SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT Monthly MARCH 2007 1 March 2007 This report is available online and can beFORECAST viewed together with Update Reports on developments during the month at www.securitycouncilreport.org

CONTENTS OF THIS ISSUE OVERVIEW FOR MARCH Annual Statistics on Council South Africa will have the presidency of the n The Council relationship with the Peace- Activity...... 3 Council in March. building Commission Status Update since our February n Côte d’Ivoire (including the proposal for No thematic debates are currently planned— a Council mission) Forecast...... 3 although some event to mark Interna- Chad/Central African Republic...... 4 tional Women’s Day is possible and a thematic Behind the scenes two very serious issues Sudan (Darfur)...... 5 discussion later in the month cannot be ruled are also likely to be pre-occupying Council Somalia...... 7 out. Other planned open meetings of the members. These include Kosovo and Iran. Council include: Kosovo...... 9 Kosovo n the monthly meeting on the Middle Lebanon...... 11 East; The Ahtisaari report is expected to be Liberia...... 13 finalised and submitted to the Council in n adoption of a resolution on Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire...... 15 extending UNAMA; and March. However, in view of the complex issues it will raise and the sensitivity of the Iraq...... 16 n adoption of a resolution on Liberia, Guinea-Bissau...... 18 extending UNMIL matter for many Council members, it is not Consultations are expected on: expected to be scheduled for consulta- Peacebuilding Commission...... 19 tions or open Council meetings until April n Sudan/Darfur Afghanistan...... 21 at the earliest. n Chad Upcoming Issues in Sanctions n Somalia We have prepared an initial brief on the Committees...... 23 n Lebanon (UNIIIC and implementation of issues for this Forecast and will cover it in Notable Dates for March...... 24 resolution 1701) more detail once the final report is available. Important Dates over the Horizon....24 n Iraq and UNMOVIC >>page 2 n Guinea-Bissau

Aide-Memoire

Important matters pending before the Coun- mentation of the [Darfur Peace] Agreement leaves future periodic Secretary-General’s cil include: or commits human rights violations.” reports in abeyance. Because of the n The 2005 World Summit requested reforms n On Somalia, the Council is still to act on its absence of a request from the Council, the relating to the Military Staff Committee. “intention to consider taking measures Secretariat has no mandate to proceed to This has yet to be addressed. against those who seek to prevent or block produce the report. n Implementation of the phased approach a peaceful dialogue process, overthrow the n The Secretary-General’s report on cross for Darfur as agreed in Abuja in Novem- Transitional Federal Institutions by force, or border issues and inter-mission coopera- ber 2006 is lagging. Sudan has not take action that further threatens regional tion in West Africa, originally due by 31 responded to the heavy support package stability” expressed in resolution 1744. December 2006, is still overdue though it proposal contained in the Secretary- n On the DRC, the Council is still to consider may be issued in March. General’s 24 January letter. AU-UN imposing individual sanctions under resolu- n The December 2004 report by the Secre- agreement on details of a hybrid opera- tions 1649 and 1698 against armed groups’ tary-General on human rights violations in tion as endorsed by the Council on 19 commanders that recruit children and/or Côte d’Ivoire, requested by a presidential December is still pending. refuse to disarm. statement, has still not been made public. n No action as envisaged in resolution 1706 n The draft resolution on small arms circu- Also on Côte d’Ivoire, the December 2005 on Darfur has been taken to impose ”strong lated by Argentina in March seems to have report by the Secretary-General’s Special effective measures, such as asset freeze or lapsed. The issue is no longer included as a Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has travel ban, against any individual or group footnote on the Council’s calendar. The not been published. that violates or attempts to block the imple- absence of a Council decision on this matter

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org  OVERVIEW FOR MARCH (continued)

Iran March. Also it is unclear whether any of the extremely relevant. Although the Court held On 22 February Mohammed ElBaradei, the new elected members will seek to play a that technically Serbia was not responsible Director-General of the IAEA, confirmed what larger role in the discussions. for the genocide in Bosnia, its findings that was already common knowledge—Iran has genocide did occur in Srebrenica and that not complied with resolution 1737 and Sudan and Chad the former Republic of Yugoslavia failed in refuses to suspend enrichment-related activ- The conflicts in eastern Chad and western its obligation to prevent it, are very impor- ities. Instead Iran seems to be expanding its Sudan are linked, not only by the cross- tant. On the facts in Sudan, it seems unlikely enrichment activities. However, it also contin- border activities of the protagonists, but that the state of Sudan and its leadership ues to insist that it is ready for meaningful also in many other ways. Both involve many would be similarly absolved. And the Court’s negotiations, but without preconditions. of the same players. Both involve horrific criticism of those who could have done use of violence against civilians. Both have something but failed to act perhaps sends a For its part the US continues to say that it precipitated large flows of refugees and dis- message of much wider application. wishes for a diplomatic solution. However, placed persons. And there are in both cases anxiety levels have increased with the arrival firm proposals on the table for UN forces to Somalia in the region of a US naval task force and in provide the backbone for operations to pro- Although not formally on the agenda in light of the increasingly tough stance being tect civilians, build processes for political March it is inevitable that Council members taken by the US military in the region, both reconciliation and establish security. The will be watching the situation in Somalia in public statements and in action against Council is dealing with each country as a very closely. Consultations are expected, Iranian personnel in Iraq. Initiatives to pro- separate agenda item, but it has a close not only because of the apparent ongoing mote the possibility of a negotiated solution appreciation of the regional dimension and deterioration in the security situation, but have been discouraged. The US turned is trying to keep that in mind. also with a view to keeping the political rec- down ElBaradei’s proposal last month for a onciliation process on a respectable track. “timeout”. One other factor which now characterises both situations is the fact that while they are It is not clear that the window of opportunity Russia seems to be less publicly supportive enemies, both Chad and Sudan are resist- that was seen in January and February will of Iran than in the past—perhaps because ing the deployment of UN personnel. This stay open indefinitely. Progress with the its advice that an incremental approach reluctance to give consent, in the face of deployment of the AMISOM force is there- would be more productive has not borne almost universal international opinion that a fore likely to be an important issue. However, any fruit as yet. Also it seems to have slowed UN presence is both appropriate and nec- it seems that at this stage most Council mem- down progress with the new Bushehr essary, seems to stem from concern that an bers are not ready to take up discussion of nuclear reactor, which it is helping to con- impartial and independent presence will in the proposed UN operation to take over from struct in Iran. But it is strongly advocating the long run result in changed political and AMISOM. It remains to be seen whether the that both Iran and the US should make military realities on the ground. In this Council will be active in urging an enhanced compromises to permit the resumption of regard, it probably reflects also a belief in UN role in the political process. negotiations. N’Djamena and Khartoum that their oppor- Lebanon tunities for using military means to achieve The Council will have two different aspects of At press time the five permanent members their objectives are not yet exhausted. of the Council plus Germany were meeting the Lebanon issue on its agenda. The first is in London to discuss their response to Iran’s Neither government seems ready for a gen- a report from Commissioner Serge Bram- non-compliance. The US has made it clear uine national reconciliation process—and mertz on progress with the UNIIIC that it will be seeking stronger sanctions especially not one in which the leadership, investigation into the Hariri assassination and against Iran. But the US has also said that skills and experience of the UN can be an associated request from Lebanon to this time around it is unwilling to indulge in brought into play. There is one important extend the Commission for 12 months. This the extended negotiations which character- difference, however. Chad shows some should be straightforward, but may reopen a ised the discussions on draft resolutions in concern for the plight of the refugees and sensitive discussion from January about who 2006. Nevertheless, it seems likely that sev- seems ready to envisage some interna- is cooperating with UNIIIC and who is not. eral weeks at least will be required to arrive tional protection—but is withholding The second aspect is the wider situation in at a draft resolution for Council consider- consent for the robust kind of operation Lebanon, set against the backdrop of much ation. In the meantime, it seems likely that which the UN believes is essential. enhanced political tension. Different ele- the US will want to raise the Iran issue in ments will be on the table, including the informal consultations under “other busi- The Council faces very difficult challenges future role of the Council under resolu- ness”, so that elected Council members are on both issues during March. Frustration tion 1701 to advance a long-term fully aware of the seriousness with which levels are building. If signs of real progress solution, alleged violations of 1701, the they are taking the issue. It is possible that are not seen soon, powerful Council mem- implementation of the arms embargo this will take place at the beginning of the bers seem likely to be looking at other and the implementation of recommenda- month. Subsequent briefings on progress options to increase the costs for the players tions regarding the Sheb’a Farms. It may with a new draft resolution are also likely. in other ways. be necessary to touch on all of these However, at this stage it is unclear whether The International Criminal Court indictments issues in a balanced way in order to any actual Council meetings or consulta- are also an important part of the backdrop. maintain the Council’s influence and tions on Iran will be scheduled during In addition, the recent genocide decision by respect by all parties. n the International Court of Justice is also

 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Annual Statistics on During 2007 we will develop a publication Statistics on the numbers of Council resolu- Security Council Activity or publications which respond to this inter- tions and presidential statements do not est. However, as a small initial contribution by themselves give a full picture of the Security Council Report has received many in this area, we have prepared the following Council’s activity. Accordingly, it will be our suggestions that it would be helpful to chart graphing the annual output of goal to present annually a wider range of produce annually an overview of Council the Council, in terms of resolutions and indicators as well. activity. presidential statements adopted from 1990 to 2006.

Annual Statistics on Security Council Resolutions and Presidential Statements (1990-2006)

200

181 Total Resolutions Presidential Statements 180

157 159 160 146 138 140 129

120 111 111 106 110 107 99 97 100 93 91 91 87 83 82 80 88 73 71 66 68 67 63 77 65 74 57 57 59 60 51 52 67 63 50 59 54 40 49 48 42 41 42 37 38 39 34 30 20 21 14 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

The chart shows clearly the huge spike in Council output from 1992- by an equally dramatic rise in the number of peace operations 94. From 1995 the level of activity drops sharply and remains flat approved by the Council and being deployed to the field. For a until 2005. detailed commentary on the growth in peacekeeping in 2006, please It is clear that in 2005 and 2006 we have witnessed another dra- see our Special Research Report, Twenty Days in August: The Secu- matic rise in output by the Security Council. rity Council Sets Massive New Challenges for UN Peacekeeping, 8 It is important to note that the rise in Council activity is matched September 2006.

Status Update since our February Forecast Recent developments on the situations cov- sector reform. (See our 14 February Update.) Foreign Minister Ján Kubiš, and adopted a ered in our February Forecast are covered in The Council adopted a presidential state- presidential statement (S/PRST/2007/4) the relevant briefs in this issue. However, ment and called on the Secretary-General to promoting cooperation between the Coun- other interesting Council developments in make concrete recommendations. (S/ cil and international organisations to February included: PRST/2007/3) enhance states’ implementation of resolu- n Democratic Republic of Congo: On 15 n Iran: On 22 February the IAEA report on tion 1540. (See our 20 February Update.) February the Council adopted resolution Iran’s non-compliance with resolution 1737 n Great Lakes Region: The Office of the Sec- 1742 rolling over MONUC’s mandate until was transmitted to the Council. retary-General’s Special Representative for 15 April 2007. It requested recommenda- (S/2007/100) the Great Lakes Region is scheduled to tions by mid-March on MONUC’s future n Timor-Leste: On 22 February the Council close at the end of March. As indicated in mandate. The Council also received a report adopted resolution 1745 extending UNMIT’s our January 2007 Forecast, the Council in on the potential impact of sanctions on the mandate until 26 February 2008 and increas- December renewed the mandate of the country’s population. (S/2007/68) ing its police personnel as recommended Special Representative for a final period, n Haiti: On 15 February the Council extended by the 1 February Secretary-General’s pending the establishment of a regional MINUSTAH’s mandate until 15 October report. (S/2007/50) secretariat (S/PRST/2006/57). So far, there 2007. (S/RES/1743) n Terrorism & WMDs: Resolution 1540: On are no indications or likelihood that the man- n Security Sector Reform: On 20 February, 23 February, the Council held an open date of the Special Representative will be the Council held an open debate on security debate (S/PV.5635), chaired by Slovakia’s renewed for a further period.

