Cloud App Security Administration Guide for Dropbox
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Cloud App Security Administration Guide For
Cloud App Security Administration Guide for Office 365 and Microsoft 365 Contents Understanding Cloud App Security 6 Understanding Email Security 6 Using Data Leak Protection 7 Understanding Anomalies 8 Understanding Click-Time Protection 8 Configuring Cloud App Security 10 Subscribing to Cloud App Security 10 Activating Cloud Applications for Cloud App Security 11 Activating Office 365 and Microsoft 365 Cloud Applications 13 Manually Configuring Office 365 and Microsoft 365 Cloud Applications During Activation 17 Managing Quarantine for Office 365 and Microsoft 365 29 Setting Up a Quarantine Mailbox for Office 365 and Microsoft 365 Email (Exchange Online) 29 Setting Up a Quarantine Folder for Office 365 and Microsoft 365 OneDrive 30 Setting Up a Quarantine Folder for Office 365 and Microsoft 365 SharePoint 30 Using the Quarantine View for Office 365 and Microsoft 365 Email (Exchange Online) 31 Using the Quarantine Page 32 Using the Quarantined File Creator Dashboard 33 Using the User Dashboard for Office 365 and Microsoft 365 34 Managing Restore Requests 35 Using the SonicWall Cloud App Security Dashboard 36 Using the Security Events Widgets 37 Changing a Security Event Widget to an Alert or Custom Query 38 Resetting a Security Event Widget 38 Hiding a Security Event Widget 39 Configuring Security Event Widget Custom Queries 39 Adjusting the Time Scale 40 Viewing the Summary of Security Events 40 Viewing Login Events 42 Viewing Secured Applications 44 Viewing the Scanned Files Summary 45 Managing Security Events 46 Using the Security -
1. Trafficking in Women ______3 2
Directorate-General for Research WORKING PAPER TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN Civil Liberties Series LIBE 109 EN This publication is available in English. At the end of this working paper you will find a full list of the other 'Civil Liberties Series' publications. PUBLISHER: The European Parliament B-1047 Brussels AUTHOR: Carmen GALIANA, lawyer EDITOR: Andrea Subhan Directorate-General for Research Division for Social, Legal and Cultural Affairs Tel. (0032) 284 3684 Fax: (0032) 284 9050 E-Mail: [email protected] The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised provided the source is acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy. Manuscript completed in March 2000 Directorate-General for Research WORKING PAPER TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN Civil Liberties Series LIBE 109 EN 3-2000 Trafficking in women Executive summary The principal objective of this study is to identify the characteristics of the phenomenon of trafficking in women for sexual purposes: its causes, structure and consequences, with the aim of increasing the visibility of the problem and bringing together a number of possible means of putting an end to this lamentable phenomenon, which is taking on ever more alarming proportions in relation to the violations of the victims' rights and its links to organised crime. Given the lack of documentary material on the subject, the attempt has been made to combine a wide range of material from disparate sources. These include: the documentation of the EU institutions; information provided by NGOs fighting this form of organised crime; information provided by governments and by Europol and Interpol; and information obtained from the press and the Internet. -
St Sar Eid Whitepaper 101007Fi
Edition1 /2007 The SECURE Application Review No portion of this publication may be is a Silicon Trust Program reproduced in part or in whole without publication, sponsored by the express permission, in writing, from Infineon Technologies AG. the publisher. All product copyrights Editorial Team and trademarks are the property of their Wendy Atkins, Rainer Bergmann, respective owners. All product names, Dr. Detlef Houdeau, Nicole Mountain specifications, prices and other infor- mation are correct at the time of going Project Development to press but are subject to change Krowne Communications GmbH, without notice. The publisher takes no Berlin, Germany responsibility for false or misleading This copy of SECURE Application information or omissions. Review is Copyright 2007 by Infineon Technologies AG. Further Information can be found at: Any comments may be addressed to www.silicon-trust.com [email protected] SECURE Application Review: CITIZEN CARDS C O NTENT S Definitions .................................................................................................................................4 Part 1 – Overview & market dynamics Change and citizen empowerment ......................................................................................7 Part 2 – Applications A smart way to deal with government applications ........................................................12 Partner Inputs: Precise Biometrics .....................................................................................21 Part 3 – Form factors Matching -
