9 Experiencing Aesthetics, Representationalism, and Expression

Rebecca Copenhaver and Jay Odenbaugh

9.1. Introduction

In this essay, we offer an account of the basic emotions and their expression. On this account, emotions are experiences that indicate and have the func- tion of indicating how our body is fairing and how we are fairing in our en- vironment. Emotions are also objects of experience: our perceptual systems are more or less sensitive to the expression of in our environment by features that indicate and have the function of indicating emotions. We apply our account to expression in . What does it mean to say that an artwork expresses ? Is perceiving in an artwork the same kind of experi- ence as perceiving joy in a friend’s face? How may artworks express emotions without having emotions or any other mental states? In the next section, we provide an overview of unrestricted representa- tionalism about experience. In section 9.3, we offer a representationalist ac- count of the basic emotions that combines exteroception and interoception. On our view, emotions are perceptual experiences that represent properties of our viscera and properties in our extra-​bodily environment. Exteroceptive and interoceptive systems combine to constitute a system whose states—​ emotions—indicate​ how we are fairing in our environment. In the fourth section, we survey aesthetic theories of expression in art, including the re- semblance, persona, and theories, and argue that each faces signficant problems. Building on the work of Dominic Lopes (2005) and Mitchell Green (2007), we offer a teleosemantic account of in art that is impersonal and continuous with a representationalist account of the basic emotions. Finally, in section 9.5, we apply our view to an example—​ Théodore Géricault’s The Raft of the Medusa—​in order to illustrate how we experience emotions as represented properties of a painted canvas.

Rebecca Copenhaver and Jay Odenbaugh, Experiencing Emotions In: The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception. Edited by: Berit Brogaard and Dimitria Electra Gatzia, Oxford University Press (2020). © Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190648916.003.0010 214 The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception

We experience emotions by having them: by being happy, or frightened, or disgusted. Emotions are also expressed—​in smiles and cringes, tones and gestures. They are expressed in artworks as well—in​ depicted figures and scenes, and in design, using non-​depictive elements. Because emotions are expressed, we may experience them a way other than by having them; we may experience them as objects: expressed in a friend’s face; de- light expressed in Mattise’s . In doing so, we need not be surprised or delighted. Indeed, the expression of emotion does not require that any person have the emotion expressed. Your friend’s face may express surprise even though she knew about her surprise-party.​ Mattise’s Dance may ex- press delight even when no one is delighted—no​ one depicted or imagined in the painting and no one viewing the painting and its expression of delight. Whether a feature expresses an emotion—be​ it a smile or a design element—​ depends on whether it has the function of indicating the emotion, not on the presence of the emotion indicated.

9.2. Representationalism

We hold a representationalist—​or intentionalist—​view of experience. Experiences are mental states for which there is something it is like for the subject of the experience to have or be in that state. In other words, experiences have a phenomenology. Experiences also convey something to the subject of the experience. Experiences present, to the subject, things in the subject’s environment as being a certain way, as having certain features.1 Representationalism, in the broadest sense, is a view about the relationship between these two apparent facts about experience. Put most generally, it holds that the phenomenology of experiences is a matter of how things are presented to the subject in her experience. How things look, the way things feel, what things sound like—​these are presented in experience as features of things: things look to have a certain shape, things feel to be a certain temperature, things sound to be at a certain pitch, and so on.2 We hold an

1 Some reserve the verb “to present” for describing disjunctivist views of experience while reserving the verb “to represent” for describing representationalist views. This is a fine distinction with some merit. We use the terms interchangeably for what experience conveys to the subject of the experience. 2 For a selection of standard representationalist views, see Byrne 2001; Dretske 1995; Harman 1990; Jackson 2004; Lycan 1996; Rey 1991; Thau 2002; Tye 1995, 2000, 2009. Byrne (2001) credits Armstrong (1968) with presenting the view first in the analytic tradition. Experiencing Emotions 215 unrestricted version of representationalism that applies to perceptual expe- rience but also to other experiential mental state kinds: bodily sensations, memories, and emotions (Byrne 2001, 205). The contents of experience need not be conceptual. Adult humans have experiences, but so do infants and non-human​ animals, creatures that lack the conceptual sophistication that adult humans possess. A book can look large and red to an infant though she may yet be incapable of forming the perceptual belief that the book is large and red. A refrigerator may sound rhythmic to a dog, though he is unlikely to experience it as a refrigerator or as rhythmic. Nevertheless, the infant and the dog have experiences with content. This is evident from the fact that their experiences can be inaccurate—​the book may look large and red to the infant when it is not, and the refrigerator may sound low-​pitched and rhythmic to the dog when it is not. The contrast between adult humans on the one hand and infants or non-​ human animals on the other illustrates how the contents of experience need not be conceptual, but beware of drawing the conclusion that the contents of adult human experience are conceptual, while the contents of infant and non-​human animals are not. Rather, the point is that an experience may have content—​it may present things to the subject as being a certain way without the subject whose experience it is possessing any of the concepts used when describing the accuracy conditions.3 The contents of experience differ from the contents of mental states such as belief in being rich and fine-grained​ .4 Take Rebecca’s perceptual belief that there is a large, red book, formed on the basis of her experience of the book looking large and red. This experience conveys more information than is contained in her belief. It includes information about the placement of the book relative to other features in her visual field and relative to her perspec- tive as an observer. It contains information about features of the book other than its relative size and color: perhaps the words on the spine, the color of the pages, the shadow it casts on the table, and so on. And the experience conveys information about other objects, properties, and relations in the environment occupied by the book. One way to express this difference in

