OMBUDSMAN TASMANIA
REPORT ON AN INQUIRY INTO RISDON PRISON
The Risdon Prison Complex
Volume 2
June 2001
1 Office of the Ombudsman
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The Office of the Ombudsman is located at Ground Floor, 99 Bathurst Street, Hobart, Tasmania, 7001.
© Office of the Ombudsman, Tasmania 2001
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ISBN 0-7246-8008-X (Set) ISBN 0-7246-8006-3 (Volume 1)
2 FOREWORD
The investigation into the Risdon Prison Hospital and the Risdon Prison Complex represents probably the most major investigations ever undertaken by a Tasmanian Ombudsman. I believe that the reports speak for themselves in respect of the independence of the investigative process, the depth of analysis and the comprehensiveness of the background research undertaken.
The investigation was initiated as an own motion inquiry by the then Ombudsman following discussions with the Minister for Justice, Hon Dr Peter Patmore, in response to a number of tragic inmate deaths and a series of adverse incidents, including escapes and riot situations.
Managing a prison is no easy task. Prisons are like no other institutions and prisoners form a highly volatile, vulnerable and atypical society. Prison authorities at Risdon and elsewhere bear a degree of responsibility that goes well beyond what is required of most authorities, public or private, in meeting this duty of care. In addition to a duty of care to prison employees and to the community at large, which expects to be protected from criminals, there is a special duty of care owed to a group of people who are deprived of many personal liberties by virtue of incarceration and who have special physical, mental, emotional and social needs, which frequently differ from those of society as a whole.
The rules which govern such a complex structure must strike the right balance between security and containment on the one hand and rehabilitation and restitution of inmates’ self esteem on the other, and that balance is not easily attained. A number of the problems uncovered in the investigation, particularly in the Prison Hospital, stemmed from an imbalance in which security concerns were given greater weight than prisoner rehabilitation. The most glaring example of this was that the medical staff in the Prison Hospital reported to the Department of Health and Human Services, but the nursing staff reported to the Department of Justice and Industrial Relations. This anomalous situation, which was identified in a Coroner’s report as well as ours , has now been rectified and nursing staff are to be transferred to the Department of Health and Human Services.
No prison is a pleasant place, but the Risdon Prison is a particularly unpleasant place. It is bleak, cold and grey and, even if a very large amount of money were to be spent on the facility, it is unlikely that it could ever conform to contemporary prison standards. The buildings reflect years of relative neglect by successive governments and even when it was built, forty years ago, the Prison would have been out of date and totally inappropriate in its design for the rigours of a Tasmanian winter. Moreover, it was built as a Maximum Security Prison and remains so, even though the demand has never been for a full maximum security facility. When additional stresses, such as an unexpected surge in prisoner numbers or a significant change in the nature of the prisoner population occur, as has happened at Risdon, there is an inevitable strain on resources and management. Staff morale drops, inmate unrest and dissatisfaction escalate and the system begins to crack. This is what had happened at Risdon, and had been happening for a significant period of time prior to the investigation.
The period of active investigation took place between September 1999 and May 2000. Because the Coroner was conducting a separate inquiry into the deaths in custody, it was agreed not to release the Ombudsman reports until the Coroner had released her report, which she did on 26 March 2001. There is a high degree of consistency between the two independent reports.
Another factor which influenced timing of the release of the Ombudsman reports has been the rapid developments that have occurred since active investigation ceased in May 2000. Since that time both Departments have taken action to remedy and improve many aspects of the administration and
3 management of the Risdon Prison, Risdon Prison Hospital and “special institution”. The most major of these is the Government’s decision to build a new prison on the Risdon site, which is due for completion in 2008, and to build a separate, secure mental health facility for those who have a mental disorder and are detained under a restriction order.
While the main focus of the reports is on the situation as it was at the time of active investigation, in fairness to the two Departments and because the public should know what is happening in terms of prison reform, whenever possible changes that have occurred since May 2000 have also been incorporated. While this could be seen as diluting the unalloyed impact of the investigation findings, I am frankly more interested in ensuring that strategies for improvement are put in place rather than in simply finding fault for past events.
Irrespective of the dreadful events which may have precipitated them, the present Government is to be commended on the many initiatives it has taken in relation to prison reform, particularly the decision to build a new prison. It is a matter for great regret that these much needed reforms come too late for five young men.
Framing the recommendations was a difficult task, as these too were overtaken by the developments in prison reform. A number of the recommendations included in early drafts of the reports have already been implemented, and are now redundant. Some recommendations will become redundant once the new prison is built, but many cannot wait that long. Consequently, they have been recommended for urgent implementation, even though it might well be argued that to do so would be a waste of resources. In our view, it is not. One such example relates to the installation of sensor devices on the existing perimeter fence. This is seen as essential to enhance security at the Prison, even though it is a relatively short term measure. Another is to continue to upgrade facilities to remove suspension points and to take other actions to better address the risk of suicide and self harm.
The primary objective has been to make recommendations that are realistic in a resource sense, but still meet the needs identified in the investigations. There has been considerable discussion with the two Departments to establish the feasibility of some recommendations and, as at the date of publication, many of the recommendations have already been accepted in principle. Others are still under consideration or are in dispute and will be the subject of further negotiation once the Government has had an opportunity to consider them.
There is one further point I wish to make. The investigation has been substantially funded from the Ombudsman’s existing budget allocation and has required two senior staff to be taken off line for a significant time. Even the most superficial comparison with the cost of other, comparable Commissions of Inquiry will indicate the strain that this has placed on my staff resources. Undertaking major inquiries of this nature is an important function of the Ombudsman’s Office and is consistent with the Ombudsman’s statutory obligations, but in future there must be due recognition of the cost.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge the many people who have worked on the two reports. Robyn Hopcroft, David Fleming and Tony Priest have been the three main investigators. Ms Hopcroft has been responsible for writing the Prison Hospital report and David Fleming and Tony Priest prepared the report on the Risdon Prison Complex. Valuable assistance has been provided by my executive assistant, Karen Adams, and of course Damon Thomas, who initiated and oversighted the investigation until his resignation as Ombudsman in October 2000.
Janine O’Grady Ombudsman (Acting)
21 June 2001
4 TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ...... 6
BACKGROUND ...... 6 THE CUSTODIAL CONTEXT...... 8 DEVELOPMENTS SINCE MAY 2000 ...... 12 CHAPTER 2: SECURITY...... 14
CAMERA SYSTEMS AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE ...... 14 DURESS ALARM SYSTEM...... 22 PEG CLOCKS...... 23 PERIMETER FENCE SECURITY...... 23 SEARCHES...... 24 SECURITY UNIT/EMERGENCY RESPONSE GROUP ...... 27 PRISONER ESCORTS...... 30 LEAVE PERMITS ...... 32 ‘N’ DIVISION (NOW DIVISION 8)...... 33 RECOMMENDATIONS...... 34 CHAPTER 3: TRAINING ...... 38
TRAINING IN SECURITY AND SEARCH PROCEDURES ...... 39 TRAINING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE GROUP...... 40 TRAINING IN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ...... 40 TRAINING IN BEHAVIOURAL MANAGEMENT AND INDICATORS...... 41 TRAINING IN ALCOHOL AND DRUG DEPENDENCY INDICATORS...... 41 TRAINING IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION...... 41 TRAINING IN NEGOTIATION SKILLS ...... 41 TRAINING FOR SENIOR AND MIDDLE MANAGEMENT...... 42 TRAINING IN BEHAVIOURAL MANAGEMENT ...... 44 RECOMMENDATIONS...... 44 CHAPTER 4: DRUGS ...... 45
THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM...... 45 ENTRY INTO PRISON ...... 46 THE EFFECTS OF DRUGS...... 48 MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES ...... 48 RECOMMENDATIONS...... 50 CHAPTER 5: INMATE HEALTH, SAFETY AND WELL-BEING ...... 52
WORKPLACE HEALTH AND SAFETY AUDITS ...... 57 RECOMMENDATIONS...... 60 CHAPTER 6: MANAGEMENT ISSUES...... 61
UNIT MANAGEMENT...... 61 DISCIPLINE...... 64 MAINTENANCE...... 68 RECOMMENDATIONS...... 69 CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ...... 71
CONCLUSIONS ...... 72
5 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
In September 1999, pursuant to section 13 of the Ombudsman Act 1978, the Ombudsman commenced an own motion investigation into the Risdon Prison. Notifications pursuant to sections 23(1)(a) and (b) of the Ombudsman Act were sent to the Attorney-General and to the Secretary of the Department of Justice and Industrial Relations (DJIR) on 20 September 1999. The main focus of the investigation was on the prison hospital which included the 'special facility' under section 6(2) of the Criminal Justice (Mental Impairments) Act 1999. A concurrent investigation was undertaken into aspects of the main prison administration. This report is concerned with the main prison investigation. The prison hospital investigation is reported separately.
The matters under investigation are identified in Attachment ‘A’.
Reasons for the investigation
The immediate catalyst for both investigations was a number of deaths in custody over a fourteen month period, most of which occurred in the prison hospital. Five deaths occurred between August 1998 and October 1999, with two happening in a single twelve hour shift. In January 2000, four months after the commencement of this investigation there was a sixth death. 1
In addition to the deaths, there had been an unprecedented number of inmate escapes over the same period 2 and a series of disturbances and incidents in the prison, which had been investigated by the Ombudsman's Office and were still in the process of being monitored when the present investigation began. 3
In light of these events, the Attorney-General, the Hon Dr Peter Patmore, and the then Ombudsman, Mr Damon Thomas, agreed that a major investigation was warranted4 and the Ombudsman was provided with some additional funding to support the investigation.
Scope of the investigation
Those aspects of the main prison administration which are dealt with in the report include security and surveillance provisions; inmate health and safety; drugs; discipline; training and aspects of operational management in the prison.
There are parts of the prison and aspects of the administration which have not been investigated in any depth. No attempt has been made to consider in detail the inadequacy of the physical environment at Risdon. It is generally acknowledged that the Risdon Prison, which was built forty years ago as a maximum security facility, was out of date almost before it was completed and was totally inappropriate in its design for the rigours of the Tasmanian climate. The 1999 Tasmanian Legislative Council Select Committee Report Correctional Services and Sentencing in Tasmania and the 1993 report by the Hon FM Neasey Report of an Inquiry into the System of Classification of Prisoners in Tasmania and other related matters both addressed the inadequacy and unsuitability of the Prison. The 1999 report concluded that “The flow-on effects are no doubt a contributing cause of the unrest and riots in the Risdon Prison since mid-1998”. 6 Mr Neasey stated in his report that “The Risdon Prison, in accordance with Tasmanian prison philosophy of the day was not designed to accommodate prisoners of varying security classifications. The whole prison was designed for maximum security accommodation which was then and has remained much in excess of real need.”
It is accepted that the design and facilities at the prison are detrimental in many respects to the effective management and treatment of inmates and I acknowledge this as one of the major problems that the administration has had to contend with. I am critical of successive governments for clearly failing to adequately address maintenance needs but given that the problem had already been identified I saw no point in pursuing it. Likewise, there was no point in investigating the issue of sentencing options nor the inmate classification system, which were the subject of previous inquiries.
The Hobart Remand Centre and the Launceston Prison5 were visited on a number of occasions, including a formal inspection by the Ombudsman at each site. The Hobart Remand Centre, which opened in January 1999, is an impressive, modern, up-to-date in terms of electronic surveillance, well run facility. The Launceston Prison, built in 1975, was less impressive as a site and, in the course of the interviews, some on-going management problems were disclosed.
The Women’s Prison at Risdon was built in 1963 and can house 23 women in single occupancy cells. Following a call for submissions from inmates, 32 complaints were received from female prisoners, most of which were not upheld after investigation and hence are not reported on here. I formed a favourable impression of the Women’s Prison and, bearing in mind that most of the 32 complaints referred to above were not substantiated, I chose not to pursue a more in-depth investigation.
Other major areas not investigated were Education and Program services and Prison Industries. I note, however, that a frequently recurring theme to emerge from interviews related to the adverse effects of prisoner boredom and idleness and to the perceived shortage of rehabilitative activities for inmates. At a future date I would be interested in discussing these with the Department.
Period of the investigation
The period covered in the report is from September 1999 to 4 May 2000. The choice of cut-off date was arbitrary and was chosen to coincide with the escape of two prisoners. It is recognised that major developments have taken place in the management of the Tasmanian Prison Service since May 2000. In fairness to the Department and because the public should know what is happening in terms of prison reform, wherever possible I have indicated changes made since May 2000. While the series of adverse events that occurred in the Prison were of major concern and prompted the own motion investigation, my main objective is to ensure that strategies for improvement in the prison administration are put in place, rather than to simply find fault in respect to past events.
The Coroner’s inquiry
The Coroner conducted an inquiry into the causes of the deaths in custody at the same time as the investigation and I have not investigated matters considered to be more properly the responsibility of the Coroner. The former Ombudsman gave an undertaking to the Chief
7 Magistrate not to release the report until the Coroner had released her findings. This occurred on 26 March 2001.
The investigation process
The Risdon Prison investigation can reasonably be considered the most major investigation undertaken by a Tasmanian Ombudsman. It involved a massive amount of information collection and preparation of the report has taken over twelve months to complete.
To gain a broad perspective the former Ombudsman invited all prison staff, as well as prisoners and the general public to make written or verbal submissions. A listing is found at Attachment ‘B’.
As well as receiving written submissions, a major interviewing program was mounted and over 100 people were interviewed, some several times. Those interviewed included staff at the prison hospital, prisoners and family members and senior management.6
The interviews were conducted by three senior investigation officers and were taped and transcribed. All persons about whom an adverse comment or criticism is made, have been given an opportunity to respond in accordance with s.23(7) of the Ombudsman Act.
The information collected in the interviews was used to identify the key issues and provides the primary data source for the report. A large number of documents, including Directors Standing Orders, Prison Rules, Policies and Standing Operating Procedures were also examined.
Site inspections of the Risdon Prison were undertaken on numerous occasions and the former Ombudsman also visited several correctional facilities in Victoria.
Finally, a questionnaire was sent to mainland correctional services, seeking information in relation to such specific matters as security provisions and training programs. While it is recognised that Tasmania does not, as a matter of course, need to follow practices in other States, the information did provide valuable benchmarks in terms of assessing management practices at Risdon. They are included in the report wherever relevant.
THE CUSTODIAL CONTEXT
Interstate comparisons
Prisoners form a highly complex, vulnerable, volatile and atypical society. Custodial authorities bear a degree of responsibility that goes well beyond the normal duty of care expected of most other public authorities. When additional stresses, such as an unexpected surge in prisoner numbers, or a significant change in the nature of the prisoner population occurs, as they have in Tasmania, this inevitably imposes strain on resources and management.
After several years of relative stability, the Tasmanian prison population has had a 34% increase since 1997/1998.
Table 1 Average daily prison population Tasmania 1994/1995 - 1999/2000 8 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 262 267 272 269 332 359
(Source: Department of Justice and Industrial Relations Annual Reports)
A similar growth trend is apparent at the national level but it is noted that despite the recent dramatic population increase, Tasmania’s imprisonment and offender rate is still well below the national average (see Table 2). So also is the rate of recidivism, (see Table 3) which is a positive indicator. Although the national imprisonment average is influenced by very high figures for the Northern Territory and West Australia, an inescapable inference to be drawn from the relatively low rate in Tasmania is that successive governments have had less of a problem, financial and otherwise, to deal with than the rest of Australia.
Table 2 Imprisonment and offender rates - (per 100,000 Adults) 1994/1995 - 1998/1999 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 Tasmania 74.2 75.3 75.6 75.8 93.3 Australia 114.8 117.0 120.0 130.3 139.1
(Source: Table 9A.5 Report on Government Services 2000. Corrective Services Attachment)
Table 3 Proportion of prisoners returning to prison within two years of release 1998/1999 NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas NT Aust 39.4 31.3 27.1 39.4 23.4 19.7 25.5 32.0
(Source: Table D,4 Proportion of prisoners and offenders returning with a correctional sanction within two years of release or order completion, 1998-99. Report on Government Services 2000, Justice Preface)
The percentage of male prisoners under 24 is higher in Tasmania than the national average, as is the percentage of male prisoners 65 and over. Tasmania has also seen a rise of nearly three times the number of prisoners serving 10 years or more between 1988 and 1999, due to an increase in sentencing for violent and sexual crimes amongst older prisoners. Juveniles and those under the age of 25 are more likely to commit property offences which often result in lesser imprisonment sentences.7
Figures provided by DJIR suggest that an estimated 15% of the prison population are drug users.8 This may be an under estimate given that 30% of all admissions to the prison hospital in 1999 were for persons diagnosed as requiring suicide observation or for alcohol or drug withdrawal9 and that 42% of 204 inmates tested recorded positive readings on urinanalysis tests (see page 43). Dr Elida Assenheimer, part time psychologist and drug counsellor at Risdon believes that almost the entire gaol population has some kind of drug or alcohol related problem
The incidence of prisoners with mental illnesses is estimated by DJIR to be in the order of 10-15% of the prison population. The Department also points to continuing concern by prison authorities about the level of over-representation of Aboriginal people in the prison system. 10
9 While I acknowledge that the increase in the population has thrown a serious strain on to the prison system, the signs of a system in crisis were evident before flash point was reached with the spate of deaths in custody. The Tasmanian prisoner escape rate increased in 1998/99 and, at that time, was generally out of line with the national trend, which had been for a continuous decline in prisoner escape rates over the previous five years or so. (see Table 4). DJIR reports that Tasmania is now closer to national trends.11 It should also be noted that most of the escapes were from open perimeter areas, such as the Hayes Prison Farm.
Table 4 Escape rates (per 100 Prisoner Years) 1994/95 - 1998/99 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 Tasmania(a) 1.53 0.75 1.10 1.49 3.62 Australia(b) 2.33 2.23 1.66 1.45 1.33
(Source: (a) Table 9A.54 Effectiveness, prisons. Report on Government Services 2000. Corrective Services Attachment and (b) Table 9A.7 Escape/abscondment rates (per 100 years). Report on Government Services 2000. Corrective Services Attachment)
Tables 5 and 6 show that in 1998/99 Tasmanian prisoners spent slightly more time locked in their cells than prisoners in most other states and for that same year, lock up times in Tasmania were higher than they had been for at least the past four years.
Table 5 Prisoner out-of-cell hours all States and Territories 1998/99 (hours per day) NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas ACT NT 11.4 11.9 11.9 11.9 10.6 11.0 10.4 11.1
(Source: Table 9A.13 Report on Government Services 2000. Corrective Services Attachment)
Table 6 Average Daily Time out of Cells in Tasmania (hours per day) 1994/95 - 1998/99 1994/95 1995/96 1996097 1997/98 1998/99 11.4 12 13 12.1 11
(Source: Table 9A.54 Effectiveness, Prisons. Report on Government Services 2000. Corrective Services Attachment.)
It is acknowledged that prison containment statistics may well be unreliable, particularly in the case of small systems such as Tasmania, so that not too much weight can be attached to interstate comparisons. Moreover, as Risdon is a maximum security prison, comparisons with other systems which are not maximum security may well be misleading. The point to be made, however, is that 1998 and 1999 were watershed years for the Tasmanian Prison Service with a high rate of escapes, increased lock up times, scuffles and potentially violent demonstrations, and a spate of suicides and self-harm incidents. The evidence was there to show that the system was breaking down and, while I appreciate that mitigating action is now taking place, action should have been taken earlier.
10 Funding
Lack of resources was consistently given as the cause of many problems at Risdon. It was argued that additional funding would enable extra staff to be employed, allow for staff training and enable an upgrading and improvement of the facilities and infrastructure
There is evidence pointing to a relatively low rate of prison expenditure in Tasmania. The Report on Government Services 2000 (p.506), for example, states that “Expenditure per person on civil and criminal justice was lowest in Tasmania ($265) and highest in the NT ($789)”.
The cost per prisoner day is a measure of the efficiency of the prison system. A range of factors, including the average daily occupancy, security classifications and the scale of the operation, affects it. In Tasmania, due to a large proportion of fixed costs, the measure is particularly susceptible to variations in the average daily occupancy.
Figures taken from the annual Report on Government Services provide information to show that, after a sharp rise in 1998/1999, Tasmanian government expenditure on prisoners on a per capita basis is now close to the national average (see Table 7 below). The reduction in the daily cost per prisoner is almost totally accounted for by the increase in daily average prisoner numbers.
11 Table 7 Recurrent Expenditure per Prisoner Day (in 1999 dollars) 1994/95 - 1998/99 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 Tasmania 98.03 113.61 123.71 152.99 137.91 132.59 Australia - - - - - 131.20
(Source: (a) Table 9A,55 Efficient Prisons (Tasmania. Report on Government Services 2000. Corrective Services Attachment. (b) Table 9A.6 Recurrent Expenditure, 1998-99. Report on Government Services 2000. Corrective Services Attachment.) Note: Data for previous years have been adjusted by the GDP deflator. Figures for 1999/00 may therefore not be directly comparable with earlier years.
Figures provided by the DJIR show that the actual recurrent expenditure on prison services in Tasmania rose from $17 million in 1996/1997 to $20.5 million in 1999/2000. This represents a considerable increase of almost 20 percent over the period and it can be seen (see Table 8 below) that for the past two years, actual expenditure has significantly exceeded the budget estimate. For the year ended June 1999, the difference between the budget estimate and the actual expenditure was $2.2 million and the following year the variation was still greater at $2.5 million. Undoubtedly one of the major factors to cause the over expenditure has been the increase in the prison population. It also reflected, however, the inadequacy of a budget model which did not allow for changes in prisoner numbers. It can be noted that the Department has now moved to a demand-based budget model which will allow for fluctuations in prisoner numbers.
Table 8 Financial Summary - Tasmanian Prison Service 1996/97 - 2000/2001 (in $’000s) Year Estimate Actual Variation 1996/97 15,924 17,055 1,131 1997/98 16,792 16,635 -157 1998/99 16,540 18,753 2,213 1999/00 17,949 20,454 2,505 2000/01 20,162 - -
(Source: Department of Justice and Industrial Relations. Finance Branch)
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE MAY 2000
The investigation provides a snapshot of the situation at the Risdon Prison between September 1999 and May 2000. In the 12 months since active investigation ceased there have been highly significant developments in relation to prison reform which include: · new planning and management structures have been established including the appointment of the DJIR’s Secretary as head of the Tasmanian Prison Service; · the budget model has been reformed; · the role of the Official Visitors has been upgraded; · additional staff have been appointed; · major improvements have occurred in relation to the prison hospital; · the Ron Barwick medium security prison has been re-opened; · a new drug strategy has been introduced; 12 · the construction of a new prison has been announced with planning already well under way.
The Government is to be commended on these initiatives, irrespective of the tragic events which may have precipitated them. But it must be remembered that the new prison will not be completed for another seven or eight years and very few of the recommendations made in this report can afford to wait that long. There is also a need to ensure that the impetus for prison reform continues and that, if the current level of community concern abates, much needed reforms will not be put on hold or watered down. To help guard against this, I have recommended a liaison between the Ombudsman’s Office and the Prison Official Visitors, who will have an on-going role in monitoring the implementation of prison reforms.
13 CHAPTER 2: SECURITY
The investigation disclosed a number of aspects of prison security which were unsatisfactory. These included: · Weaknesses in the camera surveillance system were found at the time of inspection in November 1999. Some cameras needed replacing or repairs and others were poorly positioned. · Camera repairs identified by an audit team had not been attended to. · Video recording equipment and procedures were inadequate and had resulted in the curtailment of court proceedings on one occasion. · Surveillance of the perimeter fence did not compare well with provisions in other states. · There were no systematic search procedures for inmates, staff or visitors to the prison and, generally, searches were conducted on a less frequent basis than in prisons in other states. · There were no separate Standing Operating Procedures governing the deployment of the Emergency Response Group and training for this group required improvement. · The Tasmanian Prison Service did not have a specific Escort Unit and few officers had received dedicated training in escort duties. · Current disciplinary proceedings, were previously considered unsuited to the unique characteristics of the Tasmanian Prison Service.
CAMERA SYSTEMS AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
At the time of inspection in November 1999, the camera surveillance system was not of a standard expected in a maximum security prison. Some of the problems identified were simple matters of maintenance which could have been rectified with minimum financial expenditure For example, a number of the cameras were found to be in need of lens cleaning and refocussing. These should have been addressed as part of an ongoing maintenance program, but it appears that the maintenance contractor was called only when problems were specifically identified, which did not allow for routine minor maintenance work.
A number of the cameras are located in areas where their positioning provides little observation value or are a fixed system which is not able to pan or tilt to enable better overall coverage of the yards or areas in which they are situated. Some cannot be monitored from the monitoring station because they are either linked to stand alone stations or the Main Gate Control Room, locations which are not connected to the Closed Circuit Television (CCTV).
Many of the cameras are original tube type machines which have been in the Prison for a number of years and are either no longer functional in a modern day prison setting or the mechanisms are worn causing the cameras to go out of focus; they lose focus quite quickly after adjustment or because of wear, and cannot be further adjusted or refocussed. Whilst 54 of the cameras can be monitored at the CCTV Centre, there is only one monitor from which video recordings can be made. The manually operated video recorder is 10-12 years old and is the only equipment available to record incidents from a single monitor.
14 The implications of weaknesses in camera monitoring were demonstrated when court proceedings against a number of inmates involved in a riot situation in May 1999 had to be discontinued as a result of the failure of the camera/video system within the Prison to properly record various incidents occurring within the Prison’s yards. The recording difficulties were said to have arisen principally as a result of the CCTV operator endeavouring to capture on video as much of the riotous conduct as possible, and switching the monitor from cameras in one yard to cameras in another thus confusing the images necessary for court proceedings.
