“Soft Power” – the New Concept of the Russian Foreign Policy Toward Georgia (August 2008 Postwar Period)
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“Soft Power” – the New Concept of the Russian Foreign Policy Toward Georgia (August 2008 postwar period) Contents: From the Editor The Main Vectors of Russia’s Caucasian Policy Giorgi Volski Tengiz Pkhaladze The concept of Russian “Soft Power” and main objectives in Georgia Tengiz Pkhaladze Chapter I. Diplomatic Activities of the Russian Federation Towards Georgia Occupied Territories Tengiz Pkhaladze 1 Russian Policy in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Tornike Sharashenidze Termination of United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia Giorgi Volski Russian policy in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Tornike Sharashenidze Russia at the Geneva Talks Tengiz Pkhaladze Tornike Sharashenidze Russia’s policy in the European Union Tengiz Pkhaladze Tornike Sharashenidze Chapter II. The “Compatriot Protection” Policy of the Russian Federation and Consular Policy Toward Georgia Policy of the Russian Federation on “Compatriot Protection” Toward Georgia Working with “Compatriots” on the Occupied Territories of Georgia Tengiz Pkhaladze Georgians in Russia 2 Teimuraz Karukhnishvili Tengiz Pkhaladze Consular Issues as Russia’s “Soft Power” Policy Implementation Mechanism Tengiz Pkhaladze Chapter III. Russian Media and Georgia Mariam Tsatsanashvili Media Tools to create “Enemy Image” Russian media resources in Georgia Russian media space on the occupied territories General assessments of media in the Russian Federation Chapter IV. 2008-2009 Cyber War in Georgia Mariam Tsatsanashvili Cyber space as an environment for wield of Soft Power Character and dynamics of cyber attacks in Georgia Cyber attacks against Georgian websites in 2009 Assessments of the 2008-2009 cyber attacks against Georgia Consequences of cyber attacks Cause and effect relationships between virtual acts and politics How to counter the giant state’s cyber hysteria Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania – who will become the next victim of cyber war? 3 Chapter V. Religion Factor Used by Russia in the Context of “Soft Power” Tengiz Pkhaladze Giorgi Gvimradze Orthodoxy and the Kremlin Ideology History of One Common Faith Attempts to disseminate “Russian Theology” in Georgia Russian Church and Occupied Regions of Georgia Chapter VI. Culture, Education, Science and Public Relations as Mechanisms of Russia’s “Soft Power” implementation Tengiz Pkhaladze Nato Bachiashvili Culture within the Context of Russian “Soft Power” Situation in the occupied territories Mass cultural ideological measures and other manifestations of “Soft Power” in the occupied territories 4 Education and Science as a Mechanizm of Russian “Soft Power” Preschool education General education Providing non-Georgian-language schools with textbooks Multilingual education Access to higher education Activities of Russian public-educational organizations in Georgia Occupied territories Situation in secondary schools within the occupied territories Situation in the Georgian schools within the occupied territories Chapter VII “Public Dialog” and “Russia’s Soft Power” Tengiz Pkhaladze Nana Devdariani Conclusions and Recommendations 5 From the Editor “When your enemy seems stronger than you, do something that defies his understanding." Bernard Werber “Soft Power”, a new trend of contemporary international politics emerged at the end of the twentieth century. This term was first used by an American scientist, professor of the Harvard University, Joseph Nye. In his books, “Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power”, New York: Basic Books, 1990 and “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics”, Public Affairs, 2004, Nye fully presented the aforementioned concept. In contrast to the “Hard Power” theory that uses levers of coercion and intimidation, “Soft Power” is based on mechanisms of cooperation and attractiveness to achieve the desired and prefers intellectual resources. Classic Soft Power consists of three components: values, culture and diplomacy. Joseph Nye’s ideas became popular right away and soon were widely used in foreign politics of USA and other leading Western countries. To a significant point, it was the classic Soft Power that led to the popularization of democratic values and principles in the post-soviet states and caused dramatic changes in the societies of the post-communist countries. While the West was promoting the values, Vladimir Putin, at that time president of the Russian Federation, proclaimed the collapse of the USSR the greatest geopolitical catastrophy of the twentieth century and declared the strengthening of Moscow's influence on neighbor countries as a main priority of his foreign policy. The doctrine of “Liberal Empire” ment to influence post soviet countries by means of “energy weapons” appeared during the first years oh Vladimir Putin’s 6 administration. A little later, in 2004, president Putin challenged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to improve Russia’s image on the international level: “On the whole, it is necessary to broaden further the horizons of Russian foreign policy, to seek new opportunities for cooperation, never forgetting preservation and development of positions where in the past we have invested considerable resources…They remember and know us there!” 