BRITAIN and the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AFTER the 1967 WAR by Moshe Gat*

BRITAIN AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AFTER THE 1967 WAR By Moshe Gat* This article discusses the change in British policy towards Israel following Israel’s victory in the 1967 War. It examines how prior to the Six Day war Britain and Israel enjoyed a friendly relationship characterized by the former’s absolute commitment to maintaining stability in the Middle East. Britain supplied Israel with arms and gave political support in the United Nations as well as in the international forums. The article studies how following the war, Harold Wilson’s government sought ways to minimize the damage Israel’s victory had wrought to Britain’s economic interests. This policy change was manifested in support of the Arab position regarding the territories captured by Israel in the course of the war. From the end of the 1950s until the 1967 to tensions between the British and Israeli Six Day War, relations between Great governments. This tension reached a peak Britain and Israel were friendly, in when Israel’s Prime Minister Levi Eshkol particular regarding British support for labeled British Foreign Secretary George Israel’s right to secure borders. This policy Brown as an enemy of Israel and charged was expressed in arms shipments and that British policy sought to deny Israel its political support for Israel at the United gains in the war and, in essence, to Nations in the conflict between Israel and undermine Israel’s very existence. its neighbors. The two countries generally The article at hand seeks to examine conducted an ongoing dialogue to find ways British policy led by George Brown in to prevent flare-ups between the armed regard to the occupied territories that forces of Israel and its neighbors, which reached its peak in UN Security Council could have a negative impact on British Resolution 242 in November 1967. interests in the region. These interests included— among others—the flow of oil; BRITISH STRATEGY PRIOR TO THE development of economic relations with WAR Arab countries; and, primarily, checking Soviet penetration of the Middle East. After the 1956 Sinai Campaign, it was The Six Day War ended with a smarting clear to the British government that the de- Arab defeat, but also a serious colonialization process was inevitable. corresponding blow to British economic While the Campaign did not result in the interests in the region. In order to curtail the immediate relinquishment of the United economic damage, for a short period after Kingdom’s hold on the Middle East, it did the war, the British government under indicate that Britain’s withdrawal from the Harold Wilson sought to disassociate itself region was only a matter of time. It pointed from Britain’s pro-Israel image by out that for this reason steps should be supporting the Arab position vis-à-vis the taken to do this gradually, in a manner that territories captured by Israel during the would minimize damage to British course of the war. This British position led interests—many of which were shared by 68 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) Britain and the Occupied Territories after the 1967 War the West as a whole.1 Great Britain lengthy period of stability that had preceded maintained a military presence in the region it. In late 1963, neighboring Arab states that was designed to check Soviet learned that Israel had completed expansion and penetration of the Persian construction of its National Water Carrier, Gulf and the Middle East as a whole, in designed to carry water from the Sea of order to ensure the free flow of oil from the Galilee to the south of Israel. The Arabs region to the UK and Western Europe.2 viewed Israel’s water program as an Prime Minister Harold Macmillan “existential threat” to the Arab nation, as voiced British strategy for maintaining dangerous to their existence as was the peace and stability in the region in a May establishment of the State of Israel itself in 1963 speech before Parliament. He said that 1948.6 In an emergency conference “…her Majesty’s Government [is] deeply convened in Cairo in January 1964 to interested in peace and stability in this area, address the prevention of exploitation of and are opposed to the use of force or the water from the Sea of Galilee by Israel, threat of force there as elsewhere in the Arab leaders approved as countermeasures world…”3 the diversion of the headwaters of the The British government viewed Israel’s Jordan River and the establishment of a military power as an important component Unified Arab Military Command to prepare in maintaining peace and stability in the a program for a military build-up of all region. Consequently, it did not refrain Arab forces.7 In essence, the water dispute from sending arms to Israel and viewed this set in motion dynamic forces within the support as a vehicle