DOCSLIB.ORG

Key Planning Factors and Considerations for Response to and Recovery from a Chemical Incident

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Key Planning Factors and Considerations for Response to and Recovery from a Chemical Incident Key Planning Factors and Considerations For Response to and Recovery from a Chemical Incident August 2021 Key Planning Factors and Considerations for Response to and Recovery from a Chemical Incident This page intentionally left blank This document was prepared by the FEMA Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Office Key Planning Factors and Considerations for Response to and Recovery from a Chemical Incident Table of Contents While you Read ............................................................................................................................ 1 Prologue ....................................................................................................................................... 2 1. What Is A Chemical Incident? .................................................................................................... 2 2. Industrial Accidents — Chemical Supply Industry ..................................................................... 5 2.1. Flooding at a Chemical Plant .......................................................................................... 5 2.2. Chemical Leak into Waterway ........................................................................................ 8 3. Industrial Accidents — Agricultural Industry ........................................................................... 11 3.1. Pesticide Exposure in Farm Workers .......................................................................... 11 3.2. Contaminated School Lunches ................................................................................... 13 4. Transportation Accidents ........................................................................................................ 15 4.1. Rail Tank Car Rupture .................................................................................................. 15 4.2. Train Derailment ........................................................................................................... 17 5. Deliberate Events .................................................................................................................... 19 5.1. Attempted Assassination ............................................................................................. 19 6. What do These Chemical Incidents Have in Common? ......................................................... 21 7. Common Characteristics of Chemical Incidents .................................................................... 22 Key Planning Factors for a Chemical Incident ......................................................................... 25 KPF 1 “Prime the Pump” Pre-Event Planning .......................................................................... 27 1. Why Pre-Event Plan? ............................................................................................................... 27 1.1. Keep in Mind: Natural Hazards Incidents are More Familiar than Chemical Incidents ....................................................................................................................................... 28 2. Identify and Understand the Community’s Chemical Risks and Current Capability Gaps ... 30 2.1. Identify and Create Stakeholder Working Groups ...................................................... 30 2.2. Chemical Risk Assessment .......................................................................................... 32 2.3. Critical Infrastructure ................................................................................................... 35 2.4. Population Considerations ........................................................................................... 38 2.5. Resource Requirements and Sources ........................................................................ 40 This document was prepared by the FEMA Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Office i Key Planning Factors and Considerations for Response to and Recovery from a Chemical Incident 2.6. Treat the Community’s Entire Response System as a System of Systems .............. 41 3. Understand How Time-Sensitive Decisions Are Made in Crisis Situations ........................... 41 3.1. Establish Decision-Making Processes ........................................................................ 42 3.2. Evacuation/Sheltering ................................................................................................. 42 3.3. Decontamination and Population Monitoring/Environmental Remediation ............ 43 3.4. Waste Management ..................................................................................................... 43 3.5. Establish Clearance Goals ........................................................................................... 45 3.6. Establish Protocols and Procedures for the Prioritization of Medical Resources .... 46 4. Develop a “Whole Community” Concept of Operations ......................................................... 47 4.1. Develop Community-Wide and Partner Messaging Strategies .................................. 47 4.2. Develop Operational Plans/CONOPS and Response Support Materials .................. 48 4.3. Develop and Deploy Training, Exercises, and Response Support Materials ............ 49 KPF 2 Recognize and Characterize the Incident ..................................................................... 53 1. Incident Recognition ............................................................................................................... 53 2. Active Environmental and Industrial/Utility Facility Monitoring ............................................ 55 2.1. Chemical Detection Technologies for Active Recognition .......................................... 56 2.2. Workplace Exposure Monitoring .................................................................................. 57 2.3. Active Monitoring of Public Venues ............................................................................. 59 2.4. Active Monitoring for Food Contamination ................................................................. 59 2.5. Active Monitoring for Illicit Compounds ...................................................................... 60 3. Surveillance/Passive Venue and Population Monitoring ...................................................... 60 3.1. Surveillance/Passive Monitoring of Public Venues .................................................... 