Europol Programming Document 2019 – 2021

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Europol Programming Document 2019 – 2021 Europol Public Information Europol Programming Document 2019 – 2021 Adopted by Europol Management Board on 30.11.20181 Europol Public Information The Hague, 29 January 2019 1 Section II.3 and Annexes I-III and IX-X updated after adoption of the Union budget 2019 and upon availability of 2018 final end of year figures. 1 Europol Public Information Table of Contents List of Acronyms ................................................................................................... 3 Mission Statement ................................................................................................ 4 SECTION I – General Context ................................................................................. 4 SECTION II - Multi-annual programming 2019 – 2021 ............................................. 11 Multi-annual objectives ............................................................................... 11 Multi-annual programme............................................................................. 12 Goal 1: Europol will be the EU criminal information hub, providing information sharing capabilities to law enforcement authorities in the MS ....................................... 12 Goal 2: Europol will provide the most effective operational support and expertise to MS investigations by developing and employing a comprehensive portfolio of services .......................................................................................................... 13 Goal 3: Europol will be an efficient organisation with effective governance arrangements and a positive reputation .............................................................. 16 Europol External Strategy 2017-2020 ................................................................. 18 Human and financial resource outlook for the years 2019-2021 ....................... 22 SECTION III - Work Programme 2019 ................................................................... 29 Executive summary .................................................................................... 29 2. Activities ................................................................................................... 33 Development of operational ICT capabilities ............................................ 33 Information Hub .................................................................................. 41 Combating Serious and Organised Crime ................................................ 47 Combating Cyber Crime ........................................................................ 55 Counter-Terrorism ............................................................................... 63 Provision of cross-cutting operational capabilities ..................................... 70 Governance, support and administration ................................................. 78 ANNEXES ........................................................................................................... 87 2 Europol Public Information List of Acronyms ADEP Automation of Data Exchange HR Human Resource Processes HVT High Value Targets AP Analysis Project IAC Internal Audit Capability ARO Asset Recovery Office IAS Internal Audit Service BPL Basic Protection Level ICT Information and CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological Communications Technology and Nuclear IDMC Integrated Data Management CEPOL European Union Agency for Law Concept Enforcement Training IRU Internet Referral Unit COSI Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security ISF Internal Security Fund CSDP Common Security and Defence J-CAT Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce Policy JHA Justice and Home Affairs CT Counter-Terrorism JIT Joint Investigation Team DPF Data Protection Function JOT Joint Operation Team EC3 Europol Cybercrime Centre JRC Joint Research Centre ECA European Court of Auditors LEA Law Enforcement Authorities ECTC European Counter Terrorism Centre MB Management Board EEAS European External Action Service MENA Middle East and North Africa region EES Entry-Exit System MS Member State EIS Europol Information System MTIC Excise and Missing Trader Intra EMAS Europol Malware Analysis Community Solution OAP Operational Action Plan (under EMCDDA European Monitoring Centre for EMPACT) Drugs and Drug Addiction OCG Organised Crime Group EMPACT European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats OLAF European Anti-Fraud Office EMSC European Migrant Smuggling Centre OSINT Open Source Intelligence EPE Europol Platform for Experts OSP Online Service Providers ESOCC European Serious and Organised PIU Passenger Information Unit Crime Centre PNR Passenger Name Record ETIAS EU Travel Information and Authorisation System QUEST Querying Europol’s systems ETS European Tracking Solution SIENA Secure Information Exchange Network Application EUIPO European Union Intellectual Property Office SIS Schengen Information System Eurojust The European Union's Judicial SOC Serious and Organized Crime Cooperation Unit SOCTA Serious and Organized Crime EU RTF EU Regional Task Force Threat Assessment Eu-Lisa European Agency for the TFTP Terrorist Finance Tracking Operational Management of large- Programme scale IT Systems in the Area of THB Trafficking in human beings Freedom, Security and Justice TP Third Parties FIU Financial Intelligence Unit UMF Universal Message Format Frontex European Border and Coast Guard Agency VIS Visa Information System 3 Europol Public Information Mission Statement Europol’s mission is to support its Member States in preventing and combating all forms of serious international and organised crime and terrorism. SECTION I – General Context This section presents policy factors that are expected to influence Europol’s work in the coming years. 1. Security Union 1.1. European Agenda on Security Europol’s work directly contributes to the European Agenda on Security 2015 - 2020 on each of the three priorities identified: Terrorism and Radicalisation, Serious and Organised Crime, and Cyber Crime. In addition to these priorities, Europol actively participates in the inter-agency and cross- sectorial approach against security threats promoted by the Agenda, and aims at strengthened cooperation with neighbouring countries, strengthened cooperation with the private sector to fight online crime and better law enforcement information exchange across the EU. Finally, Europol continues to support the EU Policy Cycle for serious and organised crime and promotes the use of Joint Investigation Teams (JITs). The embedment of FIU.NET in Europol contributes to cross-border cooperation between national Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) and national Asset Recovery Offices (AROs), ensuring operational cooperation to combat money laundering and to access the illicit proceeds of crime. 1.2. European Commission’s 2018 Security Package On 17 April 2018, the Commission adopted a set of new security proposals to further reduce the space in which terrorists and criminals operate - denying them the means to plan, finance and commit crimes. The package includes five proposals, relevant to Europol’s work: Document fraud: Proposal for a regulation on strengthening the security of identity cards and residence documents of Union citizens. Financial information: Proposal of a Directive aiming at facilitating the use of financial information in criminal matters. The proposal complements and extends the 5th Anti-Money Laundering directive. Explosives precursors: Proposal of a regulation to further restrict access to dangerous substances by banning two new explosives precursors and strengthening the existing rules for both online and offline sales. Export and import of firearms: the Commission updated EU rules on the export and import of civilian firearms to include improved control procedures and enhanced information exchange and issued a recommendation on immediate steps to improve the security of export, import and transit measures for firearms, their parts and essential components and ammunition. E-evidence: Proposal for a new legislation on electronic evidence (see section below: cybercrime). 1.3. European Commission’s Western Balkans Strategy On 2 February 2018, the European Commission adopted a communication on “A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans” (Western Balkans Strategy), which foresees reinforced engagement of Europol with Western Balkan countries on security and migration. Specifically, the Communication foresees the deployment of Europol Liaison Officers to the region and the further promotion of Joint Investigation Teams. Following this communication, Europol signed a grant agreement with the Commission in February 2018 for the implementation of a pilot deployment to three 4 Europol Public Information selected Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia) for 18 months. The first deployments are foreseen in 2019. 1.4. Strengthening cooperation with CSDP missions and operations The European Council conclusions of 19 October 2017 called for enhanced information exchange between JHA Agencies and CSDP missions and operations. Furthermore, the Council conclusions on strengthening civilian CSDP of 28 May 2018 called for increased coherence and cooperation between civilian CSDP and actions undertaken by the EU in the external dimension of Justice and Home Affairs, as well as for fostering synergies between the CSDP and JHA actors on the operational level to increase information exchange. Europol considers civilian CSDP missions and operations as useful means
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