Abstract ENDURING FAILURES: A BORDERLANDS HISTORY OF THE IRAQ WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH by Terry Thomas Tait This thesis places the Iraq War and its aftermath (2003-2014) within the framework of borderlands scholarship. The interdisciplinary approach used in this work makes new connections between borderlands history, particularly in the context of North America, and places it within the context of the modern Middle East. By expanding upon abstract notions of power in the frontier, this work explores the different perspectives, experiences, and goals of Iraq’s tribal community in al-Anbar Province, the U.S.-led Coalition, and al-Qaʿida in Iraq and its successor organizations to argue that these groups failed to fill the vacuum of authority that emerged in Iraq after 2003 with their own respective visions for the country’s future. This work utilizes Richard Whites concept of “the middle ground” to explore how these groups negotiated and competed with one another for hegemony, creating the political realities of post-2003 Iraq. ENDURING FAILURES: A BORDERLANDS HISTORY OF THE IRAQ WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Miami University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts by Terry Thomas Tait Miami University Oxford, Ohio 2019 Advisor: Dr. Matthew Gordon Reader: Dr. Nathan French Reader: Dr. Amanda McVety Reader: Dr. Andrew Offenburger © 2019 Terry Thomas Tait This Select thesis titled ENDURING FAILURES: A BORDERLANDS HISTORY OF THE IRAQ WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH by Terry Thomas Tait has been approved for publication by College of Arts and Science and Department of History ____________________________________________________ Dr. Matthew Gordon ______________________________________________________ Dr. Nathan French _______________________________________________________ Dr. Amanda McVety _______________________________________________________ Dr. Andrew Offenburger Table of Contents Acknowledgements. ……………………………………………………………………….. iv Introduction .……………………………………………………………………………….. 1 Chapter One: Cooperation, Coercion, and the Pursuit of Tribal Interests in al-Anbar…….. 15 Chapter Two: An Ideological Imposition: The U.S. in Iraq……………………………….. 44 Chapter Three: The Management of the Middle Ground: The Jihadist State Project in Iraq..……………………………………………………………………………................... 74 Conclusion.……………………………………………………………………………….... 105 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………….. 109 iii Acknowledgements I would like to thank my committee members who played a vital role in helping me produce this thesis: Matthew Gordon, Nathan French, Amanda McVety, and Andrew Offenburger. Throughout the process of researching and writing this work, they asked questions and encouraged me to think more critically about my own ideas and the materials that I was working with. I would also like to thank my graduate cohort, especially Adam Bruno, Allie Fair, Amanda Lawson, and Edward Strong, for aiding me through the writing process by reading several drafts and at times serving as a sound board for new ideas. The patience and attention to detail of all these individuals helped to bring a level of clarity and depth that otherwise would not have been possible. iv Introduction “Honorable Iraqis: your land has been completely liberated,” Prime Minister Haider al- Abadi declared on December 9, 2017. His speech was a declaration of victory over the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, which emerged as a unified military force only three years before, when it took over broad swaths of Iraqi territory.1 His words seemed absolute and final. However military operations in the country continued, especially in the western desert of al-Anbar Province. Nevertheless, Abadi seemed to be ushering in a new phase in Iraq’s history. But this was not the first time victory was falsely declared in Iraq. As recently as 2011, the U.S. President Barack Obama stated that “the tide of war is receding.”2 His words marked the final U.S. troops being withdrawn from an eight-year conflict that started with his predecessor, President George W. Bush, whose own “Mission Accomplished” gaffe came at the beginning of a protracted insurgency. Similarly, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi proclaimed the establishment of an Islamic state in Iraq with himself as the group’s emir.3 The perpetual state of instability in Iraq makes each of these ‘victories’ appear to be superficial, if not outright falsehoods. But why are each of these victories followed by such contradicting failures? While every party in Iraq’s conflicts, including the country’s tribes, the U.S.-led Coalition, and al-Qaʿida in Iraq (AQI) made short term progress towards their goals, they each failed to make durable progress to achieve their respective aims. This thesis seeks to examine how these groups failed to accomplish their goals during the Iraq War and establish a dominant governing authority in the country after the removal of Saddam Hussein. The single consequence of these collective failures, I argue, is the emergence of a vacuum of authority, which would later contribute to the expansion of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria in 2014. By the phrase “vacuum of authority” I am referring to a political situation where there are multiple powers that claim to hold legitimate control over a single space, creating a struggle for hegemony. This idea is an extension of the concept of a vacuum of power, where there is no political authority in a given territory. This 1 Maher Chmaytelli and Ahmed Aboulenein, “Iraq Declares Final Victory Over Islamic State,” Reuters, December 9, 2017. 2 Matt Compton, “President Obama Has Ended The War in Iraq,” Obama White House, October 21, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/10/21/president-obama-has-ended-war-iraq. 3 Kyle Orton, “The Announcement of the Islamic State—in 2006,” Kyle Orton’s Blog, 18 March 2018, https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2018/03/18/the-announcement-of-the-islamic-state-in-2006/. 1 thesis poses that because there were several powers claiming to hold political power in Iraq, there was no singular political entity that legitimately controlled the country. I will focus primarily on the actions and rhetoric of the tribes of Iraq’s al-Anbar Province, the U.S.-led Coalition, and AQI and its successor organizations in order to understand their pursuit of larger goals in the country and the region. This thesis makes the case that the internal dynamics of each of these groups and their relationships with other actors in the country, or lack thereof, contributed to their successes and failures, ultimately preventing the establishment of a single dominant authority in the country. To make this argument, this project will connect the local context of Iraq, and particularly al-Anbar Province, to each individual group’s historical development. Because the existing scholarship on this conflict places a significant amount of attention on the other actors in the conflict, this project emphasizes the role of Iraq's tribal population. While this community has received greater attention in the past few years, there are still many questions that can be answered to clarify an important aspect of this conflict and its aftermath. This thesis attempts to clarify some aspects of the tribal role in the Iraq War, but due to the limitation of available resources there are many questions that remain. The inspiration for this project’s approach is Karl Jacoby’s Shadows at Dawn, which examines the perspectives of several groups in order to understand the history of violence in the American South West. His work traces four different narratives to explore the experiences of four distinct communities: Anglo Americans, Mexican Americans, Tohono O’odhams, and Apaches. Jacoby artfully presents these different historical narratives into one historical account by blending historical research and traditional storytelling.4 In that spirit, this thesis frames the Iraq War from the perspectives of three groups that were central to the conflict’s development, tracing each group’s respective experiences, and incorporating their narratives of and goals for the war. By looking at how each group described developments in Iraq—accurately or otherwise—this thesis will show how they understood the war and placed themselves within it. Additionally, this work adopts Richard White’s idea of “the middle ground,” as a space between cultures and political groups where new realities were created through the acts of cooperation and conflict between different parties. The discussion that follows demonstrates that during the 4 Karl Jacoby, Shadows at Dawn: An Apache Massacre and the Violence of History (New York: Penguin Books, 2009). 2 transitional period of the Iraq War, several groups competed over political authority in the country, but failed to create a new, stable reality that satisfied all participants. One of the primary goals of this project is to present the narratives, goals, and internal conflicts of each of these groups—but especially of Iraq’s tribal community—within their respective historical contexts. By doing so, this project will expand our understanding of power during this conflict, and give voice to an often neglected community in American scholarship on the Iraq War. This work encourages the reader to reflect on the political and social implications of the Iraq War in the context of al-Anbar Province and more contemporary events following the war’s conclusion. Indeed, the consequences of the Iraq War are in many ways still unraveling as the consequences