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MICHAEL DAUDERSTÄDT/ANDRÉ W.M. GERRITS Democratisation After : Progress, Problems, Promotion

t the beginning of the , Central and Many of the democratic deficiencies in East Cen- AEastern Europe looks decisively more de- tral Europe today have less to do with the rem- mocratic than at any time before in its history. nants of the past than with the intentional activities Many countries that hardly existed as sovereign na- of the post-communist elites. Attaching the »re- tion-states up to ten years ago, let alone as de- form« label to all of the changes that have been mocracies, are now recognised members of the going on in the region since 1990 substitutes a Council of Europe and are about to join the Euro- normative political goal for scholarly analysis. 1 For pean Union. International watch dogs example, it goes beyond the power of imagination such as register many of the post- to define as »reforms« the deepest industrial de- communist countries as free or partly free (see ta- pression a European country has ever experienced ble 1). in peace-time, as occurred in Russia, with the in- This optimistic picture has to be qualified sub- crease in poverty, the decrease in education, the stantially though if one takes a closer look at the collapse of health care and the unprecedented whole region. There are important differences drop in life-expectancy. There is no post-com- over time and space. Some countries started de- munist transition. There are only post-communist mocratisation late or half-heartedly (e. g. most of transitions – processes of change which take quite the former Soviet Union) and never made it to real different directions, and which have dramatically democracy, while other countries slipped back into dissimilar outcomes. less democratic states (e. g. Belarus after 1996 un- In what follows, we will first focus on a limited der Aleksandr Lukashenko). Regression is even ob- number of explanatory variables related to the ex- servable with respect to the final years of commu- tent of democratisation in the region: the level of nism. Whereas and the changes socio-, the nature of com- which he had initiated had more or less forced the munist rule and the pattern of transition (inclu- communist leaderships in the Soviet republics to ding the type of governance), as well as the issue of accept at least a modicum of openness and accoun- nationalism and national minorities. We will then tability, under post-communist conditions similar deal with the apparently close relation between po- pressures remained absent. The Soviet Union at litical and economic reform, and finally, we will dis- the end of the 1980s was probably more »free« cuss some specific features of post-communist de- than most of the post-Soviet republics ten years la- mocracy (or ), and thereby compare ter. the relatively »successful« countries of Central Eu- A survey of the Central and Eastern European rope with the considerably more ambivalent and countries shows a geographic gradient in democra- tisation: the more you move within the region to- wards the South and the East, the less rapid, pro- found and sustainable the transition towards de- mocracy seems to be. In fact, there is no common 1. Milada Anna Vachudová and Tim Snyder, »Are linear transition process with a preordained out- Transitions Transitory? Two Types of Political Change come, i.e. a market economy and a more or less li- in Eastern Europe Since 1989«, in: East European Poli- beral democracy, a process that would allow defi- tics and Societies, 11 (Winter 1997) 1, p. 1. See also M. Steven Fish, »Democratization’s Requisites: The ning of all obstacles, challenges and problems Postcommunist Experience«, in: Post-Soviet Affairs, along the way as the legacy of the communist past. 14 (July–September 1998) 3.

IPG 4/2000 Michael Dauderstädt/André W. M. Gerrits, Democratisation After Communism: Progress, Problems, Promotion 361 Table 1: The Development of Political Freedom in Central and Eastern Europe Since 1989

Country/Year 1989– 1990– 1991– 1992– 1993– 1994– 1995– 1996– 1997– 1998– 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

Albania NF NF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF Armenia – – PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF Azerbaijan – – PF PF NF NF NF NF PF PF Belarus – – PF PF PF PF PF NF NF NF Bosnia-Herzegovina – – – NF NF NF NF PF PF PF Bulgaria NF PF FFFFFFFF Croatia – – PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF Czech Republic ––––FFFFFF Czechoslovakia NF F F F –––––– Estonia – – F PF FFFFFF Georgia – – NF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF Hungary PF FFFFFFFFF Kazakhstan – – PF PF PF NF NF NF NF NF Kyrgyz Republic – – PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF Latvia – – F PF PF FFFFF Lithuania – – FFFFFFFF Macedonia – – – PF PF PF PF PF PF PF Moldova – – PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF Poland PF FFFFFFFFF Romania NF NF PF PF PF PF PF F F F Russia – – PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF Slovakia ––––PFFFPFPFF Slovenia – – FFFFFFFF Tajikistan – – PF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF Turkmenistan – – PF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF Ukraine – – PF PF PF PF PF PF PF PF Uzbekistan – – PF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF

F = free; PF = partly free; NF = not free: Source: Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org)

problematic record of the Russian Federation. rial or Ottoman rule, have started nation-building and industrialisation later and have had virtually no substantial democratic experience.2 Subsequently, Democracy and Development urbanisation, education and the emergence of a ci- vil society were delayed or even deliberately op- Historical differences in economic, social and poli- tical development are often put forward to explain the differences in democratisation between Cen- 2. Attila Agh (Emerging Democracies in East Central tral Europe on the one hand, and Southern and Europe and the Balkans. Cheltenham-Northampton Eastern Europe on the other. While countries like 1998, p. 6) argues that the transition of 1989–92 was a Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland have had re-democratisation for the countries of Central Europe long, albeit interrupted, traditions of statehood, and a democratisation for the rest. This to some extent explains the differences within the transition process economic development and even democracy, the itself as well as post-transition development, in particular other countries have been subject to Russian impe- the scope and speed of consolidation of democracy.

362 Michael Dauderstädt/André W. M. Gerrits, Democratisation After Communism: Progress, Problems, Promotion IPG 4/2000 pressed. For many less developed countries in the appear in the first three columns. This indicates region, modernisation started effectively but un- that the extent of democratic and economic re- der communism. form and the level of human development (in- If one applies the democratisation index of Fre- come, life expectancy, literacy, etc.) achieved are edom House to the various post-communist coun- closely related. Indeed, there is a rather stringent tries the following picture emerges for 1998/99: al- division between the »haves« and the »have-nots« together, poorer countries with a per capita in this respect. income of less than 1000 dollar tend to be slow The picture becomes even more telling if we democratisers. However, as a group, the low- compare an aggregate rating of political and eco- income countries show very different levels of nomic reform with the countries’ ethnic homogen- democratisation, and the good democracies have eity, geographic location and religious character- very different levels of income (e.g. Slovenia has an istics. The leading position of the Central Euro- income per capita that is three times higher than pean countries emerges beyond any doubt. that of Poland). Among the historical conditions mentioned, the level of socio-economic development is gene- 3. The seminal work on economic development lead- rally perceived as the single most important »re- ing to democracy is by Seymour Martin Lipset, in parti- quisite« of democratisation.3 Empirical evidence cular his article »Social Requisites of Democracy: Eco- nomic Development and Political Legitimacy«, in: seems to confirm this. It is the exception, rather American Political Science Review, 53 (1959), pp. 69–105, than the rule, that democracy is established and is and his Political Man, New York 1960. The significance able to survive in less developed places (e. g. In- of civil society was pointed out by Rober Putnam et al., dia).4 However, it is not the only, and certainly not Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern an isolated, factor in explaining the potential of de- . Princeton 1993. Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic, and Politi- mocratisation. Table 2, which presents a rather un- cal Change in 43 Societies, Princeton 1997, and Larry sophisticated ranking of countries in terms of poli- Diamond, Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation, tical and economic reform, geographical location, Baltimore/London 1999, have analysed the condi- ethnic diversity and democratisation, suggests a tions of democratisation and democracy more generally. 4. See et al. »What makes Demo- number of causal links. cracies Endure«, in: Journal of Democracy 7 (1996) 1. Only fourteen of the 27 countries in the region 5. Steven Fish, op. cit., p. 230.

