Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463) 2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 496–508 DOI: 10.17645/pag.v8i4.3424 Article Best in Covid: Populists in the Time of Pandemic Lenka Buštíková 1,* and Pavol Baboš 2 1 School of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287, USA; E-Mail: [email protected] 2 Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts, Comenius University in Bratislava, 811 01 Bratislava, Slovakia; E-Mail: [email protected] * Corresponding author Submitted: 1 July 2020 | Accepted: 1 November 2020 | Published: 17 December 2020 Abstract How do populists govern in crisis? We address this question by analyzing the actions of technocratic populists in power during the first wave of the novel coronavirus crisis in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. We identify three features of the populist pandemic response. First, populists bypassed established, institutionalized channels of crisis response. Second, they engaged in erratic yet responsive policy making. These two features are ubiquitous to populism. The third feature, specific to technocratic populism, is the politicization of expertise in order to gain legitimacy. Technocratic populists in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia weaponized medical expertise for political purposes. Keywords ANO; Covid-19; Czech Republic; health expertise; nationalism; OL’aNO; pandemic; populism; Slovakia; technocratic populism Issue This article is part of the issue “Varieties of Technocratic Populism around the World” edited by Petra Guasti (Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Czech Republic) and Lenka Buštíková (Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Czech Republic / Arizona State University, USA). © 2020 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu- tion 4.0 International License (CC BY). I will respect whatever the consilium of experts approve. in Covid” (Bled Strategic Forum, 2020). His statement The Chief Public Health Officer makes the final decision. reflected the general sentiment following the first wave Igor Matovič, The Prime Minister of Slovakia of the pandemic in Europe. The Czech Republic quick- (“Igor Matovič stojí za,” 2020) ly introduced strict measures including mask mandates and seemed to have had the virus under control by early Hi people, the public demanded that we loosen up summer 2020. On June 30, thousands of Czechs par- [Covid-19 restrictions over the summer of 2020], ticipated in a farewell party to the pandemic on the and so, we did. Unfortunately, we were wrong. Charles Bridge in Prague. However, by mid-October, the Czech Republic had recorded more new cases per million Andrej Babiš, The Prime Minister of the Czech Republic people than any other country in the world (Lázňovský, (“Čau lidi, byla poptávka,” 2020) 2020). In May, Igor Matovič also touted Slovakia as “best in Covid” and emphasized that it had the lowest death 1. Introduction rates in the European Union (“Bulharsko a Čierna Hora,” 2020). By October, infections started to surge, which On August 31, 2020, Andrej Babiš uttered the follow- forced Slovakia to re-introduce tough freedom of move- ing words at the Strategic Forum in Slovenia: “My pro- ment restrictions. Technocratic populists in both coun- fession is businessman, crisis manager, actually Prime tries responded quickly to the pandemic threat in the Minister of the Czech Republic…we have results, best spring, but also to shifts in the public mood during the Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 496–508 496 summer. In spring, they handled the first pandemic wave Citizens), led by Andrej Babiš, presided over the pan- well. However, when the public demanded to return to demic response in the Czech Republic with the social everyday life, governments unraveled restrictions, and a democrats. OĽaNO (Ordinary People and Independent massive second wave ensued. Personalities), led by Igor Matovič, formed a govern- We explore the inner mechanics of technocratic pop- ing coalition with three other parties after winning the ulism in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Both Prime February 2020 elections in Slovakia on an anti-corruption Ministers (Andrej Babiš and Igor Matovič), leading gov- platform. However, the government’s agenda was imme- erning coalitions that grappled with the challenge of diately over-shadowed by Covid-19. We discuss the Covid-19, afford a rare opportunity to study populist Czech case first, and then compare and contrast it with governance in crisis (Caiani & Graziano, 2019; Moffitt, the Slovak case. The article concludes with a discussion 2015). Our analysis identifies three features of the pop- of the broader implications for the study of technocrat- ulist response to the pandemic. First, populists