Headquarters, Department of the Army
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
The Position of Secretary of Defense: Statutory Restrictions and Civilian-Military Relations
The Position of Secretary of Defense: Statutory Restrictions and Civilian-Military Relations Updated January 6, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R44725 Position of Secretary of Defense: Statutory Restrictions and Civilian-Military Relations Summary The position of Secretary of Defense is unique within the United States government; it is one of two civilian positions within the military chain of command, although unlike the President, the Secretary of Defense is not elected. Section 113 of the United States Code states that the Secretary of Defense is to be “appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” The section goes on to elaborate a key mechanism by which civilian control of the armed forces is maintained: A person may not be appointed as Secretary of Defense within seven years after relief from active duty as a commissioned officer of a regular component of an armed force. The proposed nomination of General (Ret.) Lloyd Austin, United States Army, who retired from the military in 2016, to be Secretary of Defense may lead both houses of Congress to consider whether and how to suspend, change, or remove that provision. This provision was originally contained in the 1947 National Security Act (P.L. 80-253), which mandated that 10 years pass between the time an officer is relieved from active duty and when he or she could be appointed to the office of the Secretary of Defense. In 2007, Section 903 of the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181), Congress changed the period of time that must elapse between relief from active duty and appointment to the position of Secretary of Defense to seven years. -
Federal Files on the Famous–And Infamous
Federal Files on the Famous–and Infamous The collections of personnel records at the National Archives available. Digital copies of PEPs can be purchased on CD/DVDs. include files that document military and civilian service for The price of the disc depends on the number of pages contained persons who are well known to the public for many reasons. in the original paper record and range from $20 (100 pages or These individuals include celebrated military leaders, less) to $250 (more than 1,800 pages). For more information or Medal of Honor recipients, U.S. Presidents, members of to order copies of digitized PEP records only, please write to pep. Congress, other government officials, scientists, artists, [email protected]. Archival staff are in the process of identifying entertainers, and sports figures—individuals noted for the records of prominent civilian employees whose names will personal accomplishments as well as persons known for their be added to the list. Other individuals whose records are now infamous activities. available for purchase on CD are: The military service departments and NARA have Creighton W. Abrams, Grover Cleveland Alexander, identified over 500 such military records for individuals Desi Arnaz, Joe L. Barrow, John M. Birch, Hugo L. Black, referred to as “Persons of Exceptional Prominence” (PEP). Gregory Boyington, Prescott S. Bush, Smedley Butler, Evans Many of these records are now open to the public earlier F. Carlson, William A. Carter, Adna R. Chaffee, Claire than they otherwise would have been (62 years after the Chennault, Mark W. Clark, Benjamin O. Davis. separation dates) as the result of a special agreement that Also, George Dewey, William Donovan, James H. -
The Example of Private Slovik
The Example of Private Slovik Of the thousands of American soldiers courtmartialed for desertion in World War II, Eddie Slovik was the only one put to death. One of the judges who convicted him looks back with regret. by Benedict B. Kimmelman When Private Eddie Slovik was executed on January 31,1945, he became the only American put to death for desertion since Lincoln was President. After his death he became the subject of a book that sold in the millions, numerous magazine articles, a television special, a play or two, and several public campaigns that made his case an issue and still keep it alive. I saw Eddie Slovik for most of one morning, no more, and he never said a word to me. 1 cannot say for certain whether it is his face I remember or a photograph in a magazine article based on William Bradford Huie’s best seller The Execution of Private Slovik. But I sat on Slovik’s courtmartial, as one of the nine officerjudges who unanimously voted the death penalty. In August of 1944 Eddie Slovik was a twentyfouryearold replacement trucked up one day in a group assigned to an infantry line company in France. Encountering shellbursts and heavy fire for the first time, he knew at once that he could never make it on the line. With a buddy he hid out, and on the following day they turned themselves in to Canadian military police who were passing through. Not under arrest, they made themselves generally useful for the next six weeks, until the Canadians returned them to American military control on October 5. -
How Soon Is Safe?