Election Code
Act of 5 January, 2011 Election Code (Journal of Laws 31 January, 2011) Section I. Introductory provisions Chapter 1 General Provisions (Article 1 - Article 9) Chapter 2 Voting rights (Article 10 - Article 11) Chapter 3 Electoral Districts (Article 12 - Article 17) Chapter 4 The register of voters (Article 18 - Article 25) Chapter 5 Roll of voters (Article 26 - Article 37) Chapter 6 Common provisions on voting (Article 38 - Article 53) Chapter 7 Voting by proxy (Article 54 - Article 61) Chapter 8 Voting by correspondence in the electoral wards established abroad (Article 62 - Article 68) Chapter 9 Determining the results of voting in the circuit (Article 69 - Article 81) Chapter 10 Election protests (Article 82 - Article 83) Chapter 11 Electoral committees (Article 84 - Article 103) Chapter 12 The election campaign (Articles 104 - 115) Chapter 13 The election campaign in the programs of radio and television broadcasters (Article 116 - Article 122) Chapter 14 Funding of elections from the state budget (Article 123 - Article 124) Chapter 15 Financing of election campaigns (Article 125 - Article 151) Section III. Elections to the Sejm Chapter 1 General principles (Article 192 - Article 200) Chapter 2 Constituencies (Article 201 - Article 203) Chapter 3 Reporting of candidates for deputies (Article 204 - Article 222) Chapter 4 Ballot (Article 223 - Article 226) Chapter 5 The method of voting and the conditions of validity of the vote (Article 227) Chapter 6 Determination of voting results and election results in constituency (Article 228 - Article 237) Chapter 7 Announcement of results of elections to the Sejm (Article 238 - Article 240) Chapter 8 Validity of election (Article 241 - Article 246) Chapter 9 The expiration of the mandate of Mr and complement the composition of the Sejm (Article 247 - Article 251) Chapter 10 The election campaign in public programs, radio and television broadcasters (Article 252 - Article 254) Section IV. -
Digital Identification: a Key Identification: Todigital Inclusive Growth
Digital identification: A key to inclusive growth inclusive Digital to identification: key A Digital identification A key to inclusive growth April 2019 McKinsey Global Institute Since its founding in 1990, the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) has sought to develop a deeper understanding of the evolving global economy. As the business and economics research arm of McKinsey & Company, MGI aims to provide leaders in the commercial, public, and social sectors with the facts and insights on which to base management and policy decisions. MGI research combines the disciplines of economics and management, employing the analytical tools of economics with the insights of business leaders. Our “micro-to-macro” methodology examines microeconomic industry trends to better understand the broad macroeconomic forces affecting business strategy and public policy. MGI’s in-depth reports have covered more than 20 countries and 30 industries. Current research focuses on six themes: productivity and growth, natural resources, labor markets, the evolution of global financial markets, the economic impact of technology and innovation, and urbanization. Recent reports have assessed the digital economy, the impact of AI and automation on employment, income inequality, the productivity puzzle, the economic benefits of tackling gender inequality, a new era of global competition, Chinese innovation, and digital and financial globalization. MGI is led by three McKinsey & Company senior partners: Jacques Bughin, Jonathan Woetzel, and James Manyika, who also serves as the chairman of MGI. Michael Chui, Susan Lund, Anu Madgavkar, Jan Mischke, Sree Ramaswamy, and Jaana Remes are MGI partners, and Mekala Krishnan and Jeongmin Seong are MGI senior fellows. Project teams are led by the MGI partners and a group of senior fellows and include consultants from McKinsey offices around the world. -
Enhanced Functionality Brings New Privacy
2018] T. Szádeczky: Enhanced Functionality Brings New Privacy ... 3 DOI 10.5817/MUJLT2018-1-1 ENHANCED FUNCTIONALITY BRINGS NEW PRIVACY AND SECURITY ISSUES – AN ANALYSIS OF EID* by TAMÁS SZÁDECZKY** As compared with traditional paper-based versions and the standard username- -password login to e-Government services, the new electronic identity and travel documents have made on-site electronic and on-line authentication of citizen more comfortable and secure. The biometric passport was introduced in Hungary in 2006. A decade later the electronic identity card (eID) was implemented. The reason for the improvement of such documents is twofold: enhancing security features and performing new functions. The development is certainly welcome, but it also generates new types of risks, with which governments and citizens must take into account. In