Current Plans for Developing the : A Critical Perspective

Shlomo Swirski January 2007

מרכז אדוה, ת.ד. 36529, תל -אביב 61364, טל. 03-5608871, פקס. 03-5602205 Adva Center, POB 36529, Tel Aviv 61364, Tel. 03-5608871, Fax. 03-5602205 web site: http://www.adva.org e-mail: [email protected]

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Adva Center is a non-partisan, independent Table of Contents action-oriented policy analysis center. The mission of Adva is to promote equality for citizens of all ethnic and socio-economic minorities, including gender equality. The Negev – a Snapshot 3

Board Members “Negev 2015” 7 Dr. Yossi Dahan, Chair Ms. Gilberte Finkel, Treasurer The National Outline Plan (NOP Professor Ismael Abu-Saad Dr. Nitza Berkovitch 35) and The Metropolis 18 Dr. Dani Filc Plan (NOP 4/14/23) Dr. Rachel Kallus Professor Hubert Law-Yone The National Security Council 24 Professor Uri Ram Position Paper Dr. Yitzhak Saporta Professor Rivka Savaiya Alternative Plans: The Regional 27 Professor Oren Yiftachel Council for Unrecognized Negev Professor Yossi Yona Villages

Audit Committee Alternative Plans: Abu-Saad and 27 Attorney Ovadia Golestany Lithwick Attorney Dori Spivak Alterna ti ve Principles for 28 Staff Developing the Negev Ms. Barbara Swirski, Executive Director Dr. Shlomo Swirski, Academic Director Appendix: Conflicting Figures on 31 Ms. Etty Konor-Attias, Research Coordinator Ms. Yael Hasson, Researcher; Co-coordinator the Population Women’s Budget Forum Attorney Ola Shtewee, Co-coordinator Bibliography 32 Women’s Budget Forum Attorney Noga Dagan-Buzaglo, Researcher Ms. Yael Vurgan, Outreach and Popular Education Coordinator Amy Tomchin, Development Coordinator Mira Asseo, Office Manager

+ The research and publication of this report was made possible by generous grants from Mr. Robert Arnow and from the Moriah Fund.

Translation: Ruth Morris 3

The Negev – A Snapshot country’s veteran Zionist population, who were of largely European stock.

The population of the Negev is a reflection A third wave of Jews, larger than its two of the geo-political changes that have predecessors, arrived in the 1950s and affected the area since 1948, as well as the 1960s. It consisted of Jews from the Arab efforts undertaken by the State of to countries, primarily in North Africa, who consolidate its control of the Negev. were settled in “development towns” and cooperative settlements known as Comprising twenty-five percent of the moshavim. To this day, these Mizrahi Jews population, the Bedouin - who for constitute the majority of the Jewish generations prior to 1948 were the only residents of the Negev. inhabitants of the Negev - have become a marginalized minority. During the 1948 In the 1960s and 1970s, major efforts were fighting, most of the were invested in putting the Jewish hold over the expelled or fled; those who remained in area on a solid footing, either through the Israeli territory were forcibly transferred construction of new urban localities, such into an area east of Beersheba known as the as Arad, or the expansion of existing ones, “Sayig,” east of Beersheba, an area that is primarily Beersheba. During the same smaller than that from which they were period, an effort was also made to attract a expelled, as well as more arid. “strong” (i.e. Ashkenazi or western) population to the urban localities of the The Palestinian villagers who prior to 1948 Negev. In the 1970s and 1980s, affluent lived in the northern part of the southern satellite or dormitory towns were region of Israel – what is today the established or expanded in the area. These Ashqelon district – fled or were expelled, include Omer (founded in 1949; it began to their villages were destroyed, and many of attract the better-off families from them were confined to the Gaza Strip, Beersheba in the 1970s), and which changed hands several times and (founded in 1984 and 1985, today is part of the Palestinian Authority. respectively). These towns are the local equivalents of the mitzpim or hilltop settlements, established in the Galilee during Most of the Jews, who today constitute the the same period and offering middle and upper- majority of the Negev population, arrived middle class Jews a suburban life style. after 1948, in a number of waves that were directed to the Negev by the government. The first wave of organized Jewish The last major wave of Jewish residents settlement arrived shortly before the arrived in the 1990s, in the wake of the declaration of the State of Israel, when the mass Jewish emigrations from the countries Zionist leadership of the pre-State Jewish of the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia. population set up kibbutzim as “footholds” This wave expanded the area’s urban in order to establish a Zionist claim to this infrastructure, i.e. the development towns part of the country. A second wave of and Beersheba. Jewish agricultural settlement came immediately after the establishment of the Continuous population growth has not State, in the 1950s, as part of the attempt to changed the status of the Negev as Israel’s block the routes along which Palestinian least populated area; it presently comprises refugees were infiltrating back to their lands less than eight percent of Israel’s total from the Gaza Strip and the southern population. Furthermore, most Negev Hebron Hills. The kibbutzim, established as residents are at the bottom of the socio- part of these two settlement waves, were economic ladder, as ranked by various primarily populated by children of the important indicators, such as income, high 4 school matriculation, and college , Yeroham, , , attendance. , and – a large proportion of residents are employed in manufacturing At the same time, the Negev has a number and services jobs and fall into the medium- of affluent “islands,” headed by Omer, low income deciles. Sderot, Netivot, and Lehavim and Meitar. Overwhelmingly, the Ofakim are classified as localities with the residents of these localities comprise the lowest average income levels among the Negev’s executives and researchers, as well country’s Jewish localities – only slightly as senior officials in both the civil and the above those of the Bedouin localities: while military echelons. These three towns rank the average income (in 2002) earned by among the country’s top ten localities with men in the seven recognized Bedouin regard to average local salary levels localities varies between NIS 5,653 a month (Schurtz, 2005). They also comprise three (in ) and NIS 6,033 a month (in out of the country’s four communities with Hora), in Sderot the equivalent figures (in the highest rate of 20-29 year olds studying 2002) were NIS 6,462, with NIS 6,555 in at academic institutions (together with the Netivot, and NIS 6,723 in Ofakim. Galilee’s Kfar Vradim: Swirski and Konor- Attias, 2005). Beersheba, the Negev’s largest city, has a At the other end of the socio-economic large number of neighborhoods whose ladder is Israel’s poorest population group, situation does not differ much from that of the Bedouin, who today comprise about a the development towns. Overall, in 2002, quarter of the Negev’s population (around the average income of males in Beersheba 150,000 out of approximately 550,000). was NIS 8,861 a month. This was slightly Slightly over half of the Bedouin live in higher than that of Jerusalem (NIS 8,373 a recognized villages that are at the bottom of month), but Jerusalem has one of Israel’s the country’s rankings for practically all highest proportions of ultra-Orthodox community-based socio-economic indices. residents, whose employment-derived The remaining Bedouin population live in incomes are notably low; in contrast, localities that are not recognized by the average wages in Beersheba were lower State and hence lack the most basic than those of Israel’s two other largest services, such as clean water, electricity and cities, Haifa (NIS 10,743 a month) and Tel telephone services, access roads, public Aviv (NIS 11,088 a month). It should also institutions, schools, and service, be noted that the average Beersheba salary commercial and industrial areas (Swirski was much lower than that of Meitar, at NIS and Hasson, 2005). The Negev Bedouin 16,242 a month, Lehavim, at NIS 18,201, have the country’s lowest rate of high and Omer, at NIS 19,146 a month (Schurtz, school matriculation. In 2005, the figure 2005). was just 26.6%, compared with a national figure of 44.9%; all seven of the recognized Most of the Jewish agricultural localities townships fall into the bottom quarter of the (moshavim and kibbutzim) are also average community wages table; all seven characterized by middle or lower income of them belong to the localities with the levels: the Hevel Ayalot, Bnei Shimon, highest level of jobseekers; and , the Tamar, Eshkol, Sha’ar Hanegev, and Sdot biggest recognized Bedouin locality, has Hanegev Regional Councils are categorized Israel’s lowest rate of 20-29 year-olds as regional councils with the lowest average studying at an academic institution (Swirski income levels out of all of Israel’s regional and Konor-Attias, 2005). councils (Schurtz, 2005).

Among the Jewish localities in the Negev, The low income levels in most of the the development towns have the lowest localities of the Negev make it difficult to socio-economic level. In all of them – generate a sufficiently broad tax basis to 5 finance local development. This is reflected per capita less than the settlements. in an examination of the sources of However, when the locally-raised income financing for Israel’s local authorities, of the Bedouin localities, most of whose showing that the local revenues of the local residents are poverty-stricken, is added to authorities in the Negev (for their regular the income from the government, the budget), calculated on a per capita basis, are resultant total (in the regular budget) of the lower than in other parts of the country: in local authorities in the Bedouin localities 2004, while average per capita local comes to NIS 3,143 per capita – compared revenue for the entire country (excluding with NIS 4,987 per capita in the Jewish settlements across the Green Line) development towns, and NIS 4,929 per amounted to NIS 3,194, for all the Negev capita in Omer, Lehavim, and Meitar. localities together, the equivalent figure was NIS 2,559. The lowest income was When the scope of this analysis is taken recorded for the recognized Bedouin beyond average income levels by locality localities, at just NIS 628, with the highest and beyond government financing of being in Omer, Lehavim, and Meitar, at municipal budgets, we find that the Negev NIS 3,664 per capita. In the Negev’s has a very narrow economic basis. Before development towns, local revenues stood at 1948, the Negev had no local economic an average of NIS 1,937 per capita, and in infrastructure capable of providing a large Beersheba, at NIS 2,983 per capita (all of population with a livelihood: the Bedouin the statistics in this paragraph and those eked out a precarious living from farming below are taken from a special analysis by and trading. The pre-1948 rulers of the area the Adva Center of data from the Interior – the Ottomans and British – did not see the Ministry, 2006). Negev as an area worth developing economically, and hence did not provide it In the absence of local resources, the with any new resources. In contrast, Israel government might have been expected to attached great importance to making the give particularly generous aid to the Negev Negev an integral part of the country. As a localities, so as to enable their local result, it sent more and more people to live authorities to provide the population with in the Negev, particularly Jewish good services, and even to invest in local immigrants from the Arab countries, and, economic development. This was done for somewhat later, it also took upon itself to municipal budgets in the Israeli settlements provide them with jobs. Initially the country in the Palestinian territories, which in 2004 invested in the area’s agricultural amounted to NIS 1,949 per capita, while the development, by bringing water down from equivalent financing for all of the local the country’s north. The water was authorities in Israel averaged NIS 1,184 per provided to the kibbutzim and moshavim capita. As far as the Negev is concerned, established in the area, but not to the Beersheba received NIS 1,258 per capita, Bedouin in the Sayig area - who, in contrast while the Negev’s development towns to the newcomers - had been farming for received an average of NIS 1,401 per generations. capita. True, in both instances this is more generous financing than the average for the As in and by itself, agriculture could not aggregate of localities in Israel (at NIS serve as a source of income for all of the 1,184 per capita), but less generous than Jews who were settled in the Negev, the what goes to the settlements over the Green government initiated the development of Line. new sources of employment. To a great extent, that development was based on the The recognized Bedouin localities enjoyed Negev’s natural resources - primarily the even greater government support – NIS potash and bromine to be found in the Dead 1,786 per capita, approximately NIS 160 Sea, and the phosphates of Nahal Zin 6

