Code Number 74

IP. - 1933

INDIVIDUAL KESE.\RCH STUDY

as a Weapon in War.1

Submitted l»y

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Tho ooparxr'i end Gonoral Staff Sohool Fort Leavenworth, Kr>n8as

O Fort Leavenworth, Kanses 12 May, 1933

MEMORANDUM F0R« The Direotor Seoond Year Cla6s, The Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenwortli, Kansas.

SUBJECT! Propaganda as a Weapon in War.

I. PAPERS ACCOMPANYING: 1* A bibliography for this study. 2* Gott Strafe England, a sample of German oounter propaganda used during the World War. II. THE STUDY PRESENTED. -- A review of the uses of propaganda as a war weapon with particular referenoe to it6 use during the World War and conclusions as to its effectiveness and value in future war, III. DEFINITION* -- Propaganda is defined in Webstor's Dictionary ast "Effort direoted systematically toward the gaining of support for an Opinion or course of aotinn"| also by George Sylvester Vioreok in his book, "Spreading Gerns of Hate", as "a campaign, camouflaging its origin, its motive, or both, conducted for the purpose of obtaining a speoifio objeo- . tive by manipulating publlo opinion". (l) And by Professor Harold D. Lasswell in his book, "Propaganda Teohnlque in the World War", at "the oontrol of opinion by stories, rumors, reports, pictures and other forms of sooial communication," (2) Sir Campbell Stuart defines it ast the presentation of a case in suoh a way that others ray be influenced. In so far as its use against an enemy is concerned it must not be self evidently propaganda. Excopt in special oiroumstanoes its origin should be uompletely ooncoaled. As a general rule too, it is desirable to hide the channels of oonftuniontion* (3)

fl) SOH, 11 2} PTW, 9 (3) SCH, 1

-1­ Modern war involves the mobilization of all the resources of a nation into a oonoorted aotion to impose the will of that nation over the will of the enemy nation. To mobilite these rosovroes the will of the nation must be that the nation ie resolved to impose its will over the enemy nation by force of arns and the conduct of war* In every na­ tion, irrespective of the form of government, there arises upon every question of publio polioy a difference of opinion* So in any deoision of a nation to resort to force of arms to settle a dispute with another nation there arises a dissenting voioe from persons who are not in sym­ pathy for various reasons with the polioy. In the carrying out of a war of any considerable duration, this dis­ senting voioe roust be stilled and those persons holding suoh views must be won over to the assenting party if the aotion of the nation is to be­ come a wholehearted unified effort to destroy the will of the enemy* This requires self justification for the aotion and it ie here that propaganda atarts. It'is impossible to go into all the ramifications and forms whioh propaganda assumes during the course of the war. It is the purpose of this study to indicate by a few historical illustmtions the use of propa­ ganda to inoroase the military effort of the nation and to deoreace the effectiveness of the counter effort of the enemy. IV. HISTORICAL FACTS RELATING TO THE SUBJECT. — With the invar ion of Belgium at the outbreak of the World War, Fngland promptly seized upon the violation of Belgian neutrality as a msane of unifying the fighting spirit In England and suoh violation of the neutral Belgian territory was proolaimed loudly as a prinoipal cause of England entering the war as an ally of France and Russia. Newspapers and states­ men alike, played up this aot of thx» German armies to Arouse the English nation and to inouloate into the minds of the British people that England was not only justified in entering the war, but that her side was the side of right against might.

