993), 5; Karen Human Rights Group, Report from the Field (Mae Sot: Karen Human Rights Group, 2005). 16 Saw Shie She, a KNU/KNLA liaison officer, interview; A former village head, interview by the author, February 4, 2017, Saw Thu Khee Village, Kyaikhto Township, Mon State. 17 Saw Shie She, a KNU/KNLA liaison officer, interview. 18 A director of a Strategic Study Institute (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon; A Karen journalist (a director of international media network), interview by the author, February 7, 2016, Yangon; Nai Tin Aye (former NMSP leader), interview by the author, May 18, 2017, Canberra, Australia. 19 A former village head, interview by the author, February 4, 2017, Saw Thu Khee Village, Kyaikhto Township, Mon State. 20 A former village head and Karen farmers, in discussion with the author, February 4, 2017, Saw Thu Khee Village, Kyaikhto Township, Mon State; a farmer (former KNLA health practitioner), interview by the author, March 7, 2016, Kamamoung Town, Papun Township, Kayin State.

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the entire year.21 At the same time, because the farmers could not go to their farms, seasonal farm workers who were solely dependent on these farming works could not work in the paddy fields from which they used to earn cash and in kind wages to support the basic living standards of their families for the year.22 Until the 1995 ceasefire, many Mon villages in the conflict zones faced similar difficulties in trying to farm and work on their agriculture, livestock, and fishery farms. In many of the conflict-affected Mon-populated areas, government military commanders deliberately ordered farmers and horticulturists not to go to their farms in the harvesting time and instead, allowed the soldiers to steal or loot ripe high value farm produce such as durian, pomelo, rambutan, mangosteen, and the like.23 Many reports from the field state that, in addition to attacks against civilian populations, the government military extorted, stole, or destroyed the food and properties of the villagers, and often forced them to become military porters or labourers.24

Moreover, in addition to the loss of lives, the loss of “the desired stock of factors of production”25 in both Karen- and Mon-populated areas was tremendous. Both Karen and Mon societies faced serious capital flights from their areas due to the destruction of infrastructure, disruption of economic activities, the breakdown in the rule of law and the hostile environment for doing business. Wartime insecurity forced those few with wealth and productive resources to shut down their businesses and move away from conflict- affected communities. Theft, dacoity, and robbery were widespread, as neither the government nor armed ethnic groups could secure the contested areas. In addition, all the armed groups including the government military targeted wealthy people for money and

21 A former village head, interview by the author, February 4, 2017, Saw Thu Khee Village, Kyaikhto Township, Mon State. 22 Ibid. 23 Former Sergeant Major of MNLA Battalion No. 333, interview by the author, February 27, 2016, Yingdein village, Ye Township, Mon State; a village elder (former village head of NMSP), interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Khawzar Town, Ye Township, Mon State; a village elder (former sawmill owner), interview by the author, March 21, 2017, Kyaungywa, Ye Township, Mon State. 24 See, for example, Karen Human Rights Group, The New SLORC Car Road to Twee Pa Wih Kyo, Karen Human Rights Group, accessed December 13, 2014, http://khrg.org/1992/09/920912/new- slorc-car-road-twee-pa-wih-kyo; and “Human Rights Interviews 1/95,” Human Rights Foundation of Monland, accessed February 23, 2015, http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/MF1995-03.htm 25 Collier, “On the Economic Consequences of Civil War,” 168.

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other resources through various forms of extortion.26 As the people with wealth and productive resources increasingly became insecure, many moved away from the areas. Almost all the owners of local private micro-enterprises with the means to flee shifted their human capital, financial resources, and physical assets, together with the whole business.27 For instance, in 1967 after paying ransom-like fees to multiple armed groups, a rice mill owner in Naihlon Village in Mudon Township dismantled his mill and moved the business to Mawlamyine after three of his seven family members were robbed and murdered at home.28 For similar reasons, many of those who owned and operated small manufacturing enterprises in both suburban and rural Karen- and Mon-populated areas also moved out of the areas affected by the conflict. At the same time, rural wealth holders also relocated their assets into more secure and stable urban capitals and some moved out of the country for good.29 Further, those who possessed higher skills such as masons, carpenters, mechanics, and blacksmiths tended to be the most mobile and could find better ways to emigrate to more stable urban centres and neighbouring countries, Karen and Mon communities were faced with capital expatriation and lost their most talented populations. Moreover, mainly for fear of physical damage to their mostly irreversible investments and misappropriation by the armed actors, civil war in Karen- and Mon- populated areas discouraged rational business financers from investing in authentic business activities with potential.30

Further, within years of the armed conflict, many farmers and goods producers inevitably had to reduce their production to a subsistence level. As the government military and local authorities constantly destroyed or confiscated their crops or obliged farmers to sell them below market value, the farmers (especially the paddy growers) in the conflict-affected areas could no longer make a profit from farming. Moreover, many faced life-threatening

26 Nai Layehtaw Suvannabhum (former NMSP leader), interview; Nai Tin Aye (former NMSP leader), interview by the author, May 18, 2017, Canberra, Australia; a marine product trader, interview by the author, February 26, 2016, Asin Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 27 Nai Pe Thein Hzel (former NMSP leader), interview by the author, October 28, 2017, Canberra, Australia; Nai Layehtaw Suvannabhum (former NMSP leader), interview. 28 A village elder, interview by the author, January 30, 2017, Naihlon Village, Mudon Township, Mon State. 29 Ibid. 30 Nai Layehtaw Suvannabhum (former NMSP leader), interview.

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perils for their commercial farming31 and some had experiences of being robbed or kidnapped due to their comparatively better-off financial situation in conflict-affected communities.32 Consequently, many large-scale farmers abandoned their farmlands and moved to more secure towns and cities, while those who remained reduced their farm production to a subsistence level.33 Most farmers in Kamarwet rice field area reduced their cultivation acreage and decreased intensity of farming such as switching from the efficient rice growing method of transplantation to a lesser unproductive broadcasting method and reducing the quality of land preparation.34 Many farmers no longer used farming inputs such as fertiliser and pesticides.35 Paddy growers and horticulturists unanimously said that at that time it was dangerous to produce an over-subsistence level of rice, fruits, vegetables, and poultry and livestock.36 The armed groups, both government military and rebel troops, targeted such farm or stockpiles as sources for looting and reproaching.37 The government military often accused those farmers who produced or stockpiled an excess amount of produce in the contested areas as rebel supporters and often confiscated or destroyed the crops.38 In many cases, military personnel arrested and tortured farmers for their surplus farm products.39 Throughout the all-out civil war, agricultural produce in the conflict-affected Karen and Mon-populated

31 A farmer and vegetable grower (former village authority of NMSP), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State; Ko Htwe Myint (a former NMSP village head), interview by the author, January 30, 2017, Nyaung Gone Village, Mudon Township, Mon State. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. Village Elders, in informal discussion with the author, January 30, 2017, Nyaunggone Village, Mudon Township, Mon State. 34 Farmers and fruit growers, in discussion with the author, January 31, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State. 35 Farmers and fruit growers, in discussion with the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 36 Ibid; a village elder (former village head of NMSP), interview by the author, March 20, 2017, Khawzar Town, Ye Township, Mon State. 37 Farmers and fruit growers, in discussion with the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 38 Village elders (Nyaung Gone), informal discussion; farmers and horticulturists, in discussion with the author, January 31, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State. 39 A farmer, interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Koemile Village, Ye Township, Mon State; a former village head, interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State.

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areas significantly declined, as most farmers in the area had cut back their farming to subsistence level.

Conversely, while most legal and regular business activities stagnated or were suspended during wartime, effectively crippling state functioning institutions and paralysing physical infrastructure, a new form of business activities that were mostly informal and illegal emerged in the Karen- and Mon-populated areas affected by the conflict. The war caused considerable changes in the structure of the local economy in conflict-affected areas and created various forms of illicit businesses. The economic mismanagement of the central state of Myanmar, coupled with the significant decrease in the capacity of the state to regulate, meant illegal business activities such as smuggling and drug production and trade expanded in the areas. By shifting their focus to short-term profits mainly realised through illegal production and exchanges, some local entrepreneurs and labourers who had lost their business, livelihood, or employment in the areas began to behave opportunistically. As individuals and in groups, they became involved in the regional black-market trade and the exploitation of natural resources.40 Throughout the decades of intense fighting, there was an increase in illegal cattle trading, smuggling of agriculture, marine and forestry products, and household appliances across the borderland under the control of the KNU and NMSP.

Livelihood and Employment Conditions in Mon-Populated Areas after the Ceasefire

Following the NMSP ceasefire, the security environment in most Mon-populated areas became relatively calm with a reasonable amelioration of the destructive, disruptive and diversionary effects of the civil war on the local economy. As agreed by some scholars, for the civilian populations who had to be ready to escape from war atrocities at a moment’s notice, the ceasefire brought about normalcy and a relatively stable and relaxing village life.41 Although many were highly sceptical, the sense of security among the populations in Mon-populated areas gradually became higher than that of those living

40 A large-scale trader (former well-connected goods smuggler), interview by the author, February 20, 2016, Thanbyuzayart Town, Mon State; business owners and traders, interview by the author, February 25, 2016, Lamine Town, Mon State. 41 See, for example, Oo and Min, Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords, 45; Ashley South, “Political Transition in Myanmar: A New Model for Democratization,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 2 (2004).

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in the rural Karen areas under continued fighting. The local livelihood and economic activities in many villages in Mon ceasefire areas improved in the years following the ceasefire.

As the fighting between the MNLA troops and government armies in the areas ended, the arbitrary orders of the local military commanders were no longer valid to enforce, particularly those that restricted movement and travel and prohibited storing extra food and overnight stays at farmhouses.42 Although still limited, villagers could move more freely and engage in goods production and trade opportunities in post-conflict Mon- populated areas. Shortly after war-related hostilities and predatory acts by the authorities decreased, commodity producers, especially farmers, horticulturists, fishers, household goods producers, and food processors whose lands, factory, or equipment survived the war, resumed production. As the arbitrary taxation over local goods producers decreased, individuals, households and enterprises eagerly tried to resume their abandoned economic activities and revive their livelihoods or establish new ones.43 Even in the early days of the ceasefire with the weak physical infrastructure and no access to productive capital, as admitted by some critics of the ceasefire,44 people in the ceasefire areas unleashed their energies and resilience in a bid to revive their lives. In all the previously contested areas, farmers enthusiastically resumed their farming activities and many expanded or established new farming plots.

Since people could move more freely and securely than ever, within a few years farming of all kinds was revived, including grain, fruits, perennial crops, and livestock breeding. Moreover, as local market and trading revived within years, the productivity of local producers also significantly increased in a short period of time. In many previously conflict-affected villages in South-Eastern Ye Township, almost all the farmers and horticulturists who still had their lands and farming instruments recommenced farming activities almost immediately, as the monsoon had already arrived by the time of the

42 Min Ye Mon (local trader), interview by the author, February 25, 2016, Lamine Town, Mon State; a large-scale export-importer, interview by the author 20, February, 2016, Thanbyuzayart Town, Mon State. 43 Min Ye Mon (local trader), interview by the author, February 25, 2016, Lamine Town, Mon State. 44 For example, Oo and Min, Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords, 45.

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NMSP ceasefire in 1995.45 For instance, in Angding Village, Ye Township, 56 of the 89 farmer households, whose farmland, tools and animals survived the conflict, resumed almost full scale their wet season paddy plantation immediately after the ceasefire.46 Many horticulturists also began repairing the broken fences of their fruit farms and their damaged watering channels and resumed nurturing their abandoned fruit plantations.47

Moreover, the ceasefire brought opportunities to revive traditional seasonal agriculture and develop new industrial and perennial crop plantations across the previously warring hillsides and idled bushlands. Many turned the bushy hillsides into plantation sites of industrial crops such as rubber and coconut plantations. Some households even summoned home their family members who were working as migrant labourers in Thailand to expand the family farming and livelihood activities.48 Tens of thousands of acres of new rubber plantations could be seen across all the previously warring areas, particularly in Mudon, Kyaikmaraw, Thanbyuzayart, Ye, and Yebyu Townships. The plantations included grain products such as rice and perennial crops such as betel nuts, mangoes, mangosteen, durians, and rambutan. The production of marine products such as freshwater and seawater fish and prawns, lobsters, shrimps, and dried fish and dried prawns also increased within a few years.49 Similarly, livestock breeders and fishers who still possessed their livelihood equipment were able to revitalise their source of revenue in a short time. Many built or repaired their abandoned or concealed fishing boats, while some even installed new powerful engine propellers.50 In Hnitkrake and New Angding

45 A farmer (former health worker of MNHC), interview by the author, March 18, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State; village elders (former NMSP village heads and administrative committee members), in discussion with the author, March 21, 2017, Kyaung Ywa, Ye Township, Mon State; mid-career villagers, in discussion with the author, March 22, 2017, Koemile Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 46 A farmer, interview by the author, March 23, 2017, Angding Village, Ye Township, Mon State; a school teacher, interview by the author, March 23, 2017, Angding Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 47 Betel nut growers, in discussion with the author, March 24, 2017, Angding Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 48 A village elder (former satellite phone service provider), interview by the author, March 21, 2017, Kyaungywa, Ye Township, Mon State; farmer and horticulturist (former village authority of NMSP), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State. 49 A marine product trader, interview by the author, February 26, 2016, Asin Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 50 Fishing boat owner, interview by the author, February 26, 2016, Asin Village, Ye Township.

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villages in Ye Township, commercial dried fish and prawn production resumed the year following the ceasefire.51

Although emigrant labour remained the preferred option for those in their productive working ages, the booms in commodity production, servicing and trading in the post- conflict Mon areas also created better employment opportunities to the populations in the areas emerging from armed conflict. Gradually, many of those who had lost much of their welfare regained access to sustainable employment and incomes. As the ceasefire continued to hold, some with capital and skills accumulated from their lives as refugees or migrant labourers returned to their home villages and either resurrected their abandoned businesses or started new ones. For instance, over a dozen villagers who worked as illegal migrant labourers in Thai lobster firms came back to their home village of Kyaukhtayan, Ye Township and started nurturing naturally trapped lobsters, adding value to the products before selling them on to traders at Mawlamyine and Yangon marine product markets.52 In the following years, one of the returnees employed as many as 12 workers in his lobster farm in the seaside Yingdein Village.53 As the communities in post- conflict areas resumed their primary production of agricultural produce and expanded their businesses, many who did not own a piece of land or fishing equipment were able to find employment opportunities for the first time in a society recovering from a prolonged civil war.

In addition to the increase in agriculture-based commodities, the ceasefire was attributive to quantitative effects in the production of non-renewable commodities and servicing creating further business activities and employment opportunities in post-conflict Mon areas. In connection with the country’s rapid boom in the construction industry in the mid-1990s, some returning migrant labourers set up construction groups and engaged in

51 Fishers and dry prawn producers, in discussion with the author, March 23, 2017, Hnitkrake Village, Ye Township, Mon State; a fisherman, interview by the author, March 23, 2017, Hnitkrake Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 52 Nai Tun Ngwe (lobster breeder), interview by the author, February 27, 2016, Yingdein village, Ye Township, Mon State. 53 Ibid.

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local construction works.54 Some also established small-scale steel fabrication, plumbing, and aluminium framing workshops in local towns.55 Through their connections with neighbouring countries, many established and engaged in trading and retailing construction hardware materials.56

When relative normalcy was gradually restored, the flow of remittance and other assistance from the borderlands and abroad into the ceasefire areas considerably increased.57 Receiving remittance or other materials from NMSP-dominated borderlands or neighbouring countries was no longer an omen of insecurity, as was previously the case.58 During times of intense fighting, information leaked to village authorities or military informants about the receiving of remittance or any in kind assistance from a family member who was, perhaps, a member of NMSP, working as a migrant labourer or an asylum seeker resettled in a third country, was highly risky for recipient families in the government-controlled or -contested areas. Many met menacing fates such as arbitrary arrest and torture for information on receiving remittances.59

However, after the ceasefire travelling to NMSP’s headquarter areas and working in the borderland and neighbouring countries was no longer a security breach; therefore, receiving remittance or other assistance from the borderland and abroad was no longer a security issue.60 In a few years, remittance flow into the ceasefire areas was neutralised and became normal in Mon communities emerging from the conflict, although an

54 In Theingone Ward of Kamarwet Town alone, there were three such migrant-labourer-turned- construction teams. Nai Myint Wai (Ward Administrator-Theingone Ward), interview by the author, February 1, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State. 55 Min Tun Myint Kyaw, chairperson of the town municipal committee, interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Thanbyuzayart, Mon State. 56 Min Hanthi, director of Ramarn Hardware Trading, interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 57 For a glimpse of the remittance to Mon State, see Nwet K. Khine, “Remittance Flows from Thailand to Mawlamyine, Mon State, Myanmar”. Paper presented at the Conference on Mainstreaming Human Security: The Asian Contribution, Chularlongkorn University, Bangkok, 4–5 October, 2007. 58 Min Min Nwe (Journalist), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Min Htay Naing (freelance lawyer), interview by the author, February 18, 2016, Mudon, Mon State. 59 A former township administrator, interview by the author, January 17, 2017, Kyaikmaraw Town, Mon State; a local grocery shop owner (former alcohol producer), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Klawtthawt Village, Mudon Township, Mon State. 60 Min Htay Naing (freelance lawyer), interview.

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effective and secure means to transfer the money was not yet in place.61 In the years of stable ceasefire, families in the ceasefire Mon-populated areas received a considerable amount of remittances and assistance that significantly helped to rebuild livelihoods and supported recovering the consumption level of the population in post-conflict Mon- populated areas.

The ceasefire also revitalised the dormant construction industry and thus, increased employment opportunities and incomes of the households in the areas. Throughout the civil war, no one was able to build a new house, religious or business structure and the construction sector, which was vigorous before the outbreak the civil war, effectually stopped.62 The period of destruction in Mon-populated areas lasted for over half a century and, over this time, the skills needed for the construction industry were virtually depleted.63 As the skilled labourers moved out of the conflict-affected areas, most of the wide array of specialist skills such as carpentry, masonry, plumbing, welding, and related other professionals withered away. However, with the post-conflict rejuvenated agricultural sector, increase in marine products and formalisation of border trading multiplied by the voluminous remittance flow revived the local construction industry and significantly created employment opportunities in the areas. When the ceasefire held and security conditions were stable for years, people started building permanent houses. The revived local economy also contributed to improvements in the building up of permanent religious and communal structures.64 Meanwhile, the local government also built various small- and -medium-scale administrative, municipal and social infrastructures in the areas emerging from the prolonged civil war. All attributed to the boom in the local construction industry across the ceasefire Mon-populated areas.

61 For decades, most remittance transfers had to rely on insecure private hundi services. A ward head, interview by the author, February 1, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State; a social worker (former MNED staff), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Klawtthawt Village, Mudon Township, Mon State. 62 Nai Pan Aung (former government township administrator), interview by the author, January 28, 2017, Kyaikmaraw town, Mon State. 63 Ibid; Nai Layehtaw Suvannabhum (former NMSP leader), interview by the author, June 30, 2017, Canberra, Australia. 64 Nai Pan Aung (former government township administrator), interview.

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At the same time, with the improved security, stabilised administration, and completion of newly built and upgraded road networks, most of the Mon-populated areas emerging from the armed conflict became connected with the local, national and even international market centres. With the improvement in transportation and less hassle during their travel, local and inter-village trade activities were revived and, over time, expanded. As the costs and time of transportation became predictable and reduced, local trading revived within a few years. In 1997, with various newly built jetties and sorting, refrigerating and fuelling facilities Zeebyuthaung and Asin, two small fishing villages in the previously highly contested Ye Township, became busy marine product processing and trading hubs of lower Myanmar.65 Some local entrepreneurs also established in the villages marine product affiliated facilities such as ice factories and cold storages.66 Following the speed up of national market liberalisation in the mid-1990s, local goods producers and traders in post-conflict Mon areas received that chance to take part in trading and markets in Mawlamyine, Yangon and even with neighbouring Thailand through the newly opened border trading points.67

In many villages, the traditional informal sociocultural and religious governance systems that have long influenced local Mon communities, were restored for a period until the commercialisation of labour was rejuvenated. Gradually, through the revitalising family ties and social relationships of community members, the level of social cohesion and social capital increased in most of the remote Mon communities. For instance, reciprocation of labour, knowledge, and expertise was reinstated for a few years in some villages in the South-Eastern Ye Township when returnees started rebuilding their houses and rejuvenating their livelihoods, as the hard and skilled labourers, farming animals, instruments and other capital was still to be revitalised.68

65 Nai Myint Oo (a marine product trader), interview by the author, February 26, 2016, Asin Village, Ye Township, Mon State; Nai Thaung Shwe (mechanical workshop owner), interview by the author, February 26, 2016, Zeebyuthoung Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 66 Nai Myint Oo (a marine product trader), interview. 67 Farmers and fruit growers, in discussion with the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State; Nai Bo Kyey, a farmer, interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 68 Village elders (former NMSP village heads and administrative committee members), in discussion with the author, March 21, 2017, Kyaungywa, Ye Township, Mon State; Nai Pan Aung (former government township administrator), interview.

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Livelihood and Employment Conditions in Karen-Populated Areas under the Continued Civil War

Until 2012, when the KNU reached a ceasefire agreement with the government, the continued government military offensives and the use of guerrilla tactics by the KNU continued to affect wide geographic areas in Karen-populated territories. The expansion of military deployment, regimentation, and incessant military offensives in conflict- affected Karen-populated areas severely affected the already shattered livelihoods of the Karen population. Consequently, while the majority of Mon refugees and some migrant labourers returned to their native places, Karen villagers from most of the conflict- affected areas were never been able to return, rehabilitate their livelihoods, and rebuild their villages with permanent houses.

The continued war atrocities held up economic recovery in most conflict-affected Karen- populated areas. Both the government military and Karen armed resistance groups intensified military operations and militarisation in the areas and attacks remained widespread against civilian villagers and their livelihoods along with the destruction of shelters and food sources.69 During the intensified multi-battalion military offensive in northern Kayin State in the mid-to-late 2000s, government troops systematically targeted civilian populations and their settlements, food sources, and livelihoods.70 Similarly, the military offensive in November 2005 in northern Kayin State at the beginning of the harvesting season, damaged the ripening crops of Karen farmers and undermined the survival of the villagers.71 Because the villagers in the offensive areas were forced to flee and not return for several months to their farms, their ripening crops were destroyed by the soldiers, left to rot, or were eaten by animals.72 Likewise, the lives of the Karen

69 For details, see Karen Human Rights Group, Self-Protection under Strain: Targeting of Civilians and Local Responses in Northern Karen State (Mae Sot: Karen Human Rights Group, 2010), 15–22; Amnesty International, Crime Against Humanity in Eastern Myanmar (Colombo: Amnesty International, 2008). Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Army Forces Thousands to Flee,” accessed February 23, 2017. https://www.hrw.org/news/2006/11/30/burma-army-forces-thousands-flee 70 Karen Human Rights Group, Truce or Transition: Trends in Human Rights Abuse and Local Response in Southeast Myanmar since the 2012 Ceasefire (Mae Sot: Karen Human Rights Group, 2014), 12. 71 Burma Issues, “Shoot on Sight: The Ongoing SPDC Offensive Against Villagers in Northern Karen State” (Burma Issues, 2006), 8. 72 Ibid.

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population in the newly established relocation sites under the government control, as well as those escaped into the mountainous jungles, increasingly worsened. The men remained in hiding, fighting, working as illegal migrant labourers or dead and the workload for household members in Karen-populated areas under the continued civil war was not redistributed. People could not maintain any productive assets, such as land or basic farming tools for producing goods, and suffered from extreme welfare loss. They were not able to generate sustainable sources to meet their basic needs or provide income. The continuing heavy fighting and subsequent looting meant that productive resources such as houses, utensils, livestock, and others of the Karen population were lost or destroyed.73 Consequently, due to looting and the appropriation of valuable assets and foods the population displacement and flight continued.74 Households who had lost productive family members, such as widow-led-households, faced difficult challenges to revive their livelihoods and avoid extreme poverty.75

Moreover, the continued armed conflict effectually hindered remittance and other assistance flows into the conflict-affected Karen areas. During the continued fighting and militarisation, many Karen families in the government-controlled and contested areas faced an ominous fate if they were found to be receiving remittances or in-kind assistance from family members in the borderland or abroad. Because it is was hard for a family in a small and insecure community to hide evidence of accepting an amount of remittance, those who had family members working in neighbouring countries often faced a form of extortion by the authorities.76 As a result, income or in kind transfers from migrant labourers, refugees, or asylum seekers who had settled in a third country became difficult to obtain and often precarious for households in the continued warring Karen areas. Sometimes, the recipient family was accused of having contact with armed resistant

73 Human Rights Watch, “Burma: They Came and Destroyed Our Village Again: The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Karen State” (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2005). 74 See, for example, Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Army Forces Thousands to Flee,” Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/news/2006/11/30/burma-army-forces-thousands-flee 75 Karen Human Rights Group, Setting up the Systems of Repression: The Progressive Regimentation of Civilian Life in Dooplaya District (Mae Sot: Karen Human Rights Group, 2006). 76 Village Elders, in discussion with the author, March 7, 2016, Kataingti Village, Papun Township, Kayin State.

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groups and they were arrested, tortured, or extorted to pay ransom-like fines.77 Often, local authorities intimidated returning migrant labourers with charges of contacting or collaborating with unlawful organisations and illegal immigration and, thus, extorted their hard-earned incomes.78

Further, as the villagers were forcefully relocated and isolated from their farmlands and livelihoods, rural development projects in most cases placed an additional burden on the population. Many residents in the relocation sites were not allowed to work on their farms or fields, while those at large in the jungle could not work at their livelihoods due to the ‘shoot on sight’ orders of the government military and unpredictable military activities by both sides. Frequent arbitrary taxation, extortion, forced labouring, and restrictions on movement continued in the areas and severely affected the food security of forcefully relocated villagers.79 As fighting continued, it was not safe for villagers to cultivate farmlands or gather food and other non-timber products in the forests even in many areas under the control of ceasefire Karen armed groups.80 Moreover, many Karen villagers in the relocation sites had to take part in the training and formation of a local militia and become involved in enforcing their fellow villagers in the plantation of commercial crops such as rubber, sesame, and castor beans for local military battalions.81 In addition, the increase in the use of landmines by both the government and the rebel organisations

77 A village elder (former auxiliary midwife), interview by the author, March 9, 2016, Hlaingbwe Town, Karen State; village elders (Ka taint Ti), discussion. 78 Ibid. 79 See, for example, Christina Fink, Living Silence in Burma: Surviving Under Military Rule, edited by Christina Fink, 2nd ed. (Chiang Mai; London: Silkworm; Zed, 2009), 452. See also, Karen Human Rights Group, Thaton (Doo Tha Htoo) District, Karen Human Rights Group, accessed 16 July, 2017, http://khrg.org/reports/location/38 80 Village elders and community leaders, in discussion with the author, March 13, 2016, Kawtbein village, Kawtkareik Township, Karen State. See also Karen Human Rights Group, Dooplaya under the SPDC: Further Developments in the SPDC Occupation of South-Central Karen State (Mae Sot: Karen Human Rights Group, 1998). 81 Village elders and farmers, in discussion with the author, March 14, 2016, Kaw Nweh Village, Kawkareik Township, Kayin State. Many reports from the fields also testify to the hardship faced by the Karen populations. See, for example, Karen Human Rights Group, Setting up the Systems of Repression: The Progressive Regimentation of Civilian Life in Dooplaya District; Karen Human Rights Group, Dooplaya under the SPDC: Further Developments in the SPDC Occupation of South- Central Karen State.

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severely restricted the ability of villagers to travel freely and limited their ability to produce food and conduct trade activities.82

Meanwhile, the armed wings of both sides increased their arbitrary taxation and extortion of funds, food, and materials from the population. The incessant demand for forced labour particularly imposed an extensive strain on the daily lives and livelihoods of the villagers, because they could not work on their own farms and plantation for days or, often, weeks. Under the continued dusk-to-dawn curfew and restrictions on free movement, many households in the new settlements could not set up new livelihoods or engage in trading activities while they were frequently not allowed to go and work on their traditional household lands.83 Moreover, numerous reports show that both the government military and civilian authorities forced town settlers to grow industrial crops such as rubber and castor seeds that were unhelpful for their immediate needs.84 In January 2007, the government IB No. 96 garrisoned at Kyaikhto forced Saw Thu Khee, Htee Wa Klu Khee, and Maw Paw Lo villages in Kyaikhto Township to each provide 10 labourers every day to build a nearby bridge.85 Moreover, all the villages had to provide over three tons of hardwood as well.86 Similarly, in March 2007, a DKBA commander forced Tot Klaw Khee villagers in Kyaikhto Township to make 1,600 thatch shingles to roof his nearby base camp.87 As many no longer had time to work on their own farms or as casual labourers, households experienced considerable loss in their livelihoods and incomes. Many casual farm labourers lost their seasonal jobs that required them to permanently stay in the field for the entire monsoon period, harvesting duration, or both.

82 Karen Human Rights Group, Report from the Field (Mae Sot: Karen Human Rights Group, 2007); Karen Human Rights Group, Self-Protection under Strain: Targeting of Civilians and Local Responses in Northern Karen State. 83 See also Thawnghmung, The Karen Revolution in Burma: Diverse Voices, Uncertain Ends, 20; Karen Human Rights Group, Setting up the Systems of Repression: The Progressive Regimentation of Civilian Life in Dooplaya District, 72. 84 See, for example, Karen Human Rights Group, Truce or Transition: Trends in Human Rights Abuse and Local Response in Southeast Myanmar Since the 2012 Ceasefire. 85 A former village head and villagers, interview by the author, February 4, 2017, Saw Thu Khee Village, Kyaikhto Township, Mon State. 86 A former village head and villagers, interview by the author, February 4, 2017, Saw Thu Khee Village, Kyaikhto Township, Mon State. 87 Village elders, informal discussion with the author, February 7, 2017, Tot Klaw Khee Village, Kyaikhto Township, Mon State. Villagers from the nearby villages, including Mi Chaung Ein, also provided information of forced labouring and demands for materials by the government LIDs.

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Moreover, in the areas under its stronghold and under the firm control of the ceasefire Karen armed groups, the government military used the advantageous conditions that arose from the ceasefire agreements as cover to militarise the areas and further hinder the livelihood recovery of the war-devastated Karen populations. In the early 2000s, the government military and its proxy militia armies implemented rural development projects in the ceasefire areas instead of government civilian line agencies and the Karen populations living in the areas became victims of the militarised development projects. Rather than improving conditions for economic recovery, the physical infrastructure development projects under the continuing armed conflict increased the vulnerability of the Karen population to rights violations and human security threats. Both the military authorities and the ceasefire Karen armed factions forced the villagers to provide funds, building materials and labour for development projects such as building roads, schools, health centres and water ponds.88 Rather than having the chance to rebuild their lives and revitalise their livelihoods, the already devastated Karen communities in the areas faced forced labouring, extortion, sexual abuse and forced relocation and, again, lost their food sources, land and livelihoods. Local and international researchers and organisations have testified in numerous reports that while some of the population were repeatedly forced to displace, many had to escape into neighbouring countries as refugees or illegal migrant labourers to survive.89 The bad experiences among returning Karen refugees meant that the number of Karen IDPs and refugees returning to their original places was modest. The war in Karen areas forced or discouraged many of the Karen population who were displaced or in refugee camps from returning to their original places.90 Many faced distressing events and security threats including violence and criminality, before they

88 Karen Human Rights Group, Dooplaya under the SPDC: Further Developments in the SPDC Occupation of South-Central Karen State. 89 See, for example, Fink, “Militarization in Burma’s Ethnic States: Causes and Consequences,” 452; Karen Human Rights Group, Setting up the Systems of Repression: The Progressive Regimentation of Civilian Life in Dooplaya District; Human Rights Watch, “Burma: They Came and Destroyed Our Village Again: The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Karen State”. 90 An NGO worker (former KED teacher), interview by the author, March 11, 2016, Kawtkareik Town, Kayin State; a CBO leader, interview by the author, March 9, 2016, Hlaingbwe Town, Kayin State.

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abandoned their home villages, thus, some of the households were less willing to return to their places of origin.91

Further, as the continued armed conflict reduced the regulatory power of the state, illicit business activities expanded and increased opportunities for illegal drug production, trading, and smuggling in the areas. Because the government military was the only government institution with coercive power, there was no longer any influence of the rule of law under the arbitrary commands and orders of local military commanders and civilian authorities. While unchecked power to preserve a distorted system of attaining assets and doing business remained in place, commanders of the local military battalions established a perverse system of extortion and a partisan business environment.92 The enforcement costs became unpredictable and security of properties, especially products and physical assets, considerably reduced for surviving local business entities. For example, in the late 1990s, a local military intelligence (MI) unit in Kawtkareik Town monopolised the sole dealer rights for alcoholic beverage distribution and distributed counterfeit foreign alcohol, including famous brands such as Johnnie Walker.93 As the MIs clearly knew that the genuine liquor was not from their recognised franchises, they would arrest, heavily fine or confiscate the goods of the dealers who sold the genuine products.94 This made legitimate local private businesses unbeneficial. Consequently, although the environment for local business to revive improved in some of the government-controlled and ceasefire areas, very few set up formal business in the areas because of the continued insecurity and other unpredictable administrative conditions. With intensifying mayhem, the ongoing civil war reduced the propensity of even the few returning refugees who had acquired some skills, assets or and contacts abroad to start up new businesses, revive their farming, or other kinds of livelihood.95 At the same time, poor, outdated, and predatory economic infrastructure facilities and the lack of financial access also hindered the efforts

91 An NGO worker (former KED teacher), interview by the author, March 11, 2016, Kawtkareik Town, Kayin State. 92 An official of an international peace organisation (a former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. See also Karen Human Rights Group, Report from the Field. 93 A former wholesale dealer, interview by the author, March 17, 2017, Ye Town, Mon State. 94 Ibid. 95 A director of a Strategic Study Institute (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon.

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of entrepreneurs to upgrade, expand and modernise production and enhance competitiveness even in the urban and peri-urban centres of Karen-populated areas.96 While many households continued to have subsistence forms of agriculture and livelihood activities with little capital and skill, the majority of the Karen population in the rural areas faced the adverse consequences of illicit drug production and trading, trafficking, logging and other illegal business activities.

Comparison of Urbanisation in the Conflict-Affected Karen- and Mon-Populated Areas

Unlike most urbanisation processes, due to the massive scale of rural-to-urban migration post-civil war urbanisation in the conflict-affected Karen and Mon-populated areas occurred in different ways. It was not the massive migration of rural Karen and Mon populations with the intention and capability to settle down in cities that built the urban centres. In the case of urbanisation in the ceasefire Mon-populated areas, it was the voluntary return and resettlement of IDPs, refugees, emigrant labourers, and ex- combatants to rural villages with stable security and relatively better socioeconomic conditions that built the new urban areas. Conversely, most of the nine newly established towns in Karen-populated areas were actually the garrison towns of government Army battalions that were tenaciously built for the purpose of military gain. Moreover, the majority of the town dwellers were families of the government military and staff. Migrants from other parts of the country who came for natural resource extraction and border trading along with a few displaced Karen people were forced to move into the designated towns.

In cases of urbanisation in ceasefire Mon-populated areas, as human security, socioeconomic conditions, and economic incentives gradually improved, the displaced population, refugees, anonymous former combatants, and migrant labourers from conflict-affected Mon areas started returning and settling down in the large villages in the NMSP ceasefire areas.97 For some incomers, sociocultural attachment and family reintegration in the villages was the main reason for settlement. Many settlers had their

96 Ibid. 97 Nai Win Hla (Member of CEC, NMSP), interview by the author, 26 January, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State.

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immediate or extended families or a well-developed social attachment and interaction with the people in the host communities making them feel psychologically at home.98

However, better administrative stability; access to health care and education services; and employment and market opportunities were the determinants for most of the returnees to settle down in the larger villages.99 The revival of agricultural activities and the emerging trading, particularly through gradually formalised markets and trading centres in the neighbouring cities, towns and, most importantly, the Myanmar-Thai border were a major driving force for many new settlers in Lamine Town.100 The new town administrators who were indirectly elected by the town community, along with the newly upgraded Lamine State High School and Lamine Station Hospital were also obvious attractions for the incomers.101 At the same time, as security, administrative, and socioeconomic conditions gradually improved in the large villages that were the main village of a village tract, incomers started building permanent houses in the available residential plots.102 In the cases of both Lamine Town and Kamarwet Town, because people had kept migrating for years, even the farmland or rice fields adjacent to the village residential areas became housing plots for the newcomers after the available residential lands in the village territory were depleted.103 Within a few years of the ceasefire, the new settlers occupied the vacant

98 Three new settlers, in discussion with the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State; a returning refugee, interview by the author, March 21, 2017, Kyaungywa Village, Ye Township, Mon State; four former combatants, in discussion with the author, February 27, 2016, Yingdein Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 99 Village elders and community leaders, in discussion with the author, February 24, 2016, Lamine Town, Mon State; farm workers, in discussion with the author, February 25, 2017, Lamine Town, Ye Township, Mon State; farmers and fruit growers, in discussion with the author, January 31, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State; rubber plantation farmers (former village authorities of NMSP), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State. 100 Nai Wai (ward administrator), interview; Min Ye Mon (local trader), interview by the author, February 25, 2016, Lamine Town, Mon State; Min Thein Htun Oo (local motorcycle dealer), interview by the author, March 15, 2017, Lamine Town, Mon State. 101 Ibid. 102 Nai Myint Wai (ward administrator), interview by the author, February 1, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State; Nai Aie Mon (a township-level Mon political leader), interview with the author, January 31, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State. 103 Nai Myint Moe (Ward Administrator), interview by the author, February 1, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State; Nai Wai (ward administrator), interview by the author, February 25, 2016, Lamine Town, Mon State.