this paper, I will first analyze the most widespread technologies of data storage cards from the passive elements to the chipcards, including the biometric passport. The objective is to provide an overview of the technical development as a background to my paper. I will then proceed to an analysis of the relevant EU and national legal background, data elements, data protection and the functions (ePASS, eID, eSIGN) of the new Hungarian and German identity card, as well as the security risks and protection properties of the eID-type documents. The paper concludes with a summary of the lessons learned from and the risks involved in the current solutions in Hungary and Germany. * The work was created in commission of the National University of Public Service under the priority project KÖFOP-2.1.2-VEKOP-15-2016-00001 titled „Public Service Development Establishing Good Governance” in the Miklós Zrínyi Habilitation Program. -
Der Personalausweis Der the German Identity Card Identity German The
The German identity card Der Personalausweis On 2 August 2021, the new design of the German Ab dem 2. August 2021 wird der Personalausweis im national identity card will be launched. The new neuen Design eingeführt. Äußerlich erkennbar ist design is distinguished by an EU flag, in line with Der Personalausweis das neue Design an der EU-Flagge, welche ab dem Regulation (EU) 2019/1157. 2. August 2021 ebenso auf allen Personalausweisen der The German identity card EU Mitgliedstaaten eingeführt wird. Damit setzt This leaflet explains the key security features of the Deutschland die Vorgaben der Verordnung (EU) new ID card. Many familiar features have been brought 2019/1157 um. into line with the latest technology and some new high-security features have been added. These In diesem Flyer werden die wesentlichen improvements continue to enable the reliable detection Sicherheitsmerkmale erläutert. Viele bekannte of misuse, counterfeiting or forgery of the ID card. Merkmale wurden auf den neuesten Stand der Technik weiterentwickelt sowie um weitere, hochsichere The online ID function (eID) remains an integral part Merkmale ergänzt. Damit können Missbrauch, of the ID card. Furthermore, two fingerprints are Verfälschung oder Totalfälschung auch weiterhin stored in the chip. As soon as the card is issued, the zuverlässig erkannt werden. fingerprints are deleted from the records of the issuing authority and the card producer, as usual. With Die Online-Ausweisfunktion (eID) bleibt unveränderter fingerprints as an additional biometric feature, it is Bestandteil des Personalausweises. Ferner werden im easier for the competent authorities to detect misuse of Chip des Ausweises zwei Fingerabdrücke gespeichert. cards by persons of similar appearance to cardholders. -
Open Source ID Cards? by Jason Kitcat, J-Dom.Org, Originally Published in Linuxuser Blunkett Has Gone but His Legacy, the Identi
Open Source ID Cards? By Jason Kitcat, j-dom.org, originally published in LinuxUser Blunkett has gone but his legacy, the Identity Cards Bill 2005, marches on. To many it seems almost unbelievable that MPs are actually going to be debating a bill on ID cards here in the UK. Follow me on a journey to see how we got here and where, if we’re lucky, we could go next. How we got here The 9/11 attacks on the twin towers and the Pentagon shocked the Western world into a sense of insecurity not seen since the Cold War. This public nervousness provided the political leverage the Labour government needed to bring ID cards onto the agenda. Fear of terrorism has been used by governments around the world to introduce authoritarian new measures in the name of protecting the citizenry. Here in the UK such moves coincided with the Government’s long tradition of centralising control to Whitehall. US demands for biometric passports along with mainland Europe’s development of ever more comprehensive identity schemes only acted to accelerate the desire for a British scheme. With both Jack Straw and David Blunkett revealing strong authoritarian streaks whilst running the Home Office, ideas that had seemed previously unthinkable were being floated. The notion of a centralised database of people in the UK that would store photos, fingerprints and iris scans must have been more than a little tempting to both Home Secretaries. However Straw and Blunkett shouldn’t have felt under too much pressure from our international partners’ apparent progress. -
Royal Holloway University of London