3 May adult human experience have conceptual content? The answer depends on an adequate ac- count of concepts and concept-​possession. For a survey of standard views on the nonconceptual content of experience, see section 4.1 of Bermúdez and Cahen 2015. 4 These features are used to support experience nonconceptualism. See Bermúdez and Cahen 2015 and Siegel 2015. We offer them here merely as observations about the phenomenology of experience and about what information experience conveys. 216 The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception informational content is as a difference between digital and analog encoding.5 We can think of beliefs as encoding information digitally: Rebecca’s belief that the book is large and red conveys that information and no more. By con- trast, experiences are analog. Rebecca’s experience of the book conveys in- formation in addition to what it conveys about the book. Her experience of the book is also more fine-grained​ than her belief that it is large and red. She experiences the book not only as large, but as a determinate (if relative) size, and a determinate shade of red (Raffman 1995). In addition to representationalism, we hold a liberal view about the contents of experience (Bayne 2009).6 Conservatives hold that the contents of perceptual experience are confined to low-​level properties. The contents of visual experience are confined to color, illumination, figure, motion, while the contents of audition are confined to pitch, volume, timbre, and so on. Conservatives hold that the features presented in the contents of experience are best understood as features that are visible, audible, gustable, olfactable, and so on. By contrast, liberals hold that experience presents some features that are not strictly visible, audible, gustable, and so on. In particular, liberals hold that some high-level​ features are represented in the contents of expe- rience: “These include being an artificial kind, being a natural kind, being a specific individual, causation, the nature of the backsides of objects, the na- ture of the occluded parts of objects, directionality” (Macpherson 2011, 9). Some liberals, including us, hold that the high-​level features that may figure in the contents of experience include multimodal features (what a strawberry looks to taste, how a bell sounds to look) as well as evaluative features (sounding dangerous, smelling rotten, looking ill) and affective features (looking sad, sounding angry). The liberal view is intended to be compatible with nonconceptualism about the contents of experience: some- thing can look to be an acorn to a squirrel; something can smell rotten to an infant, something can sound angry to a dog. Humans are social primates, and the basic emotions—,​ sad- ness, , , surprise, and —lie​ at the center of our practical lives. These emotions are experiences. There is something it is like for us to have them and something they convey: something it is like to fear what is behind you, to be disgusted by a den of snakes, to be happy with the sunlight

5 See Dretske 1981; Goodman 1976. 6 For a discussion of liberalism vs. conservatism about the contents of experience, see Bayne 2009 and the other papers collected in Hawley and Macpherson 2011. See also Siegel 2006; Siewert 1998. Experiencing Emotions 217 on your skin, to be sad at the close of day. The phenomenology of emotions is a matter of how things are presented to the subject in her experience. As with other experiences, the features presented in emotional experience are represented as features of the world: threatening movements, revolting food, comforting embraces. But emotions are also objects of experience—​they are among the features represented in our experience: the happiness expressed in a friend’s smile, the fear in a child’s trembling hand, the surprise in an award-​winner’s voice. We experience these emotional features as features of the world. And, we will argue, among the experiences that present emotions are experiences of art. Our subject is thus twofold: emotions as representations and the representa- tion of emotion.

9.3. Emotions as Representations

The basic emotions include happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, and dis- gust (Ekman 1992). The non-basic​ emotions include , , , , and so on. We focus on the basic emotions. What are emotions? We contend that emotions are experiences.7 Because we take experiences to be representational, we hold that emotions are representational. Emotions pre- sent various properties and features; they are not mere sensations. In this sec- tion, we elaborate on this proposal. There are a variety of theories of representational content, one of which is teleosemantics.8 On a teleosemantic account of the representational con- tent of emotions, emotions indicate certain properties and have the func- tion of indicating those properties. What properties do emotions have the function of indicating? One proposal is that emotions represent evaluative properties—​specifically, relational properties concerning how we are fairing in our environment. For example, anger tracks threat, fear tracks danger, and sadness tracks loss.9

7 Psychologists use the term “emotion” narrowly and broadly. Narrowly, they are referring to emo- tional experiences; broadly, they are referring to emotional experiences, physiological responses, and behavior. We are focused on emotions narrowly construed, which is compatible with broad approaches, provided emotional experience is at least a component of such an approach. 8 Classical discussions of teleosemantics include Millikan 1984 and Dretske 1988. For applications of teleosemantics to the emotions see Price 2006 and Prinz 2004. 9 This is roughly the view of psychologist Richard Lazarus, who calls these featurescore relational themes (Smith and Lazarus 1993; see Prinz 2004 as well. 218 The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception

How do emotions come to have these functions? One possibility is that the basic emotions and their expressions evolved by natural selection to do certain jobs. Perhaps the basic emotions contribute to reproductive success by alerting and motivating us with regard to important features of our social and non-social​ environment (Millikan 1995). Emotional expressions often signal our commitments. Perhaps they enable us to forge alliances (Trivers 1971).10 However, we are wary of casual evolutionary hypothesizing. A trait evolves by natural selection if, and only if, there is heritable variation in fit- ness (Sober 1993). Too often, evidence for the relevant variability and herita- bility is lacking. Likewise, adaptationist hypothesizing ignores the possibility that emotions and their expressions are homologous traits rather than adaptations, and screens off other sources of “design” such as culture (e.g., learning and imitation).11 Following Charles Darwin (1998), Paul Ekman (1971, 1983, 1984) argues that basic emotions form distinct families each composed of perceptions, facial expressions, physiological responses, and behav- ioral tendencies. And William James (1884) and Antonio Damasio (1994, 1999) hold that the emotions are experiences of characteristic bodily states. You see a bear in a clearing: your heart rate increases, you begin to sweat, the hair on the back of your neck stands up, and you prepare to run. According to James, emotions consist in perceiving these changes in one’s bodily state. He asks:

What kind of an emotion of fear would be left if the neither of quick- ened heart-beats​ nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips nor of weakened limbs, neither of goose-​flesh nor of visceral stirrings, were pre- sent, it is quite impossible for me to think. Can one fancy the state of and picture no ebullition in the chest, no flushing of the face, no dilatation of the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous action, but in their stead limp muscles, calm breathing, and a placid face? The present writer, for one, certainly cannot. (James 1884, 193–194)​

10 The most important discussion of emotions as “commitment devices” is in Frank 1988, 2001. This is due to the fact that expressions are “hard to fake.” Evolutionary biologists have studied the ev- olution of costly behaviors that reliably signal phenotypic features, and some have claimed that facial expressions are “hard to fake” signals of this sort. For detailed discussions see Ekman and Friesen 2003; Green 2007; Zahavi 1997. 11 Important recent essays on the evolution of emotions and their expressions include Panksepp 1998; Plutchik 1980; Tooby and Cosmides 1990. Experiencing Emotions 219

We deny that emotions are simply perceptions of one’s bodily states, though we hold that such perceptions are one component of emotions. The main reason for rejecting a purely somatic theory such as James’s is that the phe- nomenology of emotions is at least in part directed at the world outside our bodies. The fear you feel in the forest clearing is very much bear-directed.​ Jesse Prinz has developed a sophisticated neo-Jamesian​ theory of emotions (Prinz 2004). Following James, he argues that emotions are perceptions of one’s bodily states, including one’s heart rate, breathing, sweating, facial expressions, and so on. These perceptions have avalence : they may be pos- itive or negative. When you see the bear, your perception of the hairs at the back of your neck, your sweating, and your heart rate has a negative valence. When you see the bear retreat, your perception of your muscles relaxing, your breath returning, and your heart slowing has a positive valence. These perceptions are also appraisals in the sense that they represent core relational themes: they represent how you are fairing in your environment. When you see the bear, your body responds immediately—​you freeze, you sweat, your hair bristles, your heart rate increases, and your facial expression changes. Your body registers the danger. Additionally, you perceive those bodily changes. Following Dretske, Prinz argues that our bodily states indicate and have the function of indicating such properties.12 But Prinz’s perceptual theory of the emotions is subject to a worri- some objection. On his view, an emotion is a perception of a bodily state that represents a core relational theme.13 But perceptions themselves are representations. Thus, Prinz’s view commits him to the position that emotions are representations of bodily states that are representations of core relational themes. But transitivity is not guaranteed in intensional contexts. Emotions may represent bodily states, and bodily states may represent the properties in the environment that comprise core relational themes without the emotions themselves representing these external properties. Consider an analogy. While browsing in your local bookstore, a curious book catches your eye: The Nematode and Nasturtium: A Story of , Madness, and the

12 Walter Cannon (1927) argued that the Jamesian approach was doomed to fail since states of the autonomic nervous system are shared across different emotions. Hence, they cannot indicate dif- ferent emotions. However, we now know that emotions are associated with distinctive states of the autonomic nervous system (Ekman et al. 1983). 13 “If emotions are perceptions of bodily states, they are caused by changes in the body. But if those changes in the body are reliably caused by the instantiation of core relational themes, then our perceptions of the body may also represent those themes” (Prinz 2004b, 55). See also Prinz 2004a, 68–​69. 220 The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception

Race to Design the Perfect Garden.14 The book is about the lives of two rival landscape gardeners in the 19th century (though you do not know this). You whether the book is worth reading. Your thoughts are about the book, and the book is about rival landscape gardeners, but your thoughts are not about rival landscape gardeners—​otherwise, why read the book? So too, your emotions may be about your bodily state, and your bodily state may be about properties in the environment, but this does not entail that your emotions are about properties in the environment. Prinz’s account has diffi- culty accounting for the representational content of emotions as perceptions directed toward the world. We hypothesize that emotions are complex experiences that represent both external objects and their properties, and properties regarding the viscera; emotions are complexes composed of and integrating exterocep- tion and interoception (Zaki et al. 2012). Interoception is a sensory system that tracks physiological states of the body used for achieving homeostasis (Craig 2002).15 Interoceptors include mechanoreceptors, chemoreceptors, thermoreceptors, and osmoreceptors, each indicating specific properties of the body. Plausibly, interoceptors evolved in order to maintain bodily ho- meostasis. But the overall content of emotional experience is directed be- yond the body toward the world. As Antoine Bechara and Nasir Naqvi write, “When we feel joy on seeing someone we , information from the viscera is passed on to a second-order​ map to be re-represented​ in relation to an emotional stimulus in the world” (Bechara and Naqvi 2004, 103). The content of emotions is not merely the conjunction of the contents of interoception and exteroception, but a content unavailable to either as an iso- lated representational system. Emotions are an instance of multimodal per- ception (O’Callaghan 2012). Perceptual experience is not the conjunction of visual experience, auditory experience, tactile experience, and so on. Rather, experience is integrated across modalities such that the contents of experi- ence includes the representation of features that are neither confined nor available to a single modality in . When we see the bear in the forest clearing, our visual, auditory, and olfactory experiences of the bear and our experiences of physiological disturbances in our bodies are integrated in the emotion fear. This emotion indicates both the properties in the world that

14 The example is fictional. 15 Whether proprioception and the vestibular system are part of interoception is subject to debate (Ritchie and Carruthers 2015). Experiencing Emotions 221 compose core relational themes—​how we are fairing in our environment—​ and the states of our bodies. It is worth noting that on our view, James’s subtraction argument still holds. If we subtract the perception of physiological changes in our body from the overall content of the state, the emotion disappears. However, the emotion also disappears if we subtract the perception of properties in the environment from the overall content of the state. Exteroceptive and intero- ceptive representational systems combine to constitute a system whose states (emotions) indicate how we are fairing in the environment. How these sys- tems come to be so combined is an empirical matter. One might hypothesize they are merely correlated (Prinz 2004, 181). One might suppose that exter- oceptive perceptions cause interoceptive ones (Prinz 2004, 62). Finally, one might hold that emotional experiences are composed of and integrate exter- oceptive and interoceptive experiences (Barlassina and Newen 2014; Goldie 2002; Tye 2008b). We assume that the problem of how these modalities bind will be resolved by the sciences, but we believe that the integrative approach is the most plausible.16 Traditionally, philosophers have recognized two broad positions on the nature of emotions. Cognitivists claim that necessarily emotions contain judgments (propositional attitudes) as parts. Non-cognitivists​ deny this. We find this way of viewing the options misleading. With regard to the basic emotions, we side with non-cognitivists​ for several reasons (Zajonc 1980; LeDoux 1998). First, infants and some non-humans​ experience emotions though they lack the ability to form judgments. Second, some emotions—​ such as fear—​are directly elicited through the amygdala, bypassing the ce- rebral cortex, making it implausible to account for such emotions in terms of judgment. Third, in experimental (and cultural) contexts we may induce emotions directly absent the formation of judgments by administering drugs. Fourth, -inducing​ images shown to subjects at speeds too fast for recognition can induce emotional reactions absent judgment. Still, emotions are information-​carrying mental states. They convey some- thing to the subject of the emotion. Emotions present, to the subject, the state

16 Some have worried that representationalism about emotions, and more specifically moods, fails because they possess phenomenal character that cannot be captured in terms of representational content (Kind 2013). One may feel “down” but think that this is not directed toward any external ob- ject. In addition to other representationalist strategies (Crane 1998; Tye 2008b; Mendelovici 2013), we suggest that interoception is important in our understanding of moods. For example, often when one has an emotion, the bodily disturbance continues longer than perception of the external elicitor. Moods then would be a subset of emotions for which the bodily disturbance is especially long lived. 222 The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception of her body and things in her environment as being a certain way, as having certain features. Moreover, emotions may misrepresent. We may feel fear when there is no danger, be angry where there is no threat, feel sadness when nothing has been lost. Emotions are experiences with content. They present things to the subject as being a certain way, which way is assessable for accu- racy. Thus, in an important sense, emotions are cognitive.

9.4. Representations of Emotion

Emotions are experiences, or so we have been arguing. But emotions are also objects of experience. Among the high-​level features that may figure in the contents of experience are emotional features: something may sound to be angry, look to be happy, or feel to be frightened. Emotions are experiences that are expressed in humans (and in nonhuman animals) through various embodied states: anger expressed in tone of voice, happiness expressed in fa- cial expressions, fear expressed in trembling, disgust expressed in wretching, and so on. Embodied states such as facial expressions express emotions be- cause they indicate and have the function of indicating these emotions. Jay’s small dog Sam is frightened of paper bags. Jay knows this because he sees her trembling before them and feels her trembling when he picks her up. In doing so, Jay has an experience that represents Sam as frightened. Jay experiences Sam’s fear as a feature of the world—as​ a property of Sam. Jay does not thereby experience Sam’s fear as experienced by Sam. That is, Jay’s experience of Sam’s fear is not identical with Sam’s fear, which is also an ex- perience. This much is clear from the fact that Jay’s experience of Sam’s fear is not directed at paper bags, while Sam’s fear is. The point is the same as the one presented as an objection to Prinz’s perceptual theory of the emotions: tran- sitivity is not guaranteed in intensional contexts. Typically, artworks do not experience emotions and thus do not express emotions in the ordinary way that humans do.17 How then do artworks ex- press emotions? How can an artwork express fear when it cannot be afraid? At first sight, this is puzzling. But it is no more puzzling (or perhaps just as puzzling) as how sentences and utterances express thoughts though they cannot think. Traditionally, there are three approaches to this problem: the

17 We say “typically” because there are instances of performance, dance for example, in which an artwork is a human. Experiencing Emotions 223 resemblance, persona, and arousal theories. We consider a fourth, minimal contour, approach with which we are sympathetic. The first approach is the resemblance theory of expression. Stephen Davies, a defender of the view, writes the following concerning instru- mental (“pure”) music: “What form does it take when what is experienced is music’s expressiveness? I believe it is an experience of resemblance between the music and the realm of human emotion” (Davies 2011, 181). Consider Miles Davis’s Blue in Green—​what resemblance is there between it and say, sadness? For there to be a resemblance between the two, there must be at least one property that they share. Davies supposes that the shared prop- erties are gestural. For example, the cadence of sad people is typically slow and their voices are in a low register. Insofar as Blue and Green and the ges- ture of a sad person resemble one another, the former expresses the latter’s emotion.18 Besides the gestural similarity, the listener must experience the resemblance. Thus:

Resemblance: an artwork expresses emotion if, and only if, there is an expe- rienced resemblance between the work and a person’s emotion.

There are several problems with this approach. First, though some aspects of some artworks may resemble some emotional gestures, surely there are emotions expressed by artworks that do not resemble emotional gestures. The scope of emotional expression in artworks appears wider than the scope of gestural resemblance. Second, resemblance is sym- metric, while expression is asymmetric. Suppose Rothko’s Black on Maroon (1958) resembles and (thereby) expresses sadness. It follows that sadness resembles Rothko’s Black on Maroon, but it does not follow that sadness expresses Black on Maroon. Davies proposes that the expressive asymmetry arises because we animate objects with human emotions. Black on Maroon expresses sadness, while sadness does not express Black on Maroon because we animate Black on Maroon with the sadness we experience it as resem- bling. However, this adjustment threatens to account for expression pri- marily in terms of animation, since unrestricted experienced resemblance itself is insufficient.19

18 According to Davies, emotional predicates do not apply in their primary sense to pure music but only in a secondary sense. 19 It should be noted that Davies thinks that the notion of animation does not commit him to the persona theory described subsequently. 224 The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception

Another approach—the​ persona theory of expression—​adopts just this strategy. Jay’s dog Sam expresses fear when around paper bags—she​ is fright- ened by them and expresses her fear by whining and trembling. Her fear is ev- ident in these expressions. Edvard Munch’s The Scream expresses fear as well. But The Scream is not frightened. On the persona view, Munch’s The Scream expresses fear because it makes fear evident: it is evidence of someone’s fear, of someone’s being frightened. The painting is animated by supposing a persona whose fear the paining expresses. Jerold Levinson writes, As a number of philosophers have rightly underlined, expression is essen- tially a matter of something outward giving evidence of something inward. Otherwise put, expression is essentially the manifesting or externalizing of mind or psychology. (Levinson 2006, 191). On this view, though a painting itself cannot be afraid, it expresses the fear of an imagined persona, who is frightened. Bruce Vermazen has argued that when a thing expresses an emotion, it is evidence of that emotion (Vermazen 1986). Expressions are evidence of emotion because expressions indicate emotion. For example, suppose Rebecca spills coffee on Jay’s expensive art book. Jay experiences anger, and his furrowed brow, clenched fists, and flushed faceindicate his anger. These observable embodied states are therebyevidence of Jay’s anger. However, artworks often do not evidence a specific person’s emotion. The artist need not feel the emotion expressed in her work, and there need not be a specific person, fictional or real, depicted in an artwork that expresses an emotion. Thus, we must imagine a person—a​ persona—​who expresses the emotion evidenced in the work. In the context of pure music, Levinson writes, “A passage of music P is expressive of an emotion E iff P, in context, is readily heard by a listener as the expression of E by a persona” (Levinson 1996, 192). Thus,

Persona: an artwork expresses an emotion if, and only if, the artwork can be imagined as evidence of a persona’s emotion.

There are two problems with this approach. First, it is possible toimagine any number of mutually incompatible personae expressing emotions in an artwork. A single abstract painting could then express any emotion imag- inable, quite literally. But even the most abstract paintings that express emotions express a particular range of emotions. Second, in order to con- strain the limits of imagination, we would have to identify expressive qual- ities independently of the imagined personae. But this implies that it is the Experiencing Emotions 225 expressive qualities of the artwork that are responsible for the emotions expressed—​the personae are incidental. Finally, let us consider arousal theories of expression. Like persona theo- ries, arousal theories locate the emotions expressed by artworks in a person. However, the person so located is the spectator. A painting expresses sadness, for example, in virtue of arousing sadness in the viewer. Derek Matravers has offered the most sophisticated arousal account: A work of art x expresses the emotion e, if, for a qualified observerp experiencing x in normal conditions, x arouses in p a feeling which would be an aspect of the appropriate reaction to the expression of e by a person, or to a representation of the content of which was the expression of e by a person. (1998, 146) We may summarize this account as follows,

Arousal: an artwork expresses an emotion if, and only if, the artwork would arouse that emotion (or a distinct but suitable emotion) in a qualified ob- server in appropriate circumstances.

As Dominic McIver Lopes notes, the arousal theory is not the trival claim that some artworks do arouse emotions in observers (Lopes 2005, 66). Rather, according to the arousal theory, what it is for an artwork to express an emotion is for it to arouse that emotion (or a distinct but suitable emo- tion) in the observer. Emotional expression in artwork is constituted at least in part by the arousal of emotions in persons observing the artwork. Note as well that the emotion aroused need not be the emotion expressed. It may be a distinct but suitable emotion: a painting may express fear by arousing in the observer. As with each account so far, the arousal view faces some problems. First is the problem of dry eyes: qualified viewers in ordinary circumstances may perceive an emotion expressed by an artwork without feeling the emotion expressed (or a distinct but suitable emotion). Perhaps this condition is to be lamented, perhaps not. The arousal theory holds that dry eyes are impos- sible. It is committed to the view that an artwork cannot express an emotion, and thus that an observer cannot perceive the emotion expressed, unless that emotion or a distinct but suitable emotion is aroused in the observer. But dry eyes are possible. Second, recall that the requirement that the emotion aroused be suitable allows the arousal theory to accommodate the insight that an artwork may express fear by, for example, arousing pity. Unfortunately, this requirement also loosens the restrictions on which aroused emotions 226 The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception are sufficient for successful expression, rendering the crucial emotional con- tribution to expression entirely generic, or, as Lopes puts it, “The emotion aroused is phenomenological window-dressing”​ (2005, 69). We suggest a different approach. Following Lopes, we recognize three ex- pressive devices in paintings (Lopes 2005). First, figure expression is expres- sion attributable to a figure depicted in the painting. Degas’sThe Absinthe Drinker expresses despair because the woman in the painting is depicted as despairing. Second, scene expression is expression attributable to the depicted scene and not any depicted figure. Turner’sSnow Storm: Steam Boat off a Harbor’s Mouth expresses fear though there are no figures in the scene; the whole depicted scene expresses fear. Third, design expression (i.e., color, form, texture) is expression attributable to the picture’s designed surface, and not to any figure or scene (Lopes 2005, 62–​68).20 Picasso’s The Weeping Woman expresses and torment through clashing colors and discordant geo- metric shapes. A figure and scene are depicted in The Weeping Woman, but the designed surface expresses misery independently of its depictive content. Our approach is similar to that offered by Lopes for representational painting in his Sight and Sensibility. Lopes writes, “The physical configura- tion of a picture’s design or the figure or scene a picture depicts expresses E if and only if (1) it is an expression-​look that (2) has the function, in the circumstances, of indicating E” (2005, 78).21 Adapting Lopes’s account of pictoral expression, we are committed to

Minimal Contour: An artwork or element of it (design, depicted figure, or depicted scene) expresses an emotion if, and only if, it indicates the emo- tion and has the function of indicating it.

The minimal contour theory is animpersonal account of expression in artwork. An artwork may express an emotion without there being a person