-2­ Following are examples of British propaganda issued to the English people at that times "ffe are going into a war that is foroed upon us as the defenders of the weak and the champions of the liberties of Europe." "The Times", August 5, 19114. (h) "It should be olearly understood when It "^as and why It was we inter­ vened* It was only vfcen we were oonfrented with the ohoioe between keep­ ing and breaking solemn obligations, between the discharge of a binding trust and of shameless subsendenoe to naked foroe, that we threw away the soabbard . . • We were bound by our obligations, plain and paramount, to assert and maintain the threatened independence of a ..mall and neutral state." Mr* Asquith in the House of Comons, August 27, 19lJu (5) Also we find In a speech by the King of England, made on September 18, I91U1 MI was compelled in the assertion of treaty obligations set at naught • * • to go to war". (6) Mr. Lloyd George on January 5, 1918 states» "The treaty obligations of Great Britain to that little land (Belgium) brought us into the war". (7) Thus we soe that in England the government represented by her most eminent statesmen, pointed out to the people that the guilt of starting the war is plaeed upon Germany* In the United States we find that soon after the entrance of this country into the war, there was appointed by the President, nA Committee on Publio Infornntion", headed by Mr* George Creel* (8) This oownlttee was composed of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and Mr. Creel* (9) This committee had oharge of the publication of the "Offioial Bulletin11, a small daily magasine (See offiolal file in C & GSS Library), whloh had a circulation of about 100,000, This paper was designed to furnish suoh news and Information of what the United Statos was doing in the war as was considered by the above ooramittoe as desirable to be pub­ lished. (10)

FWT. 51 § FWT, 51 6 FW. 51 7 FffT, 51 8 PTWT, 18 9 prvrn. 18) OB, May 12,1917* P*k 10) SOH, 180 -3­ The magnitude of the work oarrled out by the Committee on Publio Infornation can best be Indicated by a statement of some of their activi­ ties* Thoy inolude the enlisting of the &ld of 18,000 newspapers, 11,000 national advertisers and advertising agenoies, 10,000 ohambers of oonuneroe, 30,000 manufaoturors assooiatlons, 22,000 labor unions, 10,000 publio libraries, 32,000 banks, 58,000 general stores, 3,500 Y.U.C.A* branohes, 10,000 members of the Counoil for National Defense, 1,000 advertising olubs, 56»°OO post of floes, 55,000 station agents, 5»000 draf*t boards, 100,000 Red Cross organisations, and 12,000 manufacturers agents* Tours of Frenoh and Belgian veterans, our own veterans, war exhibits, fairs, and mass meetings to influence publio opinion* The Conmittee organited 75#°OO four-minute speakers operating in 5»200 different communities, made 755»190 speeches. Mr* Creel ventures the guess that his four-minute speakers reaohed approximately 1*00,000,000 people* The above does not inolude by any means, all the activities of this oonmittee, whioh was charged with the control of publio opinion in the United States* (11)

From the above we see government oarrying on an aotive campaign openly to enlist tho aid and sympathetic assistance of its people to sup­ port war, undergo its resultant hardships and feel that they are a united nation oarrying on a unified effort to destroy a oonroon enoisy* .To oannot overlook the attempt on the part of a nation to justify war by producing in the minds of the people a burning hatred of the enemy* We find this in every war and but a few examples fron the last war will sufficiently illustrate this phase of propaganda. Probably the most famous war lie, if it may be so oalled, was that whioh was oomon to all allies* This is the ohavge of murder, rape, pillage, oruoifixion and wanton mutilation of the defenseless Belgians in the territory of Belgium oooupied by the Ger­ man Army* Tales of atrooity were passed from porson to person, oarriea by newspapers and proaohed from the pulpit*

It is needless to enumerate examples of these atrocities but suf­ fioient to state that all countries used them and without material founda­

(11) SOR, 178-182 4*. tlon of faot* That they served their purpose is evident, as will be found by talking with many thousands of our good people, who even at this date, then most nations have admitted the fabrication of the stories, these good people regard the word German as Implying tho worst that oan be said as to brutality and wantonness* Another means of raising the morale of the nation behind the Army, as well as the Army itself. Is to belittle the efforts and suocenses of the eriemy and to paint in glowing words the successes,and ropress the news of our own failures, (12) As examples of the above, the "Offioial Bulletin" published by the Comittee on Public Information, reported a mythical battle with German submarines and Informed the publio of the safe arrival of two American Transports after these attaoks* (13) Mr. Creel adnits that he was tho viotia of a hoax in this case. (II4) Again, on February 21, 1918, the Committee announced that the first American planes were.en route to Franco. It developed that this statement had been issued beoause of a misleading statement ae to the status of the produotion of airoraft* (15) The