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org  Chad/Central African may view a United Nations force as interfer- Options Republic ing with their military agenda and decide to Council consultations on 27 February sug- attack it”. The clear inference is that, if the gest that a large UN protection force seems Expected Council Action Council is to respond to the humanitarian to be emerging as the most likely option. Discussions on a robust protection force for protection imperative, key questions are: (The light monitoring option canvassed in eastern Chad and the Central African n Chadian rebels recognising the mission’s December now seems to be excluded.) Republic (CAR) will continue. The level of impartial nature; Other options for discussion will include: momentum suggests a final decision will be n consent from the Chadian government; n giving the mission a strong enforcement reached in March. and mandate with the robustness and assets n readiness from troop contributors. recommended by the Secretary-General, A key factor will be Chad’s response to the including a presence in northwestern Secretary-General’s proposals. (Chadian The report offers two options. But both are CAR; President Idriss Deby opposes the pro- dependent on critical military assets, high- n providing proactive assistance to the posed military component, preferring a quality troops and credible impartiality: Secretariat with encouraging potential “civilian” presence. There seems to be n option A, largely relying on air assets, troop contributors; and agreement from the CAR on an operation would require 6,000 troops; and n firmly engaging Chad to provide consent as proposed by the Secretary-General.) n option B, preferred by the Secretary-Gen- to the robust military component. A further issue is disagreement about the eral and with more reliance on infantry, priority to be accorded to a political recon- would require 10,900 troops. The option of running an operation without ciliation process. a political process (either established or Under either option, there would be 260 UN being set up in parallel) seems to have Key Recent Developments police supported by 800 local gendarmes receded in light of the risks. Chad now has 120,000 internally displaced and police in Chad, with critical backstop- persons and 230,000 Sudanese refugees. ping from the military component, and The Secretary-General’s report speaks of Fighting between Chadian forces and reb- twenty UN police advisors in the CAR. relying on perceptions of the mission’s els (some reportedly supported by impartiality and seems to envisage only a The mission would be headed by a special Khartoum) presents serious risks to those light facilitation role (which curiously does representative, headquartered in N’Dja- civilians. Direct attacks against civilians by not include initiating contact with either mena, with a regional office in Abeché, Sudanese Janjaweed have increased. Dar- Chadian or Darfurian rebels). An option, Chad headed by a deputy special repre- furian rebels are engaged in forcible therefore, is for the Council to specify this sentative and field offices. The mandate recruitment in camps and intra-communal aspect of the mandate in more detail, which would include: violence. could involve: n assistance in civilian protection and law n a political mandate to directly engage The situation in the CAR improved with the and order; Chadian rebels and government, per- signing of a peace agreement between the n deployment along the borders to reduce haps in coordination with the AU PSC government and two rebel groups on 2 tensions; initiative, as well as coordinating with February in Libya. This provides for hostili- n liaison with governments, the AU, and the key regional players within the Tripoli ties to cease, rebel integration into the army UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) (but curi- framework; and a process of national dialogue. But ously not the rebels, which is strange n signalling in the resolution that the estab- considerable insecurity remains, particu- given the proposed role of the mission in lishment of a political process is an larly in the northwest. supporting political dialogue); important step towards regional and n facilitating regional relations, especially domestic stability and for the mission’s In a communiqué on 12 February, the AU with respect to the Tripoli Agreement; Peace and Security Council (PSC) urged exit strategy; and n support, as necessary, for dialogue efforts n prioritising that role by mandating the early inclusive dialogue in Chad, offered AU with unarmed groups in Chad and coor- deployment of the civilian component. assistance and decided to send a mission dination with the UN Peacebuilding Office to assess implementation of the February in the CAR (BONUCA); Key Issues 2006 Tripoli Agreement and make recom- n assistance, as necessary, on a framework The key issue for Council members is mendations. On 22 February, Libya hosted for a ceasefire and reconciliation with agreeing on the various elements of the a Sudan-Chad-CAR summit. But in the armed groups in both countries; and proposed protection mission, including size absence of progress on the ground, deep n preliminary investigations on human and mandate. scepticism remains. rights violations. But the first issue is consent. Deby’s reluc- The Secretary-General’s report does not The report states that the advance mission tance to accept a strong military component condition deployment in eastern Chad on a (Mission des Nations Unies au Tchad et en bears some resemblance to the Sudan prec- political process. However, it cautions that République Centrafricaine, or MiNUTAC) edent and could potentially cause huge “eastern Chad is not a conventional peace- will be headed by a Secretary-General’s problems for the timing of the mission’s keeping environment” and that deployment representative for Chad and consist of 35 deployment. A related issue is whether would “carry distinct and serious risks military and 39 UN police, plus a civilian [including] the possibility that armed groups component.

 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Khartoum and regional players, such as n Chad’s position on both the military com- Libya, will also oppose a robust deployment. ponent and a political process; and n how the mission will fit in the Tripoli A related issue will be whether key Council SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT framework. members—France in particular—will be Monthly willing to push N’Djamena to accept the Most seem to believe that the mission MAR 2007 force with the robustness recommended by should be approved soon, despite those FORECAST the Secretary-General. The alternative concerns. There is some expectation of dif- Other Relevant Facts would be to accept substantial limitations ficulty in crafting the mandate, especially on the force’s effectiveness and much given Chad’s reluctance on a political pro- CAR: Special Representative of the higher risks. cess and the military component, but there Secretary-General seems to be resolve that robustness is non- Lamine Cissé (Senegal) A second major issue will be securing suffi- negotiable. BONUCA: Size and Composition cient troop and police contributions, given current demands on peacekeeping There is also wide support for language on Strength as of 30 September 2006: 19 resources. Mixed signals about consent political reconciliation. Members tradition- internationals, five military, six police and disagreement in the Council on man- ally sympathetic to Deby—in particular BONUCA: Duration date and size are likely to deter troop and France and the Congo—may be unsympa- 15 February 2000 to present; mandate police contributors. A related question is thetic to overt criticism and pressure and expires 31 December 2007 whether Council members will be prepared are likely to be sensitive to options which collectively to play a larger role in energis- are more attractive to N’Djamena. By con- Force multinationale en Centrafrique (FOMUC): Size and Composition ing the force-generation process. trast, Russia, China and Qatar, mindful of Sudan’s position, may be more sympa- • Current strength: 380 troops The final issue is that the political reconcilia- thetic to the opposite position. • Contributors: Gabon, Republic of tion dimension seems to be lagging. The Congo and Chad Secretary-General’s proposals only envis- UN Documents FOMUC: Duration age a light facilitation role for the operation combined with a hoped-for reliance on rec- Selected Security Council Resolution October 2002 to present; mandate ognition of the UN’s impartial nature. Given • S/RES/1706 (31 August 2006) man- expires 30 June 2007 that this light political role may affect both dated a multidimensional UN military effectiveness and a credible exit presence in Chad and the CAR and strategy, this raises the questions of: requested recommendations. Sudan (Darfur) n whether more work is needed to clarify Selected Presidential Statements Expected Council Action the political environment in which the • S/PRST/2007/2 (16 January 2007) With the crisis in Darfur reaching more seri- mission would operate, as well as the requested further recommendations ous proportions each month, the Council is political objectives; and on peacekeeping in Chad and the expected to take up the question again in n whether the Secretary-General’s recom- CAR by mid-February and the immedi- March, particularly Khartoum’s delayed mendations are too soft on the political ate establishment of an advance response to the Secretary-General’s heavy side and may require strengthening. mission. support proposal. It will also be pushing for Council Dynamics • S/PRST/2006/47 (22 November 2006) prompt AU-UN agreement on the hybrid During the 27 February consultations, there renewed BONUCA. operation. Renewed focus on the political reconciliation process is possible. was wide support for a robust protection Selected Secretary-General’s Reports operation in eastern Chad and in the CAR. • S/2007/97 (23 February 2007) was the The Secretary-General’s envoy Jan Elias- France and African members may present a new report on UN peacekeeping in son and AU envoy Salim A. Salim may brief draft soon, after consultations with Chad Chad and the CAR. the Council. and the CAR. • S/2006/1034 (28 December 2006) was The sanctions Panel of Experts’ mid-term the latest report on the CAR. Positions on the specifics of an eventual briefing is due by 29 March. mission have not yet been tested. Several • S/2006/1019 (22 December 2006) was members have expressed concern with the the first report on UN peacekeeping in Key Recent Developments lack of clarity on: Chad and the CAR. Attacks against civilians in February n the political and security environment, in Other increased the numbers of displaced per- sons to a record two million internally particular the degree of realism in relying • S/2006/934 (30 November 2006) con- displaced, underlining the intensification of on perceptions of impartiality; tained the new modalities for the continuing crisis in Darfur. n the lack of troop and police pledges, BONUCA. especially in view of deployments in Dar- On 14 February, Khartoum refused visas for fur and Somalia; For the full historical background, please the Human Rights Council-mandated high- see our July and December 2006 and level mission. February 2007 Forecasts. On 27 February, International Criminal Court (ICC) Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org  Ocampo presented the charges against On 13 February, Sudanese aircraft bombed Private advice to the Secretary-General former Sudanese interior minister (and cur- rebel groups preparing for a conference about the urgent need to fill the UNMIS rent state humanitarian affairs minister) on a unified negotiating platform. At press time, leadership position quickly is also a Ahmed Haroun and Janjaweed commander a new conference appeared to be underway. likely option. Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-al-Rahman (alias Ali Related Developments in the Key Issues Kushayb). Human Rights Council The key issue for the Council is how to In a Council briefing on 6 February the make progress to implement the phased In late January, the Human Rights Coun- Secretary-General reported that Khartoum approach towards a hybrid operation. There cil president appointed a five-member had not yet responded on the heavy pack- is a possibility that Sudan now intends to high-level mission to assess human age and that next steps would be obstruct the phased approach indefinitely. rights conditions in Darfur, following the considered when Eliasson and Salim The issue for the Council may therefore be Council’s December decision. The mis- returned from Sudan. how long to tolerate deliberate delays in sion is headed by Nobel laureate Jody providing responses to the heavy package The package would include 2,250 military Williams. and the hybrid operation. force “enablers” (logistical/engineering), In mid-February, the mission met with AU 300 UN police advisors and three formed The issue of sanctions is again looming as representatives in Addis Ababa and was police units (about 375 police) to patrol Sudan’s resistance to Council demands then to proceed to Khartoum. However, camps and protect civilians. To be effective, continues. The issue seems to be whether the Sudanese government reneged on the package depends on the deployment of there are still sufficient concrete indications its earlier promise to issue visas to the two AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) battal- that the phased approach has some hope delegation. Widespread international ions—already authorised but never of being implemented. criticism ensued. The Secretary-Gen- generated—to facilitate AMIS’ deployment eral, mentioning his “disappointment”, A parallel issue is how to re-establish a in three sectors. There seem to be real diffi- recalled that Sudanese President Omar peace process in Darfur, and whether to culties with generating the necessary AMIS al-Bashir had personally promised him focus on this dimension as a means to troops without simultaneously addressing to receive the mission. make progress with the phased approach. the lack of funding and facilities for the (However, some members will recall that, in troops. The mission then decided to collect 2005, the same was being said about the information from locations outside Sudan seems to object to the placing of Abuja peace negotiations.) Sudan, including Chad. A final report is overall operational command and control expected before the end of the Human There are also a number of open issues on over the military component with the Rights Council’s fourth regular session the phased approach: UN, with delegation to the AMIS force on 30 March. n the linkage between the heavy support commander. package and the need to deploy the Options Council members seem to be increasingly additional AMIS troops and the associ- Available options—perhaps through a pres- losing patience. The US appears to be ated funding issues; idential statement after the briefing from developing a broad package of sanctions. n finalising the hybrid operation proposal, Eliasson and Salim—include: Measures could include blocking Khartoum- including AU-UN agreement on mandate, n setting a deadline for Sudan’s response related banking transactions in the US. size, cost and command and control; on the heavy package; (Some observers note that Sudan has n stimulating UN-troop generation for the n providing proactive assistance to the AU already started to modify export contracts heavy support (2,250 troops and 675 and the UN with key aspects of the heavy previously in US dollars.) police) and the hybrid operation (17,300 package, such as funding and airlift for military and 5,000 police), given the pro- Eliasson and Salim’s mission to re-energise new AMIS troops; jected UN operation in Chad and the the peace process in mid-February addressed n encouraging prompt finalisation of the Central African Republic (10,900 troops key points of contention such as re-opening hybrid operation proposal; recommended) and the AU mission in the peace agreement and rebel unity. On the n pressuring Sudan to realise in practice its Somalia (8,000 troops); and other hand, there are concerns that since commitments to the operation; n ensuring that AMIS accountability, pro- Jan Pronk’s departure in December 2006, n making clear to the Secretary-General curement and managerial standards there has been no special representative of that concessions that could compromise comply with UN rules, particularly in view the Secretary-General and head of the UN the force’s effectiveness should not be of the need to secure funding commit- Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in Khartoum to made; and ment from the General Assembly’s Fifth lead for the UN on a day-to-day basis. n showing Council support for reactivation Committee. of the Darfur peace process. Libya convened its latest regional peace Council Dynamics initiative on 20 February. Eritrea (as a facili- Council-imposed sanctions against Khar- While there is consensus within the Council tator), Chad, Sudan and rebel groups toum are less likely, so long as it appears to on the need to press ahead rapidly with the attended. Eritrea and Libya also reportedly cooperate in the phased approach and in phased approach, significant divisions met with the rebels separately to encourage the absence of clear evidence of prevarica- remain on how to deal with Sudan. a unified negotiating position. tion. On the other hand, as time passes, unilateral sanctions are increasingly likely. China, Russia, Qatar and Indonesia seem to favour a cautious, quieter approach

