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Table of Contents 1. Introduction 1.1 Background ..................................................................................... 2 1.2 Purpose of Research ....................................................................... 3 1.3 Summary of Findings ...................................................................... 4 1.4 Scope of Research .......................................................................... 5 1.5 Limitation of Research ................................................................... 6 2. Measuring Integrity 2.1 The Jungle of Governance Indicators .............................................. 7 2.1.1 International Country Risk Guide – ICRG ................................ 9 2.1.2 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index – CPI 9 2.1.3 Sustainable Governance Indicators SGI - Bertelsmann Stiftung 11 2.1.4 World Bank Institute ................................................................... 12 2.2 Global Integrity ................................................................................ 13 2.2.1 The methodology ......................................................................... 14 2.2.2 Research Approach ...................................................................... 15 2.2.3 Peer Review ................................................................................. 16 3. Role of IFA .................................................................................................... 17 4. Iceland Integrity Report 4.1 Corruption Timeline ........................................................................... 18 4.2 Highlights ........................................................................................... 22 4.3 The Integrity Scorecard ..................................................................... 24 4.4 Legal Framework – Actual Implementation 4.4.1 I Non-Governmental Organizations, Public Information and Media 25 4.4.2 II Elections ..................................................................................... 26 4.4.3 III Government Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks .......... 27 4.4.4 IV Public Administration and Professionalism .............................. 28 4.4.5 V Governance Oversight and Control ............................................ 30 4.4.6 VI Anti-Corruption Legal Framework, Judicial Impartiality and Law Enforcement Professionalism ..................................................... 31 5. “Where does the shoe hurt?” 5.1 I Non-Governmental Organizations, Public Information and Media ....... 32 5.2 II Elections ................................................................................................ 32 5.3 III Government Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balance 32 5.4 IV Public Administration and Professionalism ........................................ 33 5.5 V Governance Oversight and Control ...................................................... 34 5.6 VI Anti-Corruption Legal Framework, Judicial Impartiality and Law Enforcement Professionalism ........................................................... 34 Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 37 Appendix A Integrity Indicators page 1-106 Appendix B Integrity Indicators Score Summary Appendix C Asset Disclosure – Members of Parliament Integrity Scorecard Iceland 2012 Assessment of Anti-Corruption Safeguards Research Project for Emerging Issues/Advanced Topics Course Diploma in Investigative and Forensic Accounting Program University of Toronto Prepared by Jenný Stefanía Jensdóttir May 31, 2012 For Prof. Leonard Brooks 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background The Icelandic economy collapsed almost completely in the fall of 2008, when 3 banks constituting 85 percent of the country’s banking system crashed within a week period. The rest of the banking system fell also shortly after. The natural and almost spontaneous things for people to do, after having experienced the domestic equity market being wiped out overnight, household debts sky rocketing and personal savings disappearing, is to analyse, evaluate and fix the flaws that led to such a devastating disaster for the small country with population of only 320 thousand . Almost four years later, numerous flaws have been discovered, both in the public, private and legislation sector. A Special Investigation Committee (SIC) delivered over 2500 pages report in April 2010, where alleged criminal wrongdoings by the banks and serious negligence by politicians and public officials was exposed. Corruption, nepotism, cronyism, weak control system and informality in communication within the administration and legislature is commonly believed to be the ignition for the private banks to rapidly grow more than ten times over the national GDP in only six years, last but not least an excessive greed combined with low ethical values may have played an important role there as well. The editor for one of the largest newspaper for Iceland, Morgunbladid, who was called before the SIC said: “ I have observed this society for 50 years. It is disgusting society, everything is disgusting. There are no principals, no passionate vision, nothing. There is only opportunism and power struggle.” 1 1 Styrmir Gunnarsson, The Special Investigating Commission (SIC) report, April 2010, Volume 8 page 179 (author’s translation) 2 These words, reflected somewhat perception of a corruption by a person with great influence at the upper level of society, and sparked a big surprise and enormous attention, not only because the former editor is affiliated with the Independence party who was at power in cabinet for 18 consecutive years prior to the economic collapse, but also because corruption had been a typo topic at this level of society. This wannabe perception of “no corruption” was supported by Transparency International and it’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) , reported by media on an annual basis. Iceland was always ranking among the top “very-clean” countries scoring 9,2 CPI in 2007, 10 being the highest. Undoubtedly, the CPI Index was reviewed and even taken into consideration by the many foreign investors and banks that fuelled the expansion of the Icelandic bank system, with excessive volume of cheap loans, which are now lost, almost completely. 1.2 Purpose of Research Report. The purpose and motivation for this report is to observe and apply an alternate method, which is transparent and trackable to evaluate governance indicators in Iceland. The user or observer of the report, can look for reasons why certain governance criteria is determined weak or strong. The quantitative Integrity Scorecard conveys information about strength and weaknesses in governance practices, reflecting the country’s integrity system and can serve as a parallel tool for helping policy makers, citizens, investors and reformers to reach broad assessments and also detailed diagnoses concerning the anticorruption mechanism in Iceland. Publicly available indicators are not only useful for diverse user groups, they are likely to spark discussion and greater understanding of the causal mechanisms that lie behind governance problems within a country. Corruption affects the social responsibility and integrity of both citizens and institutions. Failure to confront corruption will obstruct reform initiatives. In order to design 3 measures to prevent and control corrupt behavior, one must identify the sources of corruptions.2 Assessment of Integrity indicators on a regular basis, can serve as a comparison and evaluation tool on reform and improvement in governance. 1.3 Summary of Findings While acknowledging that corruption is difficult or impossible to capture, the method of Global Integrity (GI) approaches the issue opposite of corruption, by quantitatively assessing the performance of key integrity-promoting mechanisms , such as media, judiciary ,the access to government, the citizens ability to monitor, review and advocate for improved governance and government accountability. The GI methodology was used to create an Integrity Scorecard for Iceland 2012, providing combination of objective and subjective governance indicators that establishes the gap between regulations and their implementation. The scorecard is compiled by 325 indicators under twenty-three subcategories and six head categories. The overall score for Iceland is 71, where legal framework scores strong 80 but actual implementation score of 59 is considered “very weak” by the GI performance tiers. The implementation score differs significantly from other governance indices issued by various organizations. The Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency International, has ranked Iceland among the “cleanest” countries in their survey for many years. Another index, WGI from the World Bank Institute ranks Iceland over 90% in four out of six Governance indicators, including Corruption Control. 2 Article “An analysis of the Causes of corruption in the Judiciary” by Edgardo Buscaglia, Maria Dakolias; Law and Policy in International Business, 1999 4 In author’s opinion the Global Integrity Scorecard and report provides valuable, open and in- depth information to the search for weakness in corruption prevention and safeguards. The transparency of the whole process, allows readers to diagnose the reasons and arguments for the outcome, whereas most organization do not provide the sources or reasoning for their assessment. There is a jungle of governance indicators out there, and Global Integrity
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