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Sahel Alliance FAQ (PDF) FAQ on the Sahel Alliance 1 Table of contents WHAT IS THE SAHEL ALLIANCE? P.3 HOW DOES THE SAHEL ALLIANCE WORK? P. 3 WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SAHEL ALLIANCE AND THE G5 SAHEL? P. 4 WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SAHEL ALLIANCE AND THE SAHEL COALITION? P. 5 HOW DOES THE SAHEL ALLIANCE ENSURE COHERENCE OF ITS INTERVENTIONS WITH P. 5 THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES OF THE G5 SAHEL? 2 WHAT IS THE INTEGRATED TERRITORIAL APPROACH (ITA)? P. 6 HOW ARE THE PRIORITY AREAS DEFINED? P. 6 WHAT IS THE RESULTS FRAMEWORK OF THE SAHEL ALLIANCE AND HOW IS IT P. 6 MONITORED? WHAT IS THE PROJECT PORTFOLIO LABELLED «SAHEL ALLIANCE»? P. 7 WHO CAN I CONTACT IF I HAVE A QUESTION ABOUT THE SAHEL ALLIANCE? P. 7 What is the Sahel Alliance? he Sahel Alliance is an together a large number of institutional essential themes, which cut across all international coordination development aid actors working in the the actions of the Sahel Alliance: Climate, platform launched in July 2017 Sahel. The members of the Sahel Alliance Gender, Youth and the Private Sector. One by a group of bilateral and have chosen to concentrate their efforts of the main objectives of the Alliance is to Tmultilateral development partners. Its aim in six priority sectors of intervention, improve and accelerate the implementation is to provide a more coordinated, joint, in line with the development priorities of the projects being financed, especially adapted and effective response to the established by the G5 Sahel countries: in vulnerable areas, in order to boost their development challenges and concerns of Agriculture, rural development and food impact. To achieve this, members base the countries and populations of the G5 security; Decentralisation and basic their actions on four key principles: Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger services; Education and youth employment; and Chad). It currently has 14 full members Energy; Governance; Domestic security. and 11 observer members, thus bringing The priority sectors are reinforced by four TargetingCiblage of des their RedevabilitéMutual NouveauxNew modes modes of ZonesFragile fragiles and & interventionsactions accountabilitymutuelle d’actionaction vulnerablevulnérables areas suron 6 6 secteurs priority prioritaires sectors betweenentre partenaires partners, plusthat innovants are more et plus receivefont l’objet particular d’un andet 4 4 thématiques transversal surbased des on objectifs shared innovativeflexibles. and engagementattention. transversales.themes. objectives.partagés. flexible. particulier. 3 How does the Sahel Alliance work? n terms of governance, a solid chaired by Germany, in the person of Thanks to this global system, significant mechanism was put in place in mid- the Director for Africa of the Federal progress has been made: pooling of a 2019 based on a General Assembly Ministry for Economic Cooperation and portfolio of projects by the members of (GA), an Operational Steering Development (BMZ), Mr. Christoph Rauh the Sahel Alliance; definition of indicators ICommittee (OSC) and a Coordination Unit for monitoring results and making a (CU). • The Alliance Coordination Unit (ACU) commitment with the G5 countries to has been based in Brussels since April mutual accountability; joint proposals to • The first General Assembly of the 2019. Currently headed by Mr. Adrien change operating methods in order to make Alliance was held in Nouakchott on 25 Haye, the team in charge of running the aid more effective (setting up dedicated February 2020, under the presidency of General Secretariat of the Alliance. funds/facilities, carrying out and sharing France, in the person of its Minister for diagnostics in the areas of intervention, Europe and Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jean- To promote the Alliance on the ground, setting up databases and mapping tools for Yves Le Drian. The second General a network of spokespersons has been the geolocation of activities carried out for Assembly is being held in N’Djaména on set up in each of the G5 countries. They better coordination and decision-making 15 February 2021, under the Presidency represent the Sahel Alliance internally (vis- support); writing position papers on the of Spain, in the person of its Minister à-vis the members represented locally) main public policy reforms to be conducted/ for Foreign Affairs, European Union and and externally (vis-à-vis the authorities, encouraged in the sectors and transversal Cooperation, Ms. Arancha González partners and third parties). Their mission areas of intervention of the Alliance; writing Laya; is to facilitate communication, coordination reports on the results achieved and the and implementation of Alliance decisions in impacts of the projects financed. • Four meetings of the Operational the field. To complement and support this Steering Committee have been held mechanism, UCA liaison experts have been in the last two years (2019-2021), deployed in each of the G5 countries. 