HOW SOON IS SAFE? IRAQI FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND ―CONDITIONS-BASED‖ US WITHDRAWALS Final Review Draft: February 5, 2009 Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy And Adam Mausner [email protected] [email protected] Cordesman: Iraqi Forces and US Withdrawals 4/22/09 Page ii The Authors would like to thank the men and women of the Multinational Force–Iraq and Multinational Security Transition Command - Iraq for their generous contribution to our work. The Authors would also like to thank David Kasten for his research assistance. Cordesman: Iraqi Forces and US Withdrawals 4/22/09 Page iii Executive Summary The US and Iraq now face a transition period that may well be as challenging as defeating Al Qa‘ida in Iraq, the other elements of the insurgency, and the threat from militias like the Mahdi Army. Iraq has made progress in political accommodation and in improving security. No one, however, can yet be certain that Iraq will achieve a enough political accommodation to deal with its remaining internal problems, whether there will be a new surge of civil violence, or whether Iraq will face problems with its neighbors. Iran seeks to expand its influence, and Turkey will not tolerate a sanctuary for hostile Kurdish movements like the PKK. Arab support for Iraq remains weak, and Iraq‘s Arab neighbors fear both Shi‘ite and Iranian dominance of Iraq as well as a ―Shi‘ite crescent‖ that includes Syria and Lebanon.. Much will depend on the capabilities of Iraqi security forces (ISF) and their ability to deal with internal conflicts and external pressures. -
A Tale of Two Cities the Use of Explosive Weapons in Basra and Fallujah, Iraq, 2003-4 Report by Jenna Corderoy and Robert Perkins
December 2014 A TALE OF TWO CITIES The use of explosive weapons in Basra and Fallujah, Iraq, 2003-4 Report by Jenna Corderoy and Robert Perkins Editor Iain Overton With thanks to Henry Dodd, Jane Hunter, Steve Smith and Iraq Body Count Copyright © Action on Armed Violence (December 2014) Cover Illustration A US Marine Corps M1A1 Abrams tank fires its main gun into a building in Fallujah during Operation Al Fajr/Phantom Fury, 10 December 2004, Lance Corporal James J. Vooris (UMSC) Infographic Sarah Leo Design and Printing Matt Bellamy Clarifications or corrections from interested parties are welcome Research and publications funded by the Government of Norway, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A tale of two cities | 1 CONTENTS FOREWORD 2 IRAQ: A TIMELINE 3 INTRODUCTION: IRAQ AND EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS 4 INTERnatiONAL HumanitaRIAN LAW 6 AND RulES OF ENGAGEMENT BASRA, 2003 8 Rattling the Cage 8 Air strikes: Munition selection 11 FALLUJAH, 2004 14 Firepower for manpower 14 Counting the cost 17 THE AFTERmath AND LESSONS LEARNED 20 CONCLUSION 22 RECOMMENDatiONS 23 2 | Action on Armed Violence FOREWORD Sound military tactics employed in the pursuit of strategic objectives tend to restrict the use of explosive force in populated areas “ [... There are] ample examples from other international military operations that indicate that the excessive use of explosive force in populated areas can undermine both tactical and strategic objectives.” Bård Glad Pedersen, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, 17 June 20141 The language of conflict has changed enormously. their government is not the governing authority. Today engagements are often fought and justified Three case studies in three places most heavily- through a public mandate to protect civilians. -
Congressional Record United States Th of America PROCEEDINGS and DEBATES of the 117 CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
E PL UR UM IB N U U S Congressional Record United States th of America PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 117 CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION Vol. 167 WASHINGTON, FRIDAY, JANUARY 22, 2021 No. 13 House of Representatives The House was not in session today. Its next meeting will be held on Monday, January 25, 2021, at 1:30 p.m. Senate FRIDAY, JANUARY 22, 2021 The Senate met at 10 a.m. and was NATIONAL GUARD We owe an enormous debt of grati- called to order by the President pro Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, now, tude to the men and women who tempore (Mr. LEAHY). it came to our attention last night worked to keep us safe on January 6 and the days since. A situation like f that members of the National Guard, after standing on duty to protect the last night will never happen again. PRAYER Capitol for Inauguration Day, keeping f The Chaplain, Dr. Barry C. Black, of- us safe, were sleeping in parking ga- BUSINESS BEFORE THE SENATE fered the following prayer: rages and cramped quarters without Mr. SCHUMER. Now, I have spoken Let us pray. proper space or ventilation. It was ut- about the Senate’s agenda for the next Sovereign King, our hope for years to terly unacceptable. several weeks. We have three essential come, deliver us from the sin of run- I have told those who run the secu- items on our plate: one, the confirma- ning from the truth. Remind us often rity of the Capitol that it can never tion of President Biden’s Cabinet and that truth brings freedom. -