61 3.2. Human and Veterinary Health Surveillance Systems ................................................ 62 3.3. Surveillance for Food Contamination .......................................................................... 64 3.4. Response Initiation ...................................................................................................... 67 4. Incident Characterization: Substance and Site ..................................................................... 67 4.1. Substance Identification and Characterization .......................................................... 68 4.2. HazMat Teams .............................................................................................................. 70 4.3. Detection of Low-Volatility Agents (LVAs) .................................................................... 71 4.4. Site Assessment/Characterization/Determine the Extent of Contamination .......... 73 This document was prepared by the FEMA Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Office ii Key Planning Factors and Considerations for Response to and Recovery from a Chemical Incident 4.5. Modeling the Release (if applicable) ........................................................................... 76 4.6. Substance Identification in Food Contamination Events ........................................... 78 4.7. Intentional Acts ............................................................................................................. 79 KPF 3 Communicate with External Partners and the Public ................................................... 81 1. Recognize the Importance of Communications ..................................................................... 81 2. Recognize the Importance of Partner Communications: Lessons from Tokyo22,32 ............... 83 3. Communications for a Coordinated Response ...................................................................... 84 3.1. Communicate to Coordinate with Response Partners ............................................... 84 3.2. Locally Executed Response ......................................................................................... 85 3.3. State, Tribal, and Territorial Managed Response ....................................................... 86 3.4. Federally Supported Response ................................................................................... 86 3.5. Leverage Partner Resources to Provide Informed Public Guidance ......................... 87 3.6. Private Sector Engagement ......................................................................................... 89 3.7. Coordinate with Response Partners to Communicate with the Public ..................... 90 3.8. Co-Activation of a Joint Information Center and Emergency Support Functions (ESFs)34,35,37 .................................................................................................................. 91 3.9. Emergency Support Function #15 – External Affairs Annex43 .................................. 92 4. Communications for an Informed Public...............................................................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Report of the Advisory Group to Recommend Priorities for the IARC Monographs During 2020–2024
    IARC Monographs on the Identification of Carcinogenic Hazards to Humans Report of the Advisory Group to Recommend Priorities for the IARC Monographs during 2020–2024 Report of the Advisory Group to Recommend Priorities for the IARC Monographs during 2020–2024 CONTENTS Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1 Acetaldehyde (CAS No. 75-07-0) ................................................................................................. 3 Acrolein (CAS No. 107-02-8) ....................................................................................................... 4 Acrylamide (CAS No. 79-06-1) .................................................................................................... 5 Acrylonitrile (CAS No. 107-13-1) ................................................................................................ 6 Aflatoxins (CAS No. 1402-68-2) .................................................................................................. 8 Air pollutants and underlying mechanisms for breast cancer ....................................................... 9 Airborne gram-negative bacterial endotoxins ............................................................................. 10 Alachlor (chloroacetanilide herbicide) (CAS No. 15972-60-8) .................................................. 10 Aluminium (CAS No. 7429-90-5) .............................................................................................. 11
    [Show full text]
  • Novichok Agent - Wikipedia
    18-3-2018 Novichok agent - Wikipedia Novichok agent Novichok (Russian: Новичо́к, "newcomer") is a series of nerve agents the Soviet Union and Russia developed between 1971 and 1993.[a][2][3] Russian scientists who developed the agents claim they are the deadliest nerve agents ever made, with some variants possibly five to eight times more potent than VX,[4][5] and others up to ten times more potent than soman.[6] They were designed as part of a Soviet program codenamed "FOLIANT".[7][1] Five Novichok variants are believed to have been weaponised for military use.[8] The most versatile was A-232 (Novichok-5).[9] Novichok agents have never been used on the battlefield. Theresa May, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, said that one such agent was used in the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in England in March 2018.[10] Russia officially denies producing or researching Novichok agents.[11] In 2013, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Scientific Advisory Board reported that it had insufficient information to comment on the existence or properties of Novichok agents,[12] and in 2011 it noted there was no peer reviewed paper on Novichok agents in scientific literature.[13] Contents Design objectives Disclosure Development and test sites Description of Novichok agents Chemistry Effects Use Poisoning of Kivelidi Poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal See also References Further reading External links Design objectives These agents were designed to achieve four objectives:[14][15] To be undetectable using standard 1970s and 1980s NATO chemical detection equipment; To defeat NATO chemical protective gear; To be safer to handle; To circumvent the Chemical Weapons Convention list of controlled precursors, classes of chemical and physical form.