If the system were updated by means of a bank of video machines and additional monitors were added from which incidents could be recorded, then situations which occurred in several locations at one time could be recorded in full and the unacceptable loss of valuable evidence would be overcome.
It is acknowledged that considerable efforts have been made by the Tasmanian Prison Service to upgrade the camera system and replace cameras with more modern and effective equipment. In April 1998, an evaluation of the camera system was requested by the Security Manager from Essential Electronics and a successful submission for funding for CCTV maintenance and upgrade was prepared and lodged through the Capital Investment Improvement Plan (see Attachment ‘C’). An ongoing program of CCTV camera upgrades has been in place since that time.
The action to upgrade was taken following concerns about the capacity of the then maintenance contractor to continue to meet his obligations. A comprehensive audit of the whole system was commissioned from McCulloch P/L in September 1999. This identified that some of the difficulties experienced up to that time were associated with poor quality installation and maintenance. Consequently, a major program for rectification and maintenance of the camera system was drawn up to be progressively implemented as funds became available.12
Twice a year a workplace Health and Safety Audit is carried out within the Prison by a team headed by Mr R N Kellett, Manager of Building and Engineering Services at the prison. During the audit of the Closed Circuit Television Room (CCTV) in July 1999, it was reported by the auditors that there were no perimeter cameras in operation and that out of a total of 54 cameras, 13 (Nos. 13,31,32,36,41,42,43,51, 53,55,57,58 and 59) were all out of order and needed to be repaired or replaced. These specific problems were brought to the attention of the prison administration by way of the Audit Report.
Six months later, in January 2000, the Auditor’s report revealed that, at the CCTV Room, in addition to the 13 previously reported faulty cameras, a further camera, (No. 21) was also out of order. Notwithstanding the maintenance and upgrade program established by the Department, it appears that between July 1999 and January 2000 nothing had been done to repair the non-functional cameras. The long-standing nature of the problem was commented on by the Audit Team in their conclusions at page 12 of the Audit Report, dated January 2000 : Many of the recommendations that have been made in this and most previous Audit Reports are going unheeded. In many instances, the audit team are finding the same problems existing that existed 12 months and two years ago. There seems very little support for Managers from Senior Management in dealing with these important matters. As a result, much of this work has not been completed.
15 Cost is recognised as a major issue, particularly in light of plans to construct a completely new prison but security is a key function in a prison and, in my view, the maintenance and upgrading of the existing camera system should be given priority. More detailed observations are provided below.
‘N’ Division cameras (now Division 8)
The cameras situated in ‘N’ Division are of no value at all in their present placement. It is essential that these cameras be relocated to provide full coverage of the entrance and interior of ‘N’ Division, particularly as this area of the Prison houses those prisoners on punishment, behavioural management, or protection regimes.
Tower cameras
The inquiry revealed that the cameras located in the towers around the complex were old style large frame cameras. They were slow to pan and tilt and had every potential to create difficulties for operators endeavouring to manipulate them to monitor various areas within their arc of coverage. Advice from officers also suggested that inmates could see the cameras from within the Prison and knew when they were facing their location and when they were not, enabling inmates to be fully aware of when they were being observed. Advice also indicated that whilst the cameras could provide coverage of some areas of the Prison they were restricted in picture clarity and definition
Prison hospital
The Prison Hospital interior camera system could not be monitored from the CCTV but was in part a stand alone system which again had no video machine upon which incidents could be recorded if the need arose. It was also observed that some areas were not covered by camera surveillance and some cameras were non-functional. My investigators were advised that a video machine had been located in the hospital office which had the capacity to record incidents from the monitors in the office, but at the time of the visit the machine was not sighted and no explanation for its removal or whereabouts was provided.
Kitchen and Bakery Gallery
The Gallery area above the Kitchen and Bakery is also a stand alone system in which the placement of the cameras does not provide full coverage of the mess rooms, kitchen or bakery. It was also noted that there was no video machine.
Main gate
The main gate into the Prison also has a stand alone system situated in the main gate control room. This is able to monitor cameras situated in the towers and some of the other areas, such as the main driveway leading to the Prison. This area again has no video system in place to record any incident that might occur within the range of the cameras being monitored.
The main gate monitors only have small screens of approximately 400mm square which quite clearly would make it very hard to observe, with any real clarity, incidents or people caught on camera. This is further exacerbated by the officer rostered for main gate control room duties having a number of functions to perform other than watching the monitors. Therefore, even if an incident were captured on camera it might not necessarily be observed 16 by the officer. The Audit on 19 January 2000 also established that at the main gate central control room, four cameras were non functional.
Women's Prison
Inspection revealed that the Women’s Prison was not linked to the CCTV and had a small stand alone camera system which was monitored in the manager’s office at that prison. One camera was installed in proximity to the entrance to that complex. In 1999, a camera was also placed in the detention cell. Whilst it is appreciated that the female inmates require a degree of privacy, there are locations within the Women’s Prison where cameras could be placed to ensure proper security procedures were being followed. As with other areas of the Prison, valuable evidence, in the event of a major incident, would not be available to any inquiry or court proceeding. This is because the Women’s Prison does not have a system which enables officers to record on video any incidents which occur and there is no provision for that facility to be monitored at the CCTV room.
Stand alone camera monitoring systems
Stand alone systems are of limited value as they are reliant on an officer being in the monitoring area when an incident is occurring. Because there is no ability to record the situation, any evidence given of observations would be of a verbal nature and potentially not as reliable in court proceedings as a video record of the incident. In addition it was alleged that some officers simply sit and watch the monitors rather than undertake any patrol functions, although it is part of their duty to ensure that inmates’ conduct is properly monitored. This was of particular concern in areas such as the Kitchen and Bakery gallery, where the placement of cameras created blind spots in which inmates could avoid observation.
The audit conducted on 21 January 2000 found that the video surveillance monitor in the kitchen passage was not working and that light fittings in the passage were being regularly vandalised. This indicated that proper patrols were not being carried out and that officers working in this area were not being properly supervised.
17 Central camera monitoring system
It is acknowledged that to incorporate all the cameras and monitors into one central location would be an expensive process requiring a considerable amount of cable work as well as replacement of many of the old and out of date cameras and the relocation of a number of others.
Advice received from interstate prisons revealed that their CCTV complexes were operated on a 24 hour per day basis, and that the officers who worked in the rooms were specifically trained to properly undertake those functions. In prisons where there was more than one monitoring area, each had a dedicated operator who worked a 24 hour rotating roster system.
The Department has contended that the need to maintain camera surveillance when prisoners are locked in their cells is very limited. As a result, the CCTV room at Risdon basically operates between 0800 hours and 1700 hours daily which coincides with prisoner out of cell times. Should an incident occur when the CCTV room is closed, an officer is delegated to attend the CCTV room and take over the operation of the cameras and record the incident. However, the obvious drawback to the current arrangement is that the incident may have ceased prior to the attendance of the delegated officer to the CCTV room. Alternatively, an officer might not be familiar with the operation of the cameras and associated procedures.
It is recognised that the operation of the CCTV room for 24 hours would need to be carefully evaluated and costs in wages would be a factor. It would also require the monitoring system to be updated and the purchase of more sophisticated video recording equipment to enable a number of yards to be recorded at the same time, none of which is available at present.
Our inquiry indicated that officers were rotated through the CCTV room to familiarise them with the camera and video operation, but were only given very basic instruction in their use. The Department has indicated that officers monitoring the cameras in the CCTV room are drawn from the ranks of Senior Custodial Officers and First Class Custodial Officers. They are required to have been assessed as competent before taking on the tasks. However, when my two investigators inspected the room, it was noted that the degree of expertise in operating the cameras varied considerably. The then Security Manager when asked what process was employed if the need arose to operate the CCTV system after its normal closing time of 5.00pm , responded: What would happen is that we would have to send an officer down to that location to undo it, to open it, to turn off the alarm, which is straightforward, there’s nothing hard about that, and it once again depends on the availability of staff. I mean anybody can get in there so that’s pretty straightforward, but then can they operate the system?
18 Register - Camera Faults
Camera faults are reported to the Security Unit which is required to arrange for repairs to be carried out by a technician contracted for that purpose. In response to whether there was a record kept of camera faults, the following reply was given by the Security Officer: No. because those forms aren’t getting filled in. It is an issue that I have taken up with management and an issue that I have taken up with the contractor that we did have. We didn’t have any maintenance program either. There were never any schedules of work done, or work that needed to be done. And to this date there’s nothing.
The Security Manager agreed that there should be a register in which to record camera faults and maintenance, and that the register should be retained by Security and be under his jurisdiction and authority. When asked if he intended to introduce such a book, the Security Manager indicated that he thought it had been introduced, but for one reason or another, had been neglected.
When asked what procedures were followed when a camera was reported faulty, the Security Manager stated: If I don’t do it personally, and nine times out of ten I don’t, I assign it to one of my staff. They will go to the camera room and check that what is being said is correct. They will also then visit the site just to ensure that there is nothing immediately visible that is not allowing the system to work as it should. When all that is done, and it is done up front as it should be, I generally call in the contractor.
From the interview with the Security Manager it was apparent that the registering of camera faults was ad hoc and inefficient. There is clearly a need for the camera fault reporting system to be fully reviewed and guidelines to be formulated and strictly adhered to.
Security of video tapes in CCTV Room
Information obtained indicated that the security of the video tapes is almost non-existent, inasmuch as blank tapes evidently disappear. A check disclosed that there was no security cabinet or other measure for tape security. It was also disclosed that no investigations were launched by either the Security Unit or by management to identify the persons, who could only be officers with access to the CCTV room, who had stolen the video tapes from that area. This is notwithstanding the fact that the removal of the tapes under the circumstances described would constitute stealing as defined under section 234 of the Criminal Code Act 1924. One might have expected this to be considered a very serious issue, not only because of the theft aspect but also because of the security implications in the event that a serious incident needed to be recorded.
An obvious solution would be to secure the tapes in a locked cupboard with access restricted to persons provided with a key to the cupboard who would sign a register for the outgoing tape, with an explanation for the tape’s removal from the cupboard. From an evidentiary point of view the handling and preservation of the tapes would be of paramount
19 importance in any legal proceeding. Continuity would be a determining factor in whether or not the court would accept a tape in evidence.
CCTV Room location
In his 1998 Report on Prison Security at page 7, Superintendent J Tandy, Security and Investigations, New South Wales Corrections Service, recommended a reassessment of the location of the CCTV control room. It was evident that it would be better housed well away from where the public or persons other than officers could have access. One person interviewed suggested that if all cameras were diverted to the CCTV room the system could be monitored 24 hours per day. During the period of time between lock-down at night and unlocking the following morning the duty officer on the main gate could effectively unman that post and be employed to monitor the cameras.
The Tasmanian Prison Service has now moved the CCTV Room and the Arunta Telephone Monitoring System back inside the main Prison complex. This should overcome some of the previous security concerns relating to unauthorised access. It is not known if the operational times for the CCTV have been extended to provide 24 hour coverage. Nor is it known if additional monitors from which incidents could be recorded have been installed or whether additional video machines with which to record occurrences have been provided.
Camera repair contractor
The contractor at the time of inspection was not employed on a term contract nor was the contract subject to performance criteria conditions. Repairs and maintenance of cameras and associated equipment is dependant on funds being available for the contractor to carry out the repairs required. Evidence showed that lack of funds had at times delayed repairs or repairs had been carried out by the contractor who had then been obliged to wait a considerable time to receive payment for the work undertaken. The Security Manager, in commenting on the response time for the maintenance contractor to attend, observed that there were some unsatisfactory issues related to current arrangements and that he was looking to find a more reliable maintenance person. It is apparent, having regard to the need for the security cameras to be fully operational and maintained at all times to a high standard, that a fully funded, ongoing maintenance program should be set in place to address existing and future problems.
Hand held video recording
The Security Unit at Risdon Prison has on occasions used a hand held video camera to record incidents at the Prison, including such activities as cell extractions by the Security Unit acting in its capacity as the Emergency Response Group. The inquiry revealed that the officer delegated to undertake the video camera work will not necessarily have any expertise in using the camera which may result in images being out of focus, not properly recorded, or of little value for evidentiary purposes. The Ombudsman’s 1998/99 investigation of Risdon Prison concluded that the inexperience of the video operator resulted in a failure to properly record an incident of an assault of a prisoner by a custodial officer.
In some interstate prisons the persons delegated to operate the hand held cameras are specifically trained to Police standards. Should an officer be required to give evidence pertaining to their experience and knowledge of the camera and its functions, they must be 20 adequately equipped to respond with credibility. Under the present system, the operator could be placed in an embarrassing situation, not of his own making, the result of which could be a criticism of the operator and the professionalism of the Tasmanian Prison Service as a whole. I therefore see it as essential to train operators to a standard which would be accepted by a court as exhibiting professionalism and good camera function knowledge.
The procedure followed after use of a hand held camera is that tapes of recorded incidents are dubbed onto an ordinary VHS cassette tape. A log of the tapes is kept in the Security Unit and incorporates not only particulars of the incident but of the officers and staff involved. The original camera tape and the copy are retained for future reference until no longer required.
When the Security Manager was questioned about the storage and security of used tapes, he responded Sometimes the general manager will keep it or the operations manager. And that’s another problem that we’ve got, and that is the continuity of evidence which is something we are starting to address.
He further stated I think we should have one specific person or a specific area, be it security, be it operations, be it whoever, there should be one specific manager responsible for the collection and storage of that type of information.
The tapes of incidents recorded either from the CCTV monitor or by hand held video camera may be used in the course of any inquiry as evidence of an incident. If the method of evidence preservation is faulty then the value of that evidence diminishes accordingly. In my view, this particular issue must be addressed by management as a matter of some urgency. It is totally unacceptable that so many individuals can be the guardians of important potential evidence. There must be one person designated as an exhibits officer to secure all evidence of incidents, note any exhibit movement or analysis and be the only person to have access to the exhibit material until such time as it is required for proceedings or the tapes are no longer required and can be returned to normal storage. Similarly there should be an incident running sheet introduced and a running sheet officer appointed.
External prison blind spots
Some areas outside the Prison proper, in particular that section between the main driveway and that area bounded by the East Derwent Highway and Grass Tree Hill Road, were out of sight of the surveillance camera. This was due in the main to the prolific growth of the pine trees bordering the driveway opposite the administration building which created difficulties when operators endeavoured to manipulate the cameras to monitor various areas within the arc of manoeuvrability.
The problem this particular situation created was that when inmates were in that area and not supervised, they could quite easily either hide objects or retrieve something already hidden. Even if an officer were present or inmates were subject to physical observation approximately every 30 minutes, items could still be left hidden for an inmate to collect. I endorse the recent initiative to require all inmates who are permitted to work or be outside the actual Prison complex to be fitted with electronic bracelets to ensure that their
21 whereabouts are readily known to staff and that they have not absconded or left the specific location for which they are authorised.
DURESS ALARM SYSTEM
Officers on duty are issued with a personal alarm system worn on the belt which can be activated through the duress alarm system if they should find themselves in a violent or difficult situation. At the time of interview there was a generally held view by officers that the present duress alarm system had some safety benefits but was not the best system for their protection given that inmates were becoming increasingly violent and difficult to manage.
Discussions with the technician and Security Manager revealed that a new duress alarm system had been selected and partially installed. Problems were identified in the initial installation period. It was found that the new system was not compatible with the existing personal alarms system. There were also problems such as the existence of ‘black spots’. If an officer’s personal alarm were activated in ‘D’ yard showers, the alarm would indicate that the incident was in ‘D’ yard but not the specific location. A response to the officer in trouble would first have to identify the site of the incident.
Information provided in respect of the new duress alarm system was that it would be able to be locked into the camera system and monitored from the CCTV room. If an incident occurred and the alarm set off, the CCTV operator would be able to locate the incident site on camera and record the incident on the monitor as it unfolded. As previously noted however because of the problems with the cameras and their ability to record only one incident at a time, difficulties could arise which might render any evidence recorded as unacceptable in court.
Advice was also provided that if the duress alarm system were activated after 1700 hours when the CCTV room had closed down, it would not be possible, even if the alarm were integrated into the camera system, for the incident to be recorded as there would be no operator present.
It can also be noted that the audit conducted in January 2000 of the security systems at the prison hospital found that the personal alarm system at the hospital entrance and in the round house were not functioning, which could have jeopardised staff safety.
The new system required notification points throughout the prison. In the initial installation phase there were no notification points on an alarm anywhere in the prison except at the main gate. This could have lead to a situation in which if an alarm were triggered the only person who would know it was activated would be the officer in the main gate, who had no access to a radio and who could only telephone a senior officer in the prison and advise him that there was an alarm activation The Tasmanian Prison Officers Association apparently advised prison authorities that officers would not wear those particular alarms until such time as the system had been properly installed and new location panels were inserted in the mess room, chief’s office, reception area and camera room.
It was evident that considerable time and effort has gone into introducing the new duress alarm system (see Attachment ‘D’). The system appeared to be working well and many of the problems experienced in the initial installation phase had apparently been rectified, including an increase in the number of monitoring and alarm points throughout the prison. 22 A number of personal alarm units had arrived and had yet to be programmed into the system. The new system had also shown inaccuracies of more than six metres in pinpointing the actual incident site.
Advice received was that, at 31 January 2001, the Tasmanian Correctional Officers Association had still not signed off on the acceptance of the new alarm. Further advice has since been received from the acting Director of Prisons to the effect that new software for the unit has overcome almost all the pre-existing problems.
PEG CLOCKS
A system using what are called ‘peg clocks’ has existed in the Risdon Prison for a number of years. The clocks are situated in each yard and were designed so that when officers, during their night rounds, passed the clocks they would “peg” the clock by inserting a key in the lock and turning it to the right which would register at the main gate, recording that they had been on their rounds at that particular time and location.
Inquiries revealed that many of the peg clocks were no longer functional and had not been repaired. Non availability of parts was quoted as one reason. Officers completing their rounds of the yards, now submit a written time sheet to indicate at what time they carried out their rounds of the yards. These forms are kept by the officer on the main gate and later collected by the Security Unit.
It is accepted that the peg clock system is beyond repair, but in lieu of them a new, properly supervised system of ensuring patrols are carried out should be introduced.
PERIMETER FENCE SECURITY
In some mainland prisons, sensors are incorporated into the perimeter fence which transmit an alarm signal to a monitoring station identifying the location of any interference with the fence, for example scaling or cutting of the mesh. No such system is in place at Risdon Prison even though as a maximum security facility it might reasonably be expected to incorporate such a security system as a matter of course.
Following two escapes from prison escort vehicles, the Tasmanian Prison Service commissioned Mr J Tandy to prepare a report on security systems at Risdon. On page 6 of his 25 August 1998 report, Mr Tandy commented that “….perimeter security could be enhanced by CCTV upgrade and a fence alarm system”.
I have been advised that, except on one occasion early in 2000, the perimeter fence has not been breached by prisoners attempting to escape. I note, however, that on that particular occasion officers did not discover the breach of the fence for some considerable time (more than one day was my advice) after it had occurred. Had sensors been fitted to the fence, the Prison would have been immediately alerted that a breach had occurred and a patrol could have attended immediately and possibly foiled the escape.
In addition to sensor installation, various officers interviewed suggested that there should be an all weather roadway constructed around the entire inner side of the perimeter fence to enable vehicular travel around the perimeter so that physical examinations of the fence could be undertaken to ensure that no interference had occurred to the mesh. Information
23 from some interstate prisons revealed that there are roving patrols of the perimeter carried out by officers in a vehicle on a random circuit and time sequence.
The Secretary advises that “regular inspections of the existing perimeter are and always have been undertaken and the length of the perimeter is not so great that it cannot be adequately covered on foot”. The time taken to discover the breach referred to above, raised questions about how often these “regular” inspections are made.
Prevention of escapes is not the only consideration. There have been occasions in interstate prisons where persons have actually entered prison property for criminal purposes. It was also reported that items such as tennis balls have been thrown into the Risdon prison compound from outside the perimeter and that these can contain prohibited substances. Exclusion zones and random patrols would assist in overcoming this particular form of conduct.
The Functional Brief for the Prison Infrastructure Redevelopment Program published in December 2000 provides for a significantly enhanced perimeter fence. The concern is, however, the time frame for construction of the new prison. While the costs of installing a sensor system on the existing perimeter fences must be considered, in my view it should be installed as part of an upgrading of security procedures and requirements on the current site and should be installed without delay.
SEARCHES
The inquiry revealed inadequacies in search procedures. It is recognised that there are many factors to be considered in the implementation of a rigorous search policy, paramount being issues of personal privacy for inmates, staff and visitors to the prison. Nevertheless, the ready availability of drugs and prohibited substances in the prison clearly calls for greater stringency.
Inmate Searches
There appear to be no systematic procedures for searching inmates. Officers interviewed stated that it was not uncommon for medium security inmates who had a contact visit to return from the visit site to the main Prison and not be searched on their return, one of the reasons being that no officer was available to search them. This would appear to be a major breach of security practice and would inevitably be the subject of abuse by inmates who would be well aware that the likelihood of being searched was extremely remote.
On occasions when inmates are moved from a work shop area, back to the general yards, searches might be carried out. However, most inmates see other inmates in the group being searched and, if they have some forbidden object in their possession, they generally have time to dispose of it or pass it to another inmate for disposal.
It was stated that officers were often reluctant to search the more difficult inmates because this would involve physical or verbal abuse. The general inference was that those particular inmates were often treated differently to the less troublesome ones. Differences might include fewer searches, less likelihood of being charged and facing a defaulter hearing, reclassification and transfer to the farm or some other ‘softer’ area of the prison, such as ‘F’ yard. This statement could not be substantiated with hard evidence, it was an issue which various custodial officers raised as a matter of concern. 24 One of the problems faced by prison authorities is that they are unable to carry out body cavity searches unless a medical practitioner is present. The Accommodation Manager, Mr Kevin Salter, when asked his views on inmates not being searched and contraband, including drugs being brought into the Prison, commented I suppose they know that they can bring it in because they know that they’re not going to be searched or they’re not going to be searched adequately. The other thing, inmates have an ability, they watch us, they know what we’re allowed to do and what we’re not allowed to do. Now one of the things I found out with respect to inmates is that they place the contraband in their anus. Now we can’t do an orifice search of an inmate; we don’t have the authority to do that, so therefore if we do a strip search on the prisoner we don’t find it anyway.
It is possible for an inmate to ingest various drug substances which may be in tablet or capsule form or, for example be concealed in a condom, for later retrieval during normal bowel actions. Some interstate prisons have special observation cells with in-built toilet traps designed to retain items excreted by a suspected inmate, thereby countering this particular form of contraband entering the Prison.
Random urine testing is one of the main strategies used by prison authorities to counter drug use. Following the Department’s initial response to a draft of this report, queries were raised about the effectiveness of the random drug testing program. To test the efficacy of this process, in December 2000 one of my investigation officers checked the files of seven randomly selected inmates serving lengthy sentences. Six of these inmates had been regularly urine tested, however the seventh, who had tested positive to cannabinoids on four previous occasions, the last being 7 January 2000, had not been tested since that time. It is to be expected that an inmate with a history of positive tests would have attracted more continuous testing. This, together with he fact that so many inmates have tested positive to drug substances (see page 43) lends further support to my views on the inadequacy of searches conducted at the Prison.
Random searches are conducted of cells and other areas of the Prison. As at May 2000, they were not carried out on a frequent basis and when done generally aroused the ire of the inmates. Occasionally yards are locked down and cells are searched. On one such occasion a number of inmates created disturbances which required some to be subdued with gas and removed to ‘N’ Division by the Emergency Response Group.
Advice received from interstate prisons indicates that searches of inmates are common practice, as are cell searches. Inmates are permitted to be present when their cells are searched, unless their presence would prove disruptive or obstructive to search procedures. Inmates are also searched prior to contact visits and again on return from contact visits. They are also searched when they move from one area of the prison to another.
It is not unreasonable to assume that the lack of consistency in search procedures means that inmates will take exception to searches when they are carried out. In prisons where search procedures are standard practice, it appears that inmates tend to accept them without problems as they become part of the daily practice and procedure within the system.
In some prison systems, annual full lock down searches are scheduled and carried out. In other prisons lock down searches are conducted a number of times a year and, whilst such 25 practices create some difficulties with the regular prison procedures such as inmate showering, meal parades and prison industries, they are nevertheless considered essential for prison security.
Visitor searches
It is not a general practice to randomly search visitors. Visitors on contact visits with inmates are rarely searched and, if searched, it is usually only following the receipt of information by officers. The view was expressed that the senior administration did not encourage searches of visitors as it was considered that to do so could create dissension and unpleasant reactions from persons being searched or the inmates whom they were visiting. It should be noted that complaints made to the Ombudsman in relation to visitor searches generally do not support this view.
When two of my investigators went to Risdon Prison to conduct interviews they were both carrying briefcases, the contents of which were not checked. At the same time, two other persons were observed to carry large suitcases into the Prison, which apparently contained first aid dolls. Neither the suitcases, nor the persons carrying them, were checked. I accept that the two investigators were known to the staff and that it was not unreasonable to exercise a discretion not to search them. Nevertheless, there should be complete consistency and, in my view, all persons entering the prison should be searched, without exception.
The Secretary has advised that a visitor card system has been introduced and is being enforced. This is useful but the card system only records who is visiting the prison. It does not cover inspection of cases or bags carried by an individual, vehicles being searched on entry and egress, or the tools and items carried into the prison by contractors.
Vehicle searches
Vehicles entering the Risdon Maximum Security Prison are not usually searched on entry and, based on interview information and observations by my two investigators, appeared to be searched only in a cursory manner on exit. By contrast, interstate inquiries reveal that all vehicles, including police vehicles are searched when entering the Prison and searched again prior to departure from the Prison.13
Contractor’s Vehicles And Tools
Interviews with officers indicated that when contractors attend Risdon Prison to carry out maintenance activities, they can drive their vehicles into the main complex and park them in the cross gates area, which is situated between the main gate and the next set of inner gates. The vehicles are not usually searched nor is an audit done in respect of the tools and equipment contained within the vehicle.