Trump's Generals
STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY - PERSPECTIVE Trump’s Generals: A Natural Experiment in Civil-Military Relations JAMES JOYNER Abstract President Donald Trump’s filling of numerous top policy positions with active and retired officers he called “my generals” generated fears of mili- tarization of foreign policy, loss of civilian control of the military, and politicization of the military—yet also hope that they might restrain his worst impulses. Because the generals were all gone by the halfway mark of his administration, we have a natural experiment that allows us to com- pare a Trump presidency with and without retired generals serving as “adults in the room.” None of the dire predictions turned out to be quite true. While Trump repeatedly flirted with civil- military crises, they were not significantly amplified or deterred by the presence of retired generals in key roles. Further, the pattern continued in the second half of the ad- ministration when “true” civilians filled these billets. Whether longer-term damage was done, however, remains unresolved. ***** he presidency of Donald Trump served as a natural experiment, testing many of the long- debated precepts of the civil-military relations (CMR) literature. His postelection interviewing of Tmore than a half dozen recently retired four- star officers for senior posts in his administration unleashed a torrent of columns pointing to the dangers of further militarization of US foreign policy and damage to the military as a nonpartisan institution. At the same time, many argued that these men were uniquely qualified to rein in Trump’s worst pro- clivities. With Trump’s tenure over, we can begin to evaluate these claims. -
The Real Outcome of the Iraq War: US and Iranian Strategic Competition in Iraq
The Real Outcome of the Iraq War: US and Iranian Strategic Competition in Iraq By Anthony H. Cordesman, Peter Alsis, Adam Mausner, and Charles Loi Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy Revised: December 20, 2011 Note: This draft is being circulated for comments and suggestions. Please provide them to [email protected] Chapter 6: US Strategic Competition with Iran: Competition in Iraq 2 Executive Summary "Americans planted a tree in Iraq. They watered that tree, pruned it, and cared for it. Ask your American friends why they're leaving now before the tree bears fruit." --Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.1 Iraq has become a key focus of the strategic competition between the United States and Iran. The history of this competition has been shaped by the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the 1991 Gulf War, and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Since the 2003 war, both the US and Iran have competed to shape the structure of Post-Saddam Iraq’s politics, governance, economics, and security. The US has gone to great lengths to counter Iranian influence in Iraq, including using its status as an occupying power and Iraq’s main source of aid, as well as through information operations and more traditional press statements highlighting Iranian meddling. However, containing Iranian influence, while important, is not America’s main goal in Iraq. It is rather to create a stable democratic Iraq that can defeat the remaining extremist and insurgent elements, defend against foreign threats, sustain an able civil society, and emerge as a stable power friendly to the US and its Gulf allies. -
The Outcome of Invasion: US and Iranian Strategic Competition in Iraq
a report of the csis burke chair in strategy The Outcome of Invasion: US and Iranian Strategic Competition in Iraq Authors Adam Mausner Sam Khazai Anthony H. Cordesman Peter Alsis Charles Loi March 2012 Chapter VII: US Strategic Competition with Iran: Competition in Iraq 16/3/12 2 Executive Summary "Americans planted a tree in Iraq. They watered that tree, pruned it, and cared for it. Ask your American friends why they're leaving now before the tree bears fruit." --Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.1 Iraq has become a key focus of the strategic competition between the United States and Iran. The history of this competition has been shaped by the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the 1991 Gulf War, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and now by the withdrawal of US military forces. It is a competition increasingly shaped by Iraq’s turbulent domestic politics and power struggles, and where both the US and Iran compete to shape the structure of Iraq’s future politics, governance, economics, and security. An Uncertain Level of US Influence The US has gone to great lengths to counter Iranian influence in Iraq, including using its status as an occupying power and Iraq’s main source of aid, as well as through information operations and more traditional press statements highlighting Iranian meddling. However, containing Iranian influence, while important, is not America’s main goal in Iraq. It is rather to create a stable democratic Iraq that can defeat the remaining extremist and insurgent elements, defend against foreign threats, sustain an able civil society, and emerge as a stable power friendly to the US and its Gulf allies. -