(today, most of the chemical plants belong have been and continue to be the biggest to the Israel Chemicals group: Yiftachel, and only large-scale employer in the Negev. Gradus and Razin, n.d.: 8). As this short overview has shown, The chemicals industry was also unable to investments in the Negev have come and provide the Negev’s growing population continue to come from outside the Negev with a livelihood, as it is capital-intensive itself – from the State’s coffers, from the and generates a relatively small number of country’s defense budget, from the owners jobs (Newman, Gradus and Levinson, 1995: of chemicals, textiles and food plants who 16). Thus the government encouraged a live in the country’s central region. The new development project: in the late 1950s Negev has never managed to become a and 1960s, the Negev saw the arrival of focus of independent economic labor-intensive industrial plants, development. The main manufacturing particularly in the textiles industry. activities that take place in the Negev are Employing thousands of people, these controlled from the outside and directed factories constituted the main “solution” to towards the outside: production is the need for employment for tens of earmarked for export or for use in the center thousands of new residents, many of whom of Israel, while ownership and management had previously seen years of are in the hands of corporations unemployment. (The 1990s saw the headquartered in the country’s central closures of the textile factories, as they region; most of the profits find their way moved to Jordan, and Turkey, where outside as well. A large proportion of the wages were cheaper.) various industrial plants have their own individual ties with a nerve center outside In the 1990s, as thousands of Jews from the the Negev, and the local link between each former Soviet Union came to live in the of them is tenuous at best. Negev, employment in manufacturing in the area increased. This time, the increase Finally, it should be noted that the Negev took the form of new, labor-intensive plants has not really been involved in the main in the electronics industry (Yiftachel, economic developments taking place in Gradus and Razin, n.d.: 8). While most of Israel over the last decade, the major ones the plants were established north of being the growth of hi-tech industries and Beersheba, in the Ashqelon district, some the financial services sector. These were set up in the Negev as well, developments, which attract the lion’s share particularly in Beersheba. of capital in Israel, take place in the center of the country, and to the extent that they Despite the above developments, the most trickle down, it is a very thin trickle that is important source of employment in the not capable of generating a real turnabout in Negev was and still remains - the State the economy of the Negev. apparatus. The Jews who were settled in the Negev were accompanied by the panoply of The Negev also suffers from the fact that the trappings of government: local the government, which for decades was a authorities, police, schools, health services, key factor in its economic development – welfare services, etc. Other State agencies whether by building the Yarkon-Negev moved to the Negev included the Israel water pipeline, or setting up quarrying Defense Forces (IDF), which turned the industries, or encouraging the establishment Negev not only into a training ground, but of textile factories and army camps – is no also into an instruction and storage area. In longer taking initiatives or assuming addition, the army also set up plants and responsibility for the development of the services in the Negev. Together, the IDF, country in general and for the Negev, in local governments and state-level services particular, as it did in the past. This is the 7 result of an ideological change, a switch As a result of the Second Lebanon War, the from the “developmental state” to a neo- date of implementation of Cabinet liberal outlook that advocates reducing the Resolution 4415 was postponed. The 2007 state’s role and resources, turning the budget, a significant part of which was responsibility for economic growth and earmarked for financing the cost and development over to the business consequences of the war, includes a sum of community. just NIS 400 million for the Negev development project. The Negev – once again the focus of attention? Nevertheless, and in light of the Negev’s situation today, it may be reasonably assumed that in the future the government However, in recent years a change has will once again return to the plans referred become discernible. Firstly, the state’s to above. Against this background, we planning authorities have prepared a consider the following analysis of the national outline plan – NOP 35 – as well as various development plans for the Negev an a district plan for the Beersheba metropolis. important exercise. These two plans have implications for the development of the Negev in general, and the Bedouin localities in the Negev, in “Negev 2015” particular .

Secondly, in 2005 the “Daroma” Of all the plans discussed below, “Negev association submitted “A National Strategic 2015” is the most comprehensive. In fact, it Plan for the Development of the Negev ” may be the only comprehensive plan ever (henceforth: “Negev 2015”. This is the put forward for the area. Negev 2015 most comprehensive plan proposed to date proposes action on a broad range of issues, for government investment in actions from transport and real estate through intended to help develop the Negev. On health and education. The plan both November 20, 2005, the Cabinet adopted supplements and brings into focus the plan as part of its strategy for the 2006- proposals made earlier, in the framework of 2015 decade, in the framework of outline plans approved in previous years: “government activities to promote the National Outline Plan (NOP 35), and the Negev’s development and growth” (Cabinet “Beersheba Metropolis” outline plan (DOP Resolution 4415). The Cabinet also decided 4/14). Negev 2015 also integrates plans that to allocate from the state budget the amount have been under discussion by the of NIS 17 billion, to be spread over 10 government for a considerable time, such as years, for financing the implementation of transferring IDF training bases to the the recommendations (Cabinet Resolution Negev. Finally, unlike past government 4415, paragraph 5). plans for developing the Galilee, which were in essence plans to “Judaize the Thirdly, the Ehud Barak administration, and Galilee,” Negev 2015 pays special attention subsequently the Ariel Sharon to the Arab residents of the Negev – the administration, made a number of important Bedouin – and allocates resources to their decisions about the Negev Bedouin. In benefit. 2005, the National Security Council published a position paper based on the The plan was worked out by a group called Sharon government’s decisions, which "Daroma-Eidan HaNegev” (“Southward- outlined ways of implementing them. The Negev Era”), a non-profit association headed by Tal Dillian and Haim Blumenblat, two colonels in the IDF reserves; Nir Gilad, formerly in charge of 8 budgets at the Finance Ministry; and Eitan the same time. Wertheimer, co-owner of the Iscar corporation. The Jewish Agency teamed up Negev 2015 fills five volumes and covers a with this group. Half of Daroma’s financing very broad range of topics and sub-topics. comes from Israeli sources, while the other The discussion below will not address all of half comes from Jewish sources in the the areas covered: instead, it will focus on Diaspora (Bassok, February 2, 2006). The what I consider to be the core of the plan: group brought together persons from bringing about the conditions necessary to government and from the private and attract about 200,000 Jews with high voluntary sectors, and used a team approach incomes to the Negev from the country’s to focus on the following topics: (1) central region, as well as the assumption economic development, (2) infrastructure that these newcomers will start a chain and environmental quality, (3) housing, (4) reaction that will result in the development education, and (5) community and of the Negev and have a positive effect on leadership. all of its residents.

In October 2005, the association submitted What’s in a name? its plan to the Cabinet. In the words of its designers, the plan was intended to make the Negev into an “economically The key to the crux of Negev 2015 is to be progressive area attractive to people and found in its official name: “A National businesses, offering quality of life and Strategic Plan for the Development of the residential caliber, and making it possible to Negev.” This name hints at the existence of achieve a diverse, multi-cultural community two goals: one, a national strategic plan, texture” (Negev 2015, background chapter). and the other, the development of the Negev. On November 20, 2005, the Cabinet adopted the Daroma team’s The first half of the name indicates the recommendations en bloc, in the framework plan’s primary goal, which is to promote of its operations for 2006-2015. It did this the strategic interest of the State, or, to be “in the framework of the government’s more precise, of the Jewish national state: actions to promote the development and to strengthen the State’s hold on this growth of the Negev” (Cabinet Resolution sparsely populated, relatively remote part of 4415). The Cabinet also made a decision to the country (with eight percent of the allocate the amount of NIS 17 billion country’s population and 60 percent of its dollars from the state budget, to be spread territory), which is surrounded on two sides over 10 years, to finance the by Arab countries. Most of the inhabitants implementation of the recommendations of the Negev fall into Israel’s lowest socio- (Cabinet Resolution, Paragraph 5). economic category, and are viewed as a dependent population in need of constant It should be noted that although this is a support by State institutions. This fairly impressive amount, if it is divided by population also includes a large minority the ten years covered by the plan, it boils (about one quarter of the total) of Muslim down to around NIS 1.7 billion a year. Bedouin; for many Jews, the Bedouin are While this is not a trifling amount, it is not objects of suspicion, whose loyalty to the sufficient to bring about real change, if we State is less than total; this suspicion take into account the fact that for the sometimes turns into fear, as a result of the Bedouin population, it purports to tackle group’s high fertility rate. A combination of economic development, improve all of these factors apparently explains the infrastructure systems, upgrade the first part of the plan’s official name: “A education system, and more – at one and National Strategic Plan.” 9

The development of the Negev is the because not many Palestinian citizens of second half of the plan’s official name. It is Israel fall into the “strong population” hard to escape the impression that the fact category. that this goal is to be found in the second part of the name is indicative of its How is “a strong population” supposed to secondary importance. And indeed, as will contribute to the development of the be seen below, the present-day residents of Negev? One possibility is to be found in the the Negev, Jews and Muslims alike, occupy neo-liberal “trickle-down” theory, a position of secondary importance in the according to which a policy of making the plan’s goals. rich richer – tax cuts, capital subsidies, financial incentives to individuals and The fact that Negev 2015 has two goals corporations, “special” education and health does not help to focus it, among other tracks, and so on – ultimately help society things, because these two goals do not as a whole, since in the long run the necessarily complement each other. Any accumulated wealth at the top trickles down complementarity exists only when the issue to the lower strata as well. Although not is examined from the vantage point of the specifically stated by Negev 2015 authors, Negev’s present inhabitants and it is it can be reasonably assumed that they hope assumed that their development will that the improved conditions offered to the contribute to strengthening the State’s hold “strong population” from Israel’s central on the Negev. However, when one looks at region will, in the long run, help the the issue from the vantage point of the Negev’s present-day “weak population” powers that be, strengthening the present- through the trickle-down effect. However, it day population is just one of the ways of must be said that the trickle-down theory no strengthening the State’s hold over the area. longer enjoys the strong support it had in The State has other options to choose from the past, among other things because of the – including bringing in a new population dubious reputation earned by “in the long that it considers more suitable and more run” theories. As the well-known British reliable. economist John Maynard Keynes once quipped, “in the long run - - - we are all dead.” Attracting a strong population