The practice of searching vehicles entering Risdon Prison, when raised with one officer who had worked in an interstate prison, resulted in the statement They have a brief look through the vehicle, on the exit from the prison but it is very rare that you see one searched coming into a prison, and that flies in the face of my experience, and it was very hard for me to adapt, but I mean, you used to remove ropes, ladders and everything off vehicles when they were coming into the
26 prison, where I was working. And I started doing that here and I was basically told you don’t do that here, it’s a waste of time.
Some mainland prisons have a policy that when contractors are called to the prison to carry out maintenance functions, their vehicles are not usually permitted into the prison proper and any tools which they require to complete the job are recorded on entry to the prison and rechecked again when they exit the complex. Should any other tools be required to complete the job, they are required to record those tools in the same manner as the others when brought into the prison, and are again rechecked and recorded when they exit the complex. Some prisons also require contractors to wear a brightly coloured vest with the word “Contractor” clearly written on the back and front.
SECURITY UNIT/EMERGENCY RESPONSE GROUP
The Risdon Prison Security Unit is responsible for security within the Prison. The members also form the Emergency Response Group (ERG) and were trained by Victorian Prison ERG personnel who came to Tasmania. Training included cell and vehicle extraction techniques, baton and gas use and other associated skills. The ERG also is provided with special protection equipment and clothing
The Security Unit consists of a manager and three other ranks who are housed in a weatherboard building within the perimeter fence, but outside the main Prison complex. In other states there is external housing of the Security Unit. It is questionable whether Risdon Prison is suitable for externalising the security section which has an obligation to train other officers in some of the ERG tactics and procedures to provide assistance to the ERG in duties such as cell extraction of difficult inmates or riot control situations.
The security manager is tasked with travelling to other prison locations around the State such as Launceston Remand Centre, Hobart Remand Centre and Hayes Prison Farm to discuss security issues and liaise with the managers of those establishments. When the then manager of the Security Unit was interviewed he stated that due to work related pressures he had been unable to visit the other centres as often as he would have liked. This would not seem to be a desirable situation and care should be taken by the Director to ensure that the security manager fulfils his duties on a state-wide basis.
The Security Unit is also responsible for the Intelligence Cell (Intel Cell) and in that capacity gathers as much information and intelligence as possible from a variety of sources both within the Prison and externally. Reports were received that a number of officers who had originally contributed information to the Intel Cell had reportedly become disenchanted as a result of receiving no feed back from security on information provided or a perception that no action had been taken on their specific information.
Some concern was also expressed by security staff about the lax handling of intelligence provided to officers by the Intel Cell Unit, in that information was allegedly being fed back to inmates, and sensitive documents were left lying around and accessible to persons not authorised to view such material. If true, this is a concern.
When the Security Unit moved out of the main prison there was apparently less contact between the respective staff. This apparently resulted in resentment developing, to the extent that general officers would not call the Security Unit to carry out searches or allied functions because they were considered to be too far away from the specific location at the 27 time. There were also a number of incidents which occurred within the main Prison where security were unable respond quickly, either because of other duties or because of their office location. Apparently on some occasions when they did respond, the incident in question was already over.
I have been advised that the Security Unit has now been relocated within the main prison, which should facilitate better security communication.
The Secretary has advised me that the Security Unit is now working closely with Tasmania Police in intelligence gathering, but that was evidently not the case prior to 4 May 2000 when the investigation revealed that the intelligence gathering capabilities of the Security Unit were unsatisfactory. This was supported in discussions with the Director of Prisons, Mr John Dodd who commented Intelligence capabilities are very limited. The understanding of the nature of intelligence, of the ability to source potential intelligence information and to collate and manage, is pretty limited. And not just from the security personnel, but the understanding of that sort of thing from across custodial staff as a whole for the value of information and the uses to which information can be productively put.
In some interstate prisons, rather than a Security Unit as such, there is an appointed head of security and a large number of trained general officers, any one of whom would be available to undertake security or ERG functions if and when required with minimal delay. Perhaps a system of that nature would be beneficial to Tasmania which has only a relatively small number of officers compared to some interstate prisons. Irrespective, I believe, that there should be an analyst attached to either the security manager’s office or the Director’s office to deal with matters related to the Intel Cell.
Security vehicles
The inquiry revealed that the Security Unit did not have a dedicated vehicle for security operations and at times, if a situation had developed, a vehicle had to be obtained from one of the senior managers who was often unhappy if the vehicle was not back at the time he concluded duty for the day.
In terms of private vehicle use for security matters one witness interviewed who had been a security officer in a Victorian prison stated that the policy there was that the officer would carry his response gear in his own private car and use that vehicle to attend incident scenes but not for the purpose of prisoner removal from one location to another. An allowance was paid to the officer when called upon to use his private vehicle for that particular duty.
The use of a privately owned vehicle by a security officer to attend situations would obviously apply only to initial attendances. A follow up prison vehicle would be required for transport of inmates from the incident scene to any other location necessary. There needs to be a properly authorised policy by the Director of Prisons, relating to the use of a motor vehicle by security personnel connected with their duties.
I have since been advised that a new shared vehicle is now available for the use of Security Unit officers and for the Medium Security prison.
28 Standing Operating Procedures for the Emergency Response Group
The ERG is a specialist unit which has been provided with special equipment and training to deal with situational control of conduct. This is outside the capacity of general correctional officers. It requires separate Standing Operating Procedures for the deployment of the ERG, which specifically spell out when and under what circumstances gas, baton, firearms or other specific means of force should be adopted to overcome volatile situations. The SOPs should be comprehensive and be constantly reviewed to ensure maximum operating capability in line with ERGs in other states.14
The present inquiry revealed that there were no separate SOPs for the ERG. This was notwithstanding that recommendations to this effect had been accepted by the DJIR as the result of the former Ombudsman’s 1998 investigation into incidents at Risdon Prison and the Hobart Remand Centre.
At the time this investigation began, requests were made to the Director of Prisons on several occasions for Ombudsman investigators to be supplied with a set of SOPs for the deployment of the ERG. The investigators were constantly advised that the SOPs were being rewritten and that a copy would be provided as soon as the rewrite had been completed.
It was learnt that a draft set of SOPs had been sent to the then Director of Prisons for consideration and approval by the then Security Manager, Mr Burton. However, according to the Director, the SOPs required further work before they could be accepted. As late as February 2000, when a request for a copy of the SOPs was made, the document had still not been completed.
In a report provided by the Secretary to Mr Thomas, dated 14 May 1999, he recognised the need for ERG SOPs when he commented: As identified in your report, a preliminary draft of the proposed Standing Operating Procedures for the Emergency Response Group has been prepared by the Chief Custodial Officer in charge of security. It was considered that the initial draft was inadequate in certain respects and did not satisfactorily cover all aspects for the operations of the group. This draft is currently in the process of being refined, again with reference to the Victorian procedures and taking account of the findings of your investigation. As soon as the procedures have been finalised, they will be implemented
It is recognised that many of the principal Standing Orders under which the ERG operates were rewritten in the period between 1998 and May 2000 and are now published on the Department’s internal web-site. In particular, the Director’s Standing Order No 1.6, as amended in March 2000, details “The use of force by correctional officers” and is a document which refers to the general deployment and conduct of correctional officers. This is the same as would relate to the Commissioner of Police and his Orders for the conduct of police officers. However, the Tasmania Police Special Operations Group, which is a specialised unit similar to the ERG, is the subject of SOPs which strictly control the activities of that group, the circumstances under which it may be deployed and the manner of operation, including the chain of command and operational guidelines.
29 In my view the ERG at the prison, because of its specialised functions, should have specialised SOPs under which it operates, as opposed to the general Director’s Standing Orders.
Information gathered in interview indicated that the ERG had only had one training day in an 18 month period due to no dedicated time being allocated for unit members to attend training. This situation could not by any means be considered satisfactory, nor could it be of great benefit to the members undertaking the training as the whole concept of such training is to weld the team into a cohesive and effective unit which is then able to act efficiently and effectively in all situations. It is noted that, by not allocating regular training schedules, the Tasmanian Prison Service was acting contrary to the recommendations contained in the Ombudsman’s report into the 1998 prison incident.
It also appeared that there were no specific training days set aside for training. Tasmania Police Search and Rescue and the Special Operations Group have specific days gazetted annually for training and practice. This should be the same for the ERG. Nor were there inter-service exercises conducted between the Tasmanian Prison Service, Police, Ambulance and Fire Services. It was reasonable to conclude that, in the event of a riot or other major occurrence within the Prison, external services would be unsure of what their functions or requirements were and how they fitted into the situation control role.
It should be noted that in Tasmania, the First Aid component in other States’ training programs does not appear to be an essential aspect of security training and the Security Manager when interviewed conceded that he had not undertaken any first aid training since he initially obtained his first aid certificate. Having regard to the situations in which Security personnel can find themselves it is considered that an up-to-date knowledge of first aid procedures is an essential qualification.
In my view, it would be beneficial for the more senior members of the Tasmanian Prison Service to undertake specific training in such subjects as: · Commanders · Forward Commanders · Negotiation · Media Liaison
While it is appreciated that full scale exercises may at times be difficult to undertake, there is the option of table top exercises which can be easily conducted with appropriate personnel from the Prison and Emergency Services at regular intervals. A major benefit of this type of exercise is that all the role players gain awareness of their respective functions, which organisations are required to attend and who is responsible for which particular activity in an emergency situation.
There is of course in all such exercises a specific role and function for security personnel, who could be utilised in a containment role, headquarters security, cell extraction, or other allied functions. The Security Unit could also have very real input into the situation, in particular in the operation of a properly established functional Intel Cell which should be able to provide up to date information for the incident management team.
PRISONER ESCORTS
30 One of the security functions undertaken by Tasmanian Prison Service personnel is the escort of inmates to and from one location to another, whether it be from the remand centres to Risdon Prison or other locations, such as Hayes Prison Farm, courts and, when required, public hospitals, where it may be necessary to carry out watching duties for varying periods of time. The Tasmanian Prison Service does not have a specific Escort Unit and the Security Unit is not large enough to undertake many of the escort duties of inmates. Officers are deployed as required.
The inquiry revealed a number of problems relating to the escorting of inmates highlighted by the fact that in 1998, there were two escape incidents from prison escort vehicles reported. One escape involving three protection inmates took place on the Midland Highway en route to Risdon and the second occurred in Hobart when three prisoners were being taken to court.15
A further example of unsatisfactory prisoner escort service was highlighted in a newspaper article when it was reported that an officer who had been tasked with escorting an inmate to the Royal Hobart Hospital, had gone to sleep whilst sitting with the inmate, and had to be shaken awake by hospital staff. Had the inmate decided to escape from custody it would have been easy for him to do so, as he was not handcuffed and his guard was asleep. The officer was subsequently dealt with on a disciplinary basis by prison administration.
It appeared that few officers had received dedicated training in the performance of escort duties. The only escort training provided to officers was during the initial recruit course and there was no further specific training provided after that time. This can result in a situation where escorting personnel, who may have been in the service only a relatively short time are delegated to undertake escort duties. Alternatively, an officer may have been in the service a considerable length of time since his recruit training and be given the task of escorting inmates. In either scenario there can quite easily be problems.
Escort officers in other states receive specialised training in the field.16
It seems that Tasmania has two alternatives in the area of escort training. One is to train a specialist unit to undertake all escort functions, the other is to train a larger number of officers in escort duties and not have a specialist unit. The Tasmanian Prison Service does not employ an abundance of personnel from which to draw a special escort unit. It therefore follows that the second alternative may be the most appropriate for this state.
The general consensus was that inexperienced officers should not be assigned escort duties unless they have received proper training and briefing in escorting inmates. An example of some officers not being aware of their responsibilities was mentioned in an incident where a number of inmates were being taken to the Hobart Criminal Court. The incident involved an order by a senior officer to handcuff prisoners when the roller door which allows vehicular access to the secure area under the court could not be opened.17 The order was disputed and, while it could be argued that the failure to obey a senior officer’s instructions was a disciplinary matter, it also indicates the need for appropriate training in escort duties
Perhaps the most appropriate approach to this subject in Tasmania would be for the Security Unit manager to be made responsible for all escort functions, including the training of escort officers. One person would then have the responsibility for ensuring that all escorts were carried out in a uniform manner and that the persons delegated that task were trained to an acceptable standard. Whilst it is appreciated that this function would add 31 considerably to the work load of an already over-taxed Security Unit, there must be a definite change in attitude towards escort duties to curtail the opportunity for inmates in transit to escape.
Disciplinary action
Officers involved in escort duties, following an escape, and where there is evidence of negligence, may be subject to disciplinary proceedings. Originally the Prison Regulations contained specific offences with which officers could be charged. However, following the repeal of part of the Regulations in 1985, disciplinary matters were subsequently dealt with under the Tasmanian State Service Act 1984, which did not incorporate specific offences relevant to the prison system. In my view, the decision to remove the disciplinary Regulations from the Prison Statutes was an unfortunate one and has, to a large degree undermined the authority of the Prison Management to deal quickly and effectively with disciplinary breaches committed by staff. This point is discussed in further detail later in the report.
Prison Escort Vehicles
Inquiries indicated that there were three main prison escort vehicles used to transport inmates from one destination to another. The fleet consisted of two Coaster vans, neither of which was suitable for high security inmates, the third vehicle, a Mercedes, has been fitted out to provide for the separation of the occupants to make it more secure. The Mercedes is specifically designed for the transport of high security inmates and would make any escape very difficult.
A complaint received at the Ombudsman’s office related to a female prisoner transported from the Launceston Remand Centre to Risdon Prison. The vehicle had separate divisions, but the male inmates could see the female and she could see them. The female was subjected to continual verbal abuse by the male inmates and, even though the escorting officers remonstrated with them, their conduct did not abate. As a result the female became quite distressed and traumatised. Ideally, female prisoners should not be transported in a vehicle in which male prisoners are being transported.
I have been advised that a decision has already been taken to upgrade all escort vehicles to the standard of the Mercedes vehicle and this will occur as they become due for replacement. There is currently one on order for Launceston, supplementing the existing Hobart based one.
LEAVE PERMITS
Inmates complained of inconsistencies relative to the issue of Leave Permits under section 42 of the Corrections Act 1997, claiming that some inmates received preferential treatment by being granted longer periods of leave than others for the same or similar reasons. Section 42 Leave Permits may be granted by the Director of Prisons to a prisoner or detainee to be absent from the prison for a number of reasons.18
Investigations found that the majority of complaints were unsubstantiated, although one reported instance dating back to October 1998 revealed that management failed to ensure an inmate’s attendance at his mother’s funeral after confirming that he could go.
32 There have been complaints from members of the public in respect of unsupervised section 42 releases of some prisoners, particularly those who have been convicted of murder or other violent crimes. Whilst the implementation of the process is a matter for Prison authorities, it is also one over which I have investigational jurisdiction, and one recent complaint resulted in me requesting the Director of Prisons to provide me with the current guidelines or policy in relation to the granting of leave permits.
I understand that new Standing Orders and supporting documentation have since been raised. Appropriate safeguards, as recommended, should be implemented to prevent the potential for abuse of the system.
‘N’ DIVISION (NOW DIVISION 8)
‘N’ Division is the punishment, behavioural management and special protection section of Risdon Prison. The Tasmanian Prison Service Standing Operating Procedure No 2-11, issued in July 1999, relates to the detention of prisoners within ‘N’ Division. Item No. 5.2 of that Standing Operation Procedure states Staff are reminded that all persons under any form of detention or imprisonment shall be treated in a humane manner and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.
It is noted that the new Standing Order was drafted and implemented by the Department in response to a 1998 Prison investigation carried out by the former Ombudsman’s office.
There is universal condemnation of N Division as a facility. It is anticipated that this will be overcome by the construction of a new prison but in the meantime 'N’ Division remains an appalling environment and it is difficult to believe that anyone incarcerated there could be considered as being treated with respect for human dignity. The building and facilities have been described as archaic and ‘Dickensian’: If you have seen them you know how horrible they are, and isolation doesn’t just mean cruelty in the sense of bare concrete floors and walls, cold, draughty cells. It is almost inhumane accommodation provided for people in isolation.
Nurses in the prison hospital, and other staff, have voiced frequent concerns that inmates seeking protection from other inmates are placed in ‘N’ Division. The Division is essentially perceived as a punishment area. Irrespective of the regime they are under, those housed there do not have the same privileges, social contact or physical environment as the remainder of the prison. Inmates are in isolation for up to 23 hours a day. They take their meals, use the cell toilet and sleep in the same cell. The remainder of the 24 hour period is taken up with exercise. Inmates only shower every second day.
With regard to lockup times, an officer advised: They don’t really have an official lock up or unlock in ‘N’ Division as such, compared with the rest of the gaol. They’re woken up in the mornings, their cells are opened to feed them individually in their cells and then the doors are closed again. Then they’re allowed out for showers and exercise, but only one out at a time. One person will be let out and put in a cage and there’s six cages and each time someone’s let out there are two officers.
Inmates seeking protection can spend 30 days or more in ‘N’ Division, notwithstanding that the legislation prohibits those on disciplinary charges being sentenced to longer than 30 33 days solitary confinement on one charge. Some seeking protection in a protection yard would be transferred to ‘H’ Division when that Division was operating, and back to ‘N’ Division when ‘H’ Division was shut or would have sequential re-admissions to the Prison hospital.
On 7 December 1999 inmate K was spoken to in ‘N’ Division by members of my staff. It was established that K, a whistle blower from ‘H’ Division, had been housed in ‘N’ Division for one and a half weeks for protection. Although he was on protection and not punishment, K had been denied his privileges in that he had no television or radio.
To guard against detention of such prisoners as K being unnecessarily lengthy, as part of the Ombudsman’s 1998 Prison Report a recommendation was made that Records should be signed off by the Operations Manager each week for every inmate in ‘N’ Division, showing the reasons for placement, the length of time detained and the reason for detention in ‘N’ Division.
In the course of this present investigation, inspection of the record or documentation drawn up by the Tasmanian Prison Service ostensibly in accord with the Ombudsman’s 1998 report did not disclose the required information. Further, the two officers on duty in ‘N’ Division on the morning of 7 December 1999, were unable, for some considerable time, to advise my investigators of the reason for the placement of inmate K in ‘N’ Division and the number of weeks that he had been there.
It should be made clear that it is not necessarily wrong in principle for inmates on Behavioural Management or Protection regimes to spend longer than 30 days in ‘N’ Division. However, there is a vast difference between inmates placed in ‘N’ Division under a punishment regime, having been found guilty of a disciplinary offence, and an inmate placed in ‘N’ Division for any other purpose.
One of the reasons the former Ombudsman recommended the implementation of an appropriate record signed weekly by the Operations Manager was to ensure that it was clearly demonstrated that problem inmates were not simply relabelled “behavioural management” instead of as a defaulter, and thereby incarcerated in ‘N’ Division for a period of time in excess of prisoners disciplined on default sentences.
As indicated above, Standing Operating Procedures No. 2-11, issued July 1999, govern the management of 'N' Division. Amongst other matters they require that meticulous attention be given to security procedures and the searching of inmates and their cells. ‘N’ division is a Smoke Free Environment for all prisoners/detainees. Notwithstanding this, inmates have managed to set fire to their cells, and have on some occasions been injured. This would seem to suggest that the Order needs to be more rigorously administered.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that:
Camera systems and electronic surveillance
1. Adequate funding be provided to ensure that an effective program of camera maintenance and servicing is implemented. 2. Camera placement be reviewed and be relocated to more suitable positions, if necessary.
34 3. Cameras identified as being out of order in the July 1999 and January 2000 Audit Report be checked and if necessary repaired or replaced without delay. 4. A program of replacing old style, less efficient cameras (ie tube cameras) be undertaken. 5. All Prison cameras, including Hospital, Kitchen and Bakery Gallery, Main Gate Control Room, Towers, Women’s Prison, Medium Security be integrated into the CCTV system. 6. Tower cameras be replaced with modern tilt and pan cameras. 7. If it is not immediately possible to integrate the cameras at the prison hospital, main gate control room, Women’s Prison and Kitchen and Bakery Gallery, each of these stand alone locations be provided with a monitor and recording device to enable any incidents to be recorded. 8. A properly constituted method of recording camera faults be introduced and regularly reviewed by the Director. 9. Additional monitors, from which recordings can be made, be introduced into the CCTV system. 10. Additional video recorders be purchased and connected to the additional monitors in the CCTV room. 11. The officers performing CCTV duties be properly trained in those duties. 12. The CCTV system operate 24 hours each day. This should definitely occur in the new facility. 13. A properly formulated system of videotape and exhibit security protocols be introduced to ensure correct storage of all evidence relevant to incidents. 14. A security cabinet be provided in the CCTV room to ensure tape security and to reduce the opportunity for theft, with access by limited key holders only. 15. A tape register be introduced in which all tape movement and usage, including the names of the officers involved and the location of tapes, is recorded. 16. Consideration be given to the appointment of a specific exhibits officer who would be tasked with the security of all exhibits arising from an incident, including audio tape, videotape and other evidence. This person would be responsible for the recording of all aspects of the exhibits, security and associated tasks. 17. Consideration be given to the appointment of a properly trained running sheet officer who would be tasked with recording the particulars of persons able to provide evidence or information relevant to an incident. This person would also be responsible for the security of the statements and documents relevant to an inquiry into an incident. 18. Training be provided for all hand-held video camera operators to a standard acceptable to the courts as exhibiting professionalism and good camera function knowledge. 19. Only persons with appropriate qualifications be permitted to operate the hand-held video cameras.
Duress alarm systems
20. The duress alarm system be integrated into the camera system for improved security.
Peg clocks
21. A system similar to peg clocking be introduced to ensure patrol officers carry out their duties as required.
Perimeter fence security
22. Sensors be incorporated into the perimeter fence without delay
35 23. Consideration be given to developing an all weather perimeter road around the inside of the security fence. 24. A system of random perimeter patrols be introduced. 25. Frequent checks and inspections of the perimeter fence be undertaken. 26. Consideration be given to the introduction of exclusion zones around the interior of the perimeter fence. 27. Camera surveillance of all the perimeter fence be introduced without delay.
Searches
28. Contact visitors be subject to systematic searches of their persons and belongings, with particular attention to items which may be hidden in the mouth, prior to a visit taking place. Consideration be given to supplementing visitor search procedures with the use of drug sniffer dogs. 29. Visitors who are not prepared to be searched not be permitted into the prison. 30. All inmates, without exception be thoroughly searched following contact visits 31. Random cell searches be undertaken regularly. 32. Yard lock down searches of cells and prison areas be regularly carried out using drug sniffer dogs. 33. Inmates moving from one yard or area to another part in the new facility be required to be issued with signed passes permitting that movement. 34. Inmates issued with movement passes in the new facility be searched when moving from one area to another. 35. Random searches of inmates be carried out on a regular basis. 36. All vehicles be searched thoroughly when entering or leaving prison. 37. All parcels or cases carried by prison employees, irrespective of status, be opened and contents inspected. 38. A program of random searches of prison employees, irrespective of status, be carried out. 39. Maintenance persons convey into the prison only those tools and equipment required for the job at hand and all items to be checked and recorded on entry and exit from the prison. 40. Except in exceptional circumstances, maintenance vehicles not be permitted to enter the prison proper.
Security Unit / Emergency Response Group
41. ERG personnel be trained in tactics and procedures at least two days each calendar month. 42. ERG personnel train other general officers in ERG tactics and procedures on a regular basis. 43. Consideration be given to an alternative system to that currently in place whereby the Tasmanian Prison Service would retain a Head of Security but, instead of a team of four or five officers as a unit, implant a system similar to some other states where a large number of officers are trained in ERG tactics and are available to respond to incidents. 44. A dedicated vehicle be provided for security functions. 45. Intel procedures be revised and updated to a fully functional level. 46. A properly formulated system of intelligence gathering, storage and dissemination be introduced. 47. All Prison officers be instructed in security of intelligence and related documents.
36 48. A properly trained analyst be appointed to analyse information gathered by the Intel unit, once the appropriate systems are in place. 49. Immediate steps be taken to formally engage in a staff training program on intelligence gathering and analysis, with Tasmania Police. 50. Immediate steps be taken to complete special SOPs which strictly control the activities of the ERG and the circumstances in which it may be deployed and the manner of operation, including the chain of command and operational guidelines. 51. The special SOPs be regularly reviewed and updated.
Prison escorts
52. Ongoing escort training be introduced for all officers likely to undertake escort duties. 53. The security manager be appointed as the responsible person for all escort functions. 54. Special arrangements be introduced for female inmates to be transported in a vehicle with a separate compartment and out of sight of male inmates. 55. The Secretary have a feasibility study conducted into the existing procedures of the Tasmanian Prison Service Staff Disciplinary Process with a view to reintroducing separate procedures for prison staff.
Leave permits
56. All requests for section 42 leave be properly and speedily processed. 57. Section 42 leave requests not to be issued on a discriminatory or preferential basis in regard to time frames allocated for the leave.
‘N’ Division (now Division 8)
58. The Director of Prisons ensure that all provisions of the Standing Operating Procedure No. 2-11, issued in July 1999 are rigorously adhered to, including maintenance of a smoke free environment. 59. The Director of Prisons ensure, in accordance with recommendation 4 in the Ombudsman’s 1998 Report, that proper records are kept in ‘N’ Division and signed off by the Prison Manager every week with details of the name of inmates in ‘N’ Division, the reason for the placement, the number of weeks spent in ‘N’ Division, and for each week the reason for retention of that inmate in ‘N’ Division. 60. The lock-down times for inmates in ‘N’ Division be reviewed to allow for more time out of their cells during each 24 hour period. 61. The Director of Prisons ensure that inmates housed in ‘N’ Division on protection are provided with privileges to which they are entitled.
