Introduction to International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

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Contents

Chapter one

International relations as activity and academic field

The Evaluation of the field of International relations International relations as field of activity Ancient Greece Peloponnesian War The Thirty Years War Followed by the Treaty of

Westphalia First World War Second world war Cold war era Conclusion

Chapter two

Theoretical traditions

Political realism in International relations.

Realism and Neo realism.

Liberalism and Neo Liberalism.

Constructivism, the role of Ideas, Norms, and Identity

Introducing Feminism in International Relations Theory

Chapter three

International institutions

The failure of the league of nations

Chapter four

Post-cold war thinking on International Relations

Globalization

Twenty Years after Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations

End of History by Francis Fukuyama

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Unit One

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS ACTIVITY AND ACADEMIC FIELD

Introduction

The international analysts and the political scientists have turned their attention to the field of international relations, concepts and theories of analysis especially in the post- First World War period, which represented a turning point in world history. Conflicts and wars have been transferred to a scientific nature that goes beyond conventional conflicts. This concern comes from the importance of politics itself. Politics is a reality of human existence and is intertwined in all aspects of human life in a way that cannot be avoided or ignored. Global Environment policy is intertwined with international policies. the international agreements seriously diversify and take measures to reduce climate change. Human, as Aristotle said, is a political animal. Everyone finds himself at some point in some way part of a political system that affects him. we all participate in and contribute to International Relations on a daily basis. Every time we watch the news, vote in an election, buy or boycott goods from the supermarket, we are participating in

International Relations. The decisions we make in our daily lives have an effect, however small, on the world in which we live.

In the emergence of the political society (state), the importance of scientific knowledge for the study of political phenomena and the end of the transition from the sight of the state as a legal and constitutional entity as a political entity 5

as the authoritarian division of values and resources within the human society as social relations including power, power

and influence in degrees At the national, regional or global level, as mentioned above, the evolution of the nature of the

international conflict after World War I and II has increased international cooperation and additional dimension to

conflict patterns and internal cooperation.

Our interest in politics based on the truth of what we want to learn in addition to participate our political life, some study

politics due to self-curiosity or motivated to realize what are the causes of wars and how to provide accurate alternatives.

The following factors contributed to the importance of studying the international relations systematically after the First

World War and the supremacy of the ideal doctrine of the necessity of a union of countries to impose the foundations of

world peace. After the outbreak of World War II, to know how to reduce the possibility of another world wars.

International relations were initially taught within other fields of knowledge such as diplomatic history, international law

and international organizations. As Independent major, International relations was known in the United States of

America in particular as a modern state entering the international theater. Before World War II, the Westphalia

Agreement was signed 1648, ending the European wars of religion, including the Thirty Years' War. The treaties of

Westphalia brought to an end a calamitous period of European history which caused the deaths of approximately eight

million people. , based on the concept of Westphalian sovereignty, though this interpretation has been seriously

challenged. Announcing the beginning of the nation-state system, followed by the Vienna Convention. U.S after the

Second World War increased the need of thinking about the policy after the war, all of this led to the mobilization of

scientific expertise in America and allocated funds for scientific research from what led to the emergence of many

research centers and institutes and universities.

Generally, there is many factors have contributed to the importance of studying modern international relations:

 The enormous and continuous increase in communication among countries at all levels as a result of the technological

revolution. The various forms of connections and new models changed the international environment dynamic.

 This communication has divided the barriers and restrictions between the internal and external issues therefor it produced

a kind of complexity, and similarity in the nature of the national interests of the countries and groups. Nations increased

their dependence on each other in protecting their national security or economic entity or defending their political and

ideological or beliefs, due to technological revolution.

 According to the interdependence nature there is no longer a state that can isolate itself from world events and different

interactions outside its borders.

It must be recognized that the contemporary international situation is dynamic, we cannot study it within statically rigid

frames.

The Evaluation of the field of International relations

International relations, on a traditional account, can be Identified as actual relations between and among states. however, with the advancement of human civilization and the development of states, International relations gained a great significance in human lives and became an essential aspect for survival of individuals and states. Although in the beginning of human history,

International relation were limited only to a field of activity, it gradually developed into an academic discipline gaining worldwide recognition. International relations were subject to many changes in its evolvement process, various scholars and intellectuals have defined international relations differently and have come up with diverse theories and approaches for further understanding. we shall discuss the historical events which marker a great importance in international relations and demonstrate the gradual progression of international relations into an academic filed.

International relations as field of activity

International relations, in simpler term, could be defined as any kind of a relationship among and between the states in the world. As an activity, International relations are as old as the recorded history itself. when looking back to history, it becomes clear that humans are social beings and they cannot live in isolation, from the day states were formed, those states have built and maintained relationships with external states. Those relationships, at times, have been militant and at other times peaceful. convention identifies states as the major actors of international relations and as the nature of states evolved through time so has the international relations. Before the emergence of nation-states which exist today, the pre-national forms of governments or constitutions which ruled the different parts of the world were personal states, theocracy, oligarchy, city-states, territorial empires and trading empires. With time the nature of relationships which states form with each other has changed based on the form of government, nature of the rulers and their attitudes (form of government).

Ancient Greece

As an activity, one of earliest examples for international relations among states can be found in ancient Greece. Written evidence has been found that Greek city states have kept relationships between each other. These relationships have mostly been militant. The ancient Greece was much troubled and influences by politics. Although the city states were constantly at war with each other, in many instances they formed alliances in the name of their security to fight and eliminate threats. And also, In Greece, at the time of Olympics all city states called for a true and sized fighting until the games are over.

These Instances witness the existences of diplomacy in that period. However, the constant fighting of states makes it clear that the international relations at the time were not strong enough to hold peace for long period because rulers at that time did not focus on avoiding conflict in future.

Greek city states had many differences from each other. Sparta, for example, had a unique classification with helots, Peri koi and spartiates sharing different citizen privileges, while in democratic cities like Athens, the citizens usually shared equal privileges. Some cities had restrictions in trading with other cities, while others were economically dependent mostly on trading. These differences are the reason why Greeks preferred to be independent. Moreover, for powerful cities, join an alliance meant losing their dominance, In many cases, for example, disputes arose as to who should lead the alliance and take decisions, and whether the others should obey someone who they might consider inferior.

However, despite of many differences, Athens and Sparta joined alliances in the war against Persians between 499 and 449

B.C The formation of the Hellenic League when the Persians started moving toward mainland Greece was an early example for the relations between Greek city states.

Peloponnesian War

Following the Greco-Persian war, Greek city-states or poleis began to align themselves in protective alliances. Many states sided with Athens and together they formed the Delian League in 478 BCE. There were over 300 members in the league which was led by Athens, the strongest naval power in Greece. Member states provided ships or money to Athens in return for

Athenian protection against Persians and also Mediterranean pirates. The existence of alliances enabled Athens to gain power and threaten other city-states and turn it into an empire. Athens grew more powerful and tensions rose. This eventually led to nearly three decades of war known as the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.E.) between Athens and Sparta. Both Sparta and

Athens gathered allies and fought on and off because no single city-state was strong enough to conquer the other. Although

Athens and Sparta fought together against Persia in Persian war, in Peloponnesian war, Persia offered Sparta money to build a fleet that could challenge Athens. In return Persia demanded Sparta to recognize Persian sovereignty in Asia Minor. This shows how the states used international relations to achieve their national interests and the complexity of international

8 relations. At the end, Sparta emerged victorious, while the constant fighting left Athens bankrupt. Neither city-state regained the military strength they once had. Thucydides, a contemporary historian, believed that the war broke out because of Spartan fear of the rising power of Athens. During the Greco-Persian war and Peloponnesian war; when powerful alliances or empires were having a war with each other, Greek city states were forced to join alliances for the sake of their survival. It is clear that, since the beginning of human civilizations States have been interdependent and formed relationships with the external sources for their survival and growth. The international relations were formed for the protection of states and to gain and keep power.

However, there were both positive and negative consequences of forming alliances.

The Thirty Years War Followed by the Treaty of Westphalia

Many scholars trace the history of International Relations back to Peace of Westphalia in 1648 which was a stepping stone in the development of the modern state system and the international relations. It was the treaty which ended the thirty years war one of the most destructive wars in the history of Europe. The war or series of connected wars began in 1618, when the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II tried to impose Roman Catholicism on the Protestants in Bohemia. It set Protestants against Catholics. The war came to involve the major powers of Europe, with Sweden, France, Spain and Austria (Thirty Years War ends, n.d.). During the sixteenth century, the Reformation and the Counter Reformation had divided Germany into Protestant and Catholic camps, each prepared to seek foreign support to guarantee its survival and protection (Thirty Years War ends, n.d.). The Swedes, the Danes, the Poles, the Russians, the Dutch and the Swiss were all dragged in to this war. Commercial interests and rivalries played a huge part in the war as well as the religion and power. The war was largely fought in Germany and reduced the country to desolation. There was no order, no borders, and no protection for the nations and people. Apart from the religious conflict, balance of power among the European powers played a significant part for the thirty years war. The rulers of the opposing governments, and most importantly the people of Europe, finally grew sick of the horror and demanded the war to end. As a result, more than 179 diplomats representing 194 separate states gathered in Westphalia to discuss peace. As a result of the agreement followed by the treaty of Westphalia, a system of world order came into being and it is known as the Peace of Westphalia. International Relations that time was not organized therefore it was not an easy task to get all nations which participated in war together to one place and agree on particular terms. At the absence of technology, it took more than ten days to communicate from Munster to Paris or Vienna and twenty days or more to Stockholm or Madrid. The treaty gave the Swiss independence of Austria and the Netherlands independence of Spain. The German principalities secured their autonomy. Sweden gained territory and a payment in cash, Brandenburg and Bavaria made gains too, and France acquired most of Alsace-Lorraine. The prospect of Roman Catholics reconquering Europe vanished forever. Protestantism was in the world to remain.

Apart from ending the Thirty Years War, many have argued that the Peace of Westphalia is one of the most important events with regard to state sovereignty. The Treaty of Westphalia weakened the Holy Roman Empire, facilitating the emergence of the modern European states. According to Philpot the importance of Peace of Westphalia to international relations are as follows.  Firstly, the diplomatic communications and foreign policy designs of contemporary great powers after Westphalia revealed a common understanding of a system of sovereign states.  Secondly, Westphalia brought an end to intervention in matters of religion. By signing the treaty of Westphalia each state agreed to let other states keep its own religion without outside interference and to leave the internal affairs of each nation-state to be dealt alone. They also accepted the nation-state as the highest form of government and these nation- states would not be governed by religious leaders. Each nation agreed to only attack other nations if it was immediately and strategically threatened. They would no longer attack each other just because one nation did not like what the other was doing. Treaty of Westphalia is a fine example of the importance of international relations. It was the force which was able to stop the bloodiest war before the First World War and

9 establish the world order and peace. If not for the formation of international relations between the states, world would have been destroyed many years ago. Peace of Westphalia can be called as a victory of international relations.

International Relations as an Academic Discipline

“International Relations as a field of study can be defined as a branch of social sciences which studies the policies, developments and interactions, the effects of which cross national boundaries and affect the lives of people in different countries and in several parts of the world”. (Gale, 1968) Some scholars argue that the International Relations is a distinct discipline while others counter argue that it is a sub field. If a distinct discipline is considered as separate field wholly distinct from any other field or study, then International Relations cannot be considered a distinct discipline because it is a well-known fact that International Relations is not a subject that can be learnt, taught or studied by itself. It is closely linked to many other fields such as Political Science, History, Sociology, Law, and Economics. Therefore, International Relations can be called as an „inter-disciplinary‟ subject. But on the other hand, if distinct discipline means a disciplined study of a particular field, with a recognizable focus Wisidagama W D D S 7 of interest and body of theory, then International Relations is, and always has been a distinct discipline, a discipline that has tended to evolve with the times (Hellmann,2011). Academic discipline is a study or a subject that is formally taught in the universities or in other academic institutions. International Relations can be considered as a distinct academic discipline as it has evolved into a field of study which is formally taught in universities. There has never been a precise agreement amongst scholars regarding the definition of the discipline of International Relations  Thompson stated that International Relations was “The study of rivalry among nations and the conditions and institutions which ameliorate or exacerbate these relationships.” (Schmidt, 2012)  Quincy Wright once said that “It is not only the nations which International Relations seek to regulate. Varied types of groups –nations, states, governments, people, regions, alliances, confederations, international organizations, even industrial organizations, cultural organizations, and religious organizations must be dealt with in the study of IR, if the treatment is to be realistic.” Even though there is no one precise definition of the discipline of International Relations, it can be concluded that International Relations deal with policies and actions of states, their representatives as well as non-state actors too. These policies and actions extend beyond national boundaries and are largely political but are also concerned with social relations as well.

Rise of Nationalism

“Nationalism is a political expression of group identity often coupled with a country or state”. Nationalism led people who share the same ancestry, culture and religion, has same origin and speak same language to claim a separate state for them. It is a patriotic feeling which a group of people have toward their kind. This feeling has been in the minds of people in many forms long before the creation of the nation-state. It was the nationalism that largely contributed to the emergence and the continuation of the nation-states. French Revolution is a fine example for the nationalism in Europe. It led to a change in politics and constitution of France. In 1789 the power was transferred from monarchy to the body of citizens. It was proclaimed that henceforth the French people would shape the destiny of their country. Both American and French revolutions formalized the idea of national sovereignty. American Declaration of independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen leave no doubt that the people are the only legitimate foundation for sovereign statehood Nation-State System Westphalian treaty laid the foundation for the development of modern nation state system. A nation state is a sovereign political state whose borders encompasses the entirety of a nation and of which most of the citizens is united by a common language, customs, religion and origin (McCollum, n.d.). A new phase of international relations emerged with the development of the nation states. Nation states formed relations with each other with the intention of realizing their national interests. The process of achieving national interests often led to the break-out of war and then to the study of international relations, as a new world order without wars could be built only through a proper study of international relations. Up to the period of First World War international relations were popular only as an activity. Ordinary citizens did not have an understanding of relations among states neither they knew what could be achieved or lost by forming relations with external states. In 1914 with the commencement of First World War, the world order which was established from the peace of Westphalia collapsed. Then, in order to prevent that kind of disastrous wars in future, people started to show an interest in creating a new world order and in international relations.

The rise of the sovereign state

In medieval Europe international politics consisted of a complicated pattern of overlapping jurisdictions and loyalties. Most of life was local and most political power was local too. At the local level there was an enormous diversity of political entities: feudal lords who ruled their respective estates much as they saw fit, cities made up of independent merchants, states ruled by clerics and smaller political entities such as principalities and duchies. There were even brotherhoods – such as the Knights Hospitaller, a military order – who laid claims to a political role. There were also, especially in northern Europe, many peasant communities that were more or less self-governing. There were kings too of course, such as the kings of France and England, but their power was limited and their poverty looked like wealth only in comparison with the conditions of the near-destitute members of the peasant class underneath them.

In medieval Europe there were two institutions with pretensions to power over the continent as a whole – the (Catholic) Church and the Empire. The Church was the spiritual authority, with its centre in Rome. Apart from a small Jewish minority, all Europeans were Christian and the influence of the Church spread far and penetrated deeply into people’s lives. As the custodian, from Roman times, of institutions like the legal system and the Latin language, the Church occupied a crucial role in the cultural and intellectual life of the Middle Ages. The Empire – known as the Holy Roman Empire – was established in the tenth century in central, predominantly German-speaking, Europe. It also included parts of Italy, France and today’s Netherlands and Belgium. It too derived legitimacy from the Roman Empire, but had none of its political power. The Holy Roman Empire is best compared to a loosely structured federation of many hundreds of separate political units. The political system of medieval Europe was thus a curious combination of the local and the universal. Yet, from the fourteenth century onward this system was greatly simplified as the state emerged as a political entity located at an intermediate level between the local and the universal. The new states simultaneously set themselves in opposition to popes and emperors on the universal level, and to feudal lords, peasants and assorted other rulers on the local level. This is how the state came to make itself independent and self-governing. The process started in Italy where northern city-states such as Florence, Venice, Ravenna and Milan began playing the pope against the emperor, eventually making themselves independent of both. Meanwhile, in Germany, the pope struggled with the emperor over the issue of who of the two should have the right to appoint bishops. While the two were fighting it out, the constituent members of the Holy Roman Empire took the opportunity to assert their independence. This was also when the kings of France and England began acting more independently, defying the pope’s orders. Between 1309 and 1377, the French even forced the pope to move to Avignon, in southern France. In England, meanwhile, the king repealed the pope’s right to levy taxes on the people. With the Reformation in the sixteenth century the notion of a unified Europe broke down completely as the Church began to split apart. Before long the followers of Martin Luther, 1483–1546, and John Calvin, 1509–1564, had formed their own religious denominations which did not take orders from Rome. Instead the new churches aligned themselves with the new states. Or rather, various kings, such as Henry VIII in England or Gustav Vasa in Sweden, took advantage of the religious strife in order to further their own political agendas. By supporting the Reformation, they could free themselves from the power of Rome. All over northern Europe, the new ‘Protestant’ churches became state-run and church lands became property of the state. Yet, the new divisions were cultural and intellectual too. With the invention of the printing press, power over the written word moved away from the monasteries and into the hands of private publishers who sought markets for their books. The biggest markets were found in books published not in Latin but in various local languages. From the early eighteenth century onwards Latin was no longer the dominant language of learning. As a result, it was suddenly far more difficult for Europeans to understand each other.

In this climate, the increasingly self-assertive states were not only picking fights with universal institutions but also with local ones. In order to establish themselves securely in their new positions of power, the kings rejected the traditional claims of all local authorities. This led to extended wars in next to all European countries. Peasants rose up in protest against taxes and the burdens imposed by repeated wars. There were massive peasant revolts in Germany in the 1520s with hundreds of thousands of participants and almost as many victims. In the latter part of the sixteenth century, there were major peasant uprisings in Sweden, Croatia, England and Switzerland. In France, in the middle of the seventeenth century, the nobility rose up in defence of its traditional rights and in rebellion against the encroachments of the king. Medieval kings were really quite powerless. They had no proper bureaucracies at their disposal, no standing armies and few ways of raising money. In fact, there were few good roads, ports and not many large cities. These, however, soon came to be constructed. From the sixteenth century onwards the states established the rudiments of an administrative system and raised armies, both in order to fight their own peasants and 11 in order to defend themselves against other states. Since such state-building was expensive, the search for money became a constant concern. The early modern state was more than anything an institutional machinery designed to develop and extract resources from society. In return for their taxes, the state provided ordinary people with defense and a rudimentary system of justice. If they refused to pay up, state officials had various unpleasant ways to make them suffer.

Early modern Europe was the golden age of political economy. During this period, the economy was not thought of as a distinct sphere separated from politics but instead as a tool of statecraft which the state could manipulate to serve its own ends. Economic development meant higher revenues from taxes and gave the kings access to more resources which they could use in their wars. The state was keen to encourage trade, not least since taxes on trade were a lot easier to collect than taxes on land. It was now that a search began for natural resources – agricultural land, forests, iron and copper ore, but also manpower – which the state might make use of. Maps were drawn up which located these resources within the country’s borders, and lists were made of births, marriages and deaths in order to better keep track of the population. Domestic industries were set up and given state subsidies, above all in militarily significant sectors such as metal works and in sectors that were easy for the state to tax. In addition, various ‘useful sciences’ were encouraged, by the newly established scientific academies, and prizes were given to innovations and discoveries. In state-sponsored universities, future members of the emerging administrative class were taught how best to regulate society and assure peace and social order. First World War

First world war was probably the most important political event of the modern global system. After the First world war many theories were formed in the field of international Relations. The causes of the first World war included many factors, such as “militarism” alliances, Imperialism, and ethnic nationalism” .However the main causes was the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand who was the crown prince of Austria by a Serbian secret organization , the black hand. It led to the outbreak of the first world war which set Germany, Austria-Hungary and ottoman Empire (the central powers) against great Britain , France , Russia , Italy and Japan(the Allied powers).The united states Joined allies after 1917.By the time the first World war ended with the defeat of the Central Powers in November 1918,Massive number of deaths and unimaginable destruction were caused.

The First war largely affected international politics, economy and social status of countries. The destruction was enormous. It became a priority to research on the war and its causes to avoid such destructions in future .The trauma of the First World War made people demand a better understanding of foreign relation and drew people’s attention to the growing importance of International relations as an academic discipline.

As a result, in 1919, a department of international politics was established in the university college of Wales , Aberystwyth followed by the establishment of department of international relation in early 1920s un the London school of economics. As an academic discipline international relation initially focused on the study of political and diplomatic relations and then later commercial relations among sovereign states. International Relations were stared to be popular among Europeans as well as Americans universities and then it started to be taught in Scandinavian countries.

During the interwar period, studies in international relations were largely devoted to “normative” and the “utopian” pursuit of preserving order and the rule of law in what was considered a largely anarchical and self-regulate international system of sovereign states.

Although the concept of “territorial sovereignty” and “independent nation sate” were born from the treaty of Westphalia, it isn’t until the period after the first world war in the 1920s that International relations developed as a distinct discipline.

Idealism and the formation of League of Nations

Idealism is an approach that emerged in 1920’s after the end of the First World War It was based on a Utopian concept of “what should be, rather than what it is “and it was optimistic and Legalistic in nature. Idealism was based on the principle of “man is good by nature”. Idealists believed that man is made aggressive by weak institutions and that progress in the international system can only be achieved through peace. It

12 was based on this Idealism that the League of Nations was formulated in 1920 hoping to bring lasting peace to the world through such institution. But this concept of Idealism was clearly unsuccessful as it did not achieve its primary purpose because before long the second World War took place. Among some famous idealists are President of the United states Woodrow Wilson, Hugo Grotius, and Rousseau.

Second World War After the First World War, second World War was the most widespread and deadliest war in history. The obvious inability of the League of Nations to deal with major international issues was one of the major causes of the second World War. Started by Adolf Hitler's invasion of Poland in 1939, the war dragged on for six years until the Allied nations defeated both Nazi Germany and japan in 1945.

After the Second World War, the international System came to be a totally different system from the classical 19th century international system. The classical international system was Euro-centric and it worked on the principles of balance of power, war as a means. Secret diplomacy as an instrument, and narrow nationalism as it’s objective. Before the war , only European nations , Particularly Britain , France , Germany and Italy , were the major actors in world politics .However, after the second World war many changes took place in the international system ; the united states abandoned isolationism , Germany and Italy became very weak as a result of their defats in war, Britain and France also become weak due to the heavy war losses suffered by them and the creation of new independent states because of the liberation of Asian and African countries from colonization.

The concept of war made a huge impact on the World with mass deaths and destruction. This highlighted the compelling need to improve the techniques of international relations for the survival of the human race. After the second world war a new development stage of International Relations began. People lost faith in the political idealist approach and new approach emerged in international relations Known as Realism. The basic assumption of realistic was that “man is evil by nature” and “the state works only to secure power”, Realism foucses on the actual situation at hand rather than the idealist utopian outlook.Hans .J.Morganthau once said “All politics is a struggle for power”.Some of the pioneers of political realism who immensely contributed to the development of International Relations as an academeic discipline were E.H.Carr, Hans .J.Morganthau, Kennth .W.thompason, and Henery Kissinger.

The Development International relations as an Academic Discipline

The Development of international Relations as a field of study has a long history of growth and development. This is another important factor that proves, International Relations has indeed developed a distinct academic discipline. Between 1900-1939, the study of International relations gradually progressed and as an academic discipline it received a wider recognition during the inter-war period (1919-1939). Its development was further aided by the many universities, research bodies, and organizations that showed a great interest in International Relations at the time. The league of Nations also had a considerable role to play in the development of International Relations as a distinct discipline, as it encouraged the study by its work as a forum for international discussions and by sponsoring many International conferences. The development of international relations as an academic discipline can be divided into few phases such as the prenatal, organizational, cold war and scientific phases, Kenneth Thompson has summed it up in the following stages.

1.The period of 1900-1918 -up to the end of the First World War International Relations were taught by diplomatic historians who were more interested in history than in politics, their main concern was the description of past events rather than the analysis of present ones.

2. The period of 1918-1930 -starting after the end of the First World War, it was focused only on the study of current affairs as a reaction to the excessive concentration on the past, done during the period of 1900-1918.

3. The period after 1945-This was the period following the Second World War During this era people had lost faith in the power and authority of international organizations and international law as a tool of maintaining peace, because of the failure of the League of Nations to prevent another world war. Therefore, the emphasis of this period shifted towards a scientific analysis of the developments of International politics. Scientific studies were conducted on what causes war, how to avoid war, what influences the behavior of states,etc

Cold War Phase

After the four stages which Kenneth Thompson categorized, there comes the cold war phase. After the Second World War USA and Union of soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) rose up as two super powers in the world. There was no complete war or peace during this time; therefore, it was described as the cold war period. USA took the leadership of capitalist countries and USSR took the leadership of communist countries. Neither of the two parties declared an actual war against the other but promoted their form of governments. This can also be referred to as a “diplomatic war”. The cold war phase led the world to tension and all nations were overwhelmed by fear of war. As a result, The USA formed alliances like NATO to get together with other ant-communist countries under its own leadership and the USSR countered the move by organization the communist countries into the Warsaw pact. As another result of the cold war, a Third World was created. A large number of nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America refused to join military alliances of the two super powers. They chose to remain neutral and together they formed the Non-Alignments Movement. After the second World war nations in the world started to follow different principles and policies, therefore it became a need to understand the foreign policies and the principles which they follow for the survival of all nations. This largely contributed to the development of International Relations as an academic discipline.

The fear of war and the struggle for power remains till today. United Nations were formed as an attempt to maintain the world order, hold peace and to prevent wars in future. International relations ascended to the very top in international system acting s the only solution for world issues. The wars which took place in the past created the importance of learning international Relations and promoting peace. Therefore, International Relations emerged as an Important academic discipline.

In order to become a distinct discipline, any social science has to create own theories, approaches, and concepts to explain certain phenomena found within the field and outside as well. similarity International Relations too were recognizing as a distinct discipline once it created its own theories and approaches. According to Stanley Hoffman the theory of International relations is “A systematic study of observable phenomena trying to discover the principle variables to reveal the characteristic types of relations among national units.”

International Relations have many approaches and theories. The approaches can be classified as the Idealist approach, Realist approach, Behavioral approach, Post-behavioral approach, Neo-Realism approach and others. In the 1950’s and 1960’s the realist approach became the popular in international Relations, they believed that Politics is nothing but struggle for power. Marxism became popular during this time as well. Form the mid 1960’s to the 1970’s, the behavioral approach became popular. By the mid-1980’s Realism had once again emerged in the form of Neo-Realism. In the mid 1960’s and 1970’s another approach could be identified as the behavioural approach. This was the post -realist paradigm which concentrated on scientific analysis of the developments and phenomena of international Relations. Behaviorism in IR was a larger movement spreading across the social sciences Known as the scientific approach for analyzing International relations. However, towards the end of the 20th century the field of International relations moved towards approaches such as Post-behavioralist and Neo-realism.