Aaeriean people did not learn until January 26, 1929, that the U.SaS, San Diego had been sunk by a German torpedo seventy miles off the coast from Kew York City, in July 1918* This was reported at the time as resulting from oontaot with a floating mine* (16) It \i possible that this Com­ mittee on Publio Information had no intention of spreading any false in­ formation but it is oertainly a faot that it had for a part of its purpose, the withholding of undesirable information from the publio* (17) We see from the foregoing the attempts made to oontrol publio opinion of ones own nationals* We will now go to that part of propaganda dealing with the use of propaganda against the nationals and troops of the enemy in order to weaken his national effort to carry on as a united nation at war*

PTW, IO3-I4 SOH, 199i PTff, 39 SGH, 1991 PTVT, 39 SOH, 1991 PTvr, 39 3 SGH, 199 U7 OB, Uay 12,1917,' P.I*

.5. In England there WHS organised in August !9lU$ a "Press Bureau" which was later adopted by the Homo Offloe* This "Press Bureau" wrs oharged with hone propaganda* (18) At the sane tine the British For­ eign Offioe was engaged in tho furnishing of information as new to neutral countries• This office also engaged in propaganda work particularly anong the Balkan peoples but with little coordination with the military forces or with the Allies* However, In February 1918* Lord Northoliffe became the Direotor of Propaganda in Eneny Countries* (19) He reoognieed the need for an organisation of men skilled in their work.and with a keen in­ sight into foreign affairs and the psychology of the individuals of dif­ ferent nations* (20) He divided the department into main branohest one for production and one for distribution* (21) The production seotion was again divided into German, Auatro-Huiigarian and Bulgarian sections* In the Balkan area we find that the activities of the bureau for enemy propaganda had, shortly after Lord Northoliffe assumed control, two definite objootives, one constructive and one destructivei (1) The moral and aotive support of the national desires of these raoea for independence, with the ultimate aim of form­ ing a strong No.-German ohain of Central European and Danubian States* (2) Encouragement of their disinclination to fight on be­ half of the Central Empires, thus greatly handioapping the Austro-. Hungarian Armies as fighting force, and seriously embarrassing the German military leaders. (22) The seoret Treaty of London of April 1915* had promised to Italy oer» tain parts of the Balkans and southern Austro-Hungary in the event of a successful conclusion to the war as an inoentive to Italy to enter the war on the side of the Allies* (23) As a oounter measure, representatives of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes had assembled at Corfu and on June 20, 1917* had issued the Southern Slav

(18 PTW, 19 SCH, 81 PTO, 20 '& SCH, 9 20 SCH, 11 22 SCH, 21 23 SCH, 22 •6­ Unitary Declaration proolaiming a union of those peoples and deolaring that ''all territory ooiapaotly inhabited by them oannot be mutilated with­ out attaint to the vital interesta of the oonmunity*" (2k) In view of the oonfliot of interests as indioated between the Treaty of London referred to above, and the objeotive No, 1 (above), little mi accomplished in this field until after the Caporetto disaster when the

/ft • • Italians were willing to enter into negotiations with these people on a basis agreeable to the objective as indioatod above* As a rosult an agree­ ment was reaohed at London between representatives of these peoples and Italy providing for the amioahle settlement of territorial controversies between the two and on the baslu on the principles of nationality and of the right of peoples to decide their own destiny* This agreement was reaohed coincident with the assumption of office by Lord Northcliff©. (25) As a fvrther result of the above agreement there was held at Rome in April 1918, what vas oalled the Congress of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities, which passes resolutions and agreements recognising the rights of the smaller rationalities to independence, and sovereignty* (26) An under­ standing of the racial makeup of the population of southern Austro-Kungary is necessary to understand to what extent this agreement affooted that nation* (Suoh ethnographic study is too voluminous to present in this study.) Suffice it to say, that at that time there were in Austro-Kungary some 21,000,000 persons who were pro-German and some 31,000,000 who were anti- German* The pro-German party nevertheless ruled the country oauslng nuoh unrest and agitation among theanti-Germans* (27) Lord Northoliffe deoided that the proper sphere for his propaganda efforts in this area should be devoted toi breaking the power of Austro- Hungary, as the weakest link in the chain of enemy states, by supporting and enoouraging all anti-German and pro-Ally peoples and tendencies. (26) With this objective in view, a commission was organised In Italy for the purpose of concentrating against the Austrian Army by the use of propa­ ganda* This Conmission started work on April Id, 1918. It produced para­