    [Show full text]
  • Evolution of Ethyl Carbamate During Madeira Wine Ageing by GC-MS a New Methodology MASTER DISSERTATION
    DM Evolution of Ethyl Carbamate During Madeira Wine Ageing by GC-MS A new methodology MASTER DISSERTATION João Micael da Silva Leça MASTER IN APPLIED BIOCHEMISTRY November | 2014 Evolution of Ethyl Carbamate During Madeira Wine Ageing by GC-MS A new methodology MASTER DISSERTATION João Micael da Silva Leça MASTER IN APPLIED BIOCHEMISTRY SUPERVISOR José Carlos Antunes Marques CO-SUPERVISOR Vanda Nulita Gomes Pereira Evolution of ethyl carbamate during Madeira wine ageing by GC-MS: a new methodology AGRADECIMENTOS Quero começar por agradecer à minha família e em especial à minha mãe, Teresa Silva, à minha avó, Teresa Teixeira, ao meu avô, Quirino Teixeira, à minha tia, Ana Teixeira, à minha madrinha, Sandra Nunes, à minha madrinha, Maria Nunes e aos meus primos Ludgero Gomes e Lília Gomes, por todo o amor e apoio que sempre me deram. Um obrigado à Fátima Spínola pelo seu amor. Um especial obrigado por toda a compreensão, pelo apoio e por todos os momentos bons que já partilhamos. Certamente seria uma pessoa muito diferente se nunca nos tivéssemos conhecido. Obrigado por tudo. Um enorme obrigado à Anabela Moura, à Manuela Godinho e ao Dr. António Godinho por toda a dedicação e apoio. O meu agradecimento torna-se difícil de expressar por palavras. E porque a vida não tem valor sem ser partilhada, um grande obrigado aos meus amigos mais próximos: Vítor Correia, Victor Andrade, Catarina Lume, João Mendes, Igor Nunes, Pedro Leme, Marco Franco, João Silva, Nuno Pestana, Válter Mendes, Julie Campbell, Luís Freitas, Igor Afonso, Roberto Aguiar, Marisa Faria, Dina Maciel, Neide Cardoso, Joaquim Lopes, Miguel Nunes, Paulo Silva, Dinarte Jesus, Hugo Câmara, Núria Fernandes, Vânia Silva, Rodolfo Silva e Ricardo Mendonça.
    [Show full text]
  • 2002 NRP Section 6, Tables 6.1 Through
    Table 6.1 Scoring Table for Pesticides 2002 FSIS NRP, Domestic Monitoring Plan } +1 0.05] COMPOUND/COMPOUND CLASS * ) (EPA) (EPA) (EPA) (EPA) (EPA) (FSIS) (FSIS) PSI (P) TOX.(T) L-1 HIST. VIOL. BIOCON. (B) {[( (2*R+P+B)/4]*T} REG. CON. (R) * ENDO. DISRUP. LACK INFO. (L) LACK INFO. {[ Benzimidazole Pesticides in FSIS Benzimidazole MRM (5- 131434312.1 hydroxythiabendazole, benomyl (as carbendazim), thiabendazole) Carbamates in FSIS Carbamate MRM (aldicarb, aldicarb sulfoxide, NA44234416.1 aldicarb sulfone, carbaryl, carbofuran, carbofuran 3-hydroxy) Carbamates NOT in FSIS Carbamate MRM (carbaryl 5,6-dihydroxy, chlorpropham, propham, thiobencarb, 4-chlorobenzylmethylsulfone,4- NT 4 1 3 NV 4 4 13.8 chlorobenzylmethylsulfone sulfoxide) CHC's and COP's in FSIS CHC/COP MRM (HCB, alpha-BHC, lindane, heptachlor, dieldrin, aldrin, endrin, ronnel, linuron, oxychlordane, chlorpyrifos, nonachlor, heptachlor epoxide A, heptachlor epoxide B, endosulfan I, endosulfan I sulfate, endosulfan II, trans- chlordane, cis-chlordane, chlorfenvinphos, p,p'-DDE, p, p'-TDE, o,p'- 3444NV4116.0 DDT, p,p'-DDT, carbophenothion, captan, tetrachlorvinphos [stirofos], kepone, mirex, methoxychlor, phosalone, coumaphos-O, coumaphos-S, toxaphene, famphur, PCB 1242, PCB 1248, PCB 1254, PCB 1260, dicofol*, PBBs*, polybrominated diphenyl ethers*, deltamethrin*) (*identification only) COP's and OP's NOT in FSIS CHC/COP MRM (azinphos-methyl, azinphos-methyl oxon, chlorpyrifos, coumaphos, coumaphos oxon, diazinon, diazinon oxon, diazinon met G-27550, dichlorvos, dimethoate, dimethoate