Apart form the various theories and approaches in the discipline of International relations, It also talks about many concepts such as the state, nation-state, power m national interest, national security, war, peace, balance of power etc. all of these theories, approaches and concepts have helped towards shaping the field of international relations into a distinct discipline today. There have also been many books that have written

14 regarding the discipline of international relations which further contributed towards International Relations becoming a distinct academic discipline.

Conclusion

International relations, as an activity has long history, It was the means which used to interact with other states. It has gone through many changes and advancement and has been developed as an academic discipline today. In a world where the struggle for power created conflicts and wars, an international system to maintain the order of the world and to hold peace was much needed. In order to create such an international system, it was required to investigate and understand International Relations in depth. Further, it was important to give attention to all international problems because people’s security, welfare, and above all their survival depended on it. As a result of people’s growing interest of the International relations, it emerges as an academic discipline. However. It was only after the second World War that the International Relations began to develop largely. Since the Second war world much of international relations has centered on the search for a new international system to replace the old order that was shattered in two world wars. The emerge of many new states and with the technological changes which were the result of the second World war, the nature of the International relations changed.

International relations are comparatively new discipline as its origin and the development started in the beginning of 20th century. During this short time International relations has passed through different phases and stages and have evolved into a distinct discipline. International Relations have many characteristics common to social sciences which are required it to be considered a distinct discipline such as a distinct field of study, specific subject matter, and analytical methods. International Relations have also developed its own theories, approaches, concepts which further prove that it has indeed grown to become a distinct discipline.

Today, International relations have become a very popular and Important field as people in 21th century is connected to the international world like in no other time. The majority of things happen in the international world affect people’s lives directly or indirectly no matter which part of the world they are. International terrorism, globalization, communication and technological development affect the human race and these things cannot be controlled by one nation. Therefore, the importance of international relations rapidly increased because it is only through International relations that the world peace can be maintained. In conclusion, with the growing importance of international relation, it has undoubtedly development into an academic discipline from being a mere field.

In this unit we focused on Europe since contemporary international politics, for good and for bad, was shaped by Europeans and by non- Europeans copying European examples. This is a story of how the state emerged as a sovereign actor in the late Middle Ages by simultaneously rejecting the traditional claims made by universal and local institutions. It is a story of how the state went on to strengthen its power by means of bureaucracies and armies. European states were always competing with each other, and while the military competition had disastrous effects in terms of human suffering, the economic competition that took place was a spur to development and social change. In the course of the nineteenth century, the state was transformed into a nation-state in which, in theory at least, the people as a whole were in charge. There were great hopes that nation-states would be more peaceful in their relations with one another, but these hopes were soon dashed. Nation-states were ferocious colonisers and in the twentieth century the world as a whole suffered through two devastating world wars and came to the brink of nuclear Armageddon during the Cold War. In the twenty-first century there are once again hopes for a better future, but as long as the European state- system (now the international system) lasts a more enduring peace is unlikely.

Reference List

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2.Basu, R. (2012) International Politics, New Delhi: SAGE Publications.

3.Burke. A. D., Devetak. R. and George.J. (2007) An Introduction to International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Forms of Government [online], Available: http://www.ancientgreece.co.uk/staff/resources/background/bg10/home.html [07 July 2016].

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Herodotus, (1920) „The Histories‟, in Godley,A.D., The Perseus Digital Library, [online], Available: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgibin/ptext?lookup=Hdt.+9.1.1. [08 July 2016].

Mavrommatis, P.P. (2004) City-States and Alliances in Ancient Greece [online], Available: http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/history/21h-301-the- ancient-world-greece-fall-2004/assignments/final.pdf [07July 2016].

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Mnungu, M., International Relations [online], Avalable : http://aiu.edu/publications/student/english/DEVELOPMENT%20STUDIES%20%20INTERNATIONAL%20RELATIONS.html [08 July 2016]. Peloponnessian War [online], Available: http://www.history.com/topics/ancient-history/peloponnesian-war [08 July 2016].

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Rhodes, P.J. (2007) The Greek City-States: A Source Book, 2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schmidt, B.C. (ed.) (2012) International Relations and the First Great Debate Thirty Years War ends, [online], Available: http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/thirty-years-war-ends [07 July 2016]. Thucydides, „History of the Peloponnesian War‟ in Dutton, E.P, The Perseus Digital Library, [online], Available: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgibin/ptext?lookup=Thuc.+1.1.1. [10 July 2016].

Theoretical Tradition

International Relations theory requires the development of conceptual frameworks and theories to facilitate the understanding and explanation of events and phenomena in world politics. It also involves the analysis and recording of related policies and practices.The discipline of IR was officially established as a university department during World War I in 1913, at the University of Aberystwyth in Wales, in order to avoid future mass conflicts and to ensure peaceful change. Today the scope and complexities of world politics demand an understanding of a much wider range of issues. Moreover, new conceptual frameworks and theories are required to improve our understanding and assist in the development of better policies and practices. Based on these three major points, the theories of international relations generally attempt to create a conceptual model upon which international relations and the international system can be analyzed. IR Theories can crudely be categorised under four headings:

Realist approaches to IR; Idealist approaches to IR; Critical approaches to IR; and, finally, Issue / agenda-specific approaches to international relations.

Generally, the Realist theories tend to focus on states and their relations in relation with power. The power that is connected to this point of view is military and political power, the ability to convince other agents in the international system to act in favour of your interests. Realists, since Machiavelli, tend to give enormous emphasis on the coercive forces, in short military power, of a country. In time, Realist theories developed into Neo-Realism and Neo-Conservatism. Idealist or as what it is lately called, Liberal, theories tend to focus on the creation of a peaceful world by integration –especially economic integration- of countries into the international system. Idealists generally focus on economic power and political freedoms that a country possesses. In time, Idealist theories developed into Neo-Liberal theories. Critical theories are different than the first two because they generally do not ask how a country or a[n international] system may be successful, but they question whether the theses of the Realists and Idealists are actually truthful. Constructivism, whic h is a sub-division of Critical Theories, for instance, challenges both Realism and Idealism by saying that they both are “materialistic”, and for instance key issues as “power politics” or “soft power-centres” are not in the natural environment of international relations, they are not there as a result of a natural occurrence; but are just “social constructs,” that is, they can be changed by human behaviour.

Issue or agenda-oriented approaches, on the other hand, base their work on a specific agenda item or a single issue or a combination of very similar issues. Marxism, for instance, is based on the idea of class struggle and economic relations. Marxist and Neo-Marxist international relations theories are, in short, positivist paradigms which reject the realist/liberal view of state conflict or cooperation; and focus instead on the economic and material aspects. Feminism sees international relations as a gender-specific issue and develops its theoretical framework on the male-female divide in the society. Hegemonic Stability Theory works only when there is a dominant state, a hegemon in the international system. Cosmopolitanism stresses that all human beings belong to an international community and such concepts as fellow citizens of one country, a homeland, or a regional culture do not exist. Consequently, there are various approaches to International Relations in terms of theory. All of these different groups of approaches, however, unite in their wish to explain the current situation, in their categorization of knowledge / of data to reach some generalizations, and finally in their willingness to make projections and predictions concerning the future of the international system, of states and their role in the international system, and international relations. When we look at the major theories and approaches in IR, two of the above four become the most often used and hence the most important among the four approaches: These are the Realist and Idealist/Liberal approaches. 18

We can see that Realist views generally focus on the preservation of order in the international system. Therefore, they emphasize on the preservation of the existing system, i.e., the status quo. That the system doesn’t change is something positive for the Realists. They can, therefore, be categorized as Conservatives. Idealists or Liberals, on the other hand, focus on the increase of freedoms and therefore the evolution of the status quo to a better condition which is beneficiary for all states and organizations represented in the international system. They are therefore Idealists. As a result, we can say that when the international system is analyzed in relation to power relations, security related subjects, we use Realist approaches and when it is about freedom of movement for goods, people, and money, or in general economic issues, it is Liberal/Idealist approaches that we are employing.

THE AGENT-STRUCTURE DEBATE

Most social sciences, political science, sociology, psychology, and International Relations, rely on establishing a connection and contact between agencies/agents and the structure. This relationship can be to describe a relationship between micro and macro levels of analysis, voluntarism and determinism or individuals and society. When we look at the international system, there is a Structure and Agents or Agencies. When we talk about the Structure, what we mean is ‘the sets of factors which together construct the environment in which individual actors (agents) function. As a result, the structure shapes the number, content, and possibility of choices the actors/agents can have by limiting what is possible within the system. Also, when we talk about agents or agencies, what we mean is actors who are able to make decisions and act in any given context. The agencies may be single individuals, groups of people, organizations, nations, states, or supranational organizations like the European Union. All agencies are characterized by conscious goals. There is a general agreement among the researchers of International Relations that international politics is anarchic and that anarchy affects order. The meaning of an anarchic system is that the states are not subject to a worldwide government, a higher authority who tells them what they can do and what they cannot do. In International Relations Theories, there are different explanations for the relationship of anarchy and world order. Realists see a Hobbesian world starkly divided between peaceful domestic hierarchy and aggressive international anarchy; Liberals see world politics as more flexible and potentially peaceful; Constructivists see anarchy as an empty container which can be socially constructed in various ways; and the English School sees a society of states engaged in and with the structure, promoting legitimacy, rights, reciprocity and recognition. As a result, for the Realists, structure determines the actions of the actors; for Liberals, agencies have their say in the situation, and for Constructivists, there is an interaction between the agencies and the structure that determines what is happening in the world political arena. The agency-structure problem in social sciences is named in different ways such as “individual and society,” “actor and structure,” “part and whole,” “individualism and holism,” “micro and macro,” “voluntarism and determinism” debates. In International Relations, conditions change over time due to the changes in existing world orders, balance of power between states, and the interaction between states, non-governmental organizations. Since neither structures nor actors remain constant over time, any social theory has to consider not only the particular changes but also the social change itself as an essentially dynamic experience, and consider both agency and structure as variables that are independent from each other.

LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

As a result, we have to develop tools to analyse what is going on in the world political arena and to see the interaction between agencies and the structure more clearly. To this end, in international politics, we use two important elements which are the Levels of Analysis and Theoretical Frameworks. According to Buzan, Jones, and Little (1993), levels of analysis are tools to explain the system and the question of levels of analysis should arise “in any attempt behaviour within the system”. The idea of levels of analysis is an abstract construct but is necessary to see how sources of impact affect behaviour. Levels of analysis as a concept was first used by Kenneth Waltz in his 1959 book Man, the

State, and War and developed by J. David Singer (1961) in his article and book chapter both titled The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations (both printed in 1961). The level-of-analysis issue in the study of international politics and war was raised initially by Waltz (1959) and Singer (1961). In his 1959 book Man, The State and War, Kenneth Waltz outlined a classification system based on three layers which could be used to categorize or characterize all theories of conflict and war. His First-Image Theory explained state behaviour and international politics from the point of view of the individuals; his Second-Image Theory explains them as a result of causal developments at the national level that is made up of state and society; and, his Third-Image Theory argues that outcomes are governed by international structures. In 1961, in his article titled “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations”, Singer (1961) improved on the model constructed by Kenneth Waltz and argued there were two levels of analysis. Singer argued that the researchers of International Politics should focus on either the State Level or the International System (Systemic) Level of analysis. He included the Individual Level as a subdivision of the State-Level system. When these two approaches are analysed, it can be seen that Kenneth Waltz chose to approach the issue of ‘levels of analysis’ in terms of war explanations drawn from the analytic levels of the individual, the structure of separate states, and the structure of the system of states. On the other hand, Singer's discussion was focused on the two levels of the state and international system, with the explanatory level of the individual merged within the state level. In time, the Individual Level of Analysis which focuses on individual decision-makers who can be a single person or a group (e.g. a cabinet of ministers or a group in the bureaucracy) emerged as a different level of analysis rather than being a part of the state system. These levels of analysis are typically “used to explain the foreign policy behaviour of states –the dependent variable” and explaining the behaviour of the state “could entail taking into account factors at all of these levels of analysis. In his book International Politics KJ Holsti (1988) argues that any model, conceptual framework or framework of analysis is crated to help improve understanding of the field by ordering facts and concepts into some meaningful shape. Laura Neack (2008) believes the choice of the level of analysis depends on how much clarity the researcher wants in their work. The complexity of the study may require a combination of levels of analysis as each level limits one’s understanding as it answers some questions. However, it may leave some other issues in question. One level of analysis may not hold all the answers to all the questions about issues in international politics. Nuri Yurdusev distinguishes between levels of analysis and units of analysis, and, claims that there are three logical units of analysis which are a 1) a single individual as the actor, 2) groups made up of different actors, and 3) universe or humanity as an actor that covers everything. Even as the researcher choses more than one unit of analysis, all units fall into one of these categories. In sum, levels of analysis can be described as “the different aspects of and agents in agents in international affairs that may be stressed in interpreting and explaining global phenomena, depending on whether the analyst chooses to focus on “wholes”… or on “parts””. At the moment, in general, there are three levels of analysis that are described. These are:  The Individual-Level Analysis,  The State-Level Analysis, and,  System-Level Analysis. The Individual - Level Analysis looks at the decision-makers as it is based on the view that it is people who make policy. It involves the human decision-making process. According to Neack, states speak with one voice in the international affairs and in this context; the focus is on individual leaders who make decisions on behalf of their countries. In making foreign policy decisions, cognitive factors such as using heuristic devices or seeking cognitive consistency; emotional factors; psychological factors; biological factors ethology and gender; and perceptions play their role at this level. It can be said that the personality, perceptions, choices and activities of the individual decision-makers are the subject of this level of analysis. The reason this level of analysis is crucial to understanding international developments is that people make foreign policy; scholars might look at the roles of different leaders; influential individuals in the bureaucracy or in power positions in politics or economy may influence the final decisions of the leader of a country. For instance, individual level of analysis can explain the start of the Second World War by analysing the role of Adolf Hitler in the events leading to war or it may look at the role of George W. Bush to make conclusions about the Global War on Terrorism in the 2000s. It may evaluate different parts of the Cold War by studying Stalin, Kennedy, or Gorbachev and the bureaucratic circles that affected their decision-making processes. This level of analysis also includes cognitive theories which explain foreign policy by analysing how leaders perceive the world.

The State-Level Analysis focuses on a larger scale than individual level of analysis. Policy-making has to take place in the context of a political structure and the most important of the political structures is the state. The political structure, political forces, and subnational actors within a country lead their government to adopt one or another foreign. The state-level analysis contains the authoritative decision-making units that govern foreign policy processes of countries and the internal attributes of these countries. These shape and limit the leaders’ foreign policy choices. At this level, type of government, the situation in which the decision is to be made, political culture, political actors and bureaucracies and the links between them, interest groups, voters have inputs and affect the final foreign policy decision. According to Laura Neack, analysis at the state level involves examining different features of a country to see which of those factors shape its foreign policy. Neack argues that this level of analysis is the one that most directly borrows from the perceptions of comparative politics and regional area studies. The focus at this level is what takes place within states that ultimately has an impact on what takes place between states. The System-Level Analysis, on the other hand, focuses on the “external restraints on foreign policy,” and studies social-economic- political-geographic characteristics of the international system and how these characteristics influence the actions of countries and other actors in the international arena. The international system is a state-centric system has a horizontal authority structure and therefore is anarchical. As a result, scope, level, and intensity of interactions among the actors, power relations among the actors, and economic realities play a major role at this level of analysis. According to Laura Neack, the principal aim of analysts using this level is to get “outside” national borders in order to discuss the interactions of states with other states, transnational actors, and within international organizations. As the levels of analysis problem is part of the larger agent-structure debate in International Relations, there are other levels of analysis proposed by different theoretical approaches such as the Classical Marxist class-level analysis or the gender-level analysis of the Feminist Theory of International Relations.

Political Realism in International Relations

In the discipline of international relations there are contending general theories or theoretical perspectives. Realism, also known as political realism, is a view of international politics that stresses its competitive and conflictual side. It is usually contrasted with idealism or liberalism, which tends to emphasize cooperation. Realists consider the principal actors in the international arena to be states, which are concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own national interests, and struggle for power. The negative side of the realists’ emphasis on power and self-interest is often their skepticism regarding the relevance of ethical norms to relations among states. National politics is the realm of authority and law, whereas international politics, they so metimes claim, is a sphere without justice, characterized by active or potential conflict among states. Not all realists, however, deny the presence of ethics in international relations. The distinction should be drawn between classical realism—represented by such twentieth-century theorists as Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau—and radical or extreme realism. While classical realism emphasizes the concept of national interest, it is not the Machiavellian doctrine “that anything is justified by reason of state” (Bull 1995, 189). Nor does it involve the glorification of war or conflict. The classical realists do not reject the possibility of moral judgment in international politics. Rather, they are critical of moralism—abstract moral discourse that does not take into account political realities. They assign supreme value to successful political action based on prudence: the ability to judge the rightness of a given action from among possible alternatives on the basis of its likely political consequences. Realism encompasses a variety of approaches and claims a long theoretical tradition. Among its founding fathers, Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes are the names most usually mentioned. Twentieth-century classical realism has today been largely replaced by neorealism, which is an attempt to construct a more scientific approach to the study of international relations. Both classical realism and neorealism have been subjected to criticism from IR theorists representing liberal, critical, and post-modern perspectives.

The Roots of the Realist Tradition Thucydides and the Importance of Power Like other classical political theorists, Thucydides (c. 460–c. 400 B.C.E.) saw politics as involving moral questions. Most importantly, he asks whether relations among states to which power is crucial can also be guided by the norms of justice. His History of the Peloponnesian War is in fact neither a work of political philosophy nor a sustained theory of international relations. Much of this work, which presents a partial account of the armed conflict between Athens and Sparta that took place from 431 to 404 B.C.E., consists of paired speeches by personages who argue opposing sides of an issue. Nevertheless, if the History is described as the only acknowledged classical text in international relations, and if it inspires theorists from Hobbes to contemporary international relations scholars, this is because it is more than a chronicle of events, and a theoretical position can be extrapolated from it. Realism is expressed in the very first speech of the Athenians recorded in the History—a speech given at the debate that took place in Sparta just before the war. Moreover, a realist perspective is implied in the way Thucydides explains the cause of the Peloponnesian War, and also in the famous “Melian Dialogue,” in the statements made by the Athenian envoys.

1 General Features of Realism in International Relations International relations realists emphasize the constraints imposed on politics by the nature of human beings, whom they consider egoistic, and by the absence of international government. Together these factors contribute to a conflict-based paradigm of international relations, in which the key actors are states, in which power and security become the main issues, and in which there is little place for morality. The set of premises concerning state actors, egoism, anarchy, power, security, and morality that define the realist tradition are all present in Thucydides.

(1) Human nature is a starting point for classical political realism. Realists view human beings as inherently egoistic and self-interested to the extent that self- interest overcomes moral principles. At the debate in Sparta, described in Book I of Thucydides’ History, the Athenians affirm the priority of self-interest over morality. They say that considerations of right and wrong have “never turned people aside from the opportunities of aggrandizement offered by superior strength” (chap. 1 par. 76).

(2) Realists, and especially today’s neorealist, consider the absence of government, literally anarchy, to be the primary determinant of international political outcomes. The lack of a common rule-making and enforcing authority means, they argue, that the international arena is essentially a self-help system. Each state is responsible for its own survival and is free to define its own interests and to pursue power. Anarchy thus leads to a situation in which power has the overriding role in shaping interstate relations. In the words of the Athenian envoys at Melos, without any common authority that can enforce order, “the independent states survive [only] when they are powerful” (5.97).

(3) Insofar as realists envision the world of states as anarchic, they likewise view security as a central issue. To attain security, states try to increase their power and engage in power-balancing for the purpose of deterring potential aggressors. Wars are fought to prevent competing nations from becoming militarily stronger. Thucydides, while distinguishing between the immediate and underlying causes of the Peloponnesian War, does not see its real cause in any of the particular events that immediately preceded its outbreak. He instead locates the cause of the war in the changing distribution of power between the two blocs of Greek city-

22 states: the Delian League, under the leadership of Athens, and the Peloponnesian League, under the leadership of Sparta. According to him, the growth of Athenian power made the Spartans afraid for their security, and thus propelled them into war (1.23).

(4) Realists are generally skeptical about the relevance of morality to international politics. This can lead them to claim that there is no place for morality in international relations, or that there is a tension between demands of morality and requirements of successful political acti on, or that states have their own morality that is different from customary morality, or that morality, if employed at all, is merely used instrumentally to justify states’ conduct. A clear case of the rejection of ethical norms in relations among states can be found in the “Melian Dialogue” (5.85–113). This dialogue relates to the events of 416 B.C.E., when Athens invaded the island of Melos. The Athenian envoys presented the Melians with a choice, destruction or surrender, and from the outset asked them not to appeal to justice, but to think only about their survival. In the envoys’ words, “We both know that the decisions about justice are made in human discussions only when both sides are under equal compulsion, but when one side is stronger, it gets as much as it can, and the weak must accept that” (5.89). To be “under equal compulsion” means to be under the force of law, and thus to be subjected to a common lawgiving authority (Korab-Karpowicz 2006, 234). Since such an authority above states does not exist, the Athenians argue that in this lawless condition of international anarchy, the only right is the right of the stronger to dominate the weaker. They explicitly equate right with might, and exclude considerations of justice from foreign affairs.

.2 The “Melian Dialogue”—The First Realist-Idealist Debate We can thus find strong support for a realist perspective in the statements of the Athenians. The question remains, however, to what extent their realism coincides with Thucydides’ own viewpoint. Although substantial passages of the “Melian Dialogue,” as well as other parts of the History support a realistic reading, Thucydides’ position cannot be deduced from such selected fragments, but rather must be assessed on the basis of the wider context of his book. In fact, even the “Melian Dialogue” itself provides us with a number of contending views.

Political realism is usually contrasted by IR scholars with idealism or liberalism, a theoretical perspective that emphasizes international norms, interdependence among states, and international cooperation. The “Melian Dialogue,” which is one of the most frequently commented-upon parts of Thucydides’ History, presents the classic debate between the idealist and realist views: Can international politics be based on a moral order derived from the principles of justice, or will it forever remain the arena of conflicting national interests and power?

For the Melians, who employ idealistic arguments, the choice is between war and subjection (5.86). They are courageous and love their country. They do not wish to lose their freedom, and in spite of the fact that they are militarily weaker than the Athenians, they are prepared to defend themselves (5.100; 5.112). They base their arguments on an appeal to justice, which they associate with fairness, and regard the Athenians as unjust (5.90; 5.104). They are pious, believing that gods will support their just cause and compensate for their weakness, and trust in alliances, thinking that their allies, the Spartans, who are also related to them, will help them (5.104; 5.112). Hence, one can identify in the speech of the Melians elements of the idealistic or liberal world view: the belief that nations have the right to exercise political independence, that they have mutual obligations to one another and will carry out such obligations, and that a war of aggression is unjust. What the Melians nevertheless lack are resources and foresight. In their decision to defend themselves, they are guided more by their hopes than by the evidence at hand or by prudent calculations.

The Athenian argument is based on key realist concepts such as security and power, and is informed not by what the world should be, but by what it is. The Athenians disregard any moral talk and urge the Melians to look at the facts—that is, to recognize their military inferiority, to consider the potential consequences of their decision, and to think about their own survival (5.87; 5.101). There appears to be a powerful realist logic behind the Athenian arguments. Their position, based on security concerns and self-interest, seemingly involves reliance on rationality, intelligence, and foresight. However, upon close examination, their logic proves to be seriously flawed. Melos, a relatively weak state, does not pose any real security threat to them. The eventual destruction of Melos does not change the course of the Peloponnesian War, which Athens will lose a few years later.

In the History, Thucydides shows that power, if it is unrestrained by moderation and a sense of justice, brings about the uncontrolled desire for more power. There are no logical limits to the size of an empire. Drunk with the prospect of glory and gain, after conquering Melos, the Athenians engage in a war against Sicily. They pay no attention to the Melian argument that considerations of justice are useful to all in the longer run (5.90). And, as the Athenians overestimate their strength and in the end lose the war, their self-interested logic proves to be very shortsighted indeed.

It is utopian to ignore the reality of power in international relations, but it is equally blind to rely on power alone. Thucydides appears to support neither the naive idealism of the Melians nor the cynicism of their Athenian opponents. He teaches us to be on guard “against naïve-dreaming on international politics,” on the one hand, and “against the other pernicious extreme: unrestrained cynicism,” on the other (Donnelly 2000, 193). If he can be regarded as a political realist, his realism nonetheless prefigures neither realpolitik, in which traditional ethics is denied, nor today’s scientific neorealism, in which moral questions are largely ignored. Thucydides’ realism, neither immoral nor amoral, can rather be compared to that of Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron, and other twentieth-century classical realists, who, although sensible to the demands of national interest, would not deny that political actors on the international scene are subject to moral judgment.

Machiavelli’s Critique of the Moral Tradition Idealism in international relations, like realism, can lay claim to a long tradition. Unsatisfied with the world as they have found it, idealists have always tried to answer the question of “what ought to be” in politics. Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero were all political idealists who believed that there were some universal moral values on which political life could be based. Building on the work of his predecessors, Cicero developed the idea of a natural moral law that was applicable to both domestic and international politics. His ideas concerning righteousness in war were carried further in the writings of the Christian thinkers St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. In the late fifteenth century, when Niccolò Machiavelli was born, the idea that politics, including the relations among states, should be virtuous, and that the methods of warfare should remain subordinated to ethical standards, still predominated in political literature.

Machiavelli (1469–1527) challenged this well-established moral tradition, thus positioning himself as a political innovator. The novelty of his approach lies in his critique of classical Western political thought as unrealistic, and in his separation of politics from ethics. He thereby lays the foundations for modern politics. In chapter XV of The Prince, Machiavelli announces that in departing from the teachings of earlier thinkers, he seeks “the effectual truth of the matter rather than the imagined one.” The “effectual truth” is for him the only truth worth seeking. It represents the sum of the practical conditions that he believes are required to make both the individual and the country prosperous and strong. Machiavelli replaces the ancient virtue (a moral quality of the individual, such as justice or self- restraint) with virtù, ability or vigor. As a prophet of virtù, he promises to lead both nations and individuals to earthly glory and power.