214 SCH, 23 *25 SCH, 25 5 SCH, 26 26 SCH, 31 ,27 SCH. 30f CAH, 235 (28 -7- phlete and literature address*! to the unsympathetic soldiers among the Austrian Army with a view to demoralising that army. The leaflets and literature was distributed by aeroplane, grenade, roeket, balloon and by seoret service agents* The total number of suoh leaflets ran into mil­ lions* All possible methods of arousing a race oonsolousness of the Slavs, Croats and other peoples were utilised. The effeot of the launohing of the propaganda oanpaign was soon apparont* Unrest became manifest among the Austro-Hungarian forces* Uany of then deserted to the Italian forces. (29) An Austrian offensive planned for April had to be postponed until June when organisations of the disaffeoted soldiers oould be broken up and the personnel assigned to Austrian and German units as replaoenents. The altitude of the great numbers of deserters from the Austrian Army in­ dicated that the result of the propaganda oanpaign was seriously under­ mining discipline and the will to fight, of a large part of the Austrian Army and eventually assisted materially with the defeat of the Austrlans at the Piave River. (30) The aotual effeot of the propaganda efforts oen only be estimated as there are many other oauses for the failure of the Austrian offensive, whioh must also be oonsidered* Perhaps it oan be said that propaganda materially assistod the Italians in the Austrian defeat) certainly no one will claim that tho defeat was wholly oauaed by propaganda* We find that as early as Ootober 191b * British offioer attempted to carry on a propaganda oanpaign to lower the morale of tho Germans on the Western Front* He received no enoouragement from higher military commanders and was in faot, sot down as a orank on the subjeot* He was without assis­ tance from higher headquarters and was obliged to disoontinuo his efforts* (31) Ke also find little effort on the part of the British to undermine the German morale until early in 1916, a bureau was established in the Military Intelligence department at London for the carrying on of propaganda operations against the German soldiers* (32)

29) SCH, )|lji HPWA, 160 30) SCH, lilit CAH, 235 31) SCH, 51 32) SCH, 52 -a­ This bureau was gradually expanded and undertook the distribution of leaflets and news from tho air by use of balloons and aeroplanes* It also published a weekly newspaper whioh was distributed during the rest of the war with the exception of a single week* This paper endeavored to furnish to the German soldiery information whioh WAS presumably withheld from then for military reasons. By tho spring of 1918 about 1,000,000 of those leaf­ lets were distrlhutod over the Gorman lines monthly* (33) Early in May 1918, Mr. H.O. VTella was appointed as dirootor of propaganda operations against Germany* (3I4) Mr. Wells prepared * mem­ orandum basod upon his ideas of the British aims in the war coordinated vrith the doolarod aims of tho other allies end submitted this memorandum to the Foreign Offloe for oonourrenoe with the polioy as set forth. {?£) (It is interesting to note the oooperation indicated herein in order to insure that the promises to be made to the German people through propaganda would ooinoide with the Governmental polioy upon whioh peaoo might be made*) To quote some important atatonents from this Memorandum! "The real war aim of the Allies is not only to beat the enemy, but to establish a world peaoe whioh shall preoluie tho resumption of war.11 "Successful propaganda in Germany presupposes the dear definition of the kind of world settlement whioh the allies are determined to secure, and the plaoe of Gemmy in it." "It should be pointed out that nothing utands between the enemy peoples and a lasting peaoa exoept the predatory designs of their ruling dynasties and military and eoonouio oastes." (36) This dooumont was used as a basis for the propaganda sent into Germany by the British Foreign Propaganda Bureau from about the middle of 1918 to the end of the war* (37) Tho magnitude 'of the propaganda attack can well be seen from the faot that in June and July 1918, oror 3*700,000 leaf­ lets were spread in the Gorman linos. In September 19*8, 3i775#°^° distributed and in October, over 5,000,000 were distributed. (30)

