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A Defense of the Ambiguity Theory of 'Knows' Mark R Purdue University Purdue e-Pubs Open Access Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 4-2016 A defense of the ambiguity theory of 'knows' Mark R. Satta Purdue University Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_dissertations Part of the Epistemology Commons Recommended Citation Satta, Mark R., "A defense of the ambiguity theory of 'knows'" (2016). Open Access Dissertations. 703. https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_dissertations/703 This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact [email protected] for additional information. A DEFENSE OF THE AMBIGUITY THEORY OF ‘KNOWS’ A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Purdue University by Mark R. Satta In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy May 2016 Purdue University West Lafayette, Indiana ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS It has been an honor to learn, study, research, and write for the past five years as a graduate student in Purdue’s Department of Philosophy. My thanks to the philosophy faculty who, as a whole, have provided me with so much guidance and growth during my time here along with a consistent show of support. A special thanks to my major professor, Matthias Steup, whose clarity of mind and ability to skillfully convey ideas in both speech and writing have made me a better philosopher and a better writer. My thanks also to the other Purdue faculty members on my committee — Michael Bergmann, Rod Bertolet, and Paul Drape r — each of whom have propel led my philosophical thought and ability forward with their talents a s philosophers and as teachers. You have all helped make my dissertation better. My thanks also to my outside reader, Baron Reed, whose philosophical insight an d strong grasp on the history of philosophy has led to a superior dissertation. My gratitude extends to the many talented graduate students in Purdue’s philosophy department whom I’ve had the chance to study alongside with, including (b ut certainly not limited to) Davis Kuykendall, Joel Johnson, Mike Popejoy, Brian Johnson, Tiffany Mont oya, Jonathan Fuqua, Patrick Grafton - Cardwell, Max Spears, Ryan van Nood, Elaine Blum , and Brandon Rdzak . Thanks to each of you as well as to the many oth ers who have gone unnamed here. A special thanks to three of my closest friends and colleagues — Lacey Davidson, Natalia Washington, and Chapman Waters — whose support, friendship, and conversation have been , and still are, of immeasurable value . I’ve benefited not only from studying alongside graduate students in the philosophy department but also from conversation s and camaraderie with graduate students, both past and present, across the disciplines at Purdue , including Stefanie Plemmons, Lauren iii Kuyk end all, Quincy Law, Ben Ashman, Natalie van Hoose , Mary Beth Harris, and Paul West — as well as from the other members of the “W&C”, Jeff Greeley, Gretchen Freese, and Steve Rye. Thanks also to the many philosophical mentors I gained during my time at Purdue , notably Jonathan Beever and Tina Rulli, who have patiently answ ered my many questions . Thank you to those in the Purdue community who have enriched my quality of life beyond that of just work. To my fellow Purdue improvis ers and comedians Aaren Kracich , Michael Sullivan, Peter King, Christina Buckley, Adriano Bianchini, Nick Miller, Matt Waweru, Cole Hendricks, Natalie Weber, Patrick Wilson, Emily Chesney, Tim Walther, Kathleen Haines, and Duncan Moran, thank you for making me laugh, allowing me to crea te, and providing an ever - present family. To my friends at the Lafayette Crisis Center — especially Jason Smith, Beth Lutes, Abby Gomez de la Casa, Taylor Hall, Carol Crochet, and Olanda Torres — thank you for your service to this community and for letting me serve alongside you. Thanks also to the folks at St. John’s for your encouragement and fellowship, especially, Bradley Pace. The chanc e to be connected in all these ways to th e Purdue community has added richly to my life. To my parents, thank you for never asking “Philosophy, what are you going to do with that!?” but rather saying instead “Philosophy, that’ s such a good fit for you. We’re so proud and excited for you!” It’s been easier to take the winding journey I have knowing that you were proud of m y steps and never critical. To my siblings , Stephanie, John, and Laura, thank you for inst illing in me a sense of humor that keeps my outlook on life fresh and