Special Briefing, Kurdish Affairs, February 2019

US policy in has shifted back in favour of the Kurdish-led administration, which has been seeking to secure international support as it completes the territorial defeat of the Islamic State but faces a developing insurgency. Kurdish parties in Turkey face further state pressure in the build up to local elections next month. A new administration has been formed in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq amid continued tension between the two dominant political parties. Meanwhile, further steps have been taken to limit trade between the Kurdish regions in Iraq and Iran.

Syria

US set to retain presence in Kurdish-led Syrian region

The US has signalled its intention to keep around 400 troops deployed in Syria, seemingly reversing President Trump’s announcement on December 19 that a full military withdrawal would be complete with 100 days. The decision, initially released by the White House on February 21 and confirmed by US officials during a delegation to the Kurdish-led autonomous region in north-eastern Syria on February 26, paves the way for the creation of a US-backed buffer-zone along the Turkey- Syria border.

Under the current US proposal, 200 US troops would be stationed in Syria’s north-east, with 200 deployed in the strategically significant military base known as al-Tanf which lies close to the Iraqi border in the country’s south-east. In north-east Syria, US troops would form the basis of a larger international force tasked with overseeing a demilitarized area between Turkey and the area now controlled by the (SDF), a multi-ethnic coalition of militias.

With the support of the US, the SDF has successfully rolled back the Islamic State (ISIS) across Syria (see below) and now controls around 30 per cent of the country. However, Turkey regards the SDF as a security threat due to the leading role played within it by groups associated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

Ankara has been pushing Washington to allow its local proxies in the Syrian opposition to replace the SDF once ISIS has been defeated, repeatedly threatening a new cross-border military operation unless its demands are met. Until recently, this lobbying appeared to have been successful, with a complete US withdrawal likely paving the way for a Turkey to take control of SDF areas by force.

Pressure from senior figures in the US congress and military to maintain support for the SDF now appears to have made the Trump administration row back on its initial pronouncement. However, there are significant questions about what a continued US military presence in north-east Syria would look like in practice, with a much-reduced deployment unlikely to be able to oversee the complex frontline between Turkey and the SDF.

Crucial will be the attitude of the UK and France, which would both need to significantly increase their military commitments in Syria to compensate for the US’ pare down. The US has also not yet confirmed that it will seek to continue to dominate the region’s airspace, which the French and British do not have the capacity to maintain alone. Although unlikely, a lack of US aircover would leave the SDF vulnerable to unilateral Turkish military action.

Kurdish administration seeks international support

With US policy in flux, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have stepped up diplomatic efforts to secure their preferred outcomes in Syria. The SDF’s political wing, known as the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) recently sent delegations to Washington, Paris and London. These visits were headed by Ilham Ahmed, chair of the SDC’s executive committee, which has been tasked with negotiating on the SDF’s behalf.

In private discussions with Western officials, Ahmed has offered a 5km SDF withdrawal from the Turkish border, creating a buffer-zone to be overseen by an international force of around 1,200. Crucially, this would need to exclude cities, with most of the Kurdish-dominated urban centres located within 5km of the border.

The proposal has met a muted reception, with the UK particularly conscious of damaging its relationship with Turkey. However, SDC officials are confident they have secured support for moving towards a negotiated settlement backed by the international community, thereby significantly reducing the existential threat posed by a Turkish military incursion.

Key to this has been the issue of Western nationals detained by the SDF during operations against the Islamic State (ISIS). There are around 900 European citizens in SDF custody; this does not include an unknown number of family members currently in refugee camps. Western governments are under domestic pressure to not repatriate former ISIS members. But the SDC has reiterated that it does not have the capacity to handle such large numbers of prisoners, raising the risk they will escape or be released unless the international community provides further support.

Looking forward: After the unanticipated blow to their ambitions from the US’ decision to withdraw, the SDF/SDC have regained much of their negotiating position. Although the its stance remains volatile, the Trump administration appears to have accepted the principle of retaining a deployment.

Any US presence in north-east Syria acts as a significant guarantee for the SDF against a Turkish military operation, while helping to retain the involvement of other countries such as France and the UK. The SDF/SDC will likely come under US pressure to make concessions to Turkey, but the existential threat to their administration has been significantly reduced.

At the same time, US-Turkey relations continued to be marked by a myriad of other factors, with recent indications that these are unlikely to be resolved soon, hindering any potential cooperation in Syria at the expense of the SDF.