    [Show full text]
  • The List of Extremely Hazardous Substances)
    APPENDIX A (THE LIST OF EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES) THRESHOLD REPORTABLE INVENTORY RELEASE QUANTITY QUANTITY CAS NUMBER CHEMICAL NAME (POUNDS) (POUNDS) 75-86-5 ACETONE CYANOHYDRIN 500 10 1752-30-3 ACETONE THIOSEMICARBAZIDE 500/500 1,000 107-02-8 ACROLEIN 500 1 79-06-1 ACRYLAMIDE 500/500 5,000 107-13-1 ACRYLONITRILE 500 100 814-68-6 ACRYLYL CHLORIDE 100 100 111-69-3 ADIPONITRILE 500 1,000 116-06-3 ALDICARB 100/500 1 309-00-2 ALDRIN 500/500 1 107-18-6 ALLYL ALCOHOL 500 100 107-11-9 ALLYLAMINE 500 500 20859-73-8 ALUMINUM PHOSPHIDE 500 100 54-62-6 AMINOPTERIN 500/500 500 78-53-5 AMITON 500 500 3734-97-2 AMITON OXALATE 100/500 100 7664-41-7 AMMONIA 500 100 300-62-9 AMPHETAMINE 500 1,000 62-53-3 ANILINE 500 5,000 88-05-1 ANILINE,2,4,6-TRIMETHYL- 500 500 7783-70-2 ANTIMONY PENTAFLUORIDE 500 500 1397-94-0 ANTIMYCIN A 500/500 1,000 86-88-4 ANTU 500/500 100 1303-28-2 ARSENIC PENTOXIDE 100/500 1 THRESHOLD REPORTABLE INVENTORY RELEASE QUANTITY QUANTITY CAS NUMBER CHEMICAL NAME (POUNDS) (POUNDS) 1327-53-3 ARSENOUS OXIDE 100/500 1 7784-34-1 ARSENOUS TRICHLORIDE 500 1 7784-42-1 ARSINE 100 100 2642-71-9 AZINPHOS-ETHYL 100/500 100 86-50-0 AZINPHOS-METHYL 10/500 1 98-87-3 BENZAL CHLORIDE 500 5,000 98-16-8 BENZENAMINE, 3-(TRIFLUOROMETHYL)- 500 500 100-14-1 BENZENE, 1-(CHLOROMETHYL)-4-NITRO- 500/500 500 98-05-5 BENZENEARSONIC ACID 10/500 10 3615-21-2 BENZIMIDAZOLE, 4,5-DICHLORO-2-(TRI- 500/500 500 FLUOROMETHYL)- 98-07-7 BENZOTRICHLORIDE 100 10 100-44-7 BENZYL CHLORIDE 500 100 140-29-4 BENZYL CYANIDE 500 500 15271-41-7 BICYCLO[2.2.1]HEPTANE-2-CARBONITRILE,5-
    [Show full text]
  • Malathion Human Health and Ecological Risk Assessment Final Report
    SERA TR-052-02-02c Malathion Human Health and Ecological Risk Assessment Final Report Submitted to: Paul Mistretta, COR USDA/Forest Service, Southern Region 1720 Peachtree RD, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30309 USDA Forest Service Contract: AG-3187-C-06-0010 USDA Forest Order Number: AG-43ZP-D-06-0012 SERA Internal Task No. 52-02 Submitted by: Patrick R. Durkin Syracuse Environmental Research Associates, Inc. 5100 Highbridge St., 42C Fayetteville, New York 13066-0950 Fax: (315) 637-0445 E-Mail: [email protected] Home Page: www.sera-inc.com May 12, 2008 Table of Contents Table of Contents............................................................................................................................ ii List of Figures................................................................................................................................. v List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. vi List of Appendices ......................................................................................................................... vi List of Attachments........................................................................................................................ vi ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND SYMBOLS ............................................................... vii COMMON UNIT CONVERSIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS.................................................... x CONVERSION OF SCIENTIFIC NOTATION ..........................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • A Theoretical Study of the Hydrolysis Mechanism of A-234; the Suspected Novichok Agent in the Skripal Cite This: RSC Adv., 2020, 10, 27884 Attack†