Machiavellianism is a radical type of political realism that is applied to both domestic and international affairs. It is a doctrine which denies the relevance of morality in politics, and claims that all means (moral and immoral) are justified to achieve certain political ends. Although Machiavelli never uses the phrase ragione di stato or its French equivalent, raison d’état, what ultimately counts for him is precisely that: whatever is good for the state, rather than ethical scruples or norms

Machiavelli justified immoral actions in politics, but never refused to admit that they are evil. He operated within the single framework of traditional morality. It became a specific task of his nineteenth-century followers to develop the doctrine of a double ethics: one public and one private, to push Machiavellian realism to even further extremes, and to apply it to international relations. By asserting that “the state has no higher duty than of maintaining itself,” Hegel gave an ethical sanction to the state’s promotion of its own interest and advantage against other states (Meinecke 357). Thus he overturned the traditional morality. The good of the state was perversely interpreted as the highest moral value, with the extension of national power regarded as a nation’s right and duty. Referring to Machiavelli, Heinrich von Treitschke declared that the state was power, precisely in order to assert itself as against other equally independent powers, and that the supreme moral duty of the state was to foster this power. He considered international agreements to be binding only insofar as it was expedient for the state. The idea of an autonomous ethics of state behavior and the concept of realpolitik were thus introduced. Traditional ethics was denied and power politics was associated with a “higher” type of morality. These concepts, along with the belief in the superiority of Germanic culture, served as weapons with which German statesmen, from the eighteenth century to the end of the Second World War, justified their policies of conquest and extermination.

Machiavelli is often praised for his prudential advice to leaders (which has caused him to be regarded as a founding master of modern political strategy) and for his defense of the republican form of government. There are certainly many aspects of his thought that merit such praise. Nevertheless, it is also possible to see him as the thinker who bears foremost responsibility for the demoralization of Europe. The argument of the Athenian envoys presented in Thucydides’ “Melian Dialogue,” that of Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic, or that of Carneades, to whom Cicero refers—all of these challenge the ancient and Christian views of the unity of politics and ethics. However, before Machiavelli, this amoral or immoral mode of thinking had never prevailed in the mainstream of Western politic al thought. It was the force and timeliness of his justification of resorting to evil as a legitimate means of achieving po litical ends that persuaded so many of the thinkers and political practitioners who followed him. The effects of Machiavellian ideas, such as the notion that the employment of all possible means was permissible in war, would be seen on the battlefields of modern Europe, as mass citizen armies fought against each other to the bitter end without regard for the rules of justice. The tension between expediency and morality lost its validity in the sphere of politics. The concept of a double ethics, private and public, that created a further damage to traditional, customary ethics was invented. The doctrine of raison d’état ultimately led to the politics of Lebensraum, two world wars, and the Holocaust.

Perhaps the greatest problem with realism in international relations is that it has a tendency to slip into its extreme version, which accepts any policy that can benefit the state at the expense of other states, no matter how morally problematic the policy is. Even if they do not explic itly raise ethical questions, in the works of Waltz and of many other of today’s neorealists, a double ethics is presupposed, and words such realpolitik no longer have the negative connotations that they had for classical realists, such as Hans Morgenthau. Hobbes’s Anarchic State of Nature Thomas Hobbes (1588–1683) was part of an intellectual movement whose goal was to free the emerging modern science from the constraints of the classical and scholastic heritage. According to classical political philosophy, on which the idealist perspective is based, human beings can control their desires through reason and can work for the benefit of others, even at the expense of their own benefit. They are thus both rational and moral agents, capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, and of making moral choices. They are also naturally social. With great skill Hobbes attacks these views. His human beings, extremely individualistic rather than moral or social, are subject to “a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that cease s only in death” (Leviathan XI 2). They 24 therefore inevitably struggle for power. In setting out such ideas, Hobbes contributes to some of the basic conceptions fundamental to the realist tradition in international relations, and especially to neorealism. These include the characterization of human nature as egoistic, the concept of international anarchy, and the view that politics, rooted in the struggle for power, can be rationalized and studied scientifically.

One of the most widely known Hobbesian concepts is that of the anarchic state of nature, seen as entailing a state of war—and “such a war as is of every man against every man” (XII 8). He derives his notion of the state of war from his views of both human nature and the condition in which individuals exist. Since in the state of nature there is no government and everyone enjoys equal status, every individual has a right to everything; that is, there are no constraints on an individual’s behavior. Anyone may at any time use force, and all must constantly be ready to counter such force with force. Hence, driven by acquisitiveness, having no moral restraints, and motivated to compete for scarce goods, individuals are apt to “invade” one another for gain. Being suspicious of one another and driven by fear, they are also likely to engage in preemptive actions and invade one another to ensure their own safety. Finally, individuals are also driven by pride and a desire for glory. Whether for gain, safety, or reputation, power-seeking individuals will thus “endeavor to destroy or subdue one another” (XIII 3). In such uncertain conditions where everyone is a potential aggressor, making war on others is a more advantageous strategy than peaceable behavior, and one needs to learn that domination over others is necessary for one’s own continued survival.

Hobbes is primarily concerned with the relationship between individuals and the state, and his comments about relations among states are scarce. Nevertheless, what he says about the lives of individuals in the state of nature can also be interpreted as a description of how states exist in relation to one another. Once states are established, the individual drive for power becomes the basis for the states’ behavior, which often manifests itself in their efforts to dominate other states and peoples. States, “for their own security,” writes Hobbes, “enlarge their dominions upon all pretences of danger and fear of i nvasion or assistance that may be given to invaders, [and] endeavour as much as they can, to subdue and weaken their neighbors” (XIX 4). Accordingly, the quest and struggle for power lies at the core of the Hobbesian vision of relations among states. The same would later be true of the model of international relations developed by Hans Morgenthau, who was deeply influenced by Hobbes and adopted the same view of human nature. Similarly, the neorealist Kenneth Waltz would follow Hobbes’ lead regarding international anarchy (the fact that sovereign states are not subject to any higher common sovereign) as the essential element of international relations.

By subjecting themselves to a sovereign, individuals escape the war of all against all which Hobbes associates with the state of nature; however, this war continues to dominate relations among states. This does not mean that states are always fighting, but rather that they have a disposition to fight (XIII 8). With each state deciding for itself whether or not to use force, war may break out at any time. The achievement of domestic security through the creation of a state is then paralleled by a condition of inter-state insecurity. One can argue that if Hobbes were fully consistent, he would agree with the notion that, to escape this condition, states should also enter into a contract and submit themselves to a world sovereign. Although the idea of a world state would find support among some of today’s realists, this is not a position taken by Hobbes himself. He does not propose that a social contract among nations be implemented to bring international anarchy to an end. This is because the condition of insecurity in which states are placed does not necessarily lead to insecurity for their citizens. As long as an armed conflict or other type of hostility between states does not actually break out, individuals within a state can feel relatively secure.

The denial of the existence of universal moral principles in the relations among states brings Hobbes close to the Machiavellians and the followers of the doctrine of raison d’état. His theory of international relations, which assumes that independent states, like independent individuals, are enemies by nature, asocial and selfish, and that there is no moral limitation on their behavior, is a great challenge to the idealist political vision based on human sociability and to the concept of the international jurisprudence that is built on this vision. However, what separates Hobbes from Machiavelli and associates him more with classical realism is his insistence on the defensive character of foreign policy. His political theory does not put forward the invitation to do whatever may be advantageous for the state. His approach to international relations is prudential and pacific: sovereign states, like individuals, should be disposed towards peace which is commended by reason.

What Waltz and other neorealist readers of Hobbes’s works sometimes overlook is that he does not perceive international anarchy as an enviro nment without any rules. By suggesting that certain dictates of reason apply even in the state of nature, he affirms that more peaceful and cooperative international relations are possible. Neither does he deny the existence of international law. Sovereign states can sign treaties with one another to pro vide a legal basis for their relations. At the same time, however, Hobbes seems aware that international rules will often prove ineffective in restraining the struggle for power. States will interpret them to their own advantage, and so international law will be obeyed or ignored according to the interests of the states affected. Hence, international relations will always tend to be a precarious affair. This grim view of global politics lies at the core of Hobbes’s realism. Twentieth Century Classical Realism Twentieth-century realism was born in response to the idealist perspective that dominated international relations scholarship in the aftermath of the First World War. The idealists of the 1920s and 1930s (also called liberal internationalists or utopians) had the goal of building peace in order to prevent another world conflict. They saw the solution to inter-state problems as being the creation of a respected system of international law, backed by international organizations. This interwar idealism resulted in the founding of the League of Nations in 1920 and in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 outlawing war and providing for the peaceful settlements of disputes. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, scholars such as Norman Angell, Alfred Zimmern, and Raymond B. Fosdick, and other prominent idealists of the era, gave their intellectual support to the League of Nations. Instead of 25 focusing on what some might see as the inevitability of conflict between states and peoples, they chose to emphasize the common interests that could unite humanity, and attempted to appeal to rationality and morality. For them, war did not originate in an egoistic human nature, but rather in imperfect social conditions and political arrangements, which could be improved. Yet their ideas were already being criticized in the early 1930s by Reinhold Niebuhr and within a few years by E. H. Carr. The League of Nations, which the United States never joined, and from which Japan and Germany withdrew, could not prevent the outbreak of the Second World War. This fact, perhaps more than any theoretical argument, produced a strong realist reaction. Although the United Nations, founded in 1945, can still be regarded as a product of idealist political thinking, the discipline of international relations was profoundly influenced in the initial years of the post-war period by the works of “classical” realists such as John H. Herz, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Raymond Aron. Then, during the 1950s and 1960s, classical realism came under challenge of scholars who tried to introduce a more scientific approach to the study of international politics. During the 1980s it gave way to another trend in international relations theory—neorealism.

Since it is impossible within the scope of this article to introduce all of the thinkers who contributed to the development of twentieth-century classical realism, E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, as perhaps the most influential among them, have been selected for discussion here. E. H. Carr’s Challenge to Utopian Idealism In his main work on international relations, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, first published in July 1939, Edward Hallett Carr (1892–1982) attacks the idealist position, which he describes as “utopianism.” He characterizes this position as encompassing faith in reason, confidence in progress, a sense of moral rectitude, and a belief in an underlying harmony of interests. According to the idealists, war is an aberration in the course of normal life and the way to prevent it is to educate people for peace, and to build systems of collective security such as the League of Nations or today’s United Nations. Carr challenges idealism by questioning its claim to moral universalism and its idea of the harmony of interests. He declares that “morality can only be relative, not universal” (19), and states that the doctrine of the harmony of interests is invoked by privileged groups “to justify and maintain their dominant position” (75).

Carr uses the concept of the relativity of thought, which he traces to Marx and other modern theorists, to show that standards by which policies are judged are the products of circumstances and interests. His central idea is that the interests of a given party always determine what this party regards as moral principles, and hence, these principles are not universal. Carr observes that politicians, for example, often use the language of justice to cloak the particular interests of their own countries, or to create negative images of other people to justify acts of aggression. The existence of such instances of morally discrediting a potential enemy or morally justifying one’s own position shows, he argues, that moral ideas are derived from actual policies. Policies are not, as the idealists would have it, based on some universal norms, independent of interests of the parties involved.

If specific moral standards are de facto founded on interests, Carr’s argument goes, there are also interests underlying what are regarded as absolute principles or universal moral values. While the idealists tend to regard such values, such as peace or justice, as universal and claim that upholding them is in the interest of all, Carr argues against this view. According to him, there are neither universal values nor universal interests. He claims that those who refer to universal interests are in fact acting in their own interests (71). They think that what is best for them is best for everyone, and identify their own interests with the universal interest of the world at large.

The idealist concept of the harmony of interests is based on the notion that human beings can rationally recognize that they have some interests in common, and that cooperation is therefore possible. Carr contrasts this idea with the reality of conflict of interests. According to him, the world is torn apart by the particular interests of different individuals and groups. In such a conflictual environment, order is based on power, not on morality. Further, morality itself is the product of power (61). Like Hobbes, Carr regards morality as constructed by the particular legal system that is enforced by a coercive power. International moral norms are imposed on other countries by dominant nations or groups of nations that present themselves as the international community as a whole. They are invented to perpetuate those nations’ dominance.

Values that idealists view as good for all, such as peace, social justice, prosperity, and international order, are regarded by Carr as mere status quo notions. The powers that are satisfied with the status quo regard the arrangement in place as just and therefore preach peace. They try to rally everyone around their idea of what is good. “Just as the ruling class in a community prays for domestic peace, which guarantees its own security and predominance, … so international peace becomes a special vested interest of predominant powers” (76). On the other hand, the unsatisfied powers consider the same arrangement as unjust, and so prepare for war. Hence, the way to obtain peace, if it cannot be simply enforced, is to satisfy the unsatisfied powers. “Those who profit most by [international] order can in the longer run only hope to maintain it by making sufficient concessions to make it tolerable to those who profit by it le ast” (152). The logical conclusion to be drawn by the reader of Carr’s book is the policy of appeasement.

Carr was a sophisticated thinker. He recognized himself that the logic of “pure realism can offer nothing but a naked struggle for power which makes any kind of international society impossible” (87). Although he demolishes what he calls “the current utopia” of idealism, he at the same time attempts to build “a new utopia,” a realist world order (ibid.). Thus, he acknowledges that human beings need certain fundamental, universally acknowledged norms and values, and

26 contradicts his own argument by which he tries to deny universality to any norms or values. To make further objections, the fact that the language of universal moral values can be misused in politics for the benefit of one party or another, and that such values can only be imperfectly implemented in political institutions, does not mean that such values do not exist. There is a deep yearning in many human beings, both privileged and unprivileged, for peace, order, prosperity, and justice. The legitimacy of idealism consists in the constant attempt to reflect upon and uphold these values. Idealists fail if in their attempt they do not pay enough attention to the reality of power. On the other hand, in the world of pure realism, in which all values are made relative to interests, life turns into nothing more than a power game and is unbearable.

The Twenty Years’ Crisis touches on a number of universal ideas, but it also reflects the spirit of its time. While we can fault the interwar idealist s for their inability to construct international institutions strong enough to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War, this book indicates that interwar realists were likewise unprepared to meet the challenge. Carr frequently refers to Germany under Nazi rule as if it were a country like any other. He says that should Germany cease to be an unsatisfied power and “become supreme in Europe,” it would adopt a language of international solidarity similar to that of other Western powers (79). The inability of Carr and other realists to recognize the perilous nature of Nazism, and their belief that Germany could be satisfied by territorial concessions, helped to foster a political environment in which the latter was to grow in power, annex Czechoslovakia at will, and be militarily opposed in September 1939 by Poland alone.

A theory of international relations is not just an intellectual enterprise; it has practical consequences. It influences our thinking and po litical practice. On the practical side, the realists of the 1930s, to whom Carr gave intellectual support, were people opposed to the system of collective security embodied in the League of Nations. Working within the foreign policy establishments of the day, they contributed to its weakness. Once they had weakened the League, they pursued a policy of appeasement and accommodation with Germany as an alternative to collective security (Ashworth 46). After the annexation of Czechoslovakia, when the failure of the anti-League realist conservatives gathered around Neville Chamberlain and of this policy became clear, they tried to rebuild the very security system they had earlier demolished. Those who supported collective security were labeled idealists. 2.2 Hans Morgenthau’s Realist Principles Hans J. Morgenthau (1904–1980) developed realism into a comprehensive international relations theory. Influenced by the Protestant theologian and political writer Reinhold Niebuhr, as well as by Hobbes, he places selfishness and power-lust at the center of his picture of human existence. The insatiable human lust for power, timeless and universal, which he identifies with animus dominandi, the desire to dominate, is for him the main cause of conflict. As he asserts in his main work, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, first published in 1948, “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power” (25).

Morgenthau systematizes realism in international relations on the basis of six principles that he includes in the second edition of Politics among Nations. As a traditionalist, he opposes the so-called scientists (the scholars who, especially in the 1950s, tried to reduce the discipline of international relations to a branch of behavioral science). Nevertheless, in the first principle he states that realism is based on objective laws that have their roots in unchanging human nature (4). He wants to develop realism into both a theory of international politics and a political art, a useful tool of foreign policy.

The keystone of Morgenthau’s realist theory is the concept of power or “of interest defined in terms of power,” which informs his second principle: the assumption that political leaders “think and act in terms of interest defined as power” (5). This concept defines the autonomy of politics, and allows for the analysis of foreign policy regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of individual politicians. Furthermore, it is the foundation of a rational picture of politics.

Although, as Morgenthau explains in the third principle, interest defined as power is a universally valid category, and indeed an essential element of politics, various things can be associated with interest or power at different times and in different circumstances. Its content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment.

In the fourth principle, Morgenthau considers the relationship between realism and ethics. He says that while realists are aware of the moral significance of political action, they are also aware of the tension between morality and the requirements of successful political action. “Universal moral principles,” he asserts, “cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but …they must be filtered through the c oncrete circumstances of time and place” (9). These principles must be accompanied by prudence for as he cautions “there can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action” (ibid.).

Prudence, and not conviction of one’s own moral or ideological superiority, should guide political action. This is stressed in the fifth principle, where Morgenthau again emphasizes the idea that all state actors, including our own, must be looked at solely as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power. By taking this point of view vis-à-vis its counterparts and thus avoiding ideological confrontation, a state would then be able to pursue policies that respected the interests of other states, while protecting and promoting its own.

Insofar as power, or interest defined as power, is the concept that defines politics, politics is an autonomous sphere, as Mo rgenthau says in his sixth principle of realism. It cannot be subordinated to ethics. However, ethics does still play a role in politics. “A man who was nothing but ‘political man’ would be a beast, for he

27 would be completely lacking in moral restraints. A man who was nothing but ‘moral man’ would be a fool, for he would be completely lacking in prudence” (12). Political art requires that these two dimensions of human life, power and morality, be taken into consideration.

While Morgenthau’s six principles of realism contain repetitions and inconsistencies, we can nonetheless obtain from them the following picture: Power or interest is the central concept that makes politics into an autonomous discipline. Rational state actors pursue their national interests. Therefore, a rational theory of international politics can be constructed. Such a theory is not concerned with the morality, religious beliefs, motives or ideological preferences of individual political leaders. It also indicates that in order to avoid conflicts, states should avoid moral crusades or ideological confrontations, and look for compromise based solely on satisfaction of their mutual interests.

Although he defines politics as an autonomous sphere, Morgenthau does not follow the Machiavellian route of completely removi ng ethics from politics. He suggests that, although human beings are political animals, who pursue their interests, they are moral animals. Deprived of any morality, they would descend to the level of beasts or sub-humans. Even if it is not guided by universal moral principles, political action thus has for Morgenthau a moral significance. Ultimately directed toward the objective of national survival, it also involves prudence. The effective protection of citizens’ lives from harm is not merely a forceful physical action; it has prudential and moral dimensions.

Morgenthau regards realism as a way of thinking about international relations and a useful tool for devising policies. However, some of the basic conceptions of his theory, and especially the idea of conflict as stemming from human nature, as well as the concept of power itself, have provoked criticism.

International politics, like all politics, is for Morgenthau a struggle for power because of the basic human lust for power. But regarding every individual as being engaged in a perpetual quest for power—the view that he shares with Hobbes—is a questionable premise. Human nature cannot be revealed by observation and experiment. It cannot be proved by any empirical research, but only disclosed by philosophy, imposed on us as a matter of belief, and inculcated by education.

Morgenthau himself reinforces the belief in the human drive for power by introducing a normative aspect of his theory, which is rationality. A ratio nal foreign policy is considered “to be a good foreign policy” (7). But he defines rationality as a process of calculating the costs and benefits of all alternative policies in order to determine their relative utility, i.e. their ability to maximize power. Statesmen “think and act in terms of interest defined as power” (5). Only intellectual weakness of policy makers can result in foreign policies that deviate from a rational course aimed at minimizing risks and maximizing benefits. Hence, rather than presenting an actual portrait of human affairs, Morgenthau emphasizes the pursuit of power and the rationality of this pursuit, and sets it up as a norm.

As Raymond Aron and other scholars have noticed, power, the fundamental concept of Morgenthau’s realism, is ambiguous. It can be either a means or an end in politics. But if power is only a means for gaining something else, it does not define the nature of international politics in the way Morgenthau claims. It does not allow us to understand the actions of states independently from the motives and ideological preferences of their political le aders. It cannot serve as the basis for defining politics as an autonomous sphere. Morgenthau’s principles of realism are thus open to doubt. “Is this true,” Aron asks, “that states, whatever their regime, pursue the same kind of foreign policy” (597) and that the foreign policies of Napoleon or Stalin are essentially identical to those of Hitler, Louis XVI or Nicholas II, amounting to no more than the struggle for power? “If one answers yes, then the proposition is incontestable, but not very instructive” (598). Accordingly, it is useless to define actions of states by exclusive reference to power, security or national interest. International politics cannot be studied independently of the wider historical and cultural context.

Although Carr and Morgenthau concentrate primarily on international relations, their realism can also be applied to domestic politics. To be a classical realist is in general to perceive politics as a conflict of interests and a struggle for power, and to seek peace by recognizing common interests and trying to satisfy them, rather than by moralizing. Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss, influential representatives of the new political realism, a movement in contemporary political theory, criticize what they describe as “political moralism” and stress the autonomy of politics against ethics. However, political theory realism and international relations realism seem like two separate research programs. As noted by several scholars (William Scheuerman, Alison McQueen, Terry Nardin. Duncan Bell), those who contribute to realism in political theory give little attention to those who work on realism in international politics. Conclusion: The Cautionary and Changing Character of Realism An unintended and unfortunate consequence of the debate about neorealism is that neorealism and a large part of its critique (with the notable exception of the

English School) has been expressed in abstract scientific and philosophical terms. This has made the theory of international politics almost inaccessible to a layperson and has divided the discipline of international relations into incompatible parts. Whereas classical realism was a theory aimed at supporting diplomatic practice and providing a guide to be followed by those seeking to understand and deal with potential threats, today’s theorie s, concerned with various grand pictures and projects, are ill-suited to perform this task. This is perhaps the main reason why there has been a renewed interest in classical realism, and particularly in the ideas of Morgenthau. Rather than being seen as an obsolete form of pre-scientific realist thought, superseded by neorealist theory, his thinking is now considered to be more complex and of greater contemporary relevance than was earlier recognized (Williams 2007, 1–9). It fits uneasily in the orthodox picture of realism he is usually associated with.

In recent years, scholars have questioned prevailing narratives about clear theoretical traditions in the discipline of international relations. Thucydides,

Machiavelli, Hobbes and other thinkers have become subject to re-examination as a means of challenging prevailing uses of their legacies in the discipline and

exploring other lineages and orientations. Morgenthau has undergone a similar process of reinterpretation. A number of scholars (Hartmut Behr, Muriel Cozette,

Amelia Heath, Sean Molloy) have endorsed the importance of his thought as a source of change for the standard interpretation of realism. Murielle Cozette

stresses Morgenthau’s critical dimension of realism expressed in his commitment to “speak truth to power” and to “unmask power’s claims to truth and morality,”

and in his tendency to assert different claims at different times (Cozette 10–12). She writes: “The protection of human life and freedom are given central

importance by Morgenthau, and constitute a ‘transcendent standard of ethics’ which should always animate scientific enquiries” (19). This shows the flexibility of

his classical realism and reveals his normative assumptions based on the promotion of universal moral values. While Morgenthau assumes that states are power-

oriented actors, he at the same time acknowledges that international politics would be more pernicious than it actually is were it not for moral restraints and the

work of international law(Behr and Heath 333).

Another avenue for the development of a realist theory of international relations is offered by Robert Gilpin’s seminal work War and Change in World Politics. If

this work were to gain greater prominence in IR scholarship, instead of engaging in fruitless theoretical debates, we would be better prepared today “for rapid

power shifts and geopolitical change ”(Wohlforth, 2011 505). We would be able to explain the causes of great wars and long pe riods of peace, and the creation

and waning of international orders. Still another avenue is provided by the application of the new scientific discoveries to social sciences. The evidence for this is,

for example, the recent work of Alexander Wendt, Quantum Mind and Social Science. A new realist approach to international politics could be based on the

organic and holistic world view emerging from quantum theory, the idea of human evolution, and the growing awareness of the role of human beings in the

evolutionary process (Korab-Karpowicz 2017).

Realism is thus more than a static, amoral theory, and cannot be accommodated solely within a positivist interpretation of international relations. It is a practical

and evolving theory that depends on the actual historical and political conditions, and is ultimately judged by its ethical standards and by its relevance in making

prudent political decisions (Morgenthau 1962). Realism also performs a useful cautionary role. It warns us against progressivism, moralism, legalism, and other

orientations that lose touch with the reality of self-interest and power. Considered from this perspective, the neorealist revival of the 1970s can also be interpreted

as a necessary corrective to an overoptimistic liberal belief in international cooperation and change resulting from interdependence.

Nevertheless, when it becomes a dogmatic enterprise, realism fails to perform its proper function. By remaining stuck in a state-centric and excessively simplified

“paradigm” such as neorealism and by denying the possibility of any progress in interstate relations, it turns into an ideology. Its emphasis on power politics and

national interest can be misused to justify aggression. It has therefore to be supplanted by theories that take better account of the dramatically changing picture of

global politics. To its merely negative, cautionary function, positive norms must be added. These norms extend from the rationality and prudence stressed by

classical realists; through the vision of multilateralism, international law, and an international society emphasized by liberals and members of the English School;

to the cosmopolitanism and global solidarity advocated by many of today’s writers.

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REALISM CLASSICAL & NEOCLASSICAL REALISM

Realism is possibly the oldest of all approaches and schools of thought related to the field of International Relations. Realism explains international relations in terms of “power”. Therefore, usually the realist approach is named as Realpolitik or power politics. The Realist school is based on the views of Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes on human nature, that is, they are pessimists on human nature and believe that each person will use others to reach his/her goals, that is, people are in fact selfish. Power in this context, can be understood as “the ability to make another actor do what it would not have normally done.” So, the main idea behind Realism is that “actors in the international system are as powerful as their ability to affect others more than these others affect them.” The first Realist can be seen as the Chinese philosopher and strategist Sun Tzu who lived in the 5th century before Christianity. Sun Tzu claimed that when confronting armed and hostile neighbours, moral reasoning was not useful for state rulers. He developed theories concerning the use of power to improve their positions. About a century later from Sun Tzu, the Greek philosopher and historian Thucydides wrote the chronicles of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides famously argued that “the strong do what they have the power to do, and the weak accept what they have to accept.” In the end of 15th century, the Florentine philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli argued in his most famous work The Prince that a prince, or a ruler, has a difficult task as he must stabilize his power and build a lasting structure. This task may require the Prince to do things of an evil nature in order to achieve the greater good. The Prince is the first book that doesn’t define an ideal state or an ideal sovereign. Machiavelli just explains with examples which princes are the most successful in obtaining and maintaining power. He uses personal observations and from history. The book’s central argument is "the ends justify the means": any evil action can be justified if it is done for a good purpose. However, because Machiavelli placed a number of restrictions on evil actions, his arguments were not unethical. Again, the 17th century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes argues with his famous maxim “homo homini lupus,” that any “man is a wolf to another man.” Hobbes argued that a strong monarchy can create order. However, the modern Realist views only emerged in the 19th century, when nation-states became the norm in European politics. Especially after the German Unification of 1871, the foreign policy of German Chancellor Bismarck which is called Realpolitik can be seen as the application of Realism in the modern sense of it for the first time. The practice of many states after World War I until today show a tendency to follow Realist point of view. Basically, Realism has four major assumptions: Human beings are selfish, interest-maximizing creatures; human nature is not positive.

