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P12 Layout 1 INTERNATIONAL THURSDAY, JULY 3, 2014 China ousts three allies of former security chief BEIJING: Three officials believed to be right-hand men and before that a secretary to Zhou, was stripped of his tage of their posts and “accepted huge amounts of bribes members to fall in the current crackdown on graft, which of China’s former security chief were expelled from the party membership, the Central Commission for Discipline by seeking gains for others”, the CCDI said, adding that follows the ascension of Xi Jinping to power as the head ruling Communist Party yesterday over corruption, and Inspection (CCDI), the party’s internal watchdog, said their cases have been transferred to judicial authorities of the party. A number of officials and others with close authorities said. The oustings were the latest sign that in a statement. for criminal prosecution. Yu and Ji were also accused of ties to Zhou have come under investigation in recent Zhou Yongkang, once a member of the Politburo Also expelled were Yu Gang, an ex-vice director of the adultery, according to the statements. The news came on months, and the former security chief himself is now at Standing Committee (PSC), China’s most powerful body, office of the Central Politics and Law Commission (CPLC), the heels of the party’s announcement Monday of the the centre of rumours about a corruption probe. is being targeted. and Tan Hong, a former senior staff officer of the Ministry ousting of Xu Caihou, a former vice-chairman of China’s Zhou, who amassed huge power before his retire- His fall would send shockwaves through China’s politi- of Public Security, it said in separate statements. Central Military Commission, and another three allies of ment from the PSC in late 2012, has not been seen in cal establishment. PSC members have generally been Zhou used to head the CPLC, which oversees the pub- Zhou’s for similar reasons. public for months. Analysts say this week’s expulsions are regarded as untouchable even after retirement. Ji Wenlin, lic security ministry. Overseas Chinese reports claimed Ji, Xu, who was until 2012 a member of the Communist a strong signal that authorities are set to make an formerly a vice governor of the southern island of Hainan Yu and Tan were all his secretaries. All three took advan- Party’s elite 25-strong Politburo, is the first of its former announcement regarding Zhou. — AFP N Korea proposes suspension of military hostilities SEOUL: North Korea yesterday proposed to such harmful acts as taking issue with the that the two Koreas halt hostile military DPRK’s nuclear deterrence,” it said. With Xi activities from later this week-an apparent and Park expected to discuss Pyongyang’s show of its desire for peace before a visit by nuclear weapons, the North’s ruling party Chinese President Xi Jinping to Seoul. newspaper, the Rodong Sinmun, lashed out The surprise suggestion from the North’s at efforts to curb its nuclear ambitions as a top military body, the National Defence “stupid fantasy”. Commission (NDC), was made hours after Pyongyang announced separately Pyongyang confirmed its second missile test Monday that it will put two detained in recent days. “Let’s show all Koreans and American tourists on trial on charges includ- the world a resolute decision to completely ing “perpetrating hostile acts”. KCNA said stop all military hostile acts of pushing the suspicions about such acts had been con- North-South relations to the brink of a war,” firmed by evidence and their testimony. the commission said in a statement report- Matthew Todd Miller, 24, was arrested in ed by the official Korean Central News April after he apparently ripped up his visa Agency (KCNA). The North is ready to sus- at immigration and demanded asylum in pend all acts of verbal provocation and slan- the communist state. Jeffrey Edward Fowle, der from Friday, and urged the South to who entered the North on April 29, was reciprocate, it said. Earlier this year Seoul dis- arrested after the 56-year-old reportedly left missed a similar North Korean overture as a a Bible at a hotel. “deceptive” propaganda exercise. The NDC statement also called for an end Missile tests to live-fire drills and other hostile military The North’s latest olive branch followed a activities near the Koreas’ disputed border in series of missile launches, including the Yellow Sea-a frequent flashpoint-from Sunday’s test-launch of two short-range Friday. There have been no direct military Scud missiles overseen by its leader Kim clashes at the maritime border since 2010, Jong-Un. but the two sides intermittently fire warning A KCNA report was unclear about the shots there and engage in live-fire drills. type of missile, but the South’s