 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org taking into account Khartoum’s concerns. • S/2006/591 (28 July 2006) and Add. 1 Those members appear to prefer a step-by- (28 August 2006) and S/2006/645 (10 step approach notwithstanding the August 2006) made recommenda- SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT increasing humanitarian costs as a result of tions for UNMIS’ mandate in Darfur Monthly delays. They consider that detailed agree- and for UN assistance to AMIS. ment should be secured on each of the MAR 2007 Other FORECAST support packages before moving to the hybrid operation. • S-4/101 (13 December 2006) was the Human Rights Council Darfur Useful Additional Sources The US and the UK seem to be looking for decision. n Conciliation Resources, Peace by Piece: new options, including fine-tuned unilateral • S/2006/961 (6 December 2006) con- Addressing Sudan’s Conflicts, 2006, sanctions. They also want to increase the tained the 30 November AU Peace http://www.c-r.org/our-ork/accord/ pressure to finalise the hybrid operation and Security Council communiqué. sudan/contents.php plan and push for a final response from • S/2006/795 (2 October 2006) was the Khartoum. latest Panel of Experts’ report. Somalia Among African members, there is irritation For the full historical background, please with the damage that the current situation Expected Council Action see our February and July 2006 and Febru- has done to the AU’s reputation and concern Council members, encouraged in February ary 2007 Forecasts. about the safety of AMIS troops. There is by what they saw as a window of opportu- scepticism on whether sanctions would have Other Relevant Facts nity in Somalia, will be looking anxiously at positive effects. Some, especially Congo, developments in the country, particularly are disinclined to openly pressure Khartoum. UNMIS: Special Representative of the the slow progress with the deployment of Secretary-General Nonetheless, there seems to be a readiness the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The to notch up African pressure on Sudan. Vacant findings of the UN assessment mission will Special Envoy of the Secretary-General also be a focus. The regular report of the Most members have welcomed the Jan Eliasson (Sweden) Secretary-General, which is due by 28 Secretary-General’s efforts including the February, is likely to precipitate a discussion moves to re-energise the political track. UNMIS: Size, Composition and Cost of progress, particularly whether meaning- There is increasing support for the view that • Maximum authorised strength: up to ful steps are underway with a political concrete progress on peace talks will help 27,300 military and 6,015 police reconciliation process. A Council statement achieve progress in the negotiations on the • Strength as of 31 December 2006: is possible. peacekeeping operation. 9,317 military and 660 police • Key troop contributors: India, Pakistan The sanctions committee may discuss China’s apparent inability to use its eco- applications for exemptions to provide sup- nomic influence to persuade Sudan is not and Bangladesh • Cost: 1 July 2006-30 June 2007 port for Somali government forces in line understood by many Council members. with resolution 1744. The US openly criticised the “mixed sig- $1,126.30 million (excludes Darfur) nals” sent during Chinese President Hu UNMIS: Duration Key Recent Developments Jintao’s visit in early February to Khartoum, 24 March 2005 to present; mandate The security situation has deteriorated, with in which he reportedly urged a solution to expires 30 April 2007 growing factional violence and almost daily Darfur but also signed an aid package. attacks against Ethiopian forces and Transi- AU Special Envoy tional Federal Government (TFG) officials in UN Documents Salim A. Salim Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kismayo and other cit- Selected Security Council Resolutions AMIS: Size and Composition ies. Civilians bear the brunt of the violence, and an estimated 1.1 million face a humani- • S/RES/1714 (6 October 2006) • Total authorised strength: about tarian crisis in the south. Fighting continues extended UNMIS until 30 April 2007. 10,000 military and 1,500 police between Ethiopian troops and Union of • S/RES/1706 (31 August 2006) set a • Strength as of 1 September 2006: Islamic Courts (UIC) remnants in the south. mandate for UNMIS in Darfur. 5,703 military and 1,425 police • S/RES/1591 (29 March 2005) and • Key troop contributors: Nigeria, On 20 February, the Council adopted 1556 (30 July 2004) imposed sanc- Rwanda and Senegal resolution 1744, stressing the “need for tions in Darfur. AMIS: Duration broad-based and representative institutions • S/RES/1590 (24 March 2005) estab- 25 May 2004 to present; mandate expires reached through an all-inclusive political lished UNMIS. 1 July 2007 process” and requested the Secretary- General to assist actively. The resolution Selected Presidential Statement Human Rights Council High-Level Mission also reiterated the Council’s intention to • S/PRST/2006/55 (19 December 2006) • Jody Williams (US) (head) consider sanctions against peace spoilers. endorsed the phased approach. • Mart Nutt (Estonia) Selected Secretary-General’s Reports • Bertrand Ramcharan (Guyana) Resolution 1744 also: n authorised AMISOM to use all necessary • S/2006/1041 (28 December 2006) was • Patrice Tonda (Gabon) means to provide security for all involved the latest monthly report on Darfur at • Marakim Wibisono (Indonesia) press time.

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org  in the reconciliation process, protection stronger support for it, perhaps through a process and how they are included. (US for the Transitional Federal Institutions statement; Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer (TFIs), assistance in particular for the for- n supporting a standing “international recently stated that “we suggest the TFG mation of national security forces and working group,” perhaps based in Nai- reach out to moderate Islamists. We do not security for humanitarian assistance; robi and co-chaired by the UN and the believe that the Courts should be reconsti- n provided exemptions from the arms AU, to support the national reconciliation tuted as a political entity” and that the US embargo for AMISOM and to external process; and will “take strong measures to deny terrorists technical assistance for Somali security n imposing targeted sanctions on peace safe haven in Somalia.”) forces; and spoilers. On replacing AMISOM with a UN operation, n requested a UN assessment mission to Key Issues views range from those very supportive of a report on the possibility of replacing The key issues are: speedy transfer (such as the US and African AMISOM with a UN mission and recom- n energising the political reconciliation members) to those (such as France) seem- mendations on the UN’s future role in process and encouraging it to be more ingly concerned with UN peacekeeping support of peace and security in Somalia. inclusive; priorities elsewhere. Others seem open to (An earlier draft contained a request for n important aspects of the general frame- the idea, but prefer as a first step careful recommendations including a peace- work for any Yusuf-led reconciliation assessment of progress with national rec- keeping operation. Some members seem process are still unclear, including the onciliation and AMISOM’s deployment. to have been uncomfortable with specify- role of international facilitators and advi- ing at this stage that UN peacekeeping sors, participation (especially whether UN Documents was an option.) the UIC or some successor organisation Selected Security Council Resolutions The resolution also welcomes Ethiopia’s will be allowed to participate as a group • S/RES/1744 (20 February 2007) decision to withdraw and calls for contribu- or only individuals such as Sheikh authorised AMISOM. tions to AMISOM to create conditions for Ahmed) and the desired outcome (par- • S/RES/733 (23 January 1992) the “withdrawal of all foreign forces.” This ticularly whether it should include a imposed the arms embargo. was seen as a message separating the Ethi- power-sharing deal); opian intervention from AMISOM in order to n improving the security situation in Soma- Selected Presidential Statement safeguard the impartiality of the AU force. lia and ensuring that the TFIs remain a • S/PRST/2006/59 (22 December 2006) viable political framework through the expressed the Council’s concern over Responding to international pressure, deployment of AMISOM and future intensified fighting and called upon all Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi national security forces; parties to draw back from conflict. announced on 22 February that he will con- n guaranteeing delivery of humanitarian vene a national reconciliation conference Selected Press Statement assistance; within weeks. • SC/8947 (2 February 2007) signalled n addressing the regional impact of the sit- support for AMISOM and an all- uation in Somalia, especially regarding The TFG has sent mixed signals on its will- inclusive reconciliation. ingness to negotiate. Some reports suggest refugees, arms and combatants; and that President Abdullahi Yusuf has ruled out n how soon to begin discussion of a possi- Latest Secretary-General’s Report any UIC inclusion and that many in his ble transition from AMISOM to the UN. • S/2006/838 (23 October 2006) administration are reluctant to relinquish Questions remain on AMISOM’s troop gen- Latest Monitoring Group’s Report positions for a power-sharing arrangement. eration and funding, and on the AU’s • S/2006/913 (21 November 2006) Uganda, Nigeria, Burundi, Ghana and capacity to shoulder simultaneous commit- Historical Background Malawi have pledged half of the planned ments in Darfur and Somalia. December 2006-January 2007 Ethiopian 8,000 troops for AMISOM. Two Ugandan Council Dynamics and TFG forces overrun the UIC. battalions will be the first to arrive in Moga- Members seem agreed on a strategy for dishu, following clearance from the Somalia around an inclusive reconciliation October-November 2006 The UIC encircled Ugandan parliament on 13 February. process, with support from AMISOM in the the TFG at its sole outpost, Baidoa. Ethio- pian troops began amassing along the The AU hopes that Uganda’s deployment short-term. border. will create positive momentum for more However, for many members there is a rec- pledges. Concerns about funding are high, ognition that the TFG is not representative 25 September 2006 The UIC took control of with pledges from the EU, US and UK and that this is contributing to the current Kismayo. amounting only to approximately US$40 violence. There is emerging consensus that million. 13 September 2006 The AU formally the process should include all key players, endorsed the IGAD Mission in Somalia Options especially moderate Islamic individuals. (IGASOM). Options for the Council in March include: Members have publicly welcomed Yusuf’s n reviewing progress with the political initiative, but scepticism remains. Early June 2006 The UIC seized control of reconciliation process and expressing Mogadishu and Jowhar. The US is likely to be cautious over which UIC members could be included in the 10 October 2004 The TFG was established.

 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org April 1995 UNPOS was established. After a year of status negotiations, Ahtisaari presented an outline of the much- November 1994 The Council decided to ter- anticipated proposal for Kosovo’s status minate UNOSOM II by March 1995. SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT to Belgrade and Pristina on 2 February. Monthly October 1993 18 US Rangers were killed Ahtisaari’s outline does not mention the and mutilated, 75 were wounded. The US MAR 2007 word independence. It is silent and ambig- FORECAST announced withdrawal from Somalia by uous as to whether Kosovo would remain March 1994. part of the state of Serbia in terms of inter- agreements and seek membership in international organisations; June 1993 Pakistani troops were attacked, national law. It does however give Kosovo n protection of the rights of members of 24 were killed. many of the symbols traditionally associ- ated with statehood including a flag, communities; March 1993 UNOSOM II was established. anthem, and army and some elements of n decentralisation and transparency in international legal personality such as the public service; December 1992 The Council authorised n an integrated, independent, impartial, UNITAF. right to conduct certain aspects of foreign policy. However, none of these are defini- inclusive justice system; April 1992 UNOSOM I and a sanctions com- tive in the sense that in many federal n protection and promotion of religious and mittee were established. systems territorial sub-units enjoy similar cultural heritage; symbols. And there are examples of asso- n the rights of refugees and displaced per- January 1992 The Council imposed an arms ciated states that enjoy separate sons to return and reclaim property and embargo. treaty-making power and rights to join inter- possessions; and n a professional, multi-ethnic and demo- 1991 Civil war broke out; Somaliland national organisations cratic Kosovo security sector. declared independence. Ahtisaari has hinted that his final report, fol- Two-thirds of the proposal focuses on Other Relevant Facts lowing the conclusion of the last round of consultations with the parties, will remove strengthening protection for the Serb minor- Special Representative of the Secretary- some of these uncertainties. ity with specific provisions for the protection General of Kosovo’s non-Albanian communities, François Lonseny Fall (Guinea) The 58-page proposal contains 14 articles including guaranteed representation in the which form its key principles. These are Kosovo Assembly, government and the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee expanded in 12 annexes. One key provision judiciary. Dumisani S. Kumalo (South Africa) is a future international presence that would include an International Civilian Represen- In the weeks since the presentation of Ahti- tative (ICR) who would also be the EU saari’s proposal there has been dissent on Kosovo Special Representative, a European Secu- both sides. On 9 February, 10,000 Serbs in Mitrovica demonstrated against it. In Bel- Expected Council Action rity and Defence Policy Mission and a NATO-led International Military Presence. grade all parties in the Serbian parliament The final report by Maarti Ahtisaari, the have opposed the proposal. On 10 Febru- Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the In terms of governance, the proposal would ary ethnic Albanians in Kosovo rioted in Future Status Process for Kosovo, is replace the current transitional constitu- protest that the proposal fell short of full expected to be transmitted to the Council tional framework of UN administration, independence. Police responded with tear during March. No Council action is expected which was imposed by the Council, with a gas and rubber bullets. Two people were during the month though there will be active new framework, also to be imposed by the killed and Kosovo’s interior minister and the bilateral discussions. The Council may Council, returning the sovereign powers of UNMIK police commissioner resigned over meet on the issue in April and a draft law-making and administration to the peo- the deaths. resolution on Kosovo is likely to emerge ple, but retaining a much looser form of before long. international oversight. On 19 February a bomb attack in Pristina damaged three UN vehicles. The Kosovo The Secretary-General’s periodic report on The proposed settlement provides a 120- Liberation Army has claimed responsibility the United Nations Interim Administration in day transition period during which UNMIK’s in retaliation for the deaths of the two Kosovo (UNMIK) is also expected in March. mandate would continue. During this time Albanian protestors. On 26 February a UNMIK has already downsized significantly. the Kosovo Assembly, in consultation with hand-grenade exploded near OSCE prem- Its future awaits the Council’s decision on the ICR, would approve a constitution and ises in western Kosovo. There was a major Kosovo’s status. legislation necessary to implement the final demonstration in Belgrade on 27 February. Key Recent Developments status. Nine months later, elections would be held. On 21 February, a final round of talks Kosovo has been under UN administration, between the two sides commenced in as defined in resolution 1244, since 1999 The proposed settlement envisages: Vienna. Ahtisaari made it clear he was open when a NATO bombing campaign brought n a multi-ethnic society with democratic to constructive amendments and compro- to a halt a prolonged conflict between government, rule of law, human rights mise. The Kosovo Albanian side accepted ethnic Albanian separatists and Serbian and fundamental freedoms; the proposal without major changes. forces. n the right to conclude international The Serbians opposed most of the plan,

