View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by UCL Discovery The Wasted Decade Israel’s Policies towards the Occupied Territories 1967-1977 Ronald Ranta UCL Israeli Studies 1 I, Ronald Ranta confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. 2 ABSTRACT This thesis aims to provide a detailed historical narrative of Israel’s relationship with the Occupied Territories between the years 1967 and 1977, using the most up-to-date archival material. The central argument of the thesis is that successive Israeli governments lacked a coherent and comprehensive long-term policy towards the Occupied Territories; it is the contention of this thesis that there is no documentary evidence to support the common belief that successive Israeli governments had a comprehensive long-term territorial policy. It is true that successive Israeli governments made decisions based on several long-term plans and approaches, such as the Allon Plan and the Functional Solution, but, when put into context and viewed as a whole, these decisions were neither coherent nor comprehensive and in any case were never formally adopted by the government. In trying to explain why successive governments failed to put forward a coherent and comprehensive long-term policy, four major contributing factors have been identified: the faction-based politics of the Labour Party, the US position vis-à-vis Israel, New Zionism and the intention of successive Prime Ministers to avoid formulating a clear long-term policy. The need to maintain unity, and avoid a split amongst the factions, ensured that the Labour Party was unable and unwilling to take a clear and unequivocal stand on the issue of the Occupied Territories; the US diplomatic stance vis-à-vis Israel exacerbated existing divisions, while strengthening the positions of those who argued in favour of avoiding taking clear decisions on the Occupied Territories; the rise of New Zionism changed the dynamics and landscape of the Israeli political system in a way that weakened Mapai’s, and later the Labour Party’s, ability to dictate territorial policy; lastly, successive Prime Ministers (Eshkol, Meir and Rabin) made clear choices against the formulation of a coherent and comprehensive long-term policy. 3 Table of Content Note on the transliteration 7 Acknowledgment 8 Introduction: 9-30 The Economy 13 The Settlements 15 The Military/Security Dimension 17 The Political and Diplomatic Spheres 19 Lack of Policy 21 The Labour Party Approach 22 The Transitional State Approach 26 Examination 29 The Eshkol Period Introduction 31 Chapter One: 33-72 The Six Day War 33 The Military Administration 41 First Proposals 43 The 11th and the 13th of June 46 Jerusalem 49 The Ministerial Defence Committee 50 The 19th of June 51 Johnson’s Five Principles 56 Unification 59 The West Bank 63 The Allon Plan 65 Other Plans 67 Dayan 70 Chapter Two: 73-97 Merom Golan 73 Committees 76 The 30th of October Decision 83 King Hussein 86 Resolution 242 88 The White House 90 Gunnar Jarring 91 4 The Labour Party 94 Chapter Three: 98-125 The Settlements 98 The Gaza Strip 101 Hebron 104 Meetings with Palestinians 108 Al-Ja’abri 111 Jordan 113 Economic Integration 118 Summary 122 The Meir Period Introduction 126 Chapter one: 129-158 The War of Attrition 129 Golda Meir 131 The Electoral Platform 132 Dayan and Allon 135 The Oral Law 139 Labour Party Convention 143 The Rogers Plan 147 Rogers B 153 Chapter Two: 159-189 Israel’s Secret Peace Plan 159 Black September 161 Sadat 163 The Kitchenette 170 Israel’s Contradictory Approach 173 The Rafah Plains 177 Hussein’s Federal Plan 182 Chapter Three: 190-218 The Grand Debate 190 The Galili Document 198 The Yom Kippur War 202 The Fourteen-Point Document 206 The 1973 Elections 210 Meir’s Meetings with Hussein 211 5 Summary 216 The Rabin Period Introduction 219 Chapter One: 221-244 The Rabin Government 221 Syria and the Golan Heights 223 Jericho First 228 The NRP 232 Gush-Emonim 234 Ma’ale Adumim 237 Ofra 242 Chapter Two: 245-268 Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula 245 Interim Agreements 248 Sebastia 249 Israel’s Settlement Policy 254 The Palestinian Option 258 The 1977 Elections 260 Summary 266 Conclusion: 269-284 The Golan Heights 270 The Sinai Peninsula 272 The Gaza Strip and the Rafah Plains 273 The West Bank 274 The Lack of Policy 276 Summary 283 Bibliography: 285-292 6 Note on the Transliteration The thesis uses the transliteration system adopted by the Encyclopaedia Judaica for both Hebrew and Arab names and terms.1 The diacritical signs are written as vowels, א is transliterated as Hakibbutz Hameuhad. The consonant הקיבוץ המאוחד for example is ע is not transliterated; instead its diacritical sign is used. In addition the consonant In order to avoid .