20 Here we oversimplify. There are instances of abstract pictorial art that do contain depicted figures or scenes. For example, Willem de Kooning’sWomen I depicts a female figure, and J. M. W. Turner’s Snowstorm depicts a steamboat. How might this be? One potential explanation for this is that paintings can be more or less abstract. Fewer and fewer properties of an object can be depicted in the works. Second, Richard Wollheim considers concepts like boy, dancer, and torso as figurative and concepts like irregular solid, sphere, and space as abstract (Wollheim 1987, 62). Hence, insofar as a spectator I am object-aware​ of those properties or fact-aware​ of those properties deploying the associated concepts, the work is abstract. 21 The notion of an “expression-look”​ is unhelpful in part because that is precisely what we are trying to analyze; when does something appear to have an emotion? Thus, we have dropped it from the account. Experiencing Emotions 227 or persona to whom the emotion is attributable and without there being a person whose emotion constitutes (even in part) successful expression. The minimal contour theory is ateleosemantic account of expression in artwork. An artwork or an element of an artwork—​its design, depicted fig- ures, or depicted scene—need​ not resemble the emotions expressed. An artwork or element of it expresses an emotion if it indicates and has the function of indicating that emotion; it need not resemble the emotion in order to so indicate. Indicator-functions​ are contingent. In the case of fa- cial expressions and other embodied states that indicate emotion, the mechanisms that ground indication are a matter of the evolutionary history and environment of the species along with cultural and social conventions. In the case of expressions in artworks, the mechanisms are often cultural and social and far more contextual. For example, in the United States, the color yellow is expressive of happiness, but in Egypt, it is expressive of sadness and is associated with mourning. Embodied expressions and expressions in artworks have a history that could have been otherwise than they are: smiles could have indicated aggression, and dissonant colors could have indicated delight. As Lopes writes, “No single factor explains what gives . . . phys- ical configuration the function of indicating one or another emotion. . . . Nevertheless, it is their having emotion-indicating​ functions that makes them expressions” (2005, 81). The minimal contour theory of expression in artworks is continuous with a teleosemantic account of expression in embodied states: anger as expressed in tone of voice, fear as expressed in trembling, and so on. Embodied states express emotions because they have the function of indi- cating these emotions. Artworks and their elements—design,​ depicted figure, depicted scene—​express fear, sadness, anger, and other emotions be- cause they have the function of indicating these emotions. In neither case does the expression of emotion require the emotion expressed to be pre- sent. Your friend’s smile expresses happiness even as she struggles in si- lent sorrow; Picasso’s Weeping Woman expresses sorrow even as no woman weeps. Whether a feature expresses an emotion is a matter of it having the function of indicating the emotion, not a matter of the presence of the emo- tion indicated. Our view is inspired by Lopes, and it is useful to juxtapose it with another theory similar to his: the acccount developed by Mitchell Green in his book Self-Expression​ . According to Green, an emotion is expressed if and only if that emotion is signaled and shown. We signal emotions by functionally 228 The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception indicating them as Lopes suggests. We show emotions in one of three ways: we show-that,​ show-α,​ and show-​how. One shows-that​ one is angry by providing evidence that allows another to perceive-that​ one is angry. Jay’s email with its terse wording and no signoff allows Rebecca to form a perceptual beliefthat Jay is angry. One shows-α​ by making one’s anger perceptible. Jay’s clinched fist, lowered eyebrows, and tight, straight lips make his anger perceptible. Finally, one shows-​how one’s anger by enabling or inacting in another the ability to be empathetically aware of one’s anger. In seeing Jay’s expression of anger, Rebecca may come to know how he feels by feeling anger as well, empa- thetically. We think Green’s notion of showing is suggestive but that it makes expression more opaque than it need be. As with Lopes’s notion of expresssion-​ look, the notion of showing simply stands for that which functionally indicates an emotion and is availabe to the senses such that a person may form percep- tual beliefs, perceive, or be empathically aware of another’s emotion. One objection to the minimal contour approach is the following. If ex- pression is functional indication, then some abstract paintings represent emotions in virtue of expressive devices that have the function of indicating emotions. However, abstract expressive paintings are not representational. Therefore, expression is not functional indication. In response, we would like to make two points. First, abstract artists like Mark Rothko and Adolf Gottlieb were adamant that their paintings had subjects. They famously commented in their abstract expressionist “statement,”

It is a widely accepted notion among painters that it does not matter what one paints as long as it is well painted. This is the essence of academism. There is no such thing as good painting about nothing. We assert that only that subject matter is valid which is tragic and timeless. (Rothko and Gottlieb 1943)

Rothko also wrote,

I’m not an abstractionist. I’m not interested in the relationship of color or form or anything else. I’m interested only in expressing basic human emotions: tragedy, , doom, and so on. (Quoted in Rodman 1957, 93)

According to these abstractionists their paintings have a subject: in this instance, the emotions. Second, the earlier objection by modus tollens equivocates between two different senses of beingrepresentational : Experiencing Emotions 229

Rd: a painting represents sadness by a depictive property (figure or scene).

Ra: a painting represents sadness by a design property.

Non-​representational (abstract) paintings may represent emotions. They do not represent by way depicted figures or scenes, but they represent nonethe- less, via design properties that functionally indicate emotions. We claim that Rothko’s Black on Maroon is representational in the latter sense.

9.5. Experiencing Emotions

Finally, let us apply our view to an example—​Théodore Géricault’s The Raft of the Medusa—​in order to illustrate how we experience emotions as representated properties of a painted canvas. Suppose two art afficianados, Rebecca and Jay, find themselves at the Louvre. Rebecca is a fan of classical art, whereas Jay is enamored with modern art. Contrary to his impulses, they head to the first floor and stand before Théodore Géricault’sThe Raft of the Medusa (1818–1819;​ figure 9.1), which she very much admires. Jay is a novice with respect to classical art, but he immediately perceives several things. He perceives the facial and gestural expressions of the raft’s passengers: the sadness of the figure on the bottom who hovers over near-​ dead fellow passengers, the surprise of the figures on the right waving to the distance below the darkened mast, the fear of the figures in the center. Jay experiences these emotions: they are represented in the contents of his experi- ence as represented properties of the figures and scene depicted in the painting. He experiences sadness, surprise, and fear, even as he is not sad, surprised, or frightened. However, Rebecca knows there is more that Jay may perceive in the The Raft of the Medusa than this, so she offers Jay a lesson in art history. Rebecca tells Jay about the events on which the painting is based. In 1816 the French Royal Navy frigate Méduse set sail for Senegal, captained by an officer who had not sailed for 20 years and who ran the ship aground. The ship had few lifeboats, so 146 of the 400 passengers were forced to build an impromptu raft: the raft of theMéduse . They drifted for nearly two weeks, during which those on the raft starved, fought, and resorted to cannabilism. Fifteen remained when the raft was rescued by mere chance by the Argus. Next Rebecca describes the artistic skills Géricault brings to the canvas, realized after Géricault interviewed two passengers, prepared models, and 230 The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception

Figure 9.1 Théodore Géricault’sThe Raft of the Medusa, 1818–​1819 drew sketches in preparation for the final painting. Jay is already sensitive to the figure expression in the paining, but Rebecca highlights the scene and design expression. She draws Jay’s attention to the diagonal movement from the dead bodies on the bottom left to those waving in at the ho- rizon on the upper right. She points to the speck in the upper right corner, where Jay notices a small ship in the distance, a detail he had overlooked. Where Jay perceived despair and surprise in distinct depicted figures, he now perceives an emotional transformation from sadness and despair to hope—​ hope rising from loss. Jay perceives in the painting the temporal unfolding of emotions over the 13 days the passengers awaited their fate. Rebecca asks Jay to consider the color palette used by Géricault: dark tones that are natu- rally or conventionally expressive of negatively valenced emotions such as sadness and fear. Géricault uses chiaroscuro for the passengers, clouds, and water: a somber design. And she asks him to consider the size of the painting. It is enormous: 491 cm × 716 cm (16′1″ × 23′6″). The figures at the base of the painting are larger than those who would view the painting—​larger than Jay and Rebecca—a​ design that renders the emotions expressed urgent, impending, looming. In talking with Rebecca, Jay has learned some history, but he also learned to perceive in The Raft of the Medusa emotions and features to which he was initially blind. He has learned something about how to approach artworks, to Experiencing Emotions 231 be sure, but he has also become more sensitive to the features in his environ- ment that indicate emotions. He has gained propositional knowledge, but he has also gained recognitional and discriminatory abilities that alter the kinds of representational contents that figure in his experiences of emotion, rend- ering those possible contents richer, more fine-​grained, and discerning. He has learned facts, and he has made new judgments, but he has also learned something about how to look and what to look for, as well as what sorts of things he might perceive in such looking. Recently, Dominic Lopes (2011) has argued that pictures are “percep- tual prostheses” for developing empathic skill. Pictures evoke experiences as of the scenes they represent. However, their contribution to empathetic skill is different from face-to-​ ​face viewings of scenes, and the skills they de- velop carry over to life outside pictures. Pictures are different precisely be- cause they are able to express emotion impersonally. The skills developed by experiencing pictures such as The Raft of the Medusa carry over be- cause pictures socially reference which emotions are appropriate in various circumstances. By seeing the -stricken​ faces in The Raft of the Medusa, we determine which emotional responses are warranted. The artistic value of expressive pictures consists, in part, in their unique ability to provide us with opportunities to develop empathic skills. The theories of expression we have considered as alternatives to ours ex- plain what is going on with artworks like this painting in the Louvre dif- ferently. The resemblance theory holds that Jay and Rebecca experience a resemblance between the human figures depicted and the gestures of ac- tual humans, but it has difficulty explaining how scene and design expres- sion contribute to what Jay and Rebecca experience when they perceive the painting. The persona theory holds that Jay and Rebecca experience the emotions expressed by The Raft of the Medusa by make-​believe: they imagine personae that have the emotions expressed. The arousal view holds that Jay and Rebecca experience the emotions expressed by The Raft of the Medusa by having those emotions themselves, or by having emotions suitable to witnessing misery on such a scale. But there need be no persons—real​ or imagined—​who have the emotions expressed in The Raft of the Medusa in order for the painting to express those emotions, or for Jay and Rebecca to perceive them. And while Jay and Rebecca may have emotions upon per- ceiving the emotions expressed in the painting, they need not. They may ex- perience the emotions expressed in The Raft of the Medusa without thereby having those emotions or having emotions suitable to the knowledge of what the passengers of the raft endured. 232 The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception

9.6. Conclusion

On our representationalist account of the basic emotions, emotions are representations. Emotions are experiences that indicate and have the func- tion of indicating how our body is fairing and how we are fairing in our en- vironment. And on our representationalist account of experience, emotions are among the features presented in the contents of experience. Emotions are objects of experience. Among the features that figure in the contents of experience are features that express emotions by indicating and have the function of indicating emotions. Thus there are two senses in which we may be said to experience emotions: we may have emotions, and we may experi- ence emotions as representated properties of the environment. In both cases, experiencing emotions is a matter of experiencing how things are in the world: experiencing how one is fairing in the environment, or experiencing emotional features as features of the environment. We examined one way of experiencing emotional features: emotional ex- pression in art. Artworks and their elements express fear, sadness, anger, and other emotions because they have the function of indicating these emotions. In this way, our account of emotional expression is continuous with our rep- resentationalist account of the basic emotions. We experience the emotions expressed in artworks not by having those emotions, but by perceiving them. We perceive them they same way we perceive the emotions expressed by the embodied states of humans (and nonhuman animals): by being attuned to properties that indicate emotions. In neither artworks nor humans does the expression of emotion require the emotion expressed to be present. Whether a feature expresses an emotion is a matter of it having the function of indi- cating the emotion, not a matter of the presence of the emotion indicated. In this way, our account of emotional expression is impersonal. Features in the environment (including artworks and their elements) express emotions even in conditions in which there is no person to whom the emotion is attributable.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Dominic Lopes and Kent Bach for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts. Experiencing Emotions 233

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