But there is also a more short-term, practical approach through which it will be This is the crux of Negev 2015: attracting possible to show that bringing in “a strong some 200,000 new residents to the area, so population” will contribute to strengthening that the population of the Negev will grow the Negev in economic terms. When the from 535,000 (in 2003) to approximately authors of Negev 2015 discuss the issue of 900,000 in 2015. Because the current wages, employment and educational natural growth rate would increase the disparities between the Negev and the population of the Negev to no more than central part of Israel, they state that the 700,000 by 2015, the balance is to come plan’s objective is “to reduce the average from Israel’s central region. wage gap,” “to eliminate the disparity in

student levels,” “to bring jobless levels into The new residents in question are not line with the national rate,” and so on envisaged as average . They are to (Cabinet Resolution 4415; Negev 2015, be “a strong population,” defined expressly Chapter 2: 2). Now, a regional average can as “families with high incomes” (Negev be improved in one of two ways. One is by 2015, Chapter 2: 5, 33). Nor are these improving the situation of every single undefined “Israelis,” but Jewish ones. This individual, or at least the majority of them; detail is not stated explicitly, but it is hard while the other is to drastically improve the to miss the inference – first and foremost 10 figures by bringing in “a strong 15, 20-21); Sofer, 1992: 25-26). They population.” The latter will raise the followed the format of upscale dormitory average for Negev residents as a whole communities devoid of any independent without having to invest in any significant economic infrastructure; their residents improvement in the situation of the present derived their livelihoods by commuting to inhabitants of the Negev. the large coastal cities (Lipshitz and Czymanski, 1990: 288; Sofer, 1992: 29; How is a strong population to be Dor, 2004: 41-42). From this point of view, attracted to the Negev? the population of the hilltop communities was “a strong population,” just like the population the planners intend to bring into In its current condition, the Negev is unable the Negev under Negev 2015. The hilltop to offer suitable employment to the desired communities did not succeed in changing “strong population.” This being the case, “the demographic picture of the Jewish the authors of Negev 2015 suggest that the Galilee”; nevertheless, “their importance “strong population” come to live in the lies in their geo-political location and must Negev but continue to earn their living in be evaluated along these lines” (Sofer, the central part of the country. “A 1992: 27). considerable proportion of the Negev’s economic development must be based on How is a southern version of the hilltop commuting – i.e. the movement of a strong communities project to be brought about? population to the Negev, most of whom The solution proposed by Negev 2015 will continue to work in the central area” planners fits in with the spirit of the times: (Negev 2015, Chapter 2: 5). it must be remembered that the hilltop communities undertaking “was put into This is the very essence of Negev 2015, and practice … swiftly … and was depicted what it does is to make it into a southern entirely as a military operation or a rural- version of the Judaization of the Galilee settlement undertaking along the lines of project that involved the establishment of the 11 communities established on a single hilltop Jewish communities there. In 1979, night in the Negev during the pre-State the Israeli government initiated the creation period” (Sofer, 1992: 24). In Israel, in the of dozens of such communities in the first decade of the 21st century, when the Galilee. Within a decade, 52 of them had “strong population” is affluent, been built throughout the northern region of sophisticated, and pampered, population the country (Dor, 2004: 7). The “national transfers cannot resemble military strategic” goal of the hilltop communities operations; a different strategy is called for. project was “to promote the distribution of Accordingly, the Negev 2015 planners the Jewish population in the Galilee hills propose the creation of “high-caliber and to conserve State lands” (Sofer, 1992: transport infrastructure and attractive 24; see also Dor, 2004: 9). The background housing, education and community options” to this was the Israeli government’s fears (Negev 2015, Chapter 2: 5). that in the wake of the peace agreement with Egypt, which was signed the same Below we will discuss each of these year and promised autonomy to the separately. Palestinians in the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967, Palestinian citizens of Israel would want to obtain “national Arab High-caliber transport infrastructure autonomy” within Israeli territory (Dor, 2004: 14). The hilltop communities were Negev 2015 proposes upgrading the road established in the heart of areas with and rail system that links the Negev with contiguous Arab communities (Dor, 2004: the country’s central region, in order to 11 significantly reduce distances and travel to bring about real-estate products that are times. As for roads, the plan calls for in short supply in Israel” (Negev 2015, extending “Highway 6” (the “Trans-Israel Chapter 4: 5). The main component of the Highway”) to the Shoket Junction (instead plan is the construction of some 10,000 of to the Ma’ahaz Junction, as in the current “unique real-estate” units within the space plan), and expanding to four lanes both the of 10 years (Negev 2015, Chapter 4: 7). Lehavim-Arad road and the Beersheba ring These units are to be unique in two ways. road. As for rail transport, the plan proposes One is that they are to be built within or upgrading the Tel Aviv-Beersheba line and adjacent to attractive natural sites, such as cutting journey times, as well as laying Nahal Beersheba, Yeroham Lake, or the rim tracks alongside the Lehavim-Shoket-Arad of the Ramon Crater; as well as round road. In addition, it proposes laying tracks urban parks that Negev 2015 planners between Ramat Hovav and the Negev suggest creating, in places that include Junction, and between Ashqelon and Ofakim, Dimona, Yeroham and Sderot Beersheba. (Chapter 4: 29).

These road and rail connections are The second is that the new residents are to intended to enable the future inhabitants of be granted unique building rights on the Beersheba-Arad-Lehavim triangle, and particularly large plots – 2,000 square perhaps the new residents of more southerly meters instead of the 500 currently allowed localities, such as Yeroham, to reach their by the Israel Land Administration workplaces in Central Israel more quickly. elsewhere in Israel. Negev 2015 planners point out that this will require a change in In addition to this infrastructure, intended to the present-day outline plans (Chapter 4: serve thousands of men and women, Negev 27). 2015 also proposes special services for the crème de la crème, such as a landing strip Negev 2015 suggests three types of site in Mitzpe Ramon, to serve the residents of where high-class residential units are to be the high-class neighborhood to be built on constructed: (a) unique neighborhoods within the rim of the Ramon Crater (Negev 2015, urban localities; (b) unique rural sites; (c) Chapter 3: 7). This landing strip would be ranches for farming/tourism activities – around in addition to the two such facilities that 100 altogether (Chapter 4: 15, 18). In addition already exist in the Negev. to these exclusive and unique real-estate units, the plan also suggests constructing “almost-

unique” real estate, slightly lower in value, as The Negev 2015 view of transport well as regular real estate (Chapter 4: 7). infrastructure development places the emphasis on the link between the Negev and Central Israel. This is not the only way The view of real-estate development on of developing the region’s transport: the which the Negev 2015 planners base their Beersheba Metropolis outline plan offers a proposals can be roundly criticized. What different approach, to be examined below. they are actually proposing is to offer Israel’s affluent groups the natural Attractive housing resources and scenery that belong to all Israelis. This view encounters harsh How are Israelis in the top income quintile criticism when it is implemented in the to be enticed away from the central part of center of the country: for example, the “Sea the country to come and live in the Negev? and Sun” residential project in North Tel Negev 2015 planners believe this can be Aviv, or the marina project in Herzliya. Not done primarily by means of a “profound only do such projects lead to the destruction change in the housing experience of the of unique landscapes and natural resources, Negev by using the area’s natural resources they also negatively impact on the very 12 foundations of social equality and justice. Israel as well as worldwide. Thirdly, a As for the Herzliya marina project, it variety of bodies, including the State itself, should be remembered that Israel’s have for years been running educational Supreme Court used environmental and projects for those who excel – such as the socio-economic reasoning in its recent boarding schools project, operant since rejection of efforts by real-estate developers 1960 – without great success. One to change the designated purpose of the individual student or another may benefit apartments constructed at the marina, from from a special project, but special projects holiday and tourist abodes to regular fail to benefit the majority of students and residences. In this connection, the justices fail to raise the general level of education in wrote the following: “It would appear that an area. he [Mayor Eli Landau, who was interested in changing the designated usage] acted The and the strong primarily to remove planning restrictions so population as to enable private entrepreneurs to make a profit at the expense of protecting the Another means of attracting “a strong special character of the site” (Mirovsky, population” is to move certain IDF units to Ha’aretz, December 10, 2006). the Negev. The planners state, “it is expected that moving IDF units to the Privileged education Negev will bring about the migration to the Negev of a high-caliber population and Negev 2015’s proposals in the field of strengthen economic development” (Negev education are also primarily oriented 2015, Chapter 1: 27). This idea, first toward the “strong population” expected to advanced some time ago, is now included move to the Negev. The first paragraph of in Negev 2015. The Cabinet, in its the section on education states that Resolution 4415, attaches great importance “fostering excellence in a number of ways to this idea: “The plan is based, among will help to promote education in the Negev other things, on transferring IDF camps to and to brand it as an‘utterly different the Negev as a central step that will bring educational experience’” (Negev 2015, about and drive change, with the emphasis Chapter 5: 4). The plan proposes three ways on transferring the technological units of of fostering excellence: (1) establishing two the intelligence service and the central multi-disciplinary centers of excellence computer unit to the Greater Beersheba area (Chapter 5: 9); the planners note that “the and creating a hi-tech cluster and a centers of excellence are primarily intended ‘training-camp city,’ which will help drive for senior high school students specializing economic development, [attract] a high- in five units in their chosen field” (Chapter caliber population, and [encourage] the 5, Part B: 1); (2) introducing a system of development of educational and community differential “rewards” for excellent schools systems” (Cabinet Resolution 4415). and teachers (ibid: 9); and (3) a prestigious training program for outstanding school Now, the Negev has served for many years principals (ibid: 9). as a center for IDF camps and training areas. At the time of writing, many of those This is yet another example of a way of who live in the area’s development towns, thinking that is subject to considerable moshavim and kibbutzim are employed by controversy. Firstly, the emphasis on the IDF or the Defense Ministry. It can fostering excellence is frequently used as a reasonably be assumed that the additional smokescreen for delivering high-caliber population expected to come to the area as a education to the affluent only. Secondly, result of transferring camps and introducing differential rewards is fiercely installations will not be particularly large – opposed by the teachers’ organizations in Negev 2015 planners talk in terms of 13

