Myth-Making and Sectarian Secularists in the Middle East
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Identification of the Non-Professional Territorial Armed Formations on the MENA Region
Securitologia No 1/2016 Maciej Paszyn National Defence University, Warsaw, Poland Identification of the non-professional territorial armed formations on the MENA Region Abstract Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is characterized by a high incidence of local intrastate or international armed conflicts. In the vast majority of cases, in these operations are involved the non-professional territorial armed forces. These are military organizations composed of volunteers living various local communities. This article shows the role and significance of these formations on the example of the civil war in Syria. Keywords: armed conflict, MENA region, territorial defence, Syrian Civil War, Free Syrian Army, Peoples Protection Units DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0009.3835 ISSN: 1898-4509 ISSN: 2449-7436 online pdf E-mail contact to the Author: [email protected] 121 Maciej Paszyn Introduction Starting from the beginning of the mass anti-government protests called “The Arab Spring”1, 17 December 2010, in the Middle East and North Africa hereinafter referred to as the MENA, observed a significant number of armed conflicts. General character- istics of the listed conflicts defines them in the vast majority, as Non-international, anti- government military operations characterized in certain cases, as the substrate religious and activities of the international organization of Sunni-called “Islamic state” (IS)2. Described conflicts have been observed in areas such countries as Iraq, Yemen, Leb- anon, Libya and Syria. It should be noted that these are unfinished conflicts with highly dynamic events, which making it difficult to conduct research and will outdated infor- mation in certain cases. -
The Rojava Revolution
The Rojava Revolution By Aram Shabanian Over five years ago an uprising in Dara’a, Southern Syria, set into motion the events that would eventually culminate in the multifront Syrian Civil War we see today. Throughout the conflict one group in particular has stuck to its principles of selfdefense, gender equality, democratic leadership and environmental protectionism. This group, the Kurds of Northern Syria (Henceforth Rojava), have taken advantage of the chaos in their country to push for more autonomy and, just perhaps, an independent state. The purpose of this paper is to convince the reader that increased support of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) would be beneficial to regional and international goals and thus should be initiated immediately. Throughout this paper there will be sources linking to YouTube videos; use this to “watch” the Rojava Revolution from beginning to end for yourself. In the midst of the horror that is the Syrian Civil War there is a single shining glimmer of hope; Rojava, currently engaged in a war for survival and independence whilst simultaneously engaging in a political experiment the likes of which has never been seen before. The Kurds are the secondlargest ethnic group in the middle east today, spanning four countries (Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey) but lacking a home state of their own. Sometimes called the ultimate losers in the SykesPicot agreement, the Kurds have fought for a homeland of their own ever since said agreement was signed in 1916. The Kurds in all of the aforementioned nations are engaged in some degree of insurrection or another. -
The PYD's Separatist Project
The PYD’s Separatist Project in the Syrian Euphrates Region Abdullah Al-Najjar Political research Hermon Center for Contemporary Studies is a non-profit organization, focused mainly on producing studies and research on the Syrian situation, implementing and managing projects, activities and initiatives to rebuild Syria on the foundations of democracy, freedom, social justice, human rights, human dignity and equal citizenship values. For Contacts: e-mail: [email protected] Harmoon Center For Contemporary Studies The PYD’s Separatist Project in the Syrian Euphrates Region January 2020 Abdullah Al-Najjar Authors This study was conducted by Abdullah Al-Najjar, with the help of former col- leagues and acquaintances who assisted him in collecting and verifying the infor- mation. Three of them had submitted three background papers: two on education, and one on the oil issue. In light of the positions of these individuals where they live, we will not be disclosing their names, but would like to thank them very much. Abdullah Al-Najjar is a former officer at the Political Security Directorate, with a degree in law. He worked in Hasakeh Province for 12 years, including nine and a half years in Qamishli district, as an assistant and head of the Qamishli police station, and head of the Amuda police station. He defected from the Political Se- curity Directorate in 2012 with the rank of major. He currently works in the field of studies and research related to east of the Euphrates, and on issues related to security and the military. Harmoon Center For Contemporary -