Review and Analysis of Current and Future European e-ID Schemes Siddhartha Arora Technical Report RHUL-MA-2008-07 15 January 2008 Royal Holloway University of London Department of Mathematics Roal Holloway, University of London Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, England http://www.rhul.ac.uk/mathematics/techreports Review and Analysis of Current and Future European e-ID Card Schemes Siddhartha ARORA – [email protected] Supervisor: Dr. Michael J Ganley Royal Holloway, University of London Submitted as part of the requirements for the award of the MSc in Information Security of the University of London. Note: After submission of this document, minor typographical changes were made on August 3rd 2007. CONTENTS 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6 2. INTRODUCTION 7 2.1 SCOPE & OBJECTIVES 8 2.1.1 SCOPE RELATING TO E-ID CARDS 8 2.1.2 PROJECT OBJECTIVES 8 2.1.3 OUT OF SCOPE 8 2.2 MOTIVATION FOR E-ID CARD IMPLEMENTATIONS 9 2.2.1 E-GOVERNMENT SERVICES 9 2.3 INFORMATION SECURITY & E-ID CARDS 10 3. INTRODUCING IDENTITY 12 3.1 IDENTITY 12 3.2 ALLEGIANCE, CITIZENSHIP & NATIONALITY 13 3.3 IDENTITY DOCUMENTS 14 3.3.1 THE PASSPORT 14 3.3.2 SEED IDENTITY DOCUMENTS 15 3.4 THE ELECTRONIC IDENTITY (E-ID) 15 3.5 THE NATIONAL E-ID CARD 16 3.5.1 SECURE SIGNATURE CREATION DEVICES (SSCD) 17 4. E-ID CARD APPLICATIONS 18 4.1 APPLICATION USERS 18 4.2 BASE FUNCTIONALITY 18 4.3 GOVERNMENT APPLICATIONS 18 4.3.1 DEPLOYED E-GOVERNMENT APPLICATIONS 19 4.3.2 NON-GOVERNMENTAL AND OTHER APPLICATIONS 21 4.4 POSSIBLE FUTURE/OTHER APPLICATIONS 21 4.4.1 IDENTITY MIXER 22 5. -
Secure and User-Friendly De-Registration of a Vehicle As Off the Road Using Mobile Authentication with German Eid Card and a NFC-Enabled Smartphone
CYBER 2017 : The Second International Conference on Cyber-Technologies and Cyber-Systems Secure and User-friendly De-Registration of a Vehicle as Off The Road Using Mobile Authentication with German eID Card and a NFC-enabled Smartphone Michael Massoth Department of Computer Science Hochschule Darmstadt – University of Applied Sciences Darmstadt, Germany E-mail: [email protected] Abstract— Digitization is as important to public administration citizens and users, we implemented the new approach for a as it is to the economy. Therefore, the German authorities very popular and useful online service, namely, the de- currently see an enormous need for action for digitization and registration of a vehicle as off the road. Therefore, an cybersecurity. Provided by the German electronic identity Android app and a Website were implemented in order to be (eID) solution, every German citizen has the ability to identify able to carry out the complete process of the vehicle de- himself against various electronic and mobile government registration in a mobile and user-friendly way in order to services. In this paper, we will present a new approach for a provide the Hessian citizens the possibility to avoid the mobile de-registration of a vehicle as off the road. The new annoying paperwork and the long waiting time. The de- mobile de-registration service of a vehicle as off the road is registration of a vehicle as off the road is also a good best- secure and user-friendly. The new approach implements a practice example of an electronic government service with strong two-factor authentication with German eID card and the corresponding 6-digits personal identification number required trust level “high”. -
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2145/2004 of 15 December 2004 Amending for the 41St
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2145/2004 of 15 December 2004 amending for the 41st... 1 Document Generated: 2021-08-02 Status: This is the original version (as it was originally adopted). ANNEX Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 is amended as follows: (1) The entry ‘Al-Barakat Global Telecommunications (aka: Barakaat Globetelcompany), PO Box 3313, Dubai, UAE; Mogadishu, Somalia; Hargeysa, Somalia’under the heading ‘Legal persons, groups and entities’ shall be replaced by the following: Al-Barakat Global Telecommunications (alias (a) Barakaat Globetelcompany (b) Al Barakat Telecommunications Ltd. Address: (a) PO Box 3313, Dubai (EAU); (b) Mogadishu, Somalia, (c) Hargeysa, Somalia. (2) The entry ‘Al Furqan (alias (a) Dzemilijati Furkan, (b) Dzem’ijjetul Furqan, (c) Association for Citizens' Rights and Resistance to Lies, (d) Dzemijetul Furkan, (e) Association of Citizens for the Support of Truth and Suppression of Lies, (f) Sirat, (g) Association of Education, Culture and Building Society — Sirat, (h) Association for Education, Culture and Building Society — Sirat, (i) Association for Education, Cultural and to Create Society — Sirat, (j) Istikamet, (k) in Siratel). Addresses: (a) Put Mladih Muslimana 30a, 71 000 Sarajevo (Bosnia-Herzegovina); (b) ul. Strossmajerova 72, Zenica (Bosnia-Herzegovina); (c) Muhameda Hadzijahica 42, Sarajevo (Bosnia-Herzegovina)’ under the heading ‘Legal persons, groups and entities’ shall be replaced by the following: Al Furqan (alias (a) Dzemilijati Furkan, (b) Dzem’ijjetul Furqan, (c) Association for Citizens Rights and Resistance to Lies, (d) Dzemijetul Furkan, (e) Association of Citizens for the Support of Truth and Suppression of Lies, (f) Sirat, (g) Association for Education, Culture and Building Society — Sirat, (h) Association for Education, Cultural and to Create Society — Sirat, (i) