CHAPTER VI11 WHEN on March 17Th the Germans Withdrew Their Front
CHAPTER VI11 ARRAS, AND THE GENESIS OF THE BULLECOURT PLAN WHEN on March 17th the Germans withdrew their front from the salient between Arras and the Aisne, the r81e so long projected for the Fifth Army in the spring offensive had become impossible of performance. Its intended attack, originally a main stroke in the Allies’ thrust on the Sonime, had been reduced, under Nivelle’s plan, to an important pre- cursor of the British feint at Arras. When the Germans on February 22nd made their preliminary withdrawal, the prospect of General Gough being able to strike at all began to vanish by reason of the voluntary abandonment by the enemy of the points to be attacked. By timely retirements the enemy thrice placed himself out of range of a blow about to be de1ivered.l The final withdrawal had been so timed as to render it difficult for the Fifth Army-and even the right of the Third-to follow it up and come into effective action again before the commencement of the spring offensive. Time, however, was the enemy’s sole gain, so far as this particular stroke was concerned.2 His flank, running back at a sharp angle from the Arras front, would still offer a most tempting objective for a powerful stroke. The Fifth Army, when it came up against the Hindenburg Line, would be well to the left rear of the German front at Arras, and only eight miles distant. The Third Army’s attack, if successful, would sweep across Gough’s front, and a blow delivered by him-if one were permitted by the time avail- able and the strength of his artillery-would be more By the withdrawals on February ai, March 12, and March 17; the enemy had not eluded the stroke of the I1 Corps at Pys on February 17.
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