Syria the Security Implications of the Turkish Offensive in North-Eastern Syria
Asia-Pacific Foundation International Policy Assessment Group Telephone: +44 (0) 20-7520 9365 e-mail: [email protected] 15 October, 2019 Sajjan M. Gohel, International Security Director M.J. Gohel, Executive Director APF Analysis – Syria The Security Implications of the Turkish Offensive in North-Eastern Syria Contents Page (s) Executive Summary 1-2 A Kurdish Syrian History Lesson 3 The Kurds and Syrian Civil War 3-4 The Kurdish Democratic & Gender Equality Construct 4-5 Turkish Operations in Northern Syria 5-6 Executive Summary On 6 October, 2019, during a phone call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, U.S. President Donald Trump agreed to move American troops out of the Kurdish autonomous region of Rojava in north-eastern Syria. This cleared the way for a Turkish military operation. The U.S. presence in Rojava had been seen by Kurds as a buffer between them and Turkey. Within three days, anticipating a backlash from the West, on 9 October, Turkey began a military operation against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Rojava, ironically named ‘Operation Peace Spring’ designed to create their own buffer zone. Erdogan has long claimed that the Syrian Kurdish political grouping the PYD (Democratic Union Party) is influenced by the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) which is a proscribed terrorist organisation. There is no doubt that there are cultural connections with the two entities but the PYD’s ethos has been democratic cohabitation and the ethnic inclusivity of Kurds, Arabs and Christians, where women can veto proposed legislation and fully participate in all institutional positions. The Kurds in Syria are not pursuing outright independence. -
Identification of the Non-Professional Territorial Armed Formations on the MENA Region
Securitologia No 1/2016 Maciej Paszyn National Defence University, Warsaw, Poland Identification of the non-professional territorial armed formations on the MENA Region Abstract Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is characterized by a high incidence of local intrastate or international armed conflicts. In the vast majority of cases, in these operations are involved the non-professional territorial armed forces. These are military organizations composed of volunteers living various local communities. This article shows the role and significance of these formations on the example of the civil war in Syria. Keywords: armed conflict, MENA region, territorial defence, Syrian Civil War, Free Syrian Army, Peoples Protection Units DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0009.3835 ISSN: 1898-4509 ISSN: 2449-7436 online pdf E-mail contact to the Author: [email protected] 121 Maciej Paszyn Introduction Starting from the beginning of the mass anti-government protests called “The Arab Spring”1, 17 December 2010, in the Middle East and North Africa hereinafter referred to as the MENA, observed a significant number of armed conflicts. General character- istics of the listed conflicts defines them in the vast majority, as Non-international, anti- government military operations characterized in certain cases, as the substrate religious and activities of the international organization of Sunni-called “Islamic state” (IS)2. Described conflicts have been observed in areas such countries as Iraq, Yemen, Leb- anon, Libya and Syria. It should be noted that these are unfinished conflicts with highly dynamic events, which making it difficult to conduct research and will outdated infor- mation in certain cases. -
Research Notes
RESEARCH NOTES T he Washington Institute for Near East Policy ■ No. 32 ■ April 2016 Ascent of the PYD and the SDF BARAK BARFI HE SYRIAN WAR, entering its sixth year, continues to convulse the Middle East. The con- flict has spawned the most violent jihadist group in history, become ground zero for the T Sunni-Shiite struggle, and sparked clashes between NATO members and Russia. An inter- national community that has demonstrated a reluctance to solve the intractable conflict may well face more widespread threats if it remains on the sidelines.1 WASHINGTON has been unwilling to dedicate ground The Kurdish expansion threatens to draw Turkey troops to either defeating the Islamic State or toppling into the Syrian cauldron while affording the Islamic the Syrian regime. It has instead limited its involvement State a much-needed breather from its recent string of to carrying out low-risk airstrikes and enlisting local losses. As this paper explores, for Washington to stay allies to fight these two adversaries. But in ceding such focused on the Islamic State, it must directly support roles to smaller indigenous groups, the United States the group’s most effective adversary thus far, the Syrian has allowed other players with different agendas, such Kurds. With the resulting leverage, it can temper the as Iran and Russia, to capture the stage. Kurds’ aspirations for autonomy as well as their anti- When Russia began its Syria air campaign in Octo- Turkish expressions, thus preventing unwelcome Turk- ber 2015, it targeted U.S.-backed rebels fighting the ish activity in the war. -