    RSC Advances View Article Online PAPER View Journal | View Issue A theoretical study of the hydrolysis mechanism of A-234; the suspected novichok agent in the Skripal Cite this: RSC Adv., 2020, 10, 27884 attack† a a b b Yadhav A. Imrit, Hanusha Bhakhoa, Tetiana Sergeieva, Sergi Danes,´ Nandini Savoo, a Mohamed I. Elzagheid, c Lydia Rhyman, ad Diego M. Andrada b and Ponnadurai Ramasami *ad A-234, [EtO–P(]O)(F)–N]C(Me)–N(Et)2], is the suspected A-type nerve agent used in the Skripal attack on the 4th of March 2018. Studies related to the structure and reactivity of this compound are limited. We, therefore, aimed at understanding the underlying hydrolysis mechanism of A-234 within the DFT framework. The attack of the water molecule can occur at the phosphinate and acetoamidine reactive centres. Our theoretical findings indicate that the hydrolysis at the acetoamidine centre is thermodynamically favoured compared to the hydrolysis at the phosphinate centre. The hydrolysis at the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported Licence. acetoamidine moiety may proceed via two pathways, depending on the nitrogen atom participating in Received 9th June 2020 the hydrolysis. The main pathway consists of four distinct channels to reach the final product, with the Accepted 17th July 2020 concerted 1,3-proton shift favoured kinetically and thermodynamically in the gas phase and water as DOI: 10.1039/d0ra05086e solvent. The results are in good agreement with the literature, although some differences in the reaction rsc.li/rsc-advances mechanism were observed. 1 Introduction including A-234 (Scheme 1, structure B).
    [Show full text]
  • Daily Comment
    Daily Comment By Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA Looking for something to read? See our Reading List; these books, separated by category, are ones we find interesting and insightful. We will be adding to the list over time. [Posted: September 3, 2020—9:30 AM EDT] Global equity markets are generally lower this morning. The EuroStoxx 50 is up 1.5% from its last close. In Asia, the MSCI Asia Apex 50 closed down 0.2% from the prior close. Chinese markets were lower, with the Shanghai Composite down 0.6%, and the Shenzhen Composite up 0.8%. U.S. equity index futures are signaling a lower open. We have a new report available, the Q3 2020 Asset Allocation Quarterly Rebalance Chart Book. Every quarter, the Asset Allocation Committee reviews and makes adjustments to our Asset Allocation portfolios, which we detail in the Asset Allocation Quarterly. As a supplement to that report, this video chart book reviews our asset allocation process, details the changes to the portfolios, and offers a deep dive into the macro environment that underlies our portfolio decisions. The macro presentation is a discussion of the economy and the political and geopolitical environment. Going forward, we plan to make this chart book available in the weeks following the quarterly rebalance date for the Asset Allocation portfolios. Perhaps the biggest news this morning is that equity markets are set to open lower. Equities have continued to rally in an orderly fashion, with the major indices setting new record highs. Stocks have been lifted by improving earnings, low interest rates, moderate inflation and expectations of accommodative policy.