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spaces along the inter-village connecting roads between the main village and its subordinate smaller villages.104

Some village tracts expanded in folds and formed vast villages crowded with households. This increase in size and households of the host village began creating confusion and other administrative difficulties.105 Although it could have had other hidden objectives, the military government upgraded some such expanded village tracts into towns.106 In 2003, Lamine Village Tract was upgraded into a town with the status of sub-township in which the government administrative and some decentralised departmental offices were stationed.107 The urbanisation of Kamarwet Village Tract into the Kamarwet Town was an interesting unique case.108 Since the early 2000s, hundreds of IDPs, refugees and unidentified former combatants of MNLA returned to Kamarwet Village, the main village in the village tract, located in the middle of Mundon and Thanbyuzayart Towns. In the early 1990s, the main village had over 1,000 households and 200 to 300 households lived in the adjacent Seintaung, Htaungkey, Theingone and Gonnyindan villages that were connected with 2 km–4 km dirt roads or rice field embankments. From 2000, the returnees, most of whom had parents or extended families in the villages, resettled in the outskirts of the main village as well as the four affiliated villages. Within a few years, as the new settlers occupied all the formally recognised residential plots in all the main and subordinated villages, people started to buy and build houses on the adjacent paddy plantation fields.

At the same time, because post-conflict village authorities could institute good relationships with the Township administration and other government line departments in Mundon Township, as well as those in the District and State levels, they successfully helped landowners to convert the agricultural lands into residential land, although this

104 Nai Soe Win (a community leader), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State; Min Ye Mon (local trader), interview by the author, February 25, 2016, Lamine Town, Mon State. 105 Nai Myint Moe (Ward Administrator), interview by the author, February 1, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State. 106 Nai Wai (ward administrator, Lamine Town), interview. 107 Ibid. 108 This case study is based on interviews and formal and informal discussions conducted by the author with the current ward administrators of Kamarwet Town, former village heads, new settlers and some village elders, 29–31 March, 2017 at all five wards of Kamarwet Town.

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involved some bribery and corruption. With supervision by township-level officials from relevant departments, the housing plots on the newly converted residential lands were formed with systemic quadrants of roads and streets. In the following years, the new settlers occupied all the agriculture and idle lands along the village connecting roads as well. Meanwhile, as all the villages were expanding in folds and overlapping into each other, it became challenging for the village administrators of individual villages to properly administer and maintain order in the vast villages. By the early 2010s, the five villages of Kamarwet Village Tract developed into a gigantic village with a population of over 35,000 in 6,000 households. After installing the necessary administrative institutions and departmental offices for a town, the government authorities declared Kamarwet Village Tract a town of Kamarwet on 21 March, 2014. All the former five villages became the urban wards of a municipal administration administered by a newly designated town administrator. In the newly established towns, the traditional informal sociocultural and religious governance systems that had long influenced the local Mon communities were restored for a period of time until the commercialisation of labour was rejuvenated. Gradually, through revitalising family ties and social relationships of the community members, the level of social cohesion and social capital increased in most of the remote Mon communities. For instance, reciprocation of labour, knowledge and expertise was reinstated for a few years in some villages in the South-Eastern Ye Township when returnees started rebuilding their houses and rejuvenating their livelihoods, while the hard and skilled labourers, farming animals and instruments and other capital were yet to be revitalised.109

Conversely, unlike in the newly upgraded towns in the ceasefire Mon areas, regardless of security and socioeconomic conditions, the Myanmar military intentionally converted Karen villages that were located at strategically important military positions, into towns. Many of the nine newly designated towns across Kayin State were formerly small government military hill posts captured during the military offensives in the mid-to-late 1990s and some were forced relocation sites for returning Karen IDPs and refugees.110 Most of the towns were essentially the garrison towns of the Army battalions. For

109 Village elders (former NMSP village heads and administrative committee members), in discussion with the author, March 21, 2017, Kyaungywa Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 110 Kim Jolliffe, “Ceasefires, Governance and Development: The Karen National Union in Times of Change” (Yangon: The Asia Foundation, 2016), 46.

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example, Shan-Ywa-Thit Town in Hlaingbwe Township was essentially the military garrison town of the No. 389 LIB, with a total town dwelling population of 531 (2014 Census) and Sukali Town in Myawaddy Township was formerly the relocation site for refugee returnees with a population of 342 (2014 Census).111 In most cases, by setting up GAD offices, police stations, municipal buildings, schools and RHCs and renaming the purposefully designated Karen villages, the government military simply declared the villages, large and small, to be towns.112

In these forcefully established so-called towns, rather than the willingly returned Karen IDPs and refugees, the majority of town dwellers were people from other parts of the country who had immigrated for business interests such as logging, mining and border trading, along with the families of government military and administration staff.113 Many of the town dwellers who voluntarily moved into the new towns close to the border areas were non-permanent, circulating migrants who were mostly engaged in illicit logging, mining and border smuggling.114 Along with the militia armies and the government troops, some were also allegedly engaged in illicit drug production and trading.115 The government military forced the already displaced population, as well as people living in

111 Ibid., 86. 112 A former Minister (Kayin-1), interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Twon, Kayin State. For instance, in 2004 when it converted the Karen villages War-Lay and Choo-Ga-Li into the towns of sub-township capitals, the government renamed the former into Wawlaymyaing and the latter into Sukali. A former village administrator, interview by the author, March 7, 2016, Kataingti Village, Papun Township, Kayin State; A former Minister (Kayin-1), interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State; director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 113 A senior Karen community leader (Hpa-an), interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State; A country director of an INGO (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, January 21, 2017, Yangon. See also Kim Jolliffe, “Ethnic Armed Conflict and Territorial Administration in Myanmar” (Yangon: The Asia Foundation, 2015). 114 A Karen journalist (a director of international media network), interview by the author, February 7, 2016, Yangon; A director of a Strategic Study Institute (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 115 A village elder (former Auxiliary Midwife), interview by the author, March 9, 2016, Hlaingbwe Town, Kayin State; A CBO leader, interview by the author, March 9, 2016, Hlaingbwe Town, Kayin State. See also Jolliffe, “Ceasefires, Governance and Development: The Karen National Union in Times of Change,” 87.

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their home villages and semi-permanent hidden villages in the contested or under KNLA control areas, to move into the towns.116

Moreover, because of the continued insecurity, incessant human rights violations, lack of reliable social services and physical infrastructure and opportunities for employment and markets, the Karen settlers lacked the intention and capability to permanently settle in the forcefully designated towns. Even under heavily deployed security forces, the Karen settlers in the new towns were doubtful of their safety and did not gain a sense of normalcy or security to live and work normal lives as various troops of KNLA, other Karen ceasefire groups and militia armies were active around the towns.117 For instance, although Paingkyone Town in Hlaingbwe Township was established in 1997, the town dwellers faced an ongoing conflict situation until recently.118 Similarly, while it was established in 2003, the Kyaikdon Town in Kyarinseikgyi Township faced recurring fighting between the government troops and different Karen armed groups until 2015.119

Further, the government military and administrative authorities continued to try and consolidate their rule and control in these new towns. While the military tried to increase its control over the movements of the town dwellers, the newly installed government administrative and line agencies attempted to register the households, private assets and properties, and, at the same time, forced the villagers to become members of the local militia and other GONGOs.120 As a result, mainly because they preferred to live off traditional agriculture and formal trading, in many cases the indigenous local Karen

116 A country director of an INGO (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, January 21, 2017, Yangon. 117 A senior Karen community leader, interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 118 A high-level KNU leader, interview by the author, January 22, 2017, Yangon; An official of an international peace organisation (a former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 119 Jolliffe, “Ceasefires, Governance and Development: The Karen National Union in Times of Change”. See also, Two Separate Clashes between Armed Actors in Kawkareik Township, Dooplaya District, February 2015, Karen Human Rights Group, accessed 24 October, 2017, http://khrg.org/2015/04/15-3-nb1/two-separate-clashes-between-armed-actors-kawkareik-township- dooplaya-district 120 A director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State; a local civil society activist, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State.

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people left the new urban establishments.121 Whenever there were opportunities, local Karen people tried to leave these forcefully established urban centres.122 For example, most of the indigenous local Karen population in the Tee Nya Lei village that was renamed and upgraded into Aungmingalar Town in 2003 left the village within a year.123

Conclusion

As can be seen, compared to the situation in Karen-populated areas under the continued civil war, the economic conditions in ceasefire Mon-populated areas evolved differently. The economic consequences of the civil war in Karen- and Mon-populated areas had had severe effects on the livelihood stability and employment opportunities of the populations. Hundreds of thousands lost their livelihoods and were forced out of work. Many were displaced internally or beyond the country’s borderlands and, thus, depleted stable household incomes, making the vulnerability of food insecurity disproportionate among the families living in the conflict-affected areas.

However, with the improvements in the accessibility and quality of economic infrastructure and other favourable conditions following the NMSP ceasefire, the local economy in Mon-populated areas progressively recovered. The improved security conditions and relaxations in other restrictions enabled most in the ceasefire Mon- populated areas to resume or establish their livelihood activities. Many also joined the migrant labour force in neighbouring countries. At the same time, as the population in the ceasefire areas could move more freely with lesser disturbances at security checkpoints, local trading activities gradually revived and reconnected with the national and border trading hubs. Many who had previously engaged in illicit goods production, trading and natural resource extraction slowly readjusted their business activities into the legal fore. The ceasefire conditions also allowed migrant labourers to bring back accumulated skills and financial capital into post-conflict Mon areas. Within a few years, the development in production and trading created conditions for the wartime local subsistence economy to transform into commercial goods production in both the agriculture and fishery sectors

121 A senior Karen community leader, interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State; A leader of Karen Affairs Committee, interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State; a local civil society activist, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 122 A senior Karen community leader, interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 123 Ibid. See also Jolliffe, “Ethnic Armed Conflict and Territorial Administration in Myanmar,” 53.

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across Mon-populated areas. The ceasefire also contributed to the production of non- renewable commodities and servicing and was attributive to the development of other business activities, especially the construction industry, further creating employment opportunities in post-conflict Mon areas. The rejuvenated agriculture sector, increase in marine products, invigorated local and national trading and formalised border trading significantly generated employment opportunities and increased incomes for households in the areas.

Conversely, the Karen population in the continued war-affected areas faced difficult challenges in revitalising their livelihoods. The continued warring conditions, especially the dusk-to-dawn curfew and travel restrictions, prevented Karen farmers from going to their farmlands and hindered the resumption of goods-producing activities, while many were totally isolated from the sites of their familial farmlands. At the same time, the travel bans and restrictions on free movement across Karen-populated areas under the continued conflict grimly constrained local trading activities.

Moreover, although some Karen towns were located close to the borderland and connected to the major highways to Thai border, insecurity and poor economic infrastructure restrained the population from benefiting from national and border trading. Until the KNU ceasefire, most Karen households in the areas continued subsistence forms of agriculture and livelihood activities. As farming and goods-producing activities in the areas continued at the subsistence level, employment opportunities remained low across the conflict-affected Karen areas. In addition, the continued war-related repression inhibited most Karen migrant labourers from bringing their skills and financial capital back to their communities. Consequently, while most Mon refugees and IDPs returned to their home villages, the majority of Karen IDPs and refugees remained displaced in the mountainous jungles and refugee camps along the Myanmar-Thai borderline.

Urbanisation processes in the ceasefire Mon- and Karen-populated areas under continued armed conflict developed in obviously different ways. While post-conflict improvements in political, social and economic conditions were attributive to the emergence of new urban towns in Mon-populated areas, almost all the new towns in the conflict-affected Karen-populated areas were forcefully created by the military authorities for deliberate military objectives. With better security and socioeconomic conditions, the larger Mon villages attracted voluntary immigrants who contributed to the natural expansion of the

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villages that unavoidably became urban centres. Mainly due to the developments in human security and socioeconomic conditions, most of the settlers in the new towns in the ceasefire Mon areas became permanent town dwellers, whereas those in the newly established towns in Karen State were non-permanent circulating and returning migrants. The following chapters show that the different economic developments and urbanisation in the conflict-affected Karen- and Mon-populated areas contributed to the process of post-civil war democratic transition in the relevant local societies.

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Chapter 6. The Effects of Ceasefire on Civil Society

Introduction

Since the early 1980s, based on empirical evidence of the indispensable roles that civil society plays in the building up of necessary socio-political conditions for a successful democratisation, there has been an academic agreement on the democratising role of civil society. Many argue for civil society’s ability to be a driving force in instigating liberalisation and its essential role in sustaining the transitioning and consolidation stages of democratisation.1 At the same time, the established literature on democracy mostly agrees that civil society is an integral part of a democratic society.2 To better understand the effects of ceasefire on civil society in civil war-affected communities, this chapter investigates the changes in the principal dimensions of civil society in the conflict- affected Karen and Mon societies during the different conditions of war and peace.

Measuring Civil Society

Because of its conceptual ambiguity and empirical diversity, assessing civil society has been controversial and challenging.3 Scholars have operationalised different conceptions and definitions of civil society into various measuring indicators and variables. In the mid-1990s, scholars from a wide variety of civil society entities in Western developed countries and the international community initiated a mapping study of civil society organisations around the world and tried to establish standardised indicators to measure the major dimensions of civil society.4 The international consortium published the ‘CIVICUS Index’, known later as the Civil Society Index (CSI), a measure of the four

1 See, for example, Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. Some also suggests the term emerges in liberal thought tradition dating back to John Locke to differentiate the society from the state. See Windfuhr, “The Promotion of Civil Society in Developing Countries: The Example of European Development Cooperation,” 2. See Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict, 316. 2 See Beetham, Democracy: A Beginner's Guide, 36. And Carlos Waisman, Richard Feinberg, and Leon Zamosc, “Civil Society and Democracy: The Latin American Case,” 2. 3 For example, see Anheier, Civil Society: Measurement, Evaluation, Policy, 7. 4 Volkhartf Heinrich, “Studying Civil Society across the World: Exploring the Thorny Issues of Conceptualization and Measurement,” Journal of Civil Society 1, no. 3 (2005): 214–15.

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main dimensions of civil society.5 First, the index examines the ‘structure’ of civil society as a measure of its associational strength by investigating the organisational composition, key actors and their inter-relationships and characteristics. Second, as the ‘environment’ axis or contextual condition of the index, the CSI examines the legal, political, social and economic context in which the civil society evolves and operates. Third, the index measures the ‘value’ of civil society based on what its actors motivate and promote, such as democracy, transparency, gender-equity and so forth. As its fourth dimension, the CSI measures the ‘impact’ of civil society on the daily lives of the population and the broader process of social change.

In line with the focus of this study, the dimensions of civil society proposed by the CSI are responsive to war and peace conditions in war-affected minority ethnic areas in Myanmar. To properly analyse the changes that took place in the sphere of civil society in the conflict-affected communities throughout the civil war and during the stable ceasefire, this study uses three dimensions of CIVICUS—structure, context, and value— as the frame of reference. Through these analytical lenses, this study assesses and compares the situation of civil societies in local minority ethnic communities and their interactions with national-level political and civic movements, organisations, and networks. Throughout the rest of this chapter, after briefly describing the background context of civil society in Myanmar at the national level, the thesis examines the effects of the ceasefire on the legal, political, and social context for civil society in the war- affected Karen and Mon-populated areas. Next, the study investigates the changes in the structure, particularly the organisational composition, principal actors, and the inter- relationships of civil society during the periods of war and peace. Following this, the thesis observes the changes that took place in values that were esteemed, motivated, and promoted by civil society actors under different situations in the civil war-affected Karen- and Mon-populated areas.

Conversely, throughout the time duration of this study, the state of Myanmar remained autocratic and persistently suppressed the development of the civil society sector across the country. Thus, it was difficult to measure, compare, and contrast the effects of the

5 The scholars named it “Civil Society Diamond”. See Volkhartf Finn Heinrich and Lorenzo Fioramonti, eds., CIVICUS Global Survey of the State of Civil Society: Comparative Perspectives, vol. II (Bloomsfield: Kumarian Press, 2008), 7–8.

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ceasefire on the ‘impact’ of civil society on the community that measures the changes that took place in the daily lives of the populations and its implications on the broader processes of social and political change. Thus, the ‘impact’ of the ceasefire on civil society is omitted from this study.

Background Context of Civil Society in Myanmar

Although several scholars focused on Myanmar political and social development have argued that civil society in the Western liberal sense did not exist in Myanmar,6 the autonomous associational life has played an important role in Myanmar’s social and political change processes since the country’s independence struggle. Although there could be very few Tocquevillian-type civil society organisations (CSOs) engaging in social and political development, independent associational life in Myanmar did exist in the form of social welfare and “social movement organisations”.7 There were numerous independent organisations including student organisations, political study groups, professional associations, and many others in the country’s urban centres. In addition, community-based and religious-based social welfare organisations and networks such as the Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association (MMCWA) were functional until the early 1960s when military rulers forced them into dormancy.8

Further, successive Myanmar authoritarian governments continually apprehended the development of civil society across the country. There was very limited space left for independent associations to evolve and become established. Although the short-lived

6 See, for example, Marc Purcell, “Axe-Handles or Willing Minions? International Ngos in Burma,” in Strengthening Civil Society in Burma: Possibilities and Dilemmas for International NGOs (Amsterdam: Burma Center Netherlands & Transnational Institute, 1997); David I. Steinberg, Burma: The State of Myanmar (Washington, D.C. : Georgetown University Press, 2001), 121, n. 3. The author also quoted his personal communication with Michael Aung-Thwin on that point. It is incorrect, as there were numerous evidences of civil society activities in the western sense in both urban and rural Burma before the military authoritarian rule. 7 For details of the social movement organisations in Myanmar, please see Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Burma: Civil Society Skirting Regime Rules,” in Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space, edited by Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004). 8 Although these national civil society organisations were active in the urban cities and towns proper in central lowland Myanmar, they seldom reached the remote rural peripheries. See, for example, International Crisis Group, “Myanmar: The Role of Civil Society,” (Bangkok/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2001).

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parliamentary democracy system preserved space for both political and social associations, repeated military coup d’états effectually denied citizens participation in decision-making processes that affected their daily lives. Since the only political party in the country claimed itself the sole representative of all citizens, any social, political or business societies that were independent of the party were perceived as needless and disconcerting. Successive Myanmar military regimes harshly forbade virtually all forms of civil society association. As famously argued by David Steinberg, “[c]ivil society died under the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP); perhaps, more accurately, it was murdered”.9 The regime outlawed all mass organisations ranging from trade unions to students’ associations of minority ethnic nationalities, such as the Association of Mon University Students and professional associations such as Teachers’ Unions and Writers’ Unions.10 Further, to suppress the activities of above-ground elements of the armed insurgent groups, the BSPP government replaced the independent associational life of the country with the various state-controlled mass- and class-based organisations of the militarised socialist state. For instance, while it harshly suppressed trade unions and student unions, all labourers became members of the state-controlled Workers’ Association (The Workers’ Asi-a-yone) and all primary and secondary school students were indoctrinated default members of the Lanzin Youth Organisation (the Myanmar version of Soviet Komsomol) of the ruling party.

By the early 1980s, the government had also brought the traditionally independent Buddhist monkhood under its direct control.11 Throughout the authoritarian rule of BSPP, any forms of contesting or opposition associations had to either convert into a form of underground association or charge into open armed revolve. Further, after the renewed military coup d’état in 1988, political and social groupings and activities of the

9 David I. Steinberg, “A Void in Myanmar: Civil Society in Burma,” in Strengthening Civil Society in Burma: Possibilities and Dilemmas for International NGOs (Amsterdam: Burma Center Netherlands & Transnational Institute, 1997). After over a decade of rule by decree, the generals forcefully adopted a new constitution that mandated a single-party system and, in 1974, effectively prohibited the existence of any other independent political, social, private business or civil society entities. 10 While ruling the country with decrees, the coup d’état generals ruled on the National Solidarity Act (1964) and truncated all non-state voluntary associations and their activities altogether. With the re- enactment of the dormant 1958 Unlawful Association Act (the 1908 India Act XIV) of the colonial time, the government declared all political parties and civil society organisations unlawful. 11 The authority declared some Buddhist Gaings or denominations outlaw and forced many influential abbots of the Gaings to surrender their monkhood.

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associational sphere were brutally crushed and restricted.12 At the same time, to pre-empt the emergence of a genuine civil society entity, the military regime formed its own organisations and co-opted established CSOs that were prominent among the populations under its direct control. By establishing state-backed mass organisations that promoted loyalty to the regime and forcefully indoctrinated wide citizen participation, the military regime tried to prevent the formation of and participation in independent, voluntary associations beyond its control. In 1991, the late military regime rejuvenated and completely co-opted the MMCWA, the social organisation that was established in towns and cities across the country in 1948 and had lain dormant during BSPP’s destruction of civil society. The military regime also founded the USDA with a much broader membership coverage that included the military, all government staff and citizens of all ages. These associations became the most predominant GONGO of the country.

The Effects of Ceasefire on the Context for Civil Society

6.4.1. Context for civil society under civil war

Since colonial time, both Karen and Mon communities had CSOs that were independent of the state and that engaged in social mobilisation and welfare activities to meet the social needs, at least in the form of reciprocity, of their members.13 However, after the outbreak of civil war, the relationship between the state and society in Myanmar, particularly society in the war-affected minority ethnic communities became a case in which the state turned all its citizens into its enemies.14 After civil war broke out in Mon- and Karen-populated areas within a year of the country’s independence, the context for civil society in the areas immediately became desolate. Since then, successive Myanmar governments, both democratically elected and authoritarian military regimes, relentlessly

12 Due to concerns about the anti-government movements of the youth, particularly the students’ mass mobilisation capabilities and possible linkages with the armed resistance groups, the new military regime further prohibited various forms of independent groupings and movements. 13 Nai Pe Thein Zhel (former NMSP leader), interview by the author, October 28, 2017, Canberra, Australia; Nai Layehtaw Suvannabhum (former NMSP leader), interview by the author, 27 January, 2017, Canberra, Australia. See also 밶ုိင္ေငင ိမ္န၊ မငန္၀မခ်ိန ွနတုိြန္႔႔ ေနွက္ဥဳံ မုိင္န၊ (မငန္နဳ ္ တ္ဳပတလငတ္ေနမွက္နက္ေနမ၊ လ ခ်ိြ က္ေုတ္ေ နဥင္န၊ ရက္တငခမဳပ). [Nai Ngwe Thein, The History Background of the Mons, [in Bamar language] (NMSP liberated areas, concealed publication, n.d)]. 14 Mary P. Callahan, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004).

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suppressed and impaired all forms of independent social and communal groupings and movements in the warring areas.

Even when the parliamentary democracy government tolerated the insurrectionary movements of numerous social movement organisations in the central state of Myanmar,15 the authorities relentlessly suppressed the social and communal activities of Karen and Mon CSOs. For instance, under the rule of parliamentary democracy government, local branches of the Karen Central Organisation, Karen Youth League,16 All Ramanya Mon Association (ARMA), and United Mon Association (UMA) in Karen- and Mon-populated areas faced various forms of suppression and attacks over their social and cultural activities.17 At that time, while the peace movement of the Internal Peace Association (IPA)18 overwhelmed most of central Myanmar, the social mobilisation movements of the MNA in Mon-populated areas was under constant threat by the various security forces of the democratically elected government.19 Almost all the backbone organisations of Karen and Mon civil society were eliminated.20 The authorities, especially those in the warring Mon and Karen areas, did not tolerate any dissent and harshly suppressed groups that engaged in religious or social movements that could amount to political implications. Whereas independent organisations such as trade unions, the Writers’ Union and minority ethnic social movement organisations such as ARMA and KNDO were allowed in urban centres such as Yangon and Mawlamyine, the minority ethnic political and social movement groups in rural areas were under constant assault by the local authorities and their ‘pocket armies’.21

15 See, for example, South, Civil Society in Burma: The Development of Democracy Amidst Conflict, 16; International Crisis Group, “Myanmar: The Role of Civil Society,” 3. 16 The organisation later changed its name to Karen Youth Organisation (KYO). 17 Nai Pe Thein Zhel (former NMSP leader), interview by the author, October 28, 2017, Canberra, Australia; Nai Layehtaw Suvannabhum (former NMSP leader), interview by the author, 27 January, 2017, Canberra, Australia. See also, 밶ုိင္ေငင ိမ္န၊ မ ပန မ ုာသကာတစုာ႔းေပကၾနက သမစု နာ။ 18 The organisation was founded after the outbreak of civil war and campaigned for peace until the military coup in 1962. The highly respected Sayargyi Thakhin Ko Daw Hmine and Retd. Major General Kyaw Zaw were the founders. 19 Nai Pe Thein Zhel (former NMSP leader), interview; Nai Layehtaw Suvannabhum (former NMSP leader), interview. 20 Ibid. 21 Nai Pe Thein Zhel (former NMSP leader), interview.

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The intense civil war meant that local associational lives in Karen- and Mon-populated areas were badly affected, and almost all active social movement organisations had to disband. The security and militia forces of U Nu Administration burned down Mon and Karen villages in which social activities were strong as a measure of collective punishment.22 Many leaders of the social organisations and their followers were placed under arbitrary arrest, tortured and forced to escape to rebel-controlled areas or be killed. In 1949, because of the strong nationalist activities of the Mon Freedom League (MFL), Kawthnat village in Mawlamyine Township was assaulted and burned down, as was Kamarwat village in Mudon Township, the latter due to the actions of the MNA.23 The government’s secret police and military regiments threatened, kidnapped, and assassinated several leaders of Mon social movement organisations and their family members.24 In December 1948, Mon San Thu, a charismatic leader of the MFL, was shot dead in broad daylight by the secret police in downtown Mawlamyine, the capital city of the then Taninthayee Division.25 Most Mon social and political organisations had to become underground movements and were eventually truncated when most of the leaders fled the liberated areas in the early 1950s.26

Moreover, when the coup d’état RC government further intensified fighting in both Karen- and Mon-populated areas, the remaining CSOs, particularly the local social movement organisations, were harshly suppressed. The government tolerated only a few cultural, religious and welfare associations that were local and mostly operated informally to serve the needs of their community members. In some villages, only a few community- based organisations, such as membership-based reciprocating associations for funerals, survived the government suppression. The regime forced all CSOs to disband or become dormant. For instance, while RC forced the literature and cultural-based organisation ARMA to remain dormant, it outlawed or disbanded all other Mon social movement

22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 밶ုိင္ေ ိန္နနဇွ ( က္ဒရက္တကၠ ုိလ္)၊ သကၠဌ္က န밶ုိင္ေရ္ကခင္밶 င္ဲ ေတွ္လ န္ေရန မွန၊ ဒုိြန္႔မငန္ေကခွင္န ွန (ကင့္ွရွ၊ ိ ၈) [in Bamar language]။ Nai Pe Thein Zhil (Federal University), President Nai Shwe Kyin and Revolutionary Mon Students (Canberra: 2008). 25 Neither Kayin State nor Mon State existed at that time. 26 For details on the Mon political and social movement organisations at the time, see South, Mon Nationalism and Civil War in Burma: The Golden Sheldrake.

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organisations, such as the Moulmein District Mon Youth and Student Association and the Mon Youth Organisation.27 Many Mon social movement organisation leaders and their members, especially senior student leaders from Rangoon University and Mawlamyine Collage, were arrested and either killed through torture or had to flee to the areas controlled by the armed groups.28

However, after the years of brutal pacification that followed the coup d’état, the RC endorsed the formation of minority ethnic literature and culture committees under its watchful eyes.29 Since 1966, the Department of Higher Education of the RC government authorised the formation of literature and cultural sub-committees for minority ethnic students at the University of Rangoon campus; however, this was mainly for propaganda reasons.30 In the early 1970s, the government also allowed the registration of minority ethnic literature and cultural organisations of major minority ethnic communities in the capital Yangon.31 Further, in the mid-1970s, the Socialist government also allowed the celebration of minority ethnic identity-related national events such as Karen New Year Day and Mon National Day in the capital city Yangon.32 However, the authorities strictly prohibited celebrating such identity-related events in the warring rural Karen- and Mon- populated areas.33 For example, Hpa-an city was barely able to celebrate the lunar event of Karen New Year Day throughout the period of intense fighting.34

27 Nai Pe Thein Zhil (former NMSP leader), interview; Nai Layehtaw Suvannabhum (former NMSP leader), interview. 28 Nai Pe Thein Zhil (Federal University), President Nai Shwe Kyin and Revolutionary Mon Students. 29 Perhaps this was a mollifying move by the regime for its annihilation of all the minority ethnic social and political organisations or, because the regime might have had confidence that it could put a limit on the minority ethnic organisations that were to be non-political and non-partisan in the ongoing civil war. 30 Nai Pe Thein Zhil (former NMSP leader), interview. 31 Dr Min Nwe Soe (former chairperson of MLCC-Central), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Nai Maung Toe (former Chairperson, MLCC, Yangon), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 32 Nai Soe Kyi (a senior patron of MLCC, Yangon), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon; A senior Karen community leader, interview by the author, January 18, 2017, Yangon. 33 Saw Khin Maung Myint (former KLCA leader), interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State; Nai Maung Toe (former Chairperson, MLCC, Yangon), interview. 34 A senior Karen community leader (Hpa-an), interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State.

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Although the BSPP Government allowed the formation of ethnic literature and cultural organisations based in the capital city Yangon (mainly as propaganda to show that ethnic social and cultural rights were respected), most organisations discretely extended branch organisations to the respective ethnic-populated areas.35 Even under the scrutiny of government intelligence agencies, the literature and cultural activities of the groups soon expanded to their respective ethnic peripheries. For instance, in 1978, the Karen Literature and Cultural Committee (KLCC) of the Yangon Karen, together with the Karen university students’ Karen Literature and Cultural sub-Committee of the Universities in Yangon, began summer Karen literacy programs in the government-controlled areas in Kayin State.36 Similarly, the Yangon-based Mon Literature and Cultural Committee (MLCC) was helpful to the formation and activities of the township-level MLCCs in Mawlamyine, Hpa-an, Kyaikmaraw, Mudon, Thanbyuzart, and other townships and expanded the related activities in the sizable Mon-populated areas.37 However, throughout the rule of the Socialist government, none of the MLCCs from the township in Mon State were successful in their attempts to become a registered literature and cultural organisation.38

Similarly, efforts by Karen elders and educated elites in Hpa-an to legalise community- based welfare association the Margha Social Welfare Organisation (MSWO) in 1975 were not successful until the mid-1990s.39 In addition, the Hpa-an-based KLCC struggled to survive under intensive pressure by the local authorities.40 In addition, during the 1980 religious onslaught by the Socialist government, the provincial authorities (particularly the MI) closely scrutinised Karen and Mon Buddhist monasteries and Christian churches and their affiliated community organisations and only a few Mon and Karen religious- based community organisations survived.41 There was very limited latitude left for social

35 A senior political leader, interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 36 Saw Khin Maung Myint (former KLCA leader), interview. 37 Dr Min Nwe Soe (former chairperson of MLCC Central), interview. 38 This could possibly be due to the intense war conditions in the areas. Ibid. 39 A local civil society activist, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 40 A senior Karen community leader (Hpa-an), interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 41 In some suburbs in cities such as Yangon and Pathein, where a sizable Karen population were living, some Karen religious, social, and cultural groups and their networks operated under the auspices of retired high-level government officials. A senior Karen community leader (Hpa-an), interview; a party

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and communal activities, especially at village-level communities. Under the concealment of such religious bodies, some Karen and Mon communities at the local level could keep their community-based associations functioning, although these were informal and limited to the particular communities. In the form of low-profile community associations, local people would come together and participate in religious rites and other social activities. In some villages, locally-based small community groups, such as monastery service associations, reciprocal funeral associations, reciprocal marriage fund groups (of young singles) and some church-based welfare groups remained functional. The MSWO in Hpa-an city and its network in the neighbouring villages were an example of the local social groups operating in many Karen communities.42 Throughout BSPP rule, various networks of religious institutions and their affiliated community organisations remained the nurturing ground for the revival of the civil society sector.

However, as the civil war intensified in both Mon and Karen areas after the military re- takeover in 1988, the junta forced the literature and cultural groups and the ethnic welfare organisations to stop all previously permitted cultural and social movement activities. For instance, Mon State authorities forced MLCC at the universities in Mawlamyine to stop its routine literature, cultural, and social activities that involved hundreds of Mon university students and local youth groups.43 Moreover, the Ministry of Home Affairs denied renewal of the previously permitted two-yearly registration for both Karen and Mon literature and cultural committees in the capital Yangon, although the authorities did not outlaw the organisations.44 Throughout the SLORC/SPDC rules, the military junta banned all ethnic literature and cultural activities of the social and cultural organisations. Until the ceasefire of NMSP, the highly popular Mon National Day celebration was confined to indoor a Buddhist monastery or community house.45

leader (a Karen State-based political party), interview; a senior Mon political leader (Mawlamyine), interview. 42 Ko Khant Zaw Aung (a civil society leader-Hpa-an), interview. 43 Former leaders of MLCC (universities Yangon and Mawlamyine), in discussion with the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine. 44 Nai Soe Kyi (a senior patron of MLCC-Yangon), interview; Nai Maung Toe (former Chairperson, MLCC-Yangon), interview. 45 Ibid.

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Meanwhile, the prolonged civil war also created conditions for the EAOs to establish rebel organised non-rebel organisations (RONROs) and a host of affiliated or associated organisations inside their strongholds and across the Myanmar-Thai borderland. In the late 1980s as civil war in the areas intensified, the number of refugees and IDPs escaping war atrocities and various government prejudices in both Mon- and Karen-populated areas continue to increase.

Further, following the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, tens of thousands of protesters flooded both the KNU- and NMSP-controlled areas. The intensified fighting between government troops and Karen and Mon armed groups in the early 1990s further forced many Karen and Mon villagers to escape towards the rebel-controlled borderlands. In the early 1990s, the continued surge in the number of refugees and IDPs along the Myanmar- Thai borderline raised unprecedented international attention and, consequently, numerous international organisations particularly INGOs and UN agencies were able to reach the devastated populations. As the war intensified, and the number of refugees and IDPs hiding across the breadth and width of the rebel-controlled and contested deep jungle areas increased, it became more and more difficult for international organisations to gain access and provide humanitarian and basic social needs to the destitute population. Conversely, given the lack of security and previous experiences of government spying, rebel organisations, like the government authorities, restricted international organisations from entering their base areas.

At the same time, the independent local indigenous groups were not allowed, nor would dare to, access those deprived populations in the conflict-affected areas. The state of ‘neutrality’ is a necessary condition for an implementation organisation to access material and financial aid from most INGOs and UN agencies. The conditions generated by the intense fighting eventually led to the formations of the RONROs. With the financial and technical support of the international community, both KNU and NMSP set up RONROs under their direct control to access aid and implement the humanitarian and social service provision programs of the UN agencies and INGOs in their base areas. In such RONROs, while the EAOs took absolute control, perhaps to show civility and community participation, the authorities of both KNU and NMSP allowed the representatives of

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religious and community organisations as well.46 The Karen Christian Relief Committee or, as it was known after 1984, the Karen Refugee Committee (KRC) of KNU and Mon National Relief Committee (MNRC) of NMSP are prime examples of rebel-managed, non-rebel humanitarian and social service delivering organisations.47 In the following years, KNU established various organisations together with the networks in which many Karen religious, civil and communal associations were associated.48 Although it was under the direct control of KNU, with the involvement of the non-KNU representatives, the KRC became the natural implementation partner of most cross-border humanitarian agencies.49 KRC was directly involved in providing emergency assistance—mainly food, clothing, and shelter—to the refugees and IDPs across the KNU-controlled and contested areas.50 For decades, all cross-border humanitarian organisations including INGOs, UN agencies and religious-based organisations such as the Christian Missionary Networks and International Ecumenical Christian provided humanitarian aid to meet basic social needs through these RONROs. Likewise, until the NMSP ceasefire, virtually all the voluntary groups operating on the Myanmar-Thai borderline across the NMSP-base areas were barely independent of the Mon armed organisation.

6.4.2. Context for civil society in Mon-populated areas after the NMSP ceasefire

While flawed in many respects, the ceasefire between the government military and NMSP in 1995 created opportunity for Mon social and communal groups, newly emerged or dormant alike, to resurrect and develop in both government- and NMSP-controlled Mon communities.51 The ceasefire agreement inexorably changed the long-standing hostile and constraining context for civil society in Mon-populated areas. Even under the

46 A Mon community leader (Australia), interview by the author, September 30, 2017, Canberra, Australia; a leader of a Mon development NGO (border-based), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine. 47 A leader of a Mon rights group (border-based), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine. 48 Director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 49 Ibid. 50 Alexander Horstmann, “Sacred Spaces of Karen Refugees and Humanitarian Aid Across the Thailand–Burma Border,” Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies 4, no. 2 (2011): 262. 51 Even most of those who were critical of the ceasefire agreed on this contextual improvement. See, for example, Oo and Min, Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords.

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tyrannical rule of the authoritarian military regime, numerous forms of social and welfare associations emerged or were rejuvenated out of the conflict-ravaged Mon community and gradually progressed to the civil society in the Tocquevillian sense. At the same time, within years, many resuscitated social movement organisations also progressed into political organisations.