Table 2: Democratic and Economic Reform, and Ethnic Homogeneity

Democratic Reform Human Development Economic Reform Ethnic Homogeneity Score (1997) Index value (1997) Score (1996) Score (1996)

1. Czech Republic 1. Slovenia1. Czech Republic 1. Poland 2. Hungary 2. Czech Republic 2. Estonia 2. Albania 3. Poland 3. Slovakia 3. Hungary 3. Czech Republic – Slovenia4. Hungary 4. Poland 4. Slovenia 5. Estonia 5. Poland 5. Slovakia 5. Hungary – Latvia 6. Belarus 6. Lithuania 6. Romania – Lithuania 7. Russian Federation 7. Latvia 7. Bulgaria 8. Bulgaria 8. Bulgaria 8. Croatia 8. Russian Federation – Moldova9. Estonia Slovakia – Albania– – Slovakia 10. Croatia 10. Russian Federation 10. Lithuania

Source: the data on democratic reform is from Freedom House, the HDI scale is from the Development Program. These data and the data on economic reform and the ethnic homogeneity score are presented in Steven Fish, »Democratization’s Requisites«, pp. 217, 225. More recent figures can be found at: www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/.

IPG 4/2000 Michael Dauderstädt/André W. M. Gerrits, Democratisation After Communism: Progress, Problems, Promotion 363 Despite some scepticism about this point5, ethnic The impact of communist rule has been different homogeneity seems to be an additional positive in different countries. In the Soviet Union it star- factor in explaining the chances of successful de- ted almost directly after the collapse of the Tsarist mocratisation. Probably, as we shall see later, the empire with the non-allowance of any multi-party essential thing here is not the measure of ethnic democratic experience beyond the few months of homogeneity as such, but its irrelevance and there- Kerenski’s rule and perhaps the not yet completely fore the absence of radical, ethnically-inspired totalitarian period of early Soviet rule. Similarly nationalism. Of the ten states mentioned in the brief were the periods of and de- first column (essentially the most successful refor- mocracy in other parts of what eventually became mers in the region), eight belong to the ten most the Soviet Union (e. g. Georgia). Thus, these ethnically homogeneous countries. Only Estonia countries and their populations suffered much lon- and Latvia deviate from the rule of relative homo- ger from the communist party than geneity (due to their large Russian minorities). the countries of Central and South Bulgaria and the Russian Federation, which take Eastern Europe where communist regimes were the penultimate and the final position on the list of only established after II and again more reforming countries, are the only two explicitly rapidly in the Balkans than in Central Europe. East European nations (as far as geographic loca- The forty to fifty years of communist rule out- tion is concerned). The three Baltic states are side the Soviet Union have also been a far from dubious cases; the others are of Central European uniform experience throughout the region. It was location. The same goes for the dominant religion only in the Central European countries that anti- in these countries. Eight of the ten reformers are communist opposition became politically signifi- Western Christian countries. Orthodox Bulgaria cant. In addition, it was there more than in other and Russia are nine and ten on the list. Predomi- countries that important segments of the commu- nantly Moslem countries are wholly absent. nist elite turned to reformist ideas during the final decade of communist rule. This facilitated a pro- cess of gradual internal reform, which ultimately The Communist Legacy and the Nature of Transition enabled part of the leadership to accept the oppo- sition as a political counterpart and to engage in a

Table 3: Level of Reform, Ethnic Homogeneity, Geography and Religion

Country Reform Ethnic Geographic Religion (composite homogeneity location index) (ranking)

Czech Republic 29 3 CE WC Hungary 24 5 CE WC Poland 21 1 CE WC Estonia17 15 CE/EE WC/EC Slovenia17 4 CE WC Slovakia 15 8 CE WC Latvia 9 16 CE/EE WC/EC Lithuania 9 9 CE/EE WC Bulgaria 6 7 EE EC Russian Federation 5 8 EE EC

Source: see Table 1 CE = Central Europe; EE = Eastern Europe; WC = Western Christianity; EC = Eatern Christianity