Kurdish forces begin final operation against Islamic State militants

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have besieged the last remaining territory controlled by the Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria’s southern-eastern province of Deir ez-Zor. On February 9, the SDF announced a ‘final offensive’, pushing the remaining ISIS fighters back to the outskirts of the town of al-Baghuz Fawqani and confining the jihadi group to a built-up area and adjacent camp encompassing around 700m2.

Advances have since been slowed by the significant number of civilians seeking to leave the area, 5,000 of which are believed to have crossed the frontlines since the start of the offensive on February 9. This follows the more than 30,000 people who have exited formerly ISIS controlled territory since the resumption of the SDF’s campaign in December 2018.

Civilians are being evacuated through a humanitarian corridor in carefully controlled predetermined periods before undergoing security screening. Women, children and those deemed not a threat are then being transferred north to a camp for internally displaced persons near the town of al-Hawl.

The high density of people contained within in a small locale in al-Baghuz Fawqani is being facilitated by a network of tunnels. It is estimated that between 300 and 1,000 ISIS fighters remain in the area alongside as many as 2000 of their family members. These are believed to predominantly be foreign elements who, unlike their Iraqi and Syrian counterparts, have little chance of escaping disguised as local civilians.

Tensions between foreign and local fighters in ISIS has led to repeated reports of infighting over whether, or on what terms, the group should seek to negotiate. With ISIS’ senior leadership believed to have crossed into Iraq, what remains of the group appear to be split between seeking safe passage, most likely to the last rebel-controlled territory in Syria’s province or refusing to surrender.

Alongside the continued presence of civilians, ISIS is also seeking to leverage the smaller number of SDF and foreign prisoners it continues to hold. On February 27, a negotiated deal saw food supplied to the enclave in return for the release of around 20 SDF fighters. Several similar agreements have taken place in recent weeks, underscoring the dire situation facing the jihadi group.

Looking forward: SDF sources indicate that they expect to complete the territorial defeat of ISIS within days. However, the SDF now faces a growing humanitarian crisis impacting those displaced by the fighting, many of whom maintain an affinity with the jihadi group.

This is only one part of a large challenge involved in ‘winning the peace’, with much of the population under SDF control lacking access to basic services and sceptical of the group’s political project. With few resources of its own, the SDF will now need non-military support if it is to successfully combat ISIS’ attempts to use local grievances to fuel a low-level insurgency.

Growing insurgency in areas now under control of Kurdish-led forces

With the Islamic State facing territorial defeat in al-Baghuz Fawqani, the jihadi group has stepped up insurgency activity in the surrounding Deir ez-Zor region. On February 13, an improvised explosive device killed local Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Ahmad Musallam al-Kardush as he travelled between al-Harijiya and al-Hejjnah in northern Deir ez-Zor.

On February 15, a suspected ISIS assassination attempt targeted the head of the local SDF affiliate known as the Deir ez-Zor Military Council (DMC). Small arms fire was directed at the car of Ahmad Abu Khawlah on the road between Deir ez-Zor and the SDF stronghold of al-Hasakah, with SDF spokeswoman Lilwa al-Abdullah being targeted in a similar incident in the same area on February 14.

ISIS sleeper cells have also been blamed for a series of deadly attacks in the region. Three SDF fighters were killed by unidentified gunmen close to the town of Diban on February 16 and a car bomb killed six civilians in the SDF controlled town of Al-Shuhayl on February 21.

Looking forward: Although relatively low level, the incidents are the likely precursor to an intensive insurgency campaign that will seek to undermine SDF rule in the areas of eastern Syria captured from ISIS. ISIS is likely to focus on destabilising the region by targeting community leaders and seeking to inflame sectarian tensions.

Turkey

Oppression of Kurdish parties intensifies ahead of local elections

Crackdowns against pro-Kurdish organisations continued ahead of the March 31 local elections. Dozens more members of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democracy Party (HDP) were detained in Ankara, Istanbul, and in cities across the predominantly Kurdish south-east on charges of making terrorist propaganda.

In Siirt, two HDP officials were arrested on February 12, after they published research detailing extensive irregularities in the electoral roll. Over 50,000 voters were found to have been removed from the roll, and replaced thousands of questionable registrations, including over 6,000 first-time voters over the age of 100. An HDP deputy for Siirt outlined the findings in parliament and accused the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) of electoral fraud. The AKP maintains that over 500,000 of its own members were deleted from the electoral roll but voted down an HDP motion for a parliamentary investigation of voter registration lists.