“hundreds of families” (Chapter 1: 27). Bedouin, they are very far from what the Negev 2015 planners refer to as “a strong The main innovation does not lie in the size population.” Let it be said immediately that of the population to be lured to the Negev the situation of the Bedouin is so bad that to work in IDF compounds, but in the any of the measures proposed for them by distinction between the two populations that Negev 2015 should be welcomed. However, have ties with the IDF: the high-caliber the interesting question is whether the population (to be brought in), and its non- Negev 2015 proposals actually have the high-caliber counterpart (already living in potential to significantly improve the the Negev). This distinction reappears situation of the Bedouin. throughout Negev 2015, whether in the form of a contrast between the present-day The first point to make is that Negev 2015 population and the “strong population” that does not tackle the two main issues that the planners wish to attract, or the contrast hold up – or prevent - any improvement in between the types of military personnel. As the situation of the Bedouin: (1) the land a rule, it may be said that Negev 2015 is issue, and (2) the issue of recognition of replete with stereotypical images of the “unrecognized” Bedouin localities. It is as various population groups. if these issues have been defined by the Negev 2015 group, or by persons in There is one Negev population – the government circles with whom group Bedouin – that will derive no benefit members have been in touch, as “off whatsoever from the steps proposed above. limits.” It goes without saying that without The Bedouin are entirely excluded from the a solution to these two issues, the division between high-caliber and non- possibilities of reducing the gaps between high-caliber military personnel, because as the Bedouin and the Jews, including Jews a group they are not recruited by the IDF. A who do not belong to “a strong population,” small minority enlist on a voluntary basis, shrink drastically. and they serve primarily as scouts or as combat troops in the “Bedouin patrol The two most significant measures battalion.” The expansion of IDF bases and recommended by Negev 2015 are in the operations might even harm the Bedouin, if areas of infrastructure and education. At some of the planned camps and installations some NIS 1.8 billion, the infrastructure area were to end up on lands claimed by is slated to receive the largest financial Bedouin. investment of all the Negev 2015 plans earmarked for the Bedouin. It is noteworthy Negev 2015 and the Bedouin that this amount is part of a larger amount, approximately NIS 2.4 billion, that two The proposal to attract “a strong official bodies recommended investing: one population” of approximately 200,000 body is the government committee people to the Negev is the locomotive that examining improvements in the situation of is to pull along the other carriages of the the permanent localities in the southern Negev 2015 plan in its wake. We highlight Bedouin sector, which submitted its this component because it constitutes the recommendations in 2001; the second is the very heart of the entire project. Having Abu Basma District Council, designed to identified the locomotive, we will now serve a number of Bedouin localities in the examine Negev 2015’s proposals in relation process of attaining official recognition (see to a number of the groups that are supposed Negev 2015, Chapter 3: 6). To date, the to be pulled along by this locomotive. government has expended approximately NIS 600 million on this matter, and hence We will begin with the Bedouin. Given the the amount still awaiting disbursement, economic and social situation of the according to the Negev 2015 14 recommendation, is NIS 1.8 billion. This excellence. amount is designated primarily for water, sewage, garbage disposal, electricity and Given the poor state of the Bedouin communications - and in the Abu Basma educational system today, all of these localities, roads as well (Negev 2015, investments, including each in turn, are Chapter 3: 28-30). undeniably absolutely vital measures. However, it is a moot point whether they This sum of NIS 1.8 billion is intended for can be viewed as a “massive investment” recognized Bedouin localities: Rahat, that will bring about equality between Laqye, Hora, Segev Shalom, Ar’ara, Bedouin and Jews. It appears that the and Tel Sheva – plus the localities investments in question are intended to earmarked for inclusion in the Abu Basma obviate some of the most flagrant gaps. For District Council. The Bedouin localities example, of the multi-disciplinary centers that are “unrecognized” but not in the of excellence that Negev 2015 is proposing process of being recognized, and whose for the Negev, one is to be affiliated with population is estimated at between 40,000 Ben-Gurion University and the other with and 50,000 individuals, are not slated to Sapir College. The question is why Negev benefit from the infrastructure investments. 2015 does not include a proposal for an It should be noted that most of the -speaking multi-disciplinary center investments in question are designed to to be set up at the Shoket Junction area, bring the Bedouin localities up to the most where and near which most of the Bedouin basic level. To date, none of the recognized localities are located, given the fact that Bedouin villages has had sewerage systems, Bedouin children aged 5-19 make up a third and their road, water, communications and of this entire age group in the Negev electricity systems are of a very poor (Center for Bedouin Studies and standard. In order to evaluate the expected Development and Negev Center for contribution of the measures recommended Regional Development. 2004: Table 2/5). by Negev 2015, benchmarks should have been constructed to allow comparison Finally, it should be repeated that these between existing infrastructure levels in funds are primarily earmarked for the Jewish localities and infrastructure levels in recognized localities. In the “unrecognized” the Bedouin localities following localities, many children will continue to implementation. walk long distances in order to attend school. The Negev 2015 recommendations’ second largest investment in financial terms is the The third area addressed by the Negev 2015 investment in education. Here the figure is team is economic development. Compared between NIS 150 and NIS 160 million to the relatively large-scale investments annually, or between NIS 1.5 and NIS 1.6 proposed for infrastructure and education, billion in ten years – approximately a third the proposals in the field of economic of the total investment in education in the development are somewhat limited. One of Negev recommended by Negev 2015 them is opening job training centers, along (Chapter 5: 32; Chapter 1: 10). Of this the lines of the welfare reform pilot amount, the lion’s share is earmarked for program in operation in several localities in the construction of classrooms and Israel, while the second involves buildings. Smaller sums are designated for encouraging small businesses. This is upgrading early childhood education, particularly surprising given the fact that a improving the quality of teaching, and number of researchers have already worked training school counselors and out very detailed, wide-ranging proposals psychologists. Another amount is which, among others, include creating new designated for programs to encourage industrial areas, a variety of industrial 15 plants, a hospital, agricultural projects and vehicles and industrial plants, setting fire to more (for example, see Abu-Saad and forests and diverting rivers – all man-made Lithwick 2000). Another possibility that activities – as major causes of might have been raised by the Negev 2015 environmental degradation. However, what team is integrating the Bedouin into the does come as a surprise is that of all people, large number of projects and plants they Zohar identifies the Bedouin, with their low suggest setting up in the Negev - first and socio-economic status, as the main cause of foremost among them - hi-tech clusters, as “environmental stress” (Negev 2015, well as chemical and electronics plants. Chapter 3: 8). Zohar goes on to state that there are three causes for “the negative While the investment recommended in the effect of the Bedouin on the environment in economic development sphere falls short of the Negev”: (1) high birthrate, increasing meeting actual needs, Negev 2015 proposes the demand for limited environmental budgeting an extremely large amount in resources and increasing the generation of order to address a different “Bedouin all kinds of garbage; (2) low socio- problem.” This involves an annual figure of economic status, reflected, inter alia, in the some NIS 200 million in each of the first absence of proper sanitation services five years, which is to be earmarked for leading to health hazards such as the reducing crime and “improving the image proliferation of rodents and insects, plagues of the Negev.” This sum amounts to one- of mosquitoes and bad smells; and (3) eighth of the total Negev 2015 budget. The spatial expansion of Bedouin localities, underlying idea is to tackle property leading to the spread of these same hazards offenses, as well as the extortion of ( Chapter 3: 9-10). protection money from businessmen. The latter criminal activity results in business Such statements are hard to understand, people incurring major expenses, and it also given the fact that since the establishment makes it harder to start new enterprises of the State of Israel, the wide open spaces (Negev 2015, Chapter 2: 21, 31). Over the of the Negev have altered almost beyond years, many cases have been recorded in recognition as a result of activities which Bedouin were found to be involved undertaken by Jews: the construction of with such criminal offenses. The question is roads, landing strips, high-tension wires, whether it would not be more logical to urban housing projects, army camps, firing invest larger sums in education and ranges, sites for chemical and radioactive employment – and, of course, in solving the waste, exhaust fumes from vehicles and problem of land disputes and aircraft, jeep tours, and so on. Hence it is “unrecognized” villages - all major factors hard not to interpret Zohar’s focus on the behind the turn to crime. Bedouin, of all people, as an expression of racism, or, alternatively, as the reflection of This analysis of Negev 2015’s treatment of a desire common to many government the Bedouin is not complete without a bodies: to force the Bedouin to abandon comment on the chapter addressing the their lands and move into a small number of topic of infrastructure and the environment. recognized localities. It should be noted that This part of the work includes a document later in the document, Zohar does broaden by Dr. Aharon Zohar highlighting the his scope and refer to some of the factors environmental deterioration that has taken enumerated above as being responsible for place in the Negev and stating that the the deterioration in the quality of the “human factor” is overwhelmingly environment in the Negev, in addition to responsible for this state of affairs. This making the point that it is necessary to statement hardly comes as a surprise, since invest in empowering the Negev’s the worldwide environmental protection communities, and especially the Bedouin, movement identifies exhaust fumes from by means of education and employment 16

