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http://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt787034zq No online items Inventory of the Gordon Tullock papers Finding aid prepared by Gordon Brady; revised and updated by Hoover Institution Library and Archives Staff Hoover Institution Library and Archives © 2015, 2021 434 Galvez Mall Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305-6003 [email protected] URL: http://www.hoover.org/library-and-archives Inventory of the Gordon Tullock 82072 1 papers Title: Gordon Tullock papers Date (inclusive): 1927-2009 Collection Number: 82072 Contributing Institution: Hoover Institution Library and Archives Language of Material: English Physical Description: 407 manuscript boxes, 1 sound tape reel, 4 sound cassettes(169.7 Linear Feet) Abstract: Writings, correspondence, studies, reports, financial records, and printed matter relating to public choice, decision-making theory, political and economic theory, and legal procedure. Creator: Tullock, Gordon Hoover Institution Library & Archives Access The collection is open for research; materials must be requested at least two business days in advance of intended use. Publication Rights For copyright status, please contact the Hoover Institution Library & Archives. Acquisition Information Acquired by the Hoover Institution Library & Archives in 1982, with several increments received between 1990 and 2012. Preferred Citation [Identification of item], Gordon Tullock papers, [Box no., Folder no. or title], Hoover Institution Library & Archives. Biographical Note American economist and social scientist; editorial director, Center for the Study of Public Choice, 1968- 1922 Born, Rockford, Illinois 1947 J.D., University of Chicago 1947-1956 Worked in China, Hong Kong, and Korea for the United States Foreign Service 1949-1951 Chinese language studies at Yale University 1951-1952 Chinese language studies at Cornell University 1958 Started post-doctoral work at the University of Virginia 1959-1962 Assistant and associate professor, University of South Carolina 1962-1967 Associate professor, Thomas Jefferson Center for Political Economy, University of Virginia 1962 Author, with James M. Buchanan, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy 1965 Author, The Politics of Bureaucracy 1966 Author, The Organization of Inquiry Founded Public Choice journal 1967-1968 Professor of economics and political science, Rice University 1968- Editorial director, Center for the Study of Public Choice 1970 Author, Private Wants, Public Means 1971 Author, The Logic of the Law 1974 Author, The Social Dilemma 1976 Author, The Vote Motive 1980 Author, Trials on Trial: The Pure Theory of Legal Procedure 1983-1987 Holbert R. Harris university professor, George Mason University 1987 Author, Autocracy 1987-1999 Karl Eller professor of economics and political science, University of Arizona 1993 Author, Rent Seeking 1994 Author, The Economics of Non-Human Societies 1998 Author, On Voting: A Public Choice Approach 1999-2008 Professor of law and economics, George Mason University 1968-1983 Professor, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 2008 Retired to Tucson, Arizona 2014 Died, Des Moines, Iowa November 3 Scope and Content of Collection Inventory of the Gordon Tullock 82072 2 papers The papers document the career of Gordon Tullock, an economist known for his work on the theories of public choice and rent seeking. The collection includes writings, correspondence, studies, reports, printed matter, photographs, and sound recordings related to public choice, decision-making theory, political and economic theory, and legal procedure. The materials are divided into three groups based on date of acquisition by the Hoover Institution Library & Archives. Although the collection has not been arranged, the index to major groups can serve as a guide to the collection. The Biographical File includes family correspondence, photographs, awards, and resumes. Tullock corresponded with many well-known economists and political figures, including Yale Brozen, Karl Brunner, William F. Buckley, Jr., Ronald Coase, Milton Friedman, Gottfried Haberler, F. A. Harper, F. A. von Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, Karl R. Popper, Murray Rothbard, George Stigler, and Kenneth S. Templeton. Correspondence includes Tullock's letters to and from economists and other scholars. Tullock was a professor at several universities, including the University of Virginia, George Mason University, the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, and the University of Arizona. The collection includes correspondence and course materials from each of these universities, as well as a general Teaching File. In addition to his work as an educator, Tullock was a prolific writer. Speeches and Writings contain drafts, research files, correspondence, notes, and printed copies related to Tullock's many books and articles. Further drafts of speeches, as well as meeting materials of the Mont Pelerin Society, can be found in the Conference and Travel File. With James Buchanan, Tullock founded the economics journal Public Choice in 1966, when it was originally named Papers in Non-Market Economics. Tullock was the editor of Public Choice for many years. The Public Choice File includes papers submitted to the journal, subscriptions, orders, correspondence, meeting agendas, and sales information. The collection also contains Writings by Others in the form of drafts and printed matter. In addition to a rough proof of Religion and Science by Bertrand Russell, the collection includes writings by Duncan Black, Yale Brozen, James M. Buchanan, James S. Coleman, Otto Davis, Milton Friedman, John Harsanyi, Thomas Ireland, Richard B. McKenzie, Fritz Machlup, Donald Mackinnon, Warren Nutter, Mancur Olson, Edgar Olson, and Vincent Ostrom. 76,89,199,230,326,377,386,396, 400 Biographical FileIncludes correspondence, photographs, awards, and resumes. 3-8,141,143,145-146, 163,171-173,181,193, 199,211-212,214-217, 230,244, 276-277,282-286, 289-301, 308-309, 341, 366, 406-407 Public Choice FileIncludes papers submitted to the journal, subscriptions, orders, correspondence, meeting agendas, and sales information. 10-18,84,86-88,95,114-126,152-153,174-182,190-192,196,198,204,206-210,214,222-225,231-233,237,239,241,243-244,247-254,267-268,270-275,278-282,287-290,303-309,311,313-321,323-324,354-355,363-365,367-377,406-407 CorrespondenceIncludes incoming and outgoing correspondence with economists and others. 2,3-5,18-39,46-54,66-75,81,85, 127-135,153, 180-182,196-197, 201,214,236,256-261,269,384-385,396-397 Writings by OthersIncludes drafts and printed matter. 2,9,17,40-45,61-65,77-80,90-91,96-99,100-111, 113,136-140, 142-144, 147-151,155-162,165-170,174-175,181-192,200-203, 213-214,218-222,226-229,233-249,251-254,262,267-273,287, 302-311,313-321, 335-336,342-343,345-354,356-363, 367-383, 387-396,399-407 Speeches and WritingsIncludes drafts, correspondence, book reviews, research files, comments and critiques, and printed copies. 55-60,82-83,90,152,193-196,225, 230,255,288, 310,321-322,325, 332 Conference and Travel FileIncludes materials from Mont Pelerin Society meetings and speeches by Tullock. Includes correspondence and travel arrangements. 82,99,112,174,191,255,327-334, 337-341,343-345, 398 Teaching FileIncludes exam prompts and lecture notes and materials from the University of Arizona and the University of Virginia, as well as other schools. 1 PhotographsIncludes slides of scenic views and images of buildings and people. Subjects and Indexing Terms Audiotapes Economics Political science Economists Inventory of the Gordon Tullock 82072 3 papers Justice, Administration of Social choice Decision making Tullock: Materials received in 1990 Photographs box 1 Slides 1952-1958 undated Scope and Contents Includes scenic views and images of buildings and people. Includes slides of Washington, D.C. box 1 Photograph of Tullock and James M. Buchanan 1970 July 4 box 1 Printed matter Teaching file Scope and Contents University of Virginia file. box 2, folder 1 Exam prompts circa 1963 Writings by others box 2, folder 2 Russell, Bertrand. Religion and Science, rough proof 1935 box 2, folder 3 W undated box 2, folder 4 X, Y, Z 1954-1973 Speeches and writings box 2, folder 5 "Information Without Profit" undated box 2, folder 6 A General Theory of Politics circa 1958 box 2, folder 7-8 Lecture excerpts, Fellows of the Freedom School on Phrontistery 1963 box 2, folder 9 "Constitutional Mythology" 1964 Writings by others box 3, folder 1-4 A 1954-1973 box 3, folder 5-6 B 1962-1973 box 4, folder 1-4 R 1965-1971 box 4, folder 5 S 1968 box 4, folder 6-9 W 1969-1955 Public Choice file box 5 Correspondence 1978-1979 box 6, folder 1 General 1974-1979 box 6, folder 2-3 Correspondence 1978 box 6, folder 4 Subscription material 1976-1978 box 6, folder 5 Frontiers file 1977-1979 box 7, folder 1-5 Galley proofs, Volume 34 1979 box 8, folder 1-3 Galley proofs, Volume 34 1979 box 8, folder 4 Book orders 1970-1972 Speeches and writings box 9 A Practical Guide, edited by Tullock box 9 Conference and travel file box 9 Europe 1975 Correspondence box 10, folder 1 Carey, George 1969-1974 box 10, folder 2 Chapman, David 1965-1969 box 10, folder 3 Chau, Yau Pik 1966-1975 box 10, folder 4 Chicago Press, University of 1971-1976 box 10, folder 5 Clarke, Edward H. 1976 box 10, folder 6 Coase, Ronald 1968-1974 Inventory of the Gordon Tullock 82072 4 papers Tullock: Materials received in 1990 box 10, folder 7 Cobb, William E. 1970-1971 box 10, folder 8 Coleman, James 1964-1976 box 10, folder 9 Columbia Press 1968-1970 box 10, folder 10 Comparative Economic Systems article undated box 10, folder 11 Conflict 1969 box 10, folder 12 Connecticut, University of 1975 box 10, Cornell committees 1970-1976 folder 13-14 box 10, Courts Advisory Committee 1973-1976 folder 15-16 box 10, folder 17 Competitive Optional Way (COW), Inc.
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