37 CHAPTER 3: TRAINING
Training was a recurring theme in interviews conducted with prison staff at all levels including middle and senior management. The initial training and induction program for recruits entering the Tasmanian Prison Service was reviewed and assessed as being sufficiently well-structured to enable applicants to gain the necessary knowledge for them to perform their duties as Custodial Officers. It was asserted frequently that the main problems lay in follow up training or lack of training in important areas.
This assertion was difficult to test because it was not possible to obtain a consolidated record of staff training. Until recently, only manual records of training completed were maintained for each individual staff member. I am informed that training records are now being maintained on an electronic data base and historical records are currently being entered on it.
The Secretary has provided information to indicate the training programs offered to staff: ..regular training sessions are scheduled for all Custodial Officers at Risdon and the roster is arranged in a manner that allows each Officer to attend 4 training days per year.
Training sessions are conducted each Tuesday, except when Training personnel are otherwise engaged eg. while Induction Training for recruits is underway. Each session needs to be repeated over six weeks to fit in with the roster cycle and allow all necessary staff to attend.
The sessions are planned to cover areas in which periodic re-certification of skills is required eg. fire-arms training, first aid training; to introduce new equipment, policies or procedures eg. breathing apparatus, Discipline Standing Order; or to update existing knowledge and/or skills eg. infectious disease and blood spill control procedures, physical interventions.
The Secretary has also provided details of training initiatives directed at senior and middle managers between 1998 and 2000.19
I agree with the Secretary’s comment that ..if (subsequent) performance is (then) found wanting, the difficulty may just as likely arise through inadequate supervision and performance management (and solutions need to be found in those areas) as it is to be a training issue warranting a training solution.
In other words, additional training will not provide a panacea for the many problems exhibited in the prison. I agree with that but, given the number of adverse incidents that have taken place at Risdon in the past two to three years I would suggest that there are evident weaknesses in the officer training program which should be addressed.
I am concerned at information received which indicated that some officers failed to attend rostered training days for various reasons and it appeared that management had not addressed the matter. 38 The present Risdon Prison Roster was prepared in 1982. There appears to have been no change in the rostering format of 14 days on duty out of every 21 days. This rostering system consists of what are known as “long”, “medium” and “short” working weeks.
In a short working week, custodial officers are rostered off on Monday, Tuesday, Saturday and Sunday. The Tuesday of that week is a designated training day. There are four designated training days in a 56 week cycle (one year). The four designated training days in a 56 week rostering cycle was an agreement between the Tasmanian Prison Service and the Tasmanian Prison Officers Association.
It has been established that the present roster is published four weeks in advance and custodial officers who are rostered off on the Tuesday of the “short” week would be re- rostered to a training day. Their names would be highlighted on the Roster with the letters “TR” for training, well in advance.
Information received by my investigating officers indicated that some custodial officers had not attended designated training days as rostered. It is obvious that when an officer fails to attend a rostered training day, for whatever reason, it will be some considerable time before that person can be re-rostered for training. Quite apart from other considerations, if the non-attendance at training is as widespread as was suggested to me, it follows that assumptions made by senior management about the competence of their staff may be wrongly based. Appropriate action should be taken in relation to staff who have a questionable pattern of non-attendance at training sessions. I have recently been advised that an audit retrospective to 1995 is to be conducted.
TRAINING IN SECURITY AND SEARCH PROCEDURES
Officers stated that they received no follow up training in security after leaving their initial recruit training course. This assertion could not be substantiated but is lent some credibility given the unprecedented number of prison escapes and an increased availability of drugs and contraband in the prison. In the case of escapes, some can be attributed to the classification system, particularly where the prisoner has escaped from Hayes Prison Farm, but there can be no doubt that others are linked to a lack of security and security awareness, likewise with the availability of drugs. Irrespective of whether or not security training has been provided, it needs to be reinforced and its importance driven home much more rigorously.
The Secretary of DJIR advises that in November 1999 the Initial Recruitment Training converted to the National Qualification Certificate 3 in Correctional Practice (Custodial Corrections). This course is conducted over 12 months in Tasmania and consists of 7 weeks pre-service training, followed by 45 weeks on the job in which the individual competencies are assessed in the workplace environment. These checks include assessment of security and search competencies.
In March 2000 the qualification for appointment as a First Class Custodial Officer was converted to take in the core elements of the national Qualification Certificate 4 in Correctional Practice. These core elements include search and security competencies. Officers enrolled in this course at Risdon must have direct knowledge and skills in the operation of CCTV, main gate control and day to day supervision of the Prison. (These are assessed by way of a detailed checklist.) 39 TRAINING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE GROUP
There is, in effect, no recognised Emergency Response Group. The officers who are drawn together to perform emergency response duties are usually referred to as the Emergency Group. They are referred to in Prison Rule No. 53 (revised in June 1998) as “Trained Emergency Personnel”. These officers first undertook the Emergency Procedures Defensive Tactics Instructors Course, 2 to 6 June 1997, which was delivered by qualified instructors from the Victorian Prison Security Service and Emergency Response Group. On completion they became Emergency Response Trainers with the responsibility of training other officers. It appears that very few of those originally trained are still with the ERG, which diminishes the likelihood that ongoing ‘in house’ training will be provided.
In the Western Australian Prison Service, the Emergency Support Group undergo 18 days initial training and in addition have a dedicated 12 hour training day once every 3 weeks. Officers must qualify every 3 months in the use of firearms, breathing apparatus and also pass a physical ability test. There are no such requirements in Tasmania.
TRAINING IN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING
An essential element for the security and operation of Risdon Prison is a pro-active Intelligence Network to gather and receive information from various sources and ensure that the information is correctly evaluated and disseminated. This is a function of the Security and Operational Support Unit. As at May 2000, only a few staff from the Unit had had any previous training in intelligence gathering. There was no trained analyst appointed to the Unit and recording facilities were limited. The Tasmanian Prison Service should formally engage in a training program with Tasmania Police to assist in intelligence gathering and analysis. This should occur on a regular basis at least four times a year.
The Tasmanian Prison Service advised that discussions had been entered into in relation to access being granted to the Australia Wide Correctional Centre Intelligence data base through the Australian Bureau and Criminal Intelligences ACID and ALIEN. This would have provided the Tasmanian Prison Service with considerably enhanced access to such information. It appears that the costs for inclusion to those services would be prohibitive and, at the present time, not a feasible proposition for the Prison to adopt. It is evident that any intelligence gathering function within the Prison must be prison-based and equipped with appropriate IT access.
The New South Wales Prison Services have formed a Corrections Intelligence Group - CIG and are very reliant on the pro-active gathering of information relating to inmates in custody and management of that intelligence. The CIG is an integral part of the State Investigative and Security Group (SISG) which comprises four operational sections being: · Investigation Team · Intelligence Cell (detached from CIG) · Surveillance Unit · Drug Detector Dog Team
Neither the Tasmanian Prison Service nor Tasmania Police have a drug detection dog team. They make use of the Commonwealth dog team. Dogs should be used in covert drug operations.
40 TRAINING IN BEHAVIOURAL MANAGEMENT AND INDICATORS
This is a broad area which includes management of inmates who exhibit challenging and disruptive or violent behaviours, as well as recognition of behavioural indicia of suicide, self harm, and alcohol and drug dependency. The importance of behavioural management training particularly for custodial staff is addressed in some detail in the report on the prison hospital. Many of those interviewed saw current training in this area as inadequate and believed that it should be given a high priority.
Training in suicide awareness and prevention is addressed in induction courses for recruits. The total time spent on this subject is 4.5 hours, divided into three sessions. I understand that this training has now been expanded to at least two days for recruits and in-service staff, with ongoing annual assessment.
TRAINING IN ALCOHOL AND DRUG DEPENDENCY INDICATORS
This is also a category that is addressed in induction courses for recruits. However, there is no current ongoing training program. Some years ago, officers underwent a seven day course in Behavioural Management and Alcohol and Drug Dependency at the then John Edis Hospital, St John’s Park, New Town. Some of those officers were then deployed in the Prison hospital where their training proved to be of considerable value to forensic staff. While these courses no longer exist, it would be beneficial for the Tasmanian Prison Service to introduce a similar training program, of suitable duration into the training curriculum to ensure staff are appropriately trained in awareness of changes in the demeanour of alcohol and drug dependant inmates. This should be the responsibility of both the Department of Health and Human Services and DJIR.
The Secretary of DJIR advises that training in this particular area has been expanded to at least two days for recruits and for in-service staff, with ongoing annual assessment. The first group of recruits and the first group of in-service training occurred in May 2001 and is ongoing.
TRAINING IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Officers claimed that they had not received any ongoing training in this category. The subject of conflict resolution is briefly addressed in the induction courses for recruits. Some members of Prison Management may have attended at least one course, however, other States, especially Victoria, advise that custodial officers are trained in conflict resolution. The Victorian training program is comprehensive and consists of nine modules and the officers who receive this training are in turn responsible for the training of others. It would be beneficial for the Tasmanian Prison Service to have all custodial officers participate in a conflict resolution training program similar to other States.
It is agreed that some officers undertook training in November 1999 in Conflict Resolution, however, that is a totally separate issue to Negotiation Skills and should not be confused one with the other.
TRAINING IN NEGOTIATION SKILLS
41 Negotiation Skills relate to situational matters which may involve hostages, armed persons or threats to act violently, riots and situations which may continue over a considerable period of time and require skilled negotiations to bring such situations to a satisfactory conclusion. This particular form of negotiation is specifically designed for Critical Incident Management and responses, and is different from normal day to day negotiations and situational controls.
Officers claimed that they had not received any training in this category since completing their induction course. Whilst four hours training in Tactical Communication is delivered to recruits, it is imperative that ongoing training in negotiation skills continues. As recommended in the then Ombudsman’s 1998 Risdon Prison Investigation: That members of the Emergency Response Group and other Corrective Services personnel likely to be involved in more serious incidents, receive further and ongoing training in formal negotiation skills. Further that the procedural manual, where appropriate, provide that negotiation be the preferred option and force only be used for safety and security reasons.
That recommendation was accepted by the Secretary of the Department of Justice and Industrial Relations, and in his report to the Ombudsman dated 14 May 1999 he stated: I have previously commented on the extent to which negotiation is already strongly pursued as a preferred method of dealing with situations of conflict within the Prison. Certainly the Standing Orders will make this clear, and will continue to direct that the use of force is the last resort. Custodial staff will continue to receive training in negotiation skills, and we are currently considering the feasibility and desirability of having selected staff receive more advanced training in formal negotiation skills. They would then be available to be called on to deal with more serious situations.
Whilst some officers believe that the regimentation of the prison system would not lend itself to officers performing the dual function of disciplinarian and negotiator, other officers could see the advantage of trained negotiators within the system used in conflict resolution situations. They considered that with proper training it would enhance rather than conflict with their ability to manage prisoners. In other States negotiators are being increasingly utilised in the prison system to resolve situations, and are considered to be an asset. Prison services in other States have a course duration of three days for the Tactical Communication Course. These courses are designed to enhance the skills and knowledge of correctional staff in the art of communication, and in particular, the techniques, principles and procedures used during the negotiation process.
Training in Negotiation Skills requires intense ongoing training, including mock situations and properly formulated procedures and practices, as well as skilful and effective negotiators such as those attached to the Police Negotiations Unit. It would also be of value if Tasmania Police, who have a specialist Negotiation Unit, were involved in training and joint exercises with prison staff.
TRAINING FOR SENIOR AND MIDDLE MANAGEMENT
Senior and middle management of the Tasmanian Prison Service claimed to have had little or no training in the following: · Situational Commander Roles and Functions · Forward Commander Roles and Functions 42 · Negotiating Skills · Crisis Management · Table Top or Field Operational Exercises with other Services · Liaison Roles
This is notwithstanding the Secretary’s advice in relation to programs such as Front Line Management Programs, Negotiation Skills and EEO Training conducted for all senior and middle managers by the Office of the Anti-Discrimination Commissioner.
The Tasmanian Prison Service was first advised in January/February 1999 and again later that year regarding the lack of operational experience within senior and middle management of Risdon Prison. The Department’s agreement to rectify the problem with training programs has not been fulfilled.
I commend a recent forward planning initiative by the Tasmanian Prison Service which resulted in the enrolment of four staff in an eight week course of instruction management functions and related topics at the Rokeby Police Academy.
43 TRAINING IN BEHAVIOURAL MANAGEMENT
It is accepted that there have been courses in front line management training for some prison staff however, at the time of interviews with Correction Officers prior to 4 May 2000, officers stated that they had not received training in this category.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that:
1. The Director of Prisons, following the audit of the training programs back to 1995, to establish which custodial officers rostered to attend training, failed to attend, should ensure that missed training is undertaken within a short period. 2. The Tasmanian Prison Service ensure that a properly structured, ongoing training program is implemented for staff in the following categories: security and search procedures, CCTV operations, behavioural management, suicide awareness and prevention, alcohol and drug dependency indicators, conflict resolution, negotiation skills, situation commander roles and functions, forward commander roles and functions, crisis management, table top or field operational exercises with other services, and liaison roles. 3. A properly formulated and dedicated training program for all officers who undertake prison escorts be introduced. It is essential that these officers are trained in Emergency Response Procedures, including weapons, first aid and that officers be made fully aware of their powers and responsibilities.
44 CHAPTER 4: DRUGS
THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM
The problem of inmates having access to drugs is certainly not unique to Tasmania, but that does not make it any less of a concern. Some indication of the extent of the drug problem was revealed in statistics on the urinanalysis testing process. To review the process, which is conducted in accordance with Standing Order CO 15, my investigators obtained the particulars of all inmates tested throughout the State from 1st October 1999 to 30th April 2000.
It was ascertained that between the given dates 204 inmates were tested Statewide. Of these: · 49 inmates were randomly selected for testing · 150 inmates were suspected of having taken alcohol or prohibited substances · 5 inmates were chosen by other means.
The results of these tests were: · 42% (86) of the 204 inmates tested gave a positive reading. · Marihuana was the main prohibited substance detected between the given dates. There were 66 positive tests of this substance. One inmate had returned 6 previous positive tests and another returned 3 in relation to this substance. · Opiates-there were 17 positive tests returned of this substance. However, on 7 occasions opiates were registered as an approved medication. · Benzodiazepines -there were 9 positive tests returned of this substance. One inmate had returned 3 previous positive tests in relation to this substance. · Methadone- there were 4 positive tests of this substance, however on 3 occasions it was an approved medication. The records show that the three inmates who were on an approved Methadone program, tested positive for Marihuana, and the inmate who was detected using Methadone unlawfully also tested positive for Opiates and Marihuana. · It was found that a number of inmates tested positive to more than one prohibited substance; on 3 occasions inmates tested positive to ‘Other (unnamed) Drugs or Alcohol’.
The recording of ‘Action Taken’ as the result of inmates testing positive was also found to be inconsistent, inasmuch as only 12 of the 86 positive tests had been properly recorded with a ‘Recovery of Costs’ and/or ‘No Contact Visits’ for a certain time. The remaining 74 positive test results were recorded as either ‘Defaulted - No Result’ or ‘1st, 2nd or 3rd Offence - Cannabis’. One inmate who had tested positive on seven occasions was recorded as ‘ 7th Offence - Cannabis’.
I was told that all particulars relating to inmates tested are recorded on a data base that is maintained by the Security and Operational Support Unit. Copies of the test results, when received, are placed on inmate files. If an inmate is defaulted as a result of a positive test the documentation relating to the default process is maintained on the individual inmate files.
45 Based on the above advice all details of positive testing should be entered on the Master Sheet provided and recorded on a central data base. This procedure was not in effect happening at the time of my investigation and a manual search of 86 separate inmate files was necessary to obtain the information required. However, I understand that at that particular time, there was a problem connected with the recording of urine analysis testing results onto an electronic database and that the problem has since been rectified.
ENTRY INTO PRISON
Drugs evidently enter prison in various ways. It is common knowledge that medium security prisoners go outside the main prison building and onto the oval below the CCTV area and although they are checked every 30 minutes they are rarely searched on their return to prison. The main reason given, from the Director down, was a lack of resources. I was told that extra staff are allocated to this task at different times to ensure that inmates are searched, but there was no evidence that this was actually happening.
The location of the medical dispensary in ‘F’ yard was raised during the interview20 with a senior officer who, when asked whether he had any concerns about its location, commented: In the sense that it’s accessible to inmates in an area that’s not monitored, from what we can see, yes I have. It’s certainly better than the system that we used to have, where a nurse walked around the operational senior divvy, and pulls up through a window or an open door. And it’s better than when it was dealt with up in “A” yard, where you let them out and they wandered around. So in that sense, it is probably a good solution to what used to occur. But it certainly is not built in an area that is under enough surveillance to enable - to keep inmates out of the place.
It is acknowledged that Workplace Standards reviewed the Dispensary in relation to safe work practice in early April 2000, and was satisfied that the method of dispensing and dispensary location complied with their guidelines and regulations. A custodial officer is also present and witnesses all dispensing activity.
Creative ways are found to bring in drugs. This was illustrated when officers checked a group of inmates working at the Hobart Botanical Gardens. and discovered that drugs, which had obviously been secreted in the garden and retrieved by one of the inmates, were in the process of being conveyed back into the Prison in the prison bus.
Drugs have been thrown over the Prison walls in balls and other objects and visitors bring substances into the Prison during contact visits. It has been found that several incidents have occurred where drugs have been passed from a visitor to an inmate during the act of kissing. It is believed that on one occasion during a contact visit an inmate was injected with a drug substance by his visitor under the cover of the table around which they were seated.
On 19 December 1999, an inmate was suspected of swallowing an unknown substance administered to him during a contact visit and had to be taken to the prison hospital for observation. The inmate lost consciousness on several occasions and four hours elapsed before he fully recovered.
46 Officers have expressed concern regarding the difficulties they encounter when attempting to gain information from inmates who have been assaulted by other prisoners because of what they describe as the ‘Code of Silence’.
Studies in other states indicate that drugs are brought into the Prison environment · by passing over or under the perimeter fence · through the visiting sections · through vehicle and pedestrian gates · by civilian workers · through deliveries and stores · by vehicles · by inmates on reception · by inmates returning to the correctional centre · by corrupt staff.
Some of the methods employed by correctional services in mainland prisons to counter the incidence of drug abuse and access have included · task forces provided with special powers of entry · police attachment to the Prison to investigate staff activity · Corrections Intelligence Group for more dynamic security procedures · institutional Intelligence Officers · urinanalysis · drug detection dogs · searching programs · Correctional Centre designs with the introduction of large sterile zones · video surveillance · high profile signs as a deterrent at all entry points and visitor areas · elimination of food stuffs brought in by visitors · visitors and their belongings are searched · increased penalties for drug trafficking into prisons · prohibition of certain persons from visiting prisoners · where inmates are thought to have drugs hidden inside their body, ie in condoms, they are kept in isolation /observation cells and monitored · relocation and reclassification of inmates · staff education programs · tables in contact area to be low in height.
It has been found in other states that it is not uncommon for officers or other staff to be responsible for bringing drugs into prison. A number of reasons can contribute to this including threats to the officer or members of his/her family; unwise conduct by the officer which has been observed by inmates and resulted in blackmail practices; officers befriending inmates and thereby losing their objectivity; or simply officers undertaking criminal acts for gain, be it monetary or otherwise. Once identified by organised criminal groups they become easy targets. On questioning, some officers did not deny that prison staff at Risdon may be responsible for some illegal substances entering the prison.
The Director of Prisons is empowered under section 22 of the Corrections Act 1997 to search any member of the Prison staff for security or good order of the Prison. At the commencement of the investigation, copies of all Standing Orders were requested. No specific Standing Operations Procedure for searches of staff was forthcoming, although the 47 Secretary of the Department has directed me to Standing Order 1.16 Searches and Patrols, which deals comprehensively with all searching routines for inmates, visitors, vehicles and staff. I am now advised that additional Standing Orders have been drafted to cover situations which may arise out of sections 20-24 and 28 of the Corrections Act 1997.
THE EFFECTS OF DRUGS
The adverse effects caused by the presence of large quantities of drugs in prison cannot be overstated. The recent major report by the West Australian Ombudsman into Deaths in Prison referred at page 276 to problems caused by drug dependent inmates as being: · poor and deteriorating physical health and increased health risks to all prisoners and staff · increased risk and incidence of self harm and suicide · unpredictable behaviour and · increased potential for bullying, standover and violence.
It was clear from many interviews that drugs such as Rohypnol, Tegretol, Dexamphetamine and Ritalin together with Marihuana, Opiates, Methadone and Benzodiazepines are readily available within Risdon Prison. When asked what drugs cause the most problems, an officer replied: Rohypnol is our biggest drug problem. It’s the most dangerous drug we see here and it’s the hardest one to detect, both coming in, as it’s easy to hide, and in urine tests as it is out of the body so quickly.
Evidence gathered throughout the inquiry clearly indicated that drugs are one of the major causes of violence, bullying, assaults and behavioural problems. It is not only illegal drugs which cause problems. Prescribed medicinal drugs often result in inmates being stood over by other inmates, who seek to gain possession of the drugs.
When one officer was asked what he believed was the cause of so many inmates being assaulted he replied The majority of it would, to me, be drug related, from my experience and from speaking to some of the inmates I can speak with and talk with. Some of the ones back previously in March, February, March and early April when the majority of assaults occurred was because they had medications that had a warranted street value outside and these elder gents obviously needed it for medical reasons and weren’t going to give it up so, out of frustration and because they thought they were heavies in the yard, they- the others bashed them.
Statistics supplied by the Tasmanian Prison Service indicated that the abuse of medicinal drugs is second only to the most commonly used drug substance, cannabis, which can be found in a number of forms including block hashish; hashish oil; and the usual green leaf matter. The block form and oil are more potent than the leaf and can be much more easily smuggled into the prison when compared with the more bulky leaf substance.
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
The influx of drug substances into the Risdon Prison is an urgent and ongoing problem and stringent procedures must be pursued to counter the problem. I am aware that a new drug strategy has been drafted by the Department, following a widely attended forum and public
48 consultation. The Secretary advised me earlier this year that it was nearing finalisation but this is unconfirmed. I am also aware that various measures have been introduced such as crushing pills prior to dispensing and requiring the prisoner to consume the medication in powdered form as a means of reducing the capacity to traffic prescribed medication. Despite such measures it is evident that the traffic in drugs continues.
Clearly it would be a pointless exercise to approach the drug problem with the view that substances are only brought into the Prison by visitors, or as has been found on occasions, by drugs being secreted in locations where inmates working outside the Prison can find them and return to prison with them.
It is imperative that policies be put in place to conduct random searches, or to search on suspicion, officers and other prison staff without notice. All cases, bags and other such items, whether carried by visitors or prison staff, should be opened and inspected both on entry to and egress from the prison complex. There should be no exceptions to this practice and prison personnel should be made fully aware that such practices will be implemented and persons found offending will be charged without hesitation with offences relevant to the contraband located.
The Tasmanian Prison Officers Association may have some objections to such a course of action, but clearly the only persons with anything to fear will be those who are involved in unlawful conduct.
Officers stated that they are not informed if certain inmates are drug dependant and therefore are not aware that visitors to the inmate may be suppliers. The officers claimed that the only information they receive is from rumours circulated within the Prison.
A senior officer, when asked if he thought sufficient emphasis was placed on the information supplied to officers regarding known behavioural patterns of repeat offenders, replied No, I don’t think enough information of that type gets back to the general run officer. There seems to be a big fear that the inmate is going to find out about it, so they don’t tell anyone. Even though the officers on the floor- and a lot of them have complained of this, they try to communicate things to the security unit, very little action, if any, normally happens. And when it does they don’t hear anything about it. It is all hush, hush, and you don’t need to know. And again that comes back to the confidence of the officer. If he is doing his job, and is recording these things and something is found, or not found, he still needs to know about it to give him the confidence to be able to do his job, and know that he is doing the right thing. And if you don’t tell him nothing, he doesn’t know whether he’s done right or wrong.
The strengthening of sanctions, by the Director of Prisons in December 1998 against inmates found guilty of having used illicit substances whilst in custody was a good deterrent, but unfortunately did not achieve its potential due to the fact that inmates, vehicles, staff and certain visitors were not searched under section 22 of the Corrections Act 1997.
General measures to be taken in relation to search procedures have been dealt with in Chapter 3. The introduction of signage should also be implemented. The signs should
49 leave no one in doubt that if they are found in possession of drug substances or other prohibited items they will be subject to stringent penalties.
South Australian ‘Drug and Alcohol Strategy Project’
In February 1998 the Department for Correctional Services in South Australia released their final report in relation to a project known as the ‘Drug and Alcohol Strategy Project’ which is presently being tested in at least two prisons within that State.21 The investigation, consultation and information gathering for the Drug and Alcohol Strategy Project was conducted between July 1996 and March 1997.
The theme of the South Australian Correctional Services is ‘Harm Minimisation’, which is also the theme of the National Drug Strategy Plan, 1993 - 1997. There is a realisation by the South Australian Service that it would be virtually impossible to eliminate drugs from prisons, therefore the alternative is to decrease the harm factor. To achieve this goal an endeavour has been made through education and training to change the use of drugs by inmates from more harmful, (especially injection drugs), to less harmful substances.
I am advised that there has been positive feed back and a difference in the prison culture has been observed, with inmates talking about “reducing harm minimisation”. However, until a complete evaluation is made in relation to this project, I am unable to comment further although I believe that the South Australian Correctional Services Drug and Alcohol Strategy Project has value and the Tasmanian Prison Service may derive a benefit from reviewing the process.