In the run up to the March 31 local elections, the candidacy of several HDP members has been rejected by local electoral councils in view of ongoing legal investigations against them. Over 100 Kurdish mayors elected in 2014 have been forced out of their positions and replaced by government- appointed officials. President Erdogan has ramped up rhetoric against the HDP, claiming the party is ‘equal to’ the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and repeated threats that successful HDP candidates will be banned from taking office.

In concert with this elevated rhetoric, Turkey’s top public prosecutor has called upon the Supreme Court to shut down four political parties for using the word ‘Kurdistan’ in their name. The Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), the Kurdistan Communist Party (KKP), the Kurdistan Democratic Party-Turkey (KDP-T), and the Kurdistan Socialist Party (PSK) have refused to amend their names and are facing being banned. The PAK has argued that closing the parties would violate Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution, which protects the right to freedom of expression. Though there have been warnings by the judicial authorities against those parties since the breakdown in the peace process with the PKK in July 2015, the renewed demands by the public prosecutor has been viewed as linked to the wider crackdown ahead of the elections.

Kurdish parties unite to challenge government

On February 21, the Peoples’ Democracy Party (HDP) signed a protocol with seven other Kurdish parties to contest the local elections on one list. The official conclusion of the alliance, first announced in early January, indicates the political will to unite in the face of government oppression. In particular, the HDP and its sister Democratic Regions Party (BDP) have put aside differences with the Kurdistan Democratic Party-Turkey (KDP-T), which has close ties to the Kurdistan Democratic Party in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, led by former Iraqi President Masoud Barzani.

Co-operation against the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) ahead of the local elections has not been limited to the Kurdish parties’ alliance. The HDP has announced they will not be fielding mayoral candidates in 11 major cities in order to support the main opposition People’s Republican Party (CHP) and their ‘National Alliance’ coalition partners, the Good Party (IP) against the AKP and

their ‘People’s Alliance’ coalition partners, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP). Among the twelve cities are Istanbul and Ankara, where the Kurdish vote represents a respective 12% and 6% of the total vote share, which could be decisive in swinging helping the CHP win back the mayoralties from the AKP.

Some HDP candidates in the southeast are struggling to locate voters who have been displaced by extended periods of violence and repeated curfews following the breakdown of the peace process with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in 2015. In the city of Diyarbakir, extended clashes between the PKK and security forces have led around 6,000 families have been forced to leave the central Sur districts, though they remain registered to vote.

Kurdish MP’s hunger strike continues

Pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) Hakkari MP Leyla Guven’s indefinite hunger strike entered its 114th day on Friday 1 March. Since being released from prison to house arrest in January, momentum has continued to build behind her demands for the end to the solitary confinement of the leader of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan. Save two visits by his brother Mehmet, Ocalan has been denied all visits by his family and lawyers since the breakdown of the peace process between the government and the PKK in 2015.

Around 330 prisoners across 67 Turkish prisons are estimated to be on indefinite hunger strike in protest against Ocalan’s solitary confinement. Rallies in support of Guven and the other hunger strikers in Istanbul and Guven’s hometown of Diyarbakir have been blockaded by riot police. Most recently, former co-chair of the HDP Selahattin Demirtas has appealed to the European Parliament to help draw international attention to the hunger strikers’ demands.

Kurdish rights activists European legal bid fails

As the independence of Turkey’s judicial system has been increasingly weakened by the powers of the executive presidency, Kurdish human rights activists and lawyers have looked to the EU and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) for redress against rights abuses.

However, the case brought by lawyers for two civilians killed in Cizre has been ruled inadmissible by the ECtHR, on the basis that the case has not been seen by the Turkey’s Constitutional Court. The case alleges that the two men, among 130 other unarmed civilians, were deliberately killed by Turkish security forces in the predominantly Kurdish south-eastern town of Cizre between December 2015 and February 2016. Though the ECtHR has stated the Constitutional Court is continuing to review Cizre cases, applicants argue the Court is no longer an effective legal recourse.

In December, an Istanbul court upheld the prison sentence of former co-chair of the HDP Selahattin Demirtas, after the ECtHR ruled he should be released from pre-trial detention. Demirtas’ lawyers have appealed to the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber to re-examine his case in terms of violation of freedom of expression. Whether or not the panel decides to re-examine the case, future rulings by the ECtHR are unlikely to have much effect on Demirtas’ incarceration. Erdogan and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlut Cavusoglu have both said that Turkey is not bound by the Court and would appeal any ECtHR decisions.

The Cizre case is one of some 27,000 Turkish cases rejected by the ECtHR for not having exhausted domestic legal recourses. In combination with the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee

February 21 vote to suspend accession talks with Turkey, hopes for EU assistance in the face of ongoing human rights abuses in Turkey look increasingly remote.