1 Germany, France, European Union, World Bank, African Development Bank, UNDP, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, United Kingdom, EIB, Norway 2 United States, Canada, Japan, Belgium, Switzerland, Finland, Ireland, IFC, Gates Foundation, Tony Blair Institute, OIF What is the difference between the Sahel Alliance and the G5 Sahel? he G5 Sahel, whose Executive • The close link between economic For its part, the Sahel Alliance is a Secretariat is located in development and security, as the coordination platform, possessing neither Nouakchott, Mauritania, is an governments are convinced of the legal nor moral personality. It was created intergovernmental cooperation interdependence of the challenges of in 2017 to improve the effectiveness of Tframework created, under the impetus of security, peace and development; development aid from donors working in the Mauritanian presidency of the African the G5 Sahel countries and to be the latter’s Union, at a summit organised from 15 to 17 • To involve Sahelian states directly privileged interlocutor on development February 2014 by five Sahel States: Burkina threatened by the various jihadist issues, in a spirit of mutual accountability. Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad. organisations operating in the region. While the G5 Sahel and the Sahel Alliance The aim of the G5 Sahel organisation is to share common development objectives, both fight against insecurity and carry out their functioning and prerogatives are development actions: different and do not so much overlap as complement each other. Mauritania 4 Mali Burkina Faso Niger Chad What is the difference between the Sahel Alliance and the Sahel Coalition? he Sahel Alliance works with the President of the European Council and G5 Sahel States and their international G5 Sahel as co-actors of Pillar 4 the High Representative of the European partners. The objective is to make it a (development aid) of the Sahel Union, the President of the African Union coherent regional action that encompasses Coalition. This global initiative Commission and the Secretary-General all the actors involved in the Sahel, whether Twas announced at the Pau Summit on of the International Organization of La they are involved in security, political 13 January 2020 by the Heads of State Francophonie. The Coalition for the Sahel or development issues. This initiative of France, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, wants to give a more collective response proposes a new framework for international Niger and Chad, in the presence of the to the challenges of the Sahel region, by action, through four complementary pillars, United Nations Secretary-General, the bringing together the actions led by the each of which has its own steering. 1 2 3 4 FIGHT AGAINST STRENGTHENING THE SUPPORT THE SUPPORTING ARMED TERRORIST CAPACITIES OF THE RETURN OF DEVELOPMENT GROUPS ARMED FORCES OF THE STATE AND THE REGION’S STATES ADMINISTRATIONS TO COORDINATION BY THE G5 THE TERRITORY SAHEL AND THE SAHEL ALLIANCE 5 How does the Sahel Alliance ensure coherence of its interventions with the national and regional priorities and strategies of the G5 Sahel? egularly consulted throughout strengthen joint efforts in response to a of the Alliance have demonstrated their the construction of the multidimensional crisis. This agreement capacity to engage in the implementation conceptual framework of the was a key step in the dialogue between of emergency projects in border areas of Alliance, the five countries the Sahel Alliance and the G5 Sahel. The great fragility, and thus respond to a strong Rand the Executive Secretariat of the G5 G5 Priority Investment Plan (PIP) Donors’ demand from the Heads of State of the Sahel have continuously shared their Conference, held on 6 December 2018 in G5 Sahel. The partnership takes the form common priorities and concerns. In order Nouakchott, was another important step of regular consultations, the participation to strengthen their ties, the Sahel Alliance in the partnership established and sent a of G5 Sahel bodies in meetings of the and the G5 Sahel signed a partnership strong signal on the rise of development Alliance’s governing bodies, the association agreement on 30 October 2018 in Niamey actions in the Sahel. The members of the of G5 development experts with Alliance to increase coordination and coherence Sahel Alliance contribute €1.8 billion to the thematic groups, the working links between between the resources made available by PIP, including €266 million for the Emergency line ministers, G5 national focal points and the donors and the priorities
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