Angola and the Gulf of Guinea

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Angola and the Gulf of Guinea Angola and the Gulf of Guinea Towards an Integrated Maritime Strategy November 2012 Report of the Angola Forum conference aboard HMS Dauntless in Luanda, Angola, 29 June 2012 page ii Chatham House has been the home of the Royal Institute of International Affairs for over ninety years. Our mission is to be a world-leading source of independent analysis, informed debate and influential ideas on how to build a prosperous and secure world for all. © The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2012 Chatham House (The Royal Institute of International Affairs) in London promotes the rigorous study of international questions and is independent of government and other vested interests. It is precluded by its Charter from having an institutional view. The opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the authors. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder. Please direct all enquiries to the publishers. The Royal Institute of International Affairs Chatham House 10 St James’s Square London SW1Y 4LE T: +44 (0) 20 7957 5700 F: + 44 (0) 20 7957 5710 www.chathamhouse.org Charity Registration No. 208223 ISBN 978 1 86203 275 0 A catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library. Designed and typeset by Soapbox, www.soapbox.co.uk Printed and bound in Great Britain by Latimer Trend and Co Ltd The material selected for the printing of this report is Elemental Chlorine Free and has been sourced from well- managed forests. It has been manufactured by an ISO 14001 certified mill under EMAS. page iii Contents Preface v Conference Summary 1 Summary of Debate 11 Next Steps 13 Resources 14 Conference Programme 18 Biographies 20 Further Reading 24 page iv Map 1: The Gulf of Guinea 15º Senegal The Gambia Mali Burkina Faso Guinea Bissau Guinea Côte Nigeria Sierra Leone d’Ivoire Ghana Liberia Togo Benin Cameroon Equatorial Guinea São Tomé and Príncipe Equator Gabon Congo DRC Angola 15º Namibia 15º Meridian Prime 15º Source: Googlemaps page v Preface Maritime security is an emerging issue in the Gulf of Guinea region.1 Energy security and trade depend to a large extent on sea-based transport, and the Gulf of Guinea region is currently the source of around 5.4m barrels of oil per day (bbl/d). his is equivalent to more than the total amount imported by EU27 countries in 2008 (4.9mbbl/d) and over half of US crude oil imports in 2008 (9.8mbbl/d). Oil supply from the Gulf of Guinea region in 2011 was equivalent to 40% of total EU27 and 29% of total US petroleum consumption in the same year. Angola and Nigeria account for 34% and 47% of total GG oil supply respectively. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea accounted for nearly 30% of attacks (427 of 1,434) in African waters between 2003 and 2011, and the proportion is increasing. This is partly due to successful counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia (operation EU NAVFOR ATALANTA) which have reduced piracy east of Suez, but instances of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea are also on the increase: 53 cases were recorded in 2011, compared with 39 in 2010, and a number of cases go unreported. Map 2 shows attacks from January to October 2012. Maritime security is essential to maintain the flow of revenues from oil and gas, which have the potential to contribute significantly to development in the region. At the same time maritime resources such as fish, aquaculture and intact ecosystems directly contribute to the livelihoods of many Africans. Maritime security is important for exploiting maritime resources, securing liveli- hoods and development. It should, however, be framed within national and regional 1 There is no clear definition of the Gulf of Guinea (GG). In its narrowest definition it is bounded by the inter- section of the Equator and the Prime Meridian (0°0’0”, 0°0’0”). In its widest definition the GG includes the region from Guinea to Angola (-15°0’0”, -15°0’0”). Angola and the Gulf of Guinea: Towards an Integrated Maritime Strategy page vi Map 2: International Maritime Bureau Piracy and Armed Robbery, 2012 15º Senegal The Gambia Mali Burkina Faso Guinea Bissau Guinea Côte Nigeria Sierra Leone d’Ivoire Ghana Liberia Togo Benin Cameroon Equatorial Guinea São Tomé and Príncipe Equator Gabon Congo DRC Angola 15º Namibia Actual attack Attempted attack 15º Meridian Prime 15º Source: http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-map Preface policy that goes beyond immediate needs and reactive engagement. Such an inte- page vii grated strategy should include environmental protection, management of fish stocks, tourism, and transport needs of landlocked countries. Neglect could result in acute security challenges in the future (food insecurity due to overfishing or environ- mental degradation of the seas, for example). There are a number of regional organizations that share an interest in maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Maritime Organisation of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC). Geographical and mandate overlap argues for greater integration and coordination of maritime initiatives. Why Angola? Angola’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), declared in 1974, consists of an area of 501,050 km2 representing 40% of Angola’s total territory (1,248,000 km2). The EEZ is a resource to be managed, but no country can achieve this alone. Angola hosts the Secretariat of the GGC, which is a regional body that aims to promote peace and security, as well as economic, social and environmental wellbeing in the Gulf of Guinea region. Angola is thus well placed to take a role in developing an integrated and comprehensive strategy for managing the regional maritime space in partner- ship with other littoral states (as well as landlocked countries). Ultimately, success depends on political will as well as institutional capacity, capability and responsive- ness. The Chatham House conference held in Luanda on 29 June 2012 brought together international experts on maritime security to exchange ideas in public with policy- makers in Angola and the GGC. The conference benefited from the operational insights of Capt. Warrender, commander of HMS Dauntless. Before arriving in Luanda and hosting the Chatham House conference, the ship sailed through the Gulf of Guinea and was engaged in a variety of maritime security operations including counter-piracy (see section on HMS Dauntless below). page 1 Conference Summary In his keynote speech, the Executive Secretary of the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), Miguel Trovoada, reminded the audience of the strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea region. Seven of the eight members of the GGC produce five million barrels of oil per day, and the maritime space is of central importance for the socio- economic development of the countries in the region. This development potential is under threat from crime in the maritime space, including piracy and armed robbery at sea, trafficking of persons and illicit goods, illegal fishing, oil bunkering and the dumping of toxic waste. Trovoada also highlighted pollution from oil and gas activities and oil spills as major threats to the ecology of the Gulf of Guinea with potentially severe developmental impacts. According to Trovoada, the magnitude and scale of these challenges mean that national efforts are likely to be ineffective and a regional approach is essential. At the regional level, cooperation is most advanced of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), which has created a Regional Maritime Security Centre of Central Africa (CRESMAC) and developed a regional strategy. Nevertheless, the deterioration of maritime security in particular necessitates a concerted, ongoing, integrated and comprehensive effort by all the countries of Central and West Africa bordering the Gulf of Guinea. This is reflected in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2018 and 20392 which advocate a close collaboration between ECCAS, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the GGC and the Maritime Organisation of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) aimed at developing a comprehensive and integrated strategy to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. The ultimate goal is to develop an integrated maritime 2 Passed on 31 October 2011 and 29 February 2012 respectively. Angola and the Gulf of Guinea: Towards an Integrated Maritime Strategy page 2 Audience at the Chatham House conference aboard HMS Dauntless strategy that will be part of the global African Union (AU) maritime strategy for Africa. Acting as chair of session 2 (see programme below) but also representing the Ministry of External Relations of Angola, Francisco da Cruz praised the Chatham House initiative for its strategic relevance and its international context. The Gulf of Guinea is playing an increasingly important role in global energy security and thus for the global economy. Among other challenges and risks, da Cruz highlighted the effect of piracy in undermining the competitiveness of the Gulf of Guinea in international trade owing to the increased cost of maritime transportation, including the insurance for exports and imports. According to da Cruz, the effective response to these challenges requires the strengthening of a comprehensive regional strategy that encourages member countries of the Gulf of Guinea to act increasingly as a bloc. It is in this spirit that there is already growing coordination and sharing of intelligence at the level of navies, as well as joint patrolling actions. These measures aim to ensure a common Conference Summary surveillance procedure in the Gulf of Guinea through the establishment of joint page 3 operational procedures and means of surveillance and intervention.
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