364 Michael Dauderstädt/André W. M. Gerrits, Democratisation After Communism: Progress, Problems, Promotion IPG 4/2000 negotiated transfer of power. The measure of re- the democratic opposition. In between were the formism present in the Polish and Hungarian transitions dominated by factions of the nomen- communist parties was probably the single most klatura that were, in the best cases, reformist (Rus- important factor which enabled them to later suc- sia, where the democratic opposition, DemRos- cessfully transform into social democratic parties siya, never gained power; Bulgaria, where the ad- akin to those in Western Europe.6 hoc coalition of the Union of Democratic Forces Nationalistically inspired opposition against So- proved unable to act as a real counterforce to the viet hegemony also came from (part of) the com- restyled Bulgarian Communist Party; and some munist leadership in the Balkans. But while it led parts of former Yugoslavia) and, in the worst cases, to the relative autonomy of Yugoslavia, Albania »parties of power« using new, mostly nationalist, and, to a lesser extent, of Romania, it also weaken- disguises to continue their old rule (as in many ed the democratic resolve as it focused political parts of the former Soviet Union). energies on the national issue. Formally, democratic constitutions were adop- Following Herbert Kitschelt’s7 typology, three ted in most countries. Sometimes new constitu- different types of communist regimes can be dis- tions were designed, but more often existent ones cerned, each leading to different types of transi- amended. With the exception of Bulgaria, it was tion: not constituent assemblies, but other state bodies, bureaucratic-authoritarian communism (e. g. mostly parliaments, that formulated new constitu- Czechoslovakia, German , tions, which in many cases were then approved by Poland to some degree), which emerged in a popular referendum. The institutional settings highly developed countries and ended in a which emerged from the constitutional change regime implosion; ranged from parliamentary to presidential de- national-accommodative communism (Hungary, mocracies. In some cases, formal and real powers Slovenia, early Croatia, to some degree Poland, have been concentrated in the presidency and the Slovakia, the Baltic countries and Serbia) which powers of parliament and judiciary have been limi- also can be found in more developed societies ted to such an extent that these systems hardly and the transition of which tended to be nego- qualify as democracies. An overview of different tiated; governmental structures in Central and Eastern patrimonial communism (virtually all of the Europe reveals two trends: the more presidential former Soviet Union and South Eastern and the less parliamentary systems are, the more Europe) where transition has been either nego- likely they are to become autocratic – the con- tiated or initiated by pre-emptive reform by the tinuity of (post)communist leadership is remark- old elites unless the regime simply continued able among the countries with a presidential under a new label and new personnel. system; and secondly, parliamentary and mixed The nature of communist rule, the presence (or systems are predominant among the countries that absence) of a certain democratic tradition (inclu- we earlier identified as the most successful political ding a democratic counter-elite), the way the com- and economic reformers. munist regimes relinquished power and the de- Political transition was shaped by three groups mocratic (or the lack of) redefinition of political of key actors: institutions under post-communism seem to be The opposition movements or dissidents: Where closely linked. Again, Central Europe played a spe- the opposition movements (e. g. Solidarnosc cial role. The first free elections took place in these under Lech Walesa, with Vaclav countries. The communists negotiated their »sur- Havel) were strong and principally democrati- render« through Round Tables with the opposi- tion, which allowed for a peaceful transition. At the other extreme, the Romanian Nicolae 6. See also Michael Dauderstädt, André Gerrits and Ceausescu had to be toppled by force resulting in György Márkus, Troubled Transition. the death of several hundred Romanian citizens in East Central Europe. Amsterdam-Bonn 1999. 7. See Herbert Kitschelt et al. Post-Communist Party and eventually his own, though the new powers to Systems. Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party be were another sort of communists rather than Cooperation. Cambridge 1999, p. 35 ff.

IPG 4/2000 Michael Dauderstädt/André W. M. Gerrits, Democratisation After Communism: Progress, Problems, Promotion 365 Table 4: Systems of Government

Parliamentary Systems Mixed Systems Presidential Systems with Cabinet

weak medium strong parliamentary- presidential- with without president strong president presidential parliamentary Prime Prime president systems systems Minister Minister

Yugoslavia8 Czech Albania Lithuania Armenia Belarus Georgia Republic Bulgaria Moldova Croatia Kazakhstan Turkmenistan Estonia Macedonia Montenegro Kyrgyz Tajikistan Hungary Poland Republic Uzbekistan Slovakia Romania SloveniaRussia Serbia Ukraine

Source: Georg Brunner »Präsident, Regierung und Parlament. Machtverteilung zwischen Exekutive und Legislative«, in: Otto Luchtenhand (ed.), Neue Regierungssysteme in Osteuropa und der GUS. Berlin 1996, as quoted in Wolfgang Merkel, Systemtransformation, Opladen 1999

cally motivated, they formed the nucleus of a motives carried in the transition process influenced civil society and a political culture conducive to the course and outcome of democratisation, and democracy. Those opposition groups which did so did the specific state structure which emerged in not equate anti-communism with the quest various post-communist countries. Most countries for democracy, emphasised freedom from com- in Central and Eastern Europe are unitary states munist, Soviet or Serb rule. Economic reform, where political power is concentrated in the central though considered important, served as an government. The best known federations, the instrument to dissolve the (communist) power Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia structures that still controlled state-owned and Czechoslovakia have all collapsed. Bosnia- enterprises Hercegovina is a virtual federal state upheld by the The reformist communists (such as Aleksandr international community. Otherwise, the trend Dubcek, Miklós Németh) were more concern- is to establish states that are congruent to ethnic ed with economic, and occasionally, political habitats. Minority protection is achieved by the reform. Some attempts to reform the planned general respect for (if at all) rather economy even pre-dated the transition by than by the devolution of power to regional or decades. To them, national sovereignty was less local authorities. The latter would, in any case, a goal of transition in itself than a condition only work where the minorities are geographically for economic and political reform. These groups concentrated and not spread out through the regularly transformed themselves into social-de- country such as the Roma population in many mocratic parties after 1990. countries of Central and Eastern Europe. National communists (such as , Leo- State power and institutions are an important nid Kuchma or Aleksandr Lukashenko) wanted aspect of political transition. It refers to the good or used independence to strengthen their governance issue which seems to dominate discus- power, using nationalist rhetoric in order to get popular support. Economic and political reform has been subordinated to the preservation of 8. Milosevic has transformed a constitutionally weak power. position into a powerful one thanks to his personal influ- The different weight that these actors and their ence rather than the competencies of the office.

366 Michael Dauderstädt/André W. M. Gerrits, Democratisation After Communism: Progress, Problems, Promotion IPG 4/2000 sions on development and international co-opera- minorities that were living in the territory but did tion today. The Russian Federation offers a good not belong to the titular nation. The exception is example of the ambiguity of this issue. Lilia Shevt- the »velvet divorce« between the Czech Republic sova describes Russia’s post-communist system as a and Slovakia which led to relatively few problems »regime, in which elements of democracy, authori- but still succeeded in complicating the democra- tarianism, post-, delegative demo- tisation of Slovakia. Otherwise, conflicts were cracy, bureaucratic-, oligarchic rule, ranging from mild , or the formation of sultanism, and even monarchy are intertwined.«9 parties representing these minorities, to civil war. State power is weak and arbitrary. It is fragmented As the Table 5 shows, defective democracies were – vertically, between powerful interests at the much more numerous among new nations than centre, and horizontally, between Moscow and the among the old ones. The Baltic countries, in turn, local leaderships in the regions. Some regions are prove that countries can overcome these handi- strong, more regions are weak, and most of them caps. have a dubious record in democracy and human Nationalist conflict is almost always linked to rights. Political and economic power seem even the issue of ethnic minorities. One could argue more closely connected than in the political about the relation between democratisation and centre, the division of powers is generally weaker ethnic heterogeneity but even the unsophisticated and the media are mostly fully dependent on the statistics which we presented above, makes us disa- local powers. Obviously, any discussion about a gree with those who claim that there is no signifi- »Rechtsstaat« in Russia, or about full democracy, cant link between the two. It is not so much the seems senseless so long as the state is not capable presence of minorities per se which is crucial but of enforcing the law when necessary. the fact that post-communist leaders use it as a means of acquiring political legitimacy. The politi- cisation of the minorities issue (for reasons which The Force of Nationalism sometimes have very little to do with the issue itself) is essential because only this creates the Within the new nation-states emerging from the ethnic nationalism that is at odds with democracy. disintegration of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, This makes the relation between democratisa- and Czechoslovakia, issues of nation-building were tion and nationalist conflict a far more ambivalent prominent on the political agenda and often com- plicated or delayed democratisation. Citizenship, a core concept of any democracy, had to be defin- 9. Lilia Shevtsova, Yeltsin’s Russia. Myths and Reali- ed anew. This led to various problems with the ties. Washington 1999, p. 288.