Fy2010 Defense Budget
U N I T E D S T A T E S D E P A R T M E N T O F D E F E N S E FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET REQUEST S U M M A R Y J U S T I F I C A T I O N • M A Y 2 0 0 9 On behalf of the President, I am pleased to transmit to Congress this volume that presents the Department of Defense’s budget request of $533.8 billion for Fiscal Year 2010. The purpose of the Secretary’s Summary Justification is to inform Cong ress and provide the American people a clear understanding of how their tax dollars are being invested to provide for our Nation’s defense. It includes: • An explanation of the Department’s missions, accomplishments, and priorities; • A summary of the request by Military Department and Defense agencies; • Information on special areas of interest and emphasis for Fiscal Year 2010; and • Details on the Department’s major weapons programs. The Military Departments and Defense agencies will provide Congress with additional detailed justification materials on this request. The requested funds would: provide military pay, benefits, and world-class healthcare for 2.3 million Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen ($163.9 billion); support military operations and force readiness ($160.9 billion); invest in modernization ($186.1 billion); and support family housing and facilities ($23.0 billion). In addition to the $533.8 billion request, the Administration requests $130.0 billion for Fiscal Year 2010 to support ongoing Overseas Contingency Operations. -
Iraqi-Owned Bank Opens on U.S. Base by Maj
March 22, 2010 | Issue 8 Iraqi-owned bank opens on U.S. base By Maj. Luke Hammond 4th BCT, 1st Armd Div COB ADDER – The Iraqi-Based Industrial Zone at Contingency Operating Base Adder has long been a place where aspiring busi- ness-minded Iraqis work with U.S. forces and support the local economy by providing jobs. Whether they are contractors com- peting for contracts on COB Adder, or vendors selling everything from paintings to rugs, the IBIZ is abuzz with constant activity. However, on Jan. 13, COB Adder saw one of the most signifi- cant events to happen in IBIZ since its establishment: the grand opening and ribbon-cutting ceremony of Warka Bank. Warka has one of the largest banking operations in Iraq, oper- ating over 150 locations throughout the country. Initially proposed in the summer of 2009, the establishment of a bank within IBIZ presents will greatly aid Iraqi businesses and U.S. objectives. The bank will bring to the area – for the first time – electronic funds transfer capabilities. Having EFT capability within the IBIZ is a critical turning point in how U.S. forces and contracting agencies such as KBR pay the Iraqi contractors who will soon do a majority of the busi- ness on COB Adder. The base, also known as the Tallil – meaning “rule of Ali” – Airbase, is home to over 13,000 Soldiers and civilians and serves as a major logistics hub for U.S. forces in the nine provinces over- seen by United States Division-South. Photo by Maj. Myles Caggins Maj. -
Provincialdevelopment Strategy Basragovernorate
LADP in Iraq – Basra PDS Local Area Development Programme in Iraq Financed by the Implemented European Union by UNDP PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY BASRA GOVERNORATE November 2017 LADP in Iraq – Basra PDS 2 LADP in Iraq – Basra PDS FOREWORD BY THE GOVERNOR … 3 LADP in Iraq – Basra PDS 4 LADP in Iraq – Basra PDS CONTENT PSD Basra Governorate Foreword by the Governor ............................................................................................................................... 3 Content ............................................................................................................................................................ 5 List of Figures ................................................................................................................................................... 7 List of Tables .................................................................................................................................................... 8 Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................................... 9 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 11 1. Purpose of the PDS ................................................................................................................................... 11 2. Organisation of the PDS...........................................................................................................................