Advice from the Secretary of DJIR is that the Manager Risdon and the Manager Tasmanian Prison Service have both visited South Australia in the past six months and held discussions with SA Department officials regarding this Project. During the preparation of the Draft Drug Strategy for the Tasmanian Prison Service, documentation from that Project was considered. Elements of the Project relevant to Tasmania have been included in the Draft Drug Strategy.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations made in section 2 in relation to more stringent search procedures are emphasised as a means of overcoming the problem of contraband being brought into the prison. In addition, it is recommended that:
1. Constant vigilance be exercised to ensure that inmates provided with medicinal drugs do not use the substances for trade with other inmates. 2. Disciplinary action be taken immediately when an inmate is found to be unlawfully in possession of medicinal drugs. 3. Tables in the family visit area either be of low design or not provided at all to ensure drugs cannot be passed to inmates. 4. Prominent, high profile signs be erected warning visitors that the conveyance of prohibited contraband/drugs into the Prison will result in legal proceedings. 5. Urgent consideration be given to the introduction of extra surveillance cameras into the contact visit area, complete with a video recording system, able to be monitored in the CCTV control room.
50 6. Vigilance be maintained to refuse entry into the Prison of persons found or suspected to have previously conveyed prohibited items into the Prison, until such time as they can demonstrate that they are not bringing banned substances into the prison. 7. Corrections officers undergo a course of drug substance recognition to ensure they are familiar with the appearance of various drugs. 8. Consideration be given to advising shift managers and supervisors, where there is evidence, that a particular inmate is drug dependant, that any person visiting that inmate will be observed and, if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the visitor is in possession of prohibited substances or other contraband, that visitor will be searched. 9. All deliveries and stores brought into the Prison be thoroughly checked for contraband. 10. Consideration be given to constructing special observation cells fitted with special toilet trap facilities and video surveillance, to address situations where inmates may convey, inside their bodies, in condoms or similar, drug substances which need to be excreted for recovery. 11. Consideration be given to developing a range of interventions aimed at preventing and minimising the risk of bullying, with a focus on increasing the coping skills of prisoners at risk of being bullied to supply or pay for drugs and families at risk of pressure to bring drugs into prison. 12. Urgent consideration be given to the establishment of protocols to ensure the appropriate management of prisoners intoxicated with alcohol or other drug(s) in order to reduce the potential for harm to themselves and others.
51 CHAPTER 5: INMATE HEALTH, SAFETY AND WELL-BEING
It is recognised that the Risdon Prison complex is 40 years old, that the facilities are decaying, that the original design of the complex, based on a series of open yards, was completely inappropriate for the Tasmanian climate and that it is difficult to impose conventional standards of health and safety on a group of people who are held against their will. Nevertheless, as part of their duty of care prison authorities are required to ensure that all legislated workplace health and safety requirements under the Act are complied with, that normal standards of cleanliness and hygiene are observed and that due consideration is given to inmates’ general well-being.
General cleanliness
Complaints were received from inmates regarding the lack of cleanliness of the Prison hospital, the Prison proper and ‘N’ Division. Site inspections by the investigation officers confirmed inmates’ complaints in most instances.
Cells in the Prison hospital were evidently refurbished between November 1999 and April 2000. This included the replacement of some mattresses and all toilets and hand basins. However, male and female inmates who had been housed in the Prison hospital complained of being placed in a cell which contained a dirty mattress on the floor, no pillow, a filthy sink, and a dirty toilet that did not flush. I am advised that the cell referred to here was an observation cell, which is the reason the mattress was on the floor and there was no pillow. Mattresses in these cells are frequently abused and regularly replaced.
The unsatisfactory conditions and apparent lack of hygiene in ‘N’ Division led to complaints from inmates and Official Visitors concerning the unclean state of mattresses, lack of heating, poor lighting and generally unsatisfactory living conditions. Inmates were confined to their cells for some 23 hours a day and took their meals and slept in the same cell, which was undoubtedly unhealthy and contributed little to rehabilitation of the inmate.22
Inmates complained of toilets and drains overflowing causing unpleasant odours and raising concerns for their health. The great majority of these problems have been traced to towels, toiletry, clothing and other materials causing the blockage of the sewage system and, on occasions, the problems are deliberately created. In others it would seem that the system is not coping effectively with waste disposal.
Bird droppings
At the time of inspection, bird droppings posed an on-going problem due to the yards not being covered over. Complaints had been made by both inmates and Official Visitors regarding the lack of hygiene in the mess rooms due to birds leaving their droppings on the mess room tables. Inmates had requested Prison Management over a number of years to prevent the birds from entering the mess rooms.
My investigators brought this matter to the attention of the then Accommodation Manager in January 1999. It was again raised with prison management on 22 November 1999, after an inspection when bird droppings were found on the mess room tables and large pieces of
52 butter or margarine were observed on the walls and ceiling of the mess rooms. As at 13 June 2000, birds were still leaving their droppings on the mess room tables. A further complaint was received in January 2001 about the same problem.
Whilst it is accepted that the design of these areas makes it difficult to bird proof, I have been advised that all mess rooms have now been almost fully covered with protective wire to stop birds entering.
The prison kitchen
In January 1999, the then Ombudsman was advised by one of his investigators of concerns regarding the lack of cleanliness and general condition of the kitchen at Risdon Prison. It was established that the kitchen was not subject to inspection by the Environmental Health Officer, Clarence City Council as was the Prison bakery. However, following negotiations with Council the Prison kitchen was formally inspected on 15 January 1999. As a result, the cleanliness of the kitchen was found to be unsatisfactory and the Tasmanian Prison Service was issued with a compliance notice to conduct a thorough clean up of the kitchen area. The Clarence City Council is now conducting regular inspections of the prison kitchen.
There has been a continuing saga of indecision regarding the maintenance and replacement of kitchen equipment. In the latter part of 1999 complaints were made by inmates that some of the kitchen equipment such as the oven and hotplates, griddle plate, deep fryer, tilting fry pan (Brat pan) and slicer were unserviceable and unsafe and needed to be replaced. It was also mentioned by inmates that the bain-marie used to transport food to certain areas of the prison was unserviceable and that the food was invariably cold on arrival. The then Ombudsman, Mr Thomas, took the view that items of kitchen equipment assessed by the audit team as unfit for use should be replaced .
Similar concerns about the neglect of occupational health and safety factors in the Prison kitchen were raised by the Official Visitors to Risdon Prison, Mr Brian Marks and Mr Leslie Batchelor. On 6 April 2000 they reported to The Hon. Peter Patmore, MHA, Attorney Ge neral and Minister for Justice: Although the instability of the tilt grill and the need to re-lag a number of steam pipes, particularly the pipe to the bain-marie, have been raised in our reports, (refer Record of Visits for 28 October and 25 November 1999), these matters have not been properly addressed. The tilt grill remains a safety hazard, and the steam pipes remain unlagged.
In November 1999 Mr Marks, aware of the Ombudsman’s concern regarding the kitchen, advised that he had been informed by Mr Kevin Salter, Accommodation Manager, that approximately $30,000 worth of kitchen equipment had been ordered. However, a short time later on 8 December 1999, Mr Thomas was advised by Mr Graham Harris, Manager, Risdon Prison that this was incorrect.
On 5 May 2000 Mr Thomas attended a meeting of yard representatives at Risdon Prison. During this meeting he was told that the order for the kitchen equipment had been cancelled. This was later confirmed by Mr Harris and Mr Salter who advised that a number of the items which were to be replaced initially were to be repaired instead. This advice was received six months after Mr Marks had been told of the intention to purchase. Mr Marks was never notified by the Tasmanian Prison Service of the cancellation.
53 Due to the apparent confusion surrounding the purchase of new kitchen equipment, Mr Thomas asked Mr Robert Kellett, Manager of Building and Engineering Services, to assess the condition of a number of items of kitchen equipment to ascertain if they were capable of being repaired. Mr Kellett verified that certain items were beyond repair and needed replacing, including the oven and hot plates, griddle plate, brat pan and slicer. Other items, such as the deep fryer were found to be in good condition. Mr Kellett said they he had been informed that some of the equipment including the slicer and the brat pan had already been placed on order and that no further work had been performed on the brat pan other than to make it safe.
All items of kitchen equipment that were originally identified by the Official Visitors and Mr Thomas as being defective have now been replaced or repaired.
Mr Kellett stated that water damage to the kitchen equipment was by far the most frequent cause of equipment failure and that he had often found excessive amounts of water in the electrical components of the stove, slicer and other equipment that could have only occurred by spraying or throwing water onto the equipment. To minimise this problem water hoses have recently been removed from the kitchen.
A particular issue arose in relation to bain-maries. On 13 December 1999, Mr Thomas had a discussion with Mr. Salter, regarding two bain-maries and whether they were part of the new kitchen equipment to be ordered. Mr Salter indicated that the approval given on or about 10 December 1999 to purchase the kitchen equipment did not include the bain- maries.
In January 2001, twelve months later, a petition was received from inmates of Risdon Prison complaining about the fact that meals delivered to ‘N’ Division (now Division 8) were still cold and that nothing had been done to alleviate the problem.
Razors and hairdressing equipment
At the time of investigation, there was only one razor for use by inmates in ‘N’ Division. This razor was specially designed so that the blade was locked in and could not be removed by the inmates. The razor was immersed in a solution each time it was used and replaced with a new blade for each inmate. However, advice from the Prison’s Medical Officer was that infectious diseases could still be transmitted by this practice and the razor should be sterilised by autoclaving to assure fully safety. Disposable razors are now being used in ‘N’ Division. Inmates are issued with a new razor each time they shave and it is then disposed of. It was also ascertained that equipment in the Prison’s hair cutting unit, which is continuously in use, was not being sterilised in the proper manner. These issues were brought to the attention of the Director and other Senior Management of Risdon Prison in December 1999, and they were requested to seek medical advice on the matter.
Food contamination
On occasions my office had received complaints and petitions from inmates, mostly protection prisoners, of food contamination which had been introduced in the form of vermin, detergent, other kitchen products and foreign objects. Inmates also alleged that some officers contaminated food by placing items directly onto steel shelves or grills within the cell door or by placing their fingers directly into or onto the food. This practice is
54 alleged to have occurred mainly in ‘N’ Division. No evidence was found to verify either of these allegations but the practice of deliberately contaminating food , particularly of inmates in protective custody, is well known.
Until recently the inmates employed in the kitchen were able to view other inmates lined up for meals and it was possible to contaminate their food. The Tasmanian Prison Service has advised that this is no longer the case and in fact an inmate employed in the kitchen was reported for allegedly contaminating food and removed from kitchen duties. I understand that instructions have been issued to all staff on the proper manner in which food is to be served, particularly in ‘N’ Division. The introduction of a full time Unit Manager in ‘N’ Division has assisted this process.
The regular inspection of the kitchen area by the Environmental Health Officer, Clarence City Council should help to alleviate food contamination, but it still must be continually monitored by the Tasmanian Prison Service and every effort made to minimise the opportunities for contamination.
I would suggest that consideration be given to either ‘privatising’ or ‘civilianising’ the Prison kitchen, although it is recognised that the problem of contamination will never be entirely overcome. The claimed advantages in privatising the supply of meals to Risdon Prison would be a reduction in food costs, no overheads, no wastage and no allegations of food pilfering. The disadvantages would be reduced on-the-job training and attainment of skills by inmates.
The advantages for employing civilian staff in the Prison kitchen would be that meals would be prepared by qualified chefs and there would be more opportunity for on the job training for inmates, supervised by professionals. The disadvantages would be the likely increase in costs for wages and the increased potential for the trafficking of illegal substances and other contraband.
I am advised that a civilian catering officer had been appointed to oversee the preparation and serving of meals, as well as oversee the maintenance of a clean and sanitary kitchen, however I have now been advised that the catering officer is no longer employed at the Prison. The position is currently being filled on a temporary basis.
The Secretary of DJIR advised that the servery area has been screened off to obstruct the view of person’s serving meals and thereby reducing the opportunity for food contamination. Consideration is also being given to the future introduction of hot/chill food packs which would be issued to each yard and distributed to inmates as a further effort to overcome food contamination.
Milk pasteurisation
On 11 November 1999 the Prison Medical Officer advised the Director of Prisons in writing of a number of cases of Campylobacter-enteritis (bacterial gastroenteritis) at Risdon Prison and Hayes Prison Farm over the previous two weeks. He further advised the Director that it had come to his attention that the milk supply from Hayes Farm had not been pasteurised for approximately two months, due to a break down of equipment and that Campylobacter had been isolated from milk supplied to Risdon Hospital from Hayes and from a fresh sample directly supplied from the Prison Farm. The doctor wrote: 55 This underlines my concern over many years regarding the pasteurisation of milk and indicates a disregard for the duty of care to inmates and staff.
On 16 November 1999 the Director of Prisons, in a written response to the Prison Medical Officer, said: Thank you for your letter advising of the cases of Campylobacter enteritis that have been encountered recently. Unfortunately neither I, or the Manager Prison Industries, had been made aware of the breakdown in the pasteurising equipment and I regret that repairs had not been pursued with the urgency the situation demanded.
Quite apart from the health aspect, this example reveals a serious breakdown in the passing of essential information to senior management within the prison system.
Women’s Prison
A number of health concerns related to the Women’s prison were raised by female inmates. A Vegan inmate complained to the Ombudsman regarding her dietary requirements. It was indicated that although the Unit Manager had supplied certain vegetarian foods, it was still necessary to consult a qualified dietitian. The matter was attended to following consultation between the Director of Prisons and the Director of Nursing.
A complaint was made that the smell of onions drifted into cells from an area of the Women’s Prison which is used for vegetable processing. At the time, the Director of Prisons acknowledged the problem but indicated that the vegetable processing industry provides employment for inmates. The Health and Safety Audit of 14 February 2000 identified the need to properly fix the roof over this area. Both matters have now been rectified and vegetable processing is no longer conducted within the Women’s Prison.
Appointments
Another complaint was received from a female prisoner who claimed to have applied for new glasses in July 1999, but even though she was prepared to pay for her own replacement costs, her application had not been granted. Inquiries revealed that the delay was due to the optometrists drastically cutting back their service to the prison. Originally an optometrist regularly visited the prison to carry out eye examinations, but unless payment was made at the time, the examinations were not conducted. The problem has now been resolved. Another supplier was engaged late in 1999 and it was envisaged that all outstanding requests for glasses would be filled by February 2000.
Complaints were received about delays in seeing a dentist. A dentist visits the prison once a fortnight. Inmates wishing to see a dentist are placed on a list and if they are unable to be seen on one visit, they will be seen on the next. If necessary and where numbers warrant it, the dentist will make an additional visit. However, complaints have been made that there can still be up to a four or five week delay in seeing a dentist.
DJIR makes the point that prisoner access to dental treatment is on a par with that of the general public to community-based public dental treatment.
Inmates’ property
56 Numerous complaints were received from inmates and family members regarding the length of time taken to transfer inmates’ property from one prison to another; in one case it took 21 days to transfer underwear and socks from the Hayes prison farm to the main prison complex. While it is essential that inmates’ property is properly checked and recorded and that unauthorised property is collected by someone known to the inmate, this should not include property that is necessary for everyday living. On the basis of complaints received, the present transfer practice does not appear to be conducted in the spirit and meaning of Part 3 of the Corrections Regulations, Property of Prisoners and Detainees. While a relatively minor consideration, unnecessary delays in transfer of essential property is not conducive to prisoner’s well being.
The procedure now in place requires a receipt for property transferred from one prison location to another to be forwarded within seven days of property being received.
WORKPLACE HEALTH AND SAFETY AUDITS
Over the past three years an audit team has conducted six monthly Health and Safety Audits of the prison. The audits have evidently been conducted in a regular and professional manner and the Department is to be commended on the initiative. However, during the course of this investigation there were many instances discovered where management has apparently disregarded the findings of the audit team or has not taken appropriate action to remedy shortcomings. The following excerpt is taken from the audit report for January 2000: Many of the recommendations that have been made in this and most previous Audit Reports are going unheeded. In many instances the audit team are finding the same problems existing that existed twelve months and two years ago. There seems very little support for Managers from Senior Management.
Issues raised in the January 2000 audit report23 include the failure to conduct monthly workplace safety inspections as required by the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995, fire safety, chemical safety, inspection and tagging of electrical equipment as well as the range of kitchen problems identified above.
It is recognised that continued budget constraints require prioritisation of scarce resources. But this cannot excuse what appears to be the failure of senior management in the prison to address issues raised in the audit reports in a satisfactory and timely manner. By not doing so they run the risk of contravening the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1996 and its Regulations 1998, and could be liable if an employee or inmate is injured as a consequence of an occupational health and safety failure.
Advice from the Secretary of DJIR is that since the audit conducted in June 2000, action lists on matters in need of attention have been prepared by the Assistant Director or his delegate and distributed to relevant managers with a requirement to report thereon by the due date.
Official Visitors
The function of the Official Visitor is very important both for the well being of inmates and assistance to the Tasmanian Prison Service. The Corrections Act 1997 at section 10 provides that the Minister for Justice may appoint persons as Official Visitors to each prison, and that person may be appointed to one or more prisons with a two year tenure of 57 appointment. An Official Visitor whilst visiting a prison is to conduct him/her self in accordance with section 10(5) of the Corrections Act and if authorised can visit every prison at least once a month, either alone or with another official visitor who is authorised to visit that prison.
The core duties of an official visitor are to inquire into the treatment, behaviour and conditions of the prisoners and detainees and to receive and investigate any complaint of a prisoner or detainee and if he/she so desires, report to the Director or the Minister on: · the management or disciplining of a prisoner or detainee, or the conduct of a correctional officer, at a prison visited by the official visitor; or · any matter relating to the treatment or condition of prisoners or detainees at that prison; or · the state of the prison.
There is also a requirement that at least once every 12 months an official visitor is to make a report in writing to the Minister on the inquiries he/she has conducted. The Minister responds to the Official Visitors.
During discussions with the two Official Visitors who perform a monitoring function at Risdon Maximum Security Prison they advised that, although they bring a range of complaints to the attention of the Department and the Minister, no action has been taken to rectify many of the complaints. Inspection of the Official Visitors Book at Risdon Prison confirms this. Matters raised included the financial disadvantage of inmates from the North and North West of the State using the Arunta telephone system24 and the issue of faulty kitchen equipment referred to above.
The perception that the two Official Visitors held in relation to the effectiveness of their role was borne out by comments made by the Legislative Council Select Committee at page 98 of their 1999 report in which they said: Despite the highly motivated intentions and actions of the Official Visitors to Risdon, it is felt that their monitoring has been less effective than the Ombudsman’s. The Committee detected some diffidence and even a lack of awareness of the opportunity the visitors have to bring about an improvement in unsatisfactory conditions. For example, two of the visitors who gave evidence to the Committee acknowledged that dampness in mattresses in ‘N’ Division had been a recurring problem. Although they had drawn attention to this on a number of occasions, the problem remained unresolved for some considerable time. It appears that the visitors failed to appreciate that if they had agitated persistently in the right quarters, effective action may have been taken to cure the problem promptly. As a result the problem of damp mattresses remained unresolved for too long.
During this investigation inquiries were made with prison services in other States and having considered responses received I am of the opinion that the South Australian concept for Official Visitors to their prisons has particular merit and consideration should be given to its introduction into this State. In South Australian prisons there are two forms of ‘Official Visitors’. Visiting Inspectors are persons who have retired from judicial or magisterial office, are legal practitioners or Justices of the Peace. They are appointed by the Governor, under the South Australian Correctional Service Act 1982 and visit each prison generally on a weekly basis. The Inspectors assess a range of prison issues,
58 including, accommodation, food, clothing, hygiene etc. and provide reports to the Minister and the Prison General Manager. The Act states that the Inspectors may: · enter and inspect any part of the correctional institution; · question any person within the institution; · inquire into the treatment of prisoners, or a particular prisoner; and · receive and investigate any complaint of a prisoner.
The Prison Service Advisory Council consists of six members appointed by the Governor of whom: · one must have extensive knowledge of, or experience in, criminology, penology or other related sciences; · one must have extensive knowledge of, or experience in, business management, medicine, social welfare or education; · one will be nominated by the Attorney- General; · three will be nominated by the Minister; and · at least one must be female and at least one must be male.
The Prison Service Advisory Council: · reports to the Minister; · monitors and evaluates the administration of the Act; · reports on any matters pertaining on the administration or operation of the Act; · performs other functions prescribed by the Act, or any other legislation.
In South Australia, the Official Visitors have an accepted status within the Prison System, with random visiting rights which have no restrictions when visiting prisoners. An official visitor record is maintained at each prison and this is viewed and acted upon by Prison Management. Official Visitors carry departmental identification cards and may be escorted through a prison by Prison management.
Section 17 of the Act also prescribes the establishment of Visiting Tribunals by the Minister. Tribunals are appointed from persons with similar backgrounds to Inspectors and their function is to adjudicate on certain prisoner breaches of the Act and Regulations. The Visiting Tribunal/Inspectors receive no remuneration for their duties. They are, however, paid $25.00 per visit for out-of-pocket expenses (travel, lunch, etc.).
I commend the Government’s announcement in March 2001 that: ‘The role and function of Official Visitors has been revitalised by establishing them as an independent entity within the Department of Justice and Industrial Relations, strengthening their role and supporting them by the appointment of a paid, part-time Senior Official Visitor. They will also be provided with an appropriate level of administrative support.
In their revised roles, Official Visitors will oversee the internal grievance procedures, will have an assessment/monitoring role with regard to agreed performance standards and will be required to report on implementation of the Inquest findings and the Ombudsman’s investigation. They will also undertake themed reviews of selected aspects of the Prison Service’s operations on either a systemic or locational basis.
59 These changes will not limit prisoners’ access to official visitors nor detract from an Official Visitor’s capacity to deal with complaints and grievances raised by prisoners. They will however enhance the independence of Official Visitors and improve their ability to perform an important role. They will also result in an increased level of accountability by the Prison Service to the community.
While I believe that the South Australian Official Visitor model has much to commend it, the new arrangements announced by the Minister are appropriate.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that:
1. The Tasmanian Prison Service take steps to ensure that continuing attention is paid to issues raised in the Audit reports and that a statement of action taken on these issues is provided within three months of receiving the report. 2. The general issue of the replacement/repair of defective equipment be given priority as funding becomes available. 3. Safety procedures are put in place which comply with the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 and its regulations. Prisoners as well as staff should be made aware of their responsibilities under the Act. 4. The practice of using disposable razors in ‘N’ Division be continued. 5. Sterilisation of hairdressing equipment be introduced. 6. Vigilance be maintained and appropriate action taken to totally prevent bird droppings on the mess room tables. 7. The Director of Prisons instruct his managers in the need for vigilance in their inspection of the Prison kitchen, hospital, toilets, showers, and other areas of concern, to ensure that hygiene standards are met. 8. The Director of Prisons introduce a clean cell program. 9. Inmates who damage or deface their cells be required to contribute financially to the repairs and repainting. 10. The Director of Prisons introduce a cell takeover form on which existing faults at the time of occupancy be recorded and signed by the inmate and an officer, and the same process to be undertaken at the time of the inmate vacating the cell. Any additional damage should be treated as mentioned in 9. above. 11. The Director of Prisons ensure that, at the time of assessing all prisoners and detainees, particular attention be paid to their medical and dietary requirements. 12. Consideration be given to employing all appropriate measures in the Prison kitchen to prevent opportunities for food contamination, and to provide training opportunities for inmates. 13. The Director of Prisons ensure that inmates requesting medical and dental appointments are able to do so with the least possible delay. 14. The current system for the transfer of prisoners’ property be adhered to, to ensure that unnecessary delay is curtailed.
60 CHAPTER 6: MANAGEMENT ISSUES
UNIT MANAGEMENT
There was a general consensus of opinion amongst staff at all levels, including the Secretary, that unit management, which is ostensibly the keystone of operational management in the Risdon Prison, was not working. Moreover, despite what appeared to be considerable support for the concept, it was evident that there was limited understanding of what it meant in an operational sense.25
In the prison context, unit management is a system of devolving management at the operational level to a relatively small group of custodial officers in charge of inmates. While it incorporates the basic tenets of good management practice in any institutional setting, the unit management concept is well suited to the custodial environment. It allows threatening incidents or abusive inmates to be dealt with swiftly; it helps assure consistency in the treatment of inmates, particularly in relation to rewards and sanctions; it can potentially assist in behavioural management as officers have the opportunity to recognise the development or onset of problems amongst inmates, such as drug or alcohol dependency; it enables experienced officers to mentor less experienced officers and it can help to engender a more rehabilitative environment for inmates.
The effectiveness of unit management is not simply about the creation of relatively small management units. Rather it is to do with the interdependence of all aspects of the total operation of the prison: the physical facilities and infrastructure; adequate funding; key management processes; the organisational structure and the organisational culture.
The investigation revealed breakdowns in all of these aspects and many examples were provided of their effects. In terms of physical facilities, the inadequacy of the prison design and its aging infrastructure do not need reiteration; the ‘yard’ structure, for example, with its barriers and inmates in cages, is not conducive to effective unit management. Many of these problems will be overcome with the construction of a new prison. The brief for the Prison Infrastructure Redevelopment Program uses unit management to underpin the design concept for the new prison. In the interim, however, and given that many of the existing facility problems cannot be rectified and that the new prison will not be completed for seven years or so, the effectiveness of unit management at Risdon in the medium term will be heavily dependent on changes to management and the allocation of adequate resources.