(Negev 2015, Chapter 3: 24). Nevertheless, from the surface; a large quantity of the emphasis on the Bedouin as the cause of effluent that has accumulated in the “environmental stress” is outrageous. In oxidation ponds of the Nuclear this respect, it is worth quoting a passage Research Center (NRC) near Dimona from Elisha Efrat’s book, National has been run off down one of the wadis that drains into the HaKatan, Planning and Development in Israel in the and findings have even indicated the Third Millenium: presence in this effluent of radioactive Reality in Israel shows that any space- materials, about whose quantity and related, industrial or technological degree of toxicity there is still subject which is inherently problematic, disagreement among experts; it has or any land use which for ecological been decided to make the NRC site an and environmental reasons does not suit area subject to ongoing monitoring and the authorities in terms of location sampling because within its bounds within the bounds of populated Israel, there take place radioactive-waste is shifted to the northern Negev as a storage and burial activities; the one-off solution to a specific problem. Dimona site stores spent uranium rods Today the site at Ramat Hovav with high-intensity radioactivity levels, constitutes the largest harmful as well as low-level radioactive waste industrial concentration in Israel: it which is brought to it from the Nahal extends over hundreds of dunams and Soreq site and from some 300 medical has even acquired the status of an and industrial sites throughout Israel; independent municipal authority. water previously used for rinsing Within the boundaries of this site there phosphates, contaminated with nitrates, is planned a large-scale incinerator to chlorine, magnesium and other salts, is dispose of organic and other waste, brought to the evaporation ponds at with a capacity of incinerating some Nahal Teren in the Zin Valley. This 20,000 tons annually, in addition to the water is supposed to evaporate without ordinary garbage which it will receive leaving any residue on the surface, but on a regular basis, as well as handling it has permeated to the groundwater and the gradual incineration of dangerous also got into the springs; at the Zin and organic waste, amounting to 30,000 Oron plants, there is damage similar to tons, which have accumulated over the that at Mishor and Rotem; in the years. Likewise, the evaporation ponds Ramon Crater there is large-scale at this site concentrate the effluent of mining and quarrying in the area which some 20 plants, making worse the smell has been declared a nature reserve; nuisances which have extended as far while in the Makhtesh Hagadol there as the localities of Ramat Hanegev, are clay and pure sand works that cause Yeroham, Dimona, southern Beersheba damage similar to that at the Ramon and the environs. With the Crater; Beersheba, the area’s main government’s decision to gradually large-scale city, adds to the close down some 350 unlicensed environmental pollution of the northern garbage dumps throughout the country Negev and is not managing to maintain and send all the garbage to two central its former quality of life: because of its and three secondary sites, it has been rapid population growth it is not resolved that one of the central sites is managing to deal with the sewage the Dudaim site north-west of produced by it, and as a result raw Beersheba, which is supposed to take sewage is making its way along Nahal the garbage from central Israel; the old Beersheba, Nahal Habesor and Nahal phosphates quarrying site at Oron is Patish, creating an extensive open supposed to be used as a national sewage system that stretches as far as landfill site for garbage; Mishor Rotem the outskirts of the town of Ofakim.” has become an open-cast mine which (Efrat, 2003: 143-144). impacts adversely on the landscape and fauna and where the groundwater is Efrat himself, it should be added, also polluted, with dust constantly rising speaks of the need “to save the country’s 17 lands” from the Bedouin (2003: 144). population can be sufficiently strengthened However, at least he refrains from charging to constitute the right type of population in them with responsibility for the the future. environmental destruction of the Negev. Negev 2015 makes this point explicitly. The Negev 2015 by-passes the development chapter on education contains a document towns prepared by Nahum Blass of Blass Socio- Educational Planning and Consultancy Ltd. The crux of Negev 2015, as shown above, is Consisting largely of demographic, physical the idea of attracting “a strong population” and educational data, the document notes to the Negev. At the same time, the that “the faster growth in the number of planners focus major attention on the students in the south and the Negev is Bedouin population of the Negev, almost entirely concentrated in the particularly with regard to infrastructure populations of students from weak socio- and education. In contrast, the plan appears economic backgrounds (the Bedouin), or to largely by-pass another major population from an ideological background alienated sector: residents of Jewish development from the values of modern western society towns. (the ultra-Orthodox)” (Negev 2015, Chapter 5, Appendix: 7). It must be said that the Persons residing in the development towns ultra-Orthodox in question are largely and in many of the moshavim would appear Mizrahi youngsters studying at Shas to belong to what the Negev 2015 planners educational institutions. For its part, the would call the “non-strong population”; less expansion of the Shas political party “non-strong” than the Bedouin, but far from constitutes a historical reflection of the being the kind of persons that Negev 2015 failure of the system to offer youngsters would like to attract to the area. In all from the development towns high-quality spheres – educational achievements, education leading to a school-leaving workforce participation, salary levels, certificate, to university, and to jobs with percentage living under the poverty line – reasonable wage levels. So as if it were not the statistics for most of the Jewish enough that in the past the State gave up on residents of the Negev are not impressive. a potential workforce comprised of For example, as we have seen, the average youngsters from the development towns, salary in some of the development towns is now the Negev 2015 plan comes along and not significantly higher than the average gives up on them yet again: as Nahum salary in the permanent Bedouin townships. Blass writes, “without extremely significant upgrading of the educational system in the As shown above, Negev 2015’s primary Bedouin sector, and in the parallel opening interest is in strengthening the “national up ultra-Orthodox education to subjects strategic” status of the Negev. such as sciences and English, there is no Theoretically, in order to achieve this goal, chance whatsoever that the development of it might have suggested strengthening the the Negev can be based on the local existing population, through massive populations.” This negative evaluation of investments in education, employment, the local populations is the implied services and housing. The fact that Negev explanation for why Negev 2015 planners 2015 preferred instead to focus on attracting opted for the alternative of attracting a a strong population from central Israel newer, stronger population from the constitutes proof that as far as the planners outside. It should be noted, however, that are concerned, the present-day population, unlike his fellow members on the planning including the Negev’s Jewish residents, is team, Blass himself is pessimistic about the not only not the type of population desired, possibility of attracting such a population: but also it is highly unlikely that this “The alternative of providing an external 18

‘blood transfusion’ – shifting IDF camps, As far as education is concerned, the main large-scale migration from other parts of the suggestion in Negev 2015 that might also be country, or a new wave of immigration, relevant to residents is does exist, but in our opinion both the “fostering excellence” – a euphemism for likelihood of its happening as well as its introducing a special high school track for ability to make a difference are limited.” high achievers (Negev 2015, Chapter 5: 7- (Negev 2015, ibid: 8). 9). The main group targeted by this proposal consists of the children of future The only part of the Negev 2015 migrants from central Israel. It can recommendations that can be seen as reasonably be assumed that this special targeting the existing Jewish population of track will also serve the local affluents the Negev is one section in the chapter on (Chapter 5: 7-9). An alternative would be to economic development that discusses how devise a plan to upgrade the entire to attract investments to the Negev. True, educational system, in order to bring it up the Negev 2015 team note, “a key part of to the same level as that in the affluent the Negev’s economic development must localities in Israel’s central region, so that be based on commuting” (Negev 2015, in the future the entire population of the Chapter 5: 5), but present-day residents of Negev will be able to take part in the the Negev are supposed to benefit from the knowledge-based sectors of the economy. State giving advantages to investors interested in coming to the Negev, The National Outline Plan encouraging small businesses, helping with the development of the tourist sector, and (NOP 35) and the Beersheba providing incentives for strategic Metropolis Plan (DOP 4/14/23) investments in electronics, hi-tech and chemicals. The Negev 2015 team has also In 2005, the government approved National adopted the idea put forward by Shraga Outline Plan (NOP 35), the purpose of Brosh, president of the Israel which is to determine how Israel’s physical Manufacturers’ Association: moving some territory is to be used up to 2020. NOP 35 50-100 traditional industrial plants to the applies to all planning activities undertaken Negev (Chapter 5: 8). The area earmarked in Israel, on the national, district and local for these plants is the N.A.M. at Netivot; levels. the plants are also slated to hire workers from Ofakim and Sherot - two other NOP 35 replaces NOP 31, drawn up in development towns in the vicinity. 1991 at the peak of the large-scale wave of immigration from the former Soviet Union. Since 1950, the development towns have NOP 31 was intended to remain in force no functioned as centers of traditional more than five years, but in practice it industries. This was one of the factors in lasted until the approval of NOP 35 in their lagging behind the rest of the country. 2005. NOP 31 apparently reflected a The question is: why Negev 2015 does not national policy of giving immigrants a “free offer development-town residents tools that choice” in all matters relating to where they will enable them – and their Bedouin would live (Leshem 1998: 44). This ran neighbors – to join the modern economy? counter to the policy implemented in the Sad to say, it appears that Negev 2015 early decades of statehood, when the foresees a future for the present residents of government assumed the responsibility for the Negev that strongly resembles that of settling newcomers and finding housing and the past and the present: poorly paid jobs in employment for them. Given a “free low-tech industries. choice,” most of the newcomers chose to live in the center of the country. At the same time, a major demand developed 19 among affluent Israelis for suburban confers legitimization on the establishment housing. These two phenomena brought of new urban centers, instead of increasing about pressure on the existing housing densities in existing towns and annexing infrastructure, with a resultant tendency agricultural areas to the urban textures towards urban sprawl encroaching upon (Morgenstern, May 1, 2005). Once again, open and agricultural areas. NOP 31 simply the critics relate primarily to the situation in took a “snapshot” of Israel’s urban the center of the country. development picture and focused development efforts on the center of the The Negev appears in the next two country (Morgenstern, May 1, 2005). objectives of NOP 35. Objective no. 2 designates Beersheba as one of the four NOP 35, which took an inordinate amount metropolitan areas where development of time to come into being, is designed to activities are to be concentrated in the apply the brakes to this trend of future. The third objective designates urbanization and suburbanization, and to Beersheba as one of three highest-priority conserve Israel’s open and agricultural development objectives in Israel (in areas. The plan divides the country into a addition to Jerusalem and the Galilee). number of “textures,” a concept that combines two main land uses: land for We will focus our discussion on the plan development, and land for conservation. for the development of the Beersheba These textures differ from each other in metropolis. However, we must first present terms of the quantitative relationship two more of the NOP 35’s ten objectives. between developmental and conservational One is “responding to the varied demands land uses. NOP 35 defines a number of of different sectors of the population while texture types: urban, where most narrowing gaps between different sectors and development activities are to be regions,” while another is “encouraging concentrated in the future; rural, where cooperation among local authorities and agricultural development is to be allowed, promoting coordinated regional planning.” on condition that the area’s rural nature be These two objectives, which constitute preserved; national conservation, principles for how to proceed, are of major importance to our discussion of the Negev, and earmarked as an open, natural area, in particular of the Negev’s Bedouin intended for leisure and recreational population. As we will see, the outline plan for activities, but also for defense system the Beersheba metropolis does not fully meet activities; mixed conservation, where both the needs of the Bedouin sector, and it is residential and agricultural development is doubtful whether it can significantly contribute to be allowed; and coastal conservation, to reducing the gaps between the Bedouin and designed for the purpose of conservation of their Jewish neighbors. In addition, it would the open coastline area. appear that any “cooperation among local authorities” takes place, if at all, on the lowest The national outline plan identified ten level. One of the main obstacles to such objectives to be achieved by it. The first is cooperation is the fact that about 40% of the Bedouin live in “unrecognized” communities, “responding to the planning and building i.e. localities that have no local government, needs of the State of Israel, while directing and hence are unable to actively participate in the bulk of development to urban ‘textures’ any “cooperation among local authorities.” In and reducing suburbanization.” This is an order to gain access to the planning process, the entirely laudable goal, particularly in the residents of the “unrecognized” localities had to central part of the country, where set up an umbrella organization of their own suburbanization is threatening to gnaw and to petition the High Court, which did in fact away at the remaining agricultural and open order that they be involved in the process. spaces. However, the critics of NOP 35 However, in the meantime, participation is only wasted no time in pointing out that the plan partial (see Swirski and Hasson, 2005: 29). 20