    [Show full text]
  • Doubts About Novichok
    Doubts About Novichok By Professor Paul Mckeigue, Professor Piers Robinson, and Region: Europe, Russia and FSU Jake Mason Theme: Intelligence, Media Disinformation Global Research, April 05, 2018 In-depth Report: FAKE INTELLIGENCE Introduction In view of the seriousness of the rapidly worsening relations between the West and Russia, and the quickly evolving military events in the Middle East, especially Syria, we have taken the step to publish relevant evidence-based analysis with respect to the Skripal incident of 4 March 2018. This update to our earlier briefing note covers new material that has become available. We welcome comments and corrections which can be sent to Piers Robinson or provided on this site. Summary Official statements from the UK government claim that the “military grade nerve agent” detected in Salisbury was “part of a group of nerve agents known as Novichok” that the Russian chemist Vil Mirzayanov alleged had been developed in the Soviet Union in a secret programme. The structures of these compounds, labelled A-230, A-232, A-234, A-242 and A-262, were published by Mirzayanov in a book in 2008, twelve years after he emigrated to the US. Other than Mirzayanov’s story, there is no evidence that these compounds were ever synthesized in either the Soviet Union or Russia, or that the “Novichok” programme ever existed. The use of the term “Novichoks” to describe this A-230 series of compounds, which are real chemical structures, is therefore tendentious. An account by another Russian chemist Vladimir Uglev, often cited as corroboration of Mirzayanov’s story, appears on close examination to be about the development of a class of nerve agents denoted GV which have been studied in several countries including Czechoslovakia and the US.
    [Show full text]
  • THE PESTICIDES and TOXIC CHEMICALS ACT, 2008 No. 12 Of
    ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA THE PESTICIDES AND TOXIC CHEMICALS ACT, 2008 No. 12 of 2008 [ Printed in the Official Gazette Vol. XXIX No. 10 dated 12th February , 2009. ] ________ Printed at the Government Printing Office, Antigua and Barbuda, by Eric T. Bennett, Government Printer — By Authority, 2009. 800—2.09 [ Price$11.70 ] The Pesticides and Toxic Chemicals Act, 2008. No. 12 of 2008 No. 12 of 2008 The Pesticides and Toxic Chemicals Act, 2008. THE PESTICIDES AND TOXIC CHEMICALS ACT, 2008 ARRANGEMENT Sections 1. Short title and commencement. 2. Interpretation. 3. Establishment and constitution of the Board. 4. Functions and duties of the Board. 5. Registrar of Pesticides and Toxic Chemicals. 6. Licence to exterminate. 7. Analysts, inspectors, medical examiners and others. 8. Controlled product. 9. Offences in regard to prohibited substance or product. 10. Regulation of prohibited substance or product. 11. Powers of inspectors. 12. Analysis. 13. Medical examiners. 14. Detention and forfeiture of articles seized. 15. Regulations. 16. Offences by corporations. 17. Evidence and sufficiency of proof. 18. Record keeping and reporting. 19. Confidentiality. 20. Notice of non-compliance. 21. Right of appeal. 22. Penalties. 23. Immunity. 24. Indemnity. 25. Application to the State. 26. Repeal. The Pesticides and Toxic Chemicals Act, 2008. No. 12 of 2008 Schedules Schedule 1 – Constitution of the Pesticides and Toxic Chemicals Control Board Schedule 2 – Controlled products Schedule 3 – Prohibited Products No. 12 of 2008 The Pesticides and Toxic Chemicals Act, 2008. [L.S.] I Assent, Louise Lake-Tack, Governor-General. 31st December, 2008 ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA THE PESTICIDES AND TOXIC CHEMICALS ACT, 2008 No.