One of the major factors cited as working against effective unit management was the current ratio of one custodial officer to 40 inmates, which was considered excessive.26 This reflects the recent dramatic increase in prisoner numbers and should be overcome to some extent by the Government’s move to a demand-based funding model which will allow for fluctuations in prisoner numbers and, hopefully, the maintenance of an appropriate officer/inmate ratio. Officers stated that as a result of increased prisoner numbers they were working extended shifts and overtime which often result in stress related problems and lead to poor morale. Departmental statistics indicate that the Tasmanian Prison Service staff have a very high incidence of stress-related workers’ compensation claims.
The interviews disclosed weaknesses in key management processes, such as communication, decision making, reporting and policy making. Communication was identified as a particular problem and many officers evidently believe that they are restricted
61 in their day to day duties due to lack of adequate communication from their superiors. Two incidents investigated by the Ombudsman’s Office in October 1998 and the May 1999 riot provided explicit examples of breakdowns in communication between ranks; both had the potential to be life-threatening.27 It appears that this communication problem is not confined to the lower ranks but is also spread through the senior rank structure of the Tasmanian Prison Service.
Evidence was provided to indicate that the Director of Prisons and the General Manager appeared not to discuss issues which were relevant to the day to day operation of the Prison, including security.
Some staff voiced their concern about a lack of communication and attendance within the Prison proper by the Prison Security Unit, the result of which is that general staff perform duties that are or should be assigned to the Security Unit. One of the main reasons cited for moving the Security Unit outside the Prison was to enable it to concentrate on the more serious security matters leaving the less demanding security functions to other managers. The failure of the Unit to keep a line of communication open to other custodial staff and the failure of Security staff to visit the Prison proper on a regular basis was in contradiction of the original intention and potentially counter productive. Custodial staff were not advising security staff of incidents which took place within the Divisions, thereby decreasing information for the Intelligence Unit. (The Unit has now relocated back to the main prison.)
Custodial Officers stated they are not required to attend briefings when commencing duty, which meant that they needed to find out for themselves what may have taken place within the Prison before they arrived.
In relation to communication between sites, when speaking with the Manager of the Launceston Remand Centre, the issue of what protocols existed between the hospital, Risdon Prison and himself in relation to continuing inmates medication or replacing it, was canvassed. He commented: It’s always been a bone of contention with me, the medication in particular, inmates coming from south to north. As long as I’ve been manager, we’ve always been chasing a standard or an equally acceptable protocol for what we do with medication. As I say very frustrating, we’ve had inmates come up from down south that have been on a lot of medication, serious medication, and/or we’ve had them come up and they’ve been on a category of self harm and we don’t know anything about them and in fact if it wasn’t for the professionalism of our officers up here investigating after communicating with the inmate, the inmate would have no medication at all or we wouldn’t have knowledge of the inmates status, whether they were self harming or anything or on a category as we know it.
When asked if he would know if an inmate from Risdon had come from the hospital, he replied: Not at all, in fact we’ve got into a habit our end of phoning down and asking for information once we received the inmate from the south, and that’s the only way that we can keep our act together. We’ve asked, we’ve tried to look at protocols of how to receive information and we may receive information after I have a talk to the Director of Nursing for one or two weeks thereafter and then it just dies in a heap again. It just isn’t continual, it just can’t and won’t be fixed and I don’t see any end of the problem. 62 It appears that the Tasmanian Prison Service was aware of these problems but failed to take steps to rectify the matter.
Leadership, or more rightly lack of leadership, was evidently perceived as a major problem. The majority of custodial officers spoken to during this investigation stated that they were disillusioned with the prison system because:- · there was no leadership or team spirit; · decision making was inconsistent; · on the job training and guidance by supervisors was virtually non-existent; · resources were at a minimum; · there was a belief that a power struggle was taking place in the upper echelon of Prison management; and · management in general was in disarray.
Custodial Officers of all ranks, who were spoken to by my investigators, complained that they were not receiving the support they expected from management and they felt that the inmates were running the Prison and not the Tasmanian Prison Service. A number of officers believed they were being undermined by their senior officers in that they received complaints directly from inmates at the Division front and overrule the yard officers’ decision without consultation. Yard officers believed this placed them in an untenable position.
Some officers believe that the policy of not placing new officers in rostered divisional posts so that they did not have face to face contact with inmates until they had served the first three to six months in other areas of the Tasmanian Prison Service, had merit and should not have been discontinued. This practice gave new officers a chance to adapt to their new working environment and had the potential to prevent stress and lift morale. Staff believed that with the current resource situation it was not possible for this to occur.
In May 2000 a new management structure was announced and subsequently implemented (see Attachment ‘E’). This led to a restructuring in the chain of command within the Prison complex which resulted in the movement of some senior officers. The General Manager was moved from within the Prison complex to the administration building outside the complex. The Manager (Security and Operational Support Unit) was transferred to the Prison hospital.
The moving of the General Manager to the prison administration building is a forward planning initiative which takes into account that he is the Senior Uniform Officer at Risdon Prison and directly responsible to the Director of Prisons. The success of the initiative will be dependent on the General Manager receiving full co-operation.
The Accommodation and Operations Managers at the Prison had the same level of responsibility. The Accommodation Manager had no Operations Chief to whom he can delegate, he therefore had to delegate down to Unit Supervisors and the Senior Officer (reception) each of whom had equal status. Taking into account the size of Risdon Prison, it appeared to be more productive to amalgamate the existing positions and the resources of Accommodation and Operation Managers, as it appears that the duties of the managers are similar and overlap.
63 It was recognised that the culture of the prison environment can be counter productive. The Director of Prisons when outlining difficulties he experienced in achieving his position objectives stated: A major one is the adequacy of the facilities and to have to work with them particularly at Risdon. It’s a very inefficient place to operate as far as being able to run any sort of jail. It’s age and the deterioration and it’s basic infrastructure and costs and keeping the thing tied together is one. The second is the culture that prevails and is very strongly influential within the Tasmanian prison system. We have staff with 30 plus years custodial experience, we have one third generation custodial officer, we have a number of second generation custodial officers, we have many staff with ten plus years of experience who have a very strong conditioned view of the world and the way in which the Prison should operate. There are still staff who commenced their employment at a time when Prison rules didn’t allow a prisoner to look an officer in the eye, where prisoners were not allowed to speak unless they were spoken to. There’s only a few of them left, but that sort of culture and experience is still pervasive and still sort of influential. That certainly has a significant impact on the ability to introduce new ideas or the acceptance of change.
DISCIPLINE
It has been previously noted that officers voiced their concern about what they considered to be inconsistent treatment of inmates in relation to discipline. Incidents were related where some inmates having sworn at or threatened an officer were not penalised in any way, whilst other inmates committing similar offences were placed on a punishment regime in ‘N’ Division.
Officers claimed that there had been a change in the general attitude and behaviour of the inmate population. Many of the inmates were drug and/or alcohol dependant and had no respect for authority, property or other inmates. Officers related instances where walls had been defaced by inmates scribbling, cells trashed and offenders not dealt with accordingly.
Questioned about what the main problem was, one officer replied: Well I don’t think there’s any discipline, there’s no discipline whatsoever. The discipline’s gone, it’s completely and utterly deserted us. The criminals are running the gaol at the moment, without any doubt, you know them all, they’re all round in ‘N’ Division. They were going to make that into a behavioural unit, for the want of a better word, keep all the bad eggs in the one basket. What they should have done was open ‘H’ Division. Done ‘H’ Division up and the cells were exactly the same as you have in the main gaol, the cells are there, the shell would be there, it wouldn’t have taken a lot of work, and they should have kept them there because they are a bad influence on the rest.
A senior officer in respect to inmate conduct changes in the past eighteen months to two years commented: Over the last year or two, I worked in medium for a couple of years and when I came back into the gaol the whole attitude had changed considerably, a lack of control was quite obvious, lack of control of inmates. They said and basically did what they wanted. I went through quite a stage at that time, I just couldn’t believe the lack of respect and lack of control in the main Prison.
64 One officer advised that on reporting for duty in one of the Divisions he was confronted by an inmate who when told his requests would be passed on to senior staff for approval or otherwise, became very agitated and commenced to verbally abuse him. The officer related how he tried to reason with the inmate to no avail. He advised how the other inmates shouted and cheered their member on to the stage where a painting pole was thrown to the offending inmate who commenced to poke it through the wire at the officer’s face. The officer advised that it was only due to his quick movement that he avoided facial injury.
The officer then related how he contacted his supervisor who advised him to ring security to remove the inmate. He was informed by security that they could not help and he should contact Prison hospital staff, who told him they could not help. He stated that the inmate was still in the division and very agitated when he completed duty, and he advised his superiors of the incident prior to leaving the Prison. On his return the next day the offending inmate was still in the Division and his previous conduct was continuing.
Prior to the prison riot in May 1999 a number of assaults took place on inmates and officers. The assaults on some inmates by other inmates were described by one senior staff member as severe bashings. He stated: I’m not talking about a little punch up or a bit of a dust up, I’m talking about bashings and multiple aggressions against one victim.
The injuries sustained by victims were described as serious, such as broken noses, severe head wounds, compressed fractures of the cheek as well as broken fingers and hands that appeared to have been stamped on.
I am aware that action has now been taken by the Prison administration to charge and isolate the perpetrators, but it is of concern that it took so long to isolate the perpetrators. Had there been a pro-active security team with a properly formulated intelligence network, Prison management could have been made aware of inmate unrest and been in a position to prevent some of the incidents.
Prison administration expressed concern that the security team, in particular the Chief of Security, had failed to brief the Director of Prisons, to whom he was directly responsible, on security issues which had the potential to impact on the Tasmanian Prison Service. The Director found it necessary to recommend the transfer of his Chief of Security, citing the reason for this transfer as disparaging remarks made to him in writing and a declaration by that officer that he would not perform the duties assigned to him by the Director.
Concern was expressed by officers in relation to the reporting of prison offences committed by inmates, the investigation of those offences and the hearing and sentencing of the defaulting inmates. Some officers alleged inconsistency in reporting defaulting inmates. They were not advised of the reason why no action was taken against the defaulting inmates. Other officers expressed disappointment with the end result of the disciplinary process.
To clarify this issue the General Manager was asked about the disciplinary process. He stated: At the introduction of the new disciplinary process I raised concerns with managers that of some of the sentences may be too severe, maybe some may be not severe enough, so the relevant manager of the area where the report stems from- that all the reports, once dealt with, were to cross their desk so that they can 65 monitor. If in their opinion the sentence was either too severe or not severe enough or would need to be reviewed due to certain factors, they should go to the hearings officer and advise him or her of the decision as to why it should be reviewed. Using the example that a sentence may appear to be too harsh, as to why it’s too harsh and suggest to the hearings officer that he review it and he changes and goes back to the prisoner after he’s reviewed the evidence and shall we say reduces the sentence for these reasons.
The review process set out by Mr Harris has merit, if applied correctly. It can assist in ensuring consistency within the disciplinary process. It is imperative that the Standard Operating Procedure No. 1.8 ( Disciplinary Process) issued in December 1999 is strictly adhered to. It is also essential that custodial officers reporting inmates for prison offences be advised, where no action is to be taken, of the reasons why.
It would appear, from my investigations, that Order 1.8 is not being adhered to in the manner in which it was intended. The information gained from officers interviewed illustrated that there was little or no direction or support given to custodial staff to assist them in the behaviour of some of the inmates.
It was evident that there had been a lapse in discipline within the Tasmanian Prison Service due in the main to the inconsistency of the service to ensure that staff are properly supervised by well disciplined officers with the knowledge, ability and willingness to assist them in times of need.
The Secretary of DJIR has claimed that the Ombudsman’s investigation coincided with the introduction of a new inmate disciplinary process. A revised procedure which had, as its primary aims, the strengthening of custodial officers’ authority and allowing a more timely and less complex process of resolving disciplinary matters, represents a very significant change from the practice it replaced. He stated that, until the process had been bedded in, and modifications derived from practice experience been incorporated, that there may have been mixed feelings about the change.
The Secretary claims to be satisfied that the revised procedure has now contributed to a significantly improved disciplinary process with benefits for both staff and prisoners.
I suggest that it would be a forward planning initiative to invite the Official Visitors as observers to disciplinary hearings. Official Visitors perform similar functions in other states. As previously noted, Prison Services in South Australia have, in accordance with section 17 of their Correctional Services Act 1982, prescribed the establishment of Visiting Tribunals. Tribunals are appointed from persons with similar backgrounds to Inspectors (Official Visitors) and their function is to adjudicate on certain prisoner breaches of the Act and Regulations.
Disciplinary Regulations - Custodial Officers
The Tasmanian Prison Service is in some ways similar to the Police Service and both could be described as para-military organisations with similar special needs relating to discipline. However, unlike the regulations applying to the Police Service, the disciplinary provisions in the Regulations governing Prison Officers (the Prison Regulations 1985), were rescinded and replaced by the disciplinary provisions of the Tasmanian State Service Act 1984. 66 These matters were discussed with some of the Custodial Officers interviewed during this investigation. In the main the issues raised were that the disciplinary provisions of the Tasmanian State Service Act 1984 were not job specific with appropriate penalties and, if and when a Custodial Officer was charged with an offence, the matter seemed to take an inordinate amount of time to resolve. (Reference to these matters is made at pages 27-29.)
The duties performed by Custodial Officers contrast with those of other employees of the Tasmanian State Service. The very nature of these duties requires officers to undergo training in such areas as Security and Search procedures, Behavioural Management, Conflict Resolution, Negotiation Skills, Intelligence gathering, Emergency Response (incorporating the use of force) and other programs to qualify them in their day-to-day functions as custodians of inmates or detainees within the Prison system.
I believe it would be advantageous for the Tasmanian Prison Service to explore the possibility of the re-introduction of a separate staff disciplinary process and for the Secretary to undertake a feasibility study into the effect that such a change might bring.
Any feasibility study into the disciplinary process of the Tasmanian Prison Service should include a study of the present process used by Tasmania Police in accordance with the Police Regulation Act 1898 (as amended) and the Police Regulations 1974.
It also should be taken into account that the new State Service Act 2000 was proclaimed on 1 May 2001. The Secretary should explore the possibilities under section 55 of the new Act if he considers that new disciplinary regulations for prison staff should be introduced.
Internal Investigations
In respect of internal investigations, inquiries have been made with other prison services throughout Australia. In my view, the South Australian concept for conducting Internal Investigations within the prison system has merit and consideration should be given to its introduction into the Tasmanian prison system. In the South Australian system, incidents involving conduct by staff are investigated by the Department’s Investigations Manager, while minor matters involving prisoners are investigated by Prison Management. The Investigation Manager, who is considered middle management is appointed by, and reports directly to, the Chief Executive and is an ex-member of the South Australian Police Service with many years experience. Similar Internal Investigation systems are operating within the prison services in other States and Territories.
Yard Representative Management Meetings
The General Manager verified that after the riots in May 1999 he commenced having weekly meetings with Yard Representatives who are nominated by inmates to represent them in putting their complaints to management. He later delegated this duty to the Accommodation Manager.
In relation to Yard meetings, the General Manager stated: The advantages are, and I can only speak on experience of my involvement with the yard reps. Their concerns in relation to their housing and their yards and matters which are affecting the prisoners collectively, industry matters, sports, visits, anything which may be in place which could be improved upon to facilitate 67 their needs better within the confines of the regulations and procedures, even those things can be changed. I have always seen them as extremely beneficial for the good management of the Prison.
Following discussions with, and documentation supplied by my office to yard inmate representatives on Wednesday, 8 December 1999, submissions were received on the investigation which at that time was concentrating on the Prison hospital.
On 16 December 1999, the then Ombudsman forwarded documents containing a number of written complaints or concerns, which had been supplied by yard representatives on behalf of the inmate population of Risdon Prison, to the Secretary of the Department of Justice and Industrial Relations for comment.28
Whilst the Ombudsman was aware that some of these issues had already been addressed by either court proceedings or in earlier complaints, nevertheless there were matters that required attention. The documents were indexed and easy to follow.
Two of the Ombudsman’s investigation officers met with Mr John Dodd, Director of Prisons, and Mr Dale Webster, Manager Development and Planning for the Tasmanian Prison Service, on 22 December 1999 and discussed the matters of complaint. Whilst the Director accepted some issues he would not concede, at that time, that other matters of complaint could be resolved without incurring overtime of custodial personnel and therefore impacting on the budget. Notwithstanding that some effort was apparently made to address the complaints, there has been no report from either the Secretary or the Director of Prisons advising of the outcome.
MAINTENANCE
At the time of the investigation, information was provided to indicate that insufficient funds had been provided for an efficient ongoing maintenance program at Risdon Prison; the funding allocation, excluding salaries, was only $93,000 from which all electrical contract costs were funded at a cost of $50,000.
The Secretary of DJIR has advised that the figures quoted were not complete and did not reflect the total funding which was provided for the whole of the Prison Service.
Funding in the 1999/2000 financial year for Repairs and Maintenance (excluding employee related expenses) across the whole of the Prison Service was as follows: Building Maintenance $ 27,000 Electrical Maintenance $ 34,000 Plumbing Maintenance $ 14,000 Plant & Equipment Maintenance $110,000 Statutory Maintenance $ 29,000 Other Repairs & Maintenance$ 52,000
Total Maintenance $266,000
In the 2000/2001 financial year the funding was: Building Maintenance $ 62,000 Electrical Maintenance $ 57,000
68 Plumbing Maintenance $ 22,000 Plant & Equipment Maintenance $ 68,000 Statutory Maintenance $ 40,000 Other Repairs & Maintenance$ 80,000
Total Maintenance $329,000
The maintenance staffing level at the time of the investigation was one engineer, one plumber and one temporary utility officer which was considered insufficient to efficiently carry out required maintenance. This is clearly demonstrated by the safety audit reports.
The Secretary has since advised that the current staffing levels now consist of one senior utility officer, one utility officer and one plumber.
The Manager of Building and Engineering Services at Risdon Prison, Mr Kellett, expressed reservations in relation to the way that the prison maintenance program is managed. He has been employed at Risdon Prison since 1983, and worked with a number of Directors including the present Director. Mr Kellett commented that he very seldom sees the present Director, who has never accompanied him through the Prison for any reason, including identifying his duties.
Some years ago the then Department of Construction supervised much of the maintenance work to the Prison under the Major Upgrading special funding allocation given to them by Treasury for public buildings. This is no longer the case and the agency is now expected to find financial and other resources for this work from their budget allocation. I am unaware at this stage whether a special application has been made to Treasury for the allocation of funds for an ongoing maintenance program at the prison. Two major examples were given of inefficiencies related to the maintenance program at Risdon.29
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that:
1. A close working relationship be established between the Ombudsman’s Office and the Prison Official Visitors, who have a specific responsibility for monitoring the implementation of prison reforms. 2. The Director of Prisons ensure the Manager of Risdon Prison meets regularly and frequently with yard inmate representatives, that the meetings are productive, and that inmates’ complaints, where possible and reasonable, are addressed to the satisfaction of all concerned and not filed away without being actioned as has previously been the practice. 3. The unit management concept be reviewed and restructured, where necessary, to better suit the Risdon Prison structure and environment. 4. The Tasmanian Prison Service ensure that, in keeping with good management principles, senior officers not receive complaints directly from inmates at the division front without prior consultation with the yard officer, and that protocols are adopted to this effect accordingly. 5. Consideration be given to the formation of an internal investigation team with appropriate experience and resources to conduct internal investigations within the prison system, similar to the way in which internal investigation systems operate in prison services in other States and Territories. 69 6. The Tasmanian Prison Service ensure that, where a decision to take no action against a defaulting inmate is made, the reporting officer is advised why that course was followed. 7. The Tasmanian Prison Service conduct a formal review of the present maintenance program to assess the financial and human resources needed to carry out necessary work.
70 CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
...a person held in custody by a State agency is owed a special obligation. A duty of care arises where public authority has been exercised to assume control over a person’s life. Not only are the persons in custody deprived of their liberty, they are deprived of the ability and resources to care for themselves. (Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody)
Tasmanian Prison Service authorities carry a duty of care responsibility that far outweighs the responsibility carried by most other state authorities. Three levels of care can be identified. First, there is a ‘normal’ duty of care which requires the development of and adherence to official practices, policies, standards and procedures; an obligation to ensure that duties are carried out in a competent and professional manner; and, to generally act in a reasonable manner in all circumstances. Secondly, there is a duty of care owed to the wider community, which requires appropriate physical facilities, infrastructure and practices to provide safety and security for the community, and to ensure the effective rehabilitation of prisoners back into the community. Thirdly, there is a ‘special’ duty of care, which encompasses important moral and ethical dimensions, and which is owed to a group of people who are deprived of personal liberties by virtue of incarceration and who have special needs which frequently differ from those of society as a whole.
The key issue for this investigation was whether, with particular reference to matters of security, health and safety, the Department of Justice and Industrial Relations had fulfilled its responsibilities in relation to duty of care at all three levels.
The difficulties imposed by an aging facility, a surge in prisoner numbers, and years of relative neglect by successive governments are acknowledged. Also acknowledged is the change in the nature of the prison population, which is ostensibly more volatile and violent, inadequate funding and an organisational culture which has traditionally focussed more on containment than rehabilitation.
It is also recognised that in the past twelve to eighteen months there have been significant reform initiatives in the Risdon Prison, culminating in the recent announcement that a new prison will be erected on the site of the existing facility. The new prison will overcome many of the current problems, however it will be at least seven or eight years before it is completed.
Given the cost of a new prison, it will not be a simple task for the Government or the Department to decide which of the problems related to the existing operation of the Risdon Prison must be rectified, and which might reasonably be left unattended. The findings of this investigation and the recommendations put forward in the report, should assist these decision-making processes.
71 CONCLUSIONS
Security arrangements at Risdon Prison need to be significantly improved in order to prevent further escapes, to control the amount of illegal drugs and contraband coming into the prison, and to ensure that inmate disturbances and violent behaviour can be anticipated, or at least dealt with swiftly and effectively.
The existing camera surveillance and video recording systems need to be upgraded without delay. One in four cameras was found to need repair at the time of inspection; some were outdated or poorly positioned, the video recording equipment was inadequate and the equipment was not always operated by trained personnel. In effect, it cannot be said that the prison was under full surveillance at all times. Comparison with similar institutions interstate suggest that it is one of the least secure maximum security prisons in Australia. It is true that not all inmates have a maximum security classification but, on initial entry, all detainees are classified as maximum security until an alternative classification is reached, if necessary.
A program of camera rectification has been drawn up by the Department and is being progressively implemented as funds allow, but the process is clearly too slow. If necessary, additional funding should be allocated to this task to enable the cameras to be upgraded as a matter of urgency.
The investigation indicated that drugs are readily available to inmates. It is acknowledged that the problem is not unique to Tasmania, but it is nevertheless a major concern and should be dealt with as a matter of urgent priority. Amongst other adverse effects, traffic in drugs and prescribed medication is one of the main causes of assault by inmates on other inmates.
One of the dilemmas faced by custodial authorities is the need to balance the rehabilitative and the security aspects of prisons. Whenever greater regimentation is introduced, the concern arises as to how much it affects the capacity of prisoners to resume normal life outside prison. In the case of drugs, there appears to be no alternative to introducing more stringent measures to deter the movement of illegal drugs into the prison. The Department is already addressing the problem of illegal drugs entering the prison, but more must be done to control what is obviously a major problem. In addition to random drug testing there should be more frequent searching of inmates and cells, as well as searches made of all contact visitors, trades’ persons, vehicles and staff. Visitor searches should be undertaken irrespective of status and whether a person is known to the staff. The penalties for visitors who are found bringing drugs into prison should continue to be strictly imposed, including loss of visiting rights for a given period, and disciplinary or criminal charges should be brought against any staff member found carrying drugs or contraband. The Director has the power under section 22 of the Corrections Act 1997 to search staff members and this power should be exercised if drug trafficking is suspected, and also on a random basis. Within reason, inmate movement both inside and outside the complex should be more rigorously controlled than it appears to have been in the past.
Custodial officers should be trained to recognise the various forms of drugs and to recognise signs of behavioural abnormality amongst inmates, which may be indicia of drug and alcohol dependency, or may presage the onset of pre suicide or self harm conditions. 72 Similarly, officers should be trained to be alert to and to handle bullying and intimidation amongst inmates.
The security unit and intelligence gathering functions in the prison also need to be upgraded. Officers who form the Emergency Response Group (ERG) need continuous training in such specialised areas as cell and vehicle extraction, first aid, firearms, baton and gas use and negotiation skills, including the handling of hostage situations. I have recommended that they have regular and ongoing training. The ERG is a specialist unit which has been provided with special equipment and initial training to deal with situational control of conduct. At the time of investigation there were no specific Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) to control the deployment of this Group and to spell out when and under what circumstances specific means of force should be adopted to overcome volatile situations. It is not sufficient for the Group to operate under the more general Director’s Standing Orders, which govern the conduct of all custodial officers. In Tasmania Police the group directly comparable with the ERG is the Police Special Operations, which has specific SOPs which govern their activities and which become very relevant in any legal proceedings.
I suggest that there would be many benefits from a closer liaison between Tasmanian Prison Service staff and Tasmania Police, particularly in the training area. There are obviously close parallels between the two organisations and the sharing of expertise would be invaluable. The process has already commenced, since this investigation began, and security staff are now working closely with Tasmania Police in intelligence gathering techniques.
Current disciplinary procedures for prison staff are of some concern. In 1985 the disciplinary provisions in the Regulations governing prison officers were rescinded and replaced by the disciplinary procedures under the Tasmanian State Service Act 1984. Concerns raised in interviews indicated that the State Service procedures were not job specific and were inappropriate for prison officers. The duties of prison officers, which may involve training in emergency response, use of force and riot control, are clearly very different from the tasks performed by most public servants. Moreover, disciplinary infractions in a custodial setting frequently require a swift response, which was not possible under the existing relatively cumbersome State Service legislation. The procedures under the new State Service Act may be more flexible, but I have recommended that the Secretary review the existing disciplinary procedures with a view to changing them. I have also recommended that the Department consider the appointment of an experienced investigation manager to conduct internal investigations within the prison system. One of this person’s tasks would be to ensure that wrongdoers are brought to justice, which might mean court, and not simply reprimanded or subject to internal disciplinary procedures.