International relations are basically and necessarily conflictual and international conflicts are generally resolved by war.National survival and each state’s security are above and beyond all other matters. And, finally, Unlike domestic political life, there cannot be progress in international politics, because there are no superior agencies that regulate the international system. In the 20th century, the most important Classical Realist thinker was Hans J. Morgenthau who believed men and women have “will to power”, and that international politics isn’t any different from domestic politics in that respect. Morgenthau wrote in his 1965 book Scientific Man Versus Politics that “Politics is a struggle for power over men, and whatever its ultimate aim may be, power is its immediate goal and the modes of acquiring, maintaining, and demonstrating it determine the technique of political action.” Morgenthau also believes that there is an animus dominant, a human lust/craving for power, which dictates a search for both relative advantage over others and a secure political space in which a person can enjoy his life free from outside political pressures. The animus dominandi eventually brings men and women into conflict with each other and that creates the framework for power politics which is at the heart of all Realist thinking. So, Morgenthau argues just like Machiavelli that there should be different sets of moralities, one for the private sphere, and the other for the public sphere. Political ethics can be used to do some things that cannot be accepted nor forgiven by private, personal, social ethics. Therefore, it is safe to say that Classical Realists believe that the main component of politics is power; and that the goal of power, the means of power, and the uses of power are the main preoccupations of the Realist approaches to international relations. Realists also have a very important view: the international system is an anarchical society, that is, the international system has no dominant authority, there is no world government to arrange the international system. As there is no higher authority, they say, the state is the supreme actor in the international system. All other actors, that is to say, IGOs, NGOs, civil society organisations, aid and relief organisations and all others, are either less important or unimportant in and for the international system. According to the Realists, the main point of foreign policy is to protect and defend the interests of one’s state in international politics. However, they also believe that states are unequal because there is an international hierarchy of power amongst states: at the top, there are the Great Powers and the core of international relations, according to the Realists is the power struggle between these great powers for domination and security. Consequently, the normative, standard-setting core of realism is national security and state survival. States, in a Hobbesian tradition, are considered as essential for the good life of their citizens, therefore the main aim of foreign policy should be the defence and improvement of national interest. Concomitantly, as each state is to pursue the improvement of its own national interest, no other country or government can be trusted. If we look at Morgenthau’s Neoclassical Realism, we can see general patterns emerging: During the 1950s and 1960s, social sciences were transformed by what is known as the Behaviouralist Revolution. Behaviouralism is an approach in political science which aims to provide an objective, quantified approach to explaining and predicting political behaviour, taking its model from natural sciences, trying to apply the methods of natural, quantitative sciences to social sciences. This changed the way people approached social sciences and hence to IR, as well. The last important Classical/Neoclassical Realist thinker is Thomas Schelling who wrote in 1960s till 1990s. Schelling’s idea of realism is called Strategic Realism which mainly focuses on foreign policy decision-making. According to Schelling, when state leaders face diplomatic and military problems, they have to think strategically and actively to be successful. Schelling tried to provide tools for strategic thinking. Schelling saw diplomacy and international relations of great powers and especially of US, as a rational- operational activity which can best be understood by applying a form of logical analysis named the “game theory”. Schelling argues in his book The Strategy of Conflict (1960), that diplomacy is simply bargaining in which both involved parties seek an outcome which would not be ideal for each side but will be far better than some of the alternatives such as waging war. With enough military force, a country may not need to bargain at all.

NEOREALISM / STRUCTURAL REALISM Kenneth Waltz is the creator, the major advocate, and the leader of the next and newest stage of Realism which is called Neorealism. The idea of Neorealism is based on Strategic Realism of Schelling. Neorealism has two major branches which can be labelled as Defensive Realism and Offensive Realism. The main difference between the Neorealists and the Classical, Neoclassical, and Strategic Realists is that the Classical

Realists think of power, as Morgenthau does, as an end, as a goal to be reached. However, Neorealists see power as a means, as something to use to reach their goal, and their main goal is the survival of the state. Kenneth Waltz tried to explain in his famous books Man, the State, and War (1959) and Theory of International Politics (1979) that human nature and political ethics in order to create a “scientific theory of IR”. His approach is heavily influenced by positivist economic models. Waltz believes that a scientific IR theory will help us understand how states will behave, and the best way to do it is the neorealist systems theory. This theory focuses directly on the international system, its components and their interactions, as well as the continuities and the changes in the system. While classical realism focuses on leaders and their intentions, Neorealism focuses on the system itself. There is no central authority, so there is no hierarchy. However, there are differences among different kinds of anarchical systems in terms of stability. A bipolar system as in the Cold War period is more stable than multipolar systems as in the Interwar Period. Neorealism is built on five main assumptions. These assumptions are: States are rational actors. They generally come up with reliable strategies which maximise their expectations for survival. The main goal of any state is survival. States aim to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political system. These two always come before other goals. All states own some offensive military capability. Each state can harm its neighbours to a degree, and surely this capability changes from state to state and in time. A state can never be certain about the intentions of other states. One can never know if a state in the system wants to change, alter, the existing balance of power and hence is a revisionist state or whether they are happy with the current balance of power, hence is a status quo state. Intentions are only in the minds of decision-makers, and even if we can understand a state’s position at present, we cannot be sure of its future position; so, one can never be sure about the intentions of any state at any given time. Great Powers are the main actors in world politics and they operate in an anarchical system. The outcome of any international event and how the world system is shaped are issues directly related to the situation of the Great Powers that exist at any time. The number of and the balance of power between the great powers affect the world system’s construction, the rules and values that are seen as valid in the international system at that time, and how lesser powers manage to act. As a result, the main actors are the great powers as all other states and all other, lesser, actors have to act according to the needs and wishes of the great powers. These five requirements of the Neorealist system lead to a series of new areas of study. The existence of an anarchical international system and an unsaid need for balancing in the system lead to sub-branches of the Realist worldview. For example, Herz’s and Glaser’s theories of security dilemma states that most of the steps a Great Power takes to ensure its security leads to the increased insecurity of others, and so limits other states’ positions. The threatened states do whatever they need to do to stop this change, and this leads to a security competition.

Waltz’s Defensive Realism in the Post-Cold War World capabilities from his theory (Waltz 1979, 99). Moreover, Waltz (1979, 91–2, 118–9) only makes two explicit assumptions regarding states: that they are unitary actors and that they, at minimum, pursue policies to ensure their own survival. Since Waltz (1979, 105, 118) assumes that states are unitary actors that only differ in their capabilities and have to take care of themselves in the anarchic system, the balance of power becomes an ‘iron law’ as states can only assure their survival by making sure that none of their rivals grow too powerful. The balance of power is the dynamic part of Waltz’s otherwise static theoretical model as he contends that the number of great powers, who possess the greatest capabilities, makes up the balance or the poles of the international system and shape its character (1979, 129–130, 144). In this regard, the differentiations are between a bipolar system where the balance is maintained by two great powers and a multipolar system in which the anarchic system is inhabited by three or more great powers (Waltz 1979, 161). In Waltz’s view, a bipolar world is more stable than a multipolar world since ‘uncertainties about who threatens whom, about who will oppose whom, and about who will gain or lose from the actions of other states accelerate as the number of states increases’ (1979, 165). Interestingly, Waltz makes no mention of unipolarity in his highly influential 1979 monograph, Theory of International Politics. In his empirical writings and his publications after 1993, Waltz has however consistently maintained that the post-Cold War world is unipolar with the United States as the reigning hegemon (see e.g. Waltz 1997, 914; Waltz 2000a, 27; Waltz 2000b, 23; Waltz 2004, 4–6). In his article Structural Realism after the Cold War published at the dawn of the new millennium, Waltz for instance writes that ‘[u]pon the demise of the Soviet Union, the international political system became unipolar’ (2000b, 27). Although Waltz has constantly claimed that the post-Cold War era has been characterised by unipolarity and global American hegemony in his publications published after ‘The Emerging Structure of International 34

Politics’, he has insisted that the unipolar moment will be brief and that the world will eventually become multipolar (Waltz 2000b, 29–41; Waltz 2000a, 25–36). It is not hard to see why Waltz consistently points out that unipolarity will be short-lived and that the world will become multipolar in the future. His theory does, after all, assume that states will balance against a preponderant power no matter how benign the hegemon might be (Waltz 2000b, 30). Consequently, Waltz (2000b, 30, 36–8) maintains that American power will be checked in the blink of an eye, historically speaking. Waltz (2000b, 36–8) is also careful to point out that the United States cannot do anything to solidify its hegemony, as a new balancing coalition will be formed against it, no matter what measures the US takes to prevent such an outcome.6 Waltz himself specifically acknowledges that the balancing principle that his theory is based on suggests that American hegemony and unipolarity will be replaced by a multipolar system (2000b, 30). Waltz asserts that the European Union or a German-led coalition, China, Japan, and in a more distant future Russia will be the most likely balancers in this new constellation.

PRISONERS’ DILEMMA AND SECURITY DILEMMA

The above-cited Neorealist assumptions lead to the idea that states cannot be sure of what their neighbours and/or competitors are going to do. As a result, they stay face to face with a dilemma called the Security Dilemma. It is based on the Prisoners’ Dilemma of Game Theory which is generally used in Economics and Management. However, the Prisoners’ Dilemma is the most widely used Game Theory scenario in International Relations. The Prisoners’ Dilemma is this:

Two people are arrested because of a crime. They are taken into two separate interrogation rooms, so one doesn’t know what the other will do. The prosecutor gives them three options:

. If both do not speak at all, if both stay silent, they both leave without any punishment. . If one of them remains silent and the other confesses to their crime, the one who remains silent is sentenced to 25 years in prison. . If both confess to their crimes, they both serve 10 years in prison. Even though what serves their best interest is to remain silent, they cannot be sure of their partner’s position and don’t want to go to prison for 25 years. So, they choose the second best option and begin to confess, hence making sure they will be in prison for 10 years instead of not talking and walking free.

States, like these two prisoners, face a dilemma. Just like in the Prisoners’ Dilemma, a state faces three options because it is a rational actor which wants to guarantee its survival and security. The options for a state are these:

. It can trust its neighbour and not spend any money on buying arms and strengthening its armed forces, and so can its neighbouring state; . It can choose not to trust its neighbouring state and spends money on strengthening its armed forces while its neighbour doesn’t do that; . It can spend money on strengthening its armed forces while its neighbour also spends money on strengthening its armed forces. If the state in this scenario remains weak while its neighbour becomes stronger, it faces a possible war and annexation by its neighbour. If it spends too much, it would provoke the neighbouring state and start an “arms race” which would decrease the state’s resources and which may lead to an even more terrible war. If they both don’t spend on armament, they can spend on more rational areas such as improving education, industrial infrastructure, strengthening educational and medical sectors. However, because there is no trust, every state faces a Security Dilemma in which it has to choose the best option for itself: Will it help its nation but risk their security and the state’s survival, or will it help its armed forces to secure survival but risk industrial, educational, cultural development and improvement? This question, according to Neorealists, is answered only one way: The state has to –and does- choose its survival over development because state’s survival is the most important thing in the world.

Globalisation: Due to globalisation, goods, people, money and information flow from one state to another far more freely than at any previous time in human history. As a result, globalisation reduces the strength of the states as the major actors of international relations and sometimes it limits their sovereignty on their own territories. Failed States: The concept of “failed state” became important in the studies of IR in the last decade. These states have names, borders, even administrations, but they lack the power associated with normal functions of state. For instance, Chad, Iraq, and Rwanda are failed states: They cannot exercise authority and rule of law over their citizens, they cannot collect taxes, they cannot provide services that a state is

35 expected to provide for its citizens such as health, education, roads, safety, etc. So, the failed states are a problem that challenges the Realist school of thought. In recent years, the major debate in Neorealist circles is the NATO expansion issue. Some as Christopher L. Ball look at it as spreading the stability towards the East, and that the prime objective is regional security. Those who argue against NATO expansion as Michael McGwire claim it will threaten Russia and therefore cause greater insecurity. When we look at both sides, we see that they both operate within the same realist arguments but have different judgements on the issue. Those who are in favour seem to be more on the Classical/Neoclassical Realist line who favour moral responsibilities and other classical arguments and those who oppose are Neorealists.

At this point, many eyebrows may be raised concerning Waltz’s treatment of unipolarity and multipolarity. As Richard Little (2007, 189) puts it: ‘[g]iven the significance that Waltz attaches to the economics analogy and the importance that economists attach to monopoly, the failure to open up the issue of unipolarity in Theory of International Politics is surprising, while the focus on multipolarity in the post-Cold War era becomes distinctly odd.’ This omission of unipolarity and emphasis on multipolarity is however fully understandable once one realises that unipolarity is a condition that Waltz’s theory is inherently unable to deal with. It is also important to note that it is not only the behaviour of the sole great power in the international system – the hegemon – that becomes an anomaly to Waltz’s defensive realism under unipolarity but the entire system as a whole. This is evident when Waltz maintains that: ‘[i]n systems theory, structure is a generative notion; and the structure of a system is generated by the interactions of its principal parts [the great power(s)]’ as the ‘fates of all the states … are affected much more by the acts and the interactions of the major ones than of the minor ones’ (1979, 72). For this reason, Waltz claims that his general theory of international politics is based on the great powers but applies to lesser states ‘insofar as their interactions are insulated from the intervention of the great powers of a system’ (Waltz 1979, 73). Hence, since Waltz’s theory is admittedly based on the great powers and can only account for the behaviour of other states in so far as they can be induced from that of the great power(s), it must consequently mean that his defensive realism cannot account for smaller states either in unipolarity as it is incapable of explaining the behaviour of the only great power in the system under these conditions. As such, Waltz’s state-centric theory of international politics becomes inherently unable to account for any state behaviour under unipolarity. This is why the entire system becomes unexplainable by his theory. Indeed, since Waltz has argued that the international system has in fact been characterised by American hegemony since the end of the Cold War in his writings after 1993, this must mean that his theory cannot have had any explanatory power in the post-Cold War world, if assessed on its own terms.

DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE REALISM

Both Schelling’s Strategic Realism and Waltz’s Neorealism were parts of the Cold War political environment. They were aimed at understanding and explaining that unique international system problem. However, after the end of the Cold War, some aspects of these theories seemed not too reliable in explaining the international system. So, in 1993, John Mearsheimer tried to improve the Neorealist argument with his article titled “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” and applied Waltz’s argument to both the past and the future. He claims that Waltz was right to describe only two systems, Bipolar and Multipolar and asks the question what is to happen if a Bipolar world system is replaced by a multipolar system. His answer is that instability will grow and lead to violent conflicts. Mearsheimer sees the Cold War as an agent which transformed a very violent region like Europe to a peaceful region. He famously claims that “the West has an interest in maintaining peace in Europe. It therefore has an interest in maintaining the Cold War order, and hence has an interest in the continuation of the Cold War confrontation; developments that threaten to end it are dangerous.” However, as the two groups of Neorealism differ from each other in general, they are now seen as two sub-branches of Neorealism. The Waltz school is named now as Defensive Realism and Mearsheimer’s school is named as Offensive Realism. The Defensive Realists believe that it is unwise for states to try to maximise their share of world power because if they attempt to gain too much power, the system will punish them. Offensive Realists, on the other hand, claim that it makes good strategic sense for a state to gain as much power as possible and if the situation is right, to try to become the system’s hegemon, because to have overwhelming power ensures survival.

Defensive Realists like Kenneth Waltz, Barry Posen, Jack Snyder, and Stephen van Evera claim that states should not maximise their power because if any state becomes too powerful, balancing will take place just like in the examples of Napoleonic France, and Nazi Germany. According to defensive realism, when a great power invades another country, it brings more trouble than benefits, e.g., US and Iraq. These basic facts should be apparent for all states in the international system and should limit their appetite for more power. If not, they would threaten their own existence. Offensive Realists such as John Mearsheimer and DC Copeland think otherwise; they think that yes, there is an attempt to balance the aggressive states, but the balancing is generally not enough and so, the aggressor states may benefit from this inefficiency. Both sides agree that nuclear weapons have little utility for offensive purposes except the cases when only one side of the conflict owns them. Offensive realists expect that the great powers will always look for opportunities to gain advantage over each other. In the 21st century, the Realist doctrines seem to have problems due to three major problems in world politics that contrast with the Realist worldview. These problem areas are: The War against Terror: According to Realism, all other actors except the state are unimportant or, at least, not very important. However, the international environment is hugely affected by non-state actors such as the Al-Qaida terrorist organisation. So, the states of the world are facing a threat from a non-state actor and the Realists have no means to develop a meaningful relationship for terrorism in the international system. Some try to use Samuel P. Huntington’s “clash of civilisations” concept as a general cover to connect not only states but non-state actors, but the Realist theory is not very strong in this point.

As has been mentioned, his defensive realism is a state-centric systemic theory of international politics based on the anarchic structure of the international system and the distribution of capabilities across the system that revolves around balance of power which can be either bipolar or multipolar, according to Waltz’s writings in Theory of International Politics. In an anarchic unipolar world, there are however no longer any systemic constraints to shove and shape the hegemon’s behaviour in the international system. After all, Waltz maintains that states are judges in their own cases in an anarchic system (1959, 159). This means that even though anarchy may still persist in Waltz’s post-Cold War world, it can by itself not constrain the behaviour of the hegemon. Indeed, the hegemon can do as it pleases in the absence of a global Leviathan. This is because there is by definition no other greater power to balance against the hegemon in a unipolar world in order to constrain its behaviour. Hence, the necessary structural constraints that Waltz relies upon to explain state behaviour are no longer at play concerning the hegemon in unipolarity (2000b, 27). Even Waltz implicitly acknowledges this fact in a passage when he writes that: ‘[t]hrough the long years of the Cold War the might of each superpower balanced the might of the other and moderated the behaviour of both of them. Now the only superpower left in the field is free to act on its whims and follow its fancies’ (2004, 5). Waltz goes on to postulate that in a unipolar world there are no longer any checks and balances on the hegemon. Its behaviour is instead determined by its own internal policies rather than external structural pressures (Waltz 2003, 5).

This revelation suggests that Waltz’s (2004, 3) theory that ‘explains how external forces shape states’ behaviour, but says nothing about the effects of internal forces’ as he himself points out, cannot account for the hegemon in unipolarity. If we consider Waltz’s own arguments – that a) there are hardly any external forces on the hegemon in a unipolarity and that its behaviour is instead determined by its own internal forces and b) that his defensive realism can only explain how external forces affect state behaviour and have nothing to say about the effects of internal forces, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that his theory is inherently unequipped to account for the behaviour of the hegemon.

REALISM

Aim/contribution Key assumptions Key themes Key concepts Silences& Seminal Works limitations

 In the context  The realm of IR is  Study of IR is the study  Security  limited attention EH Carr, of the 30s, to governed by of the interaction to the role of  Sovereig The Twenty Years response to the objective laws between sovereign nty non-state actors Crisis (1939) perceived which is rooted in states  National delusions of human nature interests  little or no idealism  Power  The self-interested consideration to politics Hans Morgenthau,  The pursuit of behavior of states in economic Politics Among  To be sanguine power by the absence of any processes Nations (1948) and realistic individuals and overarching authority about the frailty states is ubiquitous on a global scale of human and unavoidable -- produces a condition of  relies on an nature and to - thus, conflict and anarchy impoverished trace the competition is conception of implications for endemic human nature the conduct of  In so far as conflict is and implausible IR avoided, this is not assumptions  The state is because of the pacific sovereign and the intentions of states but  To render IR a natural unit of precisely because of  narrowly state- rigorous and analysis in IR since the balance produced centric dispassionate states recognize by the aggressive science of no authority above pursuit of power and  less an accurate world politics themselves and security by states theory of world are autonomous of politics that the non-state actors Intellectual  It is naïve to assume image in and and structures through which Forebears that cooperation rather than conflict is the world politics  Thucydides  States are unified natural condition of was made ---  Hobbes actors, motivated world politics hence, ‘nothing  Machiavelli exclusively by but a considerations of rationalization of national interest  The evolution of world CW politics’ politics is cyclical, (Hoffman, 1977) characterized by  National interests timeless laws rooted in are objective human nature

 The principal national interests are survival/security

 There is total separation of domestic and international politics with the former subordinated to the latter

NEO-REALISM

Aim/contribution Key assumptions Key themes Key concepts Silences& Seminal Works limitations

 To produce a  World politics can be  The anarchical  Balance of  lacks clarity Charles Kindleberger, more systematic, analyzed if states were structure of the power about the rigorous and unitary rational actors international system conditions of The World in Depression 1929-1939 structural seeking to maximize compels states to act as cooperation (1973)  Relative account of IR in their expected utility they do: ordering and conflict in the realist principle; identical (as the tradition character of units in the opposed to international Kenneth Waltz, Theory of  The context in which system; differences in absolute) system International Politics (1979) states find themselves --- capabilities gains  To liberate a condition of anarchy ---  Accordingly, conflict is realism from determines the content of a consequence not of  incapable of essentialist and the rationality they  Hegemonic either Robert Gilpin, War and Change in state belligerence but stability World Politics (1981) universal exhibit of the pursuit of predicting or assumptions of national interest under explaining the human nature end of the CW  The behavior of states conditions of anarchy  Though states are despite its JL Mearsheimer, “Back to the can be explained focus on BOP Future: Instability in Europe after the  To provide a exclusively in terms of inherently conflictual and competitive, actual within the Cold War” (1990) deductive science the structure of the international of world politics international system conflict can be averted in situations in which system on the basis of itself, since states are parsimonious rational and in any given there is a balance of assumptions setting there is only one power  state-centric about the optimal course of action  Though there is always international open to them a tendency to system instability in the  displays very international system, limited and  The state is again this can be attenuated if impoverished sovereign and the natural a dominant state notion of state unit of analysis in IR assumed a leadership agency Intellectual (or hegemonic) role Forebears  Under such conditions  However, the role of  relies on a Same as realists of hegemonic stability international institutions international series of in the governance of IR institutions can serve to implausible cannot be overlooked provide a secure basis assumptions for cooperation about the unity between nations, such and rationality  States are, again, unified of the state actors, motivated solely as is evidenced in the by considerations of international economic national interests system which developed in the post- war period  States seek relative rather than absolute gains

LIBERALISM (Idealism)

Idealism, or Liberalism as it is widely called now emphasizes different features of world politics from non-governmental ties between societies to organized cooperation between states, but the different branches of Liberalism unite in three basic assumptions. The three basic assumptions that Liberalism is based on are:

Human nature is positive; International relations can be cooperative instead of conflictual; and, We should believe in progress in human nature, in the state system and in the international system.

The Realists are pessimists. They don’t trust human beings thinking their nature is bad, they don’t trust other states because the main aim of a state should be to maximize their national interests and they believe in conflict. The Idealists (Liberals) are optimists. Liberalism first emerged in the second half of the seventeenth century, with John Locke. However, it gained speed with the Industrial Revolution, when progress was the magic keyword for the society. Industrialization created new norms of living for all parts of the society, new social classes were born, and all of a sudden everything began to change.

The Classical Liberal philosophers, beginning with John Locke, saw great potential for human progress in the modern civil society and capitalist economy. Locke thought that both the civil society and the capitalist economy might succeed in states where individual liberties were guaranteed. For Locke, unlike the Realists, a state exists only to improve the liberty of its citizens so that they could live their lives and pursue their happiness without interference from other people. Locke claimed that Modernity meant a life without an authoritarian government, and with much higher material welfare. From Locke on, liberals began to think that state is a constitutional entity, not an instrument for power. A state must establish and protect the rule of law and must respect its citizens’ rights to life, liberty, and property.

The Industrial Revolution made Locke’s ideas reach other parts of Europe and North America and in time, the people who we call the Enlightenment Thinkers such as Adam Smith and David Hume became convinced that human rationality and reason were keys to everything. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Utilitarian's led by Jeremy Bentham even developed a way of calculating the best life for the society based on the concept of “the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people in the society.” Bentham also claimed that constitutional states should respect each other and invented the term “international law” and wrote that each state should abide

International law because it is to the rational interests of states to follow international law in their foreign policies.

In the second half of the nineteenth century the German philosopher Immanuel Kant came up with ideas that can be considered as the roots of the current varieties of Liberalism. Following Bentham, Kant believed that constitutional states must respect each other and constitutional and mutually respectful states could at the end establish “perpetual (lasting) peace” in the world. Kant’s main contribution is the “democratic peace” doctrine. Kant believed that wars did not start because the international system forced wars on nations, but because domestic problems led governments into war.

Liberalism actually has two major branches: Rationalist and Constructivist Liberalism.

Modern Liberalism, that is, Liberalism after World War II, may be divided into these categories:

1) Sociological Realism;

2) Interdependence Liberalism;

3) Institutional Liberalism;

4) Republican Liberalism.

1. Sociological [Pluralist] Liberalism: They believe that the Realists are wrong when they assume IR is a sum of state-to-state relationships. Instead, Sociological Liberals believe that IR is about transnational relations, i.e., relations between people, groups, and organizations belonging to different countries. Relations between people and between NGOs are more cooperative and more supportive of peace than relations between governments. Karl Deutsch is a prominent scholar of Sociological Liberalism. Deutsch argued in his book Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (1957) that a high degree of transnational ties between societies led to peaceful relations which would benefit both sides and that is 40 far more important than the absence of war, because it leads to integration and to a sense of community so, no-one would want to use violence to find solutions to their problems. In his book World Society (1972), John Burton proposed a “cobweb model” of transnational relationships; that is, each segment in any given society such as religious groups, schools, businesses, worker’s groups, each have different foreign relations on their own. Burton claimed that Realists tried to show each state as a billiard ball while they were cobwebs. As a result, he and other Sociological Liberals believe that mutually beneficial cooperation is far preferable for nations than antagonistic conflict. James Rosenau developed Burton’s model further and tried to analyse transnational relations both in the macro level of human populations and in the micro-level of individuals. Rosenau believes that individual transactions are now far more important than ever and states’ capacity to control their citizens is rapidly decreasing. So, he argues that the state-centric and anarchic system is evolving towards a multi-centric world which also has elements that are free from states’ control.