    [Show full text]
  • Ethyl Carbamate Formation in Sub-Optimal Wine Storage Conditions and Influence of the Yeast Starter
    03-larcher_05b-tomazic 26/03/13 18:21 Page65 ETHYL CARBAMATE FORMATION IN SUB-OPTIMAL WINE STORAGE CONDITIONS AND INFLUENCE OF THE YEAST STARTER Roberto LARCHER, Sergio MOSER, Ainhoa Usua MENOLLI, Loris TONIDANDEL and Giorgio NICOLINI* Unità Chimica Vitienologica e Agroalimentare, Centro Trasferimento Tecnologico - Fond. Edmund Mach, Via E. Mach 1, 38 010 San Michele all’Adige (TN), Italy Abstract Résumé Aim : To evaluate the potential risk of ethyl carbamate (EC) Objectif : Évaluer le risque potentiel de formation de carbamate formation in wine by studying its production kinetics at sub- d'éthyle (CE) dans le vin par l'étude de la cinétique de production à optimal storage temperatures. des températures de stockage sous-optimales. Methods and results : The kinetics of EC formation was Méthodes et résultats : La cinétique de formation de CE a été investigated in 60 white wines obtained from 6 varietal juices étudiée chez 60 vins blancs issus de six moûts variétaux fermentés fermented with 10 yeast strains. The wines were analysed for their avec 10 souches de levure. Les vins ont été analysés pour leur urea content at bottling, then EC formation was monitored during teneur en urée à la mise en bouteilles, puis la formation de CE a été in-bottle storage at < 12 °C for 150 days followed by 152 days at contrôlée au cours du stockage en bouteilles à < 12 °C pendant 40 °C. Storage at < 12 °C had no effect on EC formation, 150 jours, suivis par 152 jours à 40 °C. Le stockage à < 12 °C n'a regardless of initial urea content ; however, at 40 °C we found a eu aucun effet sur la formation de CE, quelle que soit la teneur en positive correlation between initial urea content and final EC urée initiale.
    [Show full text]
  • List of Extremely Hazardous Substances
    Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Facility Reporting Compliance Manual List of Extremely Hazardous Substances Threshold Threshold Quantity (TQ) Reportable Planning (pounds) Quantity Quantity (Industry Use (pounds) (pounds) CAS # Chemical Name Only) (Spill/Release) (LEPC Use Only) 75-86-5 Acetone Cyanohydrin 500 10 1,000 1752-30-3 Acetone Thiosemicarbazide 500/500 1,000 1,000/10,000 107-02-8 Acrolein 500 1 500 79-06-1 Acrylamide 500/500 5,000 1,000/10,000 107-13-1 Acrylonitrile 500 100 10,000 814-68-6 Acrylyl Chloride 100 100 100 111-69-3 Adiponitrile 500 1,000 1,000 116-06-3 Aldicarb 100/500 1 100/10,000 309-00-2 Aldrin 500/500 1 500/10,000 107-18-6 Allyl Alcohol 500 100 1,000 107-11-9 Allylamine 500 500 500 20859-73-8 Aluminum Phosphide 500 100 500 54-62-6 Aminopterin 500/500 500 500/10,000 78-53-5 Amiton 500 500 500 3734-97-2 Amiton Oxalate 100/500 100 100/10,000 7664-41-7 Ammonia 500 100 500 300-62-9 Amphetamine 500 1,000 1,000 62-53-3 Aniline 500 5,000 1,000 88-05-1 Aniline, 2,4,6-trimethyl- 500 500 500 7783-70-2 Antimony pentafluoride 500 500 500 1397-94-0 Antimycin A 500/500 1,000 1,000/10,000 86-88-4 ANTU 500/500 100 500/10,000 1303-28-2 Arsenic pentoxide 100/500 1 100/10,000 1327-53-3 Arsenous oxide 100/500 1 100/10,000 7784-34-1 Arsenous trichloride 500 1 500 7784-42-1 Arsine 100 100 100 2642-71-9 Azinphos-Ethyl 100/500 100 100/10,000 86-50-0 Azinphos-Methyl 10/500 1 10/10,000 98-87-3 Benzal Chloride 500 5,000 500 98-16-8 Benzenamine, 3-(trifluoromethyl)- 500 500 500 100-14-1 Benzene, 1-(chloromethyl)-4-nitro- 500/500
    [Show full text]