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Colombia's Killer Networks

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Colombia's Killer Networks COLOMBIA'S KILLER NETWORKS The Military - Paramilitary Partnership and the United States The junior and mid-level officers who tolerated, planned, directed, and even took part in paramilitary violence in Colombia in the 1980s now occupy senior positions in the Colombian military. To be sure, a few, linked to well-publicized cases, have been forced into retirement or dismissed, but many more have been awarded medals for distinguished service and lead Colombia's troops. As commanders, they have not only promoted, encouraged, and protected paramilitary groups, but have used them to provide intelligence and assassinate and massacre Colombians suspected of being guerrilla allies. In fact, many victims - community and peasant leaders, trade unionists, and human rights monitors among them - have no ties to guerrillas, but have been trapped in a conflict where few wear uniforms or admit their rank. Human Rights Watch has obtained evidence, including the heretofore secret Colombian military intelligence reorganization plan called Order 200-05/91 and eyewitness testimony, that shows that in 1991, the military made civilians a key part of its intelligence-gathering apparatus. Working under the direct orders of the military high command, paramilitary forces incorporated into intelligence networks conducted surveillance of legal opposition political figures and groups, operated with military units, then executed attacks against targets chosen by their military commanders. Human Rights Watch has also documented the disturbing role played by the United States in support of the Colombian military. Despite Colombia's disastrous human rights record, a U.S. Defense Department and Central Intelligence Agency team worked with Colombian military officers on the 1991 intelligence reorganization that resulted in the creation of killer networks that identified and killed civilians suspected of supporting guerrillas. Human Rights Watch New York · Washington · London · Brussels 1 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/22208e/ Copyright © November 1996 by Human Rights Watch. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. ISBN: 1-56432-203-3 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 96-77749 CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS GLOSSARY I. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS II. THE HISTORY OF THE MILITARY - PARAMILITARY PARTNERSHIP III. THE INTELLIGENCE REORGANIZATION The New Structure The Barrancabermeja Network IV. THE CONTINUING PARTNERSHIP The Northern Magdalena: A Case Study Unconvincing Denials V. IMPUNITY The Strategy of Impunity Impunity in Cases of Military-Paramilitary Actions 1. Segovia 2. La Honduras/La Negra 3. Trujillo 4. Riofrío 5. Meta 6. El Carmen y San Vicente de Chucurí VI. THE U.S. ROLE 2 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/22208e/ VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS APPENDICES A. Colombian Armed Forces Directive No. 200-05/91 B. Colombian Police Report on the Puerto Patiño massacre of 1/95 C. "List of FY 96 Deployments for USMILGP Colombia D. March 11, 1996 Letter from Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Frederick Smith to Senator Patrick J. Leahy 3 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/22208e/ ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This report was written jointly by Human Rights Watch / Americas and the Human Rights Watch Arms Project, based on research conducted by both divisions. Human Rights Watch / Americas researched paramilitary groups, human rights violations by those groups, and impunity for those violations. The Human Rights Watch Arms Project concentrated on the relationship between the Colombian military, paramilitaries, and the U.S. Government. The Arms Project investigation was led by consultant Frank Smyth and assisted by Winifred Tate, also an Arms Project consultant. The Americas Division edited the report. The Human Rights Watch Arms Project acknowledges with appreciation funding from the Compton Foundation, Ruth Mott Fund, and Rockefeller Foundation. Human Rights Watch takes sole responsibility for the contents of this report. This report is dedicated to the memory of Wilson Cáceres, a human rights activist forcibly disappeared in 1995. 