Most importantly, the ceasefire brought about conditions for the previously quiescent Mon social mobilisation organisations to resurrect. As an armed resistant organisation with the claimed objective of fighting for the ethnic identity of Mon people, NMSP had to convey ethnic identity-related gains from the mostly cynical ceasefire agreement with the military regime. The recommencement of the previously forbidden Mon National Day celebration, a highly esteemed national event traditionally celebrated across Mon- inhabited areas, became the first practical task for NMSP to deliver to the people sceptical of the ceasefire deal.52 At the same time, as an armed organisation newly connected with the community, there were various limitations for the NMSP to take over such a costly, complicated and laborious event across all the Mon-populated areas.53 Conversely, due to the cessation of fighting between the previously warring armies, security conditions could no longer be a reason to forbid public rallies in Mon-populated areas.54 Consequently, with the informal protection of NMSP, the previously dormant Mon National Day Celebration Committees across all Mon areas from Yangon through Mawlamyine to Kawtkareik and Dawei Townships resurrected one after another.55 Although it was an explicitly ethnic-nationalist activity, the authorities of the military government inevitably conceded permission for such ethnic identity-related celebrations that involved public marching and rallies across Mon-inhabited areas. As various Mon political, social, and business actors started becoming involved in this politically sensitive event, it became increasingly difficult for the government authorities to closely monitor the movement and actors involved.

52 Nai Chan Toit (former member of CEC, NMSP), interview by the author, February 26, 2016, Ye Town, Mon State. 53 Ibid. 54 Nai Myint Swe (former CC of NMSP), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 55 Nai Chan Toit (former CEC of NMSP), interview; Dr Min Nwe Soe (former chairperson of MLCC- Central), interview.

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For the authorities, to suppress such identity-related social mobilisation movement by violent means, as it had been doing all the time, such as arresting and imprisoning the leading activists, was no longer appropriate. Eventually, the authorities of the provincial military government in Mawlamyine had to negotiate with the key actors of the Mon National Day Celebration Committees across all Mon-populated areas to come up with a central body, so that they could hold a body of responsibility into account for any malpractice that might occur.56 Although it was in the form of a dictated directive, this negotiation indirectly recognised the previously banned identity-related movement of the Mons, although restrictions remained in place beyond the areas of Mon State. This informal legalisation of the central body of the Mon National Day Celebration Committee not only encouraged the revival of one of the inactive autonomous, voluntary organisations with ethnic-nationalist agenda, it also roused associations of other categories from quiescence across Mon-populated areas. The military regime inevitably had to also concede other less-explicit nationalist activities of the various Mon social movement organisations.

As correctly noted by South, while the ceasefire of NMSP provided the political context for the re-emergence of Mon civil society, the leaders of religious and community welfare networks were the principal actors.57 Since the NMSP itself was in town and openly communicated with all the religious entities, especially the Mon monasteries, the government pressure on the religious bodies significantly decreased. Some influential Mon head monks successfully negotiated with the authorities to recognise the literacy and cultural programs and, at the same time, mobilised Mon communities for the necessary support.58 As a result, the social mobilisation groups and community associations covertly functioning under cover of the religious bodies were able to operate more openly and expand their networks. Obtaining protection, though indirect, from both the NMSP and the monasteries, the summer Mon literacy groups resumed their Mon language literacy

56 Min Aung Mon, Min Win Htut, Min Lay Naing, Min Pan Aung (former leaders of university students’ MLCC-Yangon and Mawlamyine), interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Min Min Nwe (journalist), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 57 South, Civil Society in Burma: The Development of Democracy Amidst Conflict, 32. 58 Nai Mon Rae Jae (a senior leader of Mon summer literacy program), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State.

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programs in a few famous Mon monasteries.59 In the following years, the groups gradually expanded their activities to a few large villages and, over time, fervently reached most Mon communities across both the government and rebel-controlled areas. Consequently, the previously monastery-based literacy and cultural training programs delivering on an ad hoc basis become a recognised activity of the Mon social mobilisation groups. In the following year of the ceasefire, over 10,000 students participated in the Summer Mon Literacy and Buddhist Culture Association (SMLBCA) training programs in monasteries in towns and villages across Mon-populated areas. The number of participants increased from around 27,000 in 1997 to over 60,000 by 2007.60 This development in the context also opened up valuable space and opportunities for numerous Mon community-based organisations across Mon-inhabited areas to develop into standardised CSOs. As travel and communication significantly improved after the ceasefire, Mon community organisations and their networks could better initiate and efficiently implement community development projects in broader Mon-populated areas. Similarly, all the quiescent MLCCs, registered and non-registered, resumed their Mon culture and literature promotional activities across Mon-populated areas. Many urban- based Mon civil society networks could even expand their branch organisations down to the village level.

Conversely, as the ceasefire addressed war-related atrocities such as forced relocations, forced labouring and forced to serve as military porters, the situation in Mon communities under the NMSP control become stable. This increased stability in the communities under the NMSP-controlled areas provided better access for the international aid and social development agencies to reach Mon communities not only emerging from the civil war but also those internally displaced in the jungle and the borderlands, although it was to be through the covenant of NMSP. Meanwhile, although the number of refugees gradually decreased, the new IDPs escaping the hardships that resulted from the militarisation continued to increase in the NMSP-controlled areas and hard-to-access mountainous

59 A senior head monk (Yangon), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 60 A head monk (Summer Mon Language and Buddhist Culture Training Committee), interview by the author, May 6, 2016, Thanbyuzayart, Mon State. Mon State NLD government has provided substantial matching funds to the program since summer 2016. A community leader (private school teacher, Kamarwet), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Kamarwet Town, Mudon Township, Mon State.

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jungles. Over the years, as the size of the displaced population continued to grow, the necessity of relief, humanitarian and welfare assistance to offset the growing needs of the devastating populations accordingly increased. However, although there were significant decreases in war-related hostilities and serious rights abuses, NMSP hardly succeeded in providing essential goods and services to the populations living in their controlled areas.61 Because of the limited capacity of the humanitarian branches of NMSP and the necessity conditions for political neutrality of the international aid community, indigenous Mon community organisations began to mushroom in the borderlands and NMSP-controlled areas, although most were, one way or another, associated with the ceasefire party.62 With the political recognition of the government in place, many civil society actors, individually and in groups, became involved in the relief, social welfare, and development activities of NMSP and its affiliated organisations.

Over the years, the number of community organisations increased and began to form independent networks of their own across the ceasefire zones and beyond, and took part in the implementation of humanitarian, social, and community development projects. Some social welfare organisations closely linked with NMSP during the wartime gradually transformed their associational status from affiliated agencies of NMSP to locally-based social welfare and development organisations. In 2003, the Mon Health Workers Association detached from its mother unit MNHC and reformed as an independent local NGO.63 Since then, the group has provided maternal and health care services in Southern Ye Township.

Further, with the help of donor agencies and INGOs, the increasing need for neutral implementation partner agencies also created conditions for the development of non- combatant associational entity within the armed ethnic community. The increase in community organisations associated with NMSP provided opportunities for many combatants of MNLA, left idle after the ceasefire, to quit the rebel army and adapt into

61 Ibid. 62 Mi Kun Chan Non (a leader of Mon Women Organisation), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; a leader of Mon rights group (border-based), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine. 63 Nai Win Hla (member of CEC, NMSP), interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Nai Tin Hla (former head of MNHC hospital), interview by the author, February 14, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State.

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the organisations as social development workers. The Human Rights Foundation for Monland (HURFOM) is an example of an autonomous organisation established and managed by the ex-combatants of the NMSP. After the NMSP ceasefire at the end of 1995, the organisation was founded by some former staff of the MNRC, student activists and leaders of Mon refugee communities in the NMSP-controlled areas and across the borderlands, most of whom were ex-combatants of the MNLA.64 Over the years, while based on the Thai side of the border, the organisation becomes an independent NGO focusing on human rights violations and the social development of the populations across the borderland, in NMSP-controlled areas, and beyond into the government strongholds.65

Further, the NMSP ceasefire also provided conditions for Mon CSOs in the country, in exile and at the borderland to reconnect with each other, interact, and further develop and strengthen the fledgling Mon CSOs. As the security conditions across Mon areas improved, the government restrictions on travel to and from the previously NMSP- controlled and further towards the border areas were decriminalised. Over time, the number of security checkpoints reduced along the routes to NMSP-controlled areas and the borderland and the seriousness of security checks gradually lessened.66 Consequently, the ceasefire unintentionally legalised previously prohibited communication and collaboration among Mon CSOs inside the government-controlled, NMSP-based areas and across the borderland. Communication and collaboration between the border-based international humanitarian organisations, the departmental agencies of NMSP and its affiliated organisation and the revived and newly formed local community organisations inside the government-controlled Mon areas were longer acts of crimes against the state.67 For example, hundreds of previously conflict-affected Mon villages had parent-teacher associations comprised of teachers from the MNED of NMSP and the villagers.68

64 Nai Kasouhmon (a leader of a Mon development NGO, border based), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine; Nai Siri Mon Chan, chairperson of the Australian Mon Association (former leader of MNRC), interview by the author, September 30, 2017, Canberra, Australia. 65 Ibid. 66 Nai Kasouhmon, a leader of a Mon development NGO (border based), interview. 67 Ibid. 68 Nai Thein Myint, a state school teacher, interview by the author, March 19, 2017, Hangam Village, Ye Township, Mon State.

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Similarly, many village school-supporting associations were formalised that provided necessary resources and managed the Mon national schools that often have contacts with their counterpart associations in exile and overseas migrant labourer communities. In addition, the MWO of NMSP, in collaboration with locally-based social groups, was successful in bringing social welfare and development projects such as income generation, early childcare centres and women’s rights activities into some villages even in the government-controlled Chaungzon Township.69 Similarly, some local community organisations became connected with their emigrated counterparts in the borderland, neighbouring countries, those in exile and local NGOs and further progressed into fully grown CSOs. For example, with the help and support of their counterparts in Singapore and Malaysia, the SMLBCA in Kyarinn Village, in Karen State, became an NGO jointly running an income generating program with Mon-region Social Development Network (MSDN) and provided complementary salaries to the teachers of Mon national schools in the areas.70 Further, some NMSP-affiliated development organisations shared their funds with their local counterparts that operated inside the government strongholds. Moreover, as the NMSP-affiliated Mon CSOs became increasingly independent, they began projects that they could jointly implement together with the groups inside the government stronghold. For instance, in the mid-2000s, with shared funding from border-based HURFOM, MSDN implemented several capacity building training programs for youth in Mawlamyine and various Mon villages, some of which NMSP and MNRC could send their trainers and facilitators.71 Smith describes this effect of ceasefire as “the ability of long-separated communities to openly re-establish contacts and for representatives of formally opposing groups to have access (although conditional) to formally-restricted areas in each other’s territory”.72

Equally important, the ceasefire also enabled national NGOs across the country to help establish and interact with Mon CSOs. During the early period of the Myanmar ceasefire process, a few minority ethnic elite-led peace mediator groups that had been involved in

69 Mi Kun Chan Non (a leader of MWO), interview. 70 Min Min New (former director of MSDN), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 71 Ibid. 72 Martin Smith, “Ethnic Conflict and the Challenge of Civil Society in Burma,” in Strengthening Civil Society in Burma: Possibilities and Dilemmas for International NGOs (Amsterdam: Burma Center Netherlands & Transnational Institute, 1997), 14.

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the negotiation process for ceasefire formed peacebuilding-related organisations, although these were limited to peacebuilding-related activities in ceasefire zones. For instance, in acknowledgement of their mediator role in the making of the ceasefire process with Kachin Independent Organisation, the military regime permitted the Shalom Family (later reformed into Shalom Foundation [SF]) to provide a peacebuilding program that included awareness raising and leadership training in Kachin ceasefire areas. Following the NMSP ceasefire, SF expanded its program coverage into Mon ceasefire areas and helped to develop Mon civil society associations in the NMSP ceasefire zones. Although SF was involved in the NMSP ceasefire process only as a peace mediator organisation, it provided capacity building training and organisational development assistance to local Mon community organisations to develop into CSOs. SF played an important role in making the MLCC (Mawlamyine) into an independent indigenous Mon NGO, extending from its traditional identity-related activities into additional social welfare and community development works.73 In 2002, Karen Development Network (KDN) also set up a branch office in the state capital city Mawlamyine and, through the Christian network across Mon areas, extended its social and community development projects to Mon rural towns and villages and helped with the formation of grassroots voluntary community organisations.74

The ceasefire also allowed the international community to play a vital role in resuscitating and strengthening Mon civil society entities. In response to Myanmar’s ongoing social and political transformation, the international community attempted to help provide the building blocks of civil society in the areas. However, this came alongside thorny debates on the approaches of operation in the country under the authoritarian rule.75 Given the numerous restrictions imposed by the military regime and limitations sanctioned by Western democracies, both the inter-governmental and international non-governmental

73 Ja Nan La Htaw, chairperson of Shalom Foundation, interview by the author, January 19, 2017, Yangon; Dr Min Nwe Soe (former chairperson of MLCC, Central), interview. 74 A training manager of KDN (Mawlamyine), interview. Similarly, the leadership training program for the ethnic minorities of Matta Development Foundation also contributed to the civil society build up in some Mon-populated areas. Min Min Nwe (former director of MSDN), interview. 75 Although some withdrew from the country, more than 15 INGOs, including Save the Children Fund UK, Médecins Sans Frontières (Holland), and Australian Red Cross, entered Myanmar in the early 1990s. The Australian Red Cross withdrew from the country in February 1997. Purcell, “Axe-Handles or Willing Minions? International NGOs in Burma”; and Smith, “Ethnic Conflict and the Challenge of Civil Society in Burma,” 3.

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agencies prioritised working with indigenous grassroots organisations.76 Meanwhile, aiming at long-term social development and civic empowerment, most of the organisations focused on providing capacity building, participatory planning, social mobilisation and community empowerment to local community organisations.77 As various international organisations increasingly reached the Mon areas under the ceasefire, the emerging local social organisations received more support that, over time, helped them progress into autonomous, pluralist and capable societal associations serving the local communities and, later, as established NGOs. Some of these Mon community organisations became connected with the international humanitarian and development agencies that were moving their bases from the borderland into inside the ceasefire Mon areas and had become direct implementation partners of the border-based aid agencies.

At the same time, as the ceasefire assured security and, to some extent, political openness for international organisations and donor agencies to access the project sites inside previously inaccessible areas, the quality of deliverability of the Mon CSOs such as accountability and responsiveness obviously improved. For instance, together with independent international evaluators, a project evaluation team of the Pyoe Pin Programme of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office even reached the project sites of MSDN in Kyarinn Seikyin Township in Karen State where NMSP troops held ceasefire, as neither the government nor NMSP restrict access for reasons such as security, spying, or supporting either side. Further, the border-based international community also provided individual and social organisations valuable space to participate in humanitarian and development activities, obtain access to international civil society movements and build new careers for individuals to become social change agents. When the ceasefire was in place, border-based organisations and individual consultants helped to facilitate some Mon CSOs and individuals with potential to cross the border, meet donors, and apply for funding. In the mid-2000s, some consultants from the Thabyay Education Foundation, an international organisation based in Chiang Mai, voluntarily

76 Smith, “Ethnic Conflict and the Challenge of Civil Society in Burma,” 5. 77 Ibid.

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helped develop project proposals and arrange donor meetings for some newly formed Mawlamyine-based Mon CSOs.78

Moreover, the NMSP ceasefire also provided context for some re-emerged Mon CSOs to re-engage in minority ethnic identity-related social movement activities and stimulated a few to test the water in initiating more explicit political movements. For more than half a century, the successive Myanmar ruling regimes described all Mon armed political organisations as bandits and terrorist groups and never recognised these organisations as an ethnic-nationalist movement that represented the Mon people. Following the ceasefire, the ruling military regime had to concede political recognition to NMSP as an armed ethnic political organisation. Consequently, although the legal obligation that criminalised the act of connecting or collaborating with an EAO was still in place, the authority released almost all prisoners associated with NMSP and those who belonged to the party were no longer held as criminals. Thus, regional government authorities began tolerating Mon civil society actors brave enough to resume minority ethnic identity- related nationalist social movement activities. In addition to their community development and low-profile social mobilisation activities that helped accumulate social capital in the war-torn divided communities, a few Mon social mobilisation organisations started undertaking more explicit political activities. The authorities were aware of the social mobilisation activities of the Mon social organisations, including their provision of capacity building and civic education training and initiating the formation of youth organisations and networks across Mon-populated areas. The Police Special Branch summoned all six founding leaders of the League of All Mon Youth Organisations (LAMYO), the major Mon youth network that provided civic education and capacity building training to youth groups in several townships of Mon-populated areas, for dubious funding sources and their activities in several towns and villages.

However, mainly because NMSP was apparently in town, the Special Branch could no longer allege the funds from HURFOM were illegal and the minority ethnic identity- related contents of the training was sedition. Unprecedentedly, all the LAMYO leaders were released within days. In 2007, invigorated by the improved situation, the leaders, together with 13 township-level affiliated organisations, founded the MSDN as the social

78 A former international staff member (Thapyay Education), interview by the author, June 25, 2017, Canberra, Australia.

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development branch of the organisation. Over the years, MSDN expanded its activities into social service delivery and community capacity building activities. Both LAMYO and MSDN played critical roles in the formation of the Mon political party, All Mon- region Democracy Party (AMDP), at the onset of the country’s national liberalisation process in 2010.

6.4.3. Context for Karen civil society during 1995–2010

Until the KNU ceasefire in 2012, civic associational life in Karen-populated area remained virtually mired. The continued civil war prevented any legal form of Karen community association across Karen-populated areas, let alone the ability to form independent CSOs. Unlike Mon-populated areas, Karen civil society actors did not have the opportunity to revitalise their social movement organisations through their identity- related lunar events. Karen political and civil society actors could not use the Karen New Year Day as an enabling space for interacting with each other and revitalising the associational life in Karen communities under the continued armed conflict. Successfully negotiated with the last British administration in 1947, Karen New Year Day was a nationally gazetted public holiday in Myanmar.79 In this three-day-long identity-related event, all Karen groups, regardless of their sub-racial group, linguistic or religious differences, would come together and mobilise Karen populations across all the Karen- inhabited areas for months.80

While Mon civil society actors could use Mon National Day mass rallies to bring the social movement organisations back across Mon-populated areas, the continuation of war hostilities hindered Karen civil and political actors from retrieving Karen social movement organisations through such identity-related mass movements in the war- affected Karen-inhabited areas. Security conditions across many urban and rural Karen areas remained an overriding reason for authorities to ban most of Karen mass movements.81 In the late 1990s, although the military authorities allowed the Karen New

79 Dr Naw Rebecca Htin, a senior Karen community leader (Yangon), interview by the author, January 18, 2017, Yangon. 80 Ibid. 81 Throughout the years, Kayin State authorities in the Karen capital city Hpa-an claimed even the outskirts of the State capital city was insecure and denied permission for the mass rally. A leader of

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Year Day Celebration in the country’s capital Yangon, it came with numerous inconveniences. In 1998, well-connected elite Karen leaders in the capital Yangon had to hold an important mass rally in a Karen monastery compound in Innsein, on the outskirts of Yangon.82 The State capital city Hpa-an was not able to hold the Karen national celebration for over half a century since independence.83 At the same time, while many Karen religious, social and political groups held this national event in defiance, their activities were mostly confined within compounds of Karen Buddhist monasteries and Christian churches. In most Karen-inhabited areas, civil society actors could not celebrate the most important identity-related lunar event for all Karen peoples.

Meanwhile, mainly because of continued insecurity and war hostilities, only a few Karen community organisations in the government stronghold could operate under the guise of religious institutions. There were several Karen Buddhist head monks who were nationally famous and possessed a powerful influence over government officials at the central level. The personal patronage and powerful moral authority of the Karen religious leaders and retired government high-ranking officials were critical for community organisations in Karen-populated areas under government stronghold.84 Until the KNU ceasefire, Karen community-based organisations in the government stronghold areas had to operate under the patronage of Karen religious leaders, such as U Pyinnya Thami of Taungalay Monastery and Rev. Andrew Mya Han, the Archbishop of lower Myanmar, who held a powerful influence over authorities. For decades, the nationally famous Thamanya Sayardaw even provided daily food to around10,000 migrants and IDPs. The famous head monk with powerful moral authority provided protection and livelihood to the IDPs settling in and around his hilltop monastery compound. Under the patronage of these religious leaders, a few Karen community organisations implemented social welfare projects in some Karen-populated areas under government control.85 Since various Karen

Karen political party, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State; a local civil society activist, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 82 A senior Karen community leader, interview by the author, January 18, 2017, Yangon. See also Nick Cheesman, “Seeing ‘Karen’ in the Union of Myanmar,” Asian Ethnicity 3, no. 2 (2002): 199. 83 A leader of a Karen political party, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Twon, Kayin State. 84 South, “Burma’s Longest War: Anatomy of the Karen Conflict,” 26. 85 A director of a Strategic Study Institute (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon.

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Christian communities possessed well-established international contacts and had a systematic organisational structure, there were a few Karen CSOs discretely operating under the auspices of the churches.86

Meanwhile, in return for their role in the process of preliminary ceasefire negotiations between the MI and the KNU in the early 1990s, some Karen religious and community leaders were able to form the Karen Peace Mediator Group (KPMG).87 In 1994, Karen leaders expanded their field of work and established the Karen Development Committee (KDC) and augmented humanitarian, social welfare and community development activities. KDC successfully established the Kwe Ka Baw Clinic network, Karen Women’s Action Group, and the Rising Sun youth network in Yangon and a few cities in government stronghold areas.88 However, although Karen community and religious leaders could activate a few Karen community-based organisations in Karen-populated areas in the government stronghold urban centres, the continued civil war effectually obstructed organisations from expanding to conflict-affected Karen-populated areas. KDC was Yangon-based and the Kwe Ka Baw hospital network was limited to Yangon and Pathein, the capital city of Ayeyarwaddy Delta. As fighting continued, urban-based Karen civil society initiatives could not reach the Karen communities within the conflict zones. For instance, the networking and community management training programs of KDC in the conflict-affected Karen areas was confined to the government stronghold urban areas of Hpa-an and Toungoo.89 Likewise, the coordinated efforts of KDC to survey, document and analyse the situation and vulnerability of the Karen IDP faced numerous obstacles.90 Similarly, the Monastic-based Karen Literature and Culture

86 Rev. Aung Gyi (Baptist Church-Thanbyuzayart), interview by the author, February 19, 2016, Thanbyuzayart, Mon State; a senior Karen community leader (Yangon), interview. 87 For details, see Alan Saw U, “Reflections on Confidence-Building and Cooperation among Ethnic Groups in Myanmar: A Karen Case Study,” in Myanmar: State, Society and Ethnicity, edited by Narayanan Ganesan and Kyaw Yin Hlaing (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 222–25. 88 Alan Saw U, senior leader of KDN, interview by the author, January 18, 2017, Yangon. 89 Ibid; a prominent Karen community leader (Yangon), interview by the author, January 18, 2017, Yangon. 90 Ibid; a director of a local NGO (Hpa-an), interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State.

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Association (Hpa-an) could not expand its literature and cultural activities into conflict- affected Karen towns and villages.91

As the war in Karen-populated areas intensified in the mid-1990s, many international organisations flooded the areas to provide emergency assistance and humanitarian relief assistance. However, because many of the previously liberated zones of the KNU had become war zones, only the line agencies of KNU, its associated RONROs and their affiliated community organisations could access the refugee and IDP communities scattered across the areas and Myanmar-Thai borderland.92 Although the international community had traversable access to the rebel strongholds, due to war conditions they hardly reached the areas inside and beyond the control of KNU.93 At the same time, because of the limited capacity of the KNU line departments and associated community organisations, the instantaneous flood of refugees and foreign aid overwhelmed the embryonic Karen CSOs in the areas.94 Similar to the NMSP ceasefire areas, the continually increasing number of refugees and IDPs forced the border-based international humanitarian agencies to establish indigenous organisations to effectively implement their humanitarian relief and social welfare projects.95 However, the UN and international aid agencies could only help establish Karen NGOs and community organisations in the areas within KNU strongholds and the borderlands.

Moreover, in the mid-2000s when the Myanmar military intensified military offensives against KNLA base camps, local authorities further increased their suppression of local Karen community organisations and their social and communal activities. At the same time, government authorities stepped up state-sponsored community mobilisation activities, mostly by force of authority, in the government stronghold Karen-populated areas. The Myanmar Women’s Affairs Association, a notorious GONGO, allegedly

91 A senior Karen community leader (Hpa-an), interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 92 A prominent Karen community leader (Hpa-an), interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 93 Ibid. 94 Director of a local NGO (Hpa-an), interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 95 Horstmann, “Sacred Spaces of Karen Refugees and Humanitarian Aid across the Thailand–Burma Border,” 259.

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forced young Karen women to join and become involved in government propaganda activities, as well as extort arbitrary funds from the villagers.96 In addition, many government village headmen were forced to recruit dozens of villagers to trained and become members of the Swan Arr Shin Association, the government-backed non-armed militia-like organisation that was used to crack down on civilian protests.

Meanwhile, the continued violent fighting prevented connection and communication between long-separated Karen communities in the government stronghold and those under the control of Karen armed groups. Until the KNU ceasefire, communication and collaboration were limited between civil society actors from different areas of Karen- populated areas.97 None of the long-separated Karen communities, including those inside the government strongholds, in KNU control, across the borderlands and in exile, could openly contact and communicate with each other. The efforts of various Karen groups, including those working under the patronage of influential leaders, to foster cooperation between the different Karen civil society groups faced considerable challenges. While the prolonged distrust among the different Karen communities was still not adequately resolved, the restrictions imposed by the government military also proved insurmountable. Article 17(1) and 17(2) of the Unlawful Association Act (1964) criminalised those who contacted or collaborated with an armed insurgent organisation who, usually, could be punished by one to seven years imprisonment if found guilty.98 Although the NMSP, as with the KNU, was still a declared unlawful organisation, the ceasefire decriminalised the act of contacting or collaborating with the ceasefire Mon armed organisation. Consequently, while contacting and collaborating with NMSP and its affiliated organisations was no longer a crime against the state, travelling to or through the KNU-controlled areas meant contacting an illegal armed organisation and committing a serious crime. Thus, even though they were non-combatant and pure humanitarian and welfare-related activities, being involved in the undertakings of a KNU-managed or - affiliated community organisation meant collaborating with an outlawed armed

96 IMNA, “MWAF Collects Money and Forces Young Women to Join,” Independent Mon News Agency, April 3, 2007, accessed May 26, 2017, http://newsgroups.derkeiler.com/Archive/Soc/soc.culture.burma/2007-04/msg00062.html 97 A senior Karen community leader (Hpa-an), interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 98 The penalty increased from 10 years to 70 years imprisonment under Myanmar military tribunals during the harsh military rule.

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organisation and the risk of lengthy imprisonment. The few Karen social development organisations based in the government stronghold urban centres could not reach Karen communities in the conflict-affected areas to help develop community organisations. While some Karen community and religious leaders formed a few Karen NGOs in the government stronghold urban cities, their access to the war-affected Karen-populated areas remained limited. For instance, the Yangon-based KDN could not implement any of its development projects in the conflict-affected Karen areas until the KNU ceasefire.99

Likewise, although some Karen community leaders established a few Karen literature, cultural and religious-based community organisations under the auspices of the extraordinarily powerful Karen Buddhist head monks, especially U Viniya of Thamannya Monastery and U Pyinnya Tharmi of Taungalay Monastery,100 the reach of those organisations to the communities under civil war remained limited. Until after the KNU ceasefire, the Hpa-an-based Karen Literacy and Cultural Association (KLCA) could not provide its Karen literacy program beyond the government stronghold urban territory.101 Consequently, while the efforts of Karen civil society actors to build community participation in social welfare and development activities was operational in the KNU- controlled areas and within refugee communities, they largely lagged behind in the Karen- populated areas under the continued conflict. Perhaps because of the risks associated with humanitarian and welfare-related social development activities under the context of continued fighting, the relentless efforts of the KPMG and KDN failed to achieve adequate community participation in the conflict-affected Karen areas.102

Further, the efforts of some Karen armed factions that reached ceasefire agreement with the government military could not create enabling conditions for civil society to develop. In 2007, following its ceasefire agreement, the authorities of the KPC in a bid to establish similar CSOs to the two successful Kachin NGOs established after the ceasefire of KIO

99 A senior Karen community leader, interview by the author, January 18, 2017, Yangon. 100 See also South, “Burma’s Longest War: Anatomy of the Karen Conflict,” 26. 101 Saw Khin Maung Myint (former KLCA leader), interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Twon, Kayin State. 102 A prominent Karen community leader (Yangon), interview. See also South, Civil Society in Burma: The Development of Democracy Amidst Conflict, 28.

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tried hard to establish their own RONGO.103 The authorities of KPC attempted to gain support from UN agencies, INGOs, national NGOs and donor agencies operating inside the country.104 However, given the unstable security conditions resulting from the continued war in the adjacent KNU-contested areas, the hard work by the Yangon-based Karen civil society actors and members of the KPC did not yield any tangible results.105 While a few INGOs and local NGOs worked in a very low profile in the area, the RONRO of the ceasefire KPC was not able to be established.106

Moreover, the danger of contacting border-based and Thailand-based Karen NGOs and community organisations, regardless of whether they were KNU-affiliated or independent, remained seriously high, especially for high-profile organisations such as KRC and Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG). Likewise, it was extremely dangerous to contact Thailand-based international organisations and high-profile agencies such as the Office of the UN High Commisioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC).107 Those who had the courage to contact the RONROs of KNU and their affiliated organisations not only risked the danger of committing the crime of contacting an outlawed armed organisation, but also arrest, torture and extra-judiciary killing by the government military in the field. A civil society actor lamented that his travel through the KNU-controlled area in 2004 to a Thailand-based INGO for a short training and internship program saw him accused of contacting the outlawed KNU.108 These setbacks hindered not only material and financial resources, but also the technical skills and knowledge flows essential for fledgling civil society actors trying to offset needed services in Karen-populated areas inside the government strongholds.

Further, capacity drainage was also substantial in the Karen civil society sector. The continued fighting in the areas meant it was impossible for trained individuals to return

103 Core, “Burma/Myanmar: Challenges of a Ceasefire Accord in Karen State,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 28, no. 3 (2009): 101. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 Director of a local NGO (Hpa-an), interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 108 Ibid.

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to serve their populations beyond the KNU-controlled zones, as many had a relationship with members of the KNU in one way or another. The continued civil war effectively hindered those in the KNU-controlled areas or borderlands who worked with exiled groups, including the INGOs and UN agencies, from coming back to their communities under government control.109 Most capable civil society actors who had valuable skills and knowledge had very few options except to resettle in a third country far away from their home communities.110 According to an expert, almost 1000 trained locally appointed staff of the international community with invaluable knowledge, skills and expertise either could not return to their minority ethnic communities and over time, many resettled to a third country as asylum seekers.111 Similarly, a TBBC report also affirmed that in the late 2000s the Karen communities along the borderline lost at least 75 per cent of their most skilled and capable change agents.112

The Effects of Ceasefire on the Structure of Civil Society

6.5.1. Structure of civil society under civil war

In accordance with its precarious context, particularly the hostile conditions provoked by civil war, the structure of most civil society and community associations in both Karen and Mon communities was mostly centralised and top-down and opaque decision-making was a common feature. The organisational entity in both Karen and Mon societies was traditionally based on the heroic personalities of individual leaders, rather than the institutions that governed the society. The socio-political relationship and interactions in both Karen and Mon societies were conventionally status-based, in which age, wealth, education, occupation and position were the key determinants.113 Traditionally,

109 An official of an international peace organisation (a former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon; A country director of an INGO (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, January 21, 2017, Yangon. 110 A Karen journalist (a director of international media network), interview by the author, February 7, 2016, Yangon. 111 A director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. See also, Thailand Burma Border Consortium, TBBC Programme Report: January to June 2007 Including Funding Appeal (Mae Sot, Thailand: Thailand Burma Border Consortium, 2007), 28. 112 Thailand Burma Border Consortium, Programme Report 2011 (Bangkok, Thailand: Thailand Burma Border Consortium, 2011), 8. 113 Nai Layehtaw Suvannabhum (former NMSP leader), interview by the author, June 30, 2017, Canberra, Australia.

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hierarchical relations were a common feature in both Karen and Mon societies. Following the mode of armed insurgency in both societies since 1948, there were only a few who recognised the bottom-up, participatory organisational structure that is indispensable for civil society to take root and develop.114 Accordingly, the hierarchical relationship between the authoritative power of the leaders as patrons and the loyalty of the followers as clients was the entrenched organisational structure of independent associational life in both societies. Moreover, most social and political leaders in the legal entity or the armed struggle habitually tended to discourage followers from disagreement or proposing different opinions. At the same time, given that the power and authority was in the hands of one person as the leader, loyalty towards that leader became an essential requirement. Over the period, this personalised, top-down decision-making developed into an established characteristic of organisational structure in both Karen and Mon societies. For instance, although members of the executive committee of the MLCC were supposed to be elected bi-annually, the elections were rarely democratic.115 Patrons from high-profile intellectual, political and financial authorities were life-long executives of the associations. For example, even the annually elected members of the executive committees of the minority ethnic university students’ literature and culture committees were dominated by student activists who had a close connection with the armed groups, powerful elites, churches and monasteries. Only students who were supported by or, to be more accurate, selected by the seniors could be ceremoniously elected.116

At the same time, the military regime’s prohibition on independent social and political activities in the minority ethnic societies encouraged ethnic social mobilisation organisations with nationalist political agendas to operate under the guise of religious activities. Accordingly, religious leaders were continually dominated in social mobilisation movements that were the major form of traditional civil society in both Karen and Mon communities. Virtually all civil society actors including intellectual

114 A senior Karen community leader, interview by the author, January 18, 2017, Yangon. 115 A former MSP (Mon-1), interview by the author, January 28, 2017, Kyaikmaraw Town, Mon State. 116 Former leaders of university students’ MLCC (Yangon and Mawlamyine), in discussion with the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State; a senior patron of MLCC (Yangon), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. A former student leader, who became a political leader later even argued that it was necessary to maintain centralised control on the students’ associations while the nation was struggling against the chauvinist Bamar military dictatorship. a former MSP (Mon-1), interview by the author, January 28, 2017, Kyaikmaraw Town, Mon State.

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elites, business personnel and leaders of monastic- and church-based community groups inevitably had to function under the direct auspices and, thus, sole decisions of the religious leaders.117 In most Mon rural communities, the decisions made by powerful patrons were mostly final and all the hand-picked executives and members had to implement what they were instructed. For most of the village welfare and youth groups that formed under the patronage of influential religious leaders, members were only allowed to follow the dictates of the patrons. For instance, most of the politicians, young monks, business personnel, and youths in Lamine village in the previously NMSP- contested area abided by the dictates of the head monk of Rahmannya Nikarya Mon Pariyatti Monastery in their village political, social, and business affairs.118

Similarly, in some rural Karen communities many of the initiatives among both Christian and Buddhist Karen networks relied on the patronage and authority of the influential religious leaders. For example, the Taungkalay Abbot, with his personal charisma and influence on the community and local government authorities, mobilised local Karen communities around Karen literature and cultural activities. He also managed some livelihood assistance projects, especially small-scale agricultural development and a few other projects.119 At the onset of the Myanmar democratic liberalisation in 2010, the powerful abbot also played a decisive role in the formation of the only independent indigenous Karen political party, Palon-Swaw Democratic Party (PSDP).120 Similarly, with the material and spiritual resources provided by the international Christian community, the Karen Baptist Convention, a religious network with an agenda of enhancing Karen nationalism and Protestant Christianity, was the patronage body mobilising Karen civil society groups in the borderland.121

117 Former leaders of university students’ MLCC (Yangon and Mawlamyine), interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. However, the patrons might consult or take suggestions from some highly respected intellectuals or high-ranking state officials. Ibid. 118 Many even followed instructions from the abbot to join NMSP as combatants. Village elders and community leaders, in discussion with the author, February 24, 2016, Lamine Town, Mon State. 119 A director of a Strategic Study Institute (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 120 Ibid; a leader of Karen political party, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Twon, Kayin State. 121 Horstmann, “Sacred Spaces of Karen Refugees and Humanitarian Aid across the Thailand–Burma Border,” 267.

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Moreover, as with the other minority ethnic armed groups in Myanmar, the political structure of KNU and NMSP were characteristically top-down. Although both armed parties claimed to be ethno-nationalist organisations fighting for a wider political autonomy and democracy, especially after the 1988 countrywide pro-democracy uprising, the armed parties were hardly democratic in structure and practice. Moreover, the nationalist leaders and cadres of both KNU and NMSP were, by default, more accustomed to the top-down organisational hierarchy. Accordingly, it was obvious that, under the patronage of such a centralised, top-down organisational structure, there was very little space for an independent civil society to arise that promoted pluralism and practiced democratic, participatory decision-making. By arguing that unity was essential while fighting against the chauvinistic, authoritarian Bamar regime, both KNU and NMSP tended to discourage diverse opinions from below. Consequently, when the EAOs initiated the formation of various civil society-like organisations and their affiliated groups to engage in the humanitarian and social development activities of the international aid agencies, virtually all the organisations were not independent, democratic, or participatory in their organisational structure and practice. For instance, although MWO122 operated with the financial and technical support of the international community, it was initiated, protected and directly managed by a dominant faction of the executive body of NMSP. Until after the ceasefire, decision-making and staffing in MWO were hardly democratic, participatory and equal.123 Further, since the leadership of these organisations had a close relationship with an elite faction of the EAOs, they did not appreciate or exercise the bottom-up, participatory decision-making practices. Until after the ceasefire, as was common in most state sectors, governance of the RONROs was perceptibly poor and exploitative practices prevailed in the organisations.

122 To organise the increasing number of female family members of the party and refugees into the organisation structure of party, the Central Executive Committee of NMSP established MWO as a female combat unit in 1984, although the platoon was not supposed to be in a battle. Mi Condel Mon (Vice Commander of MNLA Women Unit), interview by the author, November 25, 2017, Canberra, Australia. To provide more effective assistance to the refugees and meet the necessary criteria of the internal aid agencies, the party reformed MWO into a civil society-like organisation under its close control in 1994. Mi Kun Chan Non (a leader of MWO), interview. 123 Ibid.