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org  believing it violated the territorial integrity of work of protections of minorities and and South Ossetia and Moldova’s Transd- Serbia. It asked for Kosovo to be clearly international oversight envisaged by Ahti- nestr. But the reasons for Russia’s position designated as an autonomous region saari, this could create a complicated and also seem likely to go much deeper and within Serbia. The talks are expected to potentially volatile situation. UNMIK would reflect traditional ties with Serbia and ortho- end by 10 March. still be the interim administrator of Kosovo, dox communities. It is unclear at this stage and conflict might arise should the govern- whether this opposition would be strong Elections in Serbia on 21 January did not ment want to take over UNMIK’s functions. enough to attract a veto, or under what con- produce a working majority in parliament. A situation could emerge in which hostilities ditions an abstention might be possible. A coalition government, with pro-democracy were directed at UNMIK by both Serbian parties leading the new government, is In the past the elected Council members, and Albanian factions. expected. However, both Serbian Prime essentially excluded from input on the Kosovo Minister Vojislav Kostunica and pro-West- Another issue that carries huge concerns issue because of the Contact Group pro- ern President Boris Tadic denounced the for a number of Council members (and cesses, were not unduly concerned because Ahtisaari plan. The Serb Radical Party, many outside the Council) is the impact that it was seen as a largely European issue. But which seems likely to be the opposition, a Council decision imposed without Bel- as a final decision point approaches, a num- demanded that parliament adopt a resolu- grade’s consent would have on situations ber of the elected members, including tion opposing independence for Kosovo. elsewhere in the world where other break- Indonesia and South Africa, are taking very The Serbian Orthodox Church also away regions seeking independence would close interest because of the implications for opposed Ahtisaari’s plan. use Kosovo as a precedent. territorial integrity. Strong ties in the Non- Aligned Movement will be relevant. On 12 February EU foreign ministers backed At this stage, another major issue is the fun- Ahtisaari’s proposal and said the EU was damental ambiguity underlying Ahtisaari’s Finally, it remains to be seen whether the ready to play a significant role in implement- plan. As indicated above, this may be clari- Secretary-General will take a position on ing a status settlement. The EU also offered fied in his final report, but at present while the issue. He has a number of potential Serbia the incentive of early resumption of the principles of governance are clearly ways of doing so; including in his letter of talks on a Stabilisation and Association stated, what they mean for Kosovo’s status transmittal of the Ahtisaari report to the Agreement—the first step towards EU mem- remains unclear. Council. bership—if it fully cooperated with the UN For some Council members, the proposed Underlying Problems war crimes tribunal. The EU suspended talks solution raises important legal issues. There Some believe that the short transition time last year because Serbia failed to hand over are very few precedents. envisaged by the Ahtisaari plan will create Bosnian Serb commander Ratko Mladic. problems and that UNMIK may find it diffi- Council and Wider Dynamics On 2 February the Contact Group on Kosovo cult to complete all the necessary tasks in While the Council has supported Ahtisaari, (the US, the UK, France, Italy, Russia and 120 days. it is clearly divided on what to do next. Most Germany), which Ahtisaari has closely con- of the Western members, together with the Kosovo’s economic situation is dire. If its sulted at every step, issued a short statement Latin Americans, seem open to the Council status continues to be unresolved, this will urging the parties to engage constructively. imposing a solution without Serbia’s con- delay membership in international financial A more definitive position remained elusive sent if necessary. For many of them there is organisations cutting it off from much due to differences between the five Western no willingness to consider any plan B. More- needed international aid. members and Russia. over, they are convinced that it is essential Options to achieve a solution in the near future to UN Documents It is unlikely that the Council will consider maintain stability. Security Council Resolution any options in March. The EU position is more complicated. Slo- • S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999) autho- Key Issues vakia, which has a key role as an elected rised NATO to secure and enforce the The first key issue for the Council will be Council member, may be handicapped in withdrawal of Yugoslav (FRY) forces timing. Council members will be concerned supporting an EU consensus because Ahti- from Kosovo and established UNMIK. that rushing into a decision could destabi- saari’s plan has sparked strong adverse Selected Presidential Statements lise the region. But equally there will be reactions from almost all members of Slo- • S/PRST/2005/51 (24 October 2005) deep concern that too much delay could vakia’s governing coalition. It is possible declared it was time to begin the politi- also trigger serious violence. Tensions have that Slovakia will find it difficult to support cal process to determine the future increased since the presentation of the pro- independence for Kosovo against the will status of Kosovo. posal and the Council will be very conscious of Serbia. • S/PRST/2004/13 (30 April 2004) reaf- of the spill-over risk into neighbouring Russia and China oppose an imposed solu- firmed strong support for the policy of countries. tion and would prefer that more time be “standards before status.” A second and related issue is the risk given for the talks. Russia argues that grant- Selected Secretary-General’s Reports/ that the Albanian Kosovars will unilaterally ing Kosovo independence could spark a Letters declare independence if the Council stalls chain reaction creating a precedent for sep- • S/2007/53 (1 February 2007) was the on the issue too long. Without the frame- aratist regions such as Georgia’s Abhkazia letter reporting on the operations of the Kosovo Force from 1 to 30 Novem- ber 2006.

10 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org • S/2007/39 (26 January 2007) was the Useful Additional Sources letter reporting on the operations of n Joint Contact Group statement published the Kosovo Force from 1 to 31 Octo- upon presentation by the Special Envoy SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT ber 2006. of his draft comprehensive proposal, 2 Monthly • S/2006/906 (20 November 2006) was February 2007 n Statement of the Contact Group after MAR 2007 the latest report of the Secretary-Gen- FORECAST eral on UNMIK. meeting held at ministerial level in New The political impasse in Lebanon continues • S/2006/657 (16 August 2006) and York, 20 September 2007 (please see our December 2006 Forecast S/2006/656 (14 August 2006) were let- n Kosovo’s Status: Difficult Months Ahead, for more details). In February, violence left ters between the Secretary-General International Crisis Group, Europe Brief- four people dead and about 200 injured. and the president of the Security ing No. 45, 20 December 2006 Lebanon’s Hezbollah-led opposition Council regarding the appointment of recently threatened a campaign of civil Joachim Rücker as the Special Repre- disobedience. sentative and head of UNMIK. Lebanon • S/2006/45 (25 January 2006) noted Expected Council Action The international tribunal for the trial of mur- that progress in the implementation of On 12 March the Council is due to receive derers of Rafik Hariri is one of the issues at the standards was slower than all the quarterly report on resolution 1701, the core of the crisis. On 6 February, the other reporting periods. which brought about the cessation of hos- Lebanese government and the UN signed tilities between Israel and Hezbollah. an agreement for the tribunal. However, Other Relevant Facts Recommendations on the status of the ratification by the Lebanese parliament is Special Representative of the Secretary- Sheb’a Farms are also expected. A presi- being blocked by Nabih Berri, the Shi’a General dential statement is possible. president of parliament. The next parlia- mentary session is scheduled for mid- Joachim Rücker (Germany) The International Independent Investigation March. On 16 February, Saad Hariri, the son UNMIK Commission (UNIIIC) on the assassination of late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and the • Size of UNMIK mission: 504 interna- of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik current leader of the pro-government March tional staff, 2,001 local staff; 142 UN Hariri is also expected to report in March. 14 coalition, proposed that the Security volunteers Following a Lebanese request, the Council Council override local objections and • Size of OSCE mission: 252 interna- will consider renewing the Commission’s impose the tribunal through a resolution tional staff, 768 local staff mandate for one year. under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. • Size of EU mission: 125 international Key Recent Developments staff, 336 local staff On 25 January, UN Secretary-General Ban The Council adopted a presidential state- Ki-moon attended an international donors’ Cost ment on 12 December following the conference for Lebanon in Paris. Saudi US$2.218 billion for fiscal year 2006/2007 Secretary-General’s report on implementa- Arabia, the US and France, along with forty (not including OSCE, EU and NATO tion of resolution 1701. (For background other countries plus the World Bank and the expenditures) see our 8 December 2006 Update.) International Monetary Fund, pledged $7.6 billion in grants and soft loans to help KFOR (NATO FORCE) The last UNIIIC report was presented to the rebuild Lebanon. General Roland Kather (Germany) Council by Commissioner Serge Bram- Size and Composition of Mission mertz on 18 December. He noted that the Lebanese and Israeli forces on 7 February investigation was approaching a sensitive • Size: 16,300 troops exchanged fire across the Blue Line sepa- and complicated phase, and that there were • NATO Countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, rating the two countries. A tripartite significant links between the Hariri murder Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, investigation commission, including the and other bombings in Lebanon. He noted France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Lebanese and Israeli forces and UNIFIL, that Syria’s cooperation with the commis- Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, was set up to determine the sequence of sion had been satisfactory, but that ten Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portu- events and whether Israeli forces crossed states had not responded to his request for gal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Blue Line before the Lebanese army cooperation. Spain, Turkey, UK, US fired. The Council issued a press statement expressing concern and said it looked • Non-NATO Countries: Argentina, On 5 January, Russia proposed a formal forward to receiving the results of the inves- Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Finland, request to Brammertz for the names of tigation. Georgia, Ireland, Mongolia, Morocco, countries that were not cooperating with his Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine investigation. Most members preferred an Israel reported that the Lebanese army on 8 UNMIK Civilian Police alternate proposal, expressing readiness to February intercepted a truck transporting assist the Commission further, leaving it to • Total of 1,374 officers from 42 arms east of Beirut. Israel also said that Brammertz to decide if and when to dis- countries there had been other reports of arms des- close names. However, Russia was reluctant • Key contributors: Pakistan, Rumania, tined for Hezbollah being smuggled from to compromise, and on 22 January the Ukraine, US Syria to Lebanon. Council decided to defer discussion of the draft letter.

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 11 The Council issued a press statement on 13 recommendations on the cartographic, that he anticipates technical resolution in February condemning terrorist attacks on legal and political implications of placing due course. Asking him to be more specific two public buses in Ain Aaleq, in northeast the Sheb’a Farms under UN jurisdiction is likely to continue to be a sensitive issue. Beirut, which killed three people. After a until border delineation and Lebanese On the other hand, the discussion will request from the Lebanese prime minister, sovereignty over them are fully settled. become more complex if he advises that the Council agreed to allow UNIIIC to pro- This involves determining the precise the non-cooperation was of a political vide technical assistance to Lebanese geographic scope of the Sheb’a Farms. nature or if cooperation was withheld even if authorities investigating these attacks The substantive issue the Council will it was legally possible. (similar to the case of the November 2006 have to decide is whether to request that Regarding the issue of the Council possibly assassination of Pierre Gemayel). Syria proceed to delineate its border with moving to impose the tribunal under Chap- Lebanon on the basis of the recommen- On 22 February the Lebanese government ter VII, some members may prefer the latter dations. In addition to Syria’s position, asked the Security Council to extend the outcome, as a robust indication of support Hezbollah’s position on the territorial def- mandate of UNIIIC, due to expire on 15 for the Lebanese government. But most inition of the Farms may become an June 2007, for up to one year. members seem likely to prefer a decision issue. Hezbollah considers the farms giving a 12-month extension of UNIIIC as a In February, the Personal Representative of Lebanese, and their occupation by Israel satisfactory commitment of support to the the Secretary-General in Lebanon was as the justification for their armed status. Lebanese government at this stage. upgraded to Special Coordinator of all UN However, tactically, at this time it may not agencies in Lebanon. suit Hezbollah for this issue to be resolved Council Dynamics because it would reduce the justification Russia seems to be increasingly responsive Options for operating as a militia. They may there- to Syria’s concerns about the situation in On the Investigation Commission, the Coun- fore raise objections. Also it is possible Lebanon. It seems that Syria in January was cil could respond to the UNIIIC report by: that Israel will have tactical objections to behind the proposal to name the states that n renewing the UNIIIC mandate for either resolving the status of the Farms, thereby did not cooperate with the Brammertz six months or one year; further complicating the issue. investigation. A significant majority of mem- n expressing readiness to assist Brammertz, n Violations of the Blue Line: In addition bers opposed this Russian initiative as they particularly if states are not cooperating in to the 7 February incident, there is the believed that the Council should not inter- a satisfactory manner; and issue of continuing reports of violations of fere in the commissioner’s work. Most n deferring a decision since the mandate the Blue Line by Israeli aircraft. members consider that naming the coun- does not expire until June. n Arms Embargo: A major issue is the tries could be disruptive to the investigation. On the 1701 report, the Council may adopt question of alleged movements of weap- South Africa and Indonesia seem to agree a presidential statement. It could begin to ons across the Syrian-Lebanese border. that while the Council should not override address the broader issues of long-term For Israel, the absence of satisfactory Brammertz’s judgement on this issue, it stability in Lebanon as promised in resolu- assurances on this front is the rationale should still be possible to agree on lan- tion 1701. The statement could also respond for the surveillance over-flights. The guage which asserts the importance of wide to alleged violations of resolution 1701 in a Council said in December that it was cooperation with the investigation, not only balanced way so as to address both the 7 ready to adopt further measures on this aspect. by Syria. February “Blue Line” incident and better n Monitoring the Syrian-Lebanese Border: monitoring of the arms embargo and calling Panama and South Africa have expressed This is a related issue and the Council on Syria to cooperate with such monitoring concern about systematically adding to may discuss progress toward reinforcing efforts. UNIIIC’s tasks by asking it to assist Leba- bilateral cooperation with the Lebanese nese authorities investigating new bombings. In addition, a presidential statement could army, as well as the Secretary-General’s France, on the other hand, strongly believes respond in a preliminary way to the technical evaluation of the situation along the Commission’s capacities should be Secretary-General’s recommendations on the border. used, since it contributes to support for sta- the Sheb’a Farms, although it is likely that n Israeli Prisoners: The Council is keen to bility in Lebanon. Council members may want time to con- hear the views of the Secretary-General on sider these and a more detailed discussion Hezbollah’s engagement on this issue. Consensus on reinforcing the arms in April may be possible embargo through the creation of a sanc- On UNIIIC, the main issues are the Leba- tions committee may be hard to reach. It Measures to reinforce the arms embargo nese request for an extension of UNIIIC for would be resisted by Russia. such as a sanctions committee seem twelve months and whether there has been unlikely at this stage in the absence of more progress between UNIIIC and the states There is much support within the Council concrete evidence. previously mentioned by Brammertz as that the issue of ratification of the tribunal non-cooperative. Brammertz may address should remain in the hands of the Leba- Key Issues the cooperation issue in his report, perhaps nese. Hence there is reluctance about any n Recommendations on the Sheb’a Farms: by explaining that in all or some cases the Chapter VII initiative. Also, as the Council In its December presidential statement, lack of cooperation was of a technical or has always acted in response to Lebanese the Council reminded the Secretary-Gen- legal nature rather than a political one, and requests, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora eral that it was looking forward to receiving