for preventing war, or Arab-Israeli conflict that had a decisive as the British Prime Minister Harold impact on the relationship between Israel Macmillan chose to term it, to contribute to and its neighbors. It pulled the region the consolidation of stability.4 This was towards a relentless rise in tension, which expressed by the British Ambassador to ultimately culminated in full-scale war.8 Israel in a communication to the Foreign The British government supported the Office in which he wrote: Israeli position on the issue. Great Britain was of the opinion that the actions of the We do not give the Israelis arms Israeli government were in keeping with because they are pro-Western or international law,9 and that attempts by the because we admire their Arab states to divert the headwaters of the achievement. We give them arms Jordan River flowing into the Sea of Galilee because our interest in the Middle was a patent attempt to sabotage Israel’s East is to keep the place quiet and to future development.10 Nevertheless, the prevent war. Anything which makes British government did not make this war in the Middle East more likely position public. British interests were too is against the interests of Western important to jeopardize them by supporting powers.5 the Israeli position, no matter how justified. The best policy, it was surmised, was to The stability that the British so keenly maintain a low profile, or in practice to sought to maintain was not, however, long- continue a policy of not taking a position lasting, due to the conflict over water siding with either side in the dispute. Such a resources between Israel and its neighbors, policy, the British government surmised, a conflict which threatened the relatively Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006) 69 Moshe Gat would help preserve British interests in the an Egyptian victory would be far graver. An Arab world.11 Egyptian victory would pave the way for Nevertheless, maintaining a low profile the collapse of pro-Western regimes, oil and refraining from taking sides was supply was liable to be disrupted, and such interpreted by the Arabs as support for the an outcome would surely bolster Soviet Israeli position. The Arabs were distrustful influence in the region.14 The 1967 War towards the British, and memories of the between Israel and its neighbors indeed Suez Campaign—in which Britain, France, ended in an Israeli victory, but it inflicted a and Israel had secretly coordinated their high economic price on Great Britain. One attack on Egypt together—were still fresh could even go so far as to say that the in their minds. They were aware that Great magnitude of economic damage done to Britain was secretly providing arms to Great Britain was of the same magnitude Israel. The Arabs believed that that the defeat dealt the Arabs. The closure fundamentally, British policy was pro-Israel of the Suez Canal caused serious economic and anti-Arab. One of the most salient losses, along with the Arab oil embargo, expressions of Great Britain’s support of forcing Britain to buy oil from other, more Israel in Arab eyes was Great Britain’s expensive sources. Finally, the oil-rich attempts in the days prior to the start of the Arab states began to withdraw their money Six Day War to organize an international from Britain's banks. maritime task force that would break the blockade on the Tiran Straits at the mouth POST-WAR STRATEGY of the Red Sea.12 Furthermore, on June 2, 1967, three days As soon as hostilities ceased, the Wilson before the outbreak of war, Prime Minister Government’s policy was to find ways to Harold Wilson met with President Lyndon preserve Britain’s vital interests. The Johnson in Washington in a last ditch Foreign Office defined these interests as a attempt to open the Tiran Straits to Israeli large and very profitable share of the oil shipping and thus to avoid war. The operation, large Arab investment in meeting, which was fruitless, was viewed London, a growing export market, ensured with suspicion in the Arab world and as a communications by sea and air to the east, sign of a Suez-like conspiracy. In their and the denial of effective control of the minds, the British prime minister appeared area and its resources to the Communist to be leading an attempt to establish an anti- powers.15 Arab coalition designed to serve Israel’s The British judged that they must act objectives. The Egyptians, who had learned simultaneously along two paths: a of the trip of Mossad Director General Meir comprehensive solution between Israel and Amit to Washington on May 30, saw such its neighbors and rapid improvement of its meetings as a clear case of “a Suez type image and realization of a rapprochement plot” being woven by Great Britain, the with the Arab world.16 The preferred path United States, and Israel.13 was a comprehensive settlement.

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