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UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA, IRVINE Rethinking Civic Computing in China DISSERTATION Submitted in Partial Satisfaction of the Requi UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE Rethinking Civic Computing in China DISSERTATION submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in Information and Computer Sciences by Yubo Kou Dissertation Committee: Professor Bonnie Nardi, Chair Professor Gloria Mark Associate Professor Yunan Chen 2016 © 2016 Yubo Kou DEDICATION To my wife, Xinning Gui, who has loved and supported me my cats, Teemo and Melon, who have accompanied us in the simplest yet sincerest way ii TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................................... vii LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................................... viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................................................... ix CURRICULUM VITAE .............................................................................................................................. xi ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION ...................................................................................................... xiii Chapter 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 1.1 Scope of the Research ................................................................................................................. 3 1.2 Care of the Self ............................................................................................................................ 7 1.3 Technologies of the Self ............................................................................................................ 11 1.4 Method ...................................................................................................................................... 13 1.5 Dissertation Outline .................................................................................................................. 18 Chapter 2. The Chinese Internet ......................................................................................................... 21 2.1 The Internet in China ................................................................................................................. 21 2.2 Weibo in China .......................................................................................................................... 23 2.3 Internet Censorship in China ..................................................................................................... 29 2.3 Summary ................................................................................................................................... 33 Chapter 3. On Micro-blogging and China ........................................................................................... 35 3.1 HCI research on micro-blogging ................................................................................................ 35 3.1.1 Motivations behind Micro-Blogging ................................................................................... 35 3.1.2 Privacy Concerns about Micro-Blogging ............................................................................ 37 iii 3.1.3 Credibility of Micro-Blogging .............................................................................................. 38 3.1.4 Micro-Blogging for Political Deliberation ........................................................................... 40 3.1.5 Micro-Blogging for Social Movements ............................................................................... 41 3.1.6 Micro-Blogging in Crisis ...................................................................................................... 42 3.2 Research on the Internet in China ............................................................................................ 43 3.2.1 Motivations behind Internet Usage ................................................................................... 43 3.2.2 Social Media for Public Discussions .................................................................................... 45 3.2.3 Social Media for Activism ................................................................................................... 47 3.2.4 The Internet and Civil Society ............................................................................................. 48 3.3 Summary ................................................................................................................................... 49 Chapter 4. A Complicated Media Context .......................................................................................... 51 4.1 Information about the Umbrella Movement is Pervasive ........................................................ 53 4.2 The Mainland Media and Censorship ....................................................................................... 57 4.3 Weibo ........................................................................................................................................ 64 4.4 The Hong Kong media ............................................................................................................... 72 4.5 Western Media .......................................................................................................................... 76 4.6 Summary ................................................................................................................................... 80 Chapter 5. Understanding the Umbrella Movement as Care of the Self ........................................... 82 5.1 Obtaining Diverse, Original Information ................................................................................... 82 5.2 Configuring Weibo .................................................................................................................... 87 5.3 Critical Thinking ......................................................................................................................... 90 iv 5.4 Summary ................................................................................................................................... 95 Chapter 6. Care of Others ................................................................................................................... 97 6.1 Care for other Weibo users ....................................................................................................... 97 6.2 Care for Hong Kong ................................................................................................................. 100 6.3 Care for the Country................................................................................................................ 103 6.4 Summary ................................................................................................................................. 106 Chapter 7. Technologies of the Self .................................................................................................. 107 7.1 Complex Mediation ................................................................................................................. 111 7.2 Leveled Mediation ................................................................................................................... 113 7.3 Chains of Mediation ................................................................................................................ 115 7.4 Mediating Care of the Self ...................................................................................................... 117 Chapter 8. Rethinking Civic Computing ............................................................................................ 119 8.1 Care of the Self as Civic Participation ...................................................................................... 122 8.2 Care of the Self in the Context of China .................................................................................. 133 8.2.1 Understanding China’s Unique Context ........................................................................... 133 8.2.2 Studying Civic Computing in China ................................................................................... 137 8.3 Rethinking Civic Computing .................................................................................................... 143 8.3.1 Rejecting the Means/End Dichotomy .............................................................................. 143 8.3.2 Enhancing Autonomy in Interaction with Technology ..................................................... 148 8.3.3 Care for the self through Technology ............................................................................... 152 8.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 155 v References ........................................................................................................................................ 158 vi LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. A Micro-blog about the Umbrella Movement. .................................................................... 16 Figure 2. Chinese Netizens' Ages. ....................................................................................................... 22 Figure 3. Chinese Netizens' Education. ..............................................................................................
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