military said The North also urged the South to scrap Sunday’s test was of two Scud missiles with its annual joint military exercises with the a range of about 500 kilometres (300 miles). United States slated for August, to create a A few days earlier, a similar North Korean HONG KONG: Hundreds of protesters stage a peaceful sit-in overnight on a street in the financial district in Hong Kong yesterday, following a huge rally favourable mood for this year’s Asian Games report had hailed the test of a “cutting-edge” to show their support for democratic reform and oppose Beijing’s desire to have the final say on candidates for the chief executive’s job. — AP in the South Korean city of Incheon. guided missile as a “breakthrough” in its mili- Pyongyang has promised to send ath- tary capability. The North carries out regular letes to the games, to be held from missile tests, sometimes for technical rea- September 19 to October 4. sons but often to register its displeasure Police arrest 500 after with events elsewhere. US tourists put on trial According to KCNA, Kim argued that the Xi is visiting Seoul today and Friday for missile tests “had not the slightest impact” talks with President Park Geun-Hye. China is on regional peace and security, and were in huge Hong Kong protest North Korea’s sole major ally and key eco- fact a guarantor of regional stability. nomic benefactor, and the fact that Xi is vis- “Durable peace can be protected only iting Seoul before scheduling a trip to when one is so strong that nobody dares Pro-democracy lawmakers arrested Pyongyang has been seen by some as a provoke one and it can be guaranteed by deliberate snub. one’s own strength,” he said. HONG KONG: Hong Kong police arrested more increased in June when Beijing published a con- said Mabel Au, its Hong Kong director. Despite its leverage, an increasingly frus- Tensions between North and South than 500 protesters at a sit-in early yesterday fol- troversial “white paper” on Hong Kong’s future China has promised to let all Hong Kong resi- trated China has failed to persuade the Korea have been running high for months. lowing a huge march that organisers said that was widely seen as a warning to the city not dents vote for their next leader in 2017, instead North to curb its nuclear weapons pro- Most recently, the North’s army threat- mobilised half a million people demanding to overstep its bounds. After the document was of the 1,200-strong pro-Beijing committee that gramme and to stop raising regional ten- ened a “devastating strike” after the South democratic reforms. The arrests followed the published, nearly 800,000 people took part in an currently chooses the chief executive. sions through missile and atomic tests. held a live-fire drill near the maritime bor- largely peaceful march on Tuesday that protest unofficial referendum calling for residents to But Beijing says candidates must be The NDC’s statement urged Seoul not to der. In March the two sides fired hundreds leaders said brought the biggest crowds onto have a say in the nomination of candidates for approved by a nominating committee, which take issue with the North’s nuclear weapons, of shells across the border into each other’s the streets since the city was handed over from chief executive in the 2017 election. democracy advocates fear will mean only pro- calling them a “valuable” asset. “We courte- waters after the North dropped shells on the Britain to China in 1997. Beijing branded the vote “illegal and invalid”. China figures are allowed to stand. ously advise them not to resort any longer South’s side. — AFP Police moved in at 3 am to break up the sit-in Tens of thousands of marchers Tuesday carried by about 2,000 protesters in the semi- banners with slogans including “We want real ‘Genuine choice of candidates ‘ autonomous city’s Central financial district. democracy” and “We stand united against The United States supported calls for Hong They said 511 demonstrators were arrested for China”. Kong’s voters to be given a say in who can run in illegal assembly or obstructing police, but pro- 2017. “We believe that the legitimacy of this per- democracy activists and Amnesty International ‘Trying to hijack political reform’ son (next leader) will be enhanced if universal criticised the move as excessive. Beijing’s state-run China Daily said Tuesday’s suffrage is fulfilled and if the election provides a Several pro-democracy lawmakers were march proved that Hong Kong’s “citizens have genuine choice of candidates that are represen- among those arrested. Police lifted activists, continued to enjoy rights and freedoms since tative of the voters’ will,” said State Department many lying on the ground with their arms the handover”.
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