Table 5: Democratisation and Nation-building

Old nation-states New nation-states

Sound Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, democracies Romania, Bulgaria Slovenia

Defective Albania Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Moldova, Russia, democracies Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

A country is defined as »Sound democracy« if it gets less than 3 points as the average of three democracy indicators with two (Political Rights Index and Civil Liberties Index) ranging from one to seven points and one (Freedom Status) valued 2 in the case of »free« (F), 4 in the case of »partly free« (PF) and 6 in the case of »not free« (NF) (all three indicators taken from Freedom House country rankings for 1998–99; see also table 1 above). »« is defined by more than 3 points on the above scale. »Old nation« is defined as an already established independent state between 1950 and 1990. »New nation« is defined as an independent nation established after 1950.

IPG 4/2000 Michael Dauderstädt/André W. M. Gerrits, Democratisation After Communism: Progress, Problems, Promotion 367 one than is generally accepted. The idea that exception of Slovakia) but belong also to the rela- democratisation is the best antidote available to tively rich, developed, westernised group of Cen- nationalist conflict is comforting but misleading. tral European countries. Their success can be cre- Under certain conditions democratisation will dited as much to those socio-economic factors as rather stimulate than discourage nationalist senti- to democracy. Good democracies may not auto- ments and conflicts, because it gives powerful matically make good economic reformers,13 but in groups much more room to politicise and mobilise post-communist Europe »the move toward the nationalist feelings in their own particular interest market is remarkably consistent with the move than the limited parameters of the communist toward democracy.«14 system did.10 The level of socio-economic devel- As argues on the basis of a statisti- opment, the extent to which democracy threatens cal analysis,15 democracies are better than auto- elite interests and especially the institutional legacy cratic regimes in adjusting to external shocks as of communism (the strength of democratic poli- they avoid internal friction through better con- tical institutions, the vigour of civil society) are the flict resolution and compensation mechanisms. crucial variables. They seem to be more important Democracy also might promote growth through in explaining the presence or absence of nationalist securing property rights and allowing the demise conflict than the so frequently mentioned and of bad government. On the other hand, it can seemingly age-old tribal conflicts in the area. hamper growth through unsustainable redistribu- tion or too much concern for special interests. But then again: dictatorship is by no means better. Political Democracy and Economic Reform While a development-centred autocrat (e. g. Lee Yuan Kew in ) can work wonders, most Democratisation started with legislative and con- have plundered the wealth of their stitutional changes and more or less free »found- countries. The communist , too, did ing elections«, which in most countries led to the not succeed in achieving sustainable growth even demise of the former communist government. though their growth rates were impressive until This was the easy part, as Ralf Dahrendorf pointed 1970. It was this failure that has contributed most out in 1990, directly after the collapse of com- to their collapse. However, when communists do munism: »The formal process of constitutional achieve high growth, as in China, they are less reform takes at least six months; a general sense liable to lose legitimacy and may possibly stay in that things are looking up as a result of economic power until urbanization, education and wealth reform is unlikely to spread before six years have make the drive for freedom irresistible. passed; the third condition of the road to freedom Given the enormous challenges of system trans- is to provide the social foundations which trans- formation, democracies in Central and Eastern form the constitution and the economy from fair- weather into all-weather institutions capable of withstanding the storms generated within and 10. For an extensive on this issue see Jack Snyder, From without, and sixty years are barely enough to lay to Violence. Democratization and Nationalist Con- these foundations.«11 flict. New York–London 2000. 11. Ralf Dahrendorf, Reflections on the in Economic transformation began in a situation Europe. New York: 1990, pp. 99–100. of deep crisis. Between 1990 and 1993, average 12. See Grzegorz W. Kolodko, Ten Years of Postsocialist annual growth rates of GDP were negative in all Transition. Lessons for Policy Reforms. World Bank Policy countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The de- Research Working Paper, Washington 1999, p. 4 (Table cline lasted for about two years in Poland and at 1). 12 13. See Robert J. Barro, Determinants of Economic least eight years in the Ukraine. On average, the Growth. A Cross-Country Empirical Study. Cam- most democratic countries showed a better econo- bridge–London 1997, pp. 49–87. mic performance than the less democratic ones. 14. Steven Fish, op. cit., p. 232. The five best performing countries (Poland, Slo- 15. See Dani Rodrik, »Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict, and Growth Collapses«. venia, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) are Manuscript. Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. not only good democracies (with the temporary August 1998.

368 Michael Dauderstädt/André W. M. Gerrits, Democratisation After Communism: Progress, Problems, Promotion IPG 4/2000 Europe did remarkably well. Although most poli- disastrous economic consequences. cies (stabilisation, liberalisation, privatisation) im- The transition-related economic decline caused plied heavy burdens for important social groups, a substantial increase in poverty, inequality and they were not blocked by anti-reform alliances. unemployment in societies that were accustomed In Poland, the economically most successful to economic security and equality. Unsurprisingly, democracy, government has been rather unstable. the population reacted with frustration and dis- In turn, in the Czech Republic, political stability content. Opinion polls taken by Eurobarometer went hand-in-hand with stagnating economic between 1991 and 1997 show that, in most coun- reforms. The Czech economic crisis was partly tries, the majority of the people polled were not caused by the voucher privatisation which seemed satisfied with the way their democracies were to give everybody an equal share in the new mar- developing (see Table 6). This data does not imply ket economy and was thus politically very succes- that they did not want a democracy - although in sful, but which created an ownership structure that some countries strong minorities preferred the old hampered economic modernisation. Economic system and would not have minded a dissolution recession led to a change of government (in the of democratic institutions.16 In several countries, form of an electoral victory for the social-democra- major discontent was also revealed with regard to tic opposition), but the political stalemate that human rights. prevented the necessary reforms prevailed. In some South Eastern European countries, similar 16. See Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, »New situations of powerless coalitions fragmented by Democracies Barometer III. Learning From What Is Hap- personal conflicts between leading politicians had pening«, in: Studies in Public Policy, 230, Glasgow 1994.