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6.5.2. The changes in the structure of civil society in the Mon community after the NMSP ceasefire

As security improved and restrictions to access the ceasefire zones and beyond gradually eased, the donor and international humanitarian and development agencies started to reach their project areas and provide closer facilitation, as well as supervision. After the ceasefire, officials from TBBC could come and go within hours from their base offices on the Thai side of the border to the Mon refugee camps and some IDP enclaves inside the NMSP-controlled areas and beyond.124 This improvement in accessibility for the international community helped and, at the same time, obliged the departmental agencies of NMSP and its affiliated RONROs to improve their organisational structure and turn their decision-making process into one that was democratic and participatory.125 Further, since armed conflict in the area ceased, the elites at the top levels could no longer give any reason for the continuation of the established practice of secrecy and personalised decision-making.

Post-conflict, more secure travel and communication to the NMSP-controlled areas and the borderland enabled the formation of new independent indigenous community groups that were more democratic in their organisational structure and decision-making practices, though most of the organisations were still affiliated to NMSP. Most of the projects and programs activities of NMSP and its associated RONROs were funded and supervised by the UN and international aid agencies, thus, the implementing community organisations at the grassroots level received exposure and improved their awareness and knowledge on the democratic, participatory organisational structure.126 Through the facilitation and, at the same time, obligations of the agencies of the international aid community, many Mon community organisations adapted to the new models of organisational structure and practice. Gradually, the increase in awareness of the civil society actors obliged Mon civil associational life to adapt to more democratic and participatory forms of organisational structure. Hence, although it was modest, the decision-making process of many Mon CSOs including those under the control of NMSP

124 Nai Kasouh Mon (a leader of a Mon development NGO, border based), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine. 125 Ibid; Mi Kun Chan Non (a leader of MWO), interview. 126 Ibid.

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gradually changed from the traditional top-down, personalised decision-making to a form of democratic, participatory decision-making.

Moreover, as Mon civil society actors, technical experts, and community groups with international exposure could communicate, collaborate and interact with each other with fewer restrictions, they could help to improve the organisational structure of each other to become pluralistic and participatory. Following the ceasefire, some individual experts and organisations that engaged in Mon education including the MNED of NMSP, exiles from abroad, local religious bodies and the grassroot communities were able to become involved in the Mon national education system of NMSP.127 Over the years, with the knowledge and values the individuals and groups brought from within the Mon community and abroad, as well as an obligation from the beneficiary communities and the donor agencies, the educational authorities of NMSP opened up space for the other actors to participate. After one-and-a-half years of the ceasefire in 1997, the party initiated the formation of the MNEC in which all the education actors participated, including its education wing MNED, individual experts from inside and abroad and representatives of religious bodies and the local communities.128 Although the education authorities of NMSP still took the leading positions in MNEC, the process of decision-making in the organisation became participatory to some extent.129 This improvement in the organisational structure encouraged the creative and independent thinking of the actors and opportunities for democratic and participatory decision-making in MNEC. Many community-level organisations involving in Mon national education had, for the first time, a chance to raise their voice. Like the improvement that took place in the organisational structure of the MNEC, the practice of staffing on a loyalty basis in a significant part of the Mon civil society entity was gradually replaced by merit-based appointments. For instance, the staffing policy in HURFOM became one that was based

127 Mi Sar Dar (head of Education Department of NMSP), interviewed by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Min Aung Zay (a leader of MNEC), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Mi Kun Chan Non (a leader of MWO), interview. 128 Mi Sar Dar (head of Education Department of NMSP), interview. 129 Nai Win Hla (member of CEC, NMSP), interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Min Aung Zay (a leader of MNEC), interview.

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on meritocratic posting and the advancement of staff has become an organisational characteristic of the previously NMSP-controlled humanitarian organisation.130

Further, the ceasefire enabled Mon CSOs to interact, cooperate and standardise the services they delivered to the population. For example, most of the teachers in the summer Mon language programs were university students, monks and local youth volunteers from different areas. In the early years, they used different curricula and teaching methods.131 However, the key actors involved in the program became aware of the issue and attempted to establish a standardised curriculum, teaching method and teacher training.132 With the ceasefire in place, the relevant authorities and experts from the education department of NMSP, those in exile, border-based and groups in the government-controlled areas could come together and standardise the informal Mon education services.133 After a period of interaction, members of the consortium produced standardised the curricula to use in all the summer Mon literacy programs across the Mon-populated areas. In 1997, the leaders of MLCC, head monks, education experts from the border-based INGOs and MNEC came together and formed the Mon Summer Literacy and Buddhist Culture Association as a central management body of the program.134

Equally important, the improvement in security and the government’s political recognition of NMSP also helped some Mon CSOs, including the social movement organisations, to become more pluralist and democratic in their organisational structure. For instance, due to personal security and financial needs, throughout the civil war the wealthy and well-connected senior elites from the urban centres dominated the leading body of the Mon National Day celebration committee.135 However, as the post-civil war Mon National Day ceremony became a formal national event, from 1997 the executive body for the event progressively transformed from the traditional control of the prominent elite hierarchy to an elected body, through secret voting in the annual mass meeting of

130 Nai Kasouh Mon (a leader of a Mon development NGO, border based), interview. 131 Nai Mon Rae Jae (a senior leader of a Mon summer literacy program), interview. 132 Ibid. 133 Ibid. 134 Ibid. 135 Nai Soe Aung (chairperson of MLCC-Yangon), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon.

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representatives of all the townships across Mon-populated areas.136 Similarly, although there was invisible control by a few powerful political, social and religious elites, most of the MLCCs and the Trustees of many major Mon Community Houses (Hzorb Sabangdhao) in Mon-populated areas began to follow meaningful election cycles and reformed into more participatory community-based organisations.137

6.5.3. Civil society structure in Karen communities during 1995–2010

Although the continued civil war brought about opportunities to improve the organisational structure of the Karen civil society entity, unlike in the case of the ceasefire Mon society, the war efficaciously obstructed meaningful changes from taking place in the realm of Karen civil society. Despite the efforts of the international community organisations and individual experts to help improve the organisational structure of the line agencies of KNU, its RONROs and their affiliated community organisations, they failed to bring about tangible results. Until recent years since the KNU ceasefire, the organisational structure of almost all the Karen CSOs operating in the continued civil war-affected areas remained hierarchical and centralised and personalised, top-down decision-making endured.138 Patron–client relationships and staffing also continued to dominate in many Karen civil society organisation until recently.139 Moreover, given the insecure conditions and resulting limited organisation capacity and restricted access to financial and technical resources, the Karen CSOs operating in the borderland and across areas under the KNU control had to operate under the dictates of Karen armed groups.

Conversely, although the Karen armed groups claimed to be struggling for the national self-determination and democratic rights of the Karen people, socio-political life in the rebel-controlled areas was hardly democratic.140 The Karen armed organisation was characterised by a top-down political structure and political dissent or criticism from the

136 Dr Min Nwe Soe (former chairperson of MLCC-Central), interview; Nai Soe Kyi (a senior leader of MLCC-Yangon), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 137 Ibid. 138 A director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State; An official of an international peace organisation (a former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 139 Ibid. 140 See, for example South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict.

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lower levels was rarely encouraged. The leaders tended to discourage different opinions and often suppressed innovative socio-political initiatives that came from below.141 Accordingly, most CSOs in the rebel-controlled areas remained under the direct control, and were affiliations of, the state-like armed rebel authorities. Since KNU held a firm control over its base areas and had easy access to the contested areas, it was challenging for an independent civil association to become established in the areas. Consequently, the community and welfare organisations that developed amid continued fighting more often followed the traditional existing autocratic structure of organisation. Many organisations that replicated the hierarchical organisational structure rarely encouraged pluralism or tolerated dissents. For example, although it mainly operated with the technical and financial support of the Thai-Myanmar border-based INGOs and donor agencies, the KRC remained under the direct management of KNU until the ceasefire.142 South even equates aspects of social life in the rebel-based areas with that of the pre-colonial feudal “top-down tributary political system”.143

Meanwhile, unlike in the ceasefire Mon-populated areas, the military regime strictly prohibited UN agencies and international humanitarian and development organisations from entering the conflict-affected Karen areas and the IDP hideouts, as well as the communities under government strongholds. Until after the ceasefire of KNU in 2012, there were no UN agencies or INGO based in Kayin State. With limited access to the government stronghold and areas under the continued armed conflict, the international community could not help improve the organisational structure of the RONROs of KNU or their affiliated organisations. Nor could the few UN and international aid agencies that operated inside the government-controlled areas help the structural reform of Karen religious and community organisations located inside the government stronghold urban centres to become more autonomous and participatory. The KRC and Karen Women Organisation were the few Karen RONROs that retained a patron–client, top-down

141 Although most leaders frequently quote the advantages of leftist criticism and self-criticism practice, even constructive criticism from the lower levels was perceived as a challenge. A senior Karen community leader, interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State; A director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 142 Ibid. 143 Ashley South, “Political Transition in Myanmar: A New Model for Democratization,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 2 (2004): 244.

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organisational structure, although the organisations recently became more independent and democratic in their decision-making.144

Likewise, as the civil society entities in many Karen communities in government stronghold urban centres constantly required the protection and support of powerful religious and prominent community leaders, the traditional top-down, patron–client relationship continued as the typical organisational structure. Many Karen communities in both urban and rural Karen-populated areas had long been operating under the leadership and guidelines of such respective religious and community leaders. Accordingly, most Karen CSOs and groups of community networks in the government stronghold operated under the patronage and protection of the Karen Buddhist monasteries, Christian churches and senior politicians or high-ranking government officials both retired and in service.145 The Taungalay monastery ran some agriculture development projects with the exemption of government permission, mainly due to the personal fame and influence of the abbot. Moreover, the famous Karen Abbot also possessed sufficient influence on military authorities to protect and fund the activities of the KLCA in Hpa-an and neighbouring villages. Similarly, under the auspices of the Archbishop Andrew Mya Han of the Anglican Church in Mawlamyine, some Karen Christian groups were able to engage in welfare and community development activities. Likewise, U Htun Aung Chein, a retired Director of Myanmar Historical Commission, a department highly favoured by the highest-level military authorities, played a vital role in convening the first Karen Forum on Development in 2002 in Hpa-an that led to the establishment of the KDN.146

Unlike in the ceasefire Mon-populated areas, Karen organisations could barely operate beyond the designated base areas demarcated by the changing war outcomes between the KNLA, government military and the non-KNU Karen armed splinter groups. In practice, although KNU line agencies and RONROs had long been providing relief assistance and basic humanitarian needs in the KNU stronghold areas, they hardly reached the Karen-

144 A director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 145 South, “Burma’s Longest War: Anatomy of the Karen Conflict,” 25. 146 A prominent Karen community leader (Yangon), interview by the author, January 18, 2017, Yangon; see also Civil Society in Burma: The Development of Democracy Amidst Conflict, 27–28.

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populated areas beyond the influence of KNLA troops. For instance, although hundreds of the border-based Karen back pack medic teams roamed around the thick tropical jungles providing essential health assistance, reaching out to the Karen communities in the KNLA-contested or government-controlled areas often cost their lives or brought trouble to the recipient families.147 Similarly, Karen sociocultural and religious groups could not reach the devastated Karen population that remained in the continued war zones from their bases in government stronghold urban centres. Such limited connections and communication significantly obstructed knowledge, skills and the financial flow from the border-based international aid industry to the Karen civil society entities. This obstruction hampered the emergence and revitalisation of an autonomous Karen civil society with a democratic, participatory organisational structure. Consequently, unlike in the communities in Mon ceasefire areas, the RONROs of KNU failed to transform into autonomous CSOs. Although claiming to be an independent organisation, the KHRG was founded by the KNU in 1992 and operated under the direct control of the armed organisation.148 Thus, KHRG could not stand as a self-governing organisation until after the KNU ceasefire.

The Effects of Ceasefire on the Value Esteemed by Civil Society

6.6.1. Value esteemed by civil society under the civil war

In the beginning, both Karen and Mon ethnic organisations in the form of social mobilisation organisations mainly focused on minority ethnic identity-oriented activities, although they were not political parties. Most Karen and Mon social mobilisation organisations established during and after the country’s independence struggle tried to serve their relevant ethnic population through political advocacy for minority ethnic rights. For example, since the early colonial time, Karen educated elites founded several Karen organisations, including the KNA (established in 1881), KCO (established in 1943) and several others.149 Similarly, the Mon educated elites and state civil servants founded

147 Back Pack Health Worker Team, Chronic Emergency, 22 and Yeni, “The Backpacker Medics,” The Irrawaddy Online 14, no. 11, November, 2006, accessed April 24, 2016, http://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=6403 148 A high-level KNU leader, interview by the author, January 22, 2017, Yangon. 149 Thawnghmung, The Karen Revolution in Burma: Diverse Voices, Uncertain Ends.

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the ARMA (established in 1939) and the MNA (founded in 1948). However, the organisational aims of KNA, KCO, Karen Youth Organisation (KYO) and many other Karen social organisations were mainly for the identity-based political and cultural rights of the Karen people.150 Similarly, while the principal objective of ARMA was the promotion of Mon literature and culture,151 for the MNA it was achieving identity-based ethnic political rights.152 These Mon and Karen social mobilisation organisations played essential roles in the search for ethnic identity and were the derivational associations that led to the armed revolutions in the aftermath of the country’s independence. KNA played a decisive role in making a case for a Karen sovereign state and the formation of the KNU.153 Equally, although it focused only on literacy and cultural preservation and promotion, the ARMA unintentionally nurtured the social and political leadership of the Mon that charged into the armed revolution after seven months of the country’s independence in July 1948.154

Moreover, even under the incessant suppression of Myanmar military regimes during the all-out civil war, the remaining Karen and Mon civil society entities continued to focus on the minority ethnic, political and cultural rights and constantly invigorated their respective armed resistant movements. After the government’s annihilation of independent associational lives in Karen- and Mon-populated areas in the early 1950s, most of the Karen and Mon social mobilisation organisations with a political agenda discretely operated under the guise of religious bodies and were seemingly committed to only religious activities such as pagoda and monastery servicing works. A few organisations were also involved in member-based local community reciprocal aid societies, such as village funeral associations and marriage funds for young singles to provide insurance-like self-help funds to contribute to the cost of funeral and marriage. Paradoxically, it was through these affiliations of the Christian churches and Buddhist monasteries that Karen and Mon civil society actors implemented their hidden national political agenda. Although the organisations functioned within limited geographical

150 South, “Governance and Legitimacy in Karen State”. 151 South, Mon Nationalism and Civil War in Burma: The Golden Sheldrake. 152 Nai Layehtaw Suvannabhum (former NMSP leader), interview by the author, June 30, 2017, Canberra, Australia. 153 South, “Burma’s Longest War: Anatomy of the Karen Conflict”. 154 Nai Layehtaw Suvannabhum (former NMSP leader), interview; Nai Pe Thein Hzil (former NMSP leader), interview.

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areas, some were pursuing their political aims under the guise of religious and cultural activities. Throughout the civil war, these seemingly religious-based local associations served as the medium of communication between the ethnic armed groups and the intellectuals, elites and student activists living in the government-controlled areas. The organisations were also the primary source of new recruits for the ethnic armed groups, as well as for information and material support. For instance, most educated and student activists of the NMSP were brought up in Yangon and Mawlamyine University literature and culture networks and recruited through a network of Buddhist monasteries sprawling from Yangon through Mawlamyine to the rebel-contested Ye Town.155

Similarly, several Karen Baptist, Anglican and Catholic churches in the cities in the central low land of the country and their local congregations through the networks of church-based and community associations also played an essential role in the Karen armed resistance movement.156 It was the members of the government recognised Karen Literature and Culture Committee of the students attending universities in the capital Yangon that mobilised and built the political capacity of prospective young leaders for the KNU.157 In addition, another entity in which Karen and Mon civil society actors were engaged was the minority ethnic identity-oriented national Karen New Year Day and Mon National Day ceremonies that were celebrated for a few days every year. As with other minority ethnic nationalities, Karen and Mon community groups have long celebrated Karen New Year Day and Mon National Day in the capital Yangon and in some government stronghold Karen and Mon areas as well as in the liberated lands of the KNU and NMSP (excluding the highly contested areas). In such minority ethnic identity-related events, all the political, social, religious and student and youth groups would come together and mobilise the populations in various forms including door-to-door elucidation and months of fundraising.158

155 Min Aung Mon, Min Win Htut, Min Lay Naing, and Min Pan Aung (former leaders of university students’ MLCC, Yangon and Mawlamyine), interview. 156 A senior Karen community leader, interview by the author, January 18, 2017, Yangon. 157 Ibid. 158 Although the BSPP government allowed minority ethnic communities to celebrate this identity- related event after it gained control of the urban minority ethnic areas, under the decree of the post- 1988 military regime that prohibited any groups of five or more, all such events were terminated across the government-controlled areas for years.

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The regime’s ban on civil society actually diverted the proliferation of civil society-like organisations into apparently religious and domestic self-help welfare societies that engaged in social and political activities whenever the situation allowed. Throughout the oppressive military rule, both Mon and Karen CSOs limited their activities to spiritual and domestic social welfare such as a pagoda, monastic and church services, reciprocal funeral aid and marriage funds. Most of the Mon social mobilisation organisations also discretely continued under the guise of religious activities and ceremonies such as annual Buddhist ceremonial days, annual Buddhist examinations for novices and monks, building or repairing pagodas and funerals of famous monks in the rural Mon-populated areas.

While they mostly engaged in low-profile social movement activities under the guise of religion, at times the social associations were also involved in political and emergency relief activities against the prohibition of the ruling regimes. It was those social mobilisation organisations that joined the student protesters and coordinated the activities of numerous groups during the countrywide pro-democracy uprising in the rainy season of 1988. Likewise, it was the ward and village alms-offering associations to the Buddhist monks that supported the monks’ Saffron Revolution in 2007. Moreover, it was the hundreds of associations and groups voluntarily formed by citizens in the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis that provided food, water and other basic human needs for the survival of victims in 2008.

Throughout the prolonged civil war, some local social mobilisation-oriented associations survived in the war-affected Karen and Mon communities, although only the network of Mon university students was functional under the watchful eyes of government authorities. In addition, although they had to become dormant from time to time, the monastery and church-based organisations and some traditional village and ward-based self-help associations remained functional in the war-affected Karen and Mon-populated areas. Until the ceasefire of NMSP, virtually none of the social mobilisation organisations or community organisations engaged in activities such as advocacy, social capital building, community development, social service delivery and other functions of civil society in the Western liberal sense.

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6.6.2. Value esteemed in Mon civil society after the NMSP ceasefire

The post-civil war changes that took place in the context for civil society had significant effects on the value that was esteemed by the evolving realm of Mon civil society. The post-conflict improvement in the context opened the opportunity for the emergence of new and revitalised Mon social and political organisations with better democratic structures and participatory decision-making practices. Some cross-border Mon relief and community development organisations emerged from the refugee and local communities, although they were mostly associated with NMSP.159 While continuing their emergency relief programs and essential social service delivery in the NMSP-controlled areas, the Mon social and communal organisations and their growing networks began their independent social welfare and community development activities.160 This development of independent and semi-independent civil society associations in the NMSP-controlled and across the border areas, over time inadvertently began to throw down the gauntlet to the long-standing local legitimacy of NMSP. As a result, the NMSP and its departmental and affiliated organisations that were mainly engaged in the struggle for ethnic nationality rights, gradually became aware of the importance of human rights-related issues and social and communal development. After a few years of the ceasefire, MWO, together with its broad local networks, was successful in rebuilding trust with the communities and mobilised community participation in social welfare and development activities.161 The organisation productively expanded some of its independent social welfare and community development projects, such as income generation, credit union, adult literacy, maternal and child care beyond NMSP-controlled Mon-populated areas.162 With the active participation of the host village communities, MWO also established early child care centres and credit unions in many Mon villages in the government stronghold areas.163

159 Nai Kasouh Mon (a leader of a Mon development NGO, border-based), interview. 160 Ibid; Mi Kun Chan Non (a leader of MWO), interview. 161 Based on its Mon Women Combat Unit, NMSP reformed the MWO and it was recognised as an important branch of the party in 1994. Min Kon Chan Non, interview. 162 Ibid. 163 Ibid.

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At the same time, several local Mon NGOs and CBOs were unobtrusively working on projects related to welfare and community development in the areas with the financial and technical support of national and international aid and development agencies.164 Since the ceasefire, many Mon villages including those emerging from the armed conflict and those that remained under government control, saw an increase in civil society activities. A few years after the NMSP ceasefire began, education, health and social welfare were common areas in which many Mon CSOs engaged.165 There were also a few organisations that focused on women’s rights and land rights.166 Until the semi-civilian government instated the democratic liberalisation process, only a few focused on conflict resolution and civic education activities.167

Over the years, the increase in interaction and communication in Mon civil society entities helped local-based, nascent Mon community associations develop into fully-fledged NGOs providing social services to the Mon population in both the government-controlled and NMSP ceasefire areas. Because the ceasefire was in place, the military regime tolerated the emerging Mon welfare and social service providing organisations even in the government-administered ceasefire areas. Some Mon rights-based organisations documented and reported from their border-based camps on rights violations, such as arbitrary arrests, tortures, extra-judiciary killing, forced labouring, arbitrary taxation, and land confiscation. They reformed as local NGOs and CBOs and started engaging in welfare and community development activities beyond the borderland and refugee camps. For example, Magadu Foundation, a border-based affiliated organisation of HURFOM that focused on land rights, reformed into a local NGO and began providing livelihood support training such as farmer field schools in some Mon villages.168 Although these newly formed border-based Mon CSOs required the approval and protection of NMSP, the targeted beneficiary of their welfare and development projects increasingly shifted to those civilian populations that were not involved in the armed struggle. Moreover, the

164 Min Aung Htoo (a leader of Mon State CSO Network), interview by the author, February 16, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 165 Ibid. 166 Nai Kasouh Mon (a leader of a Mon development NGO, border-based), interview. 167 Min Min Nwe (former MSDN director), interview. 168 Nai Kasouh Mon (a leader of a Mon development NGO, border-based), interview.

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ceasefire also rehabilitated some ex-combatants of the MNLA into change agents engaging in community development or welfare works. Over the years, through training and exposure inside the country and abroad, some ex-combatants have voluntarily converted and integrated into the emerging Mon CSOs.169 Moreover, as many reconnected with their former colleagues who were engaged in social mobilisation organisations and newly formed social development organisations, such as MLCC, MSDN, MWO, and MNEC, some ex-combatants of the MNLA were comfortable about integration into the social welfare and development works of the organisations.170

Further, some community-based self-help groups in various Mon communities also expanded in both the scope and area coverage of their activities and, eventually took shape as fully-fledged NGOs. For instance, the Mon Cetanar Foundation (MCF) (literally the Mon altruism foundation) was founded under the auspices of the head monk of Dhatumarlar Monastery in Mawlamyine that provided Mon language literacy services to a limited community became a fully functioning independent NGO in 1998.171 Since the executive members of the organisation were known to their counterparts in the border- based organisations, such as the MWO and the Mon Youth Progressive Organisation (MYPO), the cessation of war hostilities encouraged collaboration between the organisations. In a few years, MCF became a fully-fledged NGO in the heart of the government stronghold capital city of Mon State.172

Moreover, after the NMSP ceasefire, even Mon Christian churches and communities became increasingly involved in social service provision and community development in Mon communities emerging from the civil war. Although they had a very limited space in the majority Buddhist Mon society, Mon Christian churches were active in promoting the idea and values of civil society through their training programs and humanitarian and social development projects.173 The churches also devoted significant resources to education, community development projects and social welfare activities in the conflict-

169 Min Min Nwe (former director of MSDN), interview. 170 Ibid. 171 A leading founder of MCF, interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 172 Ibid. 173 Rev. Aung Gyi, interview by the author, February 19, 2016, Thanbyuzayart, Mon State.

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affected Mon areas. Meanwhile, through the network of international Christian groups, some Mon church leaders attended religious pastoral meetings and participated in study trips abroad.174 At the same time, through newly available international pastoral training, scholarship and internship programs, some Mon Christians had the opportunity to study the community welfare and development activities of the international Christian organisations.175 This training and exposure helped to overcome capacity constraints and skill shortages and increased the effectiveness of the welfare-related and social development activities of the Christian church networks in Mon-populated areas. Since the cessation of war atrocities in the areas, the Mon Baptist Church Union and affiliated church-based organisations were actively engaged in welfare and basic social service provisions such as health, education, water and sanitation.176 Further, with the support of their international contacts, the churches later started providing social services and community development training to prospective local social actors, especially the youth and women, in Mon towns and villages, some of which were under NMSP control.177 In the following years of NMSP ceasefire, as its affiliated organisations began to reach the population in the war-affected villages, the Baptist Church in Thanbyuzayart launched a church-based microfinance program that was also open to non-Christians.178

Additionally, some social mobilisation organisations that had survived suppression by military regimes maintained their social mobilisation activities and progressed into discrete forms of political organisations. Over the years, there was gradual progress in the realm of civil society in Mon-populated areas in the forms of indigenous voluntary organisations engaging in humanitarian, welfare and social development activities, as well as identity-oriented ethnic-nationalist movements, although these were essentially low profile.179

174 Ibid. 175 Ibid. 176 A training manager of KDN (Mawlamyine), interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 177 Rev. Aung Gyi, interview. 178 Ibid. 179 Although among the scholars who are critical of the ceasefire, Ashley South and Kim Jolliffe also agree that ceasefire creates space for Myanmar civil society and they recognise the re-emergence of civil society and networks in the minority ethnic communities. See South, Ethnic Politics in Burma:

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In the meantime, although they faced various restrictions in accessing the needy communities emerging from the armed conflict, the UN and international humanitarian agencies played an important role in the re-emergence and development of CSOs in Mon- populated areas. After the ceasefire of NMSP, a few UN agencies and international NGOs working in the government stronghold areas in Mon State started assisting some displaced and vulnerable populations in the previously conflict-affected Mon areas. However, as the government military continued to obstruct such international intervention, the UN and international NGOs were required to take a low profile and provided assistance through local community organisations under the occasional supervision of their nationally appointed staff.

Ironically, the regime’s restrictions on the donor agencies and organisations of the international community unintentionally created conditions for a boom of local NGOs and community organisations in the ceasefire Mon areas. There was growing demand for local NGOs and CBOs as indigenous implementation partners of the international agencies. This post-civil war exogenous intervention reinforced the emergence of independent Mon CSOs that focused on social welfare and community development, rather than their accustomed ethno-nationalist-oriented activities. Together with occasional humanitarian relief supplies, WHO, UNICEF, and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) started education, health care and other community-based development activities in some Mon villages that were beyond government control.180 Some international governmental and NGOs also facilitated and helped to increase the organisational capacity of many indigenous Mon community associations in the areas.181 In addition, after emphasising humanitarian and development issues for a few years, some international organisations started providing training courses in politics such as conflict resolution, civic empowerment, organisation building, and democratisation.182

States of Conflict, xiii–xiv; Kim Jolliffe, “Ethnic Conflict and Social Services in Myanmar's Contested Regions” (Yangon: The Asia Foundation, 2014). 180 Dr Min Nwe Soe (former director of Mon State Health Department), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 181 Steinberg, Burma: The State of Myanmar, 115–20. 182 Min Min Nwe, (a former director of MSDN), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State.

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In the early 2000s, as the NMSP ceasefire held, a few embassies of Western democracies in Yangon, especially the US and the UK expanded their capacity building programs to the mid-career potential ethnic leaders from the ceasefire areas. The American Centre and British Council in Yangon had been providing such personal capacity building programs aimed at providing political and personal leadership development training to central level officials of the NLD since the late 1990s. A few mid-career political and community leaders with potential from both NMSP- and government-controlled Mon-populated areas also had the opportunity to receive political and personal development training both nationally and abroad. The international training and exposure had significant effects on local social movement organisations and community welfare associations in the war-torn Mon communities.183 With the facilitated experience, sharing and dissemination of trained young leaders, some fledgling social associations began reorienting the focus areas of their organisations, while a few groups engaged in political mobilisation activities such as capacity building, civic empowerment and political networking.184 In 2006, the LAMYO, with its trained leaders and support from both the Yangon-based INGOs and the border-based RONROs of the NMSP, launched social development and civic empowerment training in several towns and villages across Mon-populated areas.185 In the following years, the group successfully retrieved dormant youth groups in the cities and towns of Mon-populated areas and, in 2007, established the first and largest Mon youth network across the Mon-populated areas.186

6.6.3. Value esteemed in Karen civil society during 1995–2010

While there was some progress in the Karen civil society sector in a few urban centres that were accessible to some Karen communities, it was incarcerated in the government stronghold urban cities outside the conflict-affected Karen communities. Social development was ominously depressing inside the majority Karen-populated areas. Until the ceasefire of KNU, only a few Karen CSOs were operational in Karen communities in

183 Min Latt, (a training recipient of American Centre), interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Thanbyuzayart, Mon State 184 Min Min New, interview. 185 Ibid. 186 Ibid; Min Htay Naing, a leader of LAMYO, interviewed by the author, February 18, 2016, Mudon, Mon State.

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the government-controlled urban centres. As an outcome of the relentless efforts of the KPMG, the number of Karen NGOs and community organisations increased and some Karen civil society networks were established in the late 1990s. The Karen Women’s Action Group and the Rising Sun youth group were a few examples.187 In 2004, following the expansion of KDC into KDN, a branch office was established in Hpa-an.188 Moreover, as a few local NGOs working on peacebuilding actives were able to operate in some government stronghold areas in Kayin State, they also helped to develop some Karen social mobilisation organisations to engage in welfare and development activities.189 For instance, under its Peace Fellows Program, Shalom Family successfully helped the Hpa- an-based KLCC become involved in social welfare and community development activities, including some livelihood and education projects.190 Following this, the KLCC became an implementation partner of the SF in Kayin State.191

However, until the ceasefire of the KNU, this development remained limited in the Karen civil society sector in conflict-affected Karen-populated areas. Although the networking and capacity training activities of the KDN expanded to the capital cities of other ethnic states, including Myitkyina (Kachin State), Lashio (Shan State), and Mawlamyine (Mon State), the reach of the organisation was constrained in the urban propers of a few government stronghold towns with sizable Karen population, such as Hpa-an and Toungoo.192 Because the situation was precarious for the trained community leaders to implement social welfare and community development projects in the conflict-affected rural Karen areas, KDC was unable to flesh out its development management training programs to the grassroots Karen communities.193 Similarly, although it was successful in urban centres such as Yangon and Pathein, the mobile Kwe Ka Baw Clinic could not

187 Dr Naw Rebecca Htin, a senior Karen community leader (Yangon), interview by the author, January 18, 2017, Yangon; a senior Karen community leader, interview by the author, January 18, 2017, Yangon. 188 Ibid. 189 A training manager of KDN (Mawlamyine), interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 190 Nang Raw, director of Shalom Foundation, interview by the author, January 19, 2017, Yangon. 191 Ibid. 192 A senior Karen community leader, interview by the author, January 18, 2017, Yangon. 193 Ibid.

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reach the conflict-affected Karen areas.194 Moreover, although these nationally-based NGOs could provide personal development and capacity building programs to the potential community leaders from war-affected areas, the security condition hindered organisations from pervading conflict-affected communities on the ground. For instance, the community leadership program of the SF was unable to implement its flagship program ‘Community Reflection’ in virtually all the targeted areas and was effectively confined to the town proper of Pa-an until recently.195

Other Karen religious-based voluntary organisations were also involved in social welfare and community development activities. Similar to the summer Mon literacy program, the Hpa-an-based KLCA implemented a summer literacy campaign in some villages around the state capital city and towns under government military stronghold, although it was under the auspice of the influential Taungalay Abbot.196 However, as security in the areas was unstable for years, some Karen community groups could not fully implement their programs.197 The Taungalay Monastery was also running some agricultural development projects that were exempt from government permission and the personal fame of the abbot was adequate to protect and fund the activities of the KLCA in Hpa-an and the neighbouring villages.198 Likewise, some Karen-dominated Christian churches and their affiliated community organisations were engaged in providing welfare services and community development activities to the Karen communities under the government stronghold areas, although they kept a low profile.199

Ironically, although civil war in Karen-populated areas continued, the war conditions did not obstruct changes in value in most Karen civil society entities. The relentlessly deteriorating humanitarian situation across all conflict-affected Karen areas, the continuous efforts of international humanitarian and development agencies and aid flow

194 Dr Naw Rebecca Htin, Director of Kwe Ka Baw Hospital, interview by the author, January 18, 2017, Yangon. 195 Nang Raw, director of Shalom Foundation, interview. 196 Saw Khin Maung Myint (former leader of KLCA), interview. 197 Ibid. 198 A director of a Strategic Study Institute (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 199 A director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State.

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could be the driving forces. Numerous border-based international humanitarian and development agencies gained direct access to some Karen CSOs in the borderland and inside KNU liberated areas.200 As fighting intensified and the refugee issues at the Myanmar-Thai borderland became increasingly internationalised and the refugee committees under the direct control of the KNU elite factions faced pressure to be more responsive to the needs of the refugees.201 As South points out, the international community developed a principle to implement programs and projects in partnership with the affected communities and encourage local participation in their projects and programs.202 Consequently, many KNU line agencies and RONROs as well as community organisations of the refugees and IDPs that were under the direct control of KNU or had an extent of autonomy became increasingly responsive to the needs of the populations they claimed to represent.203

Meanwhile, the primary focus of UN agencies, especially UNHCR and UNICEF, and many INGOs was to provide emergency relief and humanitarian assistance including food, shelter, and health care.204 Whenever possible, the international aid agencies also tried to offer development assistance and social services, particularly education and health, to the victims of the ongoing civil war. In addition to their service provisions, many international organisations that provided humanitarian and social needs across the rebel-controlled borderlands assisted and facilitated setting up local community organisations and networks.205 Accordingly, the departmental agencies of KNU and its affiliated Karen relief and development groups began providing emergency relief materials, such as food, shelter and medicine, as well as undertaking health, education, and development programs and projects in the refugee camps and IDP communities. Over

200 Saw Shie She, liaison officer of KNU/KNLA, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 201 A director of a Strategic Study Institute (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 202 South, Civil Society in Burma: The Development of Democracy Amidst Conflict, 43. However, there are also claims that some INGOs and donor agencies were uncritical of the degree to which the KNU affiliated and local civil society organisations were accountable. See, for example, South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict. 203 A director of a Strategic Study Institute (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 204 South, “Political Transition in Myanmar: A New Model for Democratization,” 249. 205 Ibid.

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time, through the social organisations associated to the KNU, a range of Karen community organisations in the areas under ongoing armed conflict gradually became connected with the international humanitarian and aid agencies and started providing emergency relief, basic social needs and livelihood assistance to the refugees and IDPs.206

This exogenous intervention created opportunities for Karen community organisations and their members who otherwise might not be able to be trained in the personal capacity building and development programs of the UN, international NGOs and governmental organisations. Many organisations and individual experts also provided training programs including leadership and management skills and knowledge related to social welfare and development to the individuals with potential.207 Moreover, the international community also provided opportunities to camp dwellers who had potential to study higher education abroad.208 The TBBC played a significant role in building up the capacity of many camp dwellers to become change agents such as community leaders and development workers. This cherished help and support strengthened the capacity of Karen voluntary community workers, members of the local NGOs, and the voluntary administrators overseeing the refugee camps along the Myanmar-Thai borderline.209 Over time, the help and support of the international community even supported established indigenous Karen NGOs from the communities struggling under the continued civil war.210 Mea Taw Clinic, Karen State Education Assistance Group, and BPHWT are a few examples of these. By the mid- 2000s, various Karen and other border-based education NGOs provided education and vocational services, such as primary, middle, high school, and post-tenth standard education, teaching aid developments and teacher training, as well as capacity building for the teens from the communities affected by the conflicts.211

206 A director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 207 See also, David I. Steinberg, “Civil Society and Legitimacy: The Basis for National Reconciliation in Burma/Myanmar,” in Myanmar’s Long Road to National Reconciliation, edited by Trevor Wilson (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 158. 208 A director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 209 A senior Karen community leader, interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State; director of a local Karen NGO (Hpa-an), interview. 210 South, Civil Society in Burma: The Development of Democracy Amidst Conflict, 43. 211 South and Lall, Education, Conflict and Identity: Non-State Education Regimes in Burma, 27.

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In the meantime, some Karen NGOs working in the refugee camps in the border areas started focusing on the opposition-oriented capacity building programs and advocacy activities, mostly on human rights, environmental issues, education, health, and gender equality in Karen communities within their reach. KHRG and Karen Environmental and Social Action Network are some of the examples of these. Many religious institutions, particularly the Christian churches, were also involved in humanitarian relief and social development activities in the Karen-populated areas under the continued armed conflict. For decades, branches of Baptist, Anglican and Catholic churches, as well as several other congregations and their networks were engaged in humanitarian and welfare development activities in the areas. Since, most of the ongoing conflict zones in Karen-populated areas were hard to access, Protestant Christian networks such as the missionary Free Burma Rangers, took risks and tried to offset the gap by raising fund overseas and providing emergency assistance.212

However, while some border-based UN agencies, INGOs and Karen NGOs could help strengthen the capacity of local Karen societal groups contribute to important progress and effectiveness in their services, they also produced some unintended consequences. The humanitarian relief and social development assistance of the international community to the Karen refugee camps that were largely managed by the refugee committees of the KNU, became centres for reproduction and strengthening of Karen nationalism.213 While the border-based organisations and individual experts helped modernise and standardise the school curriculum of the KED, they also unintentionally created a separatist Karen education system that induced unnecessary nationalism and made almost impossible for the Karen high school graduates to continue their education in the government schooling system.214

212 See Horstmann, “Sacred Spaces of Karen Refugees and Humanitarian Aid Across the Thailand- Burma Border,” 260, 69. 213 Ibid.; Mikael Gravers, “Conversion and Identity: Religion and the Formation of Karen Ethnic Identity in Burma,” in Exploring Ethnic Diversity in Burma, edited by Mikael Gravers (Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2007); Sandra H. Dudley, “Reshaping Karenni-ness in Exile: Education, Nationalism, and Being in the Wider World,” in Exploring Ethnic Diversity in Burma, edited by Mikael Gravers (Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2007). 214 Lall and South, “Comparing Models of Non-State Ethnic Education in Myanmar: The Mon and Karen National Education Regimes”.