2. Interdependence Liberalism: The Interdependence Liberalism is based on the assumption that when two nations depend on each other, peace will rule. Interdependence means mutual dependence. People and governments are affected by the actions of their counterparts in other countries, so a higher level of transnational relations means greater interdependence. Also, when Modernization increases, interdependence increases, as well.

Basically, what Interdependence Liberals argue is that a high division of labour in the international economy increases interdependence between states and that high level of interdependence discourages and reduces violent conflicts between states. According to Richard Rosencrance, War happens in less developed countries because these states only reached lower levels of economic development and therefore these states are not integrated enough to the world economy. Hence, in these countries, land ownership and agriculture continues to be the dominant factor of wealth and production.

David Mitrany (1966) set up a theory of integration during World War II, and argued that greater interdependence in the form of transnational ties between countries can lead to peace. He believed that cooperation should be arranged by expert technicians, not by politicians. It is the main idea behind the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which led to the formation of the EU.

Ernst Haas developed the neofunctionalist theory of international integration in 1958, developing Mitrany’s ideas. Haas claimed that integration cannot be achieved by neglecting politics; instead, integration can be achieved by increased cooperation of self-interested elites. When cooperation begins, cooperation in one field leads to cooperation in another field and becomes stronger. This process is called the ‘spillover effect’.

In 1977, Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye wrote Power and Interdependence. They argued that previously, use of military force in conflicts between states was an option, because the ‘high politics’ of security and survival came before the ‘low politics’ of economics and social affairs. However, with the new level of integration the World was experiencing since the 1960s, this was no longer the case. They called this new situation Complex Interdependence. They claimed that firstly, relations between states are now different than before because they are no more the limited relations just between state leaders, but relations are far more complex and include many other layers of the society. Secondly, military force is less useful as an instrument in international relations. As a result, IR is becoming more like domestic politics, with different issues creating different coalitions and different levels of conflict, and in most of these issues, military power is irrelevant. So, leaders and countries now have to deal with “low politics” of economics and social matters, and wars are therefore even less likely to take place. In this new environment, states will have more focus points in their foreign policies and NGOs and international organizations will have greater control in the international politics.

3. Institutional Liberalism: Institutional Liberalism is based on the idea that international organizations are influential and work for the good of humanity. American President Woodrow Wilson believed that international institutions would change international politics from a “jungle” to a “zoo.” They believe that international organizations are very important, and they can promote cooperation between states.

They define an international institution as either independent international organizations such as the NATO or the European Union or as a set of rules which administers state action in a particular area. These sets of rules are called “regimes” and generally operate with an international

41 organisation that oversees the set of rules’ application. For example, international trade regime is overseen by the World Trade Organisation (WTO); the international maritime (sea) regime is overseen by the Law of the Sea Conference of the United Nations Organization.

Institutional liberals claim that international institutions help promote cooperation between states and the extent of this cooperation is analyzed in terms of depth and scope. To analyze depth, commonality, specify, and autonomy of the issue at hand are analyzed. Commonality is the amount of shared beliefs in appropriate behavior and understanding on how to interpret a problem; specify is the degree these beliefs turn into forms of rules; and finally, autonomy is the degree of independence of the organizations to change their working rules without the interference of states from outside the organization. The scope is calculated by counting the number of different issues an organization may deal with.

In short, for Institutional Liberals, international institutions:

Create a flow of information and opportunities to negotiate with others for each state;

Enhance the ability of governments to monitor the compliance of other governments with some rules or a set of rules (e.g. Kyoto Accord), and to put their own commitments into operation; and, Strengthen expectations about the solidity of international agreements.

4. Republican Liberalism: The Republican Liberals believe that liberal democracies are more peaceful and law-abiding than any other political system. The main idea is not that democracies never go to war; they do; but it is that democracies do not fight each other. This idea is based on the idea of “perpetual peace” by Immanuel Kant in the 18th century. However, it is used again in 1964 by Dean Babst in an article printed in the journal Wisconsin Psychologist and later in 1972; in Industrial Research with the title “A Force for Peace” and many others followed his lead. Michael Doyle wrote in his article “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs” in Philosophy and Public Affairs in 1983 that democracies do not fight with each other. He presented three reasons: Firstly, in a democracy, domestic political culture is based on peaceful conflict resolution; and the voters will not support a government which would declare war. Secondly, democracies share a common set of values that lead to the formation of a peace zone based on democratic moral values. And thirdly, peace between democracies is strengthened by economic cooperation and interdependence.

Among different liberal models of today, Republican Liberalism is the most normative, the most value-based. The Republican Liberals are optimists; they believe in progress and therefore to the coming of a time when war will not be a reality.

Constructivism

Constructivism’s arrival in IR is often associated with the end of the Cold War, an event that the traditional theories such as realism and liberalism failed to account for. This failure can be linked to some of their core tenets, such as the conviction that states are self-interested actors who compete for power and the unequal power distribution among states which defines the balance of power between them. By having a dominant focus on the state, traditional theories has not opened much space to observe the agency of individuals. After all, it was the actions of ordinary people that ensured the end of the Cold War, not those of states or international organizations. Constructivism accounts for this issue by arguing that the social world is of our making (Onuf 1989). Actors (usually powerful ones, like leaders and influential citizens) continually shape – and sometimes reshape – the very nature of international relations through their actions and interactions.

The basics of constructivism

Constructivism sees the world, and what we can know about the world, as socially constructed. This view refers to the nature of reality and the nature of knowledge that are also called ontology and epistemology in research language. Alexander Wendt (1995) offers an excellent example that illustrates the social construction of reality when he explains that 500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than five North Korean nuclear weapons. These identifications are not caused by the nuclear weapons (the material structure) but rather by the meaning given to the material structure (the ideational structure). It is important to understand that the social relationship between the United States and Britain and the United States and North Korea is perceived in a similar way by these states, as this shared understanding (or intersubjectivity) forms the basis of their interactions. The example also shows that nuclear weapons by themselves do not have any meaning unless we understand the social context. It further demonstrates that constructivists go beyond the material reality by including the effect of ideas and beliefs on world politics. This also entails that reality is always under construction, which opens the prospect for change. In other words, meanings are not fixed but can change over time depending on the ideas and beliefs that actors hold.

Constructivists argue that agency and structure are mutually constituted, which implies that structures influence agency and that agency influences structures. Agency can be understood as the ability of someone to act, whereas structure refers to the international system that consists of material and ideational elements. Returning to Wendt’s example discussed above, this means that the social relation of enmity between the United States and North Korea represents the intersubjective structure (that is, the shared ideas and beliefs among both states), whereas the United States and North Korea are the actors who have the capacity (that is, agency) to change or reinforce the existing structure or social relationship of enmity. This change or reinforcem-ent ultimately depends on the beliefs and ideas held by both states. If these beliefs and ideas change, the social relationship can change to one of friendship. This stance differs considerably from that of realists, who argue that the anarchic structure of the international system determines the behaviour of states. Constructivists, on the other hand, argue that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt 1992). This means that anarchy can be interpreted in different ways depending on the meaning that actors assign to it.

Another central issue to constructivism is identities and interests. Construc-tivists argue that states can have multiple identities that are socially constructed through interaction with other actors. Identities are repres-entations of an actor’s understanding of who they are, which in turn signals their interests. They are important to constructivists as they argue that identities constitute interests and actions. For example, the identity of a small state implies a set of interests that are different from those implied by the identity of a large state. The small state is arguably more focused on its survival, whereas the large state is concerned with dominating global political, economic and military affairs. It should be noted, though, that the actions of a state should be aligned with its identity. A state can thus not act contrary to its identity because this will call into

43 question the validity of the identity, including its preferences. This issue might explain why Germany, despite being a great power with a leading global economy, did not become a military power in the second half of the twentieth century. Following the atrocities of Adolf Hitler’s Nazi regime during the Second World War, German political identity shifted from one of militarism to pacifism due to unique historical circ umstances.

Social norms are also central to constructivism. These are generally defined as ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’ (Katzenstein 1996, 5). States that conform to a certain identity are expected to comply with the norms that are associated with that identity. This idea comes with an expectation that some kinds of behaviour and action are more acceptable than others. This process is also known as ‘the logic of appropriateness’, where actors behave in certain ways because they believe that this behaviour is appropriate (March and Olsen 1998, 951–952). To better understand norms, we can identify three types: regulative norms, constitutive norms and prescriptive norms. Regulative norms order and constrain behavior; constitutive norms create new actors, interests or categories of action; and prescriptive norms prescribe certain norms, meaning there are no bad norms from the perspective of those who promote them (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). It is also important to note that norms go through a ‘lifecycle of norms’ before they can get accepted. A norm only becomes an expected behaviour when a critical mass of relevant state actors adopt it and internalise it in their own practices. For example, constructivists would argue that the bulk of states have come together to develop climate change mitigation policies because it is the right thing to do for the survival of humanity. This has, over decades of diplomacy and advocacy, become an appropriate behaviour that the bulk of citizens expect their leaders to adhere to. Liberals, on the other hand, might reject the notion of climate change politics in favour of continued economic growth and pursuing innovative scientific solutions, while realists might reject it due to the damage that climate policies may do to shorter-term national interests.

Although all constructivists share the above-mentioned views and concepts, there is considerable variety within constructivism. Conventional constructivists ask ‘what’-type questions – such as what causes an actor to act. They believe that it is possible to explain the world in causal terms and are interested in discovering the relationships between actors, social norms, interests and identities. Conventional constructivists assume, for instance, that actors act according to their identity and that it is possible to predict when this identity becomes visible or not. When an identity is seen to be under-going changes, conventional constructivists investigate what factors caused which aspects of a state’s identity to change. Critical constructivists, on the other hand, ask ‘how’-type questions such as how do actors come to believe in a certain identity. Contrary to conventional constructivists, they are not interested in the effect that this identity has. Instead, critical constructivists want to reconstruct an identity – that is, find out what are its component parts – which they believe are created through written or spoken communication among and between peoples. Language plays a key role for critical constructivists because it constructs, and has the ability to change, social reality.

Most constructivists, however, position themselves between these two more extreme ends of the spectrum.

International Organization As you may have picked up in the previous chapter, we live in a world of laws. While sovereign states are the principal legal actors, international organisations are increasingly important in helping us govern our world. Today’s international system is made up of a cacophony of different voices and interests. In addition to states there are also non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations and hybrid organizations which are a mix of all the different categories.

Imagine stepping off a plane into a foreign country. As you disembark you switch on your phone to check the messages that may have come through while you were in transit. You follow the sign that directs you to the airport’s exit, clear immigration, and then pick up your luggage at the designated carousel. You then head straight for the ‘nothing to declare’ green lane to exit the airport. Those routine actions would have already brought you into contact with the work of at least four different international organizations. The aircraft that you arrived in would have been one of the many planes under the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and regulated by standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); that you were able to use your phone to check messages would have been courtesy of the work of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU); and your customs clearance would have been facilitated by the Kyoto Convention set by the World Customs Organization (WCO) to simplify the customs process. These are just some of the ways in which international organizations form an integral part of our everyday lives. Whether these organisations are working to build houses for the impoverished like UN-Habitat does, or working to ensure a standard of health for everyone like the World Health Organization (WHO) does, there is no running away from international organizations. Today, it is increasingly difficult to imagine an international system in which the only voices that matter are those of states.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS:

"International organization is the process by which states establish and develop formal, continuing institutional structures for the conduct of certain aspects of their relationships with each other" (Gale, 1968:211). It is an attempt to counter the extreme parochialism and individualism of the states system. The constantly increasing complexity of the interdependence of states requires cooperation among them. International organizations therefore are manifestations of the organizing process at the international level to foster such independence and enhance interchange among nations.( Dr. Essien Ukpe Ukoyo Ukpe)

The membership of international organizations is made up of sovereign States or nations. They are essentially created and sustained by the member-States collectively. Although they are created by States, these organizations have come to co-exist with or even supersede their creators as dominant actors in the international system. It must be emphasized that although international organizations are essentially associations of states, they are more than a mere aggregation of states. They represent “something greater than the sum of the members” by assuming the status of a world property whose declarations or edicts have the semblance of bindingness and compulsion (Hallerberg, et. al., 2001:145).

Prior to World War II, nations were the principal actors in international politics. After World War II, international organizations came to acquire the status of actors in international politics. But after the war, the scope of actors was expanded to cover international organizations such as Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) now known as African Union (AU), Organization of American States (OAS), etc; supra-national organizations or bloc actors such as the North Atlantic Organization (NATO) and the defunct Warsaw Pact; Non-governmental organizations such as World Council of Churches (WCC), and Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC); Multi-national Corporations (MNCs) such as Exxon-Mobil. Sub-national groups or rebel movements also acquired the status of actors in international politics. These include organizations like the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Finally, individuals whose influence within the nation enables such nation achieve its external goals also became actors in international politics (Lakhany, 2006:37).

Recent articles by some scholars on international organizations collected and edited by Carol Ann Cosgrove and Kenneth J. Twitchett and titled, appropriately enough, The New International Actors (1970), have cited the United Nations and the EEC (now European Union) as examples of some international organizations that have emerged on the international scene as significant and new international actors in their own right. The Book declares:

Since the Second World War, international organizations have become integral features of the international scene. Only two of them, however, have emerged as significant international actors in their own right: the United Nations and the European Economic Community. They can and do exert influence on a similar scale to that of many medium-sized powers and are certainly more influential internationally than most newly independent, small, under-developed states (Cosgrove, et. al. 1970).

The book identifies three mutually interdependent acid tests, which determine an international organization's capacity to act in international affairs (test of actorness) as:

(i) The degree of autonomous decision-making power embodied in the central institutions of the international organizations. (ii) The extent to which it performs significant and continuing functions which have an impact on inter-state relations; and most importantly. (iii) The significance attached to it in the formulation of the foreign policies of states, particularly those of it members.

A capacity to influence other actors (or to resist influences from other actors) is the function of the resources, which accrue independently to the organizations - in terms of finance, expert information, popular support/legitimacy, decision-making capacity, enforcement capabilities and diplomatic skills. This, therefore, explains why some international organizations are more highly developed and why they exert more forceful impact on the international system than others.

International organizations are classified into 3 types: sub-regional, regional and universal international organizations depending on the scope of their membership. However, the Commonwealth, the Francophone Association and, perhaps, the Arab League suggest a fourth type of association of sovereign States which were recently independent from colonial rule. International organizations could also be classified as political, religious, military/security or economic or social depending on the focus of their operations. Thus, some of the organizations mentioned above are political in nature. These include the African Union (AU), Organization of American States (OAS), etc; The North Atlantic Organization (NATO) and the defunct Warsaw Pact are examples of military or security international organizations. World Council of Churches (WCC) and Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) are religious in nature, while Federation of International Football Associations (FIFA) is an example of a social international organization.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The League of Nations was the first known universal political international organization in existence. The Covenant of the League of Nations was ratified by 42 nations in 1919 and it came into effect on January 10, 1920. The formation of the League of Nations was an expression of the desire of nations for the maintenance of peace and the prevention of future wars. This was the reaction of the world to the shock and devastation which World War I, which was regarded as the most costly war ever fought before 1914, occasioned.

The chain of events that led to the outbreak of World War I was sparked off by a political assassination in Sarajevo. On June 28, 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, nephew of Emperor Franz Josef and heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was shot to death along with his wife by a Serbian nationalist in Sarajevo, Bosnia. This compounded the already tense political situation in Europe and resulted in the outbreak of the First World War. The outbreak of the war destroyed "…the old European order" (Tams, 2006:2). Due to the carnage during the ensuing war, prominent figures "…in the United States and Britain began calling for the establishment of a permanent international body to maintain peace in the postwar world" (Taboola, 2016:1). Outstanding among these anti-war advocates was President Woodrow Wilson of the United States of America. Others include Lord Phillimore, Leon Bourgeois, Colonel House, Lord Robert Cecil and South African General Jan Smuts.

The idea of the League was first popularized by Jan Smuts in the pamphlet, "The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion." In 1918, Wilson presented a 14-point proposal to end the war. This included:

"…the abolition of secret treaties, a reduction in armaments, an adjustment in colonial claims in the interests of both native peoples and colonists, and freedom of the seas, …, the removal of economic barriers between nations, the promise of “self- determination” for those oppressed minorities, a secure sovereignty for the Turkish portions of the then Ottoman Empire, an independent Polish State for territories occupied by Polish populations and a world organization that would provide a system of collective security for all nations (United States Archives, 1918).

In this proposal, he presented a sketch of the envisaged international organization that would maintain international peace and order and prevent future occurrence of war. The Paris Peace Conference was convened by Wilson to draft "…the new organization's founding document…" (Tams, 2016:2). This led the Central Powers to agree to an armistice to halt the killings in World War I in November 1918. Two months later, the Allies met with conquered Germany and Austria-Hungary at Versailles to hammer out formal peace terms. President Wilson urged a just and lasting peace, but England and France disagreed, forcing harsh war reparations on their former enemies (Taboola, 2016:1).

The League of Nations was approved, however, and in the summer of 1919 Wilson presented the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations to the United States' Senate for ratification. Unfortunately, the United States Senate refused to ratify the treaty and the Covenant due to their belief that the treaties reduced U.S. authority. Additionally, the Senate majority leader, Henry Cabot Lodge, a Republican from Massachusetts, drafted 14 reservations to counter President Wilson's 14 Points. Lodge's 14 counter reservations were strengthened by the opposing votes of the “irreconcilables,” led by William Borah (The Learning Network, 2012). However, the League of Nations proceeded without the United States. Its first meeting was held in Geneva on November 15, 1920. During its formation, President Woodrow Wilson was careful to incorporate the collective security provision into the Covenant of the League.

THE STRUCTURE AND GOALS OF THE LEAGUE

The principal organs of the League as provided in Article 2 of the Covenant included the Assembly, the Council and a permanent Secretariat located at Geneva. Although the League established a number of commissions, committees or organizations, bodies like the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) should not be regarded as organs of the League because they were not provided for in the Covenant of the League but were "…set up independently of the League." (Tams, 2006:4). Some of the commissions and organizations established by the League's Assembly and Council include the Economic and Financial Organization, the Communications and Transit Organization, the Health Organization, the Refugee Organization and the Committees on Traffic in Opium, Traffic in Women and Children and on Intellectual Cooperation.

The establishment of these organizations expanded the scope of activities of the League beyond the primary goal of international peace and security to includes mandates and trusteeship of former colonies of the defeated powers, the protection of minorities and functional cooperation, including the codification of international law. These nonetheless did not obscure the primary goal of maintaining international peace and security. Article 10 of the Covenant provides that “the respect for and the preservation of the territorial integrity and political independence of each member-State shall be incumbent on all other members” (Bennett, 1991:25). It, thus, became obligatory for all members to shun aggression while being ready to assist victims of aggression. While Article 11 made war a general concern of all the members, Article 16 recommends a general economic boycott and the application of military measures upon the recommendation of the Council as the obligation of the League members. Members were, however, free to maintain neutrality in matters pertaining to the application of military sanctions. This has caused critics to see the Covenant of the League as a toothless bulldog. It is self-evident that the framers of the Covenant of the League were “unwilling to create the conditions that can realistically control aggression and the resort to war” (Bennett, 1991:32). Apart from giving the liberty to members to back-out of military commitments to the organization, the Covenant created loopholes on which veto was also a great stumbling- block to the implementation of the provisions of the Covenant. The organization, therefore, became a failure from its inception (Bennett, 1991:134).

In the words of Inis Claude:

The Covenant was far from a perfect design for collective security. It imposed inadequate legal restrictions upon potential aggressors and exacted insufficient commitments for enforcement action from member states. The League which it created was deficient in legal authority and practical competence of the management of a collective security system (Claude, 1965:240-241).

The weakness of the Covenant of the League notwithstanding, the major problem of the organization was the power politics played by Great powers who were members of the League. This paper will therefore adopt the Theory of Power as theoretical framework.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

International politics is generally regarded as the games the stronger and more powerful members of the international system play. Adjectives such as “stronger” and “more powerful” usually refer to military power or capacity as well as indicate that power is a relationship. One, power is identified with military capacity. Power is also seen as a relationship. This implies that power is a relational variable, not an absolute one. What matters therefore is not a nation’s absolute power but its relative power.

Proponents of the theory of power or realism include Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau represent the Twentieth Century Classical Realism while Kenneth Waltz is a representative of the Neo-realists. In his postulations, Thucydides (460–411 B.C.E.) considered the importance of power. He saw "…politics as involving moral questions. Most importantly, he asks whether relations among states to which power is crucial can also be guided by the norms of justice" (Stanford, 2013:2). Machiavelli on his part presents a critique of the moral tradition while Thomas Hobbes is concerned with the anarchic state of nature. Among the Classical Realists, E. H. Carr challenges the utopian idealism and Hans Morgenthau presents the realist principles that States think and act in terms of interest defined as power. In summary,

international relations realists emphasize the constraints imposed on politics by the nature of human beings, whom they consider egoistic, and by the absence of international government. Together these factors contribute to a conflict-based paradigm of international relations, in which the key actors are states, in which power and security become the main issues, and in which there is little place for morality. The set of premises concerning state actors, egoism, anarchy, power, security, and morality that define the realist tradition are all present in Thucydides (Stanford, 2013:2).

It is also present in the writings of the other realist writers. The core of the realist doctrine is therefore the acquisition, maintenance and use of power in international politics. In all of political science and international relations, attention has been paid to all types of power, mostly political, economic and military, and to the elements or components of national power. Military power is usually measured by the number of men in uniform and by the number and types of weapons a nation has. Countries with large populations tend to have large armed forces, though not in proportion to their populations. But it must be emphasized that apart from size, other factors such as degree of military preparedness (combat readiness) morale and discipline are also very important. Possession of superior military power or not, soldiers and their political superiors must know the kind of war they are entering. The common-sensical advice of Carl von Clausewitz that “No one starts a war––or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so––without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it” is still pertinent today (Howard, et. al., 1976:223).

Apart from military might, a common standard for the comparison of national power in the industrial age is wealth or degree of economic development. There is a relationship between wealth or economic power and military power. The richest states can afford to purchase the most devastating military power, and indeed power of all kinds, which is important to the calculation of powers. The superpowers can mobilize both large nuclear and conventional forces and other kinds of power, such as economic and technical assistance that could serve as diplomatic tools, while weak or poor states cannot. With the possession of both credible military and economic powers, the Great-Power members of the League

48 felt they did not need the organization to achieve their political and diplomatic goals in the international system. However, due to the benefits collective security affords, which they did not want to lose, they could not jettison collective security. But due to the cost of collective security which they wanted to avoid, the League became stocked in-between the decision to uphold or to abandon it. This attitude of the Great Powers is evident in the resolutions passed after the ratification of the Covenant. These resolutions weakened the collective security provision of the instrument. The League then had to rely on other ad hoc pronouncements like the Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1923 and the Geneva Protocol for strengthening obligation for the enforcement of the peace (Claude, 1965:240-241).

These ad hoc pronouncements were responsible for it successful resolution of, at least, 30 disputes during the first decade of its existence. Some scholars show that the League succeeded in resolving more than half of the disputes that came to its attention. These successes were due, apart from improvisations, to the harmonious state of the international political system of the time, the need for rapprochement with Germany and the fact that the cases in question did not involve Great Powers (Couloumbis, et. al., 1986:286).

THE LEAGUE’S FAILURES

The 1920s was a period of optimism in international relations. From Locarno in 1925, to the Kellogg–Briand Pact in 1928 and the commencement of the World Disarmament Conference in 1932, there had been a sense of international cooperation and accord, which was manifest in the new League of Nations organization.

During this period (the 1920s), the League, with its headquarters in Geneva, incorporated new members and successfully mediated minor international disputes but was often disregarded by the major powers. To start with, the League was not popular in the defeated allied countries, especially Germany, because its foundation was linked to the 'unjust' post-war settlement. The League, therefore, never really enjoyed the full support of all the great powers (Tams, 2006:2). Germany which joined the League in 1926 withdraw from the organization in 1933. Japan also left in 1933, while Italy pulled out in 1937 (Lowe, et. al., 2008:10). Having left the League, these nations began to challenge the authority of the League by carrying out acts of aggression. Great Powers aggression against other nations greatly undermined the credibility of the League and this resulted in the failure of collective security.

1. Failure of Collective Security in The League:

The League of Nations was established as a collective security system. It was therefore principally meant to maintain international peace and security by pooling the powers and resources of its members to corporately police aggression. The incidents listed below prove that the League was ineffective as a collective security system. Some scholars and historians lay the blame for the failure of the League on Adolf Hitler's ambition to control ‘race and space" (racial purity and Lebensraum). However, the weaknesses of the League to maintain peace by collective security had been tested and found wanting before Hitler came to power in Germany.

Quoting Palmer and Perkings, Ebegbulem (2011:26) observed that the League of Nations was a complete failure as an instrument for enforcement of collective security. He traced this failure to the refusal of the USA to join the League from the onset, the rise of the Soviet Union as a major power outside, and the the open defiance of Japan, Italy and Germany.

The international disturbances that revealed the ineffectiveness of the collective machinery of the League began with the Japanese extension of military control over Manchuria in 1931. This was followed by the Italian campaign in Ethiopia in 1935 and Adolf Hitler's demands that the "fetters of Versailles" be smashed and that the German nation be allowed lebensraum (living space) for expansion. In 1936, Germany reoccupied the Rhineland (where, by the terms of the Versailles Treaty, it was not supposed to have armed forces) and in 1938 annexed Austria. Czechoslovakia followed in 1939. Faced with this determined assault on the post–World War I boundaries, diplomats in western Europe and in the Soviet Union, which joined the League in 1934, sought to make the machinery of the League an effective tool of war prevention by means of collective action against "aggression." The attempt was not successful.

Although Japan received a verbal rebuke from the League in 1933 for its behavior in Manchuria, it simply resigned from the League and did not end its forward policies in China, which may even have been stimulated by what was construed in Japan as a hypocritical insult. Following the eloquent appeal of emperor Haile Selassie for aid during the Ethiopian incident, the League, under British leadership, tried to organize economic sanctions against Italy in 1935, but that did not prevent the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and probably helped move Benito Mussolini closer to Hitler's side. The embargo was not sufficiently enforced to be effective. This fiasco, which ended in a British-French retreat from high principles to offer Italy a compromise deal (the Hoare-Laval proposals), did much to diminish enthusiasm for collective security through the League of Nations.