Interviews conducted with prison staff, including senior management, indicated that there was a shortage of ongoing training in several important areas. I have accepted this and have recommended accordingly, but I also recognise that additional training cannot be a panacea for all the problems to be found in the prison. As the Secretary has stated: ..if (subsequent) performance is then found wanting, the difficulty may just as likely arise through inadequate supervision and performance management (and solutions need to be found in those areas) as it is to be a training issue warranting a training solution.
73 All custodial staff are rostered to receive four designated training days in a 56 week rostering cycle. Information obtained in investigation strongly suggests that some officers had not attended designated training days as rostered. That in itself is a concern, but as well, when an officer fails to attend for whatever reason, it will be some considerable time before that person can be re-rostered. As a result, assumptions about levels of officer competence in particular areas may be wrongly based. I do not know how widespread the non-attendance is, but I have recommended that the Secretary, who is now investigating this matter, take appropriate action to ensure that all officers, so identified, are trained to required standards.
I was concerned at evidence that workplace health and safety standards were not being met in some respects. This was identified in the reports carried out on a six monthly basis by the prison audit teams. It is of particular significance in relation to the storage of chemicals and potentially volatile substances. The auditors found for example that a quantity of paint, turpentine, thinners and petrol was stored in the fire shed, where electric welding takes place. There needs to be much greater vigilance in ensuring that legislated safety standards are adhered to. The Department is to be commended for the introduction of the audits, but there is little point if the recommendations are not implemented.
Cleanliness standards were found to be a problem in some areas, partly a result of inadequate sewage and waste disposal systems, but frequently they were problems caused by inmates. It is recommended that inmates be given greater responsibility for maintaining a reasonable standard in their own cells and that inmates who deface or destroy property should be financially penalised.
‘N’ Division, or Division 8 as it is now known, is an appalling place and, if it must be used by persons seeking protection, they should retain their normal privileges. At the time of investigation they appeared to be subject to a regime that differed very little from that of inmates who were there for punishment purposes.
One disturbing finding to emerge was that inmates who had been defaulted and could not by law spend more than 30 days on any one charge in Division 8, might then be recommended for behavioural management and detained under that particular regime for a further period, which extended the actual punishment time.
Funding, or more properly lack of funding, was regarded by many as a major cause of most problems. The general feeling was that increased funding would lead to improved facilities, additional training and extra staff. Reliable funding comparisons between States are hard to find, but there indications that the Tasmanian Prison Service had been under-funded relative to mainland states. The new demand-driven budget model should help to ensure that unit management is more effective, but it will be dependent on staff/inmate ratio in the order of one officer to 14-16 inmates. The current situation, where it appears that there can be one officer responsible for 35-40 inmates, is unreasonable and can easily result in dangerous situations developing, as well as generating high levels of officer stress and low morale. If officers are to take on new roles of a more rehabilitative nature, the ratio will need to improve significantly.
The new management structure appears to be an improvement on the old structure, but it will need to be assiduously monitored to ensure that the change process is supported and that resistance from those who may be opposed to change is countered. A number of people interviewed referred to the still prevalent culture of containment, which is essentially 74 at odds with modern prison management practice. The Official Visitors in their new, expanded role will have a major part to play in monitoring the implementation of management changes and prison reforms. I have recommended that the Ombudsman’s Office liaise more closely with the Official Visitors in monitoring the prison reform process. Hopefully, this will help to reassure the public that genuine reforms are occurring.
75 ATTACHMENT ‘A’
Ombudsman Act 1978 Investigation into the management of persons detained in custody under a sentence of imprisonment, on remand or under the Mental Health Act 1963
An investigation into the administration of the Risdon Prison including any part of the prison which has been declared a special institution under s.6A of the Mental Health Act 1963.
The matters under investigation shall include: · the adequacy of policies, procedures, systems and facilities for the management of prisoners or detainees in the Risdon prison complex, taking account of the size and nature of the current prison population. · the assessment and management of prisoners or detainees at risk of self harm, including: (a) process of identifying prisoners or detainees at risk of self harm, (b) levels of supervision and emergency response procedures; (c) professional development and training of nursing staff, and (d) standards of cells; · general operational and staff management at Risdon complex; and · the cost implications of any recommended changes to policies, procedures, systems and facilities for the management of prisoners or detainees.
The investigation will also consider practices for the management of detainees in the Prison system including matters relating to the escape of persons from custody. It is my intention to initially confine my investigation to the Risdon Prison complex, and limit my investigation to administrative actions which have occurred in the last two years, however if there are substantial public interest grounds of complaint arising prior to that date, I will accept and consider written submissions on such matters.
20th September 1999
76 ATTACHMENT ‘B’ Inmates’ submissions/interviewed: Name Address Date Received Inmate 1 D Yard Laundry 23/9/99 - received 27/9/99 on submission form Inmate 2 (anonymous) Risdon Prison Interviewed December 1999
Inmate 3 (anonymous) Risdon Prison 4/10/99
Inmate 4 (anonymous) Risdon Prison 4/10/99
Inmate 5 Risdon - Medium Interviewed December 1999
Inmate 6 Women’s Division Interviewed December 1999
Inmate 7 Women’s Division Interviewed December 1999
Inmate 8 Women’s Prison Interviewed December 1999
Inmate 9 N Division 23/9/99 received 5/10/99
Inmate 10 D Yard 14/10/99 received 20/10/99 on submission form Inmate 11 E Yard 23/9/99 received 27/9/99 on submission form Inmate 12 Medium Security 28/9/99 received 30/9/99 (letter)
Inmate 13 Risdon Prison 23/9/99 received 27/9/99 on submission form Inmate 14 E Yard 6/10/99 received 8/10/99 on submission form Inmate 15 Prison Hospital 23/9/99 received 27/9/99 on submission form Inmate 16 Main Prison E Yard 27/9/99 received 28/9/99 on submission form with attachment Inmate 17 Medium Security 27/9/99 received 28/9/999 on submission form Inmate 18 Women’s Division Interviewed December 1999
Inmate 19 Maximum Security 27/9/99 received 29/9/99 on submission form Inmate 20 Maximum security 17/10/99 received 20/10/99 on submission form Inmate 21 Risdon Prison Interviewed December 1999
Inmate 22 M Division 23/9/99 received 29/9/99 on submission form Inmates 23 and 24 Maximum Section 27/9/99 received 28/9/99 on submission (joint submission) Hayes Prison Farm form with attachment
Inmate 25 D Yard 26/9/99 received 26/9/99
Inmate 26 Not specified 29/9/99 received 1/10/99 on submission form Inmate 27 Hays Prison Farm 28/9/99 received 29/9/99 on submission form Inmate 28 Prison Hospital East 14 Cell 23/9/99 received 27/9/99 on submission form Inmate 29 Not specified. 23/9/99 received 1/10/99 on submission 77 form Inmate 30 Risdon Prison · 24/10/99 received 28/10/99 (letter) (3 submissions) · 26/10/99 received 1/11/99 (letter) · 20/12/99 received 4/1/00 (letter) Inmate 31 E Yard Undated - received 27/9/99 on submission form Inmate 32 Risdon 1/10/99 received 4/10/99 on submission form Inmate 33 Prison Hospital 24/9/99 received 29/9/99 on submission form Inmate 34 E Division 26/9/99 received 28/9/99 on submission form Inmate 35 Maximum Security 23/9/99 received 29/9/99 on submission form Inmate 36 Risdon Prison Interviewed December 1999
Inmate 37 Ulverstone Tas 14/10/99 received 4/11/99 (letter)
Inmate 38 Women’s Prison Interviewed December 1999
Inmate 39 Hobart Remand Centre Interviewed December 1999
Inmate 40 Risdon - Maximum Security Interviewed December 1999
Public submissions:
BENNET, Mrs CASEY, Bill DOUGLAS, Vicki Ms HARRIS, Colin Mr HOLMES, Helen Mrs O’FLAHERTY, Joe Mr MULLAN, Denise Ms (X 2) NEAME, Peter RUE, Carol SMITH, Neville SUTCLIFFE, Alan WEVER,Christine BOYLE, Marilyn, CHISHOLM, Jill YOUNG, Mr B J
Consultants or useful contacts:
· Commonwealth Ombudsman (Prisons area - John Taylor) · Barry Perry, Victorian Ombudsman (re consultants) · Alex Errington, Deputy Ombudsman (Western Australian inquiry) · Jane Burn (Western Australian inquiry) · Professor David Bayles, consultant criminologist at the Charles Sturt University · Mary Blackwood, DHHS A/Hospitals and Ambulance Service · Kim Boyer, Royal Derwent proposal · Glen Hardwick, DHHS information · Victoria Rigney, “Forensic and Secure Review” & Forensic policy paper · Ben Marris, former Director of Prisons at Risdon · Di Thomas (Women’s Prison visitor) · Brian Marks (Official Visitor Risdon) · Les Batchelor (Official Visitor Risdon)
Persons interviewed by consultants (Drs O’Brien and Farrell): 78 JAGER, Dr Alan 15/12/99 BEADLE, Dr John 15/12/99 McCARTHY Dr Estelle 15/12/99 MUSKETT, Ms Coral 15/12/99 SALE , Dr Ian 16/12/99 PARTIGER, Dr Russell 16/12/99 MUSKETT, Ms Coral 16/12/99 DE BOMFORD, Mr Paul 16/12/99 KIRKBY, Professor Ken 16/12/99 TRADJOS, Ms Sandy 16/12/99 BLACKWOOD, Ms Mary 17/12/99 BAIN, Mr Ken 17/12/99 BOYER, Ms Kim 17/12/99 by telephone DE BOMFORD, Mr Paul 17/12/99 by telephone JAGER, Dr Alan 17/12/99
79 DISCLAIMER: Please note, not all persons have been listed due to preferred confidentially.
Register of Audio Tapes
NO. Name Date of Interview
1 Daniel V Holmes 27/9/99
2 Rosaleen Macaulay 4/10/99
3 Janine Merran 5/10/99
4 Michael Smith 5/10/99
5 Grahame Williams 6/10/99
6 Joanne Thompson 6/10/99
7 Ian Balmer 6/10/99
8 John Absolom 7/10/99, 15/12/99
9 James Tighe 11/10/99
10 Estelle McCarthy 11/10/99
11 Michael Tew 12/10/99
12 Scott Shaw 12/10/99
13 John Beadle 13/10/99
14 Andrew Muskett 13/10/99
15 Steven Edwards 14/10/99
16 Jan Blyton 18/10/99
17 Steven Gridley 18/10/99
18 John Radcliffe 18/10/99
19 Glen Jackson 18/10/99
20 Robert Sinclair 18/10/99
21 Sharon O’Halloran 19/10/99
80 22 Charles Tunks 19/10/99
23 Craig Hughes 19/10/99, 12/1/00
24 Alan Smith 19/10/99
25 Ken Bain 20/10/99
26 Scott Munday 20/10/99
27 Ian Smith 20/10/99
28 Gordon Goward 26/10/99
29 Frederick Campton 27/10/99, 1/11/99
30 Dr Wilfred Lopez 27/10/99
31 Graeme Bell 28/10/99
32 Michael Hill 1/11/99
33 Anthony Rees 3/11/99
34 Katrina Blyton 3/11/99
35 Elida Assenheimer 3/11/99
36 Sandra Trajdos 4/11/99
37 Warren Lindsay 8/11/99
38 Roger Sly 9/11/99
39 Fr Alan Farrell 9/11/99
40 Kevin Ricardo 10/11/99
41 Paul de Bomford 10/11/99
42 Sally Dabner 17/11/99
43 Sandra Barwick 23/11/99
81 44 Inmates complaints 13/12/99
45 Kurt Von Stalheim 14/12/99
46 Brian Bracken 29/11/99, 24/11/99
47 Alan Burton 2/12/99,27/3/00
48 Tony Burgess 19/1/00
49 Eric Raeburn 13/1/00
50 David Bliss 25/1/00
51 Greg Bradfield 25/1/00
52 Dale Webster 1/2/00
53 Kevin Salter 1/2/00
54 Graeme Harris 16/2/00
55 John Dodd 16/2/00
56 Greg Jones 23/2/00
57 Michael Harvey 28/2/00
58 Bruce Coles 1/3/00
59 Bob Kellett 1/3/00
60 Dr Alan Jager 9/3/00, 17/3/00 and 29/5/00
61 Colin Whitlock 16/3/00
62 Denbigh Richards 28/3/00
63 Christopher Tulip 8/5/00
64 Nathan Clothier 15/5/00
82 ATTACHMENT ‘C’ CCTV System
I have attached copies of documentation received from K W McCulloch Pty Ltd following their audit of the system. Work identified by McCulloch has proceeded according to priorities determined by Prison management and the PSSMG and as funds have become available. Additional work has also been undertaken to accommodate changed operational requirements within Risdon. A chronology of these events from August 1999 to present is as follows:
August 1999 K. W. McCulloch commissioned to investigate current CCTV system and to report on maintenance and upgrade requirements. September 1999 Report of 28 September received [copy attached]. October 1999 Assessment by Prison management of priorities for work to be undertaken. October 1999 Request for additional information from McCulloch regarding costing of proposed works. October 1999 Order placed for upgrade of PACOM 20330 switcher to ensure Y2K compliance. Work completed October 1999. December 1999 Quotation received from McCulloch. February 2000 Submission to PSSMG for approval to expend CIP-EM funding on proposed upgrades. March 2000 Order placed for proposed repairs, replacement and upgrade. April 2000 Work commences on repairs, replacement and upgrade. Work completed April 2000. April 2000 Additional work ordered. Work completed May 2000. Mav 2000 Additional work ordered-. Work completed May 2000. June 2000 Additional work ordered. Work completed June 2000. July 2000 Additional work ordered. Work completed July 2000. July 2000 Additional work ordered. Work completed August 2000. July 2000 Quotation requested for additional installations at Women's Prison. August 2000 Quotation requested for upgrade work to be undertaken in Division 8. November 2000 Upgrade of system in mess rooms and K&B Gallery monitoring station commenced. December 2000 Main CCTV monitoring station relocated into main complex adjacent to Security Group offices. December 2000 Additional equipment purchased for relocated monitoring station.
83 ATTACHMENT 'D'
Duress Alarm System
The chronology of events surrounding the installation of the Personal Duress Alarm System at Risdon is as follows:
February 1999 Tender sought for the provision of Personal Duress Alarm System at Risdon. March 1999 Tenders closed. March 1999 Tenders assessed by representatives of Management, Security and TCOA and preferred tenderer advised. June 1999 Work commenced on installation. June 1999 Request made to quote on extension of system to Ron Barwick Centre in anticipation of it re-opening as Ashley South. August 1999 Order placed for extension of system to Ron Barwick Centre. September 1999 Following representations from TCOA, request made to quote on variation of tender to increase number of system monitoring points and alarm points. October 1999 Quotation on variation received. November - Discussions between PSSMG, Management and TCOA December 1999 regarding the extent to which variation would proceed. February 2000 Order placed for preferred variation with supplier. April 2000 Supplier proposes further options for variation. April 2000 Supplier advised of preferred option. May 2000 Upgrade commenced. July 2000 Site visit by representatives of supplier to rectify faults with system. August 2000 Site visit by representatives of supplier to repair system. December 2000 Order placed for additional transmitters following advice from supplier that these would be necessary to overcome recurring operational difficulties.
84 ATTACHMENT ‘E’
Risdon Prison Complex
Minister for Justice & Industrial Relations & Industrial Relations
Secretary Department of Justice & Industrial Relations and Deputy Secretary (Corrective Services
Acting Director Prison Services (Graeme Barber)
Executive Officer Prison Service (Kevin Salter)
Manager Risdon Prison Complex (Dale Webster)
See Prison Hospital See Tasmanian Prison Service Organisation Chart (Other than Risdon) Organisational Chart
See Tasmanian Prison Service Non Custodial Officers Organisational Chart
Acting Assitant Manager Assistant Manager Unit Manager Risdon Prison Complex Medium Security Female's Prison (Ken Bain) (John Lacey) (Jan Petterd)
Acting Accommodation Chief Reception Operations Chiefs Custodial Staff (Danny Jex) Senior Custodial Officer
Acting Chief Accommodation Reception Operations Custodial Officer Custodial Staff Custodial Staff Senior Custodial Officers - Security (Steve Gridley)
Operations Custodial Staff Custodial Staff Security
85
END NOTES
1 The five persons who died were Christopher William DOUGLAS, who died on 4 August 1998; at age seventeen he was the youngest person in the Prison; Timothy Andrew HAYES died on 31 August 1999; Thomas Patrick HOLMES died on 17 September 1999; Jack NEWMAN died on 18 September 1999 and Lawrence Colin SANTOS, age twenty-one, died on 19 October 1999. Guy Fabian LONG, died on 10 January 2000. 2 Twelve prisoners escaped in 1998/99 and for the ten month period between July 1999 to May 2000 there were another eleven escapes. The rate of prisoner escapes for that period was over twice the national average. 3 In 1998 the Ombudsman’s Office had investigated an incident at the main Prison and an incident involving the deployment of the Prison Emergency Response Group to the Hobart Remand Centre. There was another serious incident in May 1999 again involving a disturbance at the main Prison, which required the attendance of the Police Special Operations Group and which resulted in significant property damage. 4 Each year the Ombudsman’s Office receives a number of complaints from prisoners on matters such as transfers, classifications, property, food, visits discipline. In the five years between 1994 and 1999 the Ombudsman received in the order of 264 prisoner complaints. Only a small number - less than ten percent - were sustained and had it not been for the specific incidents referred to above it is unlikely that a major prison inquiry would have been initiated. 5 During this investigation the former Ombudsman, Mr Damon Thomas, visited the Hobart and Launceston Remand Centres. The Hobart Remand Centre is a multi-level building located in Liverpool Street adjacent to the Magistrates Court and Police Headquarters, and was first occupied in January 1999. It contains 40 remand cells and 10 cells for watch-house cases. The centre appears to be operating in a satisfactory manner, albeit that on occasions it may be crowded. Shifts consisting of 8, 11 and 12 hours are being worked by staff. There is a nurse rostered on day shift. The Centre has been described by the Legislative Council Select Committee as modern in design with up-to-date electronic security equipment. In terms of Correctional Services facilities for remandees, it is of a high standard and comparable to similar modern facilities in other states and overseas. The Launceston Remand Centre has been described as an ‘horrendously bad building’ and since the mid 1970’s has provided short term accommodation with 33 cells. It is located in the main Launceston Police Building and provides remand and watch-house accommodation. The Centre was transferred from Police to Corrective Services in 1991, and modified. Bars on the doors were replaced with solid doors. There were originally two observation cells and this has now increased to seven. Four of the seven observation cells are specifically monitored security cells for police watch-house prisoners. These prisoners are in the main unknown to officers and on may occasions have consumed alcohol or a prohibited substance and it is essential that they are continuously monitored to prevent self harm. The Launceston Centre is without a nurse and officers dispense medication to persons in custody by means of Webster packs. The Manager and his staff are opposed to this practice and prison management have been made aware of their opposition to it and the reasons for it. A nurse should be appointed to the Launceston Prison to administer medication and attend to general medical needs. The rostering of one staff member on the night shift at the Launceston Prison has been an ongoing concern for the manager, who is dependant upon members of Tasmania Police to assist his officer should that be necessary. However, although there is an understanding between Tasmania Police and the prison service that the Police will assist in an emergency, that may not always be possible having regard to the number of Police rostered and the calls or complaints which they have to attend. There have been occasions when Tasmania Police have been unable to assist Correctional Officers when requested, for such duties as being present when medication is supplied to inmates out of hours and assisting Prison staff at certain court venues. The Manager of the Launceston Remand Centre advised that the Tasmanian Custodial Officers Association (TCOA) has complained on a number of occasions
86 concerning the unsatisfactory manning levels of the Centre, especially on night shifts, and he has also informed the Director of Prisons accordingly. However, the manning level has not changed. I believe that the staff levels at the Launceston Remand Centre should be increased to enable two officers to be on duty during night hours to overcome the present requirement of obtaining police back-up assistance (which might not always be available) in emergency situations. An internal staff problem has been continuing for two years including physical threats to the manager, threats and harrassment to the operations manager, who has since gone on stress leave, and threats to other custodial personnel by the same officer, and have been reported to the Director of Prisons. However, other than the offending officer being counselled and told he would not be authorised to relieve in a supervisory capacity, nothing has been done, thus creating a morale problem at the Remand Centre. 6 Mr Denbigh Richards, former Director Corrective Services Division Mr John Dodd, former Director of Prisons Mr Graeme Harris, former Manager, Risdon Prison Mr Kevin Salter, Accommodation Manager, Risdon Prison Mr Greg Jones, Operations Manager, Risdon Prison Mr Dale Webster, Manager, Development and Planning, Prison Services Ms Sandy Tradjos, Manager, Hobart Remand Centre Mr Tony Burgess, Manager, Launceston Remand Centre. Following major senior management changes in the first half of 2000, the Secretary of the Justice Department, Mr Richard Bingham, was appointed to the statutory position of Director of Corrective Services from 29 April, 2000, following the resignation of Mr Denbigh Richards. 7 Refer to Prison Hospital Report: Chapter 4 - The Prison Population. 8 Prison Infrastructure Redevelopment Program Capital Investment Program (PIRP) Submission. December 1999 page 19. 9 1999 Hospital Admissions Profile. Statistics compiled by the Ombudsman Office in conjunction with Ms Coral Muskett. 10 PIRP page 20. 11 This states that the situation in Tasmania is generally out of line with national trends where escapes are concerned. In fact, escapes in Tasmania were out of line when the data was gathered. Since then, the figures are much closer to national trends. Tasmania reported the highest escape rate from open custody in 1999-2000, at 7.89 escapes per 100 prisoners. The next highest rate was 5.50 in WA, with a national average rate of 2.12 escapes per 100 prisoners. Tasmania also reported the highest escape rate from secure custody in 1999-2000, at 1.48 escapes per 1000 prisoners. The next highest rate was 0.61 in SA, with a national average rate of 0.16 escapes per 100 prisoners. Escapes that have occurred in 2000-2001 have been from the Hayes Minimum Security Prison, when on two separate occasions two inmates walked away from the confines of the facility (a total of four escapes). All four persons were minimum security risks, were no risk to the public, committed no offences whilst being escapees, and were recaptured in a short period of time. Responses to these incidents have included: - changes to muster procedures; - a reduction by one hour to the lock-up time at Hayes; and - reconfirmed vigilance by staff members at Hayes. There have been no other escapes from prison custody in 2000-2001 to date. The following quote from the publishers of the Report on Government Services 2001 should be kept in mind when considering Tasmanian figures in comparison with those of other jurisdictions: Prison containment indicators are particularly vulnerable to the effects of small numbers, especially when expressed as a rate of total prisoner populations in jurisdictions with relatively small average daily prisoner populations. Given small absolute numbers in many cases, care should be used when comparing effectiveness indicators across jurisdictions and over time within
87
jurisdictions. 12 Camera plan (see Attachment ‘B’). 13 Port Phillip Prison, Victoria All vehicles entering the Port Phillip Prison are thoroughly searched in the Sallyport area by a dedicated Sallyport officer. Vehicle occupants are also searched but only on the way into prison. Dogs are also used in the searches. All searches are recorded in the Sallyport search register. Northern Territory Correctional Services advised that inspection pits have been constructed within the Prisons over which all vehicles entering must be parked whilst searches are made of the interior and the underside. This occurs when the vehicle enters and leaves the Prison. Queensland All vehicles which enter or leave the Prison complex are subject to full searches and whilst the occupants are not usually searched they are accompanied at all times whilst in the Prison. Western Australia All vehicles both entering and leaving the Prison are thoroughly searched. The occupants are not searched as a general rule, however, if considered necessary, searches will be undertaken. South Australia In high and medium security prisons, all vehicles are searched on entry and exit. Exit searches are expected to be more thorough than entry searches which may only be cursory. Vehicle occupants are generally not searched, however, details are obtained regarding their purpose and identification. The Dog Squad is generally not used in all vehicle searches unless intelligence indicates that this is desirable. All searches are recorded and records are maintained in each prison. 14 In the Queensland; Western Australia; South Australia and the Northern Territory Prison systems the functions of their equivalent security response team to the ERG, are strictly controlled by SOPs and contingency plans which are reviewed, and where necessary updated, annually. Queensland In Queensland Prisons all officers and many programs staff are trained in security procedures and methods. Each high security centre has a trained Emergency Response Group selected from volunteer officers on the centre establishment. The group reports to the centre general manager. A normal Emergency Response Group consist of approximately 12 officers on a 24 hour call out system. Australian Capital Territory The ACT prison system is unique and trains all staff in the ability to respond to likely emergencies but does not have a Security Unit or Emergency Response Unit as such. Custodial staff are provided with four days emergency response training as part of their training and are responsible to the Superintendent through the deputy superintendent. Revision training in baton use, first aid and operating procedures is conducted every 12 months. South Australia South Australia does not operate a Security Unit as such, however, high and medium security prisons have established individual Emergency Response Groups which are managed by local prison management. Each ERG has an appointed coordinator, responsible to the general manager, who is an officer within the prison, and organises such aspects as training and equipment. ERG officers are not specialised positions and officers work in various locations as rostered. ERG members are on call for emergencies, and in such situations will be directed to leave their rostered positions and attend the incident. Once resolved they will return to the normal duties. ERG training is an individual prison issue, but is usually one evening a week or fortnight. The training may be conducted within the prison, or may involve ERG officers from more than one prison, the Department’s Dog Squad or joint exercises with Police. Northern Territory The Northern territory does not have a specific Security Unit. However, the great majority of officers are trained in response to emergency procedures, and ongoing training is held on a regular basis throughout the year. Each prison has a security chief who is responsible for the total security of the prison. Western Australia
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The Training and Specialist Services Branch (TSSB) is the identified security unit for West Australian Prisons. There are three identified areas, Emergency Support Group, Training and Information Analysis. Seventy personnel from the TSSB form the ESG which maintains a number of operational perimeters including but not limited to the following:- Emergency Response Unit (ERU )- a perimeter security vehicle manned 24 hours per day by two armed officers that patrols the outer perimeters of the Prisons. Hostage Response Group (HRG) - officers who are trained to respond to a prison hostage situation and other major disturbances. Technical Support Unit (TSU) - a number of trained officers who specialise in the compilation of mobile and static command posts and associated systems. The ESG work a 24 hour rotational roster and are on call through a pager system 24 hours per day. After initial 18 day training, ESG personnel have a dedicated 12 hour training day once every three weeks. Officers must re-qualify every three months in the use of firearms, breathing apparatus and must also pass a physical ability test. Training for Security Units appear to incorporate the same curriculum subjects in all states these being:- Cell, vehicle, mess room extraction CS gas, firearms, batons and restraints Law relating to the use of force and equipment First Aid, resuscitation procedures Search Procedures Physical fitness was also an essential element of training. 15 The circumstances of the first escape were that the escort vehicle, en-route from Launceston to Risdon Prison, contained a number of prisoners, including three protection status prisoners who were travelling in a separate compartment on a Toyota escort bus which was manned by one permanent staff member and one casual driver. One prisoner produced a razor blade and threatened to self harm, the driver of the vehicle pulled over to the side of the highway, directed the prisoner to surrender the razor blade, and then, contrary to direction by the officer in charge of the escort, unlocked the security door, to get the razor blade and was overpowered, assaulted and stabbed and two inmates escaped. Dealing with this incident first, while it is recognised that small objects may be secreted on an individual in a variety of places, it was clear that for an inmate to have a razor blade in his possession, either inadequate search procedures had been adopted in Launceston, prior to him being placed in the transport vehicle, or the vehicle had not been thoroughly searched prior to prisoners being placed therein and the razor blade had been left in the vehicle. Having regard to what appears to have been a deliberate plan of escape, I believe the first scenario is the most likely. The second escape which happened in Hobart on 3 August 1998, occurred when three prisoners, en-route from Risdon Prison to the City Courts, were successfully able to break out of a Hi-ace escort van by tearing off the inner security window and climbing through the opening. There were three escorting officers in the vehicle, and none of them apparently heard the noise of the security window being torn out or became alerted to the fact that the three prisoners were climbing out of the van one after the other. It later transpired that, of the three escorting officers in the van at the time of the escape, only one had any previous experience in escort duties. 16 Inquiries interstate revealed that the escort of inmates is considered one of the more important functions of a corrective service officer and specific training is provided to selected personnel who are to be utilised as escort officers. Queensland Only officers trained and aware of prisoner escort security precautions are assigned to prisoner transportation duties. Officers assigned to prisoner transportation duties are competent in the use and application of First Aid, CPR, and where also authorised in the use of Chemical Agents, Restraining Equipment and Firearms. Prisoners from classifications maximum to medium security are always handcuffed. Whether minimum security inmates are handcuffed is at the discretion of the escorting officer.