Iraq

Kurdish parties take initial steps towards forming regional government

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has held its opening parliamentary session, selecting candidates for senior government roles on February 18. The inaugural meeting had been repeatedly postponed since elections in November 2018 amid continued disagreements between the region’s dominant political parties.

These appeared to have been resolved following a February 5 power-sharing agreement between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and its traditional rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which hold 45 and 21 of the regional parliament’s 111 seats respectively. However, the PUK later withdrew its support for the new parliamentary session, accusing the KDP of refusing to sign a written agreement of terms.

The main issue of contention between the two parties is believed to be the oil-rich region of Kirkuk, which is claimed by both the KRG and the federal government in Baghdad. In October 2017, federal troops successfully forced Kurdish fighters from the region, aided in part by the decision by elements of the PUK’s leadership to withdraw their forces under pressure from Iran.

The KRG and the Iraqi Federal Government are now seeking to normalise their relations, with a new governor set to be elected for the predominantly Kurdish region. However, the KDP has thus far refused to support its smaller rival’s candidate for the position despite Kirkuk traditionally being regarded as within the PUK’s sphere of influence. Instead, the KDP blames the PUK for losing control of the region’s energy resources and therefore ending the viability of the KRG’s move towards full independence.

The dispute is indicative of a wider breakdown in trust between the KRG’s two traditional powers which have sought to govern in coalition in the post-Saddam Hussein era. This has taken the form of an informal agreement to divide various government positions at different administrative levels amongst themselves. However, following the fallout from Kirkuk, as well as the party’s strong showing at regional and federal elections, the KDP has sought to exert growing concessions from its smaller rival, including unsuccessfully attempting to block the PUK’s candidate for Iraqi presidency.

In response to the PUK’s decision to boycott the February 18 KRG parliamentary session, the KDP used the support of the smaller Gorran Movement (GM), which holds 12 seats, to secure quoracy and nominate its preferred candidates. The GM, which has been split over the question of securing the benefits of joining the government or seeking popular support by staying in opposition, is now likely to receive four ministerial posts, including that of finance minister.

With support of the GM, the KDP’s Nechirvan Barazani has been confirmed as the KRG’s president, with his cousin, Masrour Barzani, taking the place of prime minister. Nechirvan Barzani is an experienced political operator who served as prime minister under his uncle and former President, Masoud Barzani and is notable for good relations with both Turkey and the US. Masrour Barzani is the son of the still powerful Masoud Barzani and heads the region’s well-connected intelligence agency. Both figures will likely share power under a yet-to-be-determined new political system.

Looking forward: The KDP and PUK are still expected to reach an agreement that would see the latter take up posts including parliamentary speaker and ministerial positions in the KRG, alongside justice ministry at the federal level. However, the continued mistrust between the two political factions which dominate the security services means that the risk of a political crisis leading to a sudden escalation towards violence remains.

Iran

Crackdown on crossworder trade between Kurdish regions

There are growing indications that the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq is seeking to limit the movement of goods and people across its Iranian border. Much of this trade is carried out by predominantly Iranian-Kurdish smugglers, locally referred to as kolbars, who bring goods across the mountainous Iraqi border by foot. The commerce is a crucial source of income in the predominantly Kurdish regions of Iran and has traditionally been tolerated to varying degrees by the authorities in both countries.

However, the Iranian authorities have recently taken a tougher stance against kolbars, which they accuse of helping to finance Kurdish separatist groups which operate in the area, leading to a growing number of deaths. Exact numbers are difficult to verify, but at least 5 kolbars are believed to have been killed by Iranian border guards in the first two months of 2019.

Traditionally, the KRG has taken a more tolerant position regarding both Kurdish armed groups and kolbars operating across the border but this appears to now be changing under US pressure. Cross- border commerce between the Kurdish regions in Iraq and Iran is believed to total around 8 billion dollars annually. Washington is pressuring the KRG to clamp down on illicit trade as it seeks to strengthen the impact of sanctions on Iran.

The KRG has similarly taken steps to limit the movement of migrants from Iran’s Kurdish regions, tightening labour law regulations. The move is likely to impact the flow of remittances back to Iran, limiting a significant source of foreign currency at time when the Iranian rial continues to depreciate.

Looking forward: Cross border trade is crucial to the local economy of Iran’s Kurdish regions and moves to limit it are likely to have a detrimental impact in areas where unemployment is already high. Similar circumstances in the past have led to social unrest including strikes by traders and anti- government protests.