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Meanwhile, some Karen NGOs and community groups working in the refugee camps and KNU-controlled areas focused on promoting opposition-oriented social movement organisations that were engaged in human rights, environmental and gender-related activities. However, the limited civil society developments in the Karen-populated areas in the continued civil war failed to generate the enabling environment that could nurture the natural progression of civil society into political society. The war put pressure on civil society groups to work discretely and keep a low profile; therefore, the process of trust building was slow for civil society groups, particularly among their leading actors. Given the persistent security threat, Karen civil society groups were unable to synchronise similar activities and, consequently, cooperation remained weak between and within the groups.215 In addition, occasional information leakages to government authorities, especially intelligence agencies, exacerbated distrust among the different political, social and religious actors across the Karen communities.216 While the organisations operating in the KNU-controlled areas and along the borderline did not trust those working in the government-controlled areas and vice versa, neither groups trusted the Yangon-based Karen civil and social organisations.217 As a result, in the years leading to the 2010 election civil society groups in Mon-populated areas synchronised their activities and mobilised for the emergence of a political leading body; however, Karen CSOs in majority Karen-populated areas could not form an independent political party.

Conclusion

Civil war destroyed the context for the existing civil society entity to endure and hindered the re-emergence of new autonomous associational life. Following the outbreak of the civil war, the general context for civil society in both Karen- and Mon-populated areas was no longer favourable for autonomous organisational lives to take root and develop. This hindered the continuation and progress of fledgling civil society entities in both Karen and Mon communities even when they were under the rule of a parliamentary democracy government. After the cessation of war hostilities, in the Mon communities the various elements of civil society sectors that had been previously suppressed and

215 A director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 216 Ibid. 217 Ibid.

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remained dormant experienced momentous revitalisation. Over the past decades, the ceasefire has brought about the context for autonomous civil associational life to gradually revive and there has been improved community participation in the social change process at the local level in Mon-populated areas. Although tentative in the beginning, this re-emergence of civil society in previous civil war-affected Mon communities has been a significant socio-political development resulting from the enabling context created by the NMSP ceasefire agreement. In addition, the ceasefire also provides the context for some Mon CSOs, particularly the social mobilisation organisations, to formally re-engage in identity-related activities and initiate more explicit political movements in Mon-populated areas.

Conversely, even with the substantial support of the international community, the ongoing civil war did not allow independent civil associational life to be revived in Karen- populated areas. Until the ceasefire of KNU, the continuing war conditions repressed the emergence of an enabling context in which independent CSOs could institute and develop. Although there were numerous Karen organisations involved in the humanitarian, welfare and community development activities of international aid agencies in the KNU-controlled areas and borderland, most had to remain associated with the Karen armed organisation in some way. At the same time, because of continued insecurity and war hostilities, a few Karen CSOs inside the government stronghold areas had to function under the auspices of influential religious and community leaders. In addition, as war hostilities prevailed, long-separated Karen communities were unable to reconnect and, consequently, many civil society actors could not bring back their hard- earned knowledge and skills to contribute to the communities in need. Until the ceasefire of KNU, the context for civil society remained dire in all the conflict-affected Karen communities in the government stronghold, under the control of the KNU and across the Myanmar-Thai border.

Meanwhile, the precarious context and antagonistic conditions generated by the civil war meant that the organisational structure of most civil society associations in Karen and Mon communities remained centralised and top-down. The structure of organisational lives in both Karen and Mon societies was traditionally based on the heroic personalities of individual leaders, rather than the institutions that governed the society. At the same time, opaque decision-making and patron–client rather than merit-based conscription were standard features of these organisations. The insecurity generated by the civil war 289 Chapter 6: The Effects of Ceasefire on Civil Society

allowed influential religious and community leaders to continually dominate the realm of civil society in both Karen and Mon communities. Nevertheless, the ceasefire in Mon- populated areas enhanced accessibility for the international community that, in turn, helped and obliged most Mon CSOs to improve their organisational structure and decision-making processes into democratic and participatory, regardless of whether they were associated with NMSP.

The ceasefire also created favourable conditions for independent Mon social and communal associations in both the government strongholds and areas under the NMSP ceasefire. Moreover, the improvement in security and the resulting political recognition of NMSP were conducive for some Mon CSOs, including the social mobilisation organisations, to become more pluralist in their organisational structure. In contrast, the organisational structure of Karen community organisations, both those affiliated and independent of KNU, remained hierarchical and personalised. The RONROs of KNU and their associated community organisations failed to revise their organisational structure and developed into autonomous CSOs. Top-down decision-making and patron–client staffing remained the dominant feature of Karen community organisations until after the ceasefire of KNU. Moreover, civil society networks in ceasefire Mon-populated areas were relatively better established than those in the Karen-populated areas under the continued civil war.

Prior to the ceasefire, most Karen and Mon CSOs’ social mobilisation organisations valued the ethnic identity-oriented activities from when they were founded at the onset of the country’s independence. Throughout the prolonged civil war, even under the continuous suppression of successive Myanmar governments, Karen and Mon civil society groups continued to focus on ethnic identity and cultural-oriented activities and tried to support their respective armed resistant movement. Although many of the organisations functioned under the guise of religious and community welfare activities, few were interested in social and community development work. Virtually all the social mobilisation organisations, as well as the grassroots community organisations, were involved in ethno-nationalist mobilisation activities and supporting their respective anti- state ethnic armed groups.

However, the NMSP ceasefire created conditions in Mon-populated areas for civil society-driven democratic capital build-ups in the form of relief activities and social

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development. Moreover, while many Mon CSOs began engaging in welfare and community development activities under the relative peace, the ceasefire also enabled the organisations to formally become involved in social mobilisation activities and build local capacities and human capital in the communities. After the NMSP ceasefire, both the religious-based community organisations and many of the Myanmar-Thai border-based Mon CSOs became involved in social and community development activities and expanded their outreach across all the Mon-populated areas.

Further, independent Mon civil society was gradually able to progress into a political society even under autocratic military rule, although in less active forms. Conversely, as the continued civil war maintained pressure on Karen social organisations and network groups to work discretely and keep a low profile, interaction and collaboration among Karen civil society leaders and community groups in different territories remained beyond the bounds of possibility. Karen civil society groups could not synchronise similar activities across different Karen communities and cooperation among the groups remained fragile,while social capital build-up in Karen communities also faced difficult challenges. Thus, the limited development in the value of Karen community organisations failed to generate the required conditions that could support the natural progression of Karen civil society into political society. Conversely, although the war continued in Karen-populated areas, paradoxically, many Karen RONROs and community organisations received substantial opportunities to become involved in humanitarian and social welfare provision activities. This change in focus could be due to the working principle of the international community to implement their programs in partnership with the conflict-affected communities and the essential requirement of local participation in their relief and development projects.

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Chapter 7. The Effects of Ceasefire at the Onset of Post- Conflict Democratisation

Introduction

In the previous chapters, this thesis examined the effect of ceasefire on three essential attributes or necessary conditions of a successful democratisation—stateness, socioeconomic, and civil society—in the ceasefire Mon- and Karen-populated areas under continued civil war. The stable ceasefire in Mon-populated areas and the continued civil war in Karen-populated areas generated uneven situations for essential democratic fundamentals and contributed to the post-civil war democratic transition in the respective local communities, as will be explored in this chapter.

Based on the conceptual and empirical construes of democracy, as detailed in the analytical framework (Chapter 2), scholars place the various conceptions and definitions of democracy on a continuum of scale with the bisected states beginning from non- democracy up to the maximalist conceptions of Western liberal democracy. However, this is not to argue that the democratic transition in Myanmar progressed stage by stage along the democratic continuum on a linear scale. As concisely summarised by Pedersen, democratisation “is a highly complex, multi-faceted and open-ended process, involving shifts in many different spheres of governance and social relations”.1 This is the case with Myanmar’s political transition. Nonetheless, this study utilises the stages of democracy along the democratic continuum as a framework for comparing and contrasting the uptake of Mon communities under a lasting ceasefire and Karen communities under continued civil war during the democratic transition process at the national level of the country.

According to the democratic transitology introduced by Schneider and Schmitter,2 following the process of ‘liberalisation of autocracy’ of the former semi-civilian

1 Morten B. Pedersen, “The Challenges of Transition in Myanmar,” in Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, edited by Hlaing Kyaw Yin, Robert H. Taylor, and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 161. 2 Schneider and Schmitter propose liberalisation, transition and consolidation as the three major stages of democratisation. See Schneider and Schmitter, “Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation: Measuring the Components of Democratization”.

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government, the ruling NLD-led government underwent a ‘mode of transition’ and, at the same time, attempted to consolidate the elements of democratic governance. Conversely, according to the continuum of democratisation, it could be argued that the Myanmar democratisation process has passed the stages of minimalist democracy and procedural minimum democracy and is currently undergoing the stage of expanded procedural minimum democracy. Being neither free nor fair, the 2010 general election in Myanmar did not mean that the country had reached the stage of minimalist democracy in the democratic continuum. With restrictions in the election laws, lack of universal suffrage, vote rigging, massive manipulation of vote counts, and a heavily biased pre- and post- election environment, the 2010 Myanmar election was characterised by electoral fraud. At the same time, no one was sure whether the Myanmar military would hold elections at regular intervals or respect the election outcomes. Thus, with the 2010 election, Myanmar did not pass the threshold of ‘minimalist democracy’.

However, although not free and fair, the important potential represented by the 2010 elections triggered the liberalisation process and significantly attributed to the democratic transition of the country. The election brought about new voices and provided room for political and socioeconomic activities and shifted the country’s political landscape in important ways. After the inauguration of the semi-civilian government in 2011, some positive political changes and respect for basic civil rights began to take place, although they were deliberately aimed at consolidating the political legitimacy of the government and the military. The government formally recognised the role of civil society and opened and legalised space for civil society activities. At the same time, the government also relaxed the strict media regulations and censorships and, to some extent, tolerated freedom of expression and mass communication. With the conciliatory moves towards the ethnic armed resistant organisations and the opposition party NLD led by Daw Aung San Su Kyi, the semi-civilian government also coaxed the country towards a more plural society, although fighting continued in some ethnic-populated areas.

Moreover, with the gradual increase in respect and toleration of civil liberty, the transition process reached the minimum level of freedoms, including freedom of speech, press, association, and assembly, for a typical democratisation. At this stage, it can be said that while the transitioning process failed to pass the minimalist democracy stage, it achieved most elements of the procedural minimum democracy state of the continuum. In addition, given the smooth formal handover of state power to the newly elected NLD-led 293 Chapter 7: The Effects of Ceasefire at the Onset of Post-Conflict Democratisation

government in March 2016, it can be said that the democratisation process of the country achieved what Adam Przeworski called ‘ex-ante uncertainty’ and ‘ex-post irreversibility’ as the two major attributes of democracy.3 The transition in Myanmar fulfilled most of the criteria for a minimalist democracy including secret balloting, universal adult suffrage, regular elections, and partisan competition.4

Further, it can be said that the elections became the principal passageway to accessing state power in Myanmar. Thus, the democratic transition of Myanmar passed both the minimalist democracy and the procedural minimum democracy stages of the democratic continuum. However, through constitutional protection, the newly established democratic governance must accept various elements of the non-elected dominions in both state legislative and executive bodies and cannot deny their influence and intervention. The Myanmar military remains beyond the oversight of the elected government and possesses veto power in all the legislative bodies. Moreover, by controlling three important cabinet ministries and the administration of the entire country, the Myanmar military also possesses exclusive authority over the security and administrative issues of the country. While the country is apparently moving away from previous forms of direct military rule, the direction in which it is currently moving is not yet clear. The military retains considerable legislative and executive power in the current political system; therefore, neither the previous U Thein Sein administration nor the current ruling NLD-led government possess effective power to rule. Thus, it can be said that it has passed the stages of minimalist democracy and procedural minimum democracy along the democratic continuum and the country is now undergoing the stage of expanded procedural minimum democracy.

To examine the possible causal linkages between the evolving democratic fundamentals generated by a ceasefire and the developments in post-civil war democratic transition, this chapter will explore and compare the democratic uptakes of the two conflict-affected societies at different stages of the transition at the national level of the country. During the inception phase of the Myanmar national liberalisation process, the military junta only allowed the formation of political parties and limited election-related activities. Thus, this

3 Mike Alvarez et al., “Classifying Political Regimes,” Studies In Comparative International Development 31, no. 2 (1996). 4 Schneider and Schmitter, “Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation: Measuring the Components of Democratization,” 63.

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study will first examine the developments in the political parties in Karen- and Mon- populated areas during the 2010 general elections. In analysing the political parties, scholars use various conceptualisation and dimensions. By using the oft-cited framework of party institutionalisation in the transitioning democracies in the Third World proposed by Randall and Svåsand,5 this study compares the organisational development and “value infusion”6 of the parties. For the organisational development aspect, this thesis observes both the internal organisation development within the parties and their “external relations”7 with the broader society. Conversely, the concept of value infusion of Selznick and Levitsky involves measuring the success of a party in creating a unique value system through which its actors and supporters identify and commit themselves.8 Although the current political parties in both Karen and Mon societies are still in their nascent stages, the study attempts to assess and compare the value infusion of the parties.

At the same time, because elections are among the most important indicators of a minimalist democracy, this thesis assesses the uptake by Karen and Mon societies during the 2010 Myanmar general elections. In doing so, the thesis uses the widely agreed standards for a free and fair election,9 particularly the legal framework, election commission, candidature and campaigning process, suffrage and election monitoring as the analytical framework of assessment. In addition, the resulting developments in basic civil liberties during the rule of the semi-civilian government, as well as beyond the 2015 elections, marked the country’s accomplishment of the procedural minimum democracy stage of the transition. Thus, to examine the status of democratic uptake of Karen and Mon communities during the stage transitioning to ‘procedural minimum democracy’, this chapter observes the status of basic civil liberty in the society, particularly the

5 Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies,” Party Politics 8, no. 1 (2002). 6 For details, see Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation, (New York: Harper & Row, 1957); Steven Levitsky, “Institutionalization and Peronism: The Concept, the Case and the Case for Unpacking the Concept,” Party Politics 4, no. 1 (1998). 7 Kenneth Janda, Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey (New York: Free Press, 1980). 8 Randall and Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies,” 13. 9 International organisations such as the UN, the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Venice Commission of the European Commission for Democracy through Law and others have defined and developed standards for the essential elements of a free and fair election. These include the basic standards for the legal framework, election commission, candidature and campaigning process, suffrage, election monitoring, appeals process and others.

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development of freedom of association and freedom of expression through mass media communication. Next, following the stage of procedural minimum democracy, the democratic transition in Myanmar is now undergoing the stage of ‘expanded procedural minimum democracy’ while it also grasps other elements of democracy. To understand the attributes of the ceasefire-driven democratic fundamentals on the effectiveness of governance in the transition, this study investigates the developments in the State legislative assemblies and State governments in the civil war-affected ethnic communities.

Democratic Uptake of Karen and Mon Societies during the Inception Phase of Myanmar National Liberalisation

7.2.1. The political parties

In practice, as noted by many scholars, democratisation in Myanmar is undergoing an imposed transition whereby the Myanmar military controls the pace, extent and elements of the reform process. However, there has been a parallel process of the country’s diverse political actors and popular movements seeking to promote democracy and conflict resolution. As the outcome and future trajectory of the democratisation process in Myanmar remains uncertain, it is decidedly dependent on the capacity of political organisations and actors to make democratisation real and meaningful for the population. Moreover, for the long-suffering populations in the war-torn ethnic-populated areas the change process is not only a shift from a simple authoritarian rule to a democratic one, but also from an all-out civil war through to post-civil war conditions to a democratic society. In addition to the challenges facing the mainstream political transition at the national level, post-civil war democratisation in the conflict-affected ethnic societies must overcome much more dynamic and complex political, social and economic uncertainties and difficulties.

In March 2010, Union Election Commission (UEC) instated the registration of political parties with the enactment of the Political Parties Registration Law (SPDC Law No. 2/2010). As with the other major ethnic minorities of the country, the Karen and Mon communities founded political parties and attempted to represent their respective populations. The parties have participated in policy reform and democratic transition and consolidation processes in the unpredictably evolving political space during the first years

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of Myanmar democratisation. However, it was evident that the political capacity of both the Mon and Karen political parties was weak, and their influence on policy reform and the political change process at the national level was ineffective in the current political setting of the majority Bamar supremacy and hegemony of an autonomous Myanmar military. Therefore, the Karen and Mon ethnic political parties could not effectively contribute to the country’s conflict resolution and democratisation process at the national level. However, the parties performed differently in the local political transitioning process depending on their organisational capability and relationship with the state and society that are directly dependent on the security and administrative stability of the territory, economic development and the state of civil society. In comparison with the situation for Karen political parties, the lasting ceasefire in Mon-populated areas has created conditions for Mon political parties to participate with relative efficacy in the democratic transition and policy reform processes at the local level. The ceasefire generated democratic fundamentals that provided indispensable support to the Mon political parties including stable security and local administrative institutions, improved physical infrastructure and economic conditions, sizable urbanisation and a capable local civil society.

(a) Organisational development

Based on different political, social and economic conditions, the origins of the formation of the political parties in civil war-affected Karen and Mon communities were fundamentally different. Before the 2010 general election, UEC granted the registration of three Karen political parties while denying a Yangon-based political party formed by senior Karen political leaders. First, a few former high-ranking government officials (including former military officers)10 and mission-educated urban elites founded the Kayin People’s Party (KPP) in March 2010. The majority of KPP leaders were predominantly Christian and claimed to associate with Karen populations living in Yangon and Ayeyarwady Delta.11 The party fielded 37 candidates in the 2010 general

10 The chairman and a vice-chairman of the party were former high-ranking military officers of the government military. 11 A senior Karen community leader (Yangon), interview by the author, January 18, 2017, Yangon; a director of a Strategic Study Institute (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon.

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elections. Next, the Union Karen League, the second Karen political party to contest in the 2010 elections, was originally founded by senior Karen unionist leaders during the country’s pre-independence time as the KYO and was among the largest in the 1947 national Constituent Assembly and 1951 Chamber of Deputies.12 However, the party ceased to exist in 1956. In 1990, a new generation of Karen leaders together with some old hands re-established the party and, until 2010, it was among the 10 remaining political parties during the direct military rule.13 Although the UEC initially granted permission to senior Karen politicians to re-register the party in late May, the commission later dissolved the party on 14 September, 2010, on the grounds of failure to contest in at least three electoral constituencies.

In April 2010, the PSDP, a third Karen political party was formed by some senior leaders of Hpa-an-based Karen literature and cultural organisations and community leaders.14 The party aimed to represent both the Phalon, or Pwo, who were predominantly Buddhist, and the Sawaw, or Sagaw or Saqaw, who were mostly Christian Karen nationalities living across the Karen-populated Dawna mountain ranges.15 It is said that Reverend U Pyinnya Tharmi, a well-known and highly respected abbot of the Taungkalay Buddhist Monastery,16 initiated the formation of the party to offset the lack of a locally-based Karen political party in the Karen-populated areas.17 In fact, the predominantly Hpa-an-based local elders formed the party under the auspices and patronage protection of the renowned abbot. It is also said that the abbot provided the necessary funds and guidelines for the activities of the party.18 Understandably, the predominantly Buddhist party leadership

12 Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 85. See also, Thawnghmung, The Karen Revolution in Burma: Diverse Voices, Uncertain Ends, 11. 13 A senior Karen community leader, interview by the author, January 18, 2017, Yangon. 14 PSDP submitted its application to form a political party on April 23, 2010 and, on May 4, 2010, UEC granted permission. On May 27, the party resubmitted its application with the full set up of the party. On June 4, 2010, UEC granted permission to the party. 15 Saw Khin Maung Myint (chairman of PSDP), interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Twon, Kayin State. 16 The abbot allegedly had a close connection with the then ‘First Lady’ of the country. A director of Kayin Information Centre, interview by the author, February 7, 2017, Hpa-an, Kayin State; a director of a Strategic Study Institute (former Hpa-an native close to the abbot), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 17 Saw Khin Maung Myint (chairperson of PSDP), interview; a country director of an INGO (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, January 21, 2017, Yangon. 18 Saw Khin Maung Myint (Chairperson of PSDP), interview.

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often consulted with the abbot on important issues and accepted his advice and guidelines.19 Although the abbot only holds the position of patron of the party, he possesses the final decision-making authority.20 The party fielded 18 candidates in the 2010 general elections. Lastly, under the direction of the military junta, senior leaders of the ceasefire and surrendered Karen armed groups formed the Kayin State Democracy and Development Party (KSDDP), the fourth Karen political party to contest in the 2010 election. Several sources suggest that a senior Minister of SPDC convinced the aged leaders of the ceasefire Karen armed groups to form the party less than three months before the election date.21 Involved in the party were leaders of the DKBA, the Payarkone Nyeinchanye Myothit (Payarkone New Peace Town) Group led by Phadoh Aung San22 and the KPF that surrendered to the regime in 1996 and who did not want to take part in the transformed battalions of Karen Border Guard Forces. Some sources close to the KPF and Payarkone New Peace Town groups said that officials from the government Ministry of Information developed the party constitution and policies for the party and provided funds and advice to contest against the PSDP that had become increasingly become popular within Karen State.23 The UEC granted permission for the party within nine days of the party’s primary application.24

Conversely, unlike the case of Karen political communities, a Mon political party was formed on the basis of the political and social movements of the diverse Mon political,

19 One of the party leaders explained that as the abbot has long been their chief patron, they always consult on important issues with the head monk and at all times abide by his advice. Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Several sources unanimously suggest that the Minister of Information Brigadier General Kyaw San was directly involved in the formation of the Karen party. See, for example, Mizzima, “Karen State Democracy and Development Party,” accessed January 16, 2018, http://archive-1.mizzima.com/programs/36-archives/election-center/new-party-profiles/4243-Karen- state-democracy-and-development-party; A senior official of an INGO (a former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 22 However, Phadoh Aung San did not join the KSDDP, but appeared as a candidate of USDP in the election and contested and won a seat in the Karen State Legislative Assembly. 23 A country director of an INGO (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, January 21, 2017, Yangon; an official of an international peace organisation (a former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. See also Mizzima, “Karen State Democracy and Development Party”. 24 The group submitted their primary application on 11 August, 2010 and UEC granted permission on the same day. KSDDP re-submitted the secondary application on 12 August, 2010. UEC granted permission for the KSDDP on 19 August, 2010.

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social and business communities. Senior politicians, civil society groups, ex-combatants from NMSP and the younger generation of political and social activists formed the party after long community mobilisation and a series of grudging discussions. Since 2008, a group comprised of civil society leaders, former government civil servants, former members of the underground movement and ex-combatants of NMSP, student activists and business personnel initiated the embryonic form of the AMDP. After SPDC announced the date for a constitutional referendum and possible election year in February 2008, some younger generation Mon activists and civil society leaders initiated a political group and appealed to retired government civil servants and some senior politicians from the defunct 1990 political party to join.25 In 2009, the two leading Mon civil society groups, the LAMYO and MSDN began awareness campaigns among the youth groups across Mon and Kayin State and urged the old hands to rejuvenate the dormant Mon National Democratic Front (MNDF) founded in 1990.

While acknowledging the uneven playing field and likely not free and fair nature of the election, the groups advocated for participation to grasp whatever political space the election might provide.26 The group aimed at representing the Mon people and local populations in general in the emerging parliament by taking whatever space might arise.27 Although the mobilisation activities of the two Mon civil society groups were closely watched by the government authorities, particularly the Police Special Branch (SB), the capacity building training programs that were provided by the groups in the capital city Mawlamyine and some large Mon villages across Mon and Karen State were tolerated.28 However, local intelligence units of the government military harassed and threatened all the leaders of LAMYO and MSDN, as they were youth groups mobilising and building

25 A local journalist (former activist), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 26 Nai Lwi Aung (CEC of AMDP), interview by the author, February 14, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Min Min Nwe, Min Htay Naing, Min Aung Myint Sein, Min Pe Than, Min Htay Aung, Min Aung Mon (former leaders of LAMYO and MSDN), in an informal discussion with the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 27 Dr Min Nwe Soe (General Secretary of AMDP), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 28 Min Min Nwe (former leader of MSDN), interview by the author, February 14, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Min Aung Myint Sein and Min Khaing Than (former LAMYO leader), interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Thanbyuzayart, Mon State.

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the capacity of the younger generation in several townships in Mon State.29 The two groups even openly participated in some politically sensitive activities initiated by NMSP such as the formation of Mon Affairs Union in which all legal and illegal Mon organisations from inside and in exile were involved, and also attended national conferences sponsored by the border-based exile Mon opposition groups. By the end of 2009, in a widely participated Mon national conference held in a border village in the stronghold area of the NMSP, LAMYO and MSDN declared their decision to form a political party and participate in the upcoming 2010 election, although they emphasised that they did not agree with the 2008 Constitution.30

Until the announcement of an election boycott by the NLD, all activists from Mon political, social and business groups combined together to form a Mon political party. However, after the NLD announced the election boycott, most leaders of the MNDF (the only Mon party to contest and win five seats in the 1990 election), quit the group and campaigned against the formation of a new political party. After months of discussions, meetings, splits and mergers among the Mon political and social organisations, a group of Mon political activists, former government civil servants, civil society leaders and former combatants of NMSP formed the AMDP on 7 April, 2010. Meanwhile, after NLD re-registered the party and contested in the 2012 by-election, MNDF expanded and rejuvenated the party with a few former leaders of NMSP and civil society groups. UEC approved the application of the party to register under a new name, the Mon Democracy Party. After merging with a splinter group from AMDP, the party changed its name to the Mon National Party in July 2012.31

Regarding organisational development, all three Karen political parties were in their embryonic stage and faced difficulties in party-building activities. Without adequate exposure to the bottom-up organisational structure and experience in social mobilisation activities, the organisational structure of all the parties was top-down and clientelism dominated over rule-based procedures. As they were highly centralised organisations that reserved much of the power to party leadership at central headquarters—or, in the case of

29 Ibid; Min Min Nwe, interview. 30 Min Min Nwe (former MSDN leader), interview; Min Htay Naing (former LAMYO leader), interview. 31 Dr Min Soe Lin (an MSP of MNP, Mon State Parliament), interview by the author, March 24, 2017, Mawlamyine.

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PSDP, to the Chief Patron—the parties lacked appropriate internal democracy. Within a short time, the weak organisational development triggered the long-standing tradition of personalism in the Karen political organisations. Conversely, the AMDP performed relatively well in developing its internal organisational structure. As many of its party cadres and local leaders had experience in working with international organisations and were involved in community development and social mobilisation activities, AMDP could develop its party central leading body through a bottom-up approach. Many of the village-level party members and local leaders had knowledge to some extent on civic education and democratic organisational structures through the programs and projects of Mon CSOs, particularly the social mobilisation groups, during the later years of the NMSP ceasefire. The leadership of all its township-level branch offices were elected through elections based on the village representatives in all townships.32 Moreover, the stable security conditions in most Mon areas and improved physical infrastructure were supportive of the party’s central–local relationship. Even the Yebyu Township party branch, the farthermost branch office of the party in Tanintharyi Region, could reach to party headquarter in a half a day’s drive.33

Further, Karen parties faced difficulties in expanding their party organisation and mobilising membership in the Karen-populated areas under continued conflict. For instance, although it could establish a few branch offices in the government stronghold Thandaung Township in northern Kayin State, the Yangon-based KPP could not set up branch offices in the rest of Karen-populated areas across the Dawna mountain ranges in Kayin and Mon State and Tanintharyi Region. Meanwhile, PSDP faced difficulties in expanding its branch offices in the highly contested areas in Kayin State, such as Thandauggyi and Papun Township and the Karen-populated areas outside Kayin State such as Thaton and Belin Township in Mon State and Kyaukkyi Township in Bago

32 The elected township party chose en mass the central committee (CC), and the elected CC members elected members of the central executive committee (CEC) through a secret voting process. Dr Min Nwe Soe (General Secretary of AMDP), interview; Nai Lwi Aung (CEC of AMDP), interview. 33 Nai Khin Maung Myint (chairperson of AMDP branch, Yebyu Township), interview by the author, March 24, 2017, Mawlamyine.

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Region.34 KSDDP installed only a few branch offices in the DKBA and KPF stronghold villages in Kayin State.35

The continued insecurity and unstable local administrative situation created challenges for all Karen parties in setting up branch offices in the conflict-affected Karen communities. In the case of PSDP, because the villagers were afraid of possible repression by local authorities they formed village-level party branches only with the command and, thus, protection, of the Chief Patron, the Taungkalay Abbot.36 With the poor physical infrastructure across the State, communication and interaction between the headquarters and local branches of all the parties remained weak.37 Conversely, although Article 11(a) of the political registration law prohibited parties from canvassing party members until the UEC approved the application for party registration, the associated Mon civil society networks helped to mobilise population across Mon-populated areas. AMDP could set up branch offices across most Mon-populated areas including areas outside Mon State such as Yangon, Bago, and Tanintharyi Regions and Karen State. The personal connection of the party leaders, youth movements of LAMYO and the social development activities of MSDN played a vital role in the formation of AMDP in a short time interval. The party mainly relied on members from local branches who were political and social activists, former government civil servants and a few business personnel. Before the 2010 general elections, AMDP founded branch offices in 13 townships across Mon and Karen States and Tanintharyi, Bago and Yangon Regions. Civil society networks established by the Mon CSOs during the stable ceasefire period were also a great help to AMDP in mobilising party membership and expanding its branches to all cities, towns, and large villages across all Mon-populated areas.

Improved post-conflict economic development and the succeding substantial urbanisation across Mon-populated areas generated supportive conditions for the party in expanding

34 A leader of PSDP, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Twon, Kayin State; a voluntary election observer (sponsored by CPCS), interview by the author, March 11, 2016, Kawtkareik Town, Kayin State. 35 Ibid. 36 Director of a Strategic Study Institute (former Hpa-an native close to Taungkalay Abbot), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 37 A country director of an INGO (who has close contact with the Taungkalay abbot), interview by the author, January 21, 2017, Yangon.

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its organisational networks in a short time and easily motivating the enthusiastic participation of its party members from local branches.

All the ethnic political parties faced external influences on their decision-making along the lines of the rooted goals of self-determination and the conservation and promotion of ethnic identity.38 At the same time, there were critical issues in the degree of their decisional autonomy regarding the USDP-led local parliaments and State governments in which most of their leaders held positions. Karen political parties could demonstrate little initiative or independent decision-making, perhaps because of the inter-party fragmentation that weakened their position in the local governance institutions. During President U Thein Sein’s administration, none of the ministers from the three Karen political parties could induct any policy initiative.39 Ministers from Karen political parties could not initiate Karen identity-related sociocultural activities and effective social service delivery to the Karen populations living in the continued war-affected Karen areas until after the years of the KNU ceasefire. For instance, the Karen ministers and Members of State Parliaments (MSP) could not initiate or provide support to the literacy programs of the KLCA and the Karen national schools of the KED.40

In contrast, AMDP, at least in some cases, exhibited the party’s autonomy through promoting identity-related activities and supporting social service delivery and social development in Mon State. AMDP made it clear that the party had no links to Mon armed organisations or exiled activist groups and in no way was influenced by them, although it did take into account feedback from other local community and religious groups. For example, in formally proposing and initiating the debate against the imperative of the Speaker of State Parliament and the Chief Minister, the party maintained its stand against the State Government regarding the teaching of Mon language in government schools and

38 Dr Min Nwe Soe (General Secretary of AMDP), interview; Saw Khin Maung Myint (Chairman of PSDP) interview; Dr Saw Simon Tha (Vice-Chairperson, KPP), interview by the author, January 18, 2017, Yangon. 39 A leader of Karen political party, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Twon, Kayin State. 40 A senior Karen community leader (Hpa-an), interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State; a former Kayin State Minister, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Twon, Kayin State.

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articulating and publishing Mon textbooks for schools.41 The ministers and MSPs of AMDP also stood independently on researching, excavation, and maintenance of Mon ancient archaeological sites and held Mon identity-related academic seminars and conferences in cities and towns across Mon State.42

At the same time, even in the inception phase of national liberalisation, the continued insecurity and repressive environment imposed onerous restrictions in build-up of capacity of party cadres and activists of the Karen parties. While members of AMDP, its activists, and support groups received training from the organisations that provided civic education and capacity building programs, such as Myanmar Egress, it was problematic for many local and international organisations that offered party-building training services to gain access to Karen parties and provide the training. For members of a local Karen party, as in the period of intense fighting, participating in a training program provided by a non-governmental organisation was risky.43 For instance, although Myanmar Egress could provide training to some Yangon-based KPP members, it could not reach the PSDP in Kayin State for training purposes.44 At the same time, as an affiliated political organisation of the Karen ceasefire groups formed under the auspice of the military government, members of KSDDP did not participate in such capacity building training programs.45 Meanwhile, whereas dozens of prospective candidates of the AMDP received capacity building training from Vahu Development Institute in Bangkok, Thailand, under the watchful eyes of the local intelligence unit, it was highly risky for members of Karen parties to participate in such training programs provided by the exile opposition groups at the borderland and neighbouring countries.46

41 Dr Min Nwe Soe (MSP and Mon State Government Minister), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; A high-level official (Mon State Parliament), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Nai San Tin (MSP of AMDP, Mon State Parliament), interview by the author, January 28, 2017, Kyaikmaraw Town, Mon State. 42 Dr. Min Nwe Soe (former Minister of Economic Development-Mon State Government), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 43 A leader of Karen political party, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 44 A director of Myanmar Egress, interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 45 Director of a Strategic Study Institute (former Hpa-an native close to Taungkalay Abbot), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 46 A director of Vahu institute, interview by the author, February 7, 2016, Yangon; a director of a Strategic Study Institute (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon.

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(b) Popular representation

Although they had a shared emphasis on federalism and the promotion of ethnic rights, ethnic political parties in both Mon and Karen States were diverse, divided and lacked unity. The weak party organisations and entrenched personalism posed complications in developing channels for popular representation and caused factionalism and incurable splits within the parties. In the case of the Mon parties, there were contentious issues that stemmed from the social and political origins of the two parties and the incumbent positions of the AMDP leadership. By following the decision of Daw Aung San Su Kyi, the MNDF decided at first to abstain from re-registering the party and it boycotted the 2010 general elections. However, after NLD applied to renew its registration with the UEC and won most of the contested seats in the 2012 by-election, the MNDF now known as the Mon National Party (MNP) also followed suit. This could be because AMDP was formed on the basis of the evolving social and cultural activities of the civil society group during the lasted ceasefire period, while MNP had its origin in the prolonged nationalist movements. MNDF, as the only Mon political party to contest and win five seats in 1990 election and AMDP, a Mon party that contested in the 2010 elections both contended for popular support within the same constituencies. In the 2015 elections, MNP stood against AMDP in many constituencies across Mon-populated areas. Unlike the Mon, although the two major Karen parties, PSDP and KPP, did not join hands they also did not contend for an electoral seat in the same constituency. PSDP tried to represent the Karen population, particularly the Phalon and Sawaw, and the party dedicated much of its efforts on Karen communities within Karen State. Meanwhile, KPP tried to mobilise Karen populations outside Kayin State and focused its representation of the broader population as well. There may be a long way for both Karen and Mon political parties to go before they become well-functioning political parties that represented their respective ethnic populations. Like in the Mon community, the trajectory of the constellation of the contending Karen parties remains uncertain.

Meanwhile, Karen and Mon parties performed differently in developing links with the communities they were trying to represent. Given the limited political space, lead time and experience, neither the Karen nor the Mon political parties could develop the platforms of their political parties properly. Instead, the parties were busy with burdensome administrative procedures for the registration and setting up of branch offices. However, compared to the post-conflict development in many Mon 306 Chapter 7: The Effects of Ceasefire at the Onset of Post-Conflict Democratisation

constituencies, the popular representation of Karen political parties at the onset of Myanmar national liberalisation was limited and hardly rooted in the structural building blocks of the society. For instance, although the leadership of KPP aimed at appealing to the wider populations beyond the Karen communities in Yangon and Ayeyarwady Delta, the party was not successful in developing a relationship with the communities in most of the Karen-populated areas in Kayin State, Mon State, or Tanintharyi Region. One of the reasons for this could have been the existing relationship between the leadership of the KPP and the military government that developed during the period of intense fighting. For instance, some of the KPP leaders had been involved in and facilitated the rounds of unsuccessful ceasefire negotiations between the government military and KNU47 and, to some extent, maintained a smooth relationship with the military government.

Although this appeasing relationship provided some level of protection from pre-election harassment and suppression by the state, it also generated distrust among the Karen political and social activists who were predominantly from inside Kayin State.48 Some considered KPP a Karen party with a close relationship to the military government.49 Consequently, the party could not set up branch offices in many of the area in which it claimed coverage. Similarly, since applying for registration in late April 2010, PSDP had been mobilising locals in Karen-populated areas in both Karen and Mon States with relative success. Compared to the other Karen parties, PSDP was observed by the local Karen communities as the party that was most independent.50 However, persistent insecurity, poor physical infrastructure, and patchy urban development hindered the party from building links with the wider Karen communities. Given the limited mobilisation capacity of the party and short lead time, it faced numerous difficulties in reaching the scattered Karen villages and mobilise village communities across the Dawna mountain ranges.51 Moreover, mainly because of security-related restrictions and underdeveloped

47 Dr Saw Simon Tha, (Vice-Chairperson, KPP), acted as a peace mediator and was deeply involved in the rounds of secret talks between the KNU and government military. 48 Director of a Strategic Study Institute (former Hpa-an native close to Taungkalay Abbot), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 49 This distrust could also be because a KPP leader publicly indicated that the party could join forces with the military-backed USDP in August 2010. 50 A medical practitioner, interview by the author, March 7, 2016, Kamamoung Town, Papun Township, Kayin State. 51 Saw Khin Maung Myint (Chairperson of PSDP), interview.