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Escorting personnel are given clear and concise instructions in the circumstances, conditions and situations under which firearms and security equipment can be used during transportation. New South Wales In New South Wales escorts are carried out by the Departments Transport Unit. The majority of staff have been trained in all Emergency Response Procedures, including weapons and batons. Two officers per vehicle conduct these type of escorts and carry prisoners of all classifications. The exception is extreme risk prisoners for whom special arrangements are made which incorporate additional personnel and may also involve back up by Security Unit staff or Police. It would appear from information received that similar escort situations occur in other states and that the basic formula is the same. 17 The senior officer in charge of the escort told the other officers that the inmates were to be handcuffed with their hands in front of them and then a second hand cuff was to be attached to the inmate and the escorting officer’s wrists to ensure that the inmate was properly secured whilst they were escorted, one at a time, through the main public access to the courts. One of the officers argued, in front of the prisoners, that the inmates could not be handcuffed in that manner, and as a result, had to be ordered to complete the handcuffing as instructed. 18 Section 42 Leave Permits · to visit a near relative or person with whom the prisoner or detainee has a longstanding relationship if that relative or person is seriously ill or in acute personal need; · to attend the funeral of a near relative or person with whom the prisoner or detainee has had a longstanding relationship; · to attend interviews and discussions in relation to a prisoner’s or detainee’s proposed employment; · to attend a place of education or training in connection with a course of education or training; · to perform unpaid community work; · in the case of a prisoner or detainee who is an Aboriginal person, to attend events of special cultural significance to the Aboriginal community; and · to take part in a program approved by the Director that is designed to facilitate i) the rehabilitation of the prisoner or detainee; or ii) the reintegration of the prisoner or detainee in the community; or iii) the preparation of the prisoner or detainee for release; or iv) the maintenance of family ties of the prisoner or detainee. 19 Regular training sessions are scheduled for all custodial officers at Risdon and the roster is arranged in a manner that allows each officer to attend 4 training days per year. Training sessions are conducted each Tuesday, except when training personnel are otherwise engaged, eg whilst Induction Training for recruits is underway. Each session needs to be repeated over six weeks to fit in with the roster cycle and allow all necessary staff to attend. The sessions are planned to cover areas in which periodic re-certification of skills is required, eg fire-arms training, first aid training; to introduce new equipment, policies or procedures, eg breathing apparatus, Discipline Standing Order; or to update existing knowledge and/or skills, eg infectious disease and blood spill control procedures, physical interventions. Until recently, a manual record of training completed was maintained for each individual staff member. Training records are now being maintained on an electronic database and work is presently being undertaken to enter past records on to this. Until this has been completed the production of consolidated training records remains a difficult and time consuming process. 20 In respect of the location of the F-Yard Dispensary, it should be noted that prisoners have attempted to gain access (26 May 1999) but failed to actually achieve entry. They were able to break the window and gain access to an unsecured cupboard close to the window. Since that time, modifications to the internal arrangements of the Dispensary ensure that this is no longer possible. In addition, Workplace Standards also reviewed the Dispensary in relation to safe work practice in early April 2000, and found that the method of dispensing and the location of the dispensary complied with their guidelines and regulations. A custodial officer is present and witnesses all dispensing from this dispensary. 21 Both the Manager, Risdon and Manager, Prisoner Services have visited South Australia in the past six
90 months, and both had discussions with SA Department officials which encompassed this Project. In addition, when drawing up the Draft Drug Strategy for the Tasmanian Prison Service, the documentation from the Project was considered. Elements of the project relevant to Tasmania have been included in the Draft Drug Strategy. Overall I believe it should be made clear that problems associated with drugs in Prison are not problems peculiar to this State, as witnessed by the extensive resources devoted to it and its regular inclusion on the Agenda of Correctional Administrators Conferences and Ministerial Conferences. In addition, it is not one that the Tasmanian Prison Service has sat back from and accepted. Considerable work has been done with DHHS, external providers, Tasmania Police and Australian Customs to address the problem. Internal processes have also been tightened significantly with some success. 22 It would be contended that not “some”, but the vast majority of problems that are experienced with the sewage system at Risdon are caused by inmates continually placing items into the toilets and other drainage points. It has been acknowledged “that Risdon Prison complex is 40 years old, that the facilities are decaying, that the original design of the complex, based on a series of open yards, was completely inappropriate for the Tasmanian climate and that it is difficult to impose conventional standards of health and safety on a group of people who are held against their will”. The waste disposal system is one part of this problem. Cells in the Prison Hospital were refurbished between November 1999 and April 2000. This included the replacement of some mattresses and all toilets and hand basins. I am advised that the cell referred to here is an observation cell and this is the reason why the mattress is on the floor and that there is no pillow. As you are aware an inmate placed on a particular category is held in an observation cell and articles that may be used for self-harm are removed. Mattresses in these cells are frequently abused and regularly replaced. 23 Reference is made to page 12 of the January 2000 Health and Safety Six Monthly Audit report where the Audit Team (comprising Mr R N Kellett, Mr Bruce Coles and Mr John Edwards) stated: The purpose of this six monthly audit is to assist line managers to identify potential problems in the workplace that may lead to personal injury and result in a workers compensation claim. By identifying areas where potential problems exist, we are taking a pro-active role in managing and reducing the incidence of work related claims. In turn, these recommendations, if heeded, will provide a safer workplace for our employees as well as improve worker’s morale. This has a two fold benefit in as much as making the workplace a safer workplace, it will free up urgently needed funds with which to supplement the shortfalls in our budget allocations. A little effort with Health and Safety issues will impact directly on the premium set aside for Workers Compensation. Many of the recommendations that have been made in this and most previous Audit Reports are going unheeded. In many instances, the audit team are finding the same problems existing that existed twelve months and two years ago. There seems very little support for Managers from Senior Management in dealing with these important matters. As a result, much of this work has not been completed. Many Line Managers acknowledge that there is insufficient time and financial resources with which to deal with many of these Health and Safety matters. For Line Managers to be accountable for Health & Safety, adequate time and financial resources must be made available. There is no matter more important the health and safety of our staff. There can be little exception that work related incidences, sick leave and workers compensation claims will not reduce until Senior Management take a pro-active role in the process by offering support and direction to their Line Management and Staff. The audit team consider that the audit process is a waste of time at the present commitment level of Management as many managers have little regard for Health & Safety matters. In this audit a number of problems were identified from the following locations. Hayes Farm Workshops and Vegetable Processing Unit - 20 January 2000 Auditors found that there had been a distinct improvement in the general housekeeping of the Farm Industries work areas following the last audit However the following issues were raised no monthly workplace inspection checks (as required by the OHS Act?)were conducted for the period. There were some 13 items identified as requiring attention.. There was a need to introduce improved training processes.
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The need to provide written procedures to assist worker understanding of Safe Practice was identified. Laundry - 24 January 2000 Eight items required attention. Three of these were: Bleach should be stored away separately from laundry detergents. The exhaust duct from the Burton Ironer is corroded and deposits of greasy wax are forming on the walkway in the workshop gallery. This problem was identified in a Hazard report prior to the last audit and is in need of urgent attention. Operator Training and documented procedures which were introduced in relation to general laundry operations and which were recorded and signed by prisoners as being understood, had not been in operation since October 1998. Bakery - 24 January 2000 Seven items required attention. Five items of concern were: The safety guard fitted to the high speed mixer is inadequate and should be replaced. Access to escape ladder from gallery is restricted. Bakery ventilation system is inoperative. The lead to the toaster needs to be replaced. Damaged electrical conduit on the divider needs replacement. Vegetable Processing Industry (Risdon) - 24 January 2000 Five items required attention and no Monthly workplace inspection check were conducted for the area. The items of concern were: The airlock door leading into the toilet area was propped open. Knives were not appropriately secured to the benches A metal framed chair with dangerously bent legs and should be discarded. The absence of a blood spill locker. Effluent running onto the asphalt area is producing a foul smell. 2000 Accommodation Unit and Kitchen - 21 January No monthly checklists were made available. Kitchen There had been a marked improvement in the hygiene throughout the Kitchen area due mainly to the present supervisor’s efforts. However, many of the 15 items listed in the Kitchen were brought to the attention of the manager during the previous biannual audit inspection in December 1998 and were still outstanding. Items requiring attention were: Filters in the kitchen range hood are not regularly cleaned by an approved method in accordance with Australian Standard AS 1851.6 1997. Paper towels and soap dispensers should be provided for hand cleaning. Door closer near entrance steps to kitchen passage to be rectified and the mesh extended to prevent birds from entering the area. The kitchen first aid kits need to be replenished. The inmate toilet airlock door in the kitchen should be kept closed at all times. Storage for cleaning equipment is inadequate. Elements on stove hotplate need replacement. The blood spill kit is not adequately stocked. A fire extinguisher from the kitchen office is missing. Exposed hot pipes on the cooking bells and the bain marie require covering. Lids on the bain-marie are damaged and cracked creating the potential for injury to workers when being handled. Handles have been removed from oven trays. Staff complain of being burnt on the edges of these trays as it is difficult to handle them. Handles should be replaced or new trays obtained before serious injury occurs. Adequate protective gloves should also be provided. Kitchen passage fire hoses have defective nozzles. A protective cover has been removed from a fire sprinkler in the kitchen passage.
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The video surveillance monitor in the kitchen passage is not working. Light fittings in the passage are regularly being vandalised. ‘N’ Division, Crossgates, Officer’s Mess & Forecourt - 19 January 2000 The auditors found some 20 items requiring attention in this area. Main Gate Central Control Four Cameras not operable Fire extinguisher report in last audit is still missing from switch board room. No breathing apparatus in the appropriate storage area. Outside Gang Inmates were observed operating brush cutters without adequate safety equipment. The visitors toilets were found to be very unhygienic and required cleaning regularly. Fire Shed - 19 January 2000 The auditors identified 6 items requiring attention. Two items of concern are: The quantity of paint, turpentine, thinners and petrol stored in the fire shed workshop contravenes storage regulations. As electric welding equipment is used in this work shop, an extreme danger of fire exists. Battery charging should be conducted in an open ventilated area in order to prevent an explosion. Security Hospital - 21 January 2000 The biannual audit inspection was conducted by J Edwards, R Kellett and P de Bomford. Monthly workplace inspection checks have not been conducted since the last audit. The auditors identified eleven items requiring attention. Seven items of concern are: Complaints from officers regarding cigarette smoke in Central Control introduced from the building air- conditioning system. The Director of Nursing is to refer this matter to the Management and the Health & Safety steering committee for advice. The duct work on the air conditioning system is full of contamination and should be cleaned in an approved manner to meet Australian Standards AS1851.6 - 1997. The evacuation plan needs to be approved by the Fire Service. The bed pan room needs to be tidied and a faulty power outlet replaced. The personal alarm system at the Hospital entrance and in the round house do not work. The fire hose reel is defective. The building sprinkler system should be regularly serviced by an approved fire sprinkler fitter who holds a Tasmanian Fire Service permit and tested in accordance with Appendix A of the Fire Protection Industry Association of Australia (levels 1, 2 and 3). (Refer page 9, January 2000 Audit Report). Workshop - 24 January 2000 The auditors identified five items still requiring attention from the last audit in December 1998. These were: All electrical leads, power tools and appliances need to be checked and tagged. The saw bench should have the riving knife fitted to prevent kick back. The safety cover return spring lever on the buzzer needs to be adjusted. The scribe saw was unguarded. Bench grinding wheel not adequately guarded. Spray Painting Workshop - 31 January 2000 It was found that no monthly safety inspections had been conducted since the last audit. The auditors identified six items requiring attention: The ventilation system in the store was not in operation. A high risk of fire exists in this area. Electrical leads and appliances need to be tagged by a qualified electrician. The compressed air regulator should be mounted on a suitable metal bracket. A beam over the panel beating area should be removed as it is not an approved attachment point for a lifting device. The door that has been removed from the flammable goods store must be replaced. A filter screen needs to be re-fitted.
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24 The costs of calls to inmates is not a matter over which the Prison Service has direct control since they are set by the terms of a Service Agreement with the supplier of the system – Telstra. This is an issue that is not unique to the Prison Service in Tasmania. The Victorian Corrections Security and Emergency Services Group has been asked by the Commissioner for Corrections in Victoria to review the operation of the Arunta Telephone System. Tasmania has been asked to participate in this review and a Liaison Officer from Tasmania has been appointed. The Arunta Telephone System was also an agenda item that was discussed at the recent Administrators in Corrections Conference in Canberra. 25 Comments from various Senior Prison Managers were as follows: It is not working. Unit management is basically the management principles that we try to apply in any workplace. We’re not applying them to the staff, the staff aren’t applying them to the inmates. The vision of unit management is just at odds with what is actually unit management. They espouse that it’s about having the people in place and the same people dealing with them day to day. That’s the mechanics, that’s not unit management. Unit management is about, fairness, firmness, consistency, consistency above all else and if you can get that with twenty people doing the job then you use twenty people. If you need one to get consistency you use one. We haven’t got consistency because right down the line our messages are inconsistent. And that goes to some supervisory officers just wanting an easy time, so it’s easy to say ‘yes’ the inmates when they approach you even though the custodial officer’s already said ‘no’ and they’ve said no for a whole lot of valid reasons you find they are overruled by the supervisor who just wants an easy time. And that happens so consistently that the officers just give up and become inconsistent themselves. So that’s the level that unit management fails at. Well first of all if we look at unit management , unit management is simply a name for good management tenets. The tenets that are described in unit management are just good management tools for any organisation regardless of whether it’s a prison. If it’s used effectively it is a very good thing to happen. People at the time were not given sufficient training, or they may have been given training but the impact of that training wasn’t clarified sufficiently. As a concept, it’s one that we’ve actually played down to some extent, because it has become discredited in the system and there were a large percentage of staff, custodial staff in particular, who didn’t have a positive view about what unit management meant, what it was all about, and held the view that whatever it was, it wasn’t working, and therefore there was this sort of negative perception. For that reason, in my discussions with management about the kind of management philosophy, if you like, or approach, because that’s what unit management is fundamentally, it’s a particular sort of approach for managing, that in terms of that we should continue to support some of the principles of unit management but not use the terminology and not promote the concept as something that we are actively pursuing in the system. 26 The issue of younger officers being left on their own with 30 - 40 prisoners and unable to obtain immediate assistance if required was commented on by Mrs Sandra Trajdos, Manager Hobart Remand Centre. (Ms Trajdos had also been Acting General Manager at Risdon in 1997 and 1998). Given the current climate at Risdon I don’t think it’s appropriate for one officer to be with 30 or 40 prisoners, especially given the dynamics of the Prison. In my professional view circumstances like that really ought to have two officers, for back up, for support and all good reasons, and also for observation purposes. The seniors in fact probably do have too much to do, but I think that’s got to do with work practices and a lack of guidance. It’s almost necessary to start from the beginning again, because people are so confused now and feel so overworked that they can’t see the forest for the trees and what it really needs is for people to step back and evaluate the roles of the persons involved and the proper delegation of functions. Everybody is trying to keep the wheel going but not getting anywhere. Changes are happening or trying to happen around them and they’re not embracing them because they see that as just another burden. 27 The break down in communication became apparent when the Ombudsman investigated two incidents, one at the Risdon Prison and the other at the Hobart Court of Petty Sessions in October 1998. In these incidents junior members of the Emergency Response Group were not properly briefed before deployment at Risdon Prison resulting in an inmate not being correctly restrained and the Emergency Response Group
94 acted outside their jurisdiction by removing a prisoner from the holding cell at the Hobart Court of Petty Sessions. In the May 1999 riot there did not appear to be any established protocols with the Police, Fire and Ambulance Services and the State Emergency Service, resulting in those services being unsure of what was required of them by the Prison Service and where they should position their resources. This communication breakdown and failure to properly implement the Emergency Plan was commented on by all Emergency Services and Prison Service investigators. It is self evident that when an emergency response is called for by another agency, time is paramount if the incident is to be brought to a satisfactory conclusion without injury or possible loss of life. Prison Rule 53, Section 4 paragraph 2 of the Risdon Prison Complex Emergency Plan is quite explicit and states: An officer is to be assigned to the responding emergency organisation to escort them to the emergency site, provide area information ie site purpose, and any security related matter. It is essential that liaison officers be appointed to specific and purposeful tasks for the management of such incidents and for designated “Stand to Areas” for Emergency Services to be listed on the Prison Emergency Plan. According to the Prison Service investigators the function of escorting emergency services regardless of the emergency situation at the time, did not occur in any structured form during the incident, suggesting that the Commander and/or the Forward Commander either did not know or did not invoke the Risdon Complex Emergency Plan, which can be implemented by declaration of the General Manger or on call officer. The plan details duties and responsibilities of Corrective Service personnel. On 14 May 1999, a written reply from the Secretary of the Department of Justice and Industrial Relations, stated the following in relation to the Ombudsman’s recommendation 6 A review of the current Prison Emergency Plan is being undertaken in conjunction with the revision of Standing Orders. This will allow for those matters raised in your report to be addressed, clarifying the roles and responsibilities of staff directing operations. The senior staff who take on the responsibilities have been advised of your findings and are actively involved in the revision of the existing guidelines. It appears, however, that senior Corrective Services staff responsible for directing operations are still not conversant with their respective command and control functions. 28 In the Ombudsman’s report to the Secretary on 16 December 1999 the then Ombudsman made reference to 25 separate complaints namely:- Assaults, Clothing, Canteen, Contact Visits, Drainage, Education, First Offenders, Health, Industries, Kitchen, Lock Down, Mail, ‘N’ Division, Officers, Pay Rates, Sports and Recreation, Section 42- Special Leave, Strip Searches, Standing Orders, Transfer of Inmates to Hayes Gaol Farm, Telephones, Videotapes, Welfare Programs - Psychiatric Care, Yard Issues and Correspondence. The documents forwarded to the Secretary were made up of two separate sets marked ‘A’ and ‘B’ respectively. The documents marked ‘A’ contained the inmates’ complaints. The documents marked ‘B’ contained copies of notes taken at yard representative meetings with Prison Administration, and other associated documents relative to the issues mentioned in documents ‘A’. 29 Following inmate unrest at Risdon Prison in 1998 it was decided to cover in the roof over the Division yards. A number of different materials were considered, including colourbond and/or laserlite as more conventional method of roofing with an overall negotiated cost of $22,000. This was not accepted and a cheaper canvas/sail cloth was a considered option, notwithstanding advice had been given of the danger of laying it out and rolling it up in windy conditions. The canvas/sail cloth was installed at a cost of approximately $13,500. This price did not take into consideration storm water run off. The first rain storm caused considerable damage due to flooding and inmates complained of the noise created by the cloth flapping and it was then found necessary to modify the gutters and provide special supports to hold the canvas down. The overall cost was in excess of $22,000 and was totally unsatisfactory to the extent that I am advised that the canvas has been kept rolled up since. It had been found necessary to consider either upgrading or replacing the energy management system at Risdon Prison which had been originally installed and maintained by Honeywell P/L with the original installation cost including variations of almost $50,000. Since installation the system has undergone two major upgrades, funded from Works Tasmania, to meet the changing environment and the electrical
95 requirements of the Prison Service. It is believed that the total cost for the Honeywell System is now in excess of $100,000. Mr Kellett, at that time, identified a number of errors which he wanted to correct as there had been a number of changes to the prison system, and the Prison had installed a lot of hot water loads which, I am advised, are ideal for putting on an energy management system. He suggested the hospital and administration block should also be included as a means of making a further savings and expanding the system. At that point Honeywell P/L notified that their price was in the vicinity of $37,000 for the upgrading. The systems upgrading was to be financed through Works Tasmania. Mr Kellett advised the Prison Service that Honeywell’s price seemed to be excessive and he was given the authority to look for an alternative system, which was found in Victoria. This energy system would completely replace and upgrade the present Honeywell Prison System at a cost of only $17,000. I am advised by Mr Kellett that a decision was made in 1995 by the State Manager, Mr Doug Byers, the Policy Officer, Mr Bill Harvey, the Manager Administration, Mr Wayne Clear and himself to proceed with the Victorian tender, however, a short time after the agreement to purchase the Victorian system, Mr Bill Harvey convened a special meeting with Mr Kellett, Mr Watts, Mr Harvey and Mr Clear to discuss the matter further. At that meetings Mr Harvey did not support the decision made two days previous and the funding which had been forthcoming from Works Tasmania for Honeywell to upgrade the system was withdrawn by Mr Watts. Mr Kellett stated that early in 1999 Honeywell P/L informed the Prison Service that their energy system was not Y2K compliant and offered to make the system compliant at a cost of $9,000. As this was not a budgeted item and the maintenance funds could not support this level of expenditure, no action was taken in the 1998-99 financial year. During a courtesy visit, the Victorian company indicated to Mr Kellett that due to technology improvements, they were in a position to offer substantial reductions in the cost of a replacement energy management system. Tenders were called for the supply of this equipment and were received in March 1999 for $13,900. This tender was to completely replace the existing system and provide for some upgrading of newly defined loads that needed to be controlled. Again this was not a budgeted item and permission to proceed was delayed until July 1999. By this time the tender had lapsed, new management had been appointed to the Victorian Company and the tender price was withdrawn leaving the Prison Services in a further predicament, and according to Mr Kellett the Prison did not have sufficient finances to re-negotiate with the Victorian suppliers. According to Mr Kellett a second quotation was received from Honeywell for the Y2K compliance work, this time for $14,000, however, this system would not be supported by Honeywell as the system offered was outdated and not Honeywell’s preferred option, which was now estimated to be approximately $23,000. It was then discovered that whilst the $23,000.00 system offered by Honeywell was Y2K compliant it would only do what the present system was doing. Following further negotiations with Honeywell P/L by Mr Kellett, he was advised that if he wanted to include the other options into the energy system , such as the hospital and other areas, it would cost about eighty thousand dollars ($80,000). Mr Kellett stated that during Y2K compliance testing, he was discussing these matters with the Prison’s electric boiler manufacturer, Knapp Lewer P/L, of Derwent Park and they expressed their interest in tendering for a replacement energy management system. As a result, a tender for $14,200 was accepted to completely replace the old Honeywell system. Permission to proceed was given in December 1999 and the new Knapp Lewer is now in operation. Final commissioning is presently taking place. I am of the opinion that the tenacity and lateral thinking of Mr Kellett in his dealing with this matter shows what can be achieved when people are prepared to assist their departments in making the budget stretch.
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