Table 6: Satisfaction With the Development of Democracy (percentage of those not satisfied)

Country 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98

Albania 55 54 58 66 41 24 – Armenia– 86 84 86 80 79 – Belarus – 77 68 73 67 61 – Bulgaria 45 53 69 91 80 86 73 Croatia ––––4252– Czech Republic – 57 48 53 50 59 62 Czechoslovakia 66 –––––– Estonia55 63 51 59 58 56 56 Georgia– 49 – 74 47 56 – Hungary 60 72 74 66 77 72 64 Kazakhstan – – – 74 67 75 – Latvia 52 75 61 68 66 70 69 Lithuania 32 43 56 62 66 59 55 Macedonia – 49 49 63 55 57 – Poland 50 55 49 63 38 45 37 Romania 55 69 56 67 58 43 50 Russia (European) 67 75 71 83 86 82 – Slovakia – 74 78 79 67 74 72 Slovenia– 49 59 60 60 53 59 Ukraine – 70 72 69 70 63 –

Source: Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, various issues (the years given above indicate the year the poll was taken and the subsequent year when it was published).

IPG 4/2000 Michael Dauderstädt/André W. M. Gerrits, Democratisation After Communism: Progress, Problems, Promotion 369 The high percentage of dissatisfied people in countries of the European Union as well), rang- some of the most democratic countries, such as ing from unreformed communists to right-wing Hungary or the Czech Republic, is alarming. Only nationalists. Up to now though, they have hardly in Poland does the population seem relatively con- gained big shares of the popular vote (see table 7), tent with the country’s development – unsur- but that might change. The debate concerning prisingly perhaps in view of the economic boom the accession to the EU and the adjustments and since 1994. However, polls can be illusive as was reforms required by the EU could be a catalyst proved in Albania where the highest level of satis- for both sensible reform, and a nationalist-traditio- faction of any country at any time between 1991 nalist coalition of potential losers who object to and 1997 was reached in 1996, shortly before first EU-membership. its pseudo-economy of financial pyramids and then the whole country collapsed. At the same time, the citizens of the post-communist societies evidently The Post-Communist Political System appreciated the new freedom as other polls show. When they are asked to compare their present Democracy demands a democratic culture, i. e. a liberties with the past regime, they clearly see the society that not only accepts democratic proce- progress, albeit with notable differences between dures but that also values democratic institutions countries and regarding specific aspects.17 for their own sake. The record of most post-com- In most countries of Central and Eastern munist countries is still ambivalent. As shown Europe, discontentment with poor economic per- above, discontent is wide-spread. Its most promi- formance did not deconsolidate democracy. It pro- nent expression has been the voting behaviour of duced democratic changes of government but no the electorates. Almost no government succeeded return of authoritarian rule. Moreover, economic in winning a second term. Exceptional cases were performance was weakest and the accompanying ’s re-election as president in June 1996 discontent strongest, where democracies were (with the help of the mass-media controlled by defective anyway, and could thus not be blamed those who believed themselves to have a stake in directly. In turn, the economic performance of his victory) and Vaclav Klaus’ electoral success in the »good« democracies (i. e. mostly in Central the Czech elections of 1996 (which also proved to Europe) was rather encouraging and will, hope- be short-lived and ended in an early defeat in fully, continue to improve with the support of 1998). Fortunately, the electorate chose democra- European integration (for the risks involved see tic alternatives in most cases. The first victims of below pp. 17–18). the voters’ wrath were the anticommunist victors However the risks remain. Economic decline of the founding elections. In Lithuania, Hungary, might eventually provoke authoritarian rule as Poland and Macedonia, reformed successor parties it often18 did in history, e. g. during the inter-war of the erstwhile communist parties »returned« to period after the . Discontent power. With some delay the less reformed Alba- might strengthen less democratic forces such as nian and Bulgarian communists also returned. The those which blame the economic problems on for- importance of charismatic leaders proved to be eigners (the »West«) and the democratic regime similarly unstable: personalities such as Mikhail rather than looking for appropriate domestic Gorbachev in Russia, Vaclav Havel and Jiri Dienst- reforms. Economic problems which breed discon- bier in the Czech Republic, Alexander Dubcek in tent include not only the lack of growth but also the unequal distribution of the benefits of growth, 17. See Rose/Haerpfer, op. cit., questions 35–42; unsur- which has produced a large group of losers to prisingly, the perception of democratic improvement and post-communist transformation. Aggressive iden- better treatment by the government is weaker in coun- tity is a »natural« substitute for a realistic tries such as Belarus or Ukraine. and sometimes painful assessment of one’s own 18. Larry Diamond, op. cit., p. 78 ff., holds that view deficiencies and appropriate corrections of policy. by quoting comprehensive surveys such as the article of Adam Przeworski et al. »What Makes Democracies Populist parties which prey on such sentiments Endure?« in: Journal of Democracy 7, no. 1 (1996) abound in Eastern and Central Europe (as in some pp. 41–42.

