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The Salvadoran Crucible: American Counterinsurgency in El Salvador, 1979-1992

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The Salvadoran Crucible: American Counterinsurgency in El Salvador, 1979-1992 © Copyright By Brian D’Haeseleer 2015 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii THE SALVADORAN CRUCIBLE: AMERICAN COUNTERINSURGENCY IN EL SALVADOR, 1979-1992 By Brian D’Haeseleer ABSTRACT Between 1979 and 1992 the United States engaged in its largest counterinsurgency (COIN) and nation-building exercise since the debacle in South Vietnam. For over twelve years, Washington attempted to establish a moderate government in El Salvador and defeat an insurgency by providing American military aid and training, holding elections, initiating development projects, and carrying out socioeconomic reforms. While the U.S. prevented its Salvadoran ally from economic and political collapse, Washington’s efforts did not lead to the resolution of the conflict. Arguably, it prolonged the bloodshed and failed address the grievances that fueled the violence. The inability to address the latter continues to plague El Salvador more than two decades after the end of hostilities. Yet, American military strategists and writers hold up the U.S. effort in El Salvador as a successful application of counterinsurgency. Washington’s undertaking in this country has also informed its more recent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, a close examination of the U.S. intervention in El Salvador is required to assess the success narrative and whether it offers instructive lessons for future contingencies. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I, like many other writers, have received countless help over the years from family and friends. First, without my parents, none of this would have ever been possible. While they may have preferred for me to finish my degree earlier or pursued an entirely different field, they remained steadfast in their support since I first began my graduate studies. My dissertation committee advisor also provided me with excellent criticism and feedback, which greatly enhanced my work. I could not have asked for a better advisor and chair. Various departments and organizations at American University, including the Center for Latino and Latin American Studies, the History Department, and the College of Arts and Sciences provided me with timely funding to ensure that I could continue working on my dissertation. My colleagues and friends, including Josh Jones, Boris Chernaev, and Ben Bennett read and commented on various drafts. Some were even generous enough to read my revisions more than once. And lastly, my wife Claire, provided me with the encouragement and hope that all writers need to finish a lengthy project. Without their valuable help, the finished product would have been infinitely more difficult. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ……………………………………….……..1 CHAPTER ONE: HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS ….………32 CHAPTER TWO: THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY IN EL SALVADOR AND LATIN AMERICA, CA. 1961-1979…………………………………...95 CHAPTER THREE: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATON ENTERS THE MAELSTROM, 1981-1984……………………………………157 CHAPTER FOUR: CHASING VICTORY, 1984-1988……….232 CHAPTER FIVE: TERMINATING THE BLOODLETTING, 1989- 1992……………………………………………........301 CODA…………………………………………….…362 BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………….377 1 INTRODUCTION In 1971, Donald Rumsfeld, a rising member of the Republican party, sought counsel from his boss and mentor President Richard Nixon. They discussed a variety of topics, including Rumsfeld’s future job prospects, foreign policy, and even political philosophy. During the meeting, Nixon explained Latin America’s importance to the administration and U.S. policymakers. According to the president, “Latin America doesn’t matter...people don’t give one damn” about that place. 1 For most of the twentieth century, with a few glaring exceptions, President Nixon’s words have rung true. When Washington stopped and considered Central America, it was often treated with a mixture of contempt, paternalism and racism. Often, American policymakers’ preferred way of operating in the region relied on a variety of pillars, including the deployment of U.S. marines, political subterfuge, and support for right-wing dictatorships. Several countries experienced the United States’ power repeatedly. The Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, and Nicaragua all suffered the ignominy of coups d’état or military occupation. El Salvador, however, largely escaped the fate of other Central American countries. Throughout most of its history, El Salvador avoided the power or reach of the “Colossus of the North” as its neighbors had experienced. In contrast to its treatment of much of Central America, the United States did not send Marines to protect “American lives and property,” chase 1 Quoted in Francis Fukuyama, “A Quiet Revolution: Latin America’s Unheralded Progress,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2007). PBS also produced a documentary about Donald Rumsfeld entitled “Rumsfeld’s War.” Several transcripts from this particular conversation are available online at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/paths/audio.html. This anecdote is also quoted in Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), 1. 2 “bandits,” or occupy the country. El Salvador, a country famously compared in size to Massachusetts, had never been a major concern in either U.S. domestic or foreign policy until 1979. However, this small nation then convulsed relations between the U.S. Congress and the executive branch for eight years. As William LeoGrande inquired, “why did such a small region loom so large in the American psyche during the 1980s?” 2 To fully answer that question, it is imperative to begin several decades earlier. American Cold War foreign policy in Latin America was designed to prevent communist expansion, maintain U.S. predominance, remove forces thought to be sympathetic to communism or its ideals, and ensure stability and order, especially for American investments. 3 According to historian Stephen Rabe, U.S. presidents from Harry Truman to George H.W. Bush believed that they had to keep the region “secure” so that they could wage the Cold War in other more important parts of the world. The region was the “backyard,” and U.S. leaders were determined to keep it tidy and orderly. 4 To accomplish these objectives, American policymakers implemented a counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy that relied on American aid and military training to combat internal subversion in the western hemisphere. 2The debate over the region was in part an extension of the debate over Vietnam and the struggle of communism vs. democracy. William LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977-1992 (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1998), 6. 3 During the Cold War, the U.S., including policymakers and some journalists, tended to view the region as part of a larger East-West struggle between the American and Soviet systems. To many American officials, it was simply a black or white issue. Either you were “pro American” or “anti-American.” Any challenge to U.S. hegemony or orthodoxy was generally interpreted as emanating from Moscow. The idea that people in Latin America were not simply stooges of Cuba or the Soviet Union was absent from U.S. policymakers’ assessments. They tended to view the region through a lens distorted by a paternalism and racism. For an excellent overview of how American policymakers characterized Latin Americans, consult Lars Schoultz,’s Beneath the United States: a History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998). Officials in Washington did not seriously attempt to understand Latin American resentment. Instead they resorted to labeling those critical of U.S. policy as “anti-American,” “psychopathic” “communists” overly-emotional or irrational or simply jealous or resentful of the United States size or wealth. Max Paul Friedman, Rethinking Anti-Americanism: The History of an Exceptional Concept in American Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 4 Stephen Rabe, The Killing Zone: the United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), xxx. 3 During the Cold War, the United States used Latin America as a testing ground for its counterinsurgency doctrine. The Pentagon deployed Green Berets and other Special Forces operatives and provided funds to help its allies either defeat or prevent the outbreak of insurgency throughout Central and South America. The lessons learned from the various U.S. counterinsurgency operations were not confined to other contingencies in the region. Instead, U.S. strategists applied the knowledge gained from Latin America globally. Of all the various interventions, the most important occurred in tiny El Salvador. When the U.S. government found itself confronted by a growing and intractable insurgency in Iraq in 2003, Pentagon officials leaned heavily on the American effort in El Salvador for solutions. For almost twenty years after the Cuban Revolution, the United States prevented the emergence of another communist regime in Latin America. The overthrow of Anastasio Somoza Debayle in July 1979 forced Washington to reevaluate its Central American strategy. That same year El Salvador tottered on the edge; during the 1960s, the country had been considered relatively stable. The following decade, economic and political stability slowly deteriorated. Several months after the collapse of Somoza’s regime, El Salvador was ripe for revolution. Massive political demonstrations and government-sanctioned violence had brought the country to the
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