J3) SCH, 5k 3M SCH, 60 35 SCH, 61 36 SCH, & et seq* SCH, 81 SCH, 93 -9­ In America we find the propaganda used to, lower the morale and fight­ ing spirit of Germany largely emanating from the speeches of Fresidont Wilson. President Wilson, early after the entry of America into the war, differentiated between a war against the Gorman people as compared with a war against the German Government. (39) The effeot of President Wilson's declarations put the war weary Germars into a frame of mind look­ ing to a cessation of hostilities and of the hardships forced upon the oivil population* We find hie aotion an ideal illustration of the attaok against an enemy belligerent through appeal to political and raoial minori­ ties in that oountry. President Wilson*6 declarations became tho basis of all Allied propaganda against the Govornnent of Germany, (I4O)

That the propaganda efforts of tho Allies was not without effeot, is best attested by statements of General Ludendorf1 "The army was 1itt/ally swamped by enemy propaganda, the serious danger of which was oleorly reoog­ nited. General Headquarters gave rewards for the surrender of such pam­ phlets but this oould not prevent them from poisoning the ml'ads of our sol­ diers before the pamphlets were gathorod up. Unfortunately th« enemy propaganda could not be really effectively fought without the help of the Government•" This statement was made by General Ludendorf in a descrip­ tion of the loss of morale of the German troops in Juno and July 1918 and later. (la)

TTe find, however, that at that time Allied propaganda hud so bitten into the norale of the government Itself that the government was powerless to take any deoided aotion toward preventing the further spread of "psaoe and rtoonoiliation" ideas. (1|2) That German morale was being shaken to the roots at this time and until the end of the war, is dearly indicated by the many rumors quoted by Oeneral Ludendorf which he considered ut the time of sufficiently dam­ aging nature that he ordered several inquiries into affairs particularly those tending to loss of prestige and laok of confidence of the soldiers in their offioere. (1$) SOH, 207l PTW, 216 80H, 2071 PTW, 817 LOS, 281 L08, 283l OV, 55** LOS, 286-29?I CV, 55ljj HPffA, 161 •10­ The uneasiness oaused by propaganda is also torn© out by the state­ ment of the German Crown Prinoe that he found it advisable in August 1918, to issue eiroular instructions to army and oorps commanders, directing them to take steps to oounteraot the subsersive influences undorminlng German morale* (Ui) In oomeotion with the above statements it is well to note that this lack of morale of tho German troops took place after the crushing defeat of the groat "Peace Offensive" of July 15, 1918, which may have had a far more important place in the undermining of morale than the German oommanders ware, or are now willing to admit, shifting the blame for the loss of the war to the shoulders of the German government and to the people at home. It is significant to note also that there was Apparent no loss of morale or at least no mention of its loss until the Army had failed to carry on a viotorioua war* This is true of the German Armlos but is not true of the Austrian Anrles, These were attaoked by propaganda during a long stabilised condition followed by a strong attack by the Italian army* That the morale of the Austrian Army was very low Is evidenced by the con- duo t of their operations in the face of this drive of the Italian Army* It so happens that the loss of morale of the Osrmans and the Austrian* was oolnoident to tlie launching of an intensive propaganda campaign against their governments, aimed particularly at the small raoial and political minorities in eaoh country* That both were effective Is shown by the faot that the governments of both oountries collapsed under the strain prior to tho oessatlon of hostilities* K is impossible to determine what the in­ fluence of propaganda was in either case, but it is bellevod by the writer that propaganda had a very important part In the disruption of the eneny governments and the destruction of the nation1* "till to fight"*

V, ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM* We have seen that the efforts at propaganda during the early part of the war were largely devoted to the forming within the belligerent nation, a national unified spirit Imbued with the idea of carrying the war to a