370 Michael Dauderstädt/André W. M. Gerrits, Democratisation After Communism: Progress, Problems, Promotion IPG 4/2000 Slovakia, or Lech Walesa in Poland lost much of one can say that social democracy helped demo- their appeal in their own countries while being cracy. But it is also true that social democracy needs kept in high esteem abroad. The frequency of democracy. In none of the countries with a poor governmental change in Central Europe contrasts democratic record, including the Russian Federa- with the level of political continuity in other parts tion, have social democratic parties been able to of the region, notably in the countries of the Com- establish themselves. monwealth of Independent States. Social democrats in post-communist East Cen- The electoral upheavals were prepared and tral Europe emerged from three different sources: accompanied by big changes in the party struc- from the re-founded historical parties of the inter- tures. New parties emerged, small parties turned war period, the reformist currents in communist big, big parties failed to get seats in parliamentary parties, and the left wing of opposition and citizen elections. Particularities and changes in the electo- movements. The Czech Republic saw the only ral laws contributed to the confusion. Sometimes example of a »historic« social democratic party large parts of the electorate went unrepresented in which made a successful re-appearance on the poli- parliament as, for instance, in the Polish election of tical scene. Elsewhere, only reformed communist 1994, when several competing conservative parties parties became notable political forces. But social all failed to clear the threshold required to enter democrats are not exceptional in this respect: pre- the parliament. Voter turn-out has been modest in communist party formations have generally failed many countries and indicates a general low trust in to become major political actors. parties and politics as confirmed by several polls.19 Why are the party structures as volatile as they The link between social groups or strata and are? Obviously, there is no lack of political parties specific parties is also rather weak. All this has in the post-communist world. The problem is the led to levels of political volatility which have weakness of most political formations and the lack been unprecedented even in new democracies like of identification on the part of the populace. The Germany and Italy after 1945 or Spain and Por- party landscape is highly fragmented. Parties are tugal in the 1970s.20 generally small, isolated and centred around indi- In spite of the high volatility of party politics, viduals. They suffer from a serious lack of legiti- the democratic centre has held. Extremist, anti-de- macy. At best, they are perceived as a by-product mocratic parties did gain some support but of democratisation, as a »necessary evil«.22 Even rarely power. As table 7 shows, centre-right (libe- though the poor image of political parties and ral/conservative) and centre-left (social-democra- the volatility of party structures is a region-wide tic) parties together got almost 60 % of the parlia- phenomenon, the differences between specific mentary seats (though probably a smaller share of countries are substantial. The Russian Federation the popular vote) in the Central and East Euro- pean region when taken as a whole. Without a centre-left alternative, the popular discontent 19. See also Dauderstädt et al., op. cit., pp. 60–62. might have chosen a more extremist outlet with 20. The level of a corresponding indicator reached grave consequences for the region’s political from 47 in Bulgaria 1991–94 to 63 in Poland 1991–93 and development. The centre becomes even stronger to 178 in the Czech Republic while Germany had 52 in 1949–53, Portugal 25 in 1975–77 and established democra- and broader, if one includes post-communist half- cies less than 20. All values are from a study by Richard reformed parties such as the Albanian, Bulgarian Rose, »Mobilizing Demobilized Voters in Post-Com- and Romanian socialists and some moderate natio- munist Societies«, as quoted in: Wolfgang Merkel, »Die nalists such as the party of Meciar in Slovakia or Konsolidierung postautoritärer Demokratien: Ein theo- retisches Modell (nicht nur) für Osteuropa«, in: Klaus the Macedonian VMRO. Orthodox communist and Armingeon (ed.), Der Nationalstaat am Ende des fascistic nationalists have remained marginal in 20. Jahrhunderts, Bern/Stuttgart/Wien 1996. almost all countries of the region. 21. For the process of social-democratisation of former Indeed, the democratisation (or »social-demo- communist parties see Dauderstädt et al., op. cit., pp. cratisation«) of the successor parties has been a 77–82. 22. Jakob Juchler, »Probleme der Demokratisierung crucial element in the stabilisation of post-com- in den osteuropäischen Transformationsländer«, in: Ost- munist democracy in a number of countries.21 So europa, 47 (September 1997) 9, p. 902.

IPG 4/2000 Michael Dauderstädt/André W. M. Gerrits, Democratisation After Communism: Progress, Problems, Promotion 371 Table 7: The Composition of Parliaments (percentage of seats per political/ideological current as of 1.1.1999)

Country Communist Post- Social- Conser- Nationalist- Ethnic- Miscella- Vacant communist democratic vative/ autho- regionalist neous autho- liberal ritarian non- ritarian partisans socialist

Albania 0,0 % 65,2 % 5,2 % 21,3 % 2,6 % 2,6 % 3,2 % 0,0 % Armenia3,7 % 0,0 % 0,5 % 71,6 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 23,2 % 1,1 % Belarus 16,2 % 12,7 % 0,4 % 6,5 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 40,4 % 23,8 % Bosnia-Herzeg. 0,0 % 0,0 % 4,8 % 9,5 % 0,0 % 85,7 % 0,0 % 0,0 % Bulgaria 0,0 % 24,2 % 7,1 % 57,1 % 3,7 % 7,9 % 0,0 % 0,0 % Croatia 0,0 % 0,0 % 8,7 % 20,5 % 3,1 % 64,6 % 3,1 % 0,0 % Czech Republic 12,0 % 0,0 % 37,0 % 51,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % Estonia0,0 % 0,0 % 5,9 % 81,2 % 6,9 % 5,9 % 0,0 % 0,0 % Georgia0,4 % 0,0 % 47,2 % 17,0 % 0,0 % 13,6 % 19,1 % 2,6 % Hungary 0,0 % 0,0 % 34,7 % 61,4 % 3,6 % 0,0 % 0,3 % 0,0 % Latvia 0,0 % 0,0 % 14,0 % 69,0 % 17,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % Lithuania 0,0 % 8,5 % 8,5 % 74,5 % 0,0 % 1,4 % 7,1 % 0,0 % Macedonia 0,0 % 1,7 % 22,5 % 3,3 % 50,8 % 21,7 % 0,0 % 0,0 % Moldova 39,6 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 23,8 % 0,0 % 36,6 % 0,0 % 0,0 % Poland 0,0 % 0,0 % 35,7 % 63,9 % 0,0 % 0,4 % 0,0 % 0,0 % Romania 0,0 % 26,5 % 15,5 % 35,6 % 10,8 % 11,7 % 0,0 % 0,0 % Russia 35,1 % 7,6 % 0,0 % 27,1 % 11,6 % 0,0 % 18,7 % 0,0 % Slovakia 0,0 % 0,0 % 18,0 % 34,0 % 38,0 % 10,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % Slovenia 0,0 % 0,0 % 10,0 % 65,6 % 22,2 % 2,2 % 0,0 % 0,0 % Ukraine 26,9 % 10,4 % 5,6 % 45,1 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 10,4 % 1,6 % Yugoslavia 0,0 % 60,9 % 0,7 % 21,7 % 11,6 % 5,1 % 0,0 % 0,0 % total 8,8 % 10,3 % 15,6 % 42,4 % 6,7 % 6,9 % 7,7 % 1,7 %

Source: Dauderstädt et al., op. cit., p. 136-7.

knows all the political institutions of an advanced the question of whether or not they felt that democracy, including a range of political parties, they had more influence on the government than but »real« politics is highly informal, non-institu- during communist times.23 It was certainly among tionalised and non-transparent. There is no clear Yeltsin’s worst mistakes to fail to establish division of power among branches of govern- strong political institutions (with the exception ment, and there are no undisputed mechanisms of his »super-presidency«) and stable rules of for resolving conflicts. Political culture is strongly the game.24 Under these conditions, political antagonistic. Political power largely depends on parties could only be of secondary import-ance. personal relations. It can be easily won and lost. They remained weak and unpopular (with the Vital organisations within the government bureau- partial exception of the Communist Party) and cracy are above any democratic control. The natio- nal security council, the presidential staff (which comprises thousands of employees) and security apparatus (an elite military force) are responsible 23. Stephen White, Russia’s New Politics. The Manage- ment of a Postcommunist Society. Cambridge 2000, to the president only. Characteristically, almost p. 271. half of the respondents answered negatively to 24. Shevtsova, op. cit., p. 3.

