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Technology Working Group Report

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Technology Working Group Report Canadian SMR Roadmap Technology Working Group Report Prepared by: SMR Roadmap Technology working group Issued: October 26, 2018 The information provided herein is for general information purposes only. The information within this report is provided in good faith, however no representation or warranty of any kind, express or implied, regarding the accuracy, adequacy, validity, reliability, availability, or completeness of any information within this report is made. Under no circumstances shall any party have any liability for any loss or damage of any kind as result of the use of any material within this report or reliance of any information contained therein. Any use of this report and reliance of any information is solely at the risk of the reader. The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any associated organizations or companies. Canadian SMR Roadmap Outline of Final Report 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 1 1.1 Technology Working Group Mandate and Membership ......................................................... 1 1.2 Introduction to Some Key Concepts ......................................................................................... 3 1.2.1 Fast Reactors vs. Thermal Reactors ...................................................................... 3 1.2.2 Passive and Inherent Safety ................................................................................. 3 1.2.3 Fuel Recycling and Advanced Fuel Cycles ............................................................. 4 2. Canadian SMR Applications ................................................................................................................ 6 2.1 General requirements .............................................................................................................. 6 2.2 Requirements for On-Grid Deployment ................................................................................... 7 2.3 Remote Community Application .............................................................................................. 9 2.3.1 Description of the Canadian Remote Community Application ............................ 9 2.3.2 Requirements for Remote Communities ............................................................ 10 2.4 Requirements for Heavy Industry Applications ...................................................................... 13 2.4.1 Mineral Mining ................................................................................................... 13 2.4.2 Oil & Gas ............................................................................................................... 1 2.5 Technology Features that May Impact Public Acceptance ...................................................... 4 2.6 Schedule and Technology Readiness Requirements ................................................................ 6 2.7 Findings and Recommendations .............................................................................................. 7 3. Technology Development and Deployment ....................................................................................... 9 3.1 SMR Technology Development Process ................................................................................... 9 3.1.1 Development process and steps .......................................................................... 9 3.1.2 Factory Manufacturing: Paradigm Shift.............................................................. 12 3.2 Deployment of an SMR Project .............................................................................................. 13 3.2.1 On Grid Project ................................................................................................... 13 3.2.2 Resource Project ................................................................................................. 14 3.2.3 Off Grid Project ................................................................................................... 15 3.2.4 Canadian Example of Fleet Deployment: Slowpoke Reactors ............................ 17 3.2.5 Potential Non-Terrestrial Deployment Methodologies ...................................... 18 3.3 Key Findings and Recommendations...................................................................................... 19 4. Overview of SMR Technologies and Benefits ................................................................................... 21 ii 4.1 Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 21 4.2 Overview of the SMR Technologies ........................................................................................ 23 4.2.1 Water-Cooled Reactors ...................................................................................... 23 4.2.2 High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors ............................................................ 26 4.2.3 Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor .............................................................................. 26 4.2.4 Lead-Cooled Fast Reactor ................................................................................... 27 4.2.5 Molten Salt Reactors .......................................................................................... 27 4.2.6 Heat-Pipe Reactors ............................................................................................. 28 4.3 New Fuel Types ...................................................................................................................... 29 4.4 General benefits from all SMR technologies .......................................................................... 32 4.4.1 Higher Technological Readiness Designs ............................................................ 34 4.4.2 Lower Technological Readiness Designs ............................................................ 34 4.5 Cross-Cutting Enabling Technologies ..................................................................................... 35 4.5.1 Cross-Cutting Enabling Technologies Development for SMRs in Canada .......... 38 4.6 Findings & Recommendations ................................................................................................ 39 5. SMR Technology Gaps With Respect to Applications ....................................................................... 41 5.1 Light Water Reactors .............................................................................................................. 42 5.1.1 LWR: General Requirements .............................................................................. 42 5.1.2 LWR: On-Grid Power Generation ....................................................................... 43 5.1.3 LWR: Heavy Industries ........................................................................................ 43 5.1.4 LWR: Remote Communities ................................................................................ 44 5.2 Sodium Cooled Fast Reactors ................................................................................................. 44 5.2.1 SFR: General Requirements ................................................................................ 44 5.2.2 SFR: On-Grid Power Generation ......................................................................... 46 5.2.3 SFR: Heavy Industries ......................................................................................... 46 5.2.4 SFR: Remote Communities ................................................................................. 47 5.3 Lead Cooled Fast Reactors ..................................................................................................... 47 5.3.1 LFR: General Requirements ................................................................................ 47 5.3.2 LFR: On-Grid Power Generation ......................................................................... 49 5.3.3 LFR: Heavy Industries.......................................................................................... 49 5.3.4 LFR: Remote Communities ................................................................................. 50 5.4 Molten Salt Reactors .............................................................................................................. 50 5.4.1 MSR: General Requirements .............................................................................. 50 iii 5.4.2 MSR: On-Grid Power Generation ....................................................................... 52 5.4.3 MSR: Heavy Industries ........................................................................................ 52 5.4.4 MSR: Remote Communities ................................................................................ 53 5.5 High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors ................................................................................ 53 5.5.1 HTGR: General Requirements............................................................................. 53 5.5.2 HTGR: On-Grid Power Generation ...................................................................... 55 5.5.3 HTGR: Heavy Industries ...................................................................................... 55 5.5.4 HTGR: Remote Communities .............................................................................. 56 5.6 Heat Pipe Reactors ................................................................................................................
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