1 Introduction: Evolution of the Security Dilemma
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Notes 1 Introduction: Evolution of the Security Dilemma 01 Quoted from Amitav Acharya, ‘The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: “Security Community” or “Defence Community”?’, Pacific Affairs, 64/2 (Summer 1991), p. 176. 02 Quoted from Bertil Lintner, Shada Islam and Faith Keenan, ‘Growing Pains’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 January 1999, p. 26. 03 See Nicholas J. Wheeler and Ken Booth, ‘The Security Dilemma’ in John Baylis and N.J. Rengger (eds.), Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 29–60. 04 Tim Huxley, ‘Southeast Asia in the study of international relations: the rise and decline of a region’, The Pacific Review, 9/2 (1996), p. 200. 05 Muthiah Alagappa, ‘Asian Practice of Security: Key Features and Explanations’, in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 613. 060 Huxley, op. cit., ‘Southeast Asia in the study of international relations’, p. 220. For a concise analysis of Realism’s relevance in the aftermath of the economic crisis see Amitav Acharya, ‘Realism, Institutionalism, and the Asian Economic Crisis’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 21/1 (April 1999), pp. 1–29. 07 The security dilemma has been used to redirect security concerns away from its Cold War obsession with military power, to understanding the develop- ment of identity formation, as well as broadening the scope of security to encompass economic, environmental and other concerns. See Simon Dalby, ‘Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in Contemporary Security Discourse’, in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.), Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (London: The University College of London Press, 1997), pp. 12–18. 08 For reference to Xenophon see Gideon Y. Akavia, ‘Defensive Defense and the Nature of Armed Conflict’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 14/1 (March 1991), p. 23. For Thucydides see Robert J. Lieber, No Common Power: under- standing international relations (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), p. 6, and Robert Jervis, ‘Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation’, World Politics, 40/3 (April 1988), p. 317. 09 John Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1951). 10 Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1951). 11 Ibid., pp. 19–20. 12 Ibid., p. 21. 13 Ibid., p. 20. 14 Herz, op. cit., Political Realism and Political Idealism, p. 3. 15 Ibid., pp. 3–4. 16 Ibid., p. 12. 17 Ibid., pp. 15–16. 190 Notes 191 18 John Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 234n5. 19 In particular Butterfield links Hobbesian fear to the revisionist states of Nazi Germany and Napoleonic France. See Herbert Butterfield, International Conflict in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul., 1960), pp. 85–87. 20 Herz, op. cit., International Politics in the Atomic Age, p. 239. 21 Ibid., p. 241. 22 Ibid. 23 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 64. 24 Robert Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, International Organization, 36/2 (Spring 1982), p. 360. 25 Jervis, op. cit., Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 68. 26 Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 77. 27 Quoted from Jervis, op. cit., Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 74. 28 Ibid., p. 80. 29 Ibid., p. 75. 30 Barry Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, Survival, 35/1 (Spring 1993), p. 28. 31 Wheeler and Booth, op.cit., ‘The Security Dilemma’, pp. 29–60. 32 Jack Snyder, ‘Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914’, in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (eds.), Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 155. 33 Ibid., p. 153. 34 Ibid., p. 165. 35 Ibid., p. 166. 36 For an examination of this see Alan Collins, The Security Dilemma and the End of the Cold War (Edinburgh: Keele University Press, 1997), Ch. 2. 37 Snyder, op. cit., ‘Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914’, pp. 154–155. 38 Bradley S. Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 21. 39 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Stud- ies in the Post-Cold War Era (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 2nd ed., 1991), pp. 294–295. 40 Herz, op. cit., Political Realism and Political Idealism, p. 200. 41 Jervis, op. cit., ‘Security Regimes’, p. 178. 