Direct negotiations between the major European powers during the tense crises of 1938 and 1939 bypassed the machinery of the League. One of such negotiations include the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. The Kellogg-Briand Pact, also known as the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy was named after the French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand (1862–1932) and his US counterpart, Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg (1856–1937), was signed at Paris on 27 August 1928. The Pact which was initially signed and ratified by 15 States, including Germany, the United States, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Ireland, India, Italy, Japan, Poland, and Czechoslovakia and acceded to by an additional 48 States, bringing the total number to 63, to include all members of the League of Nations with the exception of Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, and Uruguay was another attempt at collective security and therefore, an alternative to the League of Nations (Lesaffer, 2010:2).

But many have come to believe that a more vigorous and less selfish support of the League might have checked the aggressions of Japan, Italy, and Germany and prevented World War II.

2. The Corfu Case.

In August 1923 Italians forming part of an international boundary delegation were murdered on Greek soil. This led the Italian leader, Benito Mussolini to order a naval bombardment of Corfu. In the aftermath of the Italian bombardment and occupation, many of its buildings and other landmarks were destroyed. In response, the Greeks appealed to the League of Nations. The League ordered the Italians to evacuate the city, but Greece was forced to pay Italy an indemnity (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2009:1).

3. 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria, China.

The first great test to the League came on September 18, 1931 when Japan attacked Manchuria on the pretext of “protecting their rights involved in their lease of railway property". With this excuse, Japan conquered Manchuria and established a puppet government there and re-named the new state “Manchukuo” (Bennett, 1991:33). By the end of 1931 Japan had destroyed the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18 of that year (Kim, 1996:2). The League’s Council could not take effective action to stop the aggression since that was against the interest of the major powers: Great Britain, France and the United States. The last, as shown above, was not even a member of the League (Bennett, 1991:33).

Thompson attributes the lack of interest of the West in this case to a psychological hatred and resentment which the West, particularly British trading communities, haboured against these victims of Japanese aggression. They, therefore, took a vicarious pleasure in the punishment of the Chinese by the Japanese (Thompson, 1968:567).

Japan also used its veto power to forestall an attempt to send a commission of inquiry under Article 2 of Covenant to investigate the case. But due to China’s insistence and appeal to Article 15, a five-man member group, the Lytton Commission was dispatched after seven months to Manchuria. The outcome of this effort was a report which was a mere condemnation of the Japanese Military aggression. Nothing was done by the League members to compel Japan to comply with its recommendations. This clearly revealed the League’s weakness as a toothless bulldog and emboldened potential aggressors in their expansionist campaigns (Bennett, 1991:33-34). Hence, Italy under Mussolini rose up and overran Ethiopia in 1935.

4. 1935 Italian Invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia).

Italian aggression against Ethiopia can be regarded as the greatest challenge to the League's political effectiveness. "The Italian invasion of Ethiopia began on October 3rd, 1935 and culminated in the fall of Addis Ababa on May 5th, 1936. The Emperor, Haile Selassie, had fled abroad three days earlier. This conflict was an imperial grab for Africa and a rude dismissal of the ambitions of the League of Nations to achieve permanent peace and justice through collective security" (Bosworth, 2014:1). When Emperor Haile Selassie appealed to the League’s Council, Britain and France did not only hinder speedy consideration of the case by the Council, but also encouraged Mussolini in his “African ambitions” (Bennett, 1991:34). This emboldened Italy to carry out a full scale attack on Ethiopia with modern mechanized equipment, squadron bombers and mustard gas. This high-handed attack on a very weak and poor country by a Great Power was inhumane. Due to the devastation caused by the attack, the Council reluctantly identified Italy as an aggressor for violating the covenant and Article 16 was invoked calling on members to impose sanctions on Italy. This was the first time that the collective security provision of the Covenant was invoked under the League.

Even though Article 16 demanded automatic application of sanctions, however, only 50 of the 54 member merely endorsed co-operative action against Italian aggression (Bennett, 1991:34). Inis Claude unapologetically remarked that “this surprising initiative did not represent a genuine rededication to the principles of collective security enshrined in the Covenant (Claude, 1965:241). Not only was the action taken insufficient to stop Italian military action against Ethiopia, but the sanctions were abandoned prematurely. League members did not have strong national wills to see to the full implementation and/or effect of the sanction on Italy. Diplomatic relations were never cut off from Italy and, to make matters worse, the Hoare-Laval Accord which gave Italy control of most of Ethiopia was signed in December 1935 to the shock of public opinion in most of the world.

Mussolini was permitted to triumph in contempt of the League. About May 1936, he arrogantly assumed the title “Emperor of Ethiopia” after his announcement of victory. Neither did the League members refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the Italian hegemony over Ethiopia (Bennett, 1991:35,135) Hence, he League failed and “the first great attempt to created a collective security organization was for all practical purposes terminated. Members of the League themselves lost faith in the collective security provision of the Covenant and so rallied back to “the traditional devices of national policy and diplomacy for their security (Claude, 1965:241-242).

The last straw that completely revealed the League's ineffectiveness was Hitler’s abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pact through the remilitarization of Rhineland. His invasion of Austria and Czechoslovakia and Japanese second invasion of China in 1937 did not meet with enough opposition from the League. This culminated in World War II (Bennett, 1991:35). In 1946, the League of Nations was officially dissolved with the establishment of the United Nations. The United Nations was modeled after the former but with increased international support and extensive machinery to help the new body avoid repeating the League’s failures.

5. The Treaty of Versailles

The Treaty of Versailles which was signed on November 11, 1918, after four years of war, was facilitated by the United States’ President Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points”. Wilson's proposal was accepted by Germany. Unfortunately, the Treaty of Versailles sharply differed from Wilson’s points, and Germany, which felt betrayed, denounced the treaty as morally unjust (Atkinson, 2002:1). Some scholars believe that the treaty gave Europe and Western cooperation a bad start. The reparation provisions, the territorial arrangements and the military clauses provided the worst possible basis for cooperation and reconciliation with Germany. Apart from the unjust terms of the treaty, the political environment also contributed to the impossibility of attaining the post war peace settlement. Quoting Henig, Atkinson (2002:2) argues that “'the peace conference was held at a time of unprecedented political, social, economic and ideological upheaval. Any peace settlement would have to operate within highly unstable international and domestic environments… (and) this international instability made the attainment of a lasting peace so difficult.'”

The goal following World War I was to restore European stability and maintain everlasting peace. However, these goals were recognized by all of the leaders as not easily achievable. French Prime Minister Clemenceau commented on the day the Versailles treaty was signed, “We have won the war: now we have to win the peace, and it may be more difficult” (Atkinson, 2002:2). The French politician Marshal Foch, as the Versailles Treaty was being signed, stated rather prophetically, “This is not peace; it is an armistice for 20 years.” Exactly 20 years after, World War II broke out. Indeed, Foch was absolutely correct. The Versailles Treaty did little to shape any sort of long-term peace from the results of World War I. Instead, the treaty which was hastily put together and vague, exposed the Allies’ inability to cooperate toward an agreement, and fueled German nationalism from resentment over her treatment by the Allies in the treaty. Hobsbawm argues that “the Versailles settlement could not possibly be the basis of a stable peace. It was doomed from the start, and another war was practically certain” (Atkinson, 2002:3).

The principal reasons for the failure of the Treaty of Versailles to establish a long-term peace include the following: (1) the Allies did not agree on how best to treat Germany; (2) Germany refused to accept the terms of reparations; and (3) Germany’s refusal to accept the “war-guilt” clause, Article 231, led to growing German resentment and nationalism. The Versailles Peace Conference exposed the ideological rift growing between the Allies. Throughout Versailles and after, Henig argues that Britain and France had “contradictory viewpoints” regarding the treatment of Germany. While public opinions of both nations were strongly in favor of seeing Germany pay to the fullest extent, only France saw Germany as a potential threat to the future security of European stability. Thus, while Britain saw Germany as a “barrier-fortress against the Russians” and an economically strong nation with which to engage in international trade, the French viewed Germany as a threat to French security. France feared that not levying harsh enough penalties upon Germany would only make her stronger and she would eventually rise up against France in revenge. So while the British felt that the Treaty of Versailles was too harsh on Germany, France felt as though it were not harsh enough.

On their part, the perceived severity of the treaty meant that Germans, even democratic ones, wanted to reverse the settlement. Most Germans could not accept the severe losses, particularly of territory to Poland. In addition, German commitment to making reparation payments was limited. Between 1933 and 1935, Hitler therefore set about revising the Treaty of Versailles, a process that led to tension in Europe and placed pressure on the League of Nations. Most of Hitler’s demands, at least initially, were seen in the context of ‘revising the Treaty of Versailles’, a treaty that many British saw as being too harsh anyway. It was believed that once the unfairness of the treaty had been redressed, Hitler might be content. His attack on the Treaty of Versailles and those who had signed it meant that many Germans believed he and the Nazis would restore Germany’s international prestige through crushing the treaty. Hitler began by attacking reparations. Although repayment of reparations had been suspended before Hitler came to power, in 1933 he announced that the Nazis would not resume payments. The declaration was good propaganda, but was not a major cause of international friction, as most powers had already accepted this. What did increase tension was Hitler’s intention to rearm Germany (Gakurin, 2007:114).

6. Failure of the Disarmament Conferences

A major contributor to the First World War was arms race. There was therefore need for the reduction in arms if international peace and security was to be secured. Disarmament therefore featured prominently in Wilson's Fourteen Points and it was an important goal of the League of Nations. This was intended to reduce the threat of a future war. A permanent advisory Commission on armaments was appointed by the League. This resulted in three disarmament conferences in the 1920s and early 1930s. The first was the Washington Naval Conference of November 1921 to February 1922.

The Washington Naval Conference was convened at the instance of President Warren G. Harding of the United States. There where two reasons for which the conference was called. First, Japan and the UK could not afford the costs of the arms race and the United States wanted to reduce its own costs. Sec ondly there was growing tension between Japan and the United States in Asia and the United States wanted to avoid conflict which could involve many countries. The primary objective of this conference was to inhibit Japanese naval expansion in the waters of the west Pacific. Three major treaties emerged out of the Washington Conference: the Five-Power Treaty, the Four-Power Treaty, and the Nine-Power Treaty.

The Four-Power Treaty which was reached on December 13, 1921 between Britain, France, Japan and the United States contained an agreement to recognize each other’s possessions in the Pacific and if problems arose there was an agreement to reach a diplomatic solution. The Five- Power Treaty was between the US, Britain, Japan, France and Italy. The five powers agreed to maintain a fixed constant ratio of naval armaments. The US was to maintain 5 (Based on 525,000 tons), Britain 5, Japan 3, France 1.67, and Italy 1.67. Limits were placed on tonnage, gun size and number of battleships and aircraft carriers. No new naval armaments where to be constructed for the next ten years. The United States and Britain were not allowed to build new naval bases in the western Pacific.

The Nine-Power Treaty was signed on February 6, 1922. The signatories included the Big Four, plus Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and China. The treaty endorsed the Open Door Policy – a concept in foreign affairs, which usually refers to the policy around 1900 allowing multiple Imperial powers access to China, with none of them in control of that country. By this policy, the major powers pledged mutual respect for Chinese territorial integrity and independence.

The Washington Naval Treat was the most successful of the disarmament conferences. It led to an effective end to building new battleship fleets and those few ships that were built were limited in size and armament. Numbers of existing capital ships were scrapped. Some ships under construction were turned into aircraft carriers instead.

The Geneva Disarmament Conference of February 1927 was a conference held to discuss naval arms limitation, in Geneva, Switzerland. The conference had delegates from sixty countries. The conference was to consider reductions in armaments, with particular emphasis on offensive weapons. Germany, whose army and navy already were limited by the Treaty of Versailles, demanded that other states disarm to German levels and, in the event that they refused to do so, claimed a right to build up its armed forces. France, which feared the revival of German power, argued that security must precede disarmament and called for security guarantees and the establishment of an international police force before it would reduce its own forces. Talks dragged on for nearly six weeks while tensions rose among the former Allies. In early August, the delegates adjourned without reaching any significant agreement. This brought a deadlock of the conference. The conference was therefore adjourned. Before the conference reconvened in February 1933, Adolf Hitler had assumed power in Germany (World Digital Library).

The London Naval Treaty was an agreement between the United Kingdom, Japan, France, Italy and the United States, signed on April 22, 1930, which regulated submarine warfare and limited naval shipbuilding. It was a revision and an extension of the Washington treaty. The five powers; US, Japan, Britain, Italy and France met in London to review the ratio of capital ships. The ratio was increased from 5:5:3 for the US, Britain and Japan respectively to 10:10:7. France and Italy did not take part in this agreement however they did agree to continue to not build new naval armaments for the next five years. Agreements on the numbers of submarines, cruisers and destroyers that each country could have were made more strict. The Treaty was to remain valid until 1936.

Apart from the Washington Naval Treaty that was successful, the last three were not so successful. France refusal to accept general disarmament emboldened Hitler who was already determined to rearm Germany to accord it immediate military parity with other Western powers. Hitler manipulated the reluctance of France towards embracing general disarmament to justify Germany’s withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference in 1933. German military spending in the year 1934–35 increased fivefold when compared to that of 1933–34 (Gakurin 2007:114).

In 1935, after the Saar plebiscite, Hitler announced he would introduce compulsory military service in Germany. This step, again, was a violation of the Treaty of Versailles. At the same time he announced the increase of his armaments programme. Hitler then declared the existence of an army of more than 500,000 men, and had admitted the existence of an air force. The other powers were deeply concerned, but continued to hope that a revision of Versailles would satisfy the more moderate elements of German society (Gakurin 2007:116).

7. The Effect of the Great Depression:

The Great Depression undermined both the League’s ability to resist aggressor states, and the willingness of member states to work together. For instance, the reality of the British economy at the time made rearmament an unattractive policy and the cost of then waging a drawn-out war with Germany very difficult. Moreover, the general political atmosphere at the time did not also support the declaration of war. In order to get the necessary material and human resources to fight a general war, Britain needed to convince its imperial domains of the ‘just’ and inescapable nature of war with Germany. But due to the memory of the horrors of World War I which still haunted most Europeans, it was difficult to receive popular support to engage in another conflict of this scale.

The impact of the global economic crisis was particularly dramatic in Weimar Germany. The mass unemployment and despair that followed assisted Hitler’s rise to power. Indeed, the Nazi Party’s success at the polls directly correlated with the degree of unemployment in Germany; the more unemployed there were, the more successful the Nazis were in elections.

8. Weaknesses in the Covenant of the League:

The League Covenant was written into the controversial Treaty of Versailles. This was to ensure that all those who signed the treaty would become members of the League. The Covenant was made up of 26 articles. The most important one was Article X which stated that "all members undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and political independence of all members of the League" (IB Guides, 2013:1). This was the idea of collective security enshrined in the Covenant. It means that if one nation was under threat, the others would have to defend it even if it was of no interest to themselves and regardless of the outcome. Member nations were expected to sacrifice money, material and men (military staff) if ever one nation was under threat. Unfortunately, this has not been the case.

9. Effect of the Absence of Major Powers

The non membership of major powers greatly undermined the effectiveness of the League. The United States of America never joined, and USSR and Germany were excluded from being members of the League. As a result of their exclusion, USSR and Germany did not support the Versailles Treaty nor the League and Germany was consistently blamed for starting the war. This created tension instead of a reconciliation that Wilson had proposed. The USSR was weak after the war but once it regained its strength it potentially became a major threat due to its exclusion from the League and wanting to recover the territory it had lost during the War.

Because the League excluded the defeated nations it angered the USSR and Germany and both of these saw the League as an enemy which undermined the goal of peace keeping. The exclusion of Germany and the USSR and their desire to recover their lost territory once they regained strength made it impossible to discuss the terms of the settlement and negotiate a compromise with these major powers, instead it led to an inevitable conflict. As soon as the USSR and Germany regained their strength, the new small states in Europe came under threat.

The exclusion of these two countries emboldened them to sign the Treaty of Rapallo. The Treaty of Rapallo was a fallout of the Genoa Conference in 1922 where France and Britain tried to trade tsarist debts for German reparations. Worried that such a scheme was meant only to pit the two powers against each other, the Soviet delegation invited their German counterparts for a secret meeting at Rapallo. On 16 April 1922, the two foreign ministers concluded an agreement in which Soviet-Russia and Germany established diplomatic and consular relations, renounced claims against each other and granted each other most favoured nations status. The Rapallo Treaty together with the opening speech of Russian foreign minister Georgi Chicerin at the Genoa Conference was an important step towards the rapprochement between the two states, which both had a major interest in revising the territorial arrangements of the peace treaties in East and Central Europe. The Treaty of Rapallo therefore was a major threat for the League as these two countries were both major powers that now were co-operating economically and militarily. It also undermined the terms of the Treaty of Versailles as Germany could increase its armament and train military staff in the USSR without the League knowing. Since Germany was now producing arms in the USSR, the effectiveness of the disarmament process that the League had worked on was greatly reduced.

The absence of the USA however had the most devastating effect on the League. It was the only country which had emerged stronger after the end of the war. All other countries where in debt while the USA was still economically strong. It had the greatest power to intervene in case of tension between countries which could lead to possible conflicts. Its absence in the League therefore affected the purpose and power of the organization. The refusal of the USA refused to be part of the League and provide guaranteed military support also led France and Britain to also withdraw from the military guarantee. The USA and Britain went back into isolationism. This greatly diminished the effectiveness of the League.

France and Britain had very different mind sets about the treaty and Germany. Britain wanted Germany to rebuild its economy for the purpose of trade and France wanted to make it as hard as possible for Germany to recover economically as it was worried about a German attack in the future. This created conflict within the League. More important countries dropped out of the League between 1919 and 1939, this included Italy and Japan. This weakened the League even further

Political and Humanitarian Successes of The League

Although the League failed, it nonetheless made some modest achievements. At the onset, the League showed clear initiatives for the peaceful settlement of disputes between smaller states. The League, in conjunction with the Supreme War Council of the victorious powers, was also able to mediate in disputes concerning the delineation of borders between some states. These include settlement of the Swedish-Finnish dispute over the Åland Islands (1920–21), guaranteeing the security of Albania (1921), rescuing Austria from economic disaster, settling the division of Upper Silesia (1922), and preventing the outbreak of war in the Balkans between Greece and Bulgaria (1925). In addition, the League extended considerable aid to refugees; it helped to suppress white slave and opium traffic; it did pioneering work in surveys of health; it extended financial aid to needy states; and it furthered international cooperation in labor relations and many other fields (Infoplease, 2012:1).

In 1940, the League took positive action against Soviet Union's aggression on Finland by expelling Soviet Union. Politically, it was able to establish "a forum for the exchange of views, for informing the official agencies and for maintaining private contacts in Geneva" (Lowe, et. al., 2008:478). The League made significant achievement in the "financial and economic issues connected with the founding of new nations states, health and industrial safety regulations, anti-slavery, refugees, minorities, the protection of intellectual work, women's rights, as well as drug traffic" (Lowe, et. al., 2008:478-479).

Other achievements of the League include its successful completion of the 15-year administration of the Saar territory by conducting a plebiscite under the supervision of an international military force in 1935, the establishment of institutions for multilateral cooperation, facilitation of transnational relations within the League's framework which encouraged the founding of several Non-Governmental International Organizations (NGOs) in Geneva. Under the Paris Peace Treaties, the German city of Danzig and the Saarland were administered by international governmental commission accountable to the League. Under Article 22 of the Covenant, mandated former colonies of the defeated powers were successfully prepared for independence. The League also served as a forum for public debate and diplomacy, and a forum for seeking global solutions for common problems of nations in issues like the preservation of educational and ecological standards, scientific discourse, humanitarian cooperation, protection of minorities rights, establishment of norms for the treatment of indigenous populations in the colonies as well as norms in humanitarian aid and disaster relief. Finally, the Economic and Financial Organization (EFO) established under the framework of the League laid the foundation for a European Economic system (Lowe, et. al., 2008:479).

THE EVALUATION OF THE LEAGUE

The League of Nations had more chances of succeeding as a collective security system than the United Nations because the international system at the time was characterized by a considerable diffusion of power than today. States of great power rank were numerous, and in that case aggressors were more vulnerable to economic sanctions. This power configuration would have made the League more successful, but it failed.

Couloumbis and Wolfe do not, however, believe that the League was such a dismal failure as it is painted today. According to them, its present evaluation is due to the magnitude of the cases which it failed to resolve relative to the ones it successfully resolved. Moreover, the League’s failure was due to the fact that it did not meet the objective requirement of universality which would have added to the favourable distribution of power to make it more successful. Crucial to this limitation was the United States’ abstention from the League’s membership. This destroyed the League’s security base envisaged when it was planned and weakened the hands of the other powers who were the pillars of the League. Ultimately, it weakened the foundation of the organization (Claude, 1965:249). A Leroy Bennett has argued that the organization was ill- equipped to accomplish its goals. The principles upon which it was based could not assure peace and co-operation (Bennett, 1991:38).

THE LEAGUE AND AFRICA

One of the major factors that contributed to the failure of the League is that the victorious powers of World War 1 used the League to maintain their hegemony by arrogating to themselves the colonies of the defeated Axis powers. The territories that hitherto belonged to imperial Germany and the Ottoman Empire that were considered unable to function as independent states were placed under the Trusteeship of the League of Nations and supervised by some Allied powers. This arrangement was incorporated into the Covenant of the League. Three types of mandates were created by the League's Covenant (Boddy-Evans, 2009).

Article 22 of the Covenant delineated Class A mandates to covered territories that were considered to be ready to receive independence within a relatively short period of time. These territories were all in the Middle East: Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan, administered by the UK; and Lebanon and Syria, administered by France. Class B mandates covered territories for which the granting of independence was a distant prospect. These territories were all in Africa: the Cameroons and Togoland, each of which was divided between British and French administration; Tanganyika, under British administration; and Ruanda-Urundi, under Belgian administration. To the territories classified under Class C mandates virtually no prospect of self-government, let alone independence, was held out. These territories included South West Africa, administered by the Union of South Africa; New Guinea, administered by Australia; Western Samoa, administered by New Zealand; Nauru, administered by Australia under mandate of the British Empire; and certain Pacific islands, administered by Japan (Nations Encyclopedia).

This clearly shows that the Allied powers did not consider any African colony advanced enough to be given independence in the foreseeable future. All Class A mandates gained full independence by 1949 (Boddy-Evans, 2009). No country in Africa was or hoped to be a member of the League in the foreseeable future. The League was dominated by European States and was conceive to preserve European peace and security interpreted as international peace and security at the time. Unfortunately, World War I did not only shatter the balance of power in Europe, it also destroyed the Russian, German, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian empires (Encyclopedia of the New American Nation).

This unsatisfactory status quo that the founders of the League established in Europe blocked all avenues for peaceful change. Added to this, the unfavourbale changes in the international environment like the Great American Depression and the spread of Fascism in Europe contributed to the failure of the League. Moreover, mistrust between some of the victorious powers like France and Britain and the underestimation of Germany’s geometrical growth in power (Couloumbis, 1986:287) also acted as catalyst to the fall of League.

The League “never achieved a comprehensive control of international co-operative activities which was envisaged in Article 24 of the Covenant”. However, Claude has argued that “the League did serve generally to covert international organizations into organs of an organization”. It also provided what has been referred to as a ‘hub’ or a “roof’ element, giving the modern world its first taste of institutional centralization” (Claude, 1965:39). Tams (2006:2) argues that the League should not be pushed aside as a complete failure because, at its foundation, the organization "…generated an unprecedented level of hope and faith in international progress, … became the first international organization with general competence and, for at least 15 years, functioned as a permanent forum of international cooperation." Moreover, the 56

League's recognition of "the importance of economic and social questions" influenced "modern forms of international cooperation." Tams (2006:2) therefore conclude that the League can justly be described as "a forward leap of unprecedented extent and speed, accompanied by extraordinary changes in the conduct of international relations." It formed the foundation for the foundation of the United Nations.

LESSONS DERIVED FROM THE FAILURE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

As mentioned above, the League provided a foundation upon which the United Nations was formed as an improved international cooperation. An interpretation of the strengths of the UN in international peace security is that it had a predecessor that it was modeled after. The UN Security Council is comparatively stronger than the League's Council because the founders of the UN were able to avoid some of the flaws contained in the Covenant that established the Council. Some of these flaws that have been corrected following lessons learned from the League include drawing up a Charter that was more attractive to major powers to join and remain in the organization, ensuring the compatibility of the UN with the cause of decolonization by emphasizing equal rights and self-determination of peoples, inclusion of all the major powers in the Security Council, limiting veto power only to the permanent members of the Security Council, clear definition of aggression and consequent enforcement action, empowering the Security Council to use force where necessary and not merely recommending enforcement action to member-States, making the contribution of armed personnel and equipment to the command of the Security Council when necessary peremptory on member- States, and finally, cautiously dealing with Disarmament (Lowe, et. al., 2008:10-12).

REFERENCES

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 __“Failure of Collective Security”. Available @ http://www.fransamaltingvongeusau.com/documents/dl3/3.pdf. Accessed on January 25, 2017.

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 __"African Americans - The League of Nations and the Pan-African Congress" in Encyclopedia of the New American Nation. Available @ http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/A-D/African-Americans-The-league-of-nations-and-the-pan-african-congress.html. Accessed on July 25, 2016.

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Feminism in International Relations Theory

From the outset, feminist theory has challenged women’s near complete absence from traditional IR theory and practice. This absence is visible both in women’s marginalisation from decision-making and in the assumption that the reality of women’s day-to-day lives is not impacted by or important to international relations. Beyond this, feminist contributions to IR can also be understood through their deconstruction of gender – both as socially constructed identities and as a powerful organising logic. This means recognising and then challenging assumptions about masculine and feminine gender roles that dictate what both women and men should or can do in global politics and what counts as important in considerations of international relations. These assumptions in turn shape the process of global politics and the impacts these have on men and women’s lives. Rather than suggest that traditional IR was gender-neutral – that is, that gender and IR were two separate spheres that did not impact on each other – feminist theory has shown that traditional IR is in fact gender-blind. Feminist scholarship therefore takes both women and gender seriously – and in doing so it challenges IR’s foundational concepts and assumptions.

The basics of feminism If we start with feminism’s first contribution – making women visible – an early contribution of feminist theorists is revealing that women were and are routinely exposed to gendered violence. In making violence against women visible, an international system that tacitly accepted a large amount of violence against women as a normal state of affairs was also exposed. For example, former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s ‘UNiTE’ campaign to end violence against women estimated that up to seven out of ten women will experience violence at some point in their lives – and that approximately 600 million women live in countries where domestic violence is not yet considered a crime. Violence against women is prevalent globally and is not specific to any particular political or economic system. Jacqui True (2012) has demonstrated the links between violence against women in the private sphere (for example, domestic violence) and the kinds of violence women experience in public, in an increasingly globalised workplace and in times of war. In short, nowhere do women share the same economic, political or social rights as men and everywhere there are prevalent forms of gendered violence, whether this be domestic violence in the home or sexual violence in conflict. In looking at violence against women in such a way, it is possible to see a continuum of gendered violence that does not reflect neat and distinct categories of peace, stability and so on. Many societies are thought of as predominantly peaceful or stable despite high levels of violence against a particular portion of the population. It also presents a very different image of violence and insecurity to that viewed through the security agendas of states, which is characteristic of traditional IR viewpoints.