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physical infrastructure, the presence of the party was weak in the contested areas under the strong influence of the KNU, such as Thandaunggyi Township in Kayin State and Shwekyin and Kyaukkyi Townships in Bago Region.52 Until after the ceasefire of KNU, most of the activities of Karen parties generally took place inside the security tightened Karen towns, while very few happened in the rural Karen villages.53 Most of the village- level offices of the parties remained mere symbolic displays of the presence of the parties.

Meanwhile, Karen political parties could not establish strong relationships with the communities they were trying to represent. While most of the Karen population in the conflict-affected areas preferred the administrators of KNU or DKBA in resolving issues related to their daily lives, the Karen political parties hardly succeeded in gaining the trust and certitude of the people they were representing.54 Even under the rule of the semi- civilian government, due to security issues most Karen Ministers and MSPs of the Kayin State Parliament could not undertake regular visits to the majority of Karen villages and enquire about the needs of the respective constituencies that voted for them. Given the weak presence of the government military and the inadequate police force, the Chief Minister of Kayin State strictly prohibited all State cabinet ministers and high-ranking officials from going to remote Karen towns and rural villages, even in the areas under control of the ceasefire Karen armed groups.55 In addition, as there were very few party branch offices in their respective constituencies, many of the Karen parties’ elected MPs who had to be based in the country’s capital Naypyidaw, faced issues of disconnection with their local constituencies and failed to provide effective representation or deliver to the expectations of the communities.56

Moreover, because of the insecurity and numerous restrictions of the government authorities, none of the Karen political parties and their supporters could conduct a proper

52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 A director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. See also Kim Jolliffe, “Ceasefires, Governance and Development: The Karen National Union in Times of Change” (Yangon: The Asia Foundation, 2016). 55 Saw Khin Maung Myint (former minister of Kayin State Government), interview. 56 Ibid.

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investigation on issues of importance to the population living in the constituencies.57 Until KNU reached the ceasefire agreement, the links between the communities and organised politics in Kayin State remained weak. At the same time, although there were opportunities for Karen political parties to collaborate with evolving local CSOs, at least in the established large towns, neither Karen political organisations nor the CSOs acquired enough space to institute functional linkages for collaborations.

At the same time, there were only a few civil society groups that could help Karen political parties mobilise Karen populations in the continued conflict-affected Karen areas.58 Under the continued insecurity and unstable local administrations, the nascent local Karen CSOs, particularly in the small Karen towns, had to limit their interactions with the newly emerged Karen political parties.59 Many emerging local NGOs and CBOs in Karen towns expressed their disappointment with the dire security conditions and lack of social and physical infrastructure for them to interact and collaborate with the Karen political organisations.60 Some also blamed the weak organisational development of Karen political parties for the lack of capacity and preparedness to interact with the CSOs. For instance, some CSO leaders lamented that although PSDP was mainly formed on the corpus of the Karen Literature and Culture Association, which is a Karen identity-based social organisation, the party was conservative in several ways and did not present a viable space with which the other CSOs could interact.61 Conversely, some CSOs also expressed concerns about possible co-option of the parties or hostile repression by the government authorities.62

57 A leader of Karen political party, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State; a director of a Strategic Study Institute (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon; a director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 58 Ibid. 59 A local civil society activist, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State; a director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March , 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 60 Ibid; A country director of an INGO (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, January 21, 2017, Yangon; a director of a Strategic Study Institute, interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 61 Ibid; a local civil society activist, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 62 A director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State.

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Compared to the Karen, the political parties in the Mon-populated areas were better organised and played a greater role in aggregating a range of public interests and in the country’s political change process. With the support of local and international CSOs, local branch offices and activists of the party, AMDP gradually became an influential party with relatively strong roots and legitimacy in the society it represented. Some MPs and State cabinet ministers of AMDP were, to some extent, able to support the populations in their constituencies in resolving issues related to rights abuses and social service delivery. As the central–local relationship of the Mon party was somewhat resilient, the party could establish socio-political ties with communities through its local branches in Mon villages. Both AMDP and MNP had a close connection with and considerable influence on their local communities. The local ministers and MPs of both parties developed linkages with the growing numbers of local CSOs and media organisations and have collaborated on some policy issues and implementation. For instance, some Mon MPs collaborated with the local CSOs and the Thanlwin Times media group on campaigns against resource exploitation and environmental degradation such as the anti-coal fired power projects in the Southern Ye Township.63

Regarding the value infusion, instead of the shared values, ideology, mass membership, and democratic governing mechanism, virtually all the parties were founded on the basis of traditional personalism and patron–client relationship. In the absence of a clear ideological position, political program or specific policies, the personality of charismatic leaders mainly ruled the parties and ethnic national identity politics dominated the activities of both Mon and Karen political parties. Thus, both parties were unable to develop a distinctive identity. None of the parties held a clear ideological position or a specific policy platform including political, social, and economic policies beyond a general reference to federalism, the rights to self-determination, promotion of ethnic culture and literature, democracy and regional development. For both the Karen and Mon parties, winning elections and attaining political power was the main focus, whereas a few of the parties aimed to develop the necessary policies at a later stage. However, at

63 Min Min Nwe (Journalist), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State, Mon; Dr Aung Naing Oo (Deputy Speaker of Mon State Parliament), interview by the author, February 14, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State.

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least on a learning-and-doing basis, the AMDP was able to develop its policy platform and implement some of these in the later years of President U Thein Sein’s semi-civilian government.

As the shared values expressed by the Karen parties were mostly in a vague general sense, after their limited election success, none of the three Karen parties that won a few seats in the Karen State Parliament appeared to have a chance to formulate and develop policy platforms for their parties. Founded on the personal charisma of their leaders and backed up by the military regime, especially in the case of KSDDP, Karen parties faced difficulties in identifying shared values. The leadership of PSDP claimed that the party aimed to build-up national unity and encourage respect for diversity.64 The particular focus of the party included improving social infrastructure and providing better social services, particularly health and education, to all the people living in Karen-populated areas.65 However, as it was formed by the back up of the military regime just prior to the election, it was not clear what the KSDDP stood for, while many saw it as a proxy party of the regime created to compete against the increasingly popular PSDP in Kayin State.

Conversely, during the later years of the administration, the AMDP could develop a relatively indicative value infusion of the party and materialise some of the party’s values. In the beginning, because the party leadership was unsure on the form and extent of the emerging political opportunity, they merely aimed to represent the Mon population in any possible political space that might emerge from the 2010 elections.66 The party mainly focused on promoting the political and cultural rights of the ethnic minority living in the Mon-populated areas and took a complementary role in the democratic transformation of the country.67 The leadership, local actors and supporters of the party thus emphasised the values associated with literature and cultural development, better and effective social service delivery and, to a lesser degree, human rights and the rights to self-determination given the still authoritarian nature of the ruling regime.68 Despite the general absence of

64 Saw Khin Maung Myint (Chairperson, PSDP), interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Twon, Kayin State. 65 Ibid. 66 Dr Min Nwe Soe (General Secretary of AMDP), interview. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid.

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sector-specific programs and policies, after winning over 22 per cent of the seats in the local legislative assembly, AMDP tried to influence social infrastructure developments, particularly in education, in Mon-populated areas within their reach.69 Moreover, where possible, the party also engaged in Mon identity-related issues such as Mon literature and culture promotion and archaeological research and conservation works. For instance, in collaboration with MNEC, Mon community organisations, academic experts, and UNICEF, the party initiated the development of standardised Mon textbooks for primary schools and distributed them for free to the Mon national schools and the state-run mixed schools.70

Likewise, with the support of Mawlamyine University and Chulalongkorn University in Thailand, the party initiated several academic conferences and published research papers related to Mon historical development and national identity, including academic conferences on the history of Ye Town (2013) and the existence of Suvarnabhumi Desa (2015).71 The party also tried to secure the approval and support of both the union and state governments for an excavation project of the long-abandoned Mon ancient archaeological sites, such as the ancient Suvarnabhumi city in Bee Linn Township, Mon State and it also built some structures to maintain the excavated walls of the ancient Suvarnabhumi city-state.72 At the same time, the party was able to offer help and support to the population on specific issues such as land confiscation, abuses of power and rights violations by the local military and government authorities and on small-scale infrastructure developments. Some MPs of the AMDP referred several cases of land confiscation to the central government and the parliaments, as well as the State Government, during the rule of the semi-civilian government from 2013.73 Moreover, as an example of the party’s efforts in dealing with power and rights abuses by local

69 Nai San Tin (former MSP of AMDP), interview. 70 Ibid; Dr Min Nwe Soe (General Secretary of AMDP), interview. 71 Ibid; Nai Lwi Aung (former minister of Mon State Government), interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Thanbyuzayart, Mon State; a former MP of AMDP, interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Thanbyuzayart, Mon State; Nai Kao Lon (director of a local NGO), interview by the author, 26 February, 2016, Ye Town, Mon State. 72 Dr Min Nwe Soe (General Secretary of AMDP), interview. 73 Dr Banyar Aung Moe (former MP of AMDP), interview by the author, February 23, 2016, Three- Pagoda Town, Kayin State; Nai Tun Ohn (former MP of AMDP), interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Thanbyuzayart, Mon State; Nai San Tin (former MSP of AMDP), interview; a former staff member of HURFOM, interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Thanbyuzayart, Mon State.

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government and military authorities, in February 2014 an MP of AMDP raised a rape case committed by a ranker of a locally-based artillery battalion in Thanbyuzayart Township at a session of the Nationalities Assembly in Naypyidaw.74 Moreover, MPs of the party in the national parliaments involved in the constitutional amendment movement and proposed over 100 points to the Assembly of Nationalities.75

In the meantime, the value infusion of MNP gradually began to take shape as the party followed the opposition movements of the NLD and stood against the collaborative nature of the AMDP. MNP was involved in various mass mobilisation movements and mobilised the local population in several social and political reform activities through mass movements. For example, in 2013 the party was actively involved in the signature campaign for the constitutional amendment initiated by the 88 Generation and the NLD.76 Along with the local NGOs and CBOs, the party was also actively involved in mass protest and public rallies against the anti-coal fired power plant project in Ye Township.77 Further, the leaders of the party were also energetically involved in identity-related social mobilisation activities, such as Mon National Day activities and summer literacy programs across Mon-populated areas.78

7.2.2. The 2010 general elections

In late 2010, the Myanmar military government held a general election and launched a tightly managed democratic liberalisation process. However, from its legal framework through to the vote counting, the election did not by any standard meet the international norms nor was it free or fair. The pre-election environment lacked all the basic civil liberties, particularly freedom of speech, expression, assembly, the media, and association. However, even in such a contentious situation, the political communities in

74 Dr Banyar Aung Moe (former MP of AMDP), interview; A Municipal official, interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Thanbyuzayart, Mon State. 75 Dr Banyar Aung Moe (former MP of AMDP), interview. 76 Dr Min Soe Lin (MSP of MNP, Mon State Parliament), interview by the author, March 24, 2017, Mawlamyine. 77 Ibid. 78 Min Min Nwe (journalist), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State.

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the ceasefire Mon-populated areas grasped the emerging political space better than those in Karen-populated areas under continued civil war.

(a) Legal frameworks and election administration

First, the entire legal framework of the 2010 elections was unfair and unjust. The UEC possessed wide-ranging authority, from holding the power to grant or deny the registration application of a political party79 to overseeing and regulating the activities of the parties during the campaigns and beyond the election. While readily granting permissions and providing support in the military government’s formation of proxy ethnic political parties, by using its powers and unjust election laws the UEC disrupted and interfered with the formation of opposition political parties, particularly in the minority ethnic-populated areas. However, the formal and informal political and social networks across Mon-populated areas prevented the emergence of a proxy Mon political party. The ceasefire generated stable and secure conditions and the established communication channels between the Mon political, social, and religious communities successfully precluded prospective groups or individuals from taking part in the formation of such a proxy political party in Mon-populated areas. Government authorities were unsuccessful in convincing individuals or groups amid the well-connected and lively political, social, and business networks of the Mon communities. As a result, although the military junta could form a proxy political party in Kayin State, the government was not successful in its efforts to form a proxy party in the ceasefire Mon-populated areas.

At the same time, with largely broad and vague definitions, the electoral laws disenfranchised80 and effectually barred political and social activists from standing as the candidate of a constituency. Moreover, as the election commission set a deadline of 30 August, 2010, for parties to submit the names of candidates, the Karen and Mon parties only had 20 days to select and register their candidates with the election commission.

79 For example, Criteria (3), Article 12a, Section 3 of the election law states that a party can be de- registered if it violated the restriction: ‘have been in contact with or received support either directly or indirectly from members of armed rebel groups opposing the state or groups defined as terrorist organisations or that have been declared illegal organisation’. See also Article 407b of the 2008 Constitution. 80 Article 121 of the 2008 Constitution also prohibits from becoming a candidate persons serving prison terms, members of a religious order and persons who receive support or earnings from a foreign government.

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Consequently, the parties faced difficulties in identifying appropriate candidates and, given the high, non-refundable registration fee, attaining the required funds for the candidature process. The Karen State-based PSDP was unable to field a candidate for the Peoples’ Assembly in Myawaddy Township by the deadline and the candidate for Kawtkareik Township was unable to recruit an agent for the party even the day before the election date.81 Similarly, although AMDP could recruit a candidate for the Myawaddy constituency, mainly because of financial difficulties, the party was late in fielding its candidate.82 As a result, the USDP candidate automatically won the seat without a poll.

Moreover, the UEC gave only nine-and-a-half weeks between the closing date for the candidate nomination and the election date. In collaboration with local authorities, it exercised its despotic power over the campaign activities of the opposition parties in both Karen and Mon States. UEC and the local military authorities, with the enforcement of government security forces and civilian line departments, imposed tight restraints on the election campaigns of non-military-backed ethnic political parties during the transient campaign period.83 These short lead time and restrictions made campaign activities challenging and burdensome for the burgeoning Karen and Mon parties, who struggled due to financial and logistical constraints. The Mon and Karen political parties did not receive enough time to mobilise the population and convey their message to their respective electorates. While the commission easily granted permissions to the USDP, its allies, and proxy parties for campaign activities, Mon and Karen parties had to meet various requirements and, in many cases, faced frustrating delays in receiving the permissions. The parties faced numerous forms of constraints around holding mass rallies and campaigns.84 The election commission rejected several applications of Karen parties

81 A voluntary election observer (sponsored by CPCS), interview by the author, March 11, 2016, Kawtkareik Town, Kayin State. 82 Nai San Tin (former MSP of AMDP), interview. 83 On 21 June, 2010, UEC issued a directive stipulating the required procedures, rules, regulations and prohibitions on mass rallies and assemblies, speeches and media communication organised by the parties that constrained the freedom of assembly, speech and action required for a free and fair democratic election. Political parties were required to apply for permission from the relevant township UEC at least a week in advance of any political assembly or mass meeting. The parties were also required to submit speeches of their party leaders and candidates in advance and UEC scrutinised all the speeches to censor public criticism of the military government and the Constitution. 84 A leader of a Karen political party, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Twon, Kayin State; a former MSP of AMDP, Mon State Parliament, interview by the author, January 28, 2017, Kyaikmaraw Town, Mon State.

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for a campaign rally. In many areas, the local authorities did not allow the parties to use public places such as playgrounds or religious compounds as the venue for their campaign rallies.85 Moreover, in the few campaigns that took place in the government stronghold Karen urban propers, Karen candidates including senior party leaders could not deliver empowering and convincing speeches and relate their candidature to the voters. For example, many Karen candidates would sit next to the household shrine and give the speeches censored by the UEC to a few listeners, rather than discussing the issues that faced the communities or taking questions from the audience.86 A Hpa-an native Karen voter noted that their talks were mostly incomprehensible and boring, although they conceded that no one dared to raise the issues faced in the daily lives of the community.87

Moreover, mainly for the reason of insecurity, the authorities deterred non-military- affiliated Karen parties from travelling to most rural Karen villages and obstructed the parties from holding political rallies and freely canvassing their candidates.88 PSDP candidates were even unable to campaign in the villages in Papun Township located an hour’s drive from Hpa-an.89 At the same time, Karen parties also faced low voter engagement throughout the election campaign period. The long-standing insecurity and fear of the presence of various security forces, especially the military, police and people militias of the government, also contributed to the lack of voter engagement in Karen- populated areas under continued armed conflict.90 Even in urban areas in Karen cities, the presence of security forces effectively deterred people from turning out to the campaign rallies of the Karen parties.91

Conversely, the Mon political party performed relatively well in its campaign activities across Mon-populated areas in the Mon, Karen and Tanintharyi regions. Although the

85 A leader of Karen political party, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 86 Ibid. 87 A local book store owner, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State; A leader of Karen Affairs Committee, interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. 91 A leader of Karen political party, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State.

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election commission imposed various obstacles, due to the more stable security conditions, less threatening environment and improved physical infrastructure across the areas, UEC could not excessively reject or delay the applications for mass rallies and public meetings of AMDP.92 Moreover, many township-level leaders of AMDP had contact or encounters with the local authorities and members of the local election commission, who were mostly retired or acting teachers or township-level staff of the education department, through their previous political and social activities.93 Thanks to the relentless efforts of its local leaders, AMDP candidates mostly gained permission for their campaign rallies in time. For instance, a leader of AMDP in Thanbyuzayart township, who was also a former leader of MSDN and known to the local police SB as a social activist, met directly with the police commander and requested help and attained permission for campaigns that were blocked by the township election commission.94

Moreover, with the support of Mon social, religious, and business communities, AMDP faced fewer difficulties in identifying venues for its election campaigns. Many Mon monasteries and community organisations offered their places and facilities for mass meetings and public talks. Many head monks in Mon villages also offered their preaching halls and monastery compounds for public talks and encouraged the villagers to attend the campaigns.95 For instance, in a Mon village in Kayin State, although UEC and the local authorities rejected and deterred AMDP’s use of the village pagoda compound and playground of the primary school for a campaign rally, the head monk and trustee of the village monastery offered the party the use of the monastery campus instead.96 Public turnout and participation across Mon-populated areas in both Mon and Kayin States were relatively high, due to the stable security conditions and better developed physical infrastructure. As the Mon population in the government stronghold areas were accustomed to the presence of security forces, the deployment of security personnel in

92 A local party leader of AMDP, interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Thanbyuzayart, Mon State; a former MSP of AMDP, interview by the author, January 28, 2017, Kyaikmaraw Town, Mon State. 93 Ibid. 94 A local party leader of AMDP, interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Thanbyuzayart, Mon State. 95 Ibid. 96 A former MSP of AMDP, interview by the author, March 13, 2016, Dammasadh Village, Hpa-an Township, Kayin State; a former township administrator, interview by the author, January 28, 2017, Kyaikmaraw Town, Mon State.

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the campaigns of AMDP did not affect the public turnout.97 Even in the mass meetings in the NMSP-controlled villages, public turnout was high.98 Public engagement in the mass mobilisation activities of AMDP across Mon-populated areas was encouraging, except in the urban centres dominated by the election boycott movement of the NLD and MNP, such as Mawlamyine. In most townships, many willingly took the campaign handouts and flyers and posted the campaign flags and stickers of AMDP on their vehicles and motorcycles until the election date.99

(b) Voter education

In the meantime, regarding voter education, most voters in both Karen and Mon- populated areas were not aware of the function and implication of the election. The voter education programs of UEC in print media and televised were instated far too late and were apparently insufficient.100 Because of the restrictions on public gatherings and the censorship of the election-related public information, Karen parties could provide only limited voter education to the population. Under the hostile and unstable security conditions, Karen parties and their associated community groups could not provide systematic and accessible voter education to the voters.101 In many cases, members of Karen parties could only advocate their respective electorate to vote for them, rather than providing information and educating the voters about the election and their civic rights.102 Given the low level of voter education and the limited access to public communication and media in most of the rural Karen areas, many Karen voters lacked knowledge about

97 Min Soe Thein, a former MSP of AMDP, interview by the author, March 13, 2016, Dammasadh Village, Hpa-an Township, Kayin State; Nai Myoe Tint Lwin (former MP of Nationalities Assembly), interview by the author, March 13, 2016, Kawtbein Village, Hpa-an Township, Kayin State. 98 Min Tun Myint Kyaw, Chairperson of town Municipal Committee, interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Thanbyuzayart, Mon State; a former MP of AMDP, interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Thanbyuzayart, Mon State. 99 Ibid; Min Min Nwe (Journalist), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Nai Lwi Oung (former Minister of Energy and Electricity, Mon State Government), interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Thanbyuzayart, Mon State. 100 The voter education in State-run newspapers only began on October 24, 2010 and was on state television a week prior to this. 101 A leader of Karen political party, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 102 Ibid.

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the election and did not understand what they were voting for or how to vote.103 Many were unable to ensure that they had correctly filled in the ballots for the candidates for whom they wanted to vote.104 Conversely, community-level party activists of AMDP and the Mon civil society groups were actively involved in voter education and civic empowerment activities in Mon-populated areas across Mon and Kayin States. Since the younger leaders of AMDP and Mon civil society actors had for years had contacts with national NGOs, such as Myanmar Egress and EcoDev, and groups in exile in Thailand, such as Vahu Development Foundation, they gained better access to technical and financial support for their voter education activities.105 These national NGOs and groups in exile provided a series of training for trainers programs to the Mon political and social groups and offered financial and technical support for their voter education activities.106 Taking the risk of possible censure by the authorities, some civil society groups in Ye Township even conducted monastery-based and door-to-door voter education movements in several NMSP stronghold villages.107

Moreover, although the local authorities and some supporters of USDP tried to obstruct the voter education activities of Mon political and social organisations, the stable security conditions and robust Mon civil society networks helped the Mon political community in overcoming most of these. Consequently, in many instances on the election date, Mon voters showed their knowledge of the election procedure and correctly claimed their voting rights. For instance, although a polling station officer in Mudoon Village in Chaungzon Township rejected their voting rights with the reason of they were not on the voter list, over 100 voters correctly claimed and regained their voting rights.108 As

103 A voluntary election observer (sponsored by CPCS), interview by the author, March 11, 2016, Kawtkareik Town, Kayin State; a medical practitioner, interview by the author, March 7, 2016, Kamamoung Town, Papun Township, Kayin State. 104 A voluntary election observer (sponsored by CPCS), interview by the author, March 11, 2016, Kawtkareik Town, Kayin State. 105 A director of local NGO (a former member of NMSP underground movement), interview by the author, February 26, 2016, Ye Town, Mon State; a member of a secret election monitoring team (Fhi- 360 project), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 106 Ibid. 107 A director of local NGO (a former member of NMSP underground movement), interview by the author, February 26, 2016, Ye Town, Mon State. 108 A local journalist (former activist), interview by the author, January 26, 2017, Mudoon Village, Chaungzon Township, Mon State; a member of a secret election monitoring team (Fhi-360 project), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State.

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suggested by the voter education programs, the voters proved that they had previously checked and confirmed their voting rolls and demanded their voting rights. After hours of standoff, the polling station staff produced the concealed sets of voter rolls and allowed the group to vote.109

The suffrage in Karen- and Mon-populated areas was not free, equal, secret, and universal. However, while voters in all the constituencies in the ceasefire Mon-populated areas across Mon State, Karen State and Tanintharyi Region had the chance to elect their representatives, almost of half of the Karen populations in Kayin and Mon States did not have the chance to vote.110 On September 16, 2010, UEC declared the cancellation of elections in various constituencies in Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Mon, and Shan States on the grounds of a lack of conducive conditions to hold free and fair elections.111 All the areas in Kayin and Mon States in which UEC cancelled elections were largely under the control or contestation of KNU and the populations were generally opposed to the military regime. However, the commission did not cancel elections in any constituency in the Mon-populated villages under the control of NMSP in Ye Township in Mon State and Kawtkareik, Kyarinnseikgyi, and Three-Pagoda sub-Townships in Kayin State, where most people would vote against the military-backed USDP. For instance, although there were elections in all the Mon-populated villages in Kyarinseikkyi Township, the commission cancelled elections in 46 Karen-populated village tracts in the same Township.112 UEC did not hold elections in 155 of 410 village tracts in Kayin State amounting to 47.25 per cent of the total village tracts in Kayin State and in most of the

109 Ibid. 110 UEC announced the cancellation of elections in 4.08 per cent of villages in Mon State and all the villages in the Karen-populated villages under continued fighting. UEC also announced the cancellation of election in 10.69 per cent of villages in Shan State, 11.93 per cent in Kayah State and 16.60 per cent in Kachin State. 111 In total, UEC excluded over 3,300 villages in 465 village tracts from the polling. “Vote Cancellations in Conflict Areas Higher than in 2010,” Myanmar Times, accessed July 19, 2017, https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/16991-vote-cancellations-in-conflict-areas-higher-than-in- 2010.html. See also, Burma Fund UN Office, Burma’s 2010 Elections: A Comprehensive Report (New York: Burma Fund, UN Office, 2011), 26–27. 112 “2010 General Elections, Constituencies,” Myanmar Union Election Commission, accessed July 19, 2017, http://www.uecmyanmar.org/. See also Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, “2010 Myanmar General Elections: Learning and Sharing for Future” (2011), 43–44.

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nine Karen-populated village tracts in Beelin and Kyaikhto Townships in Mon State, amounting to 4.08 per cent of the village tracts in Mon State.

Meanwhile, UEC and the supporters of USDP fraudulently manipulated the key procedures that were important to the integrity of the election in favour of the military- backed USDP and its allied proxy parties. There were pervasive indications of irregularities such as manipulation of voter rolls, interference by polling booth staff, volunteers of the election commission and the authorities, and defrauding of advance votes and absentee votes. Many could not cast their votes as their names were not on the voter rolls. Many observers agree that the most disenfranchised voters were those who were supporters or prospectives to vote for Karen and Mon parties. In many cases, voters could not cast their vote because somebody had already voted on their behalf without their knowledge.113 Some polling station staff reportedly concealed sets of voter rolls throughout the day and denied voters their right to cast their votes and, without the knowledge of the absentees, marked the absent voter forms after the booths had closed.114

(d) Voter turnout

As the authorities desperately manipulated the polling process on the day of the election, it is difficult, if not impossible, to know the real voter turnout in both Karen- and Mon- populated areas. According to the Karen political parties and independent election monitoring groups, voter turnout across Karen-populated areas was considerably low.115 In the war-affected or highly contested mountainous areas and borderlands of the Karen- populated areas, poor electoral information and civic education and hard-to-access polling booths prevented many of the Karen population from voting.116 At the same time, as the election did not appear to have relevance for the difficulties facing the daily lives

113 A voluntary election observer (sponsored by CPCS), interview by the author, March 11, 2016, Kawtkareik Town, Kayin State. 114 A volunteer EC staff member, interview by the author, January 12, 2016, Mudoon Village, Chaungzon Township, Mon State. 115 A leader of Karen political party, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State; A voluntary election observer (sponsored by CPCS), interview by the author, March 11, 2016, Kawtkareik Town, Kayin State. 116 A party leader (a Karen State-based political party), interview; a prominent Karen community leader, interview.

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of the populations, there was very little popular interest.117 Given the prolonged civil war and decades of suppression, the level of trust remained very low between and among the political parties and the societies towards the state.118

Meanwhile, to achieve a high voter turnout that voted for USDP candidates, the staff of the local administrative councils and UEC forced government civil servants, especially health and education personnel, as well as the local militia groups to cast their votes for USDP.119 Based on their past experiences of the consequences of not voting for the military-backed candidates, many civil servants in Kayin State expressed fears such as losing their jobs and cast their ballots for USDP, although many also managed to vote for their preferred Karen candidates. Conversely, although voter turnout was quite low in the urban centres that had called for an election boycott, the turnout in most rural Mon areas was relatively high. This high voter turnout could be seen through the election success of many AMDP candidates, even amid massive vote rigging and manipulation. In Ye, Thanbyuzart, and Mudon Township, Mon State, most candidates of the AMDP won a decisive majority of the votes, in which the number of addible advance votes in favour of the USDP remained far too low in reference to the total number of eligible voters in the constituency. For instance, in the contest for No. 1 constituency for State Assembly in Ye Township, the primary vote counted for Nai Lwi Oung of AMDP was 16,532, while that for U Pe Aung of USDP was 4,411. As the approved total eligible voters for the constituency was 25,782, it was impossible to change the election result by adding the remaining 2,809 absent votes to the original 2,431 advance votes for the candidate of USDP.120

117 Ibid. 118 UEC data showed over 65 per cent and 62 per cent voter turnouts in Kayin State and Mon State, respectively. However, observers and party leaders expressed their scepticism on the claim of UEC of a 99.33 per cent voter turnout for the No. 10 National Assembly constituency in Kawtkareik Township and a 95.39 per cent voter turnout for the No. 12 National Assembly constituency in Kyarinnseikkyi Township.118 119 A voluntary election observer (sponsored by CPCS), interview by the author, March 11, 2016, Kawtkareik Town, Kayin State. 120 According to the statistics released by the UEC, the AMDP candidate secured 318 of the 2,850 advanced votes casted. The candidate of NUP, the allied party of USDP, gained 2,090 votes in total.

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Development of Basic Civil Liberty

Although it was not free and fair, the 2010 Myanmar elections did bring about the potential for a viable democratic transition in Myanmar. The elections held important potentials attributive to Myanmar moving towards a democratic and plural society. Although most of the changes were deliberately aimed at enhancing the political legitimacy of the government itself, some positive political changes and respect for basic civil rights gradually began to take place. Some scholars even suggest that the semi- civilian government undertook political steps “that have led to a much more liberal political environment”.121

Compared to the period of direct military rule, civic freedoms, including freedom of association, assembly, and media expression expanded considerably. Soon after taking up office, the government formally recognised the role of civil society in the country’s democratic transition and opened up and legalised the previously tightly restricted spaces for civil society actors and activities. Article 354 of the 2008 Myanmar Constitution guarantees the rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly, as well as religion, language and culture.122 While it continued to restrict the freedoms of assembly, association and expression, the Myanmar semi-civilian government underwent a slow transition towards greater openness. It allowed the activities of both registered and non- registered civil society and community-based organisations. It also legalised trade unions and student unions and legislated students’ demonstrations and labour strikes. By enacting the Law of Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession (2011) and the Law Relating to Registration of Organizations (2014), the government legalised the operating space for CSOs and eased restrictions in the registration process of associations.

Similarly, for the first time in over half a century, the minority ethnic populations in the country began attaining their basic civil rights including the freedom of association, assembly and media communication, although all of which remained limited. As part of the tentative decentralisation process, the semi-civilian government at the centre decentralised the power of local associations to approve or reject a registration application

121 See, for example, N. Ganesan, “Interpreting Recent Developments in Myanmar as an Attempt to Establish Political Legitimacy,” Asian Journal of Peacebuilding 1, no. 2 (2013): 258. 122 Ministry of Information,Myanmar. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (Yangon: Printing and Publishing Enterprise, Ministry of Information, 2008).

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to the Ministry of Social Welfare of the local government. However, the rights to peaceful association and assembly in the country remain fragile. Despite the constitutional protection of freedom of expression, those who are critical of the military or government are continually detained, imprisoned or threatened. Nonetheless, students, lawyers, labourers and peasants have been assembling and protesting on a range of issues including education, wages, land grabbing, the environment, and controversial infrastructure constructions and the extractive industry. As with the establishment of political parties and elections, the uptake of these new freedoms differed between Mon and Karen areas.

7.3.1. Freedom of association

Within months of the national liberalisation, Mon communities started forming expectations of changes at the national level and tried to interact with the fast-emerging space for political and social activities. The fledgling civil society in the ceasefire Mon- populated areas quickly grasped the opportunities and began new initiatives across the areas. After years of operating under the radar and risking imprisonment, Mon civil society groups grabbed the emerging legalised space for operation and many started openly forming formal organisations and networks, although most of the organisations were not ready to apply for registration with the local government. In fact, Mon civil society actors themselves expanded more space through both direct and indirect advocacy and interactions with the authorities at the local level. Within months of the liberalisation, many faith-based, rights-based and social service providing Mon organisations and associations had openly begun engaging in sociocultural and development activities across the areas. Over time, the Ministry of Social Welfare of the Mon State Government recognised the activities of various CSOs and granted organisational registration certificates to organisations with sufficient documentation and financial clearance.123 The department approved the registration applications of over 20 local NGOs in 2015.124 Unlike its past experience, the MCF attained its registration in 2014 without much difficulty.125 Some activists also formed politically engaged independent organisations

123 Dr HLa Oo (former Minister of Social Welfare-Mon State), interview by the author, February 14, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 124 Ibid. 125 Mi Htao Nyan (director of MCF), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State.

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such as the Mon State Students’ Union and Farmer Rights Protection Association and often provided mediating services between the communities and the government authorities, including the military.126 In June 2014, 180 representatives from 75 CSOs based in Mon State came together in a regional civil society forum and presented a list of recommendations on issues relating to the country’s democratic transition, peacebuilding, human rights and socioeconomic development to both Mon State and Central governments.127 Together with the MWO, MSDN was also involved in facilitating the development of a distinctive indigenous education system in Mon State.128 Organisations such as LAMYO and some youth groups started providing capacity building training, mobilising the population to raise their voices on issues that affected their daily lives and publicised the rights violations of the military and local authorities.129

Within a few years, in both the government strongholds and NMSP-controlled areas, there was a proliferation of NGOs and CBOs providing capacity building programs and addressing social welfare, livelihood, health and education issues. The number, size and scope of local NGO and CBO increased by folds. For instance, instead of only the Mon Literature and Culture Committee and the ward-based reciprocating funeral association, Lamaine Town had its own CSOs such as the Lamaing Town Development Network and local media group Lamaing News.130 According to statistics of the Mon CSO Network, in most Mon-populated rural townships including Chaungzon, Mudon, Paung, and Ye, the number of issues-based local CBOs, such as the reciprocal funeral fund, youth development organisations, health and education assistance groups and livelihood

126 Min Hantala Mon (Chairperson of MSSU), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Min Aung Mon (director of FRPA), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Mawlamyine. 127 Yan Snaing, “Mon Civil Society Calls for State Govt Reforms, Role in Peace Process,” The Irrawaddy, June 27, 2014, accessed May 24, 2016, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/mon- civil-society-calls-state-govt-reforms-role-peace-process.html 128 Lall and South, “Comparing Models of Non-State Ethnic Education in Myanmar: The Mon and Karen National Education Regimes”. 129 Min Htay Naing (former leader of LAMYO), interview by the author, February 18, 2016, Mudon, Mon State. 130 Min Ye Mon (local trader), interview by the author, February 25, 2016, Lamine Town, Mon State; Min Thein Htun Oo (a local businessman), interview by the author, March 15, 2017, Lamine Town, Mon State.

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supporting groups increased from 20 to 60.131 At the same time, while the number of associations increased to over 20 in the previously contested areas such as Khawzar sub- Township in which there was no CSO, in the capital township of Mawlamyine it reached over 90.132 Some organisations expanded their coverage even into the highly militarised areas, such as Khawzar sub-Township in Mon State and Yebyu Township in Tanintharyi Region.133 With the financial and technical support of the Yangon- and Mawlamyine- based UN agencies, national NGOs, cross-border INGOs and groups in exile many started providing humanitarian and emergency relief services to the populations in need.134

Moreover, many civil society networks and organisations in Mon-populated areas began to collaborate with national and international NGOs and engage in socioeconomic development activities in the areas. For instance, in collaboration with INGOs and research institutes including MDRI-CESD and Swissaid Myanmar, Mon State CSO Network, MWO, and Mon Youth Friends engaged in development projects across Mon State such as the living condition survey and labour force survey.135 Donors and the international community also continually increased their financial and technical assistance for the development of the Mon civil society sector. Through their existing contacts, groups such as MSDN, MWO, and MCF openly signed partnership contracts with various UN agencies, international government organisations, and INGOs working inside the country.136 During the years, the MWO and Mon Youth Education Organisation signed contracts with Swissaid Myanmar for projects relating to maternal and child development and Care Myanmar and MSDN partnered with the Pyoe Pin Programme of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office for an education support project in Mon-

131 Min Aung Htoo (a leader of Mon State CSO Network), interview by the author, February 16, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 132 Ibid. 133 Ibid; Min Min Nwe (former director of MSDN), interview. 134 Ibid; Nai Soi Ha (director of Ramannya Peace Foundation), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Kyi Zaw Lwin (local UNDP official), interview by the author, February 14, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 135 Mi Win Thida (former senior researcher, MDRI-CESD), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 136 Mi Kun Chan Non (a leader of MWO), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Mi Htao Nyan (director of MCF), interview.