positive. T hanks t o my cousins, Sarah, Emily, Ryan, Kristen, Andy, and Man d y, who further instil l ed that many - fold. For me, laughter and positivity enables a clear mind. To you all and to the rest of the Sattas, Gregorys, and Watsons (especially Grandpa and Grandma Satta, Grandma Watson, and Aunt Sue) — thank you for providing me with a good childhood and a belief in the positive power of meaningful relationships. To the special friends from my younger years — whose friendships have lasted, and changed, and grown, since childhood — notably Katie Cortina, Liz Snook, Jenny Miller, Jord an Smith, and Jessica Gasbarre — it’s been an honor to grow together; thank you. To the faculty and staff at Houghton College, thank you for giving me a liberal arts iv education, the value of which I didn’ t understand at the time . And to my many dear friends from Houghton College, some of whom showed exorbitant patience as I expressed my nascent philosophical thinking, thanks for providing such an invigorating and enjoyable first step into adulthood. A special thanks to Ian Taylor, a patient listene r and special friend, and to Seth Frndak, Connie Foster, Janet and Bruce Mourhess, Elissa Lahar, Susanna Addison, Mike Danylak, Nuk Kongkaw, and Briana Bishop. T hanks also to Jackie Wheeler, Emma Williams, Heather Haverstick, and especially Renee Roberts, for stepping up when I was feelin g down. Thank you to the faculty at SUNY Brockport, who rallied behind a guy with a goal, even though it was a bit of an outlandish one. And finally thank you to all those engaged in the “search after truth.” It’s an honor to be on this journey with you. May we receive when we ask, find when we seek, and have new doors opened unto us as we continue to knock. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. vi INTRODUCTION ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 1 CHAPTER 1: THEORIES OF MEANING, THE DEVELOPMENT OF EPISTEMIC CONTEXTUALISM AND A NEW CONTENDER ................................ ...................... 5 1.1 Theories of Semantics ................................ ................................ ................... 7 1.2 The History and Development of Epistemic Contextualism .......................... 16 1.3 Contextualism and the Ambiguity Theory of ‘Knows’ ................................ 33 CHAPTER 2: CONTEXTUALISM AND THE AMBIGUITY THEORY OF ‘KNOWS’ ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 39 2.1 Contextualism, Invariantism, and the Ambiguity Theory of ‘Knows’ ........... 40 2.2 The Strengths of Contextualism and the Ambiguity Theory ......................... 50 2.3 An Ambiguity Theory - Friendly Explanation of the Appeal of Con textualism ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 55 2.4 The Advantages of the Ambiguity Theory over Epistemic Contextualism .... 58 CHAPTER 3: MODERATE CLASSICAL INVARIANTISM, WARRANTED ASSERTABILITY MANEUVERS, AND THE AMBIGUITY THEORY OF ‘KNOWS’ ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 66 3.1 The Views Defined, Explained, and Compared ................................ ............. 67 3.2 The Case for the Ambiguity Theory via DRWI ................................ ............ 74 3.3 The Viability of Moderate Invariantism’s Warranted Assertability Maneuver 82 3.4 Semantic Blindness and the Ambiguity of ‘Knows’ ................................ ...... 98 CHAPTER 4: A LINGUISTIC GROUNDING FOR A POLYSEMY THEORY OF ‘KNOWS’ ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 1 08 4.1 Ambiguity, Polysemy, and Context - Sensitivity ................................ .......... 109 4.2 Stanley’s Argument Against the Ambiguity Theory of ‘Knows’ ................ 113 4.3 A Case for the Linguistic Grounding of a Polysemy Theory of ‘Knows’ .... 119 CONCLUSIO N ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 1 3 5 REFERENC ES ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 136 VITA ................................ ................................ ................................ .......................... 142 vi ABSTRACT Satta, Mark R. Ph.D., Purdue University, May 2016. A Defense of the Ambiguity Theory of ‘Knows’. Major Professor: Matthias Steup. In recent years, questions regarding the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions (sentences of the form ‘S knows that P’ where S is a subject and P a proposition) and knowledge denials (sentences of the form ‘S doesn’t know that P’) have been at the fore of a certain sector of analytic epistemology and philosophy of language. These questions include
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