VTRGCP, I4J0-I4J4I -11­ successful oonoluslcn. This was built up by utilization of all available means of influencing publio opinion, including the press, oartoons, moving pioturos, speeches, eto. The general subjeot matter being the glorification of the nation, the neoossity for tho war, and a condemnation of tho enemy, attributing to him the causes for tho war and its initiation coupled with atrocity stories whioh in sane times of peaoe would be unbelleved if at­ tributed to evon a senl-oiviliced people* Thus we see the first purpose of propaganda aocompliihedi that is the creation of a national will to fight regardless of the sacrifices necessary to carry the war to a success­ ful oonoluslon. This propaganda night be termed counter-propaganda, and had a valuable field of operations in the conception of a nation at war rather than a conception of combat only by the military foroee. We next find propaganda developing at a weapon to be used against the enemy in the maintaining of the good opinion or aotual assistance of neutral nations. In these there is a oombat brtwaen the propaganda of both sides, and is a field wherein tho propagandist must be most skilful and propaganda elosely guarded as to its source. This also is a large field for propaganda operations, as is indicated by the entry of so many nations into the World War well after tho war had started and had been oarried along for a long time* That propaganda to be suoeessful in a neu­ tral country is indicated by the failure of German propaganda in the United Statofi due to Its clumsy handling, whioh permitted the publio to ascertain Its true souroe. Its utter failure Is attested by the great national en­ thusiasm whioh was manifested in the United States upon our entry into the war on the side of the Allies* The third field of propaganda operations and the ono with whioh the military sum is most closely associated is the field cf o;tr,\tions within the enemy army and against the enemy government, though the latter is properly the function of the government than of the army* We find this field of operations poorly organised during the major ptrt of ''* ? war, particularly In all countries except the United States whioh had the experience of the Allies as an object lesson when w« entered it. It Is in the fl«ld of propaganda against the hostile forces wh*r»ln

-12­ the greatest difficulty as to what definite results were obtained liy propaganda oanpaigna is found. We find It most successful when oarried on at a tinvr :*hen the hostile forces are being defeated In the field by our anaed forces, or are held to a monotonous defensive on t stabilised front* Y(e find no mention of effective German propaganda on the American £roopn who were OR the winning side most of the tine after their entry into the war. Vfe also find no effeot of British propaganda reoorded irithin the German forces as long as those foroer were wirming or were expe* /ing to win the war* I believe thAt it is a safe assunption to state that propaganda has little effect on that force which is winning on the field of battle* However, X think it can also be stated that troops who go througn long periods of stabilised warfare or are being partially defeated are particularI' susceptible to enemy propaganda, causing & lower morale and a willingness to cease an apparontly hopeless and oosMy war. Th's attitude on the part of the soldier will quickly bring the fighting spirit of a foroo to zero and it is here that I believe the military nan will find a large field for the use of propaganda as a weapon in war*

VI* C0KCLU8I0K8 OF THE AUTHOR. Propaganda operations hava a definite place in the carrying on of war as oonoeivad by the idea that modern war must bo viewed as a "notion at war". That in every modern oivil ted country there are and will be unor­ ganised minorities who, due to raolal, religious, or politioal differences, will be la some measure opposed to the carrying on of the war. That these minorities can be best approached through propaganda, their efforts co­ ordinated, and that they can be made a tool of the opposing nation to weak­ en the will to fight of their country. (It will be noted that it was in this field thnt propaganda was nost effeetlve during; the war.) That propaganda operations are a function of the government as a whole rather than at a purely military matter. That a comittee in charge of propaganda should be organised at the outbreak of war or sooner, which

-13­ represents the State Department, the War Department and the Navy Depart­ ment. That the use of propaganda should b«t oarefully scrutinized before iasuo to Insure that statements contained therein are compatible with the intentions of the government as to war aims and peace aim* . That it is the duty of the Vfar Department to make plans for the use of p.-opaganda in war in tho cune manner as the plans for oarrying on war itself are made; those tentative plans thus to be available to the "far Department and State Department on the outbreak of hostilities,

[Notei The following, while no part of the historical researoh above, is submitted as a part of this paper as I believe that being so olosely related to the subjeot, and since there is available nothing in the library exoept one dominant (2J5) on a particular phase of Intolli­ gbnoe duties with whioh I came into oontact during the war, that I take tho liberty of attaching it to this monograph, ]