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populated areas.137 Similarly, many Mon NGOs and CBOs became the implementation partners of UN agencies, including UNDP, UNHCR, IOM, ILO, and UNICEF, while some worked with INGOs such as Swissaid Myanmar, Care Myanmar, Save the Children Myanmar, and others.138 At the same time, with their contacts inside the government- controlled Mon communities, some border-based exiled Mon NGOs also expanded their coverage areas from the borderland towards the expanding rural villages and emerging urban centres.139 For instance, formerly border-based Jeephya Civil Society Development Foundation and Remonnya Peace Foundation moved their base offices to Ye Town and Mawlamyine, respectively, at the end of 2011 and has been openly engaging in rights issues in the areas, especially land rights and human rights issues.140 In mid-2014, with the funding and technical facilitation of UNDP, hundreds of CSOs across Mon State came together and formed a Mon State CSO Network with an executive body of 29 representatives from all 10 townships.141

Conversely, although the government policy and new laws increased the operational space for civil society, the space for civil society remained restricted in Karen-populated areas. Despite substantial reforms at the national level, the embryonic Karen social and cultural groups could not form into formal associations under the strict restrictions of the local authorities. Mainly on the grounds of insecurity, authorities in Kayin State declined to absorb the reforms at the centre and reflect these in the local context under their rule.142 As security conditions in the area remained unstable, the Karen State Government restricted any grouping and prohibited associational activities.143 For instance, the local government deferred approval of the registration application of the Hpa-an-based KLCA

137 Ibid; Mi Kun Chan Non (a leader of MWO), interview; Min Min Nwe (former director of MSDN), interview. 138 Ibid; Mi Kun Chan Non (a leader of MWO), interview. 139 Nai Kasouh Mon (a leader of a Mon development NGO, border based), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine. 140 Ibid; Nai Soi Ha, (director of RPF), interview; Nai Kao Lon (director of JCSDF), interview by the author, February 26, 2016, Ye Town, Mon State. 141 Min Aung Htoo (chairperson of Mon State CSO Network), interview. 142 A leader of a Karen political party, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State; a senior Karen community leader (Hpa-an), interview interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 143 A leader of Karen political party, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State.

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and limited the literature and cultural activity of associations such as the summer Karen literacy programs in rural Karen villages.144

Moreover, although some patrons of the association became members of the State Cabinet, they could not help promote the activities of the organisation in the conflict- affected Karen communities.145 Similarly, efforts by elders to register the Margha Social Association, a locally-based long-standing social assistance organisation, were unsuccessful until recently. Even the Yangon-based, well-connected KDN could only operate in a limited space in the rural Karen areas under continued armed conflict.146 Karen communities in the government-controlled areas were unable to form any social development NGO or CBO. In 2013, the State Chief Minister warned Karen civil society actors that because the State Government had already formed all the necessary committees for rural development, no more civil society group need form for rural development purposes and it prohibited the formation of new NGOs and CBOs across Kayin State.147 A local Karen leader also lamented that while Mon social activists could form the Mon CSO Network covering the whole Mon State, the authorities in Kayin State forced Karen civil society actors to stop their efforts to establish a township CSO platform in Thandaung Township.148 Most Karen faith-based organisations also had to continue to provide assistance to the local communities under a low profile, often under the close watch of the authorities. Karen social and political activists suggest that the unstable security condition and the weak socioeconomic development of the areas were the main obstacles.149

Meanwhile, on the grounds of insecurity, international humanitarian and development NGOs could not help the development of local Karen social associations. For example,

144 Ibid. 145 A former minister (Kayin-1), interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Twon, Kayin State. 146 A leader of Karen political party, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State; a senior Karen community leader, interview by the author, January 18, 2017, Yangon; a prominent Karen community leader, interview by the author, January 18, 2017, Yangon. 147 A leader of Karen Affairs Committee, interview with the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Karen State. 148 A director of a Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Karen State. 149 A country director of an INGO (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, January 21, 2017, Yangon; An official of an international peace organisation (a former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon.

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although Save the Children and the Norwegian Relief Council were the first INGOs to gain access to Kayin State in the aftermath of the government’s liberalisation, citing reasons of insecurity and insurgency in rural Karen areas, the Kayin State Government limited the organisations to operate only in the urban area proper of Hpa-an city.150 At the same time, the local government closely watched the activities of the INGOs and obstructed their organisational development activities and capacity building programs for the fledgling local Karen civil society groups.151 For example, even after the ceasefire of KNU, the Karen State Government denied the application of Karen State Social Network to provide a capacity building program to the nascent Karen CBOs in Hpa-an Town.152 Moreover, even in the later years, many national and international organisations faced difficulties in identifying local partners and implementing their projects. For example, even as recently as mid-2015, researchers from MDRI and Michigan State University were unable to identify a local partner to conduct their scoping mission for a development project and faced restrictions from both the local government and KNU commanders.153 In addition to insecurity, the limited social and physical infrastructure, rudimentary and fragmented condition of social services, and the continued mostly subsistent economy also presented major obstacles for the development of associational life in Kayin- populated areas.

7.3.2. The media

For decades, freedom of expression and mass media communication in Myanmar were weak and ranked at the bottom of all the media freedom indexes. However, following liberalisation in 2010, the semi-civilian government relaxed the country’s strict media regulations and internal censorships and unlocked the websites of opposition groups in exile and those of international news agencies. Moreover, the relaxing of licensing requirements and the liquidation of the notorious Press Scrutiny and Registration Division in 2012, revived press freedom in a prolonged authoritarian state. In 2013, the government

150 A country director of an INGO (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, January 21, 2017, Yangon. 151 Ibid. 152 A prominent Karen community leader, interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Karen State. 153 A senior researcher of MDRI-CESD, interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon.

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allowed the publishing of private daily newspapers and granted permission to a few ethnic media outlets. Hundreds of weekly and daily journals, monthly magazines and newspapers that also covered criticism of the government and reported on the activities of the opposition political parties resumed publication. Some exile-run media groups also attained registration and started operating from inside the country. These remarkable relaxations created a different climate for the media. However, censorship still exists in the country and the authorities of the semi-civilian government continued to intimidate, prosecute and arrest journalists for critical journalism and public disclosure of controversial issues. In the past few years, although a range of limitations remained, the greater freedom of expression in the ethnic areas enabled the emergence of independent ethnic media and information flow in local ethnic languages on local issues. Similar to the development of freedom of association, the improvement in media and mass communication was uneven in Karen and Mon-populated areas.

With the enabling background context, at their peak of natural progression, Mon political and civil society groups could take the initiative in creating independent local media organisations before liberalisation at the national level. During the past decades, successive Myanmar governments have banned teaching and publishing in the Mon language. Moreover, because the media relaxation in the early years of Myanmar liberalisation process did not cover publications in ethnic languages, it was impossible to obtain a publication license for a journal published in an ethnic language. Thus, after consulting with other religious, political and civil society groups, a Yangon-based religious network began publishing the Amardain monthly Mon journal in early 2011.154 Both Mon senior and young monk networks across Yangon, Mon and Kayin State became involved in reporting media information and distributing the journal, while individual experts from a wide range of Mon political and social communities have provided information and technical expertise.155 The group continues to regularly publish the journal.

Meanwhile, since the years of the ceasefire, some high-ranking, middle-ranking, and combatants of NMSP retired from the party and returned home or permanently migrated

154 Rev Konninnya (a senior head monk), interview by the author, interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon; Nai Maung Toe (former chairperson, MLCC-Yangon), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 155 Rev Konninnya (a senior head monk), interview.

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abroad. At the same time, many members of the NMSP underground movement, who had turned to political and social activists in the ceasefire Mon-populated areas, became aware of the need to catch up with the changes that had taken place at the national level. As a result, in early 2012, although harsh media censorship was still in place, some returning leading figures of NMSP and local CSO leaders established a locally-based Mon media organisation in Mawlamyine, Mon State. In April 2012, based on their past relationships with the government’s Minister of Information during the years of the Myanmar National Convention and the national parliaments, some retired NMSP leaders secured a license to publish a locally-based ethnic periodical journal.156 When the Mon media group published the first issue of Thanlwin Times on May 7, 2012, it was the first legally published monthly journal based in an ethnic state of the country and the only journal published in both Bamar and Mon languages. As its leading editors were former social and political activists from established CSO networks, especially the LAMYO, MSDN, and CBOs across the ceasefire Mon-populated areas, the new Mon media house could establish a reporting network of citizen journalism within a few months.157 During the first months of publication, through its citizen journalism training, the Thanlwin Times trained hundreds of local reporters, journalists and technical experts and established a reporting network.158

At the same time, through the existing local NGOs and CBOs, including the religious organisations, the Mon media group set up a distribution network for the journal across Mon-populated areas. With the liquidation of state media censorship and the improvement in new electronic communication, road transportation, and printing technology, the Thanlwin Times became a locally-based weekly journal, although this was economically risky for a nascent media group. Moreover, through its old contacts, Thanlwin Times was also involved in t border-based and regional media networking such as Burma News International (BNI), an exiled media network of 12 Myanmar ethnic

156 Nai Chan Toit (Chief Executive Editor of Thanlwin Times and former CEC of NMSP), interview by the author, February 26, 2016, Ye Town, Mon State; Dr Banyar Aung Moe (former MP of AMDP and former CC of NMSP), interview by the author, February 23, 2016, Three-Pagoda Town, Kayin State. 157 Min Min Nwe (Executive Editor, Thanlwin Times), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 158 Ibid.

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groups and Southeast Asia Press Alliance.159 The Thanlwin Times was the only locally- based ethnic media organisation with a formal publication license participating in such cross-border media networks.160 In mid-2013, with the support of BNI, Thanlwin Times hosted the Ethnic Media Conference in Mawlamyine and, in collaboration with the Mon State CSO Network, developed future programs for the development of ethnic media in other ethnic areas.161 The conference also established a regular connection and interaction between the media groups and CSOs in the area. Moreover, since 2013, through contacts from the local cabinet minister, Thanlwin Times became connected with the Speaker of Mon State Parliament and secured the position of yearly parliamentary watch.162 The State Legislative Assembly also granted Thanlwin Times permission to interview MSPs and officials, access to data and information and to hold press conferences in the parliament. In the meantime, the Chief Minister of Mon State Government also invited the group to submit a yearly review report on the activities of the State Government.163 Even the Chief Minister of Karen State, where development in local media lagged behind, invited the leading editors of Thanlwin Times to consult on the establishment of a local media group in Karen State.164

At the same time, the Independent Mon News Agency (IMNA), a border-based anti- government exile media outlet of the Mons established in the late 1990s, returned to establish its base offices in Yangon and Mawlamyine. In January 2013, one week after the Ministry of Information’s announcement of allowing the returning of exiled media organisations, the exiled Mon media group applied for a license and attained it within three weeks.165 Since IMNA already had adequate and trained undercover reporters and columnists inside the ceasefire Mon-populated areas, the news agency could establish its

159 Ibid; U Ko Ko Zaw (Editor-in-Charge, Thanlwin Times), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 160 Min Min Nwe (Executive Editor, Thanlwin Times), interview. 161 Ibid. 162 Ibid. 163 Ibid; U Ko Ko Zaw (Editor-in-Charge, Thanlwin Times), interview. 164 Min Min Nwe (Executive Editor, Thanlwin Times), interview. 165 Nai Kassough Mon (a director of IMNA), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine.

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news reporting network within weeks.166 Most of the young Mon journalists, including many young Mon Buddhist monks, had been travelling to the head offices of IMNA on the Myanmar-Thai border since the ceasefire of NMSP in the late 1990s to receive the necessary training and establish secret communication channels. Most of these journalists who were interviewed agreed that the relatively secure conditions and better road transportation facilities in the areas were the decisive conditions that encouraged them to participate in what was a highly risky activity at that time.167 Moreover, since the early 2000s IMNA had an established, but concealed, distribution network of its publications, especially its flagship biweekly journal in the Mon language, Snong Taing Journal (literally The Guiding Star).168 Thus, within months, the Mon newsgroup could formalise and expand its distribution network across the ceasefire Mon-populated areas. The township-level liaison offices of the Mon Young Monk Network, MYPO and various village-based CBOs were the imperative mainstays of the underground distribution network of the Mon media group.169 By 2004, IMNA had also made its publications available online.

This emergence of locally-based media outlets covering local issues and publishing in both Mon and Bamar languages improved the accessibility and flow of media information in the ceasefire Mon areas. The increase in communication facilitated interactions between the local population and authorities. However, the locally-based ethnic journalists who covered the news from the ethnic areas were required to keep a careful balance, especially in tone and subject, when presenting their news articles and reports.170 At the same time, unlike during the period of intense fighting, local Mon communities became less fearful of being interviewed by the journalists.171 The local population agreed that they were better informed by the local media outlets publishing in their own language.

166 Ibid. 167 Six journalists and reporters of Snong Taing Journal, in discussion with the author, February 15, 2016, Snong Taing office, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 168 Nai Kassough Mon (a director of IMNA), interview; Nai Banyar Aung (Director, IMNA), interview by the author, January 27, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 169 Ibid. 170 Min Min Nwe (Executive Editor, Thanlwin Times), interview. 171 Six journalists and reporters of Snong Taing Journal, in discussion with the author, February 15, 2016, Snong Taing office, Mawlamyine, Mon State.

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Even in the formerly highly contested Ye Township, media literacy among the Mon media stakeholders was comparatively high.172

Conversely, the continued fighting effectually constrained freedom of expression and hindered the development of local media and mass communication in Karen-populated areas. Until years after the KNU ceasefire, the development of media communication in Kayin State remained limited and Karen social and political communities could not establish independent Karen media entities. While there was vigorous development in media communication in Karen communities along the Myanmar-Thai borderland, the continued civil war prohibited the establishment of such media communication organisations. Although many experienced and trained Karen journalists and reporters had long been reporting from inside Karen communities to border-based Karen news and media agencies, such as Karen News, Karen journalists could not establish a media agency in the Karen-populated areas even when the government liberalised restrictions on mass media communication. Mainly because of the continued war hostilities and restrictions imposed by both sides, Karen journalists faced difficult challenges in establishing an independent Karen media organisation. Many agree that the major obstacles were the lower development in education and poor physical infrastructure in rural Karen areas.173 The substandard physical infrastructure, lower literacy rate and subsistence living in the areas hindered the development of Karen media communication.174 Even trained Karen journalists and reporters dared not report on the local issues taking place in their native areas.175

At the same time, the Karen communities were fearful of speaking to journalists and saw them as a bad omen. People did not feel safe in speaking to a journalist even when the

172 Ko Kyi Zaw Lwin (a local UNDP official), interview by the author, February 14, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 173 A Karen journalist (a director of international media network), interview by the author, February 7, 2016, Yangon. 174 Ibid; a senior Karen community leader, interview by the author, January 18, 2017, Yangon; a director of a Strategic Study Institute (former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon. 175 A director of Karen Information Centre, interview by the author, February 7, 2017, Hpa-an town, Karen State.

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journalist was a Karen national.176 Meanwhile, the local authorities also restricted and closely watched the travel and activities of media organisations based inside and on the border.177 Even in the early years of the KNU ceasefire (2012–2013), journalists and reporters of the mainstream Myanmar journals and news agencies could not report from inside Karen communities due to the unstable security condition.178 This slowly began to change after the KNU ceasefire became stable and conditions improved. Until then, those living in Karen-populated areas found it hard to access mass media information and communication related to their daily lives. In the meantime, the mostly Yangon-based mainstream national media organisations rarely covered local issues in Karen-populated areas.

Local Governance in Transition

Although the post-election new configuration of power still favoured the stronger military establishment, the introduction of new institutions and actors at the provincial level made the previously centralised state power more diffused. Since the induction of the liberalisation process of the semi-civilian government, the context in local political institutions changed dramatically. However, it had little legislative, executive and judicial power. Although the legislative power devolved to the provincial parliaments remained limited, the creation of State parliaments opened greater space for the ethnic political parties to represent the voices of their long-marginalised electorates. Despite significant limitations, for the first time in decades local governance institutions started to open political space to political and civil society communities and the media to participate in the reform process in the ethnic-populated areas. Moreover, the newly established local political institutions also provided room for territorial politics and local actors with an alternative form of political representation and participation, rather than armed insurgency as the only alternative, through the political parties and elections at the minority ethnic-dominated local entities. Although the legislative and executive power at the local legislatures and the associated governments remained limited, the presence of

176 Ibid; village elders and mid-career villagers, in discussion with the author, February 4, 2017, Hti Lon Village, Hlaingbwe Township, Kayin State; a former village head, interview by the author, February 4, 2017, Saw Thu Khee Village, Kyaikhto Township, Mon State. 177 A Karen journalist (a director of an international media network), interview by the author, February 7, 2016, Yangon. 178 Ibid.

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Karen and Mon political parties in the local governing institutions had some influence on the dynamic and outcomes of post-civil war democratic transition processes in the areas. For the first time, the new governance system partially decentralised the traditionally centralised legislative and executive power of the State to the local governing institutions. However, with all its courts subordinate to the national Supreme Court and the strict control of the President and the Chief Justices of the Union, there was no independent judicial system in the ethnic states and the changes in the local contexts were not apparent. Thus, this section examines the development in the parliaments and governments in Karen and Mon States and omits the judicial system as an institution of local governance.

7.4.1. State parliaments

While it remains a provincial-level state institution without a full autonomy, parliamentary activism has revived in the local political entities of the country. It is widely agreed that peace is a necessary condition for Myanmar democratisation, thus, it becomes consensual that federalism and decentralisation are important issues for a successful post- conflict democratic transition in conflict-affected ethnic-populated areas. However, the ‘contents’ of the local legislatures are limited and barely possess the power or ability to address the range of grievances the ethnic minority populations have faced for decades. Nonetheless, for the first time in the country’s modern history, it is at least a symbolic sign that the ethnic-concentrated periphery regions have been constitutionally granted a ‘form’ of autonomy. When the key democratic fundamentals are in place, this movement towards some sort of decentralisation and, thus, federalism could be conducive to the democratic transition of the conflict-affected ethnic societies. In the case of the Mon State Legislative Assembly, a sense of optimism has gradually emerged among the population, business and civil societies that the local parliaments could become a reliable oversight organ that is able to check the once-unrivalled powers of the government and its branch institutions at the local level. Although the MPs from ethnic political parties did not have substantial influence in the central level parliaments, the previously marginalised ethnic groups now have the chance through the newly established institutions of local governance to speak on issues that affect their daily lives. This change in local-level representation also brings about a more responsive and informed local governance in the mostly conflict-affected ethnic communities. However, as parliaments reflect the prevailing political background context along with the will and whims of the speakers

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and perceptions of speakers and members, the status of the politics of lawmaking and oversight in Mon and Karen State Legislative Assemblies developed very differently.

After widely shared post-election scepticism, many gradually became enthusiastic about the re-emergence of parliamentary politics and increasingly lively debates on the floor of Mon State Legislative Assembly. In the beginning, in the presence of the 17 MSPs of USDP and eight military appointees, the Mon political and social communities did not expect the six MSPs of AMDP could stand independently and influence the local legislative assembly in policy formulation and lawmaking.179 Nor did the dominant business groups believe that the Mon MSPs would be allowed to participate in provincial economic planning and implementation.180 However, surprisingly, the MSPs found that the political space at the State parliaments was less constrained than at the national level.181 Although cautious and within a planned or premeditated extent, MSPs in Mon State Parliament were able to actively participate in parliamentary debates, influence voting and propose bills.182 The stable security situation, energetic civil society and fast growing local media providing the enabling background condition for the development.183 The MSPs of AMDP created, at least, an embryonic form of political opposition in the newly emerged local legislative assembly and enabled Mon ethnic constituencies to have more say on issues that affected their daily lives. The Parliament in Mon State, to an extent, could exercise oversight of the government’s accountability and procedures and, in turn, endorsed the country’s tentative democratisation process.

Although the MSPs of AMDP faced difficulties due to the unfamiliar environment and laws restricting their activities, most managed to act in accordance with the rules and

179 Dr Aung Naing Oo (Deputy Speaker, Mon State Parliament), interview by the author, February 14, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Nai San Tin (former MSP of AMDP), interview. 180 Min Banyar San (a leading Mon businessman), interview by the author, February 13, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Min Maung Nge (a leader of Mon business community), interview by the author, February 15, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 181 Min Myoe Tint Lwin (former MP of AMDP, Nationalities Assembly), interview by the author, March 13, 2016, Kawtbein Village, Hpa-an Township, Kayin State; Dr Banyar Aung Moe (former MP of AMDP and former CC of NMSP), interview; Nai San Tin (former MSP of AMDP), interview. 182 Nai San Tin (former MSP of AMDP), interview; Dr Aung Naing Oo (Deputy Speaker of Mon State Parliament), interview. 183 However, there was also a substantial loss under the old-fashioned clientelist and patrimonial co- option and strong pressure of the ruling USDP. Ibid; Nai San Tin (former MSP of AMDP), interview.

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adapt to the new legislative politics to further expand the limited space available. After a few sessions of the first assembly, the MSPs began to openly question once politically sensitive policy topics.184 For the first time in the country’s modern history, Mon political forces had the opportunity to take part in a local legislative assembly as a formal political opposition body. Over the years, the MSPs were increasingly able to check the activities of the local executive body and, whenever they had the opportunity, routinely challenge governmental policies and question the executive power of the State Government.185 Some MSPs challenged and asked for clarifications regarding the proposals of the State Government and a few even exposed cases of corruption, abuses of power and rights violation by the Army personnel and local authorities in their respective constituencies. The MSPs of AMDP proved they understood and had the ability to deal with the ruling government and constructively engage on issues that were important to the local populations. Although the debates were often vibrant, less confrontational and, sometimes, occurred outside the chamber of the parliament.186

Moreover, the MSPs of AMDP could play an important role in turning the emerging uncertain political space into an arena for political debate and, to some extent, were successful in influencing the policies and activities of the previously untouchable executive power. Mon MSPs publicly debated political, social and economic issues that had once been considered taboo in the Assembly. Through the few sessions of the legislature, with the synchronised efforts of the Mon political and social communities, civil society actors and media organisations, the MSPs could utilise the advantage of newly available formal political space effectively and, where possible, voice the views of the populations they represented. The MSPs used an array of techniques, including asking questions of cabinet ministers, proposing bills to oversee government activities and debating government policies in the Assembly.187

184 Dr Aung Naing Oo (Deputy Speaker, Mon State Parliament), interview. 185 Ibid. 186 A high-level of Mon State Parliament, interview by the author, February 14, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Nai San Tin (former MSP of AMDP), interview. 187 Ibid; Nai Chan Myint (MSP of AMDP), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Paung Town, Mon State; Dr Aung Naing Oo (Deputy Speaker, Mon State Parliament), interview.

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Over time, even the MSPs of the ruling USDP tentatively participated in a few motions that scrutinised the activities of government departments and agencies.188 These energetic actions of the MSPs significantly contributed to the optimism the Mon State Parliament has instilled over the past five years. The provincial legislative assembly in Mon State has become what Michael Mezey called a ‘policy-influencing parliament’.189 Since most MSPs of AMDP were former officials from government line agencies and civil society actors and had been engaging in political activities and social service provisions in the local community and social organisations, Mon State Parliament was more active in debating and lawmaking on issues related to social service delivery. For instance, in collaboration with individual experts, non-state actors such as MNEC, civil society groups, and the activists, Mon MSPs tried to introduce laws that legalised teaching Mon language in government schools.190 Mon State Parliament was the only local legislature that actively debated and tried to pass social policy related bills. In a parliamentary session in early 2014, the MSPs of AMDP proposed a bill aimed at legislating more space for Mon language in the local education system and an education minister and parliamentary committees for education, culture, and languages.191 With the technical expertise and support of individual education experts, non-state service providers, local civil society and UN agencies, the education debates in Mon State legislature were lively and attracted interest from the wider society. On April 9, 2014, the State legislature passed a bill allowing the teaching of ethnic languages, in particular, Mon, Karen, and Pa-O, in State

188 Dr HLa Oo (former Minister of Social Welfare-Mon State), interview by the author, February 14, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Dr Aung Naing Oo (Deputy Speaker, Mon State Parliament), interview. 189 Based on their legislative performance and impacts, scholars differentiate parliaments in three categories: (1) policymaking parliaments, if the legislatures are strong, autonomous and have a decisive role in making and checking laws and policies; (2) policy-influencing parliaments, if they have the ability to influence law-making and policy formulation, even under a dominant executive power; and (3) rubber stamp parliaments of the authoritative regimes. See, Michael L. Mezey, “The Functions of Legislatures in the Third World,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 8, no. 4 (1983); Philip Norton, Legislatures (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). See also David M. Olson, Democratic Legislative Institutions: A Comparative View (Sharpe: New York, 1994). 190 Nai San Tin (former MSP of AMDP), interview; Dr Aung Naing Oo (Deputy Speaker, Mon State Parliament), interview. See also Lawi Weng, “Mon State Likely to Pass Mother-Tongue Teaching Bill,” The Irrawaddy, 24 March, 2014, accessed 28 February, 2017, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/mon-state-likely-pass-mother-tongue-teaching-bill.html. 191 Nai San Tin (former MSP of AMDP), interview; Dr Aung Naing Oo (Deputy Speaker, Mon State Parliament), interview.

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primary schools.192 For the first time in over half a century, students in government schools where the majority of children were Mon nationals could take classes in Mon language and literature. However, on the grounds that education is not in the list of issues in Schedule II on which State legislatures could make laws, the move was forcibly stopped by the national legislative body from Naypyidaw.193 However, the persistent efforts of Mon MSPs from Mon State Parliament have been a driving force behind the 2017 constitutional amendment that provides a partially decentralised power to local parliaments to oversee the service delivery of basic education.194

Moreover, to resolve the issues facing their constituencies, some Mon MSPs also mediated with government administrators and line agency officials or interceded with local military commanders. Some also played a coordinating role in village development issues such as village electrification or road building. For instance, an MSP of AMDP played a coordination role between the government electricity department, the private company and the village electrification committee in the electrification project of Kalawtthawt Village, Mudon Township and helped the village committee with complicated office works and negotiating the cost with the company.195 Some of the MSPs routinely used the branch offices of the party as a place for public outreach and helped their constituencies advocate or demonstrate community concerns.196 The initiative taken by an MSP of AMDP in the chain of mass protests against the coal fired

192 Ibid; Nai San Tin (former MSP of AMDP), interview. 193 Education is not on the list of issues of Schedule II of the Myanmar Constitution 2008 on which local parliaments can make laws. Dr Min Nwe Soe (former Minister of Economic Development, Mon State Government), interview; Dr Aung Naing Oo (Deputy Speaker, Mon State Parliament), interview. 194 The People’s Assembly passed the National Education Law in September 2014 and, as it was controversial, it was amended in July 2015. Based on the Law, in 2016 the semi-civilian government of President U Thein Sein administration introduced the Myanmar National Education Strategic Plan. In February 2017, the greater semi-civilian government of the State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi announced the revised National Education Strategic Plan and Myanmar Parliament, again, amended the Constitution in July 2017 to provide provincial parliaments a greater role in overseeing basic education in the States and Regions. Dr Aung Naing Oo (Deputy Speaker of Mon State Parliament), interview. 195 A member of a village electrification committee (Kalawtthawt Village), interview by the author, January 31, 2017, Klawtthawt Village, Mudon Township, Mon State; Nai San Tin (former MSP of AMDP), interview. 196 Nai Lwi Aung (former Minister of Energy and Electricity, Mon State Government), interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Thanbyuzayart, Mon State; a former MP of AMDP (Nationalities Assembly), interview by the author, March 22, 2017, Thanbyuzayart, Mon State.

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power plant project in Ye Township was an obvious example.197 Some were also engaged in investigating cases of land grabbing and corruption involving government authorities and officials. For instance, some MSPs of AMDP provided support to the farmers in Kyaikmaraw Township in claiming against land grabbing by Myanmar Cement Limited.198 Over time, communities in Mon-populated areas also began to interact with the political parties, local parliament and MSPs of their respective constituencies. Some communities started collaborating with the MSPs, nudging them to secure new resources and work for the constituency.199 Some even perceived their MSPs as their local representatives with the power to act.200 Community leaders and social activists mobilised the participation of the local population in the governance issues that affected the daily lives of the populations such as elections for village headmen, the implementation of development projects, and business investments.201

Conversely, as all MSPs from all the political parties were represented in the Kayin State Government, the difference between the State Parliament as the local legislative and oversight body and the State Government as the executive branch significantly disappeared. The candidates for members of the Kayin State Legislative Assembly contested in two single-member constituencies in all seven townships in Kayin State.202 With the appointed six military representatives and nationality representatives of Bamar, Mon and Pa-O, altogether 23 MSPs formed the Kayin State Parliament. During the first parliamentary term, USDP held five seats, PSDP four seats, KPP and AMDP two seats each and the KSDDP and an independent Pa-O national one seat each. In February 2011, the appointed Chief Minister of Karen State offered two ministerial posts to the MSPs of

197 A local youth group leader, interview by the author, March 23, 2017, Angding Village, Ye Township, Mon State. 198 Dr Aung Naing Oo (Deputy Speaker, Mon State Parliament), interview. 199 Min Myoe Tint Lwin (former MP of AMDP, Nationalities Assembly), interview by the author, March 13, 2016, Dammasadh Village, Hpa-an Township, Kayin State. 200 Ibid. 201 Ibid; Nai San Tin (former MSP of AMDP), interview. 202 Additionally, candidates also contested in another three non-territorial constituencies for non-Karen ethnic communities and Bamar, Mon and Pa-O nationalities with over 0.1 per cent of the population living in the State.

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PSDP and one each to the KPP, KSDDP, and AMRDP.203 After the selected 10 MSPs were drawn by the State Government to hold their State cabinet ministerial positions and two MSPs were elected as the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the State Assembly, only a few elected MSPs were left in the Parliament. Because the majority of its members were at the same time members of State Cabinet, the Kayin State Parliament could not function as a separate local legislative and oversight body of the State Government.204 Moreover, because due to inter-party fragmentation and the lack of a functioning channel to cooperate with the civil society, Karen political parties were barely able to access the policymaking process.205

In practice, the participation of the minister-MSPs in their routine deliberations in the State Parliament was limited and those who were left in the parliament were marginalised in decision-making.206 At the same time, given the small numbers and fragmented organisational stands, there was virtually no opposition party in the Karen State Parliament making the political dynamics of the Karen State Legislative Assembly a political institution that legitimised all the decisions and activities of the centralised local government. Some MSPs of the Karen State Parliament, including members of the USDP, admitted that they approved or agreed to whatever they were asked by the Chief Minister or Speaker of the House.207 During the parliamentary sessions, a few Karen MSPs raised trivial questions that were of little importance to their electorates.208

The legislative activity of the Karen State Parliament was rather minimal, due to the weak presence of the elected MSPs and the authoritative influence of the Karen State executive body. Throughout the first parliamentary term, Karen State legislature met infrequently and passed a few essential laws, while no policymaking took place in the parliamentary

203 Min Soe Thein (former minister of Kayin State Government), interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 204 A former minister (Kayin-1), interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 205 Ibid. 206 A leader of a Karen political party, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 207 A former minister (Kayin-6), interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Karen State; a former minister (Kayin-1), interview by the author, March 10, 2016, xxx Town, Karen State (location omitted for security reason); a former MSP (USDP), interview by the author, March 11, 2016, xxx Town, Karen State (location omitted for security reason). 208 A former Minister (Kayin-6), interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State.

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chamber. For instance, during two years of its sitting, the Karen State Assembly only adopted the local laws essential for the budgetary and planning activities of the State Government and the laws it was instructed to pass by the central government, such as the State Municipal Law.209 In most of the brief parliamentary sessions, because the executive body of Karen State strictly limited the space for Karen MSPs to raise and debate local affairs, the MSPs approved mostly cosmetic proposals without parliamentary debate or discussion, while no new bill was introduced.210 With the weak and fragmented representation and capacity constraints of the Karen political parties, Karen State legislature failed to introduce or debate any legislation on issues that related to Karen electorates. Consequently, the public’s expectation of the local parliament was low. While Mon MSPs could use the emerging space to raise the voices of their electorates and provide better social services to their communities, those in the Karen State Parliament were pressured or co-opted to follow the policy lines of USDP, although the MSPs of the PSDP and KPP tried to remain independent in the local parliament. Throughout the five- year parliamentary term, only a few MSPs tried to raise a question or propose a bill in the sessions of parliament. Unlike Mon State, the Karen State Legislative Assembly failed to be a policy-influencing parliament at the onset of Myanmar’s national liberalisation process.

7.4.2. Local government

Although the traditional hierarchical and top-down chain of command prevailed, through a patchwork of reforms and arrangements over the lines of responsibilities and accountability the elements of representation gradually grew in the local administrative and executive entities in Mon-populated areas. In fact, even under the controversial 2008 Constitution, the local political executive body possessed constitutionally protected elements of devolution, such as the partially devolved features of local administration, the State/Region budget and the right to collect tax revenue. In the meantime, the Mon State Government was able to implement some of the reform agenda of the central government, in particular, the ‘people-centred’ development goals. One of the major

209 Ibid; a former minister (Karen-1), interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Karen State. 210 A leader of Karen political party, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State; a former minister (Karen-6), interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Karen State.

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features of the local governance reforms initiated in 2013 by the Myanmar semi-civilian government was the offering of civil society representation in the newly formed township and village development and management committees and recognising the role of local ethnic media in local governance.211 At first, the State Chief Minister (a former high- ranking commander and cabinet minister of the military government) and some USDP ministers were repulsed at the idea of having to deal and work with community and CSOs that were critical of the previous regime and the USDP.212 At the same time, most of the CSOs and civil society actors did not want to work in collaboration with a perceived authoritative and deceitful government.213 However, unlike in Kayin State, the ceasefire in Mon State created conditions for reconciliatory moves by both the authorities and the citizens. The increased communication and facilitated interactions gradually improved the engagement of local CSOs and the media with the government and, with their bridging capacity at the provincial level, increased popular participation in local governance and planning.

At the same time, the government’s consultation with CSOs and media representation in policymaking gradually improved. For instance, since 2012, the Chief Minister accepted requests from CSOs for meetings and either resolved, answered, or referred their concerns to the relevant departments. The presence of Mon ministers in the State Government also played an important role in building up relationships between the government and Mon CSOs and, in the education sector, even with non-state social service providers, such as the MNED of the NMSP. Under relatively supporting conditions, with the supplementary association of the locally familiar Mon political party and its ministers, the local government started inviting relevant CSOs and individual experts to the consultative and coordination meetings of the State Government.214 Although many were sceptical at first and abstained from meeting with the authorities, over time some social and communal

211 Dr Hla Oo (former minister of Mon State Government), interview by the author, February 14, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 212 Dr Min Nwe Soe (former Minister of Economic Development, Mon State Government), interview by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; a former minister (Mon-5), interview by the author, February 14, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 213 Min Min Nwe (journalist), interview; Min Aung Htoo (a leader of Mon State CSO Network), interview. 214 Dr Min Nwe Soe (former Minister of Economic Development, Mon State Government), interview; Dr Hla Oo (former minister of Mon State Government), interview.

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groups, as well as local media, gained confidence and trust in the so-called people-centred approach of the government and started becoming involved in the development activities in their local entities. For instance, in 2013, the government authorities invited both the local NGOs and CBOs in the project-affected areas to a series of local consultation meetings regarding the Mt. Minn Lwin cement factory project in Thaton Township.215 Similarly, relevant religious organisations, local NGOs, and CBOs were invited to coordination meetings regarding hotel and tourism projects in the Kyaik Htee Yoe pagoda area, Kyaikhto Township.216 However, given the prolonged distrust, public participation in both cases was meagre in the beginning.217 Nonetheless, the less hostile situation and the increased interaction of some strong local CSOs and the media through locally -based political parties gradually increased the population’s confidence in the government’s local development planning and public service delivery.218 Over time, popular participation in the social and economic development activities of the new government has augmented. For instance, the village tract administrator elections in most of the Mon-populated villages was lively and the representation of civil society and interest groups in the newly formed village committees was increasingly high.219 The interactions of the local population with the GAD, the committees and parliamentarians also increased.220

Moreover, even though the ministers of AMDP had to work within the tight constraint of Mon State Government, the party used its elements in the State Parliament, the local media and civil society to check the governance practices of the government.221 This balancing act was attributive to the local government in Mon State improving the responsiveness and efficiency of its public service delivery, although it could not promote autonomy and downward accountability. Because of the stable security conditions and growing civil society, within a few months the ministers of USDP and AMDP were able

215 Ibid. 216 Dr Min Nwe Soe (former Minister of Economic Development, Mon State Government), interview. 217 Ibid. 218 U Win Maw Oo (former Minister of Forestry and Mining, Mon State Government), interview by the author, 14 February, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Dr Hla Oo (former minister of Mon State Government), interview; Min Aung Htoo (a leader of Mon State CSO Network), interview. 219 Ibid; Min Min Nwe (journalist), interview. 220 Ibid. 221 Dr Min Nwe Soe (former Minister of Economic Development, Mon State), interview.

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to build trust with each other and attain a smooth relationship within the Cabinet. Although the Chief Minister and majority members of the State Cabinet were from USDP, whenever a minister, particularly from AMDP, argued or complained about an issue, a Cabinet discussion always took place.222 With the strong presence of the CSOs, the Chief Minister often postponed such a debates to ask for further consultation with experts or the individual recipients or groups.223 In its regular meetings, whenever it was necessary, the Cabinet would invite representatives from the relevant government line departments, civil society and the media to consult or coordinate on a particular issue or projects.224 The Chief Minister did not always try to influence the decision-making process of the Cabinet.225 This flexible approach of the Mon State Government and relatively robust local civil society allowed Mon ministers to take initiatives in formalising politically sensitive ethnic nationality issues. For instance, although education was not in their portfolios, in collaboration with the individual experts and MNEC, the two Mon ministers initiated the development of the Mon textbook curricula and publication and distribution of the school textbooks to the schools across Mon-populated areas.226

Moreover, the State Government did not obstruct the involvement of individual experts and local civil society groups, including MNED of the NMSP and supported the financial and technical assistance of UNICEF in the process.227 Similarly, although it could not allocate the required budget, Mon State Government did not object to the excavation and maintenance of ancient Mon archaeological sites initiated by the Mon ministers.228

222 Ibid. 223 Ibid; Dr Hla Oo (former Minister of Social Welfare, Mon State), interview by the author, February 14, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 224 U Win Maw Oo (former Minister of Forestry and Mining, Mon State), interview by the author, February 14, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 225 Dr Toe Toe Aung (former Minister of Urban Development, Mon State), interview by the author, February 14, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 226 Dr Min Nwe Soe (former Minister of Economic Development, Mon State Government), interview; Mi Sar Dar (head of Education Department of NMSP), interviewed by the author, February 13, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State; Nai Kasouh Mon (a leader of a Mon development NGO, border-based), interview. 227 Dr Min Nwe Soe (former Minister of Economic Development, Mon State Government), interview. 228 Ibid.