Returning to Beersheba, we move on from at the outline plan being prepared, because NOP 35, whose purview is the whole of it “does not provide a response to the Israel, and focus on DOP 4/14/23 – the petition, nor does it provide a response to district outline plan for the Beersheba the obligations of the planning institutions metropolis. This district outline plan has that were established in the framework of gone through a number of versions. It was the petition” (HC 1991/00, June 27, 2005, officially approved as long ago as 1998, reaction by petitioners). ACRI added that under the name DOP 4/14. However, even “the plan continues a discriminatory earlier, in 1994, the Negev Bedouin planning policy that enables the Jewish petitioned the High Court, arguing that the residents to live in a broad range of then plan-in-the-making took no account of localities, including the smallest ones, such the needs and wishes of the Bedouin Arab as new kibbutzim, communities with fewer population, including the possibility of than 20 families, and individual ranches” living in rural communities (HC 1991/00). (HC 1991/00, June 27, 2005, reaction by Six years later, in 2000, the High Court petitioners). Finally, the Association ordered the State to prepare an outline plan complained that the plan being prepared that would take account of the petitioners’ “leaves about 50,000 inhabitants, requests: DOP 4/14/23 is the outcome of constituting nearly 65% of the this High Court ruling. However, although unrecognized villages … without any the High Court set a period of one year for potential to achieve planning regularization submission of the amended plan, version in the future” (HC 1991/00, June 27, 2005). number 1 of the amended district outline plan was not submitted until April 2005. In addition to all of this, implementation of Before this submission, ACRI, the the High Court recommendation that Association of Civil Rights in Israel, Bedouin residents of the Negev be involved petitioned the High Court, arguing that the in shaping the outline policy is minimal. In plan being worked out did not meet the the wake of the High Court ruling, a population’s needs, nor did it comply with steering committee was set up, whose the State’s obligation to the High Court members included Bedouin representatives. (HC 1991/00, September 28, 2005, reaction However, the steering committee does not by petitioners). According to ACRI, ever take part in the planning work as such, since the High Court asked for an simply holding occasional meetings with alternative plan to be drawn up, the the planning team (Amer Al-Huzayyel, authorities had adopted a foot-dragging interview, June 5, 2005). policy. ACRI argued further that without the Supreme Court’s vigilant eye, the The following discussion of DOP 4/14/23 is authorities would have entirely failed to based on the document, “Fundamentals of meet their obligations. Furthermore, the Planning Policy” (Version No. 1), authorities were continuing “to implement submitted in April 2005. To make the two separate planning tracks: one is slow reader’s life easier, we will refer to this as and arduous, for the Negev Bedouin Beersheba Metropolis. population, involving the preparation of DOP 4/14/23; while the second is high- Spider vs. sun speed and fast track, for the Jewish population, through ‘implementation’ of the The key objective of Beersheba Metropolis government decisions asking for dozens of is “to create a metropolis – to turn the new communities and individual ranches to Negev into a metropolitan area with be set up for the Jewish population, not Beersheba at its center, as a competitive and through DOP 4/14/23” (Hamdan, 2005). On unique alternative to the other metropoli” June 27, 2005, ACRI came back to the (Beersheba Metropolis: 16). Elsewhere the High Court and expressed disappointment document describes the objective as 21 follows: “To turn the entire metropolitan investing in the existing human capital and area into an area of choice and commuting” to an even greater extent in importing (Beersheba Metropolis: 99); i.e., to human capital, generally of residents of transform the Beersheba area into a place Israel’s center and new immigrants” that has everything individuals need to live, (Beersheba Metropolis: 97). In addition, work, shop, study, relax, and so on. To this Beersheba Metropolis also states that end, “a first condition … is a sophisticated “investing in transport would bring the transport system that guarantees reliable, center of the country closer to the convenient, high-speed and egalitarian metropolitan area and make it possible to access to the entire area” (Beersheba move southward from the center and vice Metropolis: 99). Beersheba Metropolis sees versa: such investment would bring the the metropolitan transport network as the south closer to the center and permit driving force for urban development, and in mobility (or commuting) on the part of the the context of the Beersheba area, as a population to the employment centers” (p. “metropolis-building network” (Beersheba 99). In addition, Beersheba Metropolis Metropolis: 30). From this point of view, employs terminology similar to that of the graphic expression that summarizes the Negev 2015: “it will be possible to overarching view of the Beersheba encourage the “strong” urban populations to Metropolis planners is a diagram showing move from the center of the country to the the metropolitan transport network as a metropolis on the basis of generous spider’s web (p. 33), whose center is the allocations of land for suburban city of Beersheba, with concentric circles construction projects” (p. 99). radiating out from it, connected by intersecting roads (Beersheba Metropolis, Nevertheless, unlike the Negev 2015, the diagram 1.2, p. 34). emphasis in Beersheba Metropolis is on the metropolitan area itself. While the These basic principles enable us to compare Beersheba Metropolis planners state that “it Beersheba Metropolis and Negev 2015. As will be possible” to encourage a “strong explained above, the crux of Negev 2015 is population” to move to this part of the to attract some 200,000 high-income Jews country – this step is not the crux of their from the central part of the country to the plan. Negev. In order to attract this “strong population,” the Negev 2015 planners Admittedly, it may be argued that the propose investing in improving the difference between the two plans lies in the transport connection between the Negev fact that as a physical planning document and central Israel. This connection is for the district, Beersheba Metropolis must supposed to enable the new residents to live focus on the area itself, while Negev 2015, in the Negev while continuing to work in as a “national strategic” plan, can adopt a the country’s center. In other words, the wider-ranging, “national” point of view. development approach guiding Negev 2015 However, Beersheba Metropolis could have is based on the assumption that the Negev’s adopted the approach of Negev 2015; hopes lie not in the Negev itself, but outside instead of recommending a “spider’s web” it. In contrast, Beersheba Metropolis for the region’s transportation system, it assumes that the Beersheba district can and could have recommended a sun-like should become a self-contained transport network, based on direct transport independent area, one that will enable its links between the center of the country and residents to satisfy most of their needs main points in the Negev. A classical within that same space. True, like Negev example of this can be found in Argentina, 2015, Beersheba Metropolis states that “the where the dominance of the capital, Buenos basis of the economic development of the Aires, is physically expressed in the fact Beersheba Metropolis area – [involves] that all of the country’s main roads leave 22 from and lead to its biggest city, like local authorities, whose remit will be to sunbeams radiating out of a single sun. focus on development (p. 98). However, in Instead, Beersheba Metropolis opted for the all matters relating to economic spider’s web approach, which conveys a development, the ideas advanced by the different message. In my humble opinion, Beersheba Metropolis team are no more this option is more suitable for the idea of than non-binding recommendations. developing the region than the sun-based option. Finally, it is interesting to underscore the striking similarity between the public cost However, having said this, the next of implementing the Beersheba Metropolis question is: is an improved transportation development plan and that of Negev 2015. network sufficient in and of itself to The Beersheba Metropolis team calculated encourage regional development? The that the investment needed to develop the Beersheba Metropolis planners think that it metropolis over the next two decades would is; they state, “transportation should drive be $21.5 billion (in today’s values, close to development and not just underpin it” (p. NIS 100 billion). Of this amount, $14 99); their outlook runs counter to “planning billion is supposed to come from approaches that view the transportation investments by households in housing, and setup as a secondary system that has come another three billion dollars from about in the wake of urban development” investments by the business sector, (ibid). It is questionable, however, whether primarily manufacturing. The balance, it really is sufficient: given the current state totaling some $4.25 billion, is to come from of affairs, in which most of the region’s public funds (Beersheba Metropolis, p. 100, population have low incomes, in the Figure 1). In current values, this is absence of a sufficiently broad local stratum equivalent to some NIS 19 billion. It will be of entrepreneurs and persons with capital, remembered that the amount given by the with the main manufacturing activities Negev 2015 planners for implementing their taking place in the area being controlled proposal was NIS 17 billion over a period from outside and targeting markets outside, of ten years. It appears that this is the most and a quarter of the area’s population that the government is willing to spend on excluded from or on the fringes of its the Negev. economic and cultural activities, I seriously doubt that an improved transportation Beersheba Metropolis and the Bedouin network will be enough to pull the area up by its bootstraps. A transportation spider’s Beersheba Metropolis devotes considerable web can only move the Negev forward if it attention to the Negev Bedouin. This can be goes hand in hand with massive seen from the list of the project’s investments in the economy of the Negev objectives, including that of “regularizing and efforts to raise educational, Bedouin settlement patterns and fully employment and income levels. integrating them into the development of metropolitan housing, services, In fact, the Beersheba Metropolis planners employment and environmental issues” are well aware of the limitations of their (Beersheba Metropolis: 28). The Bedouin outline plan: as they put it, “the district- issue is reflected in each of the plan’s level planning toolbox will not be enough chapters, and has an entire chapter of its to devise a comprehensive development own – Chapter 7. This part of the plan also plan for the Beersheba metropolitan area” contains a fairly comprehensive sub-chapter (p. 55). As a result, they include a separate containing far-reaching recommendations chapter on development in their report for promoting Bedouin education. (Chapter 6). They also note an initiative to set up a forum of heads and engineers from 23

However, Beersheba Metropolis, like Finally, the plan proposes introducing a Negev 2015, does not come to grips with mechanism that will enable other villages to the key issue relating to the Bedouin be recognized (p. 120). Overall, the community in the Negev: the land issue. planners believe that the new planned The planners note in the development localities will provide a response to chapter that “a primary ‘flagship project’ between 80% and 90% of the residents of relating to massive public investment to the “unrecognized” localities (p. 116). As regularize Bedouin settlement patterns in for the rest, they refer to the possibility of the Negev should be added” (emphasis in “planning extra localities or separate the original) (Beersheba Metropolis: 102). neighborhoods in the vicinity of the It is no secret that there is an unresolved existing localities” (p. 111). Furthermore, land ownership dispute between the the planners indicate that “the working Bedouin and the State of Israel, with the assumption of the planning team is the Bedouin claiming ownership over land regularization of the entire population totaling approximately 650,000 dunams. living in permanent localities by the plan’s The land issue is holding up not only target date, 2020” (p. 117). regularization of the “unrecognized” Bedouin localities, but also the However, there is a fly in this particular development and expansion of the ointment: at the end of this material, the recognized ones. Although solutions to the planners write that “the entire process problem are not particularly complicated, described above is subject to the land and the State itself has already taken major settlement being speeded up and moved steps toward the same, in the framework of forward, both with regard to the existing a “beyond-the-letter-of-the-law” localities and in the areas to be designated recognition of the legitimacy of the claims, for new villages” (Beersheba Metropolis: and has also proposed a compensation 120). Given the profound differences mechanism (Swirski and Hasson, 2005: 9- between the Bedouin community and the 10), the matter has been postponed time and government concerning land settlement, time again. This may be a result of the fear this means, in effect, that all those good that a generous policy toward the Negev intentions will be put on ice. Bedouin will resurface the issue of lands expropriated from Arabs elsewhere in The significance of Beersheba Metropolis Israel. for the Bedouin can also be seen from the analyses written by organizations In practical terms, Beersheba Metropolis representing the Bedouin, in either the suggests expanding the areas of jurisdiction planning or legal systems. of the recognized Bedouin localities by the following percentages; Rahat – 63%, Laqye The Bimkom - Planners for Planning Rights – 72%, Tel Sheva – 80%, Segev Shalom – association argues that even though “there 25%, Kuseife – 48%; and Hora and Ar’ara, is no doubt about the sincere intention on a smaller increase (Beersheba Metropolis: the part of the authors of the plan to provide 119). In addition, the outline plan includes a planning response to the unrecognized nine new planned localities: Amm Batin, villages,” nevertheless Beersheba Tarabin al-Sana, Abu Krinat, Qasr as-Sirr, Metropolis “does not meet its goals, ignores Bir Haddaj, Makchul, Drayjat, Molada and the existing situation on the ground, al Sayyed (all as per the resolutions of the proposes ambiguous planning solutions Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon governments; whereby it is not clear and not certain that see Swirski and Hasson, 2005: 27-29). In these can be implemented, and above all the wake of the ACRI petition, the localities maintains a planning policy that is intended of Abu Tlul and Al-Furah were added to to concentrate the population into a small this list (Beersheba Metropolis: 119). number of localities” (Bimkom, 2005: 4). 24