12 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org would have to ask for the Council’s help. report on resolution 1701 and reiter- This seems unlikely at this stage as it would ated its support for the current probably undermine any chance of negoti- Lebanese government. SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT ating a solution to the current political crisis. Monthly (The League of Arab States is hoping to Last Report of the Secretary-General on Resolution 1701 mediate a political solution.) MAR 2007 • S/2006/933 (1 December 2006) FORECAST Underlying Problems Letters Useful Additional Sources By 14 February, thirty fatalities and 186 inju- n Lebanon in Limbo, Eben Kaplan, Council ries due to mines or unexploded ordnance • S/2007/85 (8 February 2007) and on Foreign Relations, 5 February 2007 had been reported since the end of the con- S/2007/86 (13 February 2007) was an n Mine Action Co-ordination Centre South flict. (Israel’s use of cluster munitions in exchange of letters between the Sec- Lebanon, Unexploded Ordnance Fact south Lebanon was criticised by the US on retary-General and the Council on the Sheet: http://www.mineaction.org/over- 29 January as it violated an export agree- new appointment of Geir Pedersen as view.asp?o=540 ment between the two countries.) the Secretary-General’s Special Coor- dinator for Lebanon. Selected UN Documents on UNIIIC • S/2007/82 (12 February 2007) was a letter from Lebanon stating that Israel Liberia Security Council Resolutions had violated the Blue Line on 7 Febru- Expected Council Action • S/RES/1686 (15 June 2006) extended ary, which triggered the Lebanese The Council is expected to renew the man- UNIIIC’s mandate by one year. army to open fire. date of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), • S/RES/1664 (29 March 2006) • S/2007/69 (8 February 2007) was a let- which expires on 31 March. Members await requested negotiation with Lebanon ter from Israel stating that on 7 recommendations from the Secretary- on a tribunal of international character. February the Israeli military had been General on UNMIL’s future size. A decrease • S/RES/1644 (15 December 2005) operating on Israeli territory and it had in troop levels is possible in view of the cur- authorised expanded technical assis- returned fire in legitimate defence. rent pressure on peacekeeping resources tance to Lebanon and extended • S/2007/63 (7 February 2007) was a for other proposed deployments in Africa. UNIIIC’s mandate until 15 June 2006. letter from Lebanon transmitting a sta- • S/RES/1636 (31 October 2005) urged tistical table of Israeli violations of (A related issue that may come up in dis- Syria to cooperate with the investiga- Lebanese territory in January 2007. cussions is the report on cross-border tion and established sanctions against issues and inter-mission cooperation in suspects in the Hariri assassination. Other Relevant Facts West Africa. This is now more than eight • S/RES/1595 (7 April 2005) established weeks overdue.) UNIIIC Chief Commissioner UNIIIC. Serge Brammertz (Belgium) Key Recent Developments Last UNIIIC Report Secretary-General’s Special Coordinator Liberia continues to be stable but fragile. • S/2006/962 (12 December 2006) for Lebanon The government has focused on improving Letter governance, state control over natural Geir O. Pedersen (Norway) • S/2007/90 (13 February 2007) and resources and key infrastructure. The adop- UNIFIL Force Commander S/2007/91 (15 February 2007) was an tion of a national security architecture, exchange of letters between the Sec- Major-General Claudio Graziano (Italy) however, is still pending. In an expression of retary-General and the Council Size and Composition of UNIFIL support, some countries, including the US, Germany and the UK, announced the can- authorising the extension of UNIIIC’s • Authorized: 15,000 troops cellation of part of Liberia’s external debt of technical assistance to the Lebanese • Current (as of 16 February 2007): US$3.7 billion at the Liberia Partners’ Forum authorities in the investigation of the 12,429 military personnel, including on 13 February. Ain Aaleq bombings. 178 staff officers, 10,479 troops and 1,772 maritime task force The Council renewed diamond sanctions Selected UN Documents on Imple- • Troop-contributing countries: Bel- for six months in December, noting that mentation of Resolution 1701 gium, Bulgaria, China, Denmark, insufficient progress had been made Security Council Resolution Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, towards establishing a transparent, effec- Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, • S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called tive and internationally verifiable certificate Luxembourg, Nepal, Norway, Poland, for a cessation of hostilities between of origin. It also renewed sanctions on arms Portugal, Qatar, Spain, Sweden and Israel and Hezbollah, authorised a and the travel bans on designated persons Turkey reinforcement of UNIFIL and extended for 12 months. For the first time, the sanc- the mandate until 31 August 2007. Cost (approved budget) tions committee de-listed one individual from the travel ban. Last Presidential Statement Commitment authority: 1 July 2006–31 March 2007: $350.87 million (budget not • S/PRST/2006/52 (12 December 2006) Reconstituting the security forces—the key yet approved) welcomed the Secretary-General’s benchmark for UNMIL’s drawdown—is underway, albeit with significant difficulties.

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 13 UN-assisted recruitment of 3,500 trained of the Secretary-General giving higher dreds of former soldiers protested in police officers is likely to be finalised by July priority to regional aspects; and Monrovia about arrears in demobilisation but deployment will be hampered by logisti- n reverting to the small arms debate, in view packages, prompting action by UNMIL and cal and management constraints. The of the endemic small arms problem in the Liberian police. 2,000-strong armed forces, to be recruited region, perhaps by reintroducing ele- In neighbouring Guinea, martial law was and trained by a private US contractor, may ments from the March 2006 draft resolution imposed on 12 February following a gen- not be fully operational before 2008. In addi- presented by Argentina in a new region- eral strike and violent clashes between the tion, 39,000 out of 101,495 ex-combatants ally focused presidential statement. armed forces and protestors. Rampant have not yet been included in reintegration Key Issues corruption, economic decline, and the programmes. Deciding the term of UNMIL’s mandate and steady erosion of President Lansana Con- Relatively minor adjustments were made in its troop levels will be the key issue in March. té’s twenty-year regime seem to be at the late 2006 to UNMIL’s strength, which now The question involves how best to balance root of the crisis. The recent violence comprises 14,875 troops and 1,240 police. Liberia’s needs given the absence of stand- attracted criticism from thirty African heads The December UNMIL report stressed that ing security forces and the challenging of state gathered at the Africa-France “further adjustments, including the with- regional environment, with the emerging summit in Cannes. drawal of another infantry battalion in 2007, pressure for new peacekeeping in Africa. Concerns were heightened when Conté will be considered if the security situation in Members will be hard-pressed to conclude rejected mediation by ECOWAS in early the country permits.” In a message to the that UNMIL should continue at current lev- February. Liberia Partners’ Forum, the new Secretary- els given the projected need to generate up General says he “will work with the to nearly 40,000 new peacekeepers. The risk of regional involvement is increas- Government to develop a carefully cali- ing. This includes potential supporters of But a balancing issue is how best to brated drawdown plan” which “requires the Conté, including the former rebel Liberians approach the regional dimension, taking approval of the Security Council” and United for Reconciliation and Democracy into account uncertainty in Guinea and the “needs to be linked to the Government’s (LURD), Côte d’Ivoire’s President Laurent possible need to safeguard the fragile capacity to shoulder its security and law Gbagbo and Guinea-Bissau’s President peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone. and order responsibilities.” João Bernardo Vieira. Council Dynamics Options Responding to regional instability, UNMIL Positions on the future of UNMIL’s size are Available options include: strengthened its border presence and in still being formed. Members await the n extending the mandate for six months but late 2006 conducted concurrent activities Secretary-General’s recommendations and continuing the cautious approach to with UNOCI and the armed forces of Sierra developments with the proposed missions downsizing UNMIL by maintaining cur- Leone and Guinea. in Somalia and Chad/CAR in particular. rent levels; n deciding on firm reductions in UNMIL’s The US (given its support for peacekeeping UN Documents size during the six-month mandate; commitments in Liberia, Darfur and Soma- Selected Security Council Resolutions n adopting a compromise approach involv- lia) may face strong conflicting pressures. • S/RES/1731 (20 December 2006) ing an extension of the mandate for twelve This dilemma will be similar for African renewed sanctions. months with firm reductions in UNMIL’s members. strength from September, for example; • S/RES/1712 (29 September 2006) renewed UNMIL’s mandate until 31 n adopting a phased approach involving a A flexible approach to UNMIL’s size is likely reduction, for example, by one battalion to generate support, in particular from March 2007. by mid-year and requesting recommen- France given its strong support for the • S/RES/1626 (19 September 2005) dations on a flexible future drawdown Chad/CAR mission. authorised a temporary redeployment timetable; and in Sierra Leone of UNMIL troops. Some European and African members are • S/RES/1609 (24 June 2005) autho- n bringing in the regional dimension, per- interested in discussing the situation in haps by requesting a Secretariat briefing rised inter-mission troop sharing. Guinea. There is frustration with lack of under the existing agenda item, “The situ- • S/RES/1532 (12 March 2004) imposed leadership from the UN Office for West ation along the borders of Guinea, Liberia an assets freeze against Charles Tay- Africa, and with delays with the Secretary- and Sierra Leone,” and insisting on the lor and associates. General’s report on cross-border issues. report on cross-border issues being • S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003) Some members, including China, Russia made available. imposed sanctions. and Congo, are likely to be uncomfortable • S/RES/1509 (19 September 2003) Other options include: with Council involvement without Guinea’s established UNMIL. approval. n considering the Secretary-General’s Selected Presidential Statement March 2005 recommendations on UN Underlying Problems • S/PRST/2006/38 (9 August 2006) inter-mission cooperation, including Youth unemployment, disenfranchised ex- requested the report on cross-border through extended areas of responsibility combatants and former security apparatus issues. and a sub-regional reserve force; members pose significant threats to n expressing support for UNMIL, UNOCI Liberia’s stability. In early February, hun- and the relevant special representatives

14 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Selected Secretary-General’s Reports Useful Additional Sources • International Crisis Group, Guinée: le • S/2006/958 (11 December 2006) was Changement ou le Chaos, Rapport the latest UNMIL report. SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT Afrique, No. 121 (14 February 2007) • S/2005/135 (2 March 2005) was the Monthly report on inter-mission cooperation. MAR 2007FORECAST Other Côte d’Ivoire • S/2006/1044 (28 December 2006) was talks was welcomed as long as they remain Expected Council Action the latest sanctions committee report. within the framework of resolution 1721. It The Secretary-General’s report on the UN • S/2006/976 (13 December 2006) was also recommended a Council visit. These Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) is due the latest Panel of Experts’ report. decisions were endorsed by the African on 5 March. The Council is expected to Union on 30 January. Historical Background review progress in the dialogue between Preliminary talks on the dialogue are cur- January-February 2007 Violent clashes Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo and the rently underway in Ouagadougou under between police and civilian protesters led to rebel Forces Nouvelles leader Guillaume the aegis of President Compaoré. The first a declaration of martial law in Guinea. Soro. A visit by the Council to Côte d’Ivoire may be discussed, but wider action seems meeting was held on 5 February. At the time October 2006 The Council decided not to unlikely. of writing, the talks appear to be proceeding reinstate timber sanctions. positively. The flexibility of the format, allow- The sanctions committee is expected to ing both parties to present grievances, has June 2006 The Council lifted the timber receive reports from neighbouring coun- seemed to be useful. embargo. tries on compliance with the arms and On 9 February the Council was briefed by February 2006 The Council authorised troop diamonds embargo in Côte d’Ivoire. Pierre Schori, the departing Special Repre- sharing between UNMIL and UNOCI. Key Recent Developments sentative of the Secretary-General in Côte January 2006 Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was On 10 January, the Council adopted resolu- d’Ivoire. He supported the direct dialogue sworn in as Liberia’s new president. tion 1739. This extended the mandate of and expressed enthusiasm for a possible UNOCI and the French Licorne forces until Council mission. He also emphasised that September 2005 The Council mandated 31 June 2007. UNOCI’s mandate was also targeted sanctions had been very effective UNMIL to provide security for the Special updated to reflect the content of resolution in bringing spoilers back into the peace pro- Court for Sierra Leone. 1721 (reinforcing the prime minister’s pow- cess and suggested that more names be ers and the role of the international March 2004 The Council imposed sanc- added to the list if necessary. Following community in the peace process, particu- tions on former Liberian President Charles consultations, the Council issued a press larly the roles of the Economic Community Taylor and his associates. statement welcoming the direct dialogue of West African States [ECOWAS], and the while recalling that it must take place in the December 2003 The Council imposed a African Union.) framework of resolution 1721. sanctions regime. There has been no recent progress on the On 14 February, there were media reports September 2003 UNMIL was established. roadmap, especially on the most important indicating that President Gbagbo had issues including a voter-identification pro- announced his intention to incorporate into August 2003 ECOWAS and US troops cess, disarmament and ensuring the the Ivorian army some 4,000 new recruits arrived, Taylor fled to Nigeria and a Com- impartiality of the official media. The Inter- who were supposed to be disarmed within prehensive Peace Agreement was signed. national Working Group (IWG) met on 12 the framework of the roadmap. It seems January. Noting the stalemate, it urged the Other Relevant Facts that this would contravene previous peace Chairman of ECOWAS, President Blaise agreements and may have a negative Special Representative of the Secretary- Compaoré of Burkina Faso, to convene a impact on the direct dialogue. General meeting of the parties, following up on a Alan Doss (United Kingdom) proposal made in December by President Options The Council’s options seem to have nar- UNMIL: Size, Composition and Cost Gbagbo to start a direct dialogue with Soro. The IWG also recommended a Council mis- rowed. It is increasingly clear that without • Total authorised strength: up to 14,875 sion to Côte d’Ivoire to secure commitment improved confidence between the main military and 1,240 police that the talks remain within the framework of political actors, the prospects for implemen- • Strength as of 31 December 2006: resolution 1721. tation of the roadmap are diminishing. In 13,801 military and 1,097 police the short term there seems to be no option • Key troop-contributing countries: Following a 19 January summit in Burkina but to accept the dialogue process. How- Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria and Faso, ECOWAS issued a situation report on ever, other possibilities may include: Ethiopia Côte d’Ivoire recognising that there was still n developing terms of reference for a • Cost: 1 July 2006 – 30 June 2007: a manifest lack of political will to implement Council visit; $745.57 million resolution 1721. ECOWAS decided that the n endorsing the monthly IWG communiqué UNMIL: Duration voter-identification and disarmament pro- in a presidential statement; grammes had to be launched again. September 2003 to present; mandate President Gbagbo’s proposal for direct expires 31 March 2007