bypassed ic populism. established, institutionalized channels to combat the cri- sis. Second, they engaged in erratic yet responsive policy 2. Technocratic Populism making. These two features are ubiquitous to populism. The third feature, the instrumentalization of knowledge, Populism is a thin ideology (Hawkins & Littvay, 2019; is specific to technocracy and technocratic populism. Mudde, 2019; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2018) and a strat- Technocratic populists politicize expertise in order to egy to gain power (Grzymala-Busse, 2019; Hanley & gain legitimacy and use narratives of expert-driven gov- Vachudova, 2018; Taggart, 2000; Vachudova, 2020; ernance to establish a direct link with voters. Therefore, Weyland, 2020) that can lead to executive aggrandize- responsive crisis management, legitimized by science ment (Bermeo, 2016). Populist ideologies emphasize, as and expertise, is especially conducive to their appeal. well as combine, economic divisions, identity politics The Czech and Slovak leaders illustrate this weaponiza- and technocratic expertise. Populist types are defined tion of medical expertise for political purposes. by the core definitions of the “people.” They respond to Technocratic populism is an output-oriented pop- three different grievances: economic inequality, identity- ulism that directly links voters to leaders via expertise. based exclusion and governance that negatively affects de la Torre (2013, p. 34) used the term to describe “ordinary people” (Canovan, 1981; Kaltwasser, Taggart, President Rafael Correa, formerly an economics pro- Espejo, & Ostiguy, 2017; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013). fessor, as someone who “combine[d] populist rhetoric Technocratic populism politicizes expertise to gain with top-down technocratic policies,” and called for legitimacy and instrumentalizes governance (Aprasidze the end of “partocracy” in Ecuador. Technocratic pop- & Siroky, 2020; Perottino & Guasti, 2020; Verzichelli ulism arises as a response to the crisis of governance & Castaldo, 2020). However, it is a variant of pop- by mainstream parties. When voters in inadequate- ulism (Bickerton & Accetti, 2017) rather than the rule ly governed states reject left-wing Tweedledums and of experts (Dargent, 2014). Technocratic populists’ rule right-wing Tweedledees, they opt for leaders that offer in the name of the “people” on the grounds of exper- expertise outside of the dysfunctional deliberative polit- tise. They “strategically use the appeal of technocrat- ical realm (Pop-Eleches, 2010). ic competence and weaponize numbers to deliver a Berlusconi in Italy, Babiš in Czechia, and Ivanishvili in populist message” (Buštíková & Guasti, 2019, p. 304). Georgia turned their business expertise into political cap- Furthermore, populists use technocracy in their quest ital. Macron in France was trained as an elite-level tech- to bypass the institutions of representative democracy nocrat but also worked in the banking sector. Matovič (Caramani, 2017; Guasti, 2020a; Urbinati, 2019). started in a publishing business but joined the political Table 1 locates technocratic populism as a sub-type opposition in Slovakia during 2010. He tasered the polit- of populism (which pitches the elite against the “peo- ical establishment with clownish stunts and a decade ple”). We use Canovan’s definitions of “the people” later, he won the elections. All the above-mentioned (Canovan, 1981). Technocratic populist parties respond leaders rejected the notion of a left-right continuum in to the grievances of “ordinary people” who are dissatis- politics. Some of them might appear centrist, but first fied with governance by mainstream politicians and offer and foremost, they adopt policies that are politically both expertise in governance and a direct link to voters. expedient and responsive (Mair, 2009) to the immedi- Exclusionary populism responds to grievances associated ate needs of pockets of voters, which they strategical- with ethnic diversity, while inclusionary populism seeks ly target. When in power, they weaponize expertise to to remedy economic exclusion (Mudde & Kaltwasser, undermine accountability and oversight while aggrandiz- 2013). When populists opt for divisive identity politics ing their own power. (Buštíková, 2020; Meguid, 2008; Mudde, 2019), they fab- The article proceeds as follows. First, we outline how ricate the category of the “enemy of the people” and technocratic populism differs from other forms of pop- apply it to political opponents (Pappas, 2019). Populists ulism. Second, we justify the party classification of ANO maintain flexibility to define “the other” along many in the Czech Republic and OĽaNO in Slovakia as populist identity marks, such as ethnicity, culture, language or parties (Zulianello,