In making women visible, feminism has also highlighted women’s absence from decision-making and institutional structures. For example, in 2015 the World Bank estimated that globally women made up just 22.9% of national parliaments. One of the core assumptions of traditional perspectives that feminism has challenged is the exclusionary focus on areas that are considered ‘high’ politics – for example, sovereignty, the state and military security. The traditional focus on states and relations between them overlooks the fact that men are predominantly in charge of state institutions, dominating power and decision-making structures. It also ignores other areas that both impact global politics and are impacted by it. This is a gendered exclusion as women contribute in essential ways to global politics even though they are more likely to populate those areas not considered high politics and their day-to-day lives may be considered peripheral. Traditional perspectives that ignore gender not only overlook the contributions of women and the impact global politics has on them but also perpetually justify this exclusion. If women are outside these domains of power, then their experiences and contributions are not relevant. Feminist theorists have worked to demonstrate that this distinction between private and public is false. In doing so they show that previously excluded areas are central to the functioning of IR, even if they are not acknowledged, and that the exclusion and inclusion of certain areas in traditional IR thinking is based on gendered ideas of what counts and does not count.

This brings us to the second key contribution of feminism – exposing and deconstructing socially constructed gender norms. In making sense of IR in a way that takes both women and gender seriously, feminism has demonstrated the construction of gendered identities that perpetuate normative ideas of what men and women should do. In this regard, it is important to understand the distinction between ‘sex’ as biological and ‘gender’ as socially constructed. Not all gender considerations rest on the analysis of women, nor should they, and gender relates to expectations and identities attached to both men and women. Gender is understood as the socially constructed assumptions that are assigned to either male or female bodies – that is, behaviour that is assumed to be appropriate ‘masculine’ (male) or ‘feminine’ (female) behaviour. Masculinity is often associated with rationality, power, independence and the public sphere. Femininity is often associated with irrationality, in need of protection, domesticity and the private sphere. These socially and politically produced gender identities shape and influence global interactions, and IR as theory – and global politics as practice – also produces such gendered identities in perpetuating assumptions about who should do what and why. These gender identities are also imbued with power, in particular patriarchal power, which subordinates women and feminine gender identities to men and masculine gender identities. What this means is that socially constructed gender identities also determine distributions of power, which impact where women are in global politics. Whereas men can be feminine and women masculine, masculinity is expected for men and femininity of women.

Cynthia Enloe (1989) asked the question ‘where are the women?’, encouraging IR scholars to see the spaces that women inhabit in global politics and demonstrating that women are essential actors in the international system. She focused on deconstructing the distinctions between what is considered international and what is considered personal, showing how global politics impacts on and is shaped by the daily activities of men and women – and in turn how these activities rest on gendered identities. Traditionally, the military and war making have been seen as masculine endeavours, linked with the idea that men are warriors and protectors, that they are legitimate armed actors who fight to protect those in need of protection – women, children and non-fighting men. In practice this has meant that the many ways that women contribute to conflict and experience conflict have been considered peripheral, outside the realm of IR’s considerations. For example, the issue of sexual and gendered violence in conflict has only recently entered the international agenda. Comparatively, the mass rape of women during and after the Second World War was not prosecuted as the occurrence was either considered an unfortunate by-product of war or simply ignored. This has since changed, with the 2002 Rome Statute recognising rape as a war crime. However, this recognition has not led to the curtailment of conflict related sexual violence and this form of violence remains endemic in many conflicts around the world, as does impunity for its occurrence.

In turn, these issues highlight the importance of intersectionality – understanding that IR is shaped not only by gender but also by other identities, such as class, race or ethnicity. Intersectionality refers to where these identities intersect, and in turn how different groups of people are marginalised, suggesting that we must consider each in tandem rather than in isolation. In examining wartime rape, Lori Handrahan (2004, 437) has shown the intersection of gender and ethnic identities, where the enemy’s women become constructed as ‘other’ and violence against them consequently comes to represent the ‘expansion of ethnic territory by the male conqueror.’ This rests on gendered constructions, which occur at the intersections with other forms of identity, such as ethnicity or race. Gendered constructions that see women characterised as protected mean that conquering them – through rape or sexual violence – is representative of power and domination over one’s enemy. Applying feminist theory to the issue of male wartime rape also shows the gendered logics that inform its occurrence, in particular that the rape of male opponents is seen to ‘feminise’ (that is, humiliate, defeat) opponents. This again highlights the contribution of feminism in understanding how gender influences IR and how the feminine is undervalued or devalued.

As discussed above, feminism has exposed gender violence and women’s marginalization in global politics. However, it also challenges gendered constructions of women as inherently peaceful, as in need of protection or as victims. Feminists see these constructions as further evidence of gender inequality and also as contributing to the exclusion of women from traditional IR perspectives in the first instance. If women are assumed to be victims rather than actors or as peaceful rather than aggressive or as only existing in the domestic or private realm (rather than the public sphere), then their experiences and perspectives on global politics are more easily ignored and justified as marginal. Accounts of women disrupting these gender identities, such as being agents of political violence for example, have challenged these assumptions. This is an important contribution of feminism and one that challenges the construction of gendered identities that do not reflect the diversity of women’s engagements with IR and in practice perpetuate women’s limited access to power. Therefore, taking feminism seriously is not simply about

60 upending the historical marginalization of women, it also provides a more complete picture of global politics by taking into account a broader range of actors and actions.

Feminism and peacekeeping

Building peace after conflict is an increasingly central concern of IR scholars – especially as conflicts become broader and more complex. There are also questions regarding how post-conflict societies are to be rebuilt and how best to prevent relapses into conflict. Peacekeeping missions are one way that the international community seeks to institute sustainable peace after conflict and the United Nation’s traditional peacekeeping role (understood as acting as an impartial interlocutor or monitor) has broadened considerably. Missions now frequently include a laundry list of state-building roles, including re-establishing police and military forces and building political institutions. Feminist theorists have demonstrated the ways that peacekeeping, as security-seeking behaviour, is shaped by masculine notions of militarized security. Post-conflict situations are generally characterised as the formal cessation of violence between armed combatants, ideally transitioning to a situation where the state has a monopoly on the use of force. It is this shift that peacekeeping missions seek to facilitate, conducting a wide range of tasks such as disarming combatants, facilitating peace deals between various state and non-state groups, monitoring elections and building rule of law capacity in state institutions such as police forces and the military.

However, as feminist IR scholars have shown, violence against women often continues in the post-conflict period at rates commensurate to or even greater than during the conflict period. This includes rape and sexual assault, domestic violence and forced prostitution, as well as those selling sex to alleviate financial insecurity. The dominant approach to keeping peace often obscures these kinds of violence. Issues like gender equality and domestic violence (and human rights) are considered ‘soft’ issues as opposed to the ‘hard’ or real issues of military security. This understanding of peace, then, is one in which women’s security is not central.

In terms of structural and indirect violence, women are generally excluded from positions of power and decision-making in reconstruction efforts and have limited access to economic resources. Donna Pankhurst (2008) has theorised what she terms a post-conflict backlash against women, one that is chiefly characterized by high rates of violence and restrictions on women’s access to political, economic and social resources post-conflict. The restriction of women’s access to such resources – such as basic food, housing and education – makes them more susceptible to gendered violence. This often begins with women’s exclusion from peace negotiations and deals, which instead focus on elite actors who are predominantly men, often militarized men. In peacekeeping missions, women are also under- represented. In 1993, women made up only 1% of deployed personnel. That figure had only risen to 3% for military and 10% for policy personnel by 2014. As gender inequality has become increasingly acknowledged, those involved in peacekeeping have paid more attention to the causes and consequences of women’s insecurity in post-conflict settings.

In October 2000 the UN Security Council devoted an entire session to Women, Peace and Security – adopting Resolution 1325 as a result. This resolution called for a gender perspective to be ‘mainstreamed’ throughout peace operations and for women to be included in peace agreements and post-conflict decision-making – in addition to the protection of women and girls during conflict. Resolution 1325 calls on all actors to recognise the ‘special needs’ of women and girls in post-conflict societies, to support local women’s peace initiatives, and advocates for the protection of women’s human rights in electoral, judiciary and police systems. However, consistent with the construction of a gendered understanding of peace discussed above, there remain limitations to the full implementation of Resolution 1325.

A United Nations study by Radhika Coomaraswamy (2015) found that gender in peacekeeping continues to be under-resourced politically and financially, and the gendered elements of post-conflict reconstruction are still marginalised in missions. Women still experience high rates of violence post- conflict, are still excluded from peace processes and still ignored in peace- building policy. This is demonstrated, for example, in national and international attempts to disarm former combatants after conflict and reintegrate them into post-conflict society. This is a post- conflict policy area that feminist scholars have routinely exposed as being highly gendered and exclusionary of women who are former

61 combatants. Megan Mackenzie (2010) has attributed this to constructed gender identities that minimise the idea that women are agents in conflict or involved in war-making, instead constructing them as victims with limited agency. In other words, they are subject to war rather than war’s actors.

This means not only that women are excluded from disarmament programmes because of socially produced gender norms but also that they are unable to access the material and economic benefits that may flow from such programmes – or the political and social gains they could make from being recognised as legitimate veterans in post-conflict societies. This example demonstrates the power invested in gendered identities, the ways they can shape policy and how gender inequality is perpetuated via such policy.

Finally, international interventions such as peacekeeping missions also contribute to the continuation of violence post-conflict and are a site in which gendered identities are produced. There have been numerous reports of peacekeepers perpetrating sexual violence against women, girls and boys while on mission. This issue gained much attention in 2015 and into 2016, when a United Nations whistle blower exposed not only reports of sexual abuse of children in the Central African Republic by French peacekeepers but also the United Nation’s inaction in the face of these reports. From a feminist perspective, the impunity that peacekeepers enjoy – despite rhetorical commitments to zero tolerance – is a result of gendered security imperatives in which militarised security and the coherence of the institution (whether that be an international organisation or a state) is prioritised over the welfare of the individual.

Conclusion

Feminist research has demonstrated the value in taking women’s experiences and contributions seriously and used that as a base to demonstrate how IR rests on, and perpetuates, gendered ideas about who does what, who experiences what – and why – in global politics. Beyond this there is also recognition that women are important agents in political, economic and social processes. Despite its designation, feminism does more than focus on women, or what are considered women’s issues. In highlighting both inequality and relations of power, feminism reveals gendered power and what it does in global politics. Being concerned with women’s subordination to men, gendered inequality and the construction of gendered identities, feminism has challenged a homogenous concept of ‘women’ in IR and exposed gendered logics as powerful organising frameworks

Unit four

Post-cold war thinking on International Relations

Globalization

What is globalization?

Globalization is an ambiguous concept. It has almost no particular definition, but globalization has more than a definition based on the biases of ideological researchers and their attitude towards globalization. This division among researchers in the definition of globalization crystallized in two streams. Aware of globalization in the direction of taking advantage of the benefits that promise and reduce the size of social costs of integration.

Jimis Rosenau, a professor of political science at American universities, called for the need to uncover the essence of globalization before approaching a comprehensive definition of it. He pointed out that societies and institutions are the third.

It seems that the third process that he referred to is the disappearance of the borders between countries is the common denominator between those who are biased towards globalization and those who stood against it. If globalization means that the state disappears in the current legal sense, which is first defined in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 that defines the state with three elements, Sovereignty and lifting of the economic, material and cultural restrictions that prevent the free circulation of goods, services and capital within the space that includes the globe or, in the opinion of Mohamed Abed Al- Jabri, is the concession of the national state or to induce it to relinquish rights in favor of the Or for the benefit of the controllers.

We find that during this definition of globalization, which is the result of the basic lifting of economic, material and cultural constraints that prevent the flow of capital, goods and services constitute a global space in which the integration of world markets in the fields of trade and direct investment and the transfer of funds and manpower and cultures

And a technology within the framework of free markets, which led to the world's submission to the world market forces, leading to the breach of national borders and the great decline in the sovereignty of the state.

Through the analysis of the system of globalization, some see the scene of the new international order after the end of the Cold War, which is the phenomena of integration of markets and finance and the development of technology in a way that reduces the world from medium size to small size, which makes each of us able to reach sites further in the world, as seen to globalization through three levels:

Globalization as Ideology:

At this level, globalization is seen as an intellectual framework based on the idea of the triumph of Western civilization and the establishment of a new human civilization, based on a range of ideological frameworks such as neo-liberalism, postmodernism, postmodernism, post-development or post-imperialism.

Globalization as a System:

63 conditions on the groupings to serve their interests and with instruments dominated by them such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization and the United Nations.

Globalization as a process:

This is a historical stage or a new qualitative development in human history. It is the result of a cumulative historical development with many roots. Globalization at this level means the emergence of new forces dominated by global trends such as international companies, financial and international institutions and the emergence of new international patterns. A global economic format - a media format as well as a military one, and then the emergence of new global issues.

The historical dimension of globalization and its developments in the course of international relations have been linked to the question of continuing capitalist expansion beyond borders. This began centuries ago, when capitalism moved from the borders of the nation-state and the national economy to the overseas world in a process of extensive colonial expansion, Centuries ago, the capitalist system emerged from the stage of competition or free competition into the stage of monopoly and the imperialist stage. Today, in the context of the great cultural revolution, capitalist expansion reaches the limit of the societies belonging to the system This new pattern of expansion today is called globalization. Its main feature is the unification of the world and the imposition of common laws that end all kinds of sovereignty. The path has begun since the birth of multinational companies decades ago. Today, internationally after the negotiations and was institutionalized in an international organization with the same name, in laws and measures that would be revoked by the laws after the end of the Cold War and the emergence of major transformations in the structure and layout of the international system and crystallized the features of the so-called new international order. The role of the state as a unit of fundamental analysis was enhanced by the emergence of new ideas that were the product of the globalization of economy and politics and in turn constituted new concepts in the analysis of international politics.

The emergence of agglomerations and blocs in the twenty-first century has led to the transfer of the international order from the control of geopolitical considerations, geopolitics, to the direction of geopolitical considerations, namely, economic geography, meaning that economic interactions between states, regardless of borders, will have longitudinal policy and the identification of their national interests. This is clearly demonstrated by the emergence of regional blocs such as the European Union, ASEAN and OPEC in achieving the economic interests of Member States.

The decline of the geopolitical factor in international relations was the result of the decline of the ideological and military role after the end of the Cold War and the accompanying developments in the structure of the international system, which were in favor of the increasing role of the economic and technological actors in the structure of international relations.

During the Cold War and before the phenomenon of globalization, the state was the main element in the concept of the international economy where the countries were independent economic units, but after the emergence of the phenomenon of globalization and the spread of transnational companies, the concept of globalization and its economic dimensions formed from the role of these large multinational companies and transnational While the concept of the international economy was shaped by the role of the state and its control in the movement of the economy under the international system that prevailed during the Cold War.

Globalization has posed great challenges to the realistic perspective that dominated the analysis of international relations during the Cold War, through the decline of the State as a fundamental unit of analysis through the erosion of its role in favor of globalization of new structures in the structure of the international system, which has led to integration and integration, Regional blocs and geographically oriented societies to create large economic blocs, the Karl Watch study on

64 geographical connectivity and convergence and its role in international relations found its appropriate environment in post- cold-war blocs.

The expansion of the European Union into the Eastern European countries and its transformation into a united Europe, as well as the transformation of American-Canadian relations into complementary relations involving all North American countries within the framework of the so-called NAFTA and the ASEAN bloc among South-East Asia, the African Union and the Organization of Latin American States, In which geopolitical considerations, a world that embodies the phenomenon of large economic blocs, both on the level of integration between political units or institutional integration, as in the case of the World Trade Organization, these phenomena carried by the trend of globalization were and still are The role of the state as a fundamental unit of analysis in the understanding and interpretation of international relations, a role that is highly dependent on the realistic perspective.

Globalization as a System:

At this level, globalization is understood as a system in the sense of a set of actions, policies and practices intended and issued by the major powers in a conscious and reliable manner in order to renew the concept of globalization and impose conditions on the groupings to serve their interests and with instruments dominated by them such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization and the United Nations.

Globalization as a process:

The emergence of the new world order:

That the idea of a global system is not new to international relations has existed during the past periods where the communication between nations and peoples in it is fraught with many difficulties. But the element that has been emerging is what these systems of concepts and principles, and their perception of others and the extent of their response and ability to adapt to the interactions and changes that occur on the ocean that prevail in it. Here some researchers, such as Abraham

Abrach, point out that former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was the first to launch the term "New World Order" in modern times in a speech before the United Nations General Assembly in 1988. While others see as noble that it came for the first time in a speech to former US President George Bush before the US Congress in January 1991. Ibrahim Abrach and

Zaki al-Abidi link the concept of the new international order to the historical development of the United States of America.

The former president of the United States, Andrew Wilson, who ruled the country from 1913 to 1921 and was described as having religious principles and principles, has been calling for the establishment of a new world order based on respect for self-determination and universalization of democracy and liberty Trading. Therefore, those who view this view

Washington's attempts to be active in the international arena as a practical application of this historical property that has been required since that time.

It is believed that the emergence of the world order dates back to the beginning of the fifteenth century - the European

Renaissance - when the nation-state came to replace the feudal state, expanding the market to include the entire nation rather than the city or province. Al-Shiekhi states in 1973 the second human rights declaration on the need to build a global government: We deeply regret the division of mankind on the basis of nationalism. We have reached a turning point in human history where the best choice is to transcend national politics and move towards the establishment of a world order based on the establishment of a federal government that transcends national boundaries.

Al-Sheikhi also believes that former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had a vision of integrating the global economy into some of the principles known as "Thatcherism", which is no more than a process of globalization of the economies of countries that have been based on a national basis to make them integrated into a unified global economic system Is managed from a single control center. In this context, al-Shaikhi refers to the support of former US president Ronaldo Reagan for this vision. Others, like Ismail Sabri, believe that the origin of the world order dates back to the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the twentieth century, referring to the speech of Adolf Hitler before the Third Reich, which stated:

Socialist revolution in establishing a new world order.

Just as there was a disagreement between scholars and thinkers about the time these terms appeared and became common place in the political dictionary, there was a divergence over the meanings that they meant. While some considered that the status of "universality" corresponds to the "international", others considered that the launch of the status of universality means dealing with the world as a single unit, regardless of the units that are - States. They also pointed out that this status was not arbitrary, but came to suggest that there are other actors in the international arena - excluding countries - for example: transnational corporations, civil society organizations and pressure groups. Among them is the American James Rossino, who believes that the world is living a life beyond international relations, and therefore the state is no longer the only effective mechanism in this arena. Therefore, it calls for a world order, one of which is the State, along with the entities mentioned, which gives it a position that is equal to or sometimes superior to that of States.

The global system is based on principles that can be summed up in:

1. Exceeding the principle of the absolute sovereignty of States and non-interference in their internal affairs established by the Treaty of Westphalia, and replacing the principle of "international legality" with their place.

2 - the emergence of new concepts such as: the protection of human rights and the adoption of good governance and democracy and intervention legislation on the pretext of minority protection and relief and disaster prevention.

3. The integration of national economies into the orbit of the global economy based on the principle of free market and the removal of customs barriers, nationalization and others, and the transformation of the state's economic function from an apparatus that works to achieve development and welfare and provide services to its citizens, to implement the so-called "economic reform plans" International finance to define and chart the economic plans of States in accordance with the interests of the world economy, not the interests of peoples

To the implementation of the so-called "economic reform plans", and to give the right to the international financial institutions to determine and draw the economic plans of States in accordance with the interests of the world economy, not the interests of peoples. In addition to considering the decisions of those institutions in relation to the economic conditions of different countries reference references determine the extent of cooperation with them.

4. Launch international and specialized organizations, such as the United Nations, human rights organizations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to judge the actions of some Third World countries in matters that were at the heart of their powers and their sovereignty over their peoples and geographical space. In the absence of the will of these organizations or the consensus of their member States on the violation of a law by a particular State or failure to observe due process of conduct with regard to a specific case.

5. To give a greater role to what is now known as "civil society organizations" to the extent that they are considered as one of the components of the global system.

6. Provide greater opportunities for transnational corporations to control the world economy and to exercise monopoly and speculation, regardless of the extent to which some national economies may be harmed by such practices.

7. to compel countries to abide by conventions and treaties that are incompatible with their values, culture, beliefs and internal laws, in order to follow specific cultural and social models, as in the Beijing and Cairo population conferences. As well as the pressure exerted on some countries to force them to sign the additional protocol of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

8 - Interpretation of the laws and customs governing the relations between States according to the whims and interests of the great powers, and grant those powers the right to define some concepts such as national security and terrorism, which detracts from the sovereignty of other States, and the involvement of some institutions such as the Security Council on issues that are at the heart of the state's powers and geographical space.

9. The application of the criteria that have been duplicated, as required by the interests of the superpowers, especially the United States of America and its friends.

Twenty years after Huntington clash of civilization

Today: Mali; yesterday: 9/11; the day before yesterday: Iran’s 1979 revolution and its aftermath, including sustained hostilities with the USA. Since the late 1970s, the talk has been of the impossibility of different sets of values, norms and beliefs living side-by-side in an increasingly globalized world. In 1993, Samuel Huntington published what must be one of the most cited articles ever: ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’1 Why is the article so important? Why is it a touchstone for nearly all contemporary debates about the capacity of different groups to live together in relative amity not enmity?

My argument in this brief piece is not that Huntington’s article was so important because his argument was ‘correct’ or

‘right’. My claim is twofold: First, Huntington’s article was and is important because it captured perfectly the end-of- the-Cold War zeitgeist, a way of seeing the world which has endured in the uncertain times which we call

‘globalization.’ Second, it has proved to be an abiding statement about globalization and the hopes and fears that it conveys.

It is almost irrelevant that his focal point: the impossibility of the West – read; the USA – and ‘Islam’ – read; ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ – living together in harmony was laughingly over-simplified, redolent of the paranoia of someone experiencing the shattering of a stable, safe and unchanging world suddenly and demonstrably confronted with the scenario of the post-World War II paradigm smashed to smithereens. What is a card-carrying Realist to do? Of course: find a new enemy and dress it up in the same preposterous ‘baddy’ clothes that had marked the treatment by US

Realists of the USSR since the start of the Cold War and transfer the characteristics to a new ‘actor’: ‘Islamic fundamentalism.’

It is worth recalling – especially for our younger readers – that in the early 1990s, we had just emerged from a 50-year period of secular ideological polarisation. Despite the claims of some today in the USA, the US did not ‘win’ the Cold

War; rather, the Soviet Union ‘lost’ it. Unable to compete with America in a completion for global dominance, its shaky, dysfunctional and misanthropic political/social/economic system spectacularly imploded within a seemingly impossibly short period of time: apparently as strong as ever in the mid-1980s, by 1991, the Soviet Union and its system as well as its parasitic coterie of attendant nations was no more. This left a gulf, a hole, a vacuum. How, and with what, to fill it?

If globalization was the force which defeated the USSR, it was also the trend that enabled religion to resume its long-

abandoned place in global politics. Exiled to marginalization after 1648, the sudden demise of the Cold War and the

USSR and its attendant secular ideology, opened the way for a new focus on ‘culture’. Now, as everyone knows who

has ever played a word association game, ‘religion’ is almost a synonym for ‘culture’, because what primarily

differentiates cultures from each other is religion and, especially, religious difference

The 9/11 attacks on the United States were a key event in the debate about the role of cultural and religious difference

– especially, ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ – in international conflict, especially in the way that they focused attention on

al-Qaeda’s brand of globalised cultural terrorism. For some scholars, analysts and policy makers – especially but not

exclusively in the United States – 9/11 marked the practical onset of Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’

between two cultural entities: the ‘Christian West’ and the ‘Islamic world’, with special concern directed at those

entities which might attract the nomenclature ‘Islamic fundamentalists.’ This is not to claim of course that Huntington

had it all his own way: Many have addressed his claims of global cultural conflict between the ‘Christian West’ and the

‘Islamic fundamentalists’ by a counter-argument: 9/11 was not the start of a clash of civilizations but rather the last

gasp of transnational Islamist radicalism. (It remains to be seen if the unfolding events in Mali and Algeria are the start

of a new phase.) It is hard to disagree with the claim that the events of September 11 thrust culture on to forefront of

the international agenda, providing as a result Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis with a new lease of life.

Henceforward, many commentators were no longer inhibited in attributing essentialist characteristics to the ‘Christian

West’ and ‘Islam’. After 9/11, there was a pronounced penchant to see the world in a Huntington-inspired simplistic

division, with straight lines on maps – ‘Islam has bloody borders’, he averred2 – apparently the key to understanding

what were increasingly portrayed as definitively ethically and racially defined lines across the globe.

September 11, 2001, as well as many subsequent terrorist outrages, were perpetrated by al-Qaeda or its followers; all involved extremist Muslims that wanted to cause destruction and loss of life against ‘Western’ targets that nevertheless often led to considerable loss of life, for example in Istanbul and Casablanca, among Muslims. The US response – the Bush administration’s ‘war on terror’ – targeted Muslims, some believe rather indiscriminately, in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. Some have claimed that these events ‘prove’ the correctness of Huntington’s thesis on the ‘clash of civilizations’. In such views, the 9/11 attacks and the US response suggested that Huntington’s prophecy about clashing civilizations was now less abstract and more plausible than when first articulated in the early 1990s. Others contend, however, that 9/11 was not the start of the clash of civilizations – but, as already noted, the last gasp of radical Islamists’ attempts to foment revolutionary change in inter alia, Algeria and Egypt in the 1980s and early 1990s. We can also note, however, that 9/11 not only had major effects on both the USA and international relations but also contributed to a surge of

Islamic radicalism in Saudi Arabia. This was a result not only of the presence of US troops in the kingdom, as highlighted 70 by bin Laden, but also due to a growing realisation that the function of Saudi Arabia’s ulema was and is overwhelmingly to underpin and explain away the unearned and unrepresentative dominance of the ruling king, his extended family and parasitic entourage.