4 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/22208e/ GLOSSARY ACC Autodefensas Campesinas de Colombia, Peasant Self-Defense Groups of Colombia, a paramilitary organization. ACCU Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá, Peasant Self-Defense Groups of Córdoba y Urabá, a paramilitary group led by the Castaño family in northern Colombia. ACDEGAM Asociación Campesina de Agricultores y Ganaderos del Magdalena Medio, Association of Peasants and Ranchers of the Middle Magdalena. ACDEGAM has been linked to paramilitary groups since the early 1980s. ANUC Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos, National Association of Peasant Small- holders. BINCI Batallón Único de Inteligencia y Contrainteligencia "Charry Solano," the army's Intelligence and Counterintelligence Battalion and military intelligence headquarters. It is also known as the Twentieth Brigade. CINEP Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular, Center for Investigation and Popular Education, a Colombian human rights group based in Santafé de Bogotá. CREDHOS Comité Regional para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, Regional Committee for the Defense of Human Rights, a Colombian human rights group that covers the Middle Magdalena region and is based in Barrancabermeja, in the department of Santander. CTI Cuerpo Técnico de Investigación, Technical Investigation Unit, investigators who work for the attorney general's office. Consejería Presidencial para los Derechos Humanos 5 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/22208e/ The Presidential Counselor for Human Rights is part of the executive branch and advises the president on human rights matters, The office also has a limited budget to assist victims of human rights abuses and families that have been internally displaced because of political violence. In 1996, the office began collecting information for a computerized network of reports of human rights abuses. DAS Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad, Administrative Security Department, an investigative police force that operates without uniforms and is administered by Colombia's executive branch. All other police units are administered by the Interior Ministry. DIJIN Dirección de Policía Judicial e Investigación, Judicial and Investigative Police, part of the National Police that prepares cases for trial. Defensoría The government's Public Ombudsman, responsible for protecting the citizenry against abuses of their constitutional rights. The Public Ombudsman oversees regional and local offices as well as Colombia's corps of public defenders. ELN Ejército de Liberación Nacional, National Liberation Army, a guerrilla group. EPL Ejército Popular de Liberación, the Popular Liberation Army, a guerrilla group active along Colombia's northern coast. The EPL split in 1991. One group accepted a government amnesty and demobilized. Many of those former militants then formed Esperanza, Paz y Libertad, the Hope, Peace, and Liberty Party. However, some remaining EPL militants continue in combat. FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Colombia's largest insurgency. Fiscalía The attorney general (Fiscal de la Nación) and the Fiscalía, Colombia's corp of prosecutors, are responsible for investigating and prosecuting violations of Colombia's criminal code. Within the Fiscalía, the Human Rights Unit investigates human rights crimes, including those carried out by paramilitaries or guerrillas. In practice, cases in which members of the security forces are implicated are usually turned over to the military justice system following a military jurisdictional challenge, closing the case to civilian investigators. INDUMIL 6 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/22208e/ Industria Militar, Military Industry. INDUMIL, part of the military, is the only entity authorized to manufacture firearms in Colombia. M-19 Movimiento 19 de Abril, April 19th Movement, a guerrilla group named for the election date they believed was invalidated by fraud in 1970. The M-19 accepted a government amnesty in 1990 and was demobilized. MAS Muerte a Secuestradores, Death to Kidnappers. MAS was formed by drug traffickers in 1981. The name was also adopted by army-organized paramilitaries in the Middle Magdalena region, some of which later allied with drug traffickers. The name is now generic and is used throughout Colombia by paramilitary groups. MINGA Asociación para la Promoción Social Alternativa, Association for Alternative Social Development, a Colombian human rights group. Minga is a Quechua term meaning collective work. MORENA Movimiento de Restoración Nacional, National Restoration Movement, a short-lived political party linked to paramilitaries in the Middle Magdalena region. PCC Partido Comunista Colombiano, Colombian Communist Party. Paramilitary In Colombia, paramilitary has come to mean a clandestine organization of armed individuals, which can include active duty and retired military officers, who work in close coordination with the security forces. Procuraduría The government's internal affairs agency, responsible for investigating reports of crimes by government employees and recommending administrative punishment like suspensions, fines, and dismissals. Within the agency, specific divisions are responsible for investigating the abuses of various branches of government. They include the Procuraduría Delegate for the Armed Forces and the Procuraduría Delegate for the Police Forces. The Procuraduría Delegate for Human Rights investigates
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