The Bimkom planners argue, for example, of regional or national-level infrastructure, that although the authorities have agreed to or for industrial development (pp. 10-11). allow the Bedouin to pursue a rural lifestyle, Beersheba Metropolis caps the The Association of Civil Rights in Israel, percentage of persons that are to reside in whose petition to the High Court ultimately rural localities at six per cent. At present, led to Amendment 23 to DOP 4/14, also the proportion of persons residing in rural argues that Beersheba Metropolis “does not localities is higher than this figure – without provide an equal and reasonable planning even counting the non-Jewish rural response to the population of the population (Bimkom, 2005: 5). unrecognized villages and continues a discriminatory and unreasonable policy Another example cited by Bimkom: against them” (Shughry-Badarne, Beersheba Metropolis defines a designated November 26, 2006: 4). geographical area as a “search space” for the establishment of new Bedouin Finally, let us note the position of Adalah, localities, pursuant to the principle of the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights, proposing a range of settlement patterns on the Negev 2015 plan: “The plan neglects and the principle of potential recognition the Arab population, invests heavily in for “unrecognized” Bedouin localities. developing Jewish localities and the Jewish However, there is another fly in the population, and is designed to attract a ointment: first of all, the “search space” is particularly strong Jewish population, and defined such that it leaves out most of the thereby increases the socio-economic and “unrecognized” villages (Bimkom, 2005: spatial gap between the two populations … 6), and secondly, instead of the “search in the Negev.” (Hamdan, 2006) space” being earmarked for habitation by the Bedouin only, the plan also allows for Jewish settlement – “something which runs The National Security Council counter to all reasonable planning logic and Position Paper ignores the reality on the ground. In the southern district, there are numerous In January 2006, Israel’s National Security alternatives for Jewish population Council (NSC) presented a series of settlement, alternatives that according to recommendations concerning the Negev any criterion are preferable to setting up Bedouin. The fact that the NSC considered new (Jewish) localities” (ibid.). it appropriate to draw up a document on the Negev Bedouin, and the fact that this Bimkom planners go on to argue that the document was considered worthy of areas earmarked for new Bedouin localities presentation at the Herzliya Conference on are, for various reasons, located in the Israel’s national security, indicates that the vicinity of a number of the recognized Bedouin continue to be viewed as a Bedouin townships, giving rise to the “security issue” – to the same extent at least suspicion that despite the fact that on the as they are viewed as a “socio-economic face of it, these are to be new, independent issue.” localities, the intention is ultimately to increase the density of existing townships It should be noted that the NSC drew up its (p. 10). Finally, under Beersheba paper not long after the implementation of Metropolis, apparently some of the the Gaza disengagement plan, and this fact “unrecognized” Bedouin localities will not is very evident from the spirit of its be able to request recognition, either recommendations. because their location is defined by the plan as a “desert landscape area,” or because it is Unlike Negev 2015, the NSC designated as an area for the establishment recommendations do not constitute a 25

“plan.” Moreover, the recommendations do framework of the Israel Police and would not apply to the entire Negev, but only to be headed by a senior police officer. The the Bedouin who live there. We have board was to coordinate the operations of nevertheless chosen to relate to the NSC the various state-level bodies already paper in the framework of the present involved in this field, including, for document, in light of the fact that the example, the Green Patrol. In addition, the Bedouin constitute around a quarter of the resolutions called for the setting up of two Negev’s population, as well as the fact that new specialized bodies whose purpose was both Beersheba Metropolis and Negev 2015 to deal with enforcement of land laws: a devote extensive chapters to the Bedouin specialized police unit, with 108 officers; population of the Negev. and a special department in the State Prosecutor’s Office, with 10 budgeted The NSC paper is tantamount to a call to posts, including six budgeted posts for the government to establish a mechanism counsels. The Regional Council for for the implementation of existing Cabinet Unrecognized Negev Villages viewed the resolutions, and specifically, a series of Sharon plan as “a declaration of war on the three resolutions on the issue of the Negev Bedouin community in the unrecognized Bedouin, adopted in 2003 by the Israeli villages” (Swirski and Hasson, 2005: 29). government under Ariel Sharon. The first resolution in this series (Resolution 881, The NSC recommendations “were intended dated September 25, 2003) is actually a to strengthen the policy line pursued since ratification of a decision taken when Ehud 2003” (NSC: 10). In this framework, the Barak was in power (Arab/43, dated NSC recommended introducing an November 30, 2000) about recognizing a enforcement apparatus to operate in the number of the “unrecognized” Bedouin framework of a time limit of five years. localities in the Negev (the Sharon Within this time frame, the NSC team administration decided to accord recommended that the government act the recognition to seven additional localities. same way it did over the disengagement At the same meeting the Sharon issue: “to offer [the inhabitants of the administration instituted a multi-year plan “unrecognized” Bedouin localities] a intended to cover the 2003-2008 period, at defined response, time-limited, with a a cost of NIS 1.1 billion (see Swirski and financial incentive to the entire community Hasson, 2005: 25). A considerable portion interested in reaching a solution. When the of this amount was earmarked for the time limit is up (for example, two years budgets of bodies responsible for policing from when the proposal was made), to carry the Bedouin, such as the State Prosecutor’s out an intensive operation of evacuating Office, the Green Patrol and the Ministry of [persons residing in] illegal structures… If Internal Security. the government evacuated 8,000 citizens who were in legal structures, it can also Three months after Resolution 881, two evacuate thousands of citizens living in follow-up resolutions were passed illegal structures” (NSC: 3). (Resolution 2886 of December 12, 2004, and Resolution 2959 of December 23, The NSC adopts a sweeping approach, 2004). The latter were intended to stating that “the setting up of additional enumerate the steps the government would settlement localities should not be rejected take in order to implement the policing out of hand” – i.e., the recognition of element of Resolution 881. The principle “unrecognized” villages in addition to those behind the two resolutions was the recognized by the Barak and Sharon establishment of an inter-ministerial board governments; in other words, to make it to coordinate land-law enforcement possible for most of the Bedouin to live in measures. This board was to be set up in the recognized localities, situated where they 26 live today. This is of course a welcome feared that at the end of the given time step, but the NSC conditions recognition on frame, a coerced solution is to be imposed. a number of prerequisites that are unlikely to be acceptable to the Bedouin. The main Interim summary condition is the agreement of the Bedouin inhabitants of the localities applying for recognition to a land settlement – an issue Thus far we have reviewed two government over which substantive disagreement exists plans for developing the Negev – the between the Bedouin and the government, Beersheba Metropolis outline plan (DOP whether the matter is compensation levels 4/14/23), and the National Strategic Plan or land use. It is difficult to imagine that the for the Development of the Negev, the Bedouin will agree to a settlement brainchild of the Daroma Association. To according to the present government offer these two plans we have added the National (see Swirski and Hasson, 2005). This being Security Council document concerning the the case, the possibility of the NSC Negev Bedouin. recommendation being implemented depends to a great extent on the At the time of writing (December 2006), government’s willingness to offer the Negev 2015 was frozen: in the wake of the Bedouin a better settlement than that Second Lebanon War, the government currently before them. True, the NSC is decided to divert funds earmarked for the recommending “increasing what is offered Negev to the Galilee. The district outline in consideration for land compromises,” but plan for the Beersheba metropolis is going this is only on condition that there is a through long-drawn-out approval “critical mass of people involved,” i.e. procedures. As mentioned, the NSC whole tribes or clans. This is a problematic document is not a plan, but rather a call for condition that shifts the burden of reaching the implementation of decisions taken by a compromise to the various Bedouin the Sharon administration about how to communities and relieves the authorities of deal with the Bedouin. having to negotiate directly and separately with every single landowner – as is the case In the meanwhile, things are happening on for disputes with other groups of citizens. the ground. On the one hand, broad swathes In this context, it should be noted that when of land are being earmarked for “individual the government decided to evacuate the ranches” for Jewish families, and on the Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip, it other hand, the Israel Police regularly and offered generous compensation on an repeatedly demolish the homes of Bedouin individual or family basis, and did not families, in the absence of a land settlement impose on the settlers the responsibility for and in the absence of official recognition reaching compensation agreements among for the “unrecognized” Bedouin villages. themselves. We will now consider proposals submitted The key problem of the NSC by non-government bodies that relate recommendations lies in the attempt to specifically to the Negev Bedouin: the plan place the process within the straitjacket of a by the Regional Council for Unrecognized set time limit, at the end of which stands the Negev Villages, and the economic threat of a coerced settlement. In the development plans submitted by academic absence of any reference to the researchers. government’s willingness to allocate significant sums to a land settlement, it may be assumed in advance that coming to an arrangement that is acceptable to residents is an extremely difficult task, and it is 27