A dozen years after 9/11 and 20 years since the publication of Huntington’s article, what do we know now about the

‘clash of civilizations’? Huntington did note in his article that he was aware of differences of opinion and outlook within

‘civilizations’ but he appeared to think this was much less important than an apparently clear ‘clash’ of values norms, and beliefs which for him characterized the division ‘between’ the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’. It is clear – to me, at least – that the very idea of a world divided into ‘seven, or eight major civilizations’ is absurd. (In parenthesis, as it were, the very idea that there is ‘possibly [an] African civilization’4 is belied by current events in Mali: just one African civilization? What, pray tell, would this comprise?) Time has shown, once again, that anyone who takes seriously the idea of a world divided into seven or eight major civilizations lacks capacity to have any possible understanding of our fascinating mosaic of a world filled with myriad ideas, norms, beliefs and conceptions of how the world is.

Enemy Wanted: Apply Without

A friend of mine once told me a story about the seminar he attended at which Samuel Huntington first presented his nascent ideas about “the clash of civilizations.” The Cold War had recently ended, much to everyone’s surprise, and people were scrambling to figure out what world politics would look like next. Others had already staked their claims. John Mearsheimer had predicted a return to rough-and-tumble 1930s-style multipolarity.1 Charles Krauthammer had proclaimed America’s “unipolar moment.”2 Francis Fukuyama had foreseen the triumphal sweep of liberal democracy across the globe.3 And President George H. W. Bush had trumpeted a “new world order” based on the rule of law and sound global governance.4

Islam,” said Huntington.

“What?” said the audience.

“Islam is the next enemy.”

“Why?”

“Well—it just is. They hate us.”

“What do you mean, ‘It just is,’ Sam? That’s not a reason. You need some kind of theory to back that up.”

“Fine. I’ll be back.”

And thus, according to my friend, was the “clash of civilizations” thesis born.

Now, I was not present in the room, so I cannot vouch for my friend’s account. And in any case, he admitted that he was paraphrasing in his typically colorful way. But that was the gist, he said; the clash of civilizations thesis began with a hunch, and the theory came later.

Anyone who understands social science knows that it isn’t supposed to work this way. We aren’t supposed to start with our predictions and engineer theories to back them up. This isn’t even supposed to be possible, epistemologically or psychologically. Our world views—which in the case of International Relations (IR) scholars includes specific kinds of theories—are supposed to shape our expectations Since the attacks on the United States on September 11th 2001, Western countries have become increasingly fearful of the phenomenon of “home-grown terrorism” arising out of the radicalization of youthful first, second and even third generation Muslim immigrants. Radicalized individuals, born and bred in the West were involved in terrorism, such as the Madrid train bombings of March 2004, the murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in November 2004, and the London bombings of July 2005.

In addition to these acts of violence, Islamic “radicalization” also finds expression in non-violent acts of defiance and statements of difference, such as the wearing of the hijab or headscarf and other distinct cultural practices. These symbolic actions produce discomfiture, as these are seen as aggressive rejections of Western civilization. Additionally, these developments help explain the rise in popularity of theories of civilizational clashes between the West and Islam2, with migration and terror allegedly two new weapons in the Muslim armoury directed against the West. Furthermore, a heated debate over the possibility of harmonious integration of Muslim communities has emerged in the West.

The alternative explanation for disgruntled Muslim behaviour in Europe lies in wider socio-economic disadvantage, the underpinnings for which date back to Ted Gurr’s classic work on relative deprivation as the source of rebellion.6 Frances Stewart has documented the systematic disadvantage that Muslim groups face in Western countries. Muslim citizens in European countries are systematically poorer, suffer from greater unemployment and are less than proportionately represented in public life,7 in addition to the opprobrium their cultural identity attracts. Muslims, particularly in Western Europe, may be subject to systemic inequalities of opportunity in economic, political and social spheres.

The Anatomy of Muslim Radicalization

Contemporary racism in the West, especially in Europe, is driven more by disdain for cultural identities such as Islam, rather than the traditional biologically based phenomenon, complexion. This explains the rise in anti-Muslim sentiment, which is not merely an indignant reaction to violence perpetrated by Muslims, but is symptomatic of a wider disdain for Muslim culture. According to surveys,8 negative perceptions about Muslims among non-Muslims had grown by 2008: 52% in Spain, 50% in Germany, 38% in France, but only 23% in the UK and the USA felt negative about Muslims. The same survey indicates growth in the Muslim sense of identity amongst Muslims immigrants.

It is widely believed, even in liberal circles, that Islam is an intolerant and violent religion. There is a long ‘orientalist’ tradition in this regard; for example Sir William Muir said in 1878: “the sword of Mahomet, and the Coran, are the most stubborn enemies of Civilization, Liberty and Truth”.9 Unfortunately, these notions are based on selective and limited interpretation. It can be equally argued that the Islam celebrates racial diversity,10 and requires believers to accept other religions as an article of faith.11 Some of the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad and his cousin and son-in-law Ali, during Islam’s inception are testimony towards inclusiveness.12 The important point is that a devout Muslim must eschew racism in all forms, should not hate Judeo-Christian civilization and reject universal values of toleration; rather the dislike of the West could emanate from injustices perpetrated thereof. Moreover, historically, Muslim countries and empires have exercised greater toleration towards other religions, compared to European practice until the 19th century (a good example

72 would be Muslim ruled Medieval Spain).Historical acts that may add to the sense of Muslim collective grievances include events such as the wholesale expulsion of Muslims who did not convert to Christianity from Spain (16th-17th centuries), Sicily (14th century) and the massacre and expulsion of Muslims in the Balkans (18-20th centuries). In the Middle East, the Anglo-French Sykes-Picot pact (during the First World War) resulted in an extremely unfair disposition of the former Ottoman territories.13 Later, the emergence of Israel, and the West’s lack of even handed behaviour towards the protagonists in the Arab-Israeli conflict spawned deep resentment. Other areas of Muslim disadvantage in the recent past include Kashmir in India, and Bosnia in the European Balkans. Their predicament is often blamed on Western double standards towards the plight of Muslims.

Terrorism is only part of the total set of actions adopted by radicalized Muslim groups in Europe, as many adopt strategies of peaceful protest, and some simply reject certain Western cultural practices. Muslim religious discourse that accompanies the retreat into confrontational behaviour towards the majority communities in their countries of adoption or birth can be linked to the spread of the Salafiyya movement (which means following those who went before, in this case early Muslims) among Muslim diasporas. Such dynamics should be analysed against the backdrop of the current three- fold manifestation of Islamic activism: political, missionary and jihadi.14 Political Islam, as embodied by the Muslim Brotherhood usually aims to seek power through political rather than violent means. Missionary activism tends to refrain from political confrontation; rather it tends to concentrate on preaching and reviving the community of believer (Ummah). It includes the Tablihgi (evangelical) and the Sufi (mystical) movements, which although theologically distinct, are both avowedly peaceful. Jihadi Islamists committed to violence with a view to defending (or expanding) Dar- al-Islam (the world of Islam). Identity and Collective Action Individuals may derive utility not just from consumption or identification with a cause, but also from behaviour in conformity to their sense of identity, and the like minded behavior of other members of the group they belong to; for example the performance of prayers by the individual and his co-religionists. Here the position that the group occupies in societal hierarchy is also crucial to their collective self-esteem. The individual not only derives utility from a set of his own actions, but also similar actions of other like-minded individuals belonging to his group, and above all his own identity or self image, which in turn depends on the group’s social standing.15 The last factor depends both on the group’s economic disadvantage, and other factors such as the West’s foreign policy towards the Muslim world. If another group member suffers disutility from inappropriate behaviour by another group member, they may lure the errant individual back to the fold. This is more likely amongst poor but culturally homogenous communities suffering from widespread unemployment, living proximate to each other in isolated ghettos with close kinship ties. Moreover, the dissident group may use this type of cooperative behaviour to resolve the collective action problem, which involves converting like-minded individuals into groups. Group grievances become individual grievances, and individuals act upon group grievances. It is useful to utilize the expression ‘horizontal inequality’, originating in the work of Frances Stewart. Horizontal inequality is inequality between culturally distinct groups, such as between Catholics and Protestants, Muslims and Christians and

The Crescent and the Cross

It is now two decades since Samuel Huntington put forward his clash of civilizations hypothesis about the nature of future conflict being cultural; specifically between Confucianism, or with greater likelihood Islam, and the West.1 This piece contends that civilizational conflict occurs mainly between distinct cultural groups within (and not between) nation states, and this conflict does not occur in a socio-economic vacuum.

Since the attacks on the United States on September 11th 2001, Western countries have become increasingly fearful of the phenomenon of “home-grown terrorism” arising out of the radicalization of youthful first, second and even third generation Muslim immigrants. Radicalized individuals, born and bred in the West were involved in terrorism, such as the Madrid train bombings of March 2004, the murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in November 2004, and the London bombings of July 2005.

Although there is a vast body of work on how Islamic radicalization functions, and an even larger literature on the dangers it poses, the development of radicalization is often assumed to have emerged in a socio-economic and political vacuum. The “culturalist”3 view regards Islam as the source of a monolithic and innately violent mindset, using non- democratic means to achieve political objectives. The hatred for the West by some Muslim groups is treated as a given; hence conflict with the West necessarily follows. Some Western writers depict Muslims as wallowing in wounded pride about their historical decline. One states that: “the underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization, whose people is convinced of the superiority of their culture and is obsessed with the inferiority of their power”.4

Contrary to “culturalist” predictions, global religions, such as Islam, are not monolithic. Dichotomized identity categories, pitting Western culture (“us”) against Islam (“them”) and vice-versa, do not do justice to the fact that there are many faces of Islam across both historical and time and at present. Secondly, and more importantly, individual identity is regarded as a singular phenomenon, ignoring the multiplicity of identities that individuals may possibly possess.5 Thus, it is conceivable for an individual to be simultaneously a Muslim, a Western citizen, a believer in democracy, as well as someone who respects difference and human rights. Furthermore, culture is not immutable; it evolves over time, and changes as material conditions alter.

From the viewpoint of the individual perpetrator of radicalized Islamic activities, intrinsic motivation, which is often the outcome of their collective sense of humiliation, plays a major role. Perpetrators of extremist violence are not always uneducated and poor. It is not their personal poverty that will necessarily drive individual membership of a radical group, but the disadvantage faced by the group at large. From the viewpoint of individual choice, extreme acts like suicide bombing may be rational. This is because the individual has made an all or nothing choice between solidarity and individual autonomy.

Interaction between Fear and HatredJust as aggrieved Muslims, indoctrinated and herded by conflict entrepreneurs into groups for collective action, may feel a profound hatred for the West, certain politicians and political parties in the West seek their own political self-advancement by preaching the dangers posed by Islam in general, and Muslim migrants in particular. In 2001, for instance, the Danish People’s Party campaigned with a poster showing a young blond girl and the statement “When she retires, we will be a Muslim majority nation.” The party came in third in terms of seats in 74

Parliament, experiencing a 70% increase in its vote bank. In the 2002 French Presidential elections, Jean-Marie Le Pen of the Front National – later convicted for spreading Islamophobic messages in an interview to the Newspaper Le Monde in 2003- won a place in the runoff against Chirac and received 17% of votes. In August 2007, the Governor of Carinthia in Austria, Joerg Haider promised to ban the construction of mosques and minarets in his Province; the Austrian right won 28% of votes in the September 2008 general elections. The appeal of anti-Muslim political parties is growing, for example the Dutch PVV gained 15% of the votes in the national election of 9th June 2010, making them the second largest party. This is the notion of fear of a minority, something that can be succinctly be described as the phobia for ‘Eurabia’, which in part is whipped up by exaggerated statements from hate-mongering politicians and exploited within electoral politics wherever feasible.

We can think of the hate message against Muslim migrants as originating in messages sent out by a demagogic politician. Its attractiveness to the public will depend on their need for scapegoats and their own personal life experiences of these minority groups. Not all these signals will be believed: the better educated among the public may discount part of the message and others with greater knowledge of minorities based upon personal interaction may similarly disregard this signal. Some individuals (older people, less educated, those whose jobs are vulnerable) are more likely to abandon the search for truth in favour of the hate message. If enough voters believe the signal then the state will act. These take the form of anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant legislation making it difficult for families to join relatives in Europe, linguistic and cultural proficiency tests, and the banning of headscarves and veils.

Conclusions Against the backdrop of a politicized Muslim identity, and substantial socioeconomic and political disadvantage suffered by Muslims, domestic ‘integrationist’ policies aimed at ‘moderate Muslims’ are unlikely to curb radicalization – let alone fight terrorism. Rather, they may backfire. American-style integrationist (as opposed to multicultural) policies are gaining favour in Europe, but these are doomed to failure unless the objects of the integrationist policies are also offered equality of economic, political and social opportunities. Furthermore, and quite crucially, if individuals have multiple identities, then they are more likely to act on the basis of their other (Western) identity when they are less socio-economically deprived and less frowned upon. The presence of virulent Islamophobic messages not only instils fear, but also elicits hatred, undoing the pacific-integrationist effects of material progress amongst Muslims migrants in the West.

Two decades ago, after the end of the cold war, and the triumph of liberal free market democracy, Samuel Huntington predicted that future conflict would be purely civilizational, and between nation states. The West’s antagonists in these future conflicts would be the world’s remaining unassimilated non-Western cultures: Confucianism, but especially Islam. In the past decade, civilizational conflict with Islam has, indeed, escalated. These struggles, however, are taking place, within and not between, nation states, including the internecine warfare (Fitnah) inside Islam. Finally, and most importantly, culture and civilization are inseparable from the economy, polity and society. Cultures are not shaped, nor do they ever evolve, in a socio-economic vacuum, making a purely civilizational conflict virtually impossible.

References lit

 1 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993).2

 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996);

 Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror, (London: Phoenix, 2003).3 Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim,

 Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War and the Roots of Terror, (New York: Doubleday, 2004).4 Huntington 1996: 217.5 See: Amartya Sen, “Violence, Identity and Poverty”, Journal of Peace Research, 45(1) (2008): 5-15.6

 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, (Princeton: University Press, 1970).7 Frances Stewart, ‘Global Aspects and Implications of Horizontal Inequalities (HIs): Inequalities Experienced by Muslims Worldwide’, (2008), www.microcon.eu.8 http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=2629 William Muir,

 The Life of Mahomet: From Original Sources, London: Smith, Elder, (1878): 235.10 “—We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one another–the noblest of you, in the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct”. Quran: 049.013.

 “And of His signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the difference of your languages and colours”. Quran: 030.022. English translations from Marmaduke Pickthall,

 The Glorious Quran, http://www.islam101.com/quran/QTP/index.htm11 “Say (O Muhammad): We believe in Allah and that which is revealed unto us and that which was revealed unto Abraham and Ishmael and Isaac and Jacob and the tribes, and that which was vouchsafed unto Moses and Jesus and the prophets from their Lord. We make no distinction between any of them, and unto Him we have surrendered”. Quran: 003.084.1

 2 Consider an excerpt from Muhammad’s Last Sermon (circa 632 AD): “An Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab nor a non-Arab has any superiority over an Arab; also a black person has no superiority over a white person, nor a white person has any superiority over a black person, except by piety and good action. Indeed the best among you is the one with the best character…” http://www.themodernreligion.com/prophet/prophet_lastsermon.htm.13

 See, Jeremy Salt, The Unmaking of the Middle East: A History of Western Disorder in Arab Lands, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008). 14

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/egypt_north_africa/37_understanding_isla mism.pdf.1

 5 See: George Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton ‘Economics and Identity’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3) (2000): 715-753.

The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ and Its Unexpected Liberalism

University professors often complain about how little political attention their ideas gain. Likewise, politicians often find the work of academics esoteric, abstract, and policy-irrelevant. If scholars find it hard enough to get their students and peers to read what they have written, they find it nearly impossible to make an impact in policy circles. Samuel Huntington’s 1993 Foreign Affairs article on “the clash of civilizations” is a noteworthy exception. Not only is it one of the most cited pieces ever written by an international relations scholar — it is also one of the most widespread in policy and media circles worldwide. While there is consensus from followers and critics alike on what arguments Huntington was attempting to make – that religion rather than ideology would become the main denominator in post-Cold War conflicts, that the world’s major religious communities are largely territorially delineated, and that these religious communities are given and cannot be changed — Huntington’s contentions stirred and continue to stir, heated debate Huntington not only rejected Francis Fukuyama’s then recently published piece on the end of history, and the coming victory of liberal democracy worldwide, but also reinvigorated the much-critiqued Realist worldview of the never-ending tragedy of global power politics. Huntington did so by simply replacing the clash of ideology with the clash of civilizations (read: religions).

In this chapter we focused on Europe since contemporary international politics, for good and for bad, was shaped by Europeans and by non- Europeans copying European examples. This is a story of how the state emerged as a sovereign

77 actor in the late Middle Ages by simultaneously rejecting the traditional claims made by universal and local institutions. It is a story of how the state went on to strengthen its power by means of bureaucracies and armies. European states were always competing with each other, and while the military competition had disastrous effects in terms of human suffering, the economic competition that took place was a spur to development and social change. In the course of the nineteenth century, the state was transformed into a nation-state in which, in theory at least, the people as a whole were in charge. There were great hopes that nation-states would be more peaceful in their relations with one another, but these hopes were soon dashed. Nation-states were ferocious colonisers and in the twentieth century the world as a whole suffered through two devastating world wars and came to the brink of nuclear Armageddon during the Cold War. In the twenty- first century there are once again hopes for a better future, but as long as the European state-system (now the international system) lasts a more enduring peace is unlikely.

There is proof however that the “clash” thesis has been politically utilized in a liberal and rather unexpected way, beyond, and even contradicting, the usual story about bolstering neoconservative notions of war on terrorism and Islamophobia. Surprisingly, the best example of this is how former president George W. Bush used the concept of a clash of civilizations. Bush’s foreign policy has generally been described as strongly neoconservative, following rather than refuting the idea of a clash of civilizations, citing as evidence his distinction between “civilized nations” and “rogue states”. Nevertheless, the manner in which Bush explicitly utilized Huntington’s concept conveyed elements of liberalism. In a Presidential Address to the Nation on September 11, 2007, Bush commented on his “war on terrorism” in the following manner: “this struggle has been called the clash of civilizations. In truth, it is a struggle for civilization”. This refutation of Huntington’s idea was repeated many times by Bush and his administration, including Secretary of State Colin Powell and his successor Condoleezza Rice.

This rejection of Huntington’s idea did not however mean that Bush found it useless. On the contrary, Bush’s rhetoric redefined “civilization” to distinctively liberal vales such as universal freedom and democracy rather than separate religious community. This was the effect of the simple rewording from a clash of to a clash for civilization. This liberal underpinning of Bush’s foreign policy was reinforced by many other rhetorical elements of the “war on terrorism”, such as how “the force of freedom” will stop the “rise of tyranny”, and how the war on terrorism was defined as a war of ideology and ideas — not religion.

While Huntington’s pessimistic clash of civilizations presumed religious communities as static and impermeable to change, Bush’s optimistic clash for civilization presumed that communities are susceptible to fundamental value change. In his 2007 State of the Union Address, Bush argued that: “Free people are not drawn to malignant ideologies — and most will choose a better way when given the chance”. On various occasions, Bush made it clear that he believed in the transformative power of spreading ideas of freedom and democracy.

It is noteworthy that Obama, while having redirected US foreign policy in many significant ways (emphasizing multilateralism, ending the war in Iraq, shifting focus to East Asia), actually has continued rather than changed Bush’s liberal foreign policy rhetoric. In a speech before the Turkish Parliament in April 2009, Obama stated that the United Stated “is not and will never be at war with Islam”, echoing Bush’s words that “the enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends.”

What the above examples illustrate is that even an explicit refutation of an idea can imply utility. In political debate, there is nothing as useful as a diametrically opposed view, target, or enemy. By sharply contrasting US foreign policy with the much-debated “clash of civilizations”, Bush used this idea symbolically, legitimating policy, and responding to critics. 78

The ambiguity of the word civilization allowed Bush’s cunning reframing from a neoconservative to a liberal understanding. Such play on words is not always possible, and such useful “others” are not always available. Nevertheless, a broader understanding of “policy relevance” and “political utility” is called for – an understanding which includes not only direct applicability, but also conceptual and symbolic utilization. The late Professor Samuel Huntington was a world-renowned great scholar of raravis. He is greatly missed since his premature passing away. He was full of often unorthodox ideas and his writings exuded from passions about the United States and its missions. In this essay I introduce Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis in the post-Cold War context of “one hundred schools of thought” blossoming across the globe. Then I situate his clash of civilizations thesis within his own intellectual contour of alarming and alerting fellow Americans about what he believed were the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the United States as it confronted the world with its own devout missions. Thirdly, I carry out an evidence-based analysis of his thesis. This is an important exercise because Huntington was not only a great scholar but also an irresistibly seductive writer. One Hundred Schools of Thought Blossom after the Cold WarThe end of the Cold War saw the “one hundred schools of thought” literally blossom. One can recall all the prophesies like the end of history, the imminent great crisis,2 U.S. primacy, and the clash of civilizations. I have joined the one hundred schools movement by proposing the scheme of the tripartization of global politics: Westphalian, Philadelphian, and anti-Utopian. By tripartization I mean that the world would be driven largely by three distinctive principles with varying mixes: Westphalian, Philadelphian, and anti-Utopian. By Westphalian, I mean sovereign state-centered perspective. By Philadelphian, I mean functionally formed global regimes. By anti-Utopian, I mean the prevalence of anarchical spirits and emotions. Instead of arguing that one dominant principle prevails in global politics as many of the prophets in the one hundred schools movement do, I argue that three distinctive driving forces interact together depending on history, geography, and economics

The End of history By Francis Fukiyama

The End of History and the Last Man (1992), by Francis Fukuyama, is a political book of philosophy which proposes that with the ascendancy of Western liberal democracy – occurred after the Cold War (1945–1991) and the dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991) – humanity had reached "not just ... the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: That is, the end-point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government".[1] As an expansion of his essay "The End of History?" (1989), for the book The End of History and the Last Man Fukuyama drew upon the philosophies and ideologies of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx, who defined human history as a linear progression, from one socio-economic epoch to another.

• According to Fukuyama’s perspective, history is purposive, directional, progressive and goal- oriented. • The goal to which history is oriented is ‘Rationality’ and ‘Freedom’. With end of cold war, clash of ideologies has been resolved. (Hegel and Karl Marx dialectics). • The end of the history means Liberal democracy is the final form of government for all nations. There can be no progression from liberal democracy to an alternative system. According to Fukuyama, since the French revolution, democracy has repeatedly proven to be a fundamentally better system (ethically, politically, economically) than any of the alternatives. • The most basic (and prevalent) error in discussing Fukuyama’s work is to confuse “history” with events. Fukuyama claims not that events will stop occurring in the future, but that democracy will become more and more prevalent in the long term, although it may suffer “temporary” setbacks

(which may, of course, last for centuries). ‘Liberal Democracy cannot be improved i.e. final stage of political evolution’.).

Feminism

Aim/contribution Key Key Key concepts Seminal Works assumptions themes Silences& limitations

 To introduce gender  Gender refers to  Exclusion of  Gender as  Liberal feminism: Betty Friedan, Feminine as a relevant the assymetrical women’s lives and constitutive of IR unclear in dealing Mystique (1962) empirical category social constructs experiences in IR with the abstract and theoretical tool of masculinity state or the actual for analyzing global and femininity as  Contesting the state; failure to Kate Millet, Sexual Politics power relations as opposed  Women as a gendered dimension understand women (1970) well as a normative ostensibly disadvantaged of sovereignty, the in varying group on a world state, rationality standpoint from which ‘biological’ male- situations; provided to construct female scale formal equality and alternative world differences not substantive Catherine MacKinnon, orders (True)  Liberal feminism: equality  Focus on the reform; equality of Feminism, Marxism,

gender dynamics of women with men Method and the State  Contesting the (1987)  Not just to add privileging of the capitalist expansion  Radical feminism: women in the study of masculine over in the South: naturalizing  Radical feminism: world politics but to the feminine economic patriarchy as the patriarchy contest the globalization being single cause of Zillah Eisenstein, exclusionary, state- accompanied by women’s Developing a Theory of centric and positivist  Gender is a worldwide oppression and Capitalist Patriarchy and relational expansion in the  Marxist feminism: nature of IR capitalism thus homogenizing Socialist Feminism (1979) concept based use of female labor the oppression; on the analysis failed to see the  To deconstruct and of masculinity  Socialist feminism: difference of non-  Gendered Judith Allen, Does subvert realism as and femininity, combines the dual white women’s construction of IOs Feminism Need a Theory of the dominant ‘power men as well as system of class and experiences with initiatives to politics’ explanation women, by patriarchy as sources the State (1990) for post-war IR foregrounding mainstream gender in global of oppression  To unmask the the study of  Marxist feminism: gendered dimension mane and governance subsumed women of forms of masculinities in institutions  Postmodern/poststru in the category of oppression prevalent IR ctural feminism: class on world politics deconstruction and rejection of the state; the state as a  Postmodern/poststr discursive process uctural feminism: too focused on discourses and lacks specificity; deconstructed category of women

Reffrences

. International Relations EDITED BY STEPHEN McGLINCHEY

 Bull, Hedley (1977). The Anarchical Society. New York: Columbia University Press.

 Chapman, Roger and James Ciment (eds). 2013. Culture Wars in America: An Encyclopaedia of Issues, Viewpoints, and Voices, London: Routledge.

 Clifford, James (1986). ‘Introduction: Partial Truths’. In J. Clifford and G. E. Marcus (eds) Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, 1–26. Berkeley: University of California Press.

 Coggins, B. (2015). ‘Does State Failure Cause Terrorism? An Empirical Analysis (1999–2008)’. Journal of Conflict Resolution 59(3), 455–83.

 Coll, Steve (2014). ‘The Unblinking Stare: The Drone War in Pakistan’. New Yorker, 24 November. Available at: www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/11/24/unblinking-stare

 Collier, Paul (2008). ‘The Politics of Hunger’. Foreign Affairs 87(6): 67–79.

 Cooper, Andrew F. (2010). ‘Beyond the Boardroom: “Multilocation” and the Business Face of Celebrity Diplomacy’. In Morten Ougaard and Anna Leander (eds) Business and Global Governance, 218–34. London and New York: Routledge.

 Curtis, L. (1918). ‘Windows of Freedom’. The Round Table 8(3): 1–47.

 Curtis, L. (1938). Civitas Dei: The Commonwealth of God. London: Macmillan, 1–994.

 Da Silva, José Graziano, Mauro Eduardo Del Grossi and Caio Galvão De França (2011). The Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) Program: The Brazilian Experience. Brasilia: Ministry of Agrarian Development.

 Davies, Thomas (2014). NGOS: A New History of Transnational Civil Society. London: C. Hurst & Co.

Dershowitz