ع rendered as (‘), this is also used in regards to the Arabic when at the beginning of a name is transliterated י confusion, the Hebrew consonant as (Y), e.g. Yisrael Galili. is transliterated as צ In order to make the vocalisation easier the Hebrew Consonant ,(K) ק ,(is (H ח Tz) as opposed to the normal (Z); in addition the Hebrew Consonants) as خ Sh or S). One exception has been the transliteration of the Arabic Consonants) ש .(H) ح Kh) and) is transliterated as (Tz) as צ To make it easier to vocalise, the Hebrew Consonant opposed to the normal (Z). To provide an example of the approach this thesis uses, the .is transliterated as Ya’akov Hertzog יעקב הרצוג Hebrew Name Finally, in many cases, and where relevant, the English or internationally known term has been used, e.g. the Jewish Agency’s Settlement Department. 1 “Transliteration,” Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1 (Second Edition, Farmington Hills, 2007), Page 197. 7 Acknowledgment I would like to thank the many archivists who helped me with my research, in particular Helena and Michal at ISA, Murry, Aharon and Rivka at Yad Tabenkin, and Michael at Beit Berl. Thanks are also due to the Ian Karten Charitable Trust from which I was fortunate to obtain some financial support. I also wish to acknowledge the support and help I received from my tutor Dr. Neill Lochery and the Jewish and Hebrew Department at UCL. Additionally, I would like to thank Ori Lamm and Elen Shute for their advice and constructive criticism. Lastly, I owe a bit debt to both of my parents for their financial and practical support throughout my research and I can only hope that my father would have been proud with the end result. 8 Introduction Government and Politics are interesting when problems are difficult. The most fascinating problems are likely to be on the agenda for a long time without being solved in any final sense. Attention may come and go. Individual episodes may find their treatment, but the same underlying problems will return.2 Following the Six Day War,3 Opposition member Uri Avneri asked for the government’s inclination regarding the Occupied Territories. Avneri was particularly interested to know how the Eshkol government saw the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In his view there were four possible scenarios: to exchange the territories for peace with Israel’s Arab neighbours, to annex the territories, to transform the territories into a Palestinian state, or to create a pseudo colony in the territories whereby Israel would informally annex the territories without allowing the Palestinians to become Israeli citizens. Avneri proposed that the best long-term option for Israel would be the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.4 The discussion that ensued involved not only those territories mentioned by Avneri, but also the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights and the future of East Jerusalem.5 In the aftermath of the Six Day War Israel faced a new reality. The war left Israel in possession of territories three and a half times its own size and a population of over one million Arabs. The occupation of Arab lands and people posed numerous problems for Israel, particularly with security and the economy, but also with some complex demographic and diplomatic challenges. Israel needed to take into account the complexity of these problems and define its approach towards them, not only in a manner that addressed the challenges but also in a way that corresponded to its national objectives. The problem of defining such an approach was further complicated by the need to reach a consensus within the confines of the National Unity Government. The government’s first objective was to reach a decision regarding Israel’s future borders, i.e. which of the territories it wanted to retain and from which it was willing to withdraw as part of a negotiated settlement. However, 2 Ira Sharkansky, Ambiguity, Coping, and Governance: Israeli Experiences in Politics, Religion, and Policymaking (Westport, Praeger, 1999), Page 1. 3 The use of the term Six Day War (also known as the June War) throughout this thesis reflects the fact that the thesis deals with the Israeli state and government. 4 Knesset Transcripts/Booklet 32/Meeting 184/Page 2346. 5 Ronald Ranta, The Seventh Day (MSc, 2005), Page 25. 9 this decision was, to a certain degree, dependent upon whether the government adopted an Instrumental or Normative standpoint in relation to the territories.6 It was a question of whether the territories would be viewed in relation to their perceived military-strategic importance (i.e. Instrumental), or their perceived historical and religious significance (i.e.