Alternative Plans: way that those involved would be able to make a proper living from it. The study The Regional Council for identified a number of agricultural activities Unrecognized Negev Villages that could meet this need, including hothouse cultivation, intensive sheep- In June 1999, the Regional Council for rearing, and intensive fish farming (Znobar, Unrecognized Negev Villages submitted an 1999: pp. 3-4). The prerequisites were the alternative plan to DOP 4/14. This plan availability of capital and suitable does not deal with the overall development infrastructure, including a regular supply of of the Negev; instead, it focuses on the potable water. Bedouin population, and, more precisely, on the inhabitants of the “unrecognized” The principles laid down by the Regional villages. The main objective of the plan, Council for Unrecognized Negev Villages which was drawn up strictly in accordance should be taken into account by the with planning rules, was to achieve government in its deliberations on recognition of the existing villages and development in general, and on the develop municipal entities that would make development of Bedouin localities in it possible to put into practice the right to particular. elect a local government and at the same time guarantee the provision of services to Alternative Plans: the residents of the villages, as is the standard practice in localities elsewhere in Abu-Saad and Lithwick Israel (Regional Council for Unrecognized Negev Villages, 1999: 6). The plan sought In recent years, a number of plans for the to make it possible to build and develop economic development of the Negev within the boundaries of the localities; to Bedouin have been published. The most lay down land uses, as well as building comprehensive and thorough proposal for rights; to lay down conditions for the changing the status and standard of living detailed planning of the road and highway of the Negev Bedouin is the one drawn up system; to strengthen the system of existing by Prof. Ismael Abu-Saad and Prof. Harvey internal roads and approach roads – all the Lithwick (Abu-Saad and Lithwick, 2000). way up to the development of a planned The two scholars proposed a development transportation system; to preserve and plan for the seven recognized Bedouin foster historical, natural and archeological townships, based on integrating the assets; to determine the size of the localities Bedouin into the planning and development and the directions of their development, system of the entire Negev: integration into with the goal of assuring quality of life and the Negev economy, and integration into community living; to bring about conditions the planning of the Beersheba Metropolis for raising the residents’ standard of living (for proposals in a similar spirit, see Al- and guaranteeing a variety of sources of Krenawi, 1999). employment within the boundaries of the planning area; and to develop economic The first step proposed by Abu-Saad and entrepreneurship (p. 7). Lithwick was to connect the Bedouin to the transportation network of the Negev, from Among other things, the plan was based on providing the Bedouin localities with access research carried out by the Znobar to the Trans-Israel Highway and to the Company for the Center for Jewish-Arab railway, to transforming the army Development (Znobar, 1999). The research, base into a civilian airport that would based on a sample of “unrecognized” connect the Negev’s economic Bedouin villages, examined the economic infrastructure with the global economy and potential of developing agriculture such a at the same time increase employment 28 possibilities for the residents of Kuseifeh establishing industrial parks and and A’rara. These proposals fit in with technological incubators, with an emphasis broader plans for the economic on modern agriculture, modern approaches development of the entire Negev (Lithwick, to construction, desert gardening, and so on. Gradus, Razin and Yiftachel, 1997). Lastly, they suggested encouraging the creation of joint commercial-industrial In parallel, Abu-Saad and Lithwick parks for Jewish and Bedouin localities, proposed establishing and improving a such as the one currently planned at the wireless communications infrastructure, so Lehavim Junction. that the Bedouin community could be connected up with the Israeli economy as a In addition to the Abu-Saad and Lithwick whole. At the same time, this would also plan, there is also a plan to expand make it easier for Bedouin women to work employment among the Negev Bedouin, from home. The authors also proposed drawn up by economists Amin Faris and setting up a telephone call routing center in Amer Abu Hani (Faris and Abu Hani, one of the recognized localities. 2005). The authors review all the job areas, Regarding education and vocational identifying for each the potential for training, Abu-Saad and Lithwick proposed, expanding employment. This plan was inter alia, setting up a technological college financed and published by the Ministry of in one of the recognized localities, to have Industry, Trade and Employment in branches in the others. In the health sector, conjunction with the Joint Distribution they suggested setting up a hospital in one Committee and the Negev Center for a of the recognized localities, to act as a Peace and Development Strategy. secondary hospital for the Negev area. Plans for development of the Negev, In the field of farming, Abu-Saad and whether created by the government or by Lithwick argued that sheep-rearing using contracted agencies, like “Daroma Eidan advanced technological means could Hanegev,” need to pay serious attention to constitute a respectable source of income the recommendations of Abu-Saad and and employment. Such farming, which Lithwitch, as well as those emerging from could operate using relatively small areas of other academic research, as part and parcel land, could generate large quantities of of their own planning efforts. meat, milk and wool products, which could be marketed not only in Israel but also in the West Bank, in Gaza and in the Alternative Principles for neighboring countries. Moreover, this Developing the Negev activity could employ a large number of people, including women, who have The Negev’s problems are Israel’s traditionally played an important role in problems livestock rearing (Abu-Saad and Lithwick, 2000: 40). The first question that begs to be asked is In the business sphere, the authors whether the Negev needs a regional suggested examining the possibility of development plan. Or to put it another way, setting up a Bedouin development bank that are the problems reviewed in the would give grants to businesses as a way of introduction to this paper – low levels of expanding employment. They also economic development, education, labor suggested assigning a high national priority force participation and income from classification to the Bedouin localities, employment – problems that are unique to making them eligible for a variety of state- the Negev? Are these problems whose financed aid programs. Also suggested: 29 solution lies in a plan focusing on the throughout the country: overall, only about Negev? 40% of young people are entitled to a school leaving (matriculation) certificate Below we will argue that most of these that meets university entrance requirements, problems are simply a local (but not a and only about 30% of high school unique) expression of the problems of graduates go on to study at university or an Israeli society as a whole: academic college.

1. The first problem is that economic 4. The fourth problem can be defined as a growth is concentrated in the center of the problem of the “shrinking of the strong country and among a narrow stratum of population.” Overall, Israel has been Israeli society. The growth recorded in suffering from this syndrome: since 1967, Israel in the last two decades is and all the more so since 1985, when it concentrated in a small number of sectors – turned its back on a policy designed to primarily hi-tech and financial services, and bring all Israelis into the mainstream. it takes place in a small part of the country Instead, it has embraced a policy of growth – primarily the Tel Aviv and central areas. focusing on capital-intensive sectors – hi- Around these foci of growth lies a large tech and financial services – and the most “periphery,” with a far slower growth rate. highly educated part of the workforce. One This peripheral area includes the Negev, but of the results of this policy has been the also large areas of the Galilee and the shrinking of the middle class and the central part of Israel. In the periphery, or to expansion of the lower class (see Swirski be more precise, the peripheries, the level and Konor-Attias, 2004). of labor force participation is low, and this is particularly striking among ultra- Summing up these four points, we can say Orthodox Jews and among Arab women. In that anyone who seeks to come to grips the Israeli periphery as a whole, pay levels with these problems cannot do so by going for most workers, both male and female, are to the Negev, drawing a circle around it, low: approximately two-thirds of all and saying: I will deal with this area and employees in Israel earn NIS 5,000 or less; this area only. This is because these are approximately half of them are paid at a problems that exist throughout the whole of minimum-wage level. the country. What needs to be done is to bring about a profound change in public 2. The second problem is the lag in policies in Israel: the whole country needs infrastructure investment. While the investments in a broad range of areas of the Negev’s infrastructure needs upgrading, economy, and in all parts of the country; a overall Israel lacks a modern rail network consistent policy of salary increases; a capable of rapidly transporting workers, massive upgrading of the educational students and buyers from one place to system; and investments in improving the another. The central area has a highly transportation infrastructure. developed road and rail infrastructure, but even there rail-road integration is still far It is no secret that this is not the direction from sufficient. In addition, the central area being pursued by the present government. suffers from the absence of an intra-urban For the last two decades, the various rail system. At the same time the northern governments in power have advocated a part of the country – apart from the coastal neo-liberal economic policy that aspires to strip – is no less remote from the center. reduce government initiative and involvement, and, at the same time, to 3. The third problem is the low reduce budgetary expenditures and transfer performance of the education system. Once part of the burden of paying for services again, this is a problem that exists such as health, education and housing to the 30 users of those services. By systematically did, for example, in the 1980s), and 60% cutting income taxes on individuals and studying at institutions of higher learning. corporations, successive governments have been reducing the resources available for Similarly, additional objectives can be investment in economic development, in posited, including an increase in workforce upgrading education and in improving participation, an increase in the minimum infrastructure. Even when tax revenue wage, a decrease in infant mortality for increases, as has happened in the last two Arab families, and a national pension years, this revenue has been used to cut insurance law. taxes and/or reduce government debt, instead of for investments. In practice, the To this can be added an economic policy only area where large-scale budgets are that seeks to distribute economic activity being invested is on improvements to the more evenly throughout the country. transportation infrastructure. Moreover, the private business sector does not contribute “Absorbing” the Bedouin all it could to economic development in Israel: not only are its investments The only group in the Negev that requires a concentrated in a small number of high- special policy are the Bedouin: first and profit sectors, but also it does not make any foremost because up to now, they have been effort to invest in the periphery. Recently, it totally excluded from government has tended to invest at least as much development plans. overseas as in Israel. It seems to me that the best model available The best path to follow in order to bring is the immigrant absorption model: the about significant change in the situation of State needs to absorb the Bedouin, just as in the Negev population would begin with a the past it absorbed Jewish immigrants. profound change in public policy in Israel This means looking after housing, as a whole. Negev 2015 proposes a employment, education, health and so on. soothing, temporary local ointment: but it In the case of the Bedouin, translating this does not contain the seeds of genuine immigrant absorption model into practice change. And even if the plan does manage means recognizing land ownership, to attract a certain number of “strong according recognition to the Israelis,” any process of trickling down will “unrecognized” localities, and setting up a take an inordinately long time. whole array of physical and social infrastructure – on the same level as in the Four principles for alternative plans area’s moshavim and development towns.

In light of all the above, I would like to “Absorbing” the Bedouin means switching propose a number of basic principles for over from a policy of exclusion based on alternative plans for developing the Negev: suspicion and fear to one of inclusion based on self-confidence and partnership. Public policy with clear-cut objectives: Preventing the Negev from becoming the Even without a unique “regional” garbage dump of Israel development plan, the Negev can be upgraded as the result of a national-level The scenery of the Negev is unique, and it socio-economic policy based on clear-cut is in dire need of a clear-cut, tough objectives, clear deadlines, and clear conservation policy. Geographer Elisha criteria: for example, an educational policy Efrat noted that any space-related industrial that sets a goal for 2020 of 80% entitlement or technological issue or any land use that to a school-leaving certificate (as France does not suit the authorities in terms of 31 location is shifted to the northern Negev as Appendix: Conflicting Figures a one-off solution to a specific problem. This policy – or policy failure – must be on the Bedouin Population discontinued, so that the Negev will continue to function as a scenic and natural There is no official, accepted figure on the resource for all Israelis. Bedouin population of the Negev. For this reason, the figure for the general population Planning Beersheba as a two-way of the Negev is not accurate either. The metropolis: Central Bureau of Statistics states that “it is difficult to estimate the proportion and all Beersheba Metropolis and Negev 2015 the more so the characteristics of the view Beersheba first and foremost as a Bedouin population in the [recognized] metropolis located on a north-south axis. settlements as well as the characteristics of From this point of view, Beersheba’s only the Bedouin who are still outside of the external link is with the central part of [recognized] settlements (2006: 82). The Israel. However, Beersheba is also located figure we used – 550,000 persons in the on the road from Egypt to Jordan, and, on a Beersheba district, among them smaller scale, on the road between the approximately 146,000 Bedouin Arabs, is southern Hebron Hills and the Gaza Strip. from the Central Bureau of Statistics (ibid: Today, these two areas are in a state of Table 2.10). For the sake of comparison, hostilities with Israel, but in the future it is the Israel Land Administration states that in to be hoped that the hostilities will give 2003 it was serving approximately 150,000 way to cooperation. Hence now is the time Bedouin, 87,000 of whom resided in to prepare the infrastructure for the recognized localities (Israel Land Beersheba metropolis so that it will be able Administration, 2003). The National to serve the movement of people and goods Security Council mentioned 160,000 along an east-west axis as well as a south- Bedouin (in January 2006), about 100,000 north one. In addition, a development plan residing in recognized localities and 60,000 based on Beersheba’s function as a staging in localities that are either “unrecognized” post on an east-west axis carries with it or in the process of receiving recognition great potential for the Bedouin population (National Security Council, 2006). The of the metropolis. Statistical Annual for the Bedouin in the Negev for 2004 presents, alongside the estimate of the Central Bureau of Statistics, the figure used by the Council of Unrecognized Negev Villages – 159,000 in 2002 (http://w3-new.bgu.ac.il/bedouin).

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