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 15 n reinforcing pressure on the parties that have a negative impact at this stage and Latest Reports by the Sanctions the dialogue has to remain within the would support them only as a last resort. Committee framework of resolution 1721 and that the However, they are also concerned with the • S/2006/1017 (21 December 2006) was roadmap should be implemented in lack of progress toward the organisation of the annual report of the committee, parallel; and elections and support the 1721 framework noting violations of the arms and dia- n expanding targeted sanctions against as the long-term objective. monds embargo possible spoilers. There is still significant support for exerting • S/2006/964 (8 December 2006) noted Key Issues Council pressure on the political actors, that diamonds are being smuggled A key concern will be whether the parties particularly through targeted sanctions. out of Côte d’Ivoire via Mali and Ghana have entered the dialogue in good faith and Belgium, as chair of the sanctions commit- in violation of the embargo and that are genuinely willing to negotiate. A related tee, is playing an active role. criminal networks are also smuggling issue is whether President Gbagbo truly arms into Côte d’Ivoire. Most Council members agree that, at this wants an agreement to implement the road- Selected Letters stage, it would be better to stop trying to map or whether the dialogue is a strategy to micromanage the peace process. In partic- • S/2007/78 (9 February 2007) was a buy time. A second issue arises from the ular, it seems that France is moving towards letter from the Secretary-General fact that it now seems that neither Gbagbo a less proactive role. This dynamic also extending the mandate of the Group nor Soro appear interested in holding elec- plays out with respect to the proposal for a of Experts for an additional six tions in October. A third is that there is no Council mission. months. timeframe for the dialogue. • S/2007/19 (18 January 2007) was a It seems that a majority of Council members While the Council does not need to address letter from the Secretary-General want to see the initial results of the direct it in March, the issue that will arise before enclosing the twelfth IWG communi- dialogue, possibly even a preliminary long is whether the Council can keep push- qué. agreement, before sending a mission. For ing for the implementation of resolution many, it is premature at this point to agree 1721 in parallel with the dialogue. (In prac- Other Relevant Facts on a clear message to send to the parties. tice, it seems that progress on the roadmap Special Representative of the Secretary- depends on results of the dialogue.) As the new chairman of the African Union, General Ghana will have a leading role both in the A related issue, which cannot be delayed To be appointed Council and on the ground. It clearly wants to indefinitely, is the timeline for UNOCI and its High Representative for the Elections be strongly involved in the peace process. mandate if elections are not held by 31 Gérard Stoudmann (Switzerland) October. There are serious concerns that if Underlying Problems Size and Composition of UNOCI the current stalemate continues much lon- Despite long-standing allegations that • Authorised strength as of 2 June 2006: ger, it would not be possible for elections to Burkina Faso participated in the conflict by Up to 8,115 military personnel and up be organised on time. providing help to the rebel forces, President to 1,200 police Gbagbo accepted Burkina Faso as the dia- Council Dynamics • Strength as of 31 January 2007: 8,994 logue convener. Engaging this important Several Council members, especially the total uniformed personnel, including regional actor (and the current ECOWAS Europeans, are suspicious of President 7,850 troops and 954 police chairman) in the peace process is a positive Gbagbo’s intentions and are cautious about • Key troop-contributing countries: development. the direct dialogue initiative. However, they Bangladesh, Morocco, Ghana and are also aware that there are few other UN Documents Pakistan options in the short-term and that the Cost dialogue may represent a window of oppor- Selected Security Council Resolutions 1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007 $472.89 tunity. There is clear consensus within the • S/RES/1739 (10 January 2007) million Council on the necessity to ensure that extended the UNOCI mandate until 30 the dialogue does not replace the peace June 2007. process but complements it, and that it • S/RES/1727 (15 December 2006) should take place within the framework of renewed the sanctions regime in Côte Iraq resolution 1721. d’Ivoire until 31 October 2007. Expected Council Action • S/RES/1726 (15 December 2006) Some members of the Non-Aligned Move- No Council action is expected in response renewed the mandate of UNOCI until ment, especially new Council members like to the quarterly report of the UN Assistance 10 January 2007. Indonesia and South Africa, tend to favour Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) due 8 March. On 15 • S/RES/1721 (1 November 2006) pro- increased local ownership of the process March the Secretary-General’s Special longed by one year the transitional and are therefore more comfortable with Representative for Iraq, Ashraf Jehangir period in Côte d’Ivoire and reinforced the dialogue initiative. They believe that Qazi, will brief the Council. The US will also the powers of the prime minister. there should be fewer outside attempts to give a briefing on the activities of the Multi- influence the dialogue at the outset. They Latest Secretary-General’s Report on national Force (MNF). UNOCI also think that targeted sanctions might • S/2006/939 (4 December 2006)

16 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Consultations are also expected on 7 March Options on the UN Monitoring, Inspection and Verifi- Although no action is expected on UNAMI cation Commission (UNMOVIC). The or on the MNF before the next review pro- SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT Commission’s Acting Executive Chairman, cess in June, a presidential statement Monthly Demetrius Perricos, will brief the Council. It supporting the regional contribution to remains to be seen whether there will be building security in Iraq and addressing the MAR 2007FORECAST any concrete proposals on a possible termi- worsening refugee crisis, as well as the nation of UNMOVIC mandate. humanitarian situation in Iraq, remains an A second issue is the worsening humanitar- option. ian crisis and ways to address it, especially Key Recent Developments the refugee crisis and the fact that both On 6 December the Iraq Study Group, On UNMOVIC, the most likely scenario is Syria and Jordan may have to limit refugees which was established by the US Congress that the Council will resume but not con- or even close their borders. and co-chaired by James Baker and Lee clude its discussion of a possible termination Hamilton, recommended a new policy of its mandate. Options include: Another issue is the initial assessments by approach for the US in Iraq, including: n continuing discussion on whether and the US of its new security plan and troop n engaging directly with Syria and Iran; how to retain UNMOVIC’s expertise; surge in Baghdad. This, however, will likely n renewing efforts toward a comprehensive n reaching agreement on whether the con- be more thoroughly considered in June, at settlement of all Middle East conflicts; clusions of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) the next MNF review process. n reducing support for the Iraqi govern- should be taken up in the context of the Council Dynamics ment if it does not make progress toward closure of the UNMOVIC mandate; Dynamics on UNMOVIC remain the same. reconciliation and security; n focusing on the details of what to do with Both the US and the UK are reluctant for the n establishing clear steps toward national UNMOVIC’s comprehensive compen- Council to take up the ISG conclusions reconciliation, security and governance, dium of Iraq’s programmes for WMDs and perhaps for related reasons seem and avoiding an open-ended commit- and examining whether and how reluctant to pursue the idea of harnessing ment to a large US troops presence in UNMOVIC’s records and archives should UNMOVIC’s expertise for the future. Rus- Iraq; and be transferred to the UN archive; and sia, however, still seems to support a debate n redeploying or increasing the number of n deciding to terminate UNMOVIC’s on the ISG conclusions as a necessary step US combat forces to stabilise Baghdad mandate. for the closure of UNMOVIC. During consul- and avoiding a dramatic increase of the tations in December, Japan and Slovakia general number of troops in Iraq or an Key Issues proposed to reallocate UNMOVIC experts immediate and complete withdrawal. While the US and the UK may be contem- plating several options to close UNMOVIC, to the 1718 Committee on North Korea and In response to the last recommendation, at press time there are no concrete propos- the 1540 Committee on the non-prolifera- US President George Bush decided in Jan- als on the table. (For more information on tion of WMDs. These proposals will likely uary to increase the number of American UNMOVIC, see our June 2006 Forecast.) come up again in March. troops in Baghdad by 21,500. Issues likely to arise during consultations The idea of a possible presidential state- Sectarian violence has increased, espe- on UNAMI and the MNF in March include ment on the Iraqi refugee crisis has cially after the execution of Saddam Hussein the need for a regional approach to peace attractions for a number of members but it on 30 December. Deadly bombings have in Iraq (this has already been emphasised remains to be seen who would be willing to multiplied. There is now an average of 100 by Qazi in December), in view of an assess- take the lead and what the US and the UK’s civilian casualties every day. ment of Qazi’s regional tour. positions would be.

The refugee crisis is also growing. The UN The desire to find an adequate multilateral Any new dynamics on the activities of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) framework to address the situation in Iraq is UN and the MNF in Iraq might only arise estimates that there are 1.8 million internally therefore emerging and is likely to be dis- during the June MNF review process. displaced persons. In addition, because of cussed as the international compact on Iraq Underlying Problems the security situation, the food distribution does not seem to be moving forward There have been allegations by the US, the system has deteriorated. Four million peo- quickly. Several proposals have already UK and Saudi Arabia that Iran is arming ple in Iraq are now considered as “food been made: UNAMI suggested that the groups in Iraq, and a number of Iranians insecure”. The UNHCR now estimates that periodic meetings between Iraq and its have been detained by US forces in Iraq. there are about two million Iraqi refugees in neighbours be broadened to include the Iran stated at the end of January that it was neighboring countries, mainly Syria and P5; and the League of Arab States has tried planning to expand military and economic Jordan. to organise a regional conference on Iraqi ties with Iraq. national accord. It seems that a meeting is Ashraf Jehangir Qazi has sought to secure being organised in Baghdad which will Criticism is mounting over the Iraqi govern- regional support for peace efforts in Iraq gather officials from regional states, includ- ment’s ability to lead the country toward through visits to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria ing Syria and Iran, and US and UK envoys. reconciliation. The government appears and Iran. These began at the end of January. It will take place in mid-March.

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 17 increasingly divided. The division of the Useful Additional Sources Former Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior country along sectarian lines seems to be n War and Occupation in Iraq, Global Policy sought refuge in the UNOGBIS compound increasingly becoming a reality, with the Forum Special Report on 10 January, claiming that his life was in multiplication of sectarian enclaves. On the n Iraq’s New Political Map, Phebe Marr, US danger. The government had issued a war- other hand, the recent approval by the Iraqi Institute of Peace, Special Report 179, rant for his arrest after he accused President cabinet of a draft law to equitably share oil January 2007 João Bernardo Vieira of being involved in revenues among Iraq’s 18 provinces may n Iraqi Refugees: Resettle the Most Vulner- Sanhá’s assassination. Gomes also claimed foster sectarian unity as it would remove a able, Refugees International, 16 January that Vieira was systematically killing those bone of contention between factions. The 2007 who overthrew him in 1999. (Vieira fled to law remains to be approved by the Iraqi n Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover Portugal and remained in exile for six years parliament. from an Iraqi Civil War, Daniel L. Byman, until 2005 when he came back and won the Kenneth M. Pollack, Saban Center for national election.) Selected UN Documents Middle East Policy at the Brookings Insti- Gomes remained under UN protection for tution, Analysis Paper No. 11, January Latest Resolutions 17 days and left only after the Secretary- 2007 • S/RES/1723 (28 November 2006) General’s representative in Guinea-Bissau, n UNAMI Human Rights Report, 1 Novem- extended the MNF mandate until 31 Shola Omoregie, persuaded the govern- ber – 31 December 2006 http://www. December 2007. ment to drop the arrest warrant against him. • S/RES/1700 (10 August 2006) uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/HR%20Report% extended the UNAMI mandate for 20Nov%20Dec%202006%20EN.pdf Some members of the International Contact another 12 months. n After Baker-Hamilton: What to Do in Iraq, Group on Guinea-Bissau (made up of International Crisis Group, Middle East France, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, the Latest UNAMI Report Report No. 60, 19 December 2006 Executive Secretariat of the Economic • S/2006/945 (5 December 2006) n Report of the Special Advisor to the Direc- Community of West African States, and the Selected UNMOVIC Reports tor of the CIA on Iraq’s WMDs, 30 Executive Secretariat of the Community of September 2004 https://www.cia.gov/ • S/2007/106 (26 February 2007) was Portuguese Speaking Countries) met on 23 cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/index.html the latest UNMOVIC report. January in Guinea-Bissau. The next Con- • S/2006/420 (21 June 2006) was the tact Group meeting is scheduled to be held summary of the compendium of Iraq’s in March in Lisbon. Guinea-Bissau proscribed WMD programmes. Options Selected Letters Expected Council Action Options for the Council could include: • S/2006/987 and S/2006/988 (15 In March the Council will receive the Secre- n Adopting a wait-and-see position. Given December 2006) was an exchange of tary-General’s quarterly report on the UN the Council’s past approach this is per- letters between the Secretary-General Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea- haps most likely. and the Council on an Iraqi request to Bissau (UNOGBIS), mandated by resolution n Issuing a press statement expressing transfer $40 million from the 1580. The Council in December renewed concern and stressing the importance of UNMOVIC account to the Permanent the UNOGBIS mandate for 12 months political stability. This is possible if Coun- Mission of Iraq to the UN. through an exchange of letters with the cil members feel that the situation has not • S/2006/963 (7 December 2006) was a Secretary-General. improved since January. n Issuing a presidential statement is also letter from League of Arab States Guinea-Bissau had a low priority in the possible should the Council be per- enclosing a statement by the Ministe- Council last year but events in the country in suaded by the Contact Group to take a rial Committee on Iraq. January and the situation in neighbouring stronger position. Guinea may trigger greater interest. The n Asking the Secretary-General to prepare Other Relevant Facts UNOGBIS mandate expires on 31 Decem- recommendations on what more ber. Formal Council action on the Special Representative of the Secretary- UNOGBIS can do to support national rec- General for Iraq Secretary-General’s report is not required, onciliation and security sector reform, but depending on the conclusions of the Ashraf Jehangir Qazi (Pakistan) especially taking into account the out- International Contact Group on Guinea-Bis- Deputy Special Representative for Iraq come of the Council debate on security sau, some Council members could seek a sector reform on 20 February. Jean-Marie Fakhouri (Lebanon) heightened level of Council attention. Deputy Special Representative for Politi- Key Issues Key Recent Developments cal Affairs in Iraq The flare-up between Gomes and Vieira is a Recent events suggest that deep-rooted Michael von der Schulenburg (Germany) clear indication that political reconciliation political problems have not been resolved. remains fragile. There seems to be a possi- On 6 January the assassination of the for- bility of further violence unless these issues mer head of the navy, Mohamed Lamine are dealt with. Sanhá, led to fighting between protestors and security forces leaving one dead and several injured.