1 As a result, Russian politicians got a new concern – to build a new image of their own country, acceptable for the West and at the same time strengthen the mechanisms of influence on the neighbor countries. To accomplish this, Kremlin made some changes in its political arsenal. First of all it refers to the introduction of “Soft Power” to the Russian foreign policy. This weapon has a specific “target”. As stated in the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the struggle “for cultural influence in the world calls for more effective efforts by all ministries, agencies and organizations involved in carrying out the external cultural policy of Russia and for mobilizing available resources”, 2 to ensure Moscow’s success in this “struggle” and strengthen Russia’s informational and cultural impact on the world. In 2007 “The Humanitarian Dimention of Foreign Policy” was first mentioned in Russian political survey. The document prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia explicitly indicated that culture, education and science, protection of interests of compatriots abroad, consular issues and Russian media are Russian foreign policy implementation instruments. Moscow continuously applies them to strengthen its influence on neighbor states. For example, “compatriot protection” – that’s what allegedly motivated Russia to deploy its armed forces in Georgia. “Concern for compatriots” was the pretext of illegal passportization, artificial change of population structure in Abkhazian and South Osetia as well as occupation and annexation of part of Georgia’s territory. Governmental organizations as well as state budget of the Russian Federation are used for purposes of Foreign Policy “Humanitarian Dimention”. Russian media along with seemingly public organizations such as “Russkiy Mir” foundation are also engaged in the implementation of “Soft 1 http://archive.kremlin.ru/appears/2004/07/12/0000_type63374type63378_74399.shtml 2 The Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Activities of the Russian Federation in 2008 – page 121 http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/itogi/B286E140E4B7E48AC325752E002DEF65 7 Power”. Such organizations are financed by federal budget and therefore are commissioned by the state. The goals and objectives of their work are reflected in the basic documents of Russia's foreign policy, such as directions in foreign policy, annual reports of the foreign ministry, compatriot protection state program etc. In one of his articles Vladimir Mukomel, head of division at Institute of Sociology at Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of Centre for ethno political and regional researches, writes that “Immigrants are an important resource of foreign policy pressure on their country of origin. Introduction (or the threat of introduction) of visa requirements, naturalization of citizens of the unrecognized states, the initiation of negotiations on readmission, holding conventions of the citizens of other States on the eve of elections in their countries, the persecution of indigenious peoples of neighboring states on the territory of Russia (including their own citizens) has become commonplace tools of Russian foreign policy in post soviet space. 3 The mechanizm of “Soft Power” is well developed in Russian research centers. Moreover, as a worthy successor of the USSR, Putin’s Russia uses achievements of former Soviet propaganda machine to a full scope and exploits full arsenal of “Soft Power” enriched by this experience in neighboring countries such as Baltics, Moldova, Ukraine and others. Lately it is practiced more and more actively in Georgia. On September 25, 2008 (In a few weeks after the occupation of the Georgian territory) Prime Minister Putin gave a “green light” to excercise Soft Power in Georgia. “We should develop good relationships with the cities in Georgia. It would do no good to leave Georgia to nationalists and irresponsible people”. 4 After the war Russian President, Prime Minister and other high ranked officials repetedly expressed their “worm feelings” toward Georgian, Abkhaz and Ossetian people, but taking into concideration actual results of the Kremlin policy, this “sentimentalism” radically differs from the true desire of future cooperation. What is Kremlin “Soft Power”? How is it different from traditional version