Afrin: Possible Scenarios
Afrin: Possible Scenarios In April 2017, the Turkish government indicated an escalation of its involvement in Syria through several statements. In addition, the Turkish Armed Forces escalated their military operations by bombing the Kurdish-held towns of Afrin and threatening to take over this area. This occurred after the Turkish Forces launched the military operation of ‘Saif al-Furat’ (Euphrates Sword) along with Free Syrian Army factions on the eastern border of Afrin. The campaign was met with threats from the Self-Administration which controls the area. This escalation could lead to many possible scenarios that have the potential to influence the social peace of the area, which is already fragile because of the current situation in Syria, particularly given the presence of multiple influential forces. This paper attempts to outline some of the possible scenarios that could take place in the future in light of the recent developments at the political and military levels. I. Introduction: Afrin (sometimes also spelled Efrîn) is the name of a town and a district and is one of the Kurdish majority areas in Syria. The district of Afrin was part of the Aleppo governorate. However, Syrian government forces lost control of Afrin in 2012, and the area, later called the Afrin Federal Region, has become one of the three areas controlled by the de facto Kurdish Self-Administration in the north of Syria. The three Kurdish regions in Syria are: o The Jazeera Federal Region including the cantons of Hasakah and Qamishli. o The Euphrates Federal Region including the cantons of Kobani and Tel Abyad. -
Pyd-Ypg Can Acun, Bünyamin Keskin Branch In
REPORT REPORT THE PKK’S BRANCH IN NORTHERN SYRIA THE PKK’S PYD-YPG CAN ACUN, BÜNYAMIN KESKIN BRANCH IN The PYD, conducting activities as the PKK’s Syrian branch, contem- NORTHERN SYRIA plated exploiting the Syrian revolution which broke out in 2011 for its own ends and has since acted together with the Assad regime on the basis of their common interests. The PYD formed a military-wing owing to its military engagement with the regime and the support provided by the PKK. Therefore, the PYD has managed to control the PYD-YPG Kurds who previously sided with the Syrian opposition, has declared self-ruled cantons, and formed a sphere of influence as an “armed-non- PYD-YPG SYRIA: NORTHERN IN BRANCH PKK’S THE state-actor” in the north of Syria. In fact, the PKK has started to imple- ment its self-administration model in the cantons, a model it plans to implement in Turkey as well. The PKK has adopted a policy based on CAN ACUN, BÜNYAMIN KESKIN absolute authority over even dissident Kurds; it offers no alternatives to those who do not support its causes. The PYD has presented itself as a useful actor in the U.S. fight against DAESH by taking advantage of DAESH’s presence in Syria; and has exerted efforts to connect the can- tons under its control. After the Russian involvement in the Syrian civil war, the PYD has taken Machiavellist steps to establish a relationship with Russia similar to the one it enjoys with the United States. To realize its aspirations over the region, the PYD has developed tacti- cal relations with the Assad regime, the USA and Russia, and has been trying hard to capture the regions populated in majority by Arabs and Turkmens in Northern Syria. -
Post-ISIS States by Dr
Background Report VI: 4 September 2017 Post-ISIS States by Dr. Gina Lennox Kurdish Lobby Australia Email: [email protected] PO Box 181, Strathfield, NSW, 2135 Website: www.kurdishlobbyaustralia.com Note: This report must not be changed without permission from Kurdish Lobby Australia but you are welcome to share it. 1 Table of Contents Figures .................................................................................................................................... 3 Acronyms ............................................................................................................................... 3 Overview ................................................................................................................................ 4 The current situation ................................................................................................................. 4 Ways Forward ............................................................................................................................... 7 Iraq ....................................................................................................................................... 10 Overview .......................................................................................................................................10 Mosul Offensive and Nineveh Post-ISIS .............................................................................14 Kirkuk ............................................................................................................................................17 -
How to Stabilise the Middle East and North Africa in the Post- IS / Daesh Era?