After arriving at a conclusion that propaganda should be organized and carried on during war to lower the morale of the ene^y, it occurs that in turn something must be done within our own forces to counteract the sub­ versive propaganda of the enemy. I am not at liberty to state what the organisation for ascertaining what the effect of subversive propaganda among our own troops was, even if I knew what may have been the organisation in higher headquarters. My experience gave me the opportunity to noe the organization only in its most subordinate phases. However, X believo that I dA, as a result of war experience, indioate a general idea of an organisation whioh I believo should be plannod in peaoetime to be plaood into operation whon war has been declared*

Intelligence Seotion of the Oonoral Staff of OHQ and of Armies has a section whioh is ohargod with oounter-esplonage. My understanding of the reoognited duties of this seotion is to looate and trace spies, etc, within the Territorial jurisdiction of those units. I would add to this seotion the duty of ascertaining and maintaining aoourate Information at

06)

-15­ This organisation will asoortain very early the effeot of propaganda on the troops and will be of great assistance in the elimination of enemy sympathisers, propagandists, eto», before their activities can poison the minds of any large number of men* It is believed that suoh a nuoleus of men oan by a few well advised remarks do a great deal toward the preven­ tion of any propaganda damage when it, cone a to his ears, by making state­ ments which will counteract any favorable impression created by enemy propaganda, however well concealed.

-16­ B I B L I 0 G R A P H Y

KEYs (FWT, 51) = No. 1 Text (below), page 51.

1, Ponsonby, Arthurt "Falsehood in Wartime.11 New Yorkj B.P. Dutton Company, 1928 2, "Propaganda in its Military and Legal Aspoots", Military Intelli­ gence Branoh, General Staff, U.S. Any, published late in 1916. 3, Vierook, George Sylvesteri "Spreading Germs of Hate". New York, Horace Liveright, 19J0, I4. Lasswell, Harold D,i "Propaganda Teohnique in the 'florid .Tar." New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 192?. 5» Stuart, Sir Canpb&lli "Seorets of Crowe House." London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1921* 6. "Offioial Bulletin" - Committee on Publio Information. Published during the World War by the U.S. Government* 7* Ludendorf, General ErVoh V.t "Ludendorf's Own Story," New York, Harper ft Brothers, 1919« 8, "Memoiros dtt Kronprins." [Uar Recollections of the German Crown Prlnoe.) Paris, Payot * Cie, 1922. 9* Bourget, J.H.i "Lea Origlnes de la Victor!e." (Causes of viotory.] xM>}li8ned In xarls, by la nenaissar.ee du Livro, 19?D. 10* Sohultie-Pfaelcer, Gerhardt "Hindenburg; Peaee—-War—Aftoraath." Translated by Christopher R. Turner. London, Philip Allan, 1931. 11, v.Glaise-Horstenau, Edmindi "The Collapse of the Austro-Hungarlan Bnpire," Translated from ths German by Ian F.D. Morrow* New York, B.P, Dutton A Co., I93O. 12. "Counter Espionage Bulletins", published by Intelligence Seotlon j , A^F, during the War*

-17­ REFERENCE ABBREVIATIONS

1* FYfT - Ponsonby, Arthuri "Falsehood in Wartime,"

2, PMLA - "Propaganda in its Military and Legal Aspeots."

3» SOH - Viereok, George Sit "Spreading Gerrna of Hate,"

U» PTVfff - Laoswell, Harold D,t "Propaganda Teohnique in the World War."

5« SCH - Stuart, Sir Campbelli "Seorets of Crowe House."

6. OB - "Offioial Bulletin."

7. LOS - Ludendorf, General Erioh v.i "Ludendorf'« Own Story."

8. TTRGCP - "ffar Reoolleotionc of the German Crown Prinoe."

9» CV - Bourget, J.M.J "Causes of Viotory."

10» HPVfA - Sohultte-Pfaelier, Gerhardt "Hindenburgj Peace—War— Aftermath."

11* CAH - v.OlAise-Horstenau, Edmundt "The Collapse of the Austro- Hungarian Empire,11

12, CEB - "Countor-Espionage Bulletins,"

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