18 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Members will also be mindful of recent insta- UN Documents bility in Guinea. Regional repercussions are possible. Vieira is a long-time ally of Lansana Security Council Resolutions SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT Conté, the Guinean president. Guinea- • S/RES/1580 (22 December 2004) Monthly Bissau has denied it has any forces in revised and extended the mandate of Guinea, although there have been reports of UNOGBIS. MAR 2007FORECAST Portuguese-speaking troops in the country. • S/RES/1233 (6 April 1999) supported the decision of the Secretary-General lead-up to the open debate please see our A future issue is whether the $460 million to establish UNOGBIS. January 2007 Forecast and 25 January requested at the donor roundtable on Update.) Guinea-Bissau, held in Geneva in Novem- Reports and Letters of the Secretary- General ber, is actually being delivered. So far the Key Recent Developments in the donors include the European Union, Spain, • S/2006/974 (8 December 2006) was Council Portugal and Japan. Investor confidence, the letter recommending extension of The open debate was the Council’s initial already shaky, is likely to be further affected UNOGBIS until 31 December 2007 review of the work of the PBC and was pro- by the events in January. and detailing the activities of UNOG- posed by Russia as Council president for BIS. January. Two recurring points emerged: Council Dynamics • S/2006/946 (6 December 2006) was n suggestions as to how the PBC may Guinea-Bissau has been low on the Coun- the latest report on UNOGBIS. improve its work, in particular a sense of cil’s radar screen since Brazil left the Council Security Council President’s Letter urgency to move on substantive work in at the end of 2005. No member has wanted the Commission’s country-specific mode, • S/2006/975 (13 December 2006) to take a lead role. Urgent demands from and the need for integrated work plans noted the Secretary-General’s inten- other parts of Africa, especially the Demo- involving key stakeholders with input and tion to extend UNOGBIS until cratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, ownership from the countries in question. December 2007. Sudan, Chad and Somalia, have kept the Some stressed the need to move beyond Council focused on these situations rather Other outstanding procedural issues and than on countries in the peacebuilding • SC/8910 (15 December 2006) was institutional competition to achieving phase like Guinea-Bissau. During 2006 the press statement expressing con- agreement and cooperation on a com- some members attempted to change the cern over the political and economic prehensive strategy for key peacebuilding reporting cycle from three to six months. situation. gaps the PBC has identified for Burundi Resistance from Argentina and Peru and a and Sierra Leone; and mandate renewal that takes place through Other Relevant Facts n suggestions on how the Security Council an exchange of letters made it difficult to could better harmonise its work with that change the cycle. Representative of the Secretary-General for Guinea-Bissau, Head of UNOGBIS of the PBC and weave the results of the PBC’s work into its own discussions. Underlying Problems Shola Omoregie (Nigeria) Guinea-Bissau is one of the poorest coun- Size of UNOGBIS Staff Suggestions on harmonisation between the tries in the world. Falling revenue from its PBC and the Council included: 22, including nine international civilians, only cash crop, cashew nuts, and floods n requesting PBC advice, for example, at two military advisers, one police adviser that ruined 85 percent of its rice production the time of a mandate renewal, negotia- and ten local civilians last year could result in an agricultural crisis tions on the mandate of a new peace- in 2007. With most of the population Duration keeping operation, amending an existing involved in farming and 85 percent of them 6 April 1999 to present UN mission strategy to enhance collabo- connected to cashew cultivation, poverty ration between UN operations and PBC among farmers could lead to political For historical background and a more com- activities, and devising an integrated mis- unrest. plete list of UN documents please see our sion planning process; 23 December 2005 Update, and March and Growing discontent among civil servants n receiving early warning on potential set- December 2006 Forecasts. may trigger a new problem. The govern- backs and risk factors in countries on the ment has found it difficult to pay salaries Council’s agenda; and provide basic services. As a result, n since Burundi and Sierra Leone are on there were labour strikes in the education Peacebuilding Commission the agendas of both bodies, establishing and health sectors late last year. more regular and timely interaction with Expected Council Action the PBC. This could include invitations for The growth of transnational crime is In March, the Council will hold consultations briefings from PBC chairpersons when potentially destabilising. Guinea-Bissau is on the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). It the Council considers those situations becoming a transit point for both cocaine intends to take stock of the remarks and and regular meetings between the presi- and undocumented migrants to Europe. discuss suggestions made at the 31 Janu- dents of the General Assembly, the ary open debate on the PBC, particularly on Council and the Economic and Social improving the working relationship between Council (ECOSOC); and the Council and the PBC. No formal out- come is expected. (For background on the

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 19 n issuing Council statements when PBC emphasising the complementary—rather The peacebuilding strategies for Burundi reports have been received, to encour- than competitive—nature of the input that and Sierra Leone would become the age synergy and interaction with PBC both the Council and the General Assembly principal framework for the relationship country-specific strategies. can have on the PBC, and how to dispel the with the PBC. They will record the com- negativities that surrounded its inception. Speakers further highlighted problems with mitments made by the parties, and The issue will be to determine how far mem- achieving sustained commitment and coor- would serve as a type of compact. They bers might go, in style and substance, dination among key players for successful will provide benchmarks by which the without reviving the controversy and suspi- peacebuilding, in particular the main UN PBC can monitor progress and identify cions of 2005. bodies. Some participants felt the Council peacebuilding gaps at the country level. might encroach on the work of the PBC. Input from participants in the informal Council Dynamics Most stressed the need for a partnership thematic meetings will add value to strat- The Council so far has kept its distance approach linking the Council, the General egy development. from the work of the PBC. This seems to Assembly and other parts of the UN system. have been a result of awareness that some The PBC will visit Burundi and Sierra This reflects the tensions that surrounded PBC members have a strong interest in Leone, probably in mid-March. Together the PBC’s creation and the start of its work. demonstrating independence from the with a briefing series organised by a spe- Russia, for example, expressed the hope Council and in avoiding an overlap. Mem- cial working group on lessons learned that the discussions “will give additional bers have been concerned with helping from post-conflict situations, these visits impetus to a mutually supportive partner- create a positive working environment for may assist in developing further under- ship between [the Council and the General the PBC’s formative period and to assuage standing of the challenges in both Assembly] and among all those who are the climate of suspicion over the way deci- countries. (The first meeting on lessons contributing to the peacebuilding process, sions were taken when the PBC was learned under the priority areas identified and that it will facilitate the constructive work established. by Sierra Leone took place on 20 Febru- of the [PBC].” ary; a meeting for Burundi is scheduled The idea of exploring the Council’s role in Jamaica, speaking on behalf of the Non- to take place on 12 March.) relation to the PBC’s country-specific work Aligned Movement (NAM), expressed had been about for some time as the Coun- The work plans suggest three interre- concern that ”the Security Council should cil discussed the work of the UN Integrated lated phases: at this stage find it necessary to review the Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) and • identification; work of the Peacebuilding Commission. the creation of the UN Integrated Office • integrated peacebuilding strategy While it is no secret that the Commission in Burundi (BINUB). Concerns outlined development; and has experienced some difficulties with its above, however, meant that only vague • review, monitoring and continued internal operations and processes, we think mentions were included in resolutions and implementation. that it is both lacking in merit and premature statements. to have the Security Council review or eval- The first phase was completed in Decem- Nonetheless, the generally positive tone uate its activities at this juncture.” ber, when good governance, rule of law during the 31 January meeting—bearing in and community recovery were identified Perhaps as a response to the Russian mind the cautionary note from NAM— as critical peacebuilding challenges for initiative, the General Assembly held a seems to have reinforced thinking in the Burundi. For Sierra Leone, the chal- similar debate to review progress with the Council that there are important areas in lenges are youth empowerment and PBC’s work on 6 February after a request which more elaboration on the working employment, democracy and good gov- from NAM. relationship between the PBC and the ernance, justice and security reform, and Council can be helpful. Upcoming PBC Developments capacity-building. The thematic discus- sions should catalyse progress in the Most members seem to agree that input The PBC has started a series of informal second phase. from PBC chairs should be sought at the thematic discussions to develop inte- time the Council discusses the renewal of grated peacebuilding strategies for Key Issues the integrated offices in Burundi or Sierra Burundi and Sierra Leone by mid-2007. The key issue emerging from the 31 Janu- Leone. For some, particularly the UK, a key The discussions will be open to relevant ary debate is how to proceed with the idea aspect has been the involvement of BINUB stakeholders (civil society, the private of better defining the Council’s role relative and UNIOSIL in the preparation of PBC sector and international actors) and to the PBC and improving the working rela- country strategies. There is an interest in will focus on matters falling within the pri- tionship. The immediate task will be to reflecting and clarifying that role in their ority areas identified in the December follow up on suggestions that emerged and mandates and improving the operational country-specific meetings. identify key areas where the relationship coordination between the missions and the can be strengthened, such as the design of PBC. One member made the point that the A Burundi donors’ roundtable in Bujum- mandates of UN peacekeeping operations. bura has been scheduled for 14-15 PBC held its formal country-specific meet- March. The next formal country-specific A related question is how to respond to the ings on the same months that the Council meetings are expected to take place in wider membership’s concerns for a mean- held meetings on Burundi and Sierra Leone, April for Burundi and April or May for ingful role for the General Assembly. There including the creation of BINUB. Sierra Leone. is general sympathy within the Council for

20 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org UN Documents emerging from conflict to achieve sus- tainable peace and security. Selected Security Council Resolutions • S/PRST/2006/28 (22 June 2006) on SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT • S/RES/1646 (20 December 2005) strengthening international law Monthly decided that the five permanent mem- emphasised the role of the PBC with bers and two elected members of the MAR 2007 respect to the promotion of justice and FORECAST Council will have seats on the PBC’s the rule of law. Organisational Committee. Other Relevant Facts Selected Security Council Debate • S/RES/1645 (20 December 2005) PBC Organisational Committee Mem- created the PBC and the Peace- • S/PV.5627 and resumption 1 (31 bers (as of 22 January 2007) building Fund. January 2007) was the Council debate • Security Council: the P5 (China, on the PBC. Security Council Resolutions with a France, Russia, UK and US), Panama reference to the PBC Selected PBC Documents and South Africa • S/RES/1734 (22 December 2006) • Chairman’s summary of the second • From the top ten financial contribu- extended the mandate of the UNIOSIL country-specific meeting on Sierra tors: Germany, Italy, Japan, the and encouraged the government of Leone (13 December 2006). Netherlands and Norway Sierra Leone to continue its close • Chairman’s summary the second • From the top ten military and police engagement with the PBC. country-specific meeting on Burundi contributors: Bangladesh, Ghana, • S/RES/1719 (25 October 2006) (12 December 2006). India, Nigeria and Pakistan requested the Secretary-General to • PBC/2/BUR/SR.1 (10 November 2006) • ECOSOC: Angola, Brazil, Guinea-Bis- establish BINUB, which was were the summary records of the first sau, Indonesia and Sri Lanka (two requested to conduct its activities tak- country-specific meeting on Burundi. seats vacant) ing the role of the PBC into account. • Chairman’s summary of the first coun- • General Assembly: Burundi, Chile, • S/RES/1653 (27 January 2006) try-specific meeting on Burundi (13 Croatia, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji and addressed conflict prevention and October 2006). Jamaica peaceful resolution of disputes in the • Chairman’s summary of the first coun- Chairman of the PBC Organisational Great Lakes Region, welcomed the try-specific meeting on Sierra Leone Committee establishment of the PBC and under- (12 October 2006). • Ambassador Ismael Gaspar Martins lined its potential importance for the • PBC/OC/1/2 (21 June 2006) was a (Angola) Council’s work in the region. Council letter referring Burundi and PBSO Head Security Council Presidential Statements Sierra Leone to the PBC. with a reference to the PBC Selected General Assembly Resolutions • Carolyn McAskie (Canada) • S/PRST/2007/1 (8 January 2007) on • A/RES/60/261 (8 May 2006) decided PBSO Budget the Council debate on Threats to Inter- the General Assembly Organisational • US$1.571 million national Peace and Security Committee seats. underlined the importance of close • A/RES/60/1 (16 September 2005) is interaction between the Council and the 2005 World Summit Outcome. the PBC. Afghanistan Other • S/PRST/2006/42 (26 October 2006) Expected Council Action on the Council debate on Women and • GA/10570 (6 February 2007) was the The Council is expected to extend the man- Peace and Security welcomed the role General Assembly debate on the PBC. date of the UN Assistance Mission in the PBC can play in mainstreaming • S/2007/16 (12 January 2007) commu- Afghanistan (UNAMA), which expires on 24 gender perspectives into the peace nicated the Council’s election of March. The Special Representative of the consolidation process. Panama and South Africa to the Secretary-General to Afghanistan, Tom • S/PRST/2006/39 (20 September 2006) Organisational Committee. Koenigs, will likely brief the Council. on cooperation between the UN and • S/2006/1050 (26 December 2006) contained summaries of the October regional organisations in maintaining The Secretary-General’s report on the situ- and December 2006 country-specific international peace and security wel- ation in Afghanistan is also due in March. meetings. comed the intent of regional His report is expected to ask the Council to • E/2006/L.2/Rev.2 (12 April 2006) was organisations to be closely associated endorse UNAMA’s expansion to all prov- the draft resolution adopted with the with the work of the PBC and inces, facilitation of regular cooperation distribution of ECOSOC PBC seats. expressed the Council’s commitment between regional players, verification of to facilitate their participation in the Selected Secretary-General’s Reports civilian casualties and greater humanitarian PBC’s country-specific activities. • S/2006/922 (28 November 2006) was coordination. • S/PRST/2006/38 (9 August 2006) on the latest report on Sierra Leone. Key Recent Developments peace consolidation in West Africa, • S/2006/838 (23 October 2006) was the Violent attacks in Afghanistan rose steadily underscored the importance and role latest report on Burundi. of the PBC in assisting countries during 2006. Hostilities were recorded in all

