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The Sahel Performance

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The Sahel Performance ABOUT THE PEOPLE’S OCOUALRITION FOR THE SAHEL PERFORMANCE The People’s Coalition for the Sahel is an informal alliance of several dozen Sahelian and West African civil society organisations, supported by international NGOs. Its objective is to promote a new approach to the Sahel (for adoption by governments) to protect civilian populations more effectively. The People’s Coalition was launched in July 2020, with the publication of its People’s Pillars – four priorities the People’s Coalition believe should guide any response to the crisis in the Sahel. To find out more about the People’s Coalition, visit: https://www.sahelpeoplescoalition.org/home LIST OF ORGANISATIONS SUPPORTING THIS REPORT: Organisations in the Sahel and West Africa Burkina Faso Association pour la Promotion Féminine de Gaoua (APFG) Centre Diocésain de Communication (CDC) Centre pour la Gouvernance Démocratique (CGD) Collectif contre l’Impunité et la Stigmatisation des Communautés (CISC) Mouvement Burkinabè des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples (MBDHP) Union Fraternelle des Croyants (UFC – Dori) West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) – Burkina Faso Mali Association des Femmes Africaines pour la Recherche et le Développement (AFARD) Association des Juristes Maliennes (AJM) Association Malienne des Droits de l’Homme (AMDH) Coordination des Associations des Femmes de l’Azawad (CAFA) Doniblog/Benbere Institut Malien de Recherche Action pour la Paix (IMRAP) ONG Eveil Volontaires pour le Mali West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) – Mali Women in Law and Development (WiLDAF) THE SAHEL: WHAT NEEDS TO CHANGE | TOWARDS A NEW PEOPLE-CENTRED APPROACH | RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE PEOPLE'S COALITION FOR THE SAHEL - 2 Niger Association Nigérienne de Défense des Droits de l'Homme (ANDDH) Coordination des ONG et Associations Féminines Nigériennes (CONGAFEN) Réseau Nigérien pour la Gestion Non Violente des Conflits (RE-GENOVICO) Réseau Panafricain pour la Paix, la Démocratie, et le Développement (REPPAD) West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) –Niger Regional organisations African Security Sector Network (ASSN) Afrikajom Center All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) Ligue Tchadienne des Droits de l’Homme (LTDH) Observatoire Kisal Réseau de Réflexion Stratégique sur la Sécurité au Sahel (2R3S) Timbuktu Institute Wathi, Think Tank citoyen de l'Afrique de l'Ouest International organisations supporting the People’s Coalition CARE International CCFD-Terre Solidaire Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) Fédération internationale pour les droits humains (FIDH) Fokus Sahel Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P) Handicap International (Humanité & Inclusion) Human Rights Watch (HRW) International Rescue Committee (IRC) Médecins du Monde (MDM) Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) Open Society European Policy Institute (OSEPI) Oxfam international Plan international (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger) Première Urgence Internationale Saferworld Search for Common Ground Secours Islamique France Research for the report conducted by: With the support of: THE SAHEL: WHAT NEEDS TO CHANGE | TOWARDS A NEW PEOPLE-CENTRED APPROACH | RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE PEOPLE'S COALITION FOR THE SAHEL - 3 Table of Contents F o r e w o r d 6 E x e c u t i v e S u m m a r y 8 M e t h o d o l o g y 1 1 L i s t o f A b b r e v i a t i o n s 1 3 1 ) P u t t i n g t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f c i v i l i a n s a t t h e h e a r t o f 1 5 t h e r e s p o n s e t o t h e c r i s i s i n t h e S a h e l I n d i c a t o r 1 : N u m b e r o f a t t a c k s a g a i n s t c i v i l i a n s 1 6 C u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n 1 8 W h a t n e e d s t o c h a n g e ? 2 0 I n d i c a t o r 2 : M e c h a n i s m s w i t h i n d e f e n c e a n d 2 1 s e c u r i t y f o r c e s f o r m o n i t o r i n g c i v i l i a n h a r m C u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n 2 1 W h a t n e e d s t o c h a n g e ? 2 6 2 ) S u p p o r t i n g p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g i e s t o a d d r e s s t h e 2 7 c r i s i s o f g o v e r n a n c e i n t h e S a h e l I n d i c a t o r 3 : D i a l o g u e w i t h a l l a c t o r s i n t h e 2 8 c o n f l i c t C u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n 2 8 W h a t n e e d s t o c h a n g e ? 3 1 I n d i c a t o r 4 : T r a n s p a r e n c y i n d e f e n c e b u d g e t s 3 3 C u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n 3 3 W h a t n e e d s t o c h a n g e ? 3 6 3 ) R e s p o n d i n g t o h u m a n i t a r i a n e m e r g e n c i e s 3 7 I n d i c a t o r 5 : F u n d i n g t h a t i s c o m m e n s u r a t e , o n 4 0 t i m e a n d r e s p o n s i v e t o n e e d C u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n 4 0 W h a t n e e d s t o c h a n g e ? 4 2 I n d i c a t o r 6 : E n s u r i n g h u m a n i t a r i a n a c c e s s 4 3 C u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n 4 3 W h a t n e e d s t o c h a n g e ? 4 5 THE SAHEL: WHAT NEEDS TO CHANGE | TOWARDS A NEW PEOPLE-CENTRED APPROACH | RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE PEOPLE'S COALITION FOR THE SAHEL - 4 Table of Contents 4 ) C o m b a t i n g i m p u n i t y 4 6 I n d i c a t o r 7 : Z e r o t o l e r a n c e o f a b u s e s c o m m i t t e d 4 7 b y d e f e n c e a n d s e c u r i t y f o r c e s C u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n 4 7 W h a t n e e d s t o c h a n g e ? 5 1 I n d i c a t o r 8 : B o o s t i n g t h e c a p a c i t y a n d r e s o u r c e s 5 3 o f t h e j u s t i c e s y s t e m C u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n 5 3 W h a t n e e d s t o c h a n g e ? 5 5 R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s 5 6 E n d n o t e s 6 7 THE SAHEL: WHAT NEEDS TO CHANGE | TOWARDS A NEW PEOPLE-CENTRED APPROACH | RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE PEOPLE'S COALITION FOR THE SAHEL - 5 OUR FOREWORD Occasionally, a conflict or humanitarian crisis results in suffering and instability of such an enormous scale that it requires global attention. This report successfully makes the case that the situation in the Sahel is such a crisis. This report lays bare the extent to which governance faPilures Ehave reRsulted Fin the lOoss of lifeR, loss oMf opportunAity and Nthe lack oCf dignitEy for the people of the Sahel.
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