42 The precise role anarchy performs is a disputed topic in the literature. For some, anarchy is not a cause of the security dilemma but rather a necessary condition. That is, because anarchy promotes self-help behaviour and leaves states uncertain of others’ intent it creates propitious conditions for the security dilemma, but is itself not a cause. Hence Alexander Wendt’s assertion that ‘[w]e do not begin our relationship … in a security dilemma; security dilemmas are not given by anarchy or nature’. Instead, it is the interaction of states and the perceptions that statesmen gain from such contact that will determine if the security dilemma occurs. In contrast, 192 Notes Robert Jervis argues, ‘[b]ut the heart of the security dilemma argument is that an increase in one state’s security can make others less secure not because of misperception or imagined hostility, but because of the anarchic context of international relations’. Whether a cause or a necessary condi- tion, what is clear is that its role is important. See Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics’, International Organization, 46/2 (Spring 1992), p. 407; Jervis, op. cit., Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 76. 43 Buzan, op. cit., People, States and Fear, p. 177. 44 Wendt, op. cit., ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’, p. 395. 45 The key text in the common security literature is the report by the Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues conducted under the chairmanship of Olof Palme, Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament (London: Pan Books, 1982). The essence of these shared interests being new is not only captured in Gorbachev’s new thinking but also in the Palme’s Commission’s recommendation for action requiring a new departure. 46 Charles E. Osgood, An Alternative to War and Surrender (Chicago: University of Illinois, 1962). Amitai Etzioni, The Hard Way to Peace: a new strategy (New York: Collier Books, 1962). 47 Snyder, op. cit., ‘Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914’, p. 155. 48 Ibid. 49 Wendt, op. cit., ‘Anarchy is What States make of it’, p. 418. 50 Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, 30/1 ( January 1978), pp. 167–214. 51 The value of the offence/defence variable for the security dilemma has in certain instances gained such a prominent position that it has almost become synonymous with the security dilemma. This is particularly evident in Posen’s article concerning ethnic conflict. While the ‘offensiveness’ of a force posture is an important factor in exacerbating a security dilemma there are also important cognitive factors such as enemy imaging, zero-sum thinking and ethnocentrism that play an equally vital role. Reducing the security dilemma to the offence/defence variable is highly misleading. See Posen, op. cit., ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, pp. 27–47. 52 Jervis, op. cit., ‘Security Regimes’, p. 374. 53 Jervis, op. cit., ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, p. 201. 54 Ibid., p. 214. 55 Snyder, op. cit., ‘Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914’, pp. 158–160. 56 Ken Booth, ‘The interregnum: world politics in transition’, in Ken Booth (ed.), New Thinking About Strategy and International Security (London: Harper Collins, 1991), p. 20. 57 In addition to Stuart Kaufman and Barry Posen the security dilemma has been applied to ethnic conflict by David Lake/Donald Rothchild and Šumit Ganguly. See ‘Ethnic Nationalism, Conflict, and War’, International Security, 21/2 (Fall 1996). These writings are examined in Chapter 3. 58 Stuart J. Kaufman, ‘An “international” theory of inter-ethnic war’, Review of International Studies, 22/2 (April 1996), p. 151. 59 Ibid. 60 Posen, op. cit., ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, p. 27. 61 Ibid., p. 28. Notes 193 62 Ibid., p. 37. 63 Kaufman, op. cit., ‘An “international” theory of inter-ethnic war’, p. 158. 64 Ibid., p. 157. 65 Ibid., p. 162. 66 Ibid., p. 170. 67 Ibid., p. 151. Kaufman’s use of structure leads him to adopt two classifica- tions (structural and perceptual) of the security dilemma. These labels were created by Jack Snyder in order to highlight two different factors that drive a security dilemma. The structural security dilemma refers to the tangible issues of offensive/defensive force postures and geographical terrain, while the perceptual security dilemma includes the intangible beliefs and convic- tions of statesmen. Both attributes can work independently, though more often collectively, to drive the dynamics of the security dilemma. Kaufman, however, produces an erroneous analysis of the relationship between them. He states that the ‘real potency of perceptual security dilemmas, in ethnic conflict as in international conflict, is that they can create real, structural, security dilemmas’ (p. 152). The implication being that a perceptual secu- rity dilemma is an imaginary or inferior version, while the structural vari- ant is the real thing. This though is simply untrue; perceptual factors are just as important, if not more so, than structural factors. Indeed, the per- ception of statesmen may explain why in the mid to late 1980s the West was slow to react to the structural changes Gorbachev was initiating with his arms control proposals. Hence Snyder’s conclusion that ‘the addition of perceptual factors makes the security dilemma a more powerful theory of international conflict.