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 21 but two of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. n Requesting the Secretary-General to Members differ on some important ele- Faced with an obviously deteriorating secu- become directly involved in coordinating ments. Russia, together with most members rity situation, the international community regional cooperation, particularly in of the Council, supports the reconstruction began to focus its attention on Afghanistan bringing together Afghan-Pakistani lead- process but has criticised what it calls the again. In February the US, the UK and some ers. One possibility would be to develop “inertia of old approaches” which has other NATO members committed additional a structure like a tripartite commission slowed down progress in reconstruction. troops to counter an anticipated Taliban with UNAMA, Pakistan and Afghanistan This could result in a tussle over language spring offensive. to improve regional coordination. when negotiating the new resolution. n Addressing both drug production and The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Having UNAMA verify civilian casualties impunity, which are important underlying Board (JCMB) held its third meeting on 30 may be a sensitive issue. ISAF operations issues in Afghanistan. and 31 January in Berlin. This body over- last October resulted in the deaths of doz- sees the Afghanistan Compact, a five-year Key Issues ens of civilians across the country. However framework for reconstruction between the The key issue is the precarious security situ- actual numbers were not released. Never- Afghan government and the international ation and its threat to nation-building. A theless, verifying civilian casualties is a role community that was launched on 31 Janu- related issue is the continuing upsurge in that the UN plays in Iraq, publishing infor- ary 2006. At the Berlin meeting the JCMB illegal drug production and trafficking. The mation about casualties from both insurgent assessed the achievements of the Compact narco-economy is one of the main threats and coalition operations. over the year, concluding that it had made to stability in Afghanistan in that proceeds Regional cooperation could also see some slow but steady progress, achieving eight from the drug trade feed the insurgency. interesting dynamics. Pakistan is a key out of 12 benchmarks set for 2006. A second key issue is how to demonstrate player and it has in the past objected to Koenigs briefed the Council on 5 February the wider commitment of the international being singled out for specific mention in in a closed-door session about the situation community to Afghanistan. If UNAMA is cooperating with Afghanistan. It prefers on the ground and outlined UNAMA’s renewed for less than a year this could send more general references to regional coop- future goals. a negative signal. eration in any resolution on Afghanistan.

A Council delegation led by Japan visited A related issue is how to assist regional Italy is now the lead country in the Council Afghanistan from 11 to 16 November 2006. coordination between Afghanistan and its on this issue and as a member of the Con- The report of the mission was presented to neighbours. The outcome of the proposed tact Group on Afghanistan it is expected to the Council on 7 December. cross-border jirgas or assemblies between play a key role. However, Afghanistan is Afghanistan and Pakistan to improve secu- currently a highly sensitive political domes- Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf rity and stability will be important. But an tic issue in Italy, and was in part responsible announced that Pakistan would fence part underlying question is whether the UN can for the recent resignation of the Italian prime of the border with Afghanistan to stop mili- do more to help and whether the Council minister. It is unclear whether this will in any tants from crossing over. But Pakistan is should actively steer the Secretariat in that way limit Italy’s leadership role. coming under pressure to take more force- direction. ful measures against Al-Qaida forces in Underlying Problems Pakistan. Another issue is how to support the JCMB Despite the surge in the Taliban-led insur- to become more effective. At its last meet- gency some ISAF troop contributors are Options ing, the JCMB acknowledged that it needed reluctant to increase numbers and send Council options include: to be strengthened to accelerate implemen- troops into more dangerous areas. The n Adopting a resolution to renew UNAMA’s tation of the Compact. Currently it does not weakness of the Afghan police force contin- mandate for 12 months, expanding its have a full-time secretariat. While it meets ues to be a major problem. As the situation presence to all the provinces and giving it quarterly there is little international engage- deteriorates civilians are getting caught up a bigger coordination role between the ment between meetings. in hostilities and reconstruction work is International Security Assistance Force being disrupted. (ISAF), Operation Enduring Freedom and Also on the minds of Council members is the UN agencies in Afghanistan. the security of UN staff, particularly if On 29 February the Afghan parliament n Adopting a resolution as above but UNAMA expands further into southern passed a resolution that would give amnesty renewing the mandate only for six Afghanistan. UNAMA currently has eight to former combatants. If it becomes law, it months. China has recently been in regional offices outside Kabul, including could lead to dissatisfaction among parts of favour of shorter duration mandates. one in Kandahar. the Afghan population who have been n Deciding to expand the UNAMA mandate demanding justice for war crimes for many Council and Wider Dynamics to include specific focus on security sec- years. An Action Plan on Peace, Reconcilia- The Council is generally in agreement on tor reform. tion and Justice was delayed in 2005 the importance of the UN’s presence in n Deciding to hold more frequent meetings because of the security situation. However, Afghanistan and the need to show support on Afghanistan, so as to be better- lack of accountability for war crimes and for UNAMA. informed on the security situation and human rights abuses may erode the legiti- UNAMA’s role. macy of the government.

22 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org UN Documents • Duration: 20 December 2001 to pres- ent; mandate expires on 13 October Selected Security Council Resolutions 2007 SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT • S/RES/1707 (12 September 2006) Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF): Monthly extended ISAF’s mandate until 13 Size, Composition and Duration October 2007. MAR 2007 • Current strength: about 11,000 troops FORECAST • S/RES/1662 (23 March 2006) revised (this is an estimate as the troop num- and extended UNAMA’s mandate until to protect DRC’s natural resources from bers shift continuously) 24 March 2007. unlawful and foreign predators. These • Top contributor: US • S/RES/1401 (28 March 2002) created measures had been recommended by • Duration: 7 October 2001 to present UNAMA. the Group of Experts on 18 July 2006 (S/2006/525). • S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999) Useful Additional Sources imposed sanctions against the n UNAMA’s website http://www.unama- The Group of Experts had recommended Taliban. afg.org/ that the DRC’s government, with the assis- Selected Report of the Secretary- n ISAF’s website http://www.afnorth.nato. tance of the international community, General int/ISAF/index.htm should develop an effective system of • S/2006/727 (11 September 2006) was n Afghanistan’s Endangered Compact, natural resources control which could be the latest report. International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing backed up by the Council by declaring ille- Other Relevant Documents No. 59, 29 January 2007 gal exploitation and commerce outside these measures to be a “sanctionable act”. • S/PV.5581 (7 December 2006) was the Violators of DRC natural resources laws discussion on the report of the Council Upcoming Issues in could then be added to the list of individuals mission to Afghanistan. Sanctions Committees and entities subject to the targeted sanc- • S/2006/935 (4 December 2006) was tions imposed under resolution 1596. the report of the Council mission to Somalia Sanctions (751 Committee) Afghanistan. The Committee is likely to begin receiving In its 31 January 2007 report (S/2007/40), • SC/8850 (9 October 2006) was a shortly applications under resolution 1744 the Group of Experts further elaborated its press statement expressing concern for exemptions covering supply of material original concepts and reiterated its earlier about the security situation in Afghani- to support the Transitional Federal Govern- recommendations. stan and the increase in opium ment. These are likely to be proposed under The Secretary-General’s report will be dis- cultivation and trafficking. a “no objection” procedure. Meetings may cussed by the Committee in conjunction • S/2006/765 (26 September 2006) was not be needed in March. The Monitoring with the January report of the Group of the latest ISAF report. Group mid-term briefing is unlikely to be Experts. given to the Committee before mid-April. Other Relevant Facts S/RES/1724 Sudan Sanctions (1591 Committee) The Panel of Experts mid-term briefing is Special Representative of the Secretary- Liberia Sanctions (1521 Committee) General and UNAMA’s Chief of Mission due by 29 March 2007. The report is The Panel of Experts briefing to the Com- expected to be discussed in the Committee Tom Koenigs (Germany) mittee in preparation for the Council’s on 27 March. S/RES/1713 UNAMA: Size, Composition and Duration review of the diamond sanctions may occur • Current strength: 206 international in March. (The Council review is due after Democratic People’s Republic of civilians, 848 local civilians, 11 military 20 April 2007.) The Kimberley Process is Korea Sanctions (1718 Committee) observers, three civilian police, also expected to inform the Committee of its The Committee will try to resolve outstand- 34 UN volunteers assessment of progress made by the Libe- ing issues relating to its guidelines. Some • Duration: 28 March 2002 to present; rian government towards joining the discussion of amending the lists of desig- mandate expires on 24 March 2007 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme nated sanctioned items (including before the Council’s review takes place. S/ S/2006/814, 815, and 853) is also expected. ISAF Military Commander RES/1731 The Committee’s next report to the Council General Dan McNeill (US) DRC Sanctions (1533 Committee) is in early April 2007. S/RES/1718 ISAF: Size, Composition and Duration The Committee has received the much • Current strength: about 35,460 troops delayed Secretary-General’s report • Contributors of military personnel: 37 (S/2007/68 of 8 February 2007, prepared by NATO and non-NATO countries the Office for the Coordination of Humani- • Current top contributors: US, UK, Ger- tarian Affairs) on the potential economic, many, Canada, Italy and the humanitarian and social impact of the Netherlands implementation of the proposed measures

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 23 Notable Dates for March Important Dates over the Reports Due for Consideration in March Relevant Document Horizon 26 February Commissioner’s quarterly UNMOVIC report (UN n The Council is tentatively planning visit- Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) S/RES/1284 ing missions for 2007 to West Africa 28 February SG regular report on Somalia S/RES/1725 (including Côte d’Ivoire), Timor-Leste and early March SG regular report on UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo) S/RES/1244 Central Africa. 5 March SG quarterly report on UNOCI (UN Operation in n The Peacebuilding Commission’s next Côte d’Ivoire) S/RES/1739 round of country-specific meetings are 8 March SG quarterly report on UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission expected in April for Burundi and in April in Iraq) S/RES/1700 or May for Sierra Leone. 12 March SG quarterly report on resolution 1701 (Lebanon), n Parliamentary elections in Chad are including recommendations on the status of the scheduled for April. Sheb’a Farms S/PRST/2006/52 n Presidential elections in Timor-Leste are 15 March SG recommendations on MONUC’s mandate expected in April, with parliamentary (UN Mission in the DRC) S/RES/1742 elections expected in June. mid March Commissioner’s quarterly UNIIIC report (UN n A UN Conference at the ministerial- International Independent Investigation Commission) S/RES/1686 level on Iraq will be held in Geneva on mid March SG semi-annual report on UNAMA (UN Assistance 17-18 April. Mission in Afghanistan) S/RES/1662 n Human Rights Council elections are mid March SG quarterly report on UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia) S/RES/1712 scheduled for May. mid March SG quarterly report on UNOGBIS (UN Peacebuilding n A Council open debate on Protection of Support Office in Guinea-Bissau) S/RES/1580 Civilians is expected in June. mid March Neighbouring states’ reports to the Côte d’Ivoire n The Special Court for Sierra Leone has Sanctions Committee on compliance with the arms and reported that Charles Taylor’s trial at The diamonds sanctions S/RES/1727 Hague will begin in June. 29 March Panel of Experts mid-term briefing to the Sudan n Election of Nepal’s constituent assembly Sanctions Committee S/RES/1713 is expected in June. 31 March SG monthly report on Darfur S/RES/1590 n Elections in Sierra Leone are expected Expiry of Mandates Operations Relevant Document in July. in March 2007 n The Secretary-General’s next reports on 24 March UNAMA S/RES/1662 the thematic issues of Protection of Civil- 31 March UNMIL S/RES/1712 ians in Armed Conflict and Women, Peace 31 March SG’s Special Representative for the Great Lakes & Security are expected by October. (final period) S/PRST/2006/57 n Presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire are March 2007 Other Important Dates tentatively expected by 31 October. 5-9 March IAEA Board of Governors meeting n Local elections in the DRC are expected 14-15 March Donors’ roundtable in Bujumbura for Burundi in the second half of 2007. 22 March The Temporary International Mechanism for Assistance to the n A workshop on security sector reform, a Palestinian People is due to expire, it is up to the Quartet to renew it. joint initiative of Slovakia and South Also expected in March: Africa, is being planned for later in 2007 • There are media reports of a mid-March meeting in Baghdad bringing together regional actors, in Africa. including Iran and Syria, along with US and UK officials, to discuss stabilisation strategies for Iraq. • A Somali national reconciliation conference is possible. • The Peacebuilding Commission is expected to visit Burundi and Sierra Leone in mid-March. • The preliminary proposal from the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, was submitted to the Contact Group and the parties in late January and is currently under discussion. It is expected to reach the Council in March with possible discussion in April.

SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT STAFF Colin Keating, Executive Director Joanna Weschler, Director of Research Security Council Report is published with the support of the Government of Canada, the Curtis A. Ward, Senior Research Consultant Government of Norway, The Rockefeller Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacAr- Anne-Gaëlle Claude, Research Analyst thur Foundation and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. It is incorporated as a not Fernanda Rafaela Fernandes, Research Analyst for profit Organisation and operates in affiliation with the Center on International Organiza- Amanda Roberts, Programme Coordinator tion in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University in New York. Shamala Kandiah, Research Consultant Brian Lockstone, Communications Consultant Nicole Richards, Administrative Assistant

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24 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org