Special Briefing, Kurdish Affairs, February 2019

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Special Briefing, Kurdish Affairs, February 2019 Special Briefing, Kurdish Affairs, February 2019 US policy in Syria has shifted back in favour of the Kurdish-led administration, which has been seeking to secure international support as it completes the territorial defeat of the Islamic State but faces a developing insurgency. Kurdish parties in Turkey face further state pressure in the build up to local elections next month. A new administration has been formed in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq amid continued tension between the two dominant political parties. Meanwhile, further steps have been taken to limit trade between the Kurdish regions in Iraq and Iran. Syria US set to retain presence in Kurdish-led Syrian region The US has signalled its intention to keep around 400 troops deployed in Syria, seemingly reversing President Trump’s announcement on December 19 that a full military withdrawal would be complete with 100 days. The decision, initially released by the White House on February 21 and confirmed by US officials during a delegation to the Kurdish-led autonomous region in north-eastern Syria on February 26, paves the way for the creation of a US-backed buffer-zone along the Turkey- Syria border. Under the current US proposal, 200 US troops would be stationed in Syria’s north-east, with 200 deployed in the strategically significant military base known as al-Tanf which lies close to the Iraqi border in the country’s south-east. In north-east Syria, US troops would form the basis of a larger international force tasked with overseeing a demilitarized area between Turkey and the area now controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a multi-ethnic coalition of militias. With the support of the US, the SDF has successfully rolled back the Islamic State (ISIS) across Syria (see below) and now controls around 30 per cent of the country. However, Turkey regards the SDF as a security threat due to the leading role played within it by groups associated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Ankara has been pushing Washington to allow its local proxies in the Syrian opposition to replace the SDF once ISIS has been defeated, repeatedly threatening a new cross-border military operation unless its demands are met. Until recently, this lobbying appeared to have been successful, with a complete US withdrawal likely paving the way for a Turkey to take control of SDF areas by force. Pressure from senior figures in the US congress and military to maintain support for the SDF now appears to have made the Trump administration row back on its initial pronouncement. However, there are significant questions about what a continued US military presence in north-east Syria would look like in practice, with a much-reduced deployment unlikely to be able to oversee the complex frontline between Turkey and the SDF. Crucial will be the attitude of the UK and France, which would both need to significantly increase their military commitments in Syria to compensate for the US’ pare down. The US has also not yet confirmed that it will seek to continue to dominate the region’s airspace, which the French and British do not have the capacity to maintain alone. Although unlikely, a lack of US aircover would leave the SDF vulnerable to unilateral Turkish military action. Kurdish administration seeks international support With US policy in flux, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have stepped up diplomatic efforts to secure their preferred outcomes in Syria. The SDF’s political wing, known as the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) recently sent delegations to Washington, Paris and London. These visits were headed by Ilham Ahmed, chair of the SDC’s executive committee, which has been tasked with negotiating on the SDF’s behalf. In private discussions with Western officials, Ahmed has offered a 5km SDF withdrawal from the Turkish border, creating a buffer-zone to be overseen by an international force of around 1,200. Crucially, this would need to exclude cities, with most of the Kurdish-dominated urban centres located within 5km of the border. The proposal has met a muted reception, with the UK particularly conscious of damaging its relationship with Turkey. However, SDC officials are confident they have secured support for moving towards a negotiated settlement backed by the international community, thereby significantly reducing the existential threat posed by a Turkish military incursion. Key to this has been the issue of Western nationals detained by the SDF during operations against the Islamic State (ISIS). There are around 900 European citizens in SDF custody; this does not include an unknown number of family members currently in refugee camps. Western governments are under domestic pressure to not repatriate former ISIS members. But the SDC has reiterated that it does not have the capacity to handle such large numbers of prisoners, raising the risk they will escape or be released unless the international community provides further support. Looking forward: After the unanticipated blow to their ambitions from the US’ decision to withdraw, the SDF/SDC have regained much of their negotiating position. Although the its stance remains volatile, the Trump administration appears to have accepted the principle of retaining a deployment. Any US presence in north-east Syria acts as a significant guarantee for the SDF against a Turkish military operation, while helping to retain the involvement of other countries such as France and the UK. The SDF/SDC will likely come under US pressure to make concessions to Turkey, but the existential threat to their administration has been significantly reduced. At the same time, US-Turkey relations continued to be marked by a myriad of other factors, with recent indications that these are unlikely to be resolved soon, hindering any potential cooperation in Syria at the expense of the SDF. Kurdish forces begin final operation against Islamic State militants The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have besieged the last remaining territory controlled by the Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria’s southern-eastern province of Deir ez-Zor. On February 9, the SDF announced a ‘final offensive’, pushing the remaining ISIS fighters back to the outskirts of the town of al-Baghuz Fawqani and confining the jihadi group to a built-up area and adjacent camp encompassing around 700m2. Advances have since been slowed by the significant number of civilians seeking to leave the area, 5,000 of which are believed to have crossed the frontlines since the start of the offensive on February 9. This follows the more than 30,000 people who have exited formerly ISIS controlled territory since the resumption of the SDF’s campaign in December 2018. Civilians are being evacuated through a humanitarian corridor in carefully controlled predetermined periods before undergoing security screening. Women, children and those deemed not a threat are then being transferred north to a camp for internally displaced persons near the town of al-Hawl. The high density of people contained within in a small locale in al-Baghuz Fawqani is being facilitated by a network of tunnels. It is estimated that between 300 and 1,000 ISIS fighters remain in the area alongside as many as 2000 of their family members. These are believed to predominantly be foreign elements who, unlike their Iraqi and Syrian counterparts, have little chance of escaping disguised as local civilians. Tensions between foreign and local fighters in ISIS has led to repeated reports of infighting over whether, or on what terms, the group should seek to negotiate. With ISIS’ senior leadership believed to have crossed into Iraq, what remains of the group appear to be split between seeking safe passage, most likely to the last rebel-controlled territory in Syria’s Idlib province or refusing to surrender. Alongside the continued presence of civilians, ISIS is also seeking to leverage the smaller number of SDF and foreign prisoners it continues to hold. On February 27, a negotiated deal saw food supplied to the enclave in return for the release of around 20 SDF fighters. Several similar agreements have taken place in recent weeks, underscoring the dire situation facing the jihadi group. Looking forward: SDF sources indicate that they expect to complete the territorial defeat of ISIS within days. However, the SDF now faces a growing humanitarian crisis impacting those displaced by the fighting, many of whom maintain an affinity with the jihadi group. This is only one part of a large challenge involved in ‘winning the peace’, with much of the population under SDF control lacking access to basic services and sceptical of the group’s political project. With few resources of its own, the SDF will now need non-military support if it is to successfully combat ISIS’ attempts to use local grievances to fuel a low-level insurgency. Growing insurgency in areas now under control of Kurdish-led forces With the Islamic State facing territorial defeat in al-Baghuz Fawqani, the jihadi group has stepped up insurgency activity in the surrounding Deir ez-Zor region. On February 13, an improvised explosive device killed local Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Ahmad Musallam al-Kardush as he travelled between al-Harijiya and al-Hejjnah in northern Deir ez-Zor. On February 15, a suspected ISIS assassination attempt targeted the head of the local SDF affiliate known as the Deir ez-Zor Military Council (DMC). Small arms fire was directed at the car of Ahmad Abu Khawlah on the road between Deir ez-Zor and the SDF stronghold of al-Hasakah, with SDF spokeswoman Lilwa al-Abdullah being targeted in a similar incident in the same area on February 14. ISIS sleeper cells have also been blamed for a series of deadly attacks in the region.
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