Vereniging voor de Verenigde Naties Model United Nations - Flanders, th 12 Edition EEYYEESS OONNLLYY SIMULATION EXERCISE December 2016 How to stabilise the Middle East and North Africa in the post- IS / Daesh era? Prof. dr. David Criekemans 1 Introduction As you are reading this paper, several international coalitions, countries and non-state actors are engaging the so-called ‘Islamic State’ or ‘Daesh’ on many fronts, night and day. There are currently open battle grounds in Libya, Syria and Iraq, a situation not seen since the end of the Second World War. An international coalition under the leadership of the United States has made significant ground in Libya, but the situation is not yet consolidated. The military theatre in Syria is extremely complex. A geopolitical race for competing spheres of influence is manifesting itself, to some degree similar to the race to Berlin in the final days of World War II in the European theatre. Russia and the US find themselves on a collision course, and have criticized each other openly in the UN Security Council. The last couple of weeks, Aleppo has become a symbol of the military pressure by Syrian president Assad and Russian forces to attack civilian targets so as to force Sunni opposition fighters to surrender. 1 Prof. dr. David Criekemans teaches at the University of Antwerp (Belgium), University College Roosevelt (the Netherlands), the Geneva Institute of Geopolitical Studies (Switzerland) & the Blanquerna School of Communication and International Relations, Ramon Lull University, Barcelona (Spain, Catalonia). © 2016 – The Middle East and North Africa in the post-IS/Daesh-period 1 However, both great powers still agree with one another that IS constitutes a common enemy. -
SMA Reach-Back 6 January 2017
27 January 2017 SMA Reach-back 6 January 2017 Question (R2 QL7): What significance will small military groups, particularly in Northern Syria, have in a post-ISIL Levant? How should CENTCOM best shape or influence these groups? Contributors: Mr. Vern Liebl (Marine Corps University); Mr. Faysal Itani (Atlantic Council); Dr. Craig Whiteside (Naval War College) Citation: Reedy, K. (Ed.). (2017). Military Influence in Post-ISIL Levant. Arlington, VA: Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) Reach-back Cell. Retrieved from http://nsiteam.com/sma-reachback-military-influence-in-post-isil-levant/ Executive Summary Dr. Kathleen Reedy, RAND Corporation The primary theme that all of the experts touched upon is that there will be no single unified situation regarding either the military groups or status of northern Syria in a post-ISIL environment. The current fractured nature of the resistance groups in the area will continue, with different sub-regions experiencing different likely outcomes with different actors. Dr. Craig Whiteside (Naval War College) also includes the important caveats that a) post-ISIL means after ISIL loses its ability to control extended territory, as it will likely continue to hold control of villages across Syria and Iraq for some time to come; and b) this question is predicated on continued U.S. strategic interest in engaging in Syria in the near- and medium-term future. A third assumption is that these militant groups continue to operate. If a political solution can ever be reached, some of these militias will likely sign on to the agreement and may disarm or be incorporated into regime security forces, meaning many of them may be removed from consideration. -
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
yrian Democratic Forces (SDF): From the Washington - Moscow agreement S to Animosity with Turkey Introduction Field and Political Background Structure and Formation Ideology, Grassroots Base, and Funding External Relations and Stances Conclusion Dhu Al-qadah - Dhu Al-hijjah, 1437 25 August - September, 2016 © KFCRIS, 2016 ISSN: 1658-6972 Issue No. 25 - 21/09/2016 L.D. No: 1437/2868 Dhu Al-qadah - Dhu Al-hijjah, 1437 - August - September, 2016 his study presents a comprehensive Tportrayal of one of the critical actors in the Syrian arena, and one whose role recently became more prominent: the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF.) It discusses the conditions that led to its formation, its structure, its funding mechanisms and support, its military capabilities, and its grassroots base. The study also presents maps displaying the SDF’s influence and control in Syria, its areas of influence, and its military tactics, which depend primarily on the People’s Protection Forces (YPG). The study also presents prominent international and regional actors’ positions regarding Syria’s Democratic Forces, the relationships it enjoys with actors such as the United States and Turkey, and its level of animosity with Turkey. Dhu Al-qadah - Dhu Al-hijjah, 1437 - August - September, 2016 4 Introduction Field conditions in Syria have become more complex, a development that has had wide-ranging effects for most actors in Syria and beyond, especially the opposition. Geneva’s proposed political solution failed after Russia’s military intervention in Syria. Russia’s military action was under the guise of combating Daesh - which turned out to be a pretext to shell moderate opposition and tip the scales in Syria.