372 Michael Dauderstädt/André W. M. Gerrits, Democratisation After Communism: Progress, Problems, Promotion IPG 4/2000 poor countervailing forces – if not mere extensions more about identity and the general direction of the executive (like the presidential party of development. These are the cleavages between Edinstvo). regions and ethnic groups, between traditiona- The link between parties, their programmes lists and modernisers, between libertarians and and values on the one hand and the societal inte- authoritarians, between nationalists and cosmopo- rests they ideally have to articulate and represent litans. on the other, is generally weak. One reason for this Few parties represent simply one side of a is that the interest structure in the society has been cleavage. Identity-based parties have to develop volatile and rapidly changing with the changing political positions towards the central questions of economy. The transition was transforming a dual- transformation. Socialist or social-democratic par- istic society of a small, politically powerful ties must also define themselves with regard to »nomenklatura« and an almost unstratified popu- identity-related questions like the basic foreign lation into a pluralistic society with many different policy orientation of the country (e. g. joining EU social groups and with different interests separated or NATO). Eventually, parties compete not only from each other by a multitude of cleavages. through the programmatic articulation of socie- Under communism, the cleavage structure25 tal cleavages but also by presenting charismatic posed communists against anti-communists. Its leaders or competencies such as good macro-eco- political expression is the broad citizens movement nomic management or by distributing benefits to (e. g. Solidarnosc or Civic Forum) which intends their clients (patronage). and succeeds to change the regime. Unsurpris- To some extent, parties are the product of ingly, these movements disintegrated rapidly after their political cultures. Popular attitudes towards their primary goal was achieved. The cleavage con- authority differ as do styles of conflict resolution. tinued to exist afterwards although its importance Electoral laws and state structures (the relative has been decreasing. Typical remaining con- weight of branches of government, i. e. legislative, flicts are problems like »« (should former executive and judiciary) determine to a large high communist officials be allowed to hold office extent the nature of party competition.26 Pro- in the new democracies?), compensation for the grammatic competition is more important in victims of communism (restitution of expropriated developed parliamentary systems while charismatic assets) or punishment of former communists. or clientelistic competition prevails in less advan- Conservative parties also use anticommunist feel- ced countries with presidential systems. ings to fight the successor parties of the com- A well functioning democracy needs (or is sig- munist parties even when they have reformed nificantly strengthened by) a vibrant civil society themselves. that links the population to the polity, comple- The transition itself has produced the cleavage menting the party organisations in articulating and between the winners and the losers of econo- formulating societal interests and values as well as mic transformation, in particular of privatisation. in designing policies and introducing them to the Whereas the actual or potential losers want more public debate.27 As most parties want to get as political protection of their social status, and thus broad a popular support as possible they are often opt for a more interventionist economic and social forced to incorporate conflicting interests, thus policy, the winners embrace the new open market watering them down. In turn, social organisations economy. This cleavage will eventually transform and movements can focus on single issues and par- itself into, or partially coincide with, the well- ticular interests. For instance, trade unions will re- known capitalist cleavage between capital and present workers and their interest in employ-ment, labour, although some entrepreneurs, notably in high wages and social security. While they deal pri- declining industries, will be less pro-market than others in expanding modern industries, where even workers might support a pro-market 25. As elaborated in Dauderstädt et all, op. cit., p. 58 ff. approach. While these cleavages confront basic and Kitschelt et al., op. cit., pp. 64–69. 26. See Kitschelt et al., op. cit., pp. 43–93. economic and social interests about the distribu- 27. For a more complete list of functions see Diamond, tion of wealth and income, other cleavages are op cit., pp. 218–260.

IPG 4/2000 Michael Dauderstädt/André W. M. Gerrits, Democratisation After Communism: Progress, Problems, Promotion 373 marily with employers, negotiating wages and has yet to be established. In both cases, this is working conditions, they will also lobby different foremost a task for the democratically minded branches of government and political parties. In so people in the respective countries. Short of a pro- far as they are close to certain parties (often social- longed occupation, there is hardly a way to force democratic ones), they will strengthen this party in democratisation upon a country. However, there is its competition with other parties which, in turn, meaningful scope for support from abroad. might get support from other social organisations From the point of view of western Europe, the such as employers’ associations or chambers of differentiation between the more and the less de- commerce. mocratic countries in Central and Eastern In Central and Eastern Europe, the develop- Europe has acquired a new structure since 1998. ment of the civil society, the prerequisite of an ad- The group of most developed and democratic vanced »Rechtsstaat«, is as unequal as that of de- countries coincides with the group of those coun- mocracy itself. Even though non-governmental or- tries that are associated with the EU and started ganisations have sprung up in many countries, negotiations for accession in 1998. The next group they are far more numerous in the more developed of associated countries which only started negotia- democracies of Central Europe than elsewhere, tions in 2000 is economically and politically less notably Russia. In general though the situation has advanced. Both groups fulfil the Copenhagen cri- improved. Religious institutions have become im- teria which encompass the economic and political portant again, after having been suppressed by conditions of successful democratisation. Further communism. In Poland, in particular, the Catholic reforms are overwhelmingly orientated towards church played a major role in the opposition meeting EU standards and requirements with against the communist regime, and it is still a ma- little bearing on the issue of democracy. The jor conservative political force. In most countries, remaining countries of South Eastern Europe churches tend to support or to be used by conser- (Croatia, Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia and possibly vative and national(ist) forces, religion itself being later Yugoslavia, i. e. Serbia, Montenegro, and a constituent element of national-ethnic identity. Kosovo) are supposed to benefit from the Stability Trade unions, which under communism have been Pact and stability and association agreements with the transmission belts between the party and the the EU. They do not fulfil all of the Copenhagen working class, are turning into independent, de- criteria, although some of them are members of mocratic organisations of the labour force. While the Council of Europe, what usually passes as the reformed old unions tend to support the refor- an international seal of approval for democratic med successor parties, there are new unions in se- achievements. The CIS republics constitute the veral countries that are linked to more liberal or fourth group albeit again with substantial differ- conservative political parties. However, employers’ ences. While Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Mol- organisations that would be »natural« allies of eco- dova are members of the Council of Europe, too, nomic (and, possibly, political) are still the others have not even surmounted this rela- underdeveloped and weak in most countries. tively low threshold. The desire to be part of »Europe«, translated into the application for membership of the Euro- Promoting Democracy pean Union or of the Council of Europe, has been a major force supporting democratic and econo- In view of our diagnosis of post-communist de- mic reforms in domestic politics. Reformers tend mocracy, there can not be a single strategy of to present themselves and get support as those strengthening and promoting democracy through- accepted by European institutions and, thus, able out the region of Central and Eastern Europe. to open the door to Europe, while less democratic While the task in the more advanced countries of politicians (such as Vladimir Meciar in Slovakia or Central Europe will basically consist of supporting Franjo Tudjman in Croatia) appear(ed) as stumb- an existent democracy and strengthening it against ling blocs on the way to Europe. Whereas the EU potential risks which we will discuss below, in most insists on completed democratic reforms before even of the remaining countries, a working democracy starting negotiations for accession, the Council of

374 Michael Dauderstädt/André W. M. Gerrits, Democratisation After Communism: Progress, Problems, Promotion IPG 4/2000 Europe has accepted dubious regimes as members ment might increase the overall welfare of the new in the hope of further democratisation. That atti- member countries, that might give little consola- tude has paid off in Croatia but less so in Russia. tion to the overall losers in the whole process. The Strengthening the already vibrant democracies economic risks of EU membership, potentially in the applicant countries requires alternative mea- compounded with fears about sovereignty and sures to promoting the democratisation of identity, have already reduced the popular approval defective democracies and authoritarian regimes. of accession dramatically since 1996 and not only However, one common starting point is the eco- among Polish peasants. They might lead to a nomy. As Larry Diamond puts it: »Poverty in itself wider discontent affecting democracy and Euro- does not preclude democratic development, but it pean orientation in general. does significantly shorten the average life expec- A similar risk threatens democracy on a wider tancy of a democracy, especially in the absence of scale. For most countries and governments in Cen- sustained economic growth.«28 The Czech case tral and Eastern Europe, there seems to be no illustrates that relationship particularly well as choice of policy, in particular social and economic this country is one of the most prosperous and policy or the general direction of development. developed countries of the region and was most Even when the social results of the adopted poli- enthusiastic about transformation at the beginning cies, such as liberalisation or economic stabilisa- in 1990. But the Czech Republic experienced a tion, are, at least in the short run, damaging to continuous decline in the approval of the market large segments of the society, there appears to be economy even between 1993 and 1996 when the no viable alternative to free market reforms. The economy was growing albeit accompanied by constraints to economic policy are particularly increasing inequality. Although there are no com- strict for highly indebted countries that depend parable data for the following years, the crisis con- on the approval of financial markets and institu- tinued, in both economic and political terms. Sub- tions. For those voters who elected a party in order sequently, the already marginalised and unre- to get a new government which would enact formed communist party experienced a revival different policies, it is particularly frustrating if in the opinion polls and temporarily became the the old policies continue. In some cases they second strongest party challenging both big par- will vote in the next elections for less democratic, ties of the centre. General evidence, as well as that more extremist or populist parties promising »real specific example, show the importance of « although the result might well be the and economic development for the continued legi- same or even worse when capital flight ruins the timacy of democracy. This is particularly so for already weak economy. Actually, populist parties of a young democracy where any failure is easily the right have successfully started to appeal to the blamed on the system rather than on specific losers of transition by using a mix of socialist and actors. nationalist rhetoric. Successfully promoting growth and prosperity The prospect and the requirements of EU is probably the single most promising way to membership also affect the very structure of promote democracy even though it possibly con- governance in the applicant countries. The Euro- stitutes a rather long-term approach which is pean Commission not only watches carefully over additionally burdened by the lack of proven stra- the translation of the »acquis communautaire« tegies to achieve rapid growth. In the case of the into national law (already an often difficult pro- relatively better-off applicant countries the process cess) but also over the establishment of appro- of EU accession has to be shaped in a way that priate administrative and judicial structures that takes into account the specific needs of the appli- can implement the law and guarantee its rule to cant economies. Accession will increase the adjust- those (including citizens, companies and govern- ment pressures on them and possibly entail severe ments of other member states) who rely on the distributive effects at the expense of those social groups that already suffered most from the transi- tion process. Although EU transfer payments, safer market access and more foreign direct invest- 28. Idem, p. 262.

IPG 4/2000 Michael Dauderstädt/André W. M. Gerrits, Democratisation After Communism: Progress, Problems, Promotion 375 authorities and the courts to get their right under bad government, corruption and scandals can the common rules. Furthermore, the national im- undermine the legitimacy of democratic regimes. plementation of EU policies such as the Common Inducing democratic governments to make a good Agricultural Policy or the regional policy requires job of governing, to prevent corruption, to solve often substantial administrative reforms including conflicts within the government or the ruling a new regional division of the country. coalition, and to deal with the opposition in a civil For those countries which are not going to manner can contribute to establishing a political become members in the near future, the EU is culture that stabilises and supports a democratic nonetheless their most important trading partner regime. In the grassroots of society, the population and investor. However, present EU policies seem also has to be educated and guided to accept non- often more concerned with the narrow short- violent conflict resolution, to develop trust in de- term economic interests of the EU than with the mocratic institutions and to actively co-operate development and sustained growth of the neigh- with them. International co-operation and dialo- bouring countries.29 After enlargement, in parti- gue that integrates the elite and organisations into cular, the economic situation of the non-joining international networks (e. g. national trade unions countries might become even more precarious in European or international federations), where due to the re-orientation of trade and investment that kind of practice is the norm, will strengthen flows towards the new member states, partly at the similar behaviour in the domestic context. expense of the other countries of the region. The legitimacy of democratic governments The support for economic growth might be results originally from the fact that they are elected considered problematic in the case of authoritarian in free and fair elections and thus, at least ideally, regimes. In the short run, trade and investment represent the interests and values of the majority opportunities will strengthen the position of of the population. Positive outcomes such as eco- governments that do not respect human rights. nomic growth and social justice reinforce that legi- But economically isolating undemocratic coun- timacy. However, crisis, recession and inequality tries is certainly counterproductive in the long tend to undermine the legitimacy, though voters run, and possibly even in the short run, when the in well established democracies will punish incum- populace, rather than the oligarchy, has to bear the bents rather than start opposing the system itself. brunt of sanctions, leading those affected to blame The important task in Central and Eastern Europe foreigners rather than their own government. The is to get that virtuous circle of legitimate govern- best advertising for democracy in these countries ment and rising incomes working. will be the growing prosperity of other demo- cracies, in particular neighbouring ones with a similar point of departure with regard to the level of development. One can but hope that the good example of Poland will convince Belarus and Ukraine of the virtues of democratic government. Promoting prosperity is just one approach to promoting democracy and possibly not the most direct or rapid one. Direct co-operation must focus on those forces in the democratising socie- ties that will strengthen democracy. Prime tar- get groups are democratic parties, civic organisa- tions, social organisations such as trade unions or employers organisations, education and research institutions, free media etc.. In the case of already democratic countries, the governments themselves can be the subject of assistance. Improving their legitimacy will possibly strengthen democracy itself. Even under favourable economic conditions,

376 Michael Dauderstädt/André W. M. Gerrits, Democratisation After Communism: Progress, Problems, Promotion IPG 4/2000