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Conversely, the local government in Kayin State did not perform well in the taking up of the emerging spaces during the national liberalisation process. The Kayin State Government remained authoritative, mainly because of the continued civil war. Unlike in the case of Mon State Government, President U Thein Sein re-appointed the former Chairman of Kayin State SPDC, a non-elected and serving military commander, as the Chief Minister of Kayin State Government. Brigadier General Zaw Min was the only non- elected appointee among the 14 State and Region Chief Ministers of the Thein Sein government. At the same time, because Myanmar military continued to be actively involved in the armed conflict and continued militarisation across Kayin State, it played a dominant role in all the contested areas and had a significant influence on the local government, particularly through the Chief Minister.229 As a result, the long-suffering local population reaffirmed their frustration and dissatisfaction on the continued imposing manner of local government authorities and its distrust on the new approach of the so- called ‘people-centred’ governance as part of the democratic transition process. Due to the prevailing insecurity and distrust between the newly established Kayin State Government and the local population, the democratic reforms in the governance of Myanmar semi-civilian government at the national level were not fully reflected in Kayin State and did not alter the attitude or set up of local governance. Kayin State Government remained more or less similar to the military authoritarian government and its service delivery was not responsive to the needs of the citizens.230

Moreover, compared to the situation in Mon State, the decentralisation process in Kayin State remained limited. The executive authority of the Kayin State Government was weak and the effectiveness of local government in Kayin State was limited. The ministers from Karen political parties also remained marginalised in local politics and in accomplishing their executive power.231 Some Karen ministers did not have ministries, dedicated officials or staff.232 Because the union-level ministries seldom delegated their authority to State-level line agencies, the local authorities, including the ministers themselves, were

229 A former minister (Kayin-1), interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 230 A director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State; a local civil society activist, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 231 Ibid. 232 Ibid.

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faced with confusion in their roles and responsibilities and could not build confidence in their works.233 Moreover, the continued physical infrastructure development projects that were mostly aimed at militarisation of the conflict-affected areas, also incapacitated the executive power of Kayin State Government. For instance, because almost 90 per cent of the development funds for Kayin State in 2013–2014 budget year came from the union- level Ministry of Border Affairs and were implemented by the State-level line departments of the ministry and the local military engineering battalion, Kayin State Government could not influence the planning and implementation of the projects.234 Even after the ceasefire of KNU in 2012, the continued conflict of interest among the government military, the Karen armed groups, and the authorities of the local religious orders on the local development projects created confusion and often destabilised the still fragile security conditions in the conflict-affected Karen communities. For example, in the early years of the KNU ceasefire, Kayin State Government faced a difficult challenge in deciding to build an internationally-funded station hospital in a village in Three-Pagoda Township. The Myanmar military wanted the Kayin State Government to build the hospital as symbol of a peace dividend to the population.235 However, as it was perceived as strengthening the presence of the government in its control areas, KNU wanted the project to be postponed until the political issues were settled between the party and Myanmar central government.236

At the same time, under the mobilisation of pro-government and anti-government lobby groups, local religious leaders together with recipient populations became confused, divided, and fearful of a relapse in fighting.237 However, without adequate power to resist the military, Kayin State Government managed to gain approval from the leaders of the local religious order and implemented the project in a rush.238 Consequently, the hospital building was left idle as the local population did not want to use it and the government

233 A former minister (Kayin-6), interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 234 Ibid. 235 A former Minister (Kayin-1), interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 236 Ibid. 237 Ibid; a leader of a community organisation (native of Three Pagodas Pass), interview by the author, January 27, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 238 A former Minister (Kayin-1), interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State.

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staff refused to take postings to the controversial hospital.239 Villagers blamed the Karen ministers for their inability to resolve the confusion that led to a problematic conflict among the religious leaders, government and Karen armed groups and the community.240

Further, throughout the rule of the Thein Sein government, responsiveness and efficiency remained limited in the public service delivery of Kayin State Government. The government was simply spending the allocated budget on implementing easy and highly visible infrastructure projects, such as health centres and schools, without a proper review of the existing facilities and the accessibility of the population in need.241 For instance, instead of renovating the existing buildings and installing capable medical equipment and diagnostic instruments, Kayin State Fovernment built a new building in the compound of Kamamoung Station Hospital.242 However, as with its predecessors, the government did not install the necessary medical equipment or diagnostic instruments.243 A Karen dental surgeon struggled to provide services to his patients due to the lack of a standard dental bed and also had to provide all the necessary equipment and even medication himself.244 The lack of consultation and coordination with State-level ministries, particularly with the ministers from Karen political parties and the recipient populations, meant the distribution of development funds across Karen Townships was largely skewed.245 For instance, a 2014 UNDP report suggests that the amount of per capita funds received by Hlaingbwe Township was 12 times higher than that received by Hpa-an Township.246 Most of the Karen ministers who had contact with the local communities were unable to

239 a leader of a community organisation (native of Three Pagodas Pass), interview by the author, January 27, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 240 A former Minister (Kayin-1), interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 241 Ibid. 242 An official of an international peace organisation (a former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon; a farmer (former KNLA health practitioner), interview by the author, March 7, 2016, Kamamoung Town, Papun Township, Kayin State. 243 A senior official of an INGO (a former Hpa-an native), interview by the author, February 6, 2016, Yangon; a medical practitioner (Kamamoung), interview by the author, March 7, 2016, Kamamoung Town, Papun Township, Karen State. 244 Ibid. 245 A former Minister (Kayin-1), interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 246 UNDP, The State of Local Governance: Trends in Kayin (Yangon: UNDP, 2014), 46.

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suggest alternatives or raise the concerns of the recipient communities.247 Moreover, because of security concerns, all the ministers were strictly prohibited from travelling and monitoring government projects in the contested areas.248

Meanwhile, the planning and service delivery of Kayin State Government remained hierarchical and its strictly top-down decision-making structure delayed the newly developed policy of the central government to enhance popular participation in its reform activities at the provincial level. In 2013, as a major reform agenda, the Myanmar semi- civilian government introduced popular participation in social and economic development processes at the local level. Followed by the release of the Framework for Economic and Social Reforms of the central government, Karen State Parliament adopted the Karen State Municipal Law and, as instructed by presidential orders, the local government formed the necessary committees. These included the Township Development Support Committee (TDSC), Township Development Affairs Committee (TDAC) at the township level, and Village Tract or Ward Development Support Committee (VTDSC) at village tract level and villagers were supposed to be involved in these committees. However, the peoples’ participation in these government-initiated social and economic development activities remained weak.249 Given their distasteful past experiences, very few villagers came forward for the village tract administrator elections and, in many cases, the authorities of the township-level GAD, often together with the local military commander, had to select ‘suitable’ participants.250

Moreover, because of the lack of adequate consultation by authorities, let alone active involvement in the consultation meetings of these committees at the urban wards or rural villages, many of the population of Kayin State had never heard of the existence of the development committees: the TDSC, TDAC, or the VTDSC.251 Under this unfamiliar and volatile situation, it was challenging for the local population to raise their voices in

247 A former minister (Karen-6), interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State; A leader of Karen political party, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State. 248 Ibid. 249 A director of a local Karen NGO, interview by the author, March 5, 2016, Hpa-an Town, Kayin State; a local civil society activist, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 250 A leader of Karen Affairs Committee, interview by the author, March 6, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 251 UNDP, The State of Local Governance: Trends in Kayin, 51.

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criticism of the predominant authorities. At the same time, even under the legislated protection of the newly set up institutional framework, people did not dare to take part in processes that prioritised their needs.252 Some villager committee members who were mostly hand-picked by the authorities also acknowledged that they did not dare to propose the priorities of the villagers or demand explanations on decisions they were informed about without prior consultation.253 The villagers still did not believe that the emerging administrative structure would allow them to criticise or reject decisions made by the higher-level authorities or propose their local needs and priorities with impunity.254 Overall, the persisting insecurity, fragmented socioeconomic conditions and weaker development in the civil society effectually hindered the political and social communities from occupying the emerging political, social and economic spaces in the Karen- populated areas under the continued conflict.

Conclusion

The 2010 national liberalisation and democratic transitioning process in Myanmar has influenced the future of the country and set in motion political and social events in the conflict-affected Karen- and Mon-populated areas. However, as can be seen, the democratic uptake of the two conflict-affected ethnic societies with different developments in the democratic fundamentals proved uneven in the Myanmar national liberalisation and subsequent democratic transition process. The stable ceasefire in Mon- populated areas and the continued civil war in Karen-populated areas generated the different status of democratic fundamentals and, at the onset of liberalisation process at national level, contributed differently to the post-civil war democratic transition in the respective local societies. The dynamic of the political developments that took place in the two societies evolved in different ways. With the better development in the capacity of stateness, economic development and the state of civil society, the communities in Mon-populated areas under a lasting ceasefire performed better in the country’s democratic liberalisation and transition process. However, the Karen communities under the continued war hostilities lagged behind in occupying the emerging spaces at the onset

252 a local civil society activist, interview by the author, March 10, 2016, Hpa-an, Kayin State. 253 Villge elders and mid-career villagers, in discussion with the author, February 4, 2017, Htilon Village, Hlaingbwe Township, Karen State. 254 Ibid.

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of the country’s national liberalisation process. Compared to Karen-populated areas, the establishment of multi-party elections for the local legislative assembly and the associated government allowed better inclusion of Mon political, social and economic communities into the country’s political change process and the governance of local ethnic entities. Regarding the development in the formation of political parties as an essential element for a democratisation process, Mon political parties originated from the political and social mobilisation movements and societal development activities of the political and civil societies that largely re-emerged during the lasting ceasefire period. The Mon parties developed their organisational structure based on broad local branches through a bottom- up approach and their decision-making process was also participatory and independent of external influence from the ruling government, armed party or exiled opposition. In many cases, Mon parties could maintain their decisional autonomy. The internal democracy of the Mon parties was also relatively lively. At the same time, with their close collaboration with the civil society and functional relationship with the population, the parties could better represent their electorates. Both Mon political parties played important roles in the local-level democratic transition process and consolidating the evolving democratic institutions in the conflict-affected Mon-populated areas.

Conversely, the three Karen political parties were founded under the auspices of either a highly respected patron, elite leadership or the direction of the Myanmar military government. The organisational structure and practices of internal democracy of the Karen parties were mostly in the form of patron–client and centralised top-down. Based on the different origins of the organisations, the organisational structure and practices of internal democracy, popular representation and the relationship of the Karen parties remained weaker than that of the Mon parties until after the ceasefire of KNU. There was a lack of functioning linkages of collaboration between the Karen parties and the fledgling Karen civil society entity and the parties failed to bring the widely expected socioeconomic resources and privileges into their constituencies under the continued armed conflict. The Karen parties failed to grasp the emerging political space and push the political reform process at the local level further towards the democratic transition.

Moreover, although it received significantly less attention compared to the national parliaments and union government at the centre, the legislature and executive branch in Mon State provided at least opportunities for the marginalised Mon political and civil society communities to have a significant influence on provincial-level governance. The 352 Chapter 7: The Effects of Ceasefire at the Onset of Post-Conflict Democratisation

newly established governance institutions at the local level became a vital premise in the building up of a foundation for federalism and, thus, sustained peace. However, Karen parties could not effectively utilise the democratic openings initiated by the central government and did not have the opportunity to play a role in representing and mobilising local populations to participate in the reform process of the local governance. Although their presence reflected the dominance of the Karen population in the territory and attributed to the establishment of multi-ethnic local political institutions in Kayin State, Karen parties failed to properly attribute to the overall legitimacy of the developing local democratic system. In contrast, although still restricted, Mon political and social communities, together with the local populations, were increasingly able to exercise their rights to freedom of association, peaceful assembly and expression. However, the continued restrictive conditions in Karen State gravely hindered political and social communities from taking up their basic civil liberties. Moreover, CSOs and their networks continually expanded across Mon-populated areas and increasingly interacted with the government to represent the interests of the populations. Popular participation has gradually improved in the government’s socioeconomic reform process and development activities in Mon-populated areas. The independent local media outlets and the authorities in Mon State engaged with each other, although there were frictions from time to time.

Conversely, the weaker condition of the social and communal associations and the lack of an independent local media organisation in Karen-populated areas contributed to the failure to provide a regular information flow and assist in enhancing the voice of local people on local governance that affected their daily lives. The unstable security situation combined with lagging socio-economic conditions discouraged popular participation in local governance across conflict-affected Karen-populated areas even after the early years of the KNU ceasefire. Overall, compared to the communities in Karen-populated areas under the continued civil war, Mon communities performed better in the taking up of emerging democratic spaces at the onset of Myanmar liberalisation and democratic transitioning process, due to the better security situation, socio-economic conditions and a lively civil society.

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Chapter 8: Conclusion

Chapter 8. Conclusion

This thesis has sought to explain why Karen and Mon areas, which otherwise share similar histories, cultures, and socioeconomic structures, have experienced uneven democratic uptake after the onset of political liberalisation in 2011. Drawing on mainstream democracy theory, it has examined the causal relationships between war/peace, key democratic fundamentals and post-war democratisation. The results suggest that, contrary to conventional wisdom, durable ceasefires (i.e. the end of fighting), even in the absence of political settlements, may facilitate democratisation by permitting the development of stronger democratic fundamentals. Specifically, it was found that the 15-year long ceasefire between the government and the NMSP from 1995-2010 saw significant improvements in stateness, socioeconomic recovery and civil society in Mon areas, which in turn supported a relatively strong uptake of new democratic opportunities after the end of military rule in 2011. By contrast, continued fighting between the government and the KNU during this 15-year period inhibited the development of similar democratic fundamentals in Karen areas. As a result, Karen communities were less ready for democracy and benefitted less from the post-2010 national political reforms, at least in the short- to medium-term.

Key improvements in stateness in Mon areas during the ceasefire period included the development of stronger enforcement, administrative, and infrastructural capacities. The presence of government security forces increased significantly and became permanent. With a clearer demarcation of territories under government and NMSP control, state administrative institutions were stabilised and expanded into previously ungovernable areas. The administrative effectiveness of both state and non-state actors also increased. With the considerable expansion of physical infrastructure, including roads, railroads, and waterway transportation, as well as electrification and telecommunication facilities, basic social service delivery improved as well. One important aspect of this was improved cooperation and coordination between state and non-state health and education providers, which helped improve both the accessibility and quality of basic social services in the previously war-affected Mon communities. The greater presence of the state in Mon areas had some negative implications as well in terms of increased exploitation of local communities. But many of these negative effects were substantially reduced after the start

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of political reform in 2011 as the new post-military government initiated a new era of good governance and people-centred development. The net-advantage of improved stateness for democratisation thus became more evident.

The ceasefire period also saw significant improvements in economic conditions in Mon areas as the subsistence war economy was replaced by a more commercially-oriented economy. With improved security, stability of local administration, and physical infrastructure, people were able to resume or establish normal economic activities. Local trading activities revived and gradually connected with the national and border trading hubs. Many people who were previously engaged in illegal natural resource extraction and goods smuggling readjusted their business activities and joined the formal economy. Increased production and the gradual move towards a market-based economy generated new, more stable employment opportunities and increased household incomes. The return of many formerly displaced people also contributed to the natural expansion of villages that gradual took on the character of urban centres, with their different political, social, and economic characteristics.

Improvements in state capacity and economic conditions during the ceasefire period, along with wider access for international organisations and aid, also supported the revitalisation and further development of civil society. Many new CSOs were established, mainly focusing on welfare and social development programs, but increasingly also social mobilisation and community capacity building activities. CSOs developed more pluralistic organisational structure and established stronger networks in local areas and beyond, which also helped strengthen community participation in social change process at the local level. The later ceasefire period even saw the development of embryonic political organisations, despite the continuance of military rule.

These developments in Mon areas after the post-1995 ceasefire contrast sharply with the experience in Karen areas where the civil war between the government and the KNU continued until 2012. Multiple armed actors remained active in many Karen areas, and territorial administrative arrangements remained fluid and unstable. Many Karen communities continued to be under the rule of multiple authorities. With continuing insecurity and weak administrative effectiveness, physical infrastructure also remained underdeveloped and even basic health and education services were often lacking.

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Continuing hostilities severely limited livelihood and employment opportunities for local communities. Many farmers remained unable to access their land and, although some Karen towns are located on the natural trading routes to the Thai border, insecurity and poor physical infrastructural facilities meant that people were unable to benefit from trading activities. Without stable employment opportunities, the majority of households remained extremely poor. Although new towns developed also in Karen as the military forcibly displaced highland villagers to separate them from the insurgent, the population remained highly fluid and normal urban life did not develop.

Unsurprisingly, civil associational life, too, remained underdeveloped. Leadership of the few existing Karen CSOs remained highly personalised and top-down decision-making and patron-client staffing continued. Subject to intense repression, Karen CSOs had to work discreetly and cooperation among organisations remained weak. There was therefore very little social and political capital build-up in Karen communities.

As a result of the uneven development of key democratic fundamentals in Mon and Karen areas, there was a great difference in democratic uptake after the onset of Myanmar’s democratic liberalisation in 2011/12, with Mon communities performing much better than their Karen neighbours.

This was evident, for example, in the area of political party formation. In Mon areas, the political, social, and business communities quickly came together and founded an independent political party, the All Mon-region Democracy Party, which succeeded in winning a total of 16 seats in the 2010 elections. AMDP exercised participatory decision- making and internal democracy was lively. By collaborating with civil society and local media, the party was able to establish a functional relationship with the population and better represent the electorate. As a result, the Mon community was actively engaged in the country’s political change process and played significant roles in developing democratic institutions at the local level.

By contrast, the three new Karen political parties that were established in the lead up to the 2010 elections were founded by individual leaders and organised around highly personalised patron-client relationships. The organisational structure of the parties was highly centralised and their ability to represent the electorate was weak. There was lack of functional linkages between the parties and local civil society. Karen partiers were

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therefore unable to grasp the evolving political space and push the political change process further toward democratic transition.

Another major difference in democratic uptake at the start of reform in 2011 was evident in the far greater transformation of local governance in Mon State. Mon political and civil society were able to grasp the new freedoms of association, assembly, and expression, and use them to promote local interests. Civil society organisations and networks expanded across Mon areas and, in interacting with local government agencies, were able to represent the interest of local communities. Direct popular participation in the socioeconomic reform process and local development activities also considerably improved. The newly developed local media outlets took active part in the local political and governance reform process by acting as watch dogs of local governance institutions.

In contrast, Karen communities were largely unable, at least in the short-term, to take advantage of the nascent democratic governance system and get involved in the political change process. The underdevelopment of social and communal associations and the lack of independent local media organisation were major obstacles to improving public information systems and enhance the voice of local people. Continued insecurity and poor socioeconomic conditions also discouraged popular participation in local governance activities, even after the 2012 KNU ceasefire.

In sum, the Mon experience shows how ceasefires, even in the absence of a political settlement and “genuine” peace, may support longer-term democratisation by facilitating a strengthening of democratic fundamentals. The cessation of war hostilities in Mon areas after 1995 became a catalyst for improvements in stateness, economic conditions, and civil society, which in turn meant that Mon political and civil society were ready to take up the new democratic opportunities that opened up as a result of the post-2010 national liberalisation process.

Contributions to knowledge

This thesis has challenged the conventional view of Myanmar’s early ceasefires in the 1990-2000s as detrimental to the country’s political development. The findings suggest that, although the ceasefires clearly did not resolve the root causes of conflict or lead to a political settlement, they did become a catalyst for improvements in key democratic fundamentals that, in turn, supported the local uptake of new democratic opportunities

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after the onset of national political liberalisation in 2011 (with the Wa ceasefire constituting an exception). This conclusion is highly significant, not least, as early optimism about the second round of ceasefires, which began in 2011-12, is beginning to dissipate and ethnic political leaders, international donors and scholars alike are beginning to ask themselves whether continued support for the peace process is warranted. Specifically, this study highlights the need to take a long-term view and provides a framework for assessing the pros and cons of different policy options.

These findings are relevant also to the broader literature on democratisation. Although it is broadly recognised that peace is an important precondition for democracy, little work has been done to establish how this applies to different kinds of peace. Similarly to many Myanmar scholars, the existing, very sparse comparative literature on ceasefires and democratisation tends to treat ceasefire as an integral part of the dynamics of conflict and highlight its negative effects. Some argue that because of the failure to resolve the fundamental causes of conflict, ceasefires tend to simply generate conditions for renewed fighting.1 Others argue that because ceasefires tend to have negative effects on war-torn societies they are in fact detrimental to the process of post-civil war democratisation.2 According to Fortna and Huang, because civil wars are fundamentally used to determine political issues such as who will rule a country and how they will be selected, a truce without political settlement is unlikely to lead to democratisation.3 While one would not want to generalise from a single-country case study – and a limited one at that – the findings of this thesis suggest that further attention is needed to the link between peace and democratisation, and especially the possibility that even a negative peace (understood as the mere absence of fighting) can be supportive of longer-term democratisation.

Future research

Although the research for this thesis focused exclusively on Karen and Mon areas, it is worth briefly considering how the findings resonate with the experience in other conflict- affected areas across the Myanmar borderlands. I focus here on Pa-O, Kachin and Wa areas, which cover a variety of different background conditions and experiences, and

1 See, for example, Ashild Kolas, “Naga Militancy and Violent Politics in the Shadow of Ceasefire,” Journal of Peace Research 48, no. 6 (2011); Kirsten E. Schulze, “Ceasefire or More,” The World Today 59, no. 1 (2003). 2 Kolas, “Naga Militancy and Violent Politics in the Shadow of Ceasefire,” 782. 3 Virginia Page Fortna, Huang, Reyko, “Democratization after Civil War: A Brush-Clearing Exercise,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 4 (2012): 802. 359 Chapter 8: Conclusion

therefore can give an initial sense of how generalizable the findings of this thesis is. The analysis draws on a combination of personal observations and mostly secondary data from the existing literature.

Pa-O areas

The experience in Pa-O areas, which benefitted from a 1991 ceasefire between the government and the Pa-O National Organisation (PNO), has been very similar to the Mon. Local communities saw significant improvements in stateness, socio-economic conditions and civil society during the early ceasefire period (1991-2010), which in turn helped facilitate a relatively strong democratic uptake after the launch of political reforms in 2011.

After the ceasefire agreement in 1991, security conditions and administrative stability improved significantly in Shan State Special Region-6, which encompasses three townships in southern Shan State predominantly populated by Pa-O. The ceasefire created an official platform for local actors to peacefully interact and cooperate with the government on political, social, and economic affairs.4 Indeed, because cooperation between the PNO and the military government was particularly good, PNO was able to maintain a significant administrative presence not only in the Special Region-6 but also in several neighbouring Pa-O-populated townships.5 Although administrators of the government General Affairs Department were in ultimate control of local governance,6 relatively effective cooperation between government line ministries and the PNO departments of economics, information, and organisation quickly saw significant improvements in local infrastructure and social service delivery compared to surrounding conflict-affected areas in Shan State.7

With advice and support from the government, as well as foreign and Myanmar businesspeople, PNO reinvested a significant portion of the party’s revenues in economic

4 Mary P. Callahan, Political Authority in Burma's Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation, and Coexistence (Singapore; Washington, D.C.: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; East-West Center Washington, 2007), 45-47. 5 Kim Jolliffe, “Ethnic Armed Conflict and Territorial Administration in Myanmar,” (Yangon: The Asia Foundation, 2015), 64. See also Ashley South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 124. 6 Callahan, Political Authority in Burma's Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation, and Coexistence, 46. 7 South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict, 124.

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development in Pa-O areas. Already a few years into the ceasefire previously poverty stricken Pa-O villages had become self-sufficient in food.8 From the mid-2000s, some Pa- O farmers were also able to start up commercial agriculture and horticulture production.9 The Ruby Dragon Company, an affiliated company of the PNO, became one of the most successful mining, construction, agriculture, and tourism companies in the country.10

The state of civil society also improved as Pa-O CSOs were able to formally organise and mobilise the community around identity-related organisations and social development activities. Although it was formed under the auspice of the PNO, the Parami Development Network gradually developed into a strong independent civil society organisation;11 and the Pa-O Youth Network became one of the most active ethnic nationality CSO networks in southern Shan State with numerous member organisations.12

As a result of the strengthening of democratic fundamentals over the 20-year ceasefire period, Pa-O political and civil society were well-placed to take advantage of the post- 2010 national political reforms. In the 2010 elections, PNO candidates won all ten national and local parliamentary seats up for grabs in Pa-O areas, as well as all elected positions for the Leading Body of Pa-O Self-Administered Zone (SAZ). This local landslide was repeated in the 2015 elections. Although the actual power of the Pa-O Leading body was minimal, elected Pa-O parliamentarians and administrative authorities thus got a chance to supervise and coordinate the activities of local government line agencies and had a direct channel to report to the national government on the situation in their areas. Unlike in the period of SLORC/SPDC rule, Pa-O representatives were able to advocate on behalf of local communities in the new semi-civilian system, rather than simply accepting what they were given.13

8 Callahan, Political Authority in Burma's Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation, and Coexistence, 47. 9 Khun Kyaw San Win, leader of Pa-O development organisation, interview by the author, February 13, 2017, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 10 Ibid. Callahan, Political Authority in Burma's Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation, and Coexistence, 47. 11 Ibid. 12 Min Aung Htoo, leader of Mon State CSO Network, interview by the author, February 16, 2016, Mawlamyine, Mon State. 13 Jolliffe, “Ethnic Armed Conflict and Territorial Administration in Myanmar,” 38. 361 Chapter 8: Conclusion

Kachin areas

The Kachin experience, too, conforms with the findings in the Southeast, but in more complex and ultimately humbling ways. Like in Mon areas, a 17-year long ceasefire between the government and the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), first negotiated in 1994, facilitated substantial improvements in stateness, socio-economic conditions and civil society across previously conflict-affected Kachin areas. However, with increasing tensions between the government and the KIO in the later years of the ceasefire and its ultimate collapse in June 2011, the Kachin never got a chance to harvest the political benefits of this. Instead, the resumption of fighting has left Kachin communities far behind even their Karen cousins in democratic development.

As a result of the 1994 ceasefire, the presence of government security forces quickly expanded into most of the previously ungovernable Kachin areas.14 Meanwhile, KIO formally assumed administrative authority in areas demarcated in the ceasefire agreement.15 The clear demarcation between KIO-controlled “Special Regions” and government-controlled areas helped improve administrative stability and effectiveness,16 and many previous repressive restrictions were lifted. Like in Mon and Pa-O areas, government line ministries, KIO departments, and a wide range of Kachin civil society and religious groups and networks began working together to deliver social services, helped also by international NGOs. For example a British NGO, ‘Health Unlimited’, was gradually able to expand and deliver an integrated health program with various prevention and curative healthcare components including immunisation programs across KIO- controlled areas.17 The health and education departments of KIO were also able to

14 Karin Dean, “Struggle over Space in Myanmar: Expanding State Torritoriality after the Kachin Ceasefire,” in Autonomy and Armed Separatism in South and Southeast Asia, ed. Michelle Ann Miller (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), 122; South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict, 153. 15 Tom Kramer, Neither War nor Peace: The Future of the Cease-Fire Agreements in Burma (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2009); South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict, 155. See also Bruce Matthews, Ethnic and Religious Diversity: Myanmar'a Unfolding Nemesis (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001). 16 Kramer, Neither War nor Peace: The Future of the Cease-Fire Agreements in Burma, 61; Global Witness, “A Choice for China Ending the Destruction of Burma's Northern Frontier Forests,” (Global Witness, 2005). 17 Joseph J. Capuno, “Harnessing Public-Private Service Delivery Arrangements in Developing Asia,” in Governance in Developing Asia: Public Service Delivery and Empowerment, ed. Anil B. Deolakikar, Jha Shikha, and Philipnas F. Quising (Chelttenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), 167; Martin Smith, "Ethnic Conflict and the Challenge of Civil Society in Burma," in Strengthening Civil Society in Burma: Possibilities and Dilemmas for International NGOs (Amsterdam: the Burma Center Netherlands & Transnational Institute, 1997), 17.

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establish fully-equipped public hospitals and schools that taught Kachin language and culture.18 Compared to other conflict-affected ethnic communities, education services in Kachin areas during this period were of high standard.19

The ceasefire also facilitated major improvements in physical infrastructure as both the government and KIO invested heavily, in particular, in roads and bridges.20 With well- maintained highway networks, Kachin areas became far better connected to the central state of Myanmar, as well as to the Myanmar-China border. Further investments by a KIO-affiliated company in hydropower generation ensured that Kachin towns were the only ethnic minority urban centres with access to 24-hour electricity.21 Improvements in physical infrastructure, along with much-improved security conditions,22 also had significant economic benefits. Local farmers were able to replant their fields and with much-improved access both to Central Myanmar and to China commercial agriculture and horticulture soon developed and employment opportunities also expanded. Many Kachin villages soon developed into towns with paved roads and electrification. There were also significant socioeconomic downsides for some local communities, particularly as result of local military commanders and KIO leaders selling off logging and mining rights to Central Myanmar or Chinese companies and the prevalence of unsustainable business practices. Indeed, this became a major source of contention and was a key factor in the resumption of fighting in 2011. However, there is no question that, overall, the local economy expanded.

The main success story of the KIO ceasefire though, was the expansion of local civil society. Helped by the terms of the ceasefire, which explicitly sanctioned the establishment of Kachin CSOs, Kachin civil society expanded earlier and faster than perhaps anywhere else in the country. The Shalom Foundation and Metta Development Foundation, in particular, became early models for the rejuvenation of Myanmar civil

18 As early as 1997, KIO run significant number of schools and hospitals with modernised equipment. See, Bertil Lintner, The Kachin: Lords of Burma's Northern Frontier (Teak House Publication, 1997); Kramer, Neither War nor Peace: The Future of the Cease-Fire Agreements in Burma. 19 Jasmin Lorch, “The (Re)-Emergence of Civil Society in Areas of State Weakness: The Case Ofeducation in Burma/Myanmar,” in Dictatorship, Disorder and Decline in Myanmar, ed. Monique Skidmore and Trevor Wilson (Acton, Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008), 163. 20 Global Witness, “A Choice for China Ending the Destruction of Burma's Northern Frontier Forests,” 52. 21 Ibid. 22 Callahan, Political Authority in Burma's Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation, and Coexistence, 43.

363 Chapter 8: Conclusion

society after decades of repressive military rule with a high level of institutionalisation and a wide range of activities that soon expanded beyond Kachin State. This, in turn, significantly contributed to bottom-up sociopolitical interactions and the growth of social capital in Kachin areas. For instance, for Kachin national lunar events, such as Kachin State Day and Harvest Dinner, Kachin armed groups regularly came together with a wide range of religious, political, and social groups to mobilise Kachin communities across the state.23

If one had asked political scientists in the mid-2000s, which part of Myanmar was most ready for democracy, many would probably have answered “Kachin State”. However, as a result of growing tensions between the military government and KIO over the subsequent years (the detailed causes of which are beyond the scope of this thesis) and the eventual collapse of the ceasefire in June 2011, local Kachin communities never came to enjoy the democratic opportunities that emerged as a result of the post-2010 national political reforms. They were not even able to form a political party to contest the 2010 elections. When Kachin political leaders sought to register the Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP), they were turned down by the government which instead forcefully formed a Kachin proxy-party of the military-backed USDP. Without a strong local party, the USDP proceeded to take a dominant victory in the local elections, giving the party control of both the newly formed Kachin State Parliament and Government. Further, as fighting resumed soon after, Kachin civil society organisations and community groups soon came to face serious restrictions on their activities. The uptake of new democratic opportunities in Kachin areas was thus nominal. Or one might say that such opportunities were actively denied them.

Wa areas

While the experience in Pa-O and Kachin areas broadly conforms with the findings from the core case studies, developments in the Wa region constitute an outlier. Although a 1989 ceasefire between the government and the United Wa State Party (UWSP) did improve security and, to a lesser extent, social and economic conditions in the Wa region, it did not generate significant improvements in democratic fundamentals and Wa communities have not benefitted from the later national liberalisation process.

23 Global Witness, “A Choice for China Ending the Destruction of Burma's Northern Frontier Forests,” 52. 364 Chapter 8: Conclusion

After entering into the ceasefire with Myanmar government in May 1989, UWSP took formal control of Shan State (North) Special Region-2 in the mountains near the Chinese border, with a total population of around 400,000 people. Unlike their counterparts in Mon, Pa-O, and Kachin areas, however, Wa leaders did not enter into a cooperative relationship with the Myanmar government, but established what was effectively an independent Wa mini-state.24 Neither the Myanmar military nor civilian government agencies were allowed to establish a permanent presence and had to apply for prior permission from the Wa authorities even to enter the territory.25 As such, even today, there is effectively no trace of the Myanmar state in Wa areas. Even local Wa administrative capacity remains extremely weak outside of the main towns.26

The post-1989 ceasefire period did see numerous large-scale infrastructure projects spring up across the Wa region, funded by a combination of Chinese investment and local drug money. The former sleepy rebel headquarter of Phangsan became of the most developed urban centres in northeast Myanmar with paved roads, 24-hour electricity, and modern mobile phone and other telecommunication networks.27 With technical and material support from China, within years of the ceasefire, the previously war-torn Wa region also started producing rice, vegetables, and other agricultural produce.28 The new ceasefire economy was entirely connected to China, however, not Myanmar – and the top-down development approach meant that rural areas where the majority of Wa people live benefitted little. On the contrary, as an effect of the forceful elimination of opium production, which had been a mainstay of the local economy before the ceasefire, many local farmers saw a further reduction in their income and livelihood opportunities.29

Very significantly for our purposes, no civil society was allowed to develop. The highly centralised and personalised style of leadership of the Wa administration, which had been adopted from the administrative model of the former Communist Party of Burma, did not

24 Tom Kramer, The United Wa State Party: Narco-Army or Ethnic Nationalist Party? (Singapore and Washington, D.C.: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and East-West Center Washington, 2007), 21, 29. 25 Ibid., 47-48. 26 Ibid., 39. 27 Callahan, Political Authority in Burma's Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation, and Coexistence, 28. 28 Kramer, The United Wa State Party: Narco-Army or Ethnic Nationalist Party?, 32. 29 Ibid, 29.

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allow any popular participation in decision-making.30 The Wa authorities remained highly suspicious of any autonomous activity and perceived even local community participation in development activities as a threat.31

Unsurprisingly, given the stranglehold of the UWSP on power and the near-total disconnect between the Wa region and the rest of Myanmar, the post-2010 national political reforms have had almost no impact on local Wa politics. Due to obstruction by the UWSP, the Myanmar Election Commission had to cancel elections in the Wa region in 2010, and again in 2015. The UWSP has remained the only political party and has continued to rule the territory in an authoritarian style. Even today, no autonomous civil associational or media activity is permitted. This very different experience of the Wa region underscores the need for further study to understand the conditions under which the expected positive relationship between ceasefires and post-war democratisation is likely to hold.

To be able to generalise the findings of this study, further in-depth case studies are needed, from Myanmar and beyond. The brief reflections offered above on the experience in Wa areas point to the need, in particular, to consider under what conditions ceasefires are likely to support the evolution of democratic fundamentals. The case studies of this thesis suggest that factors such as political leadership, broader political culture and international linkages could all be important. As case studies accumulate, it should be possible also to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the development of relevant democratic fundamentals during ceasefires and how they support post-war democratisation. This would be important not just for scholarly understanding of democratisation, but also for political actors engaged in the struggle for democracy and in need of strategic guidance.

30 UNODC, “Replacing Opium in Kokang and Wa Special Regions, Shan State, Myanmar,” (Yangon: UNODC, 2003). 31 Kramer, The United Wa State Party: Narco-Army or Ethnic Nationalist Party? See also Ashley South, “Political Transition in Myanmar: A New Model for Democratization,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 2 (2004): 250 366 Bibliography

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밶ုိင္ေ ိန္နနဇွ ( က္ဒရက္တကၠ ုိလ္)၊ သကၠဌ္က န밶ုိင္ေရ္ကခင္밶င္ဲ ေတွ္လ န္ေရန မွန၊ ဒုိြန္႔မငန္ေကခွင္န ွန (ကင့္ွရွ၊ ိ ၈) [in

Bamar language]။ Nai Pe Thein Zhil (Federal University). President Nai Shwe Kyin and Revolutionary Mon Students. Canberra: 2008.

ပကာဲယွာဲုးေၾ ပနာန၊ သမၷု န တုၾန။ ဍ နမတနမိစႀာန၊ ီကပ းေ နအပနဒၾနာန၊ းေဗကနဍ နမပနတ္ုာန၊ သၷကဳံတၾန္တာ-ဟ ါ။ Nai Shwe Kyin, The Shadows of the Past [in Mon language]. Mawlamyine, Mon State: Department of Organization, NMSP, n.d.

ေမ ွ္ န္န ွနသ နဥင္ ငန္ြန္႔ (ဗုိလ္ဥခ်ဳ္္က နေ ွင္န)၊ ္က်ဳံေတငြဥခဲရ ကၽငန္ေတွဲ့ ၀ေေငေေင။ ရန္ကုန္၊ ဳန္နမခ်ိနတတ္ရွဳုဳံ밶 ိဳ္တုိက္၊ိ ္၊၂၀၁၅။ U. Khin Nyunt (Hmaw Wun), My Lifelong Memoirs [in Bamar language]. Yangon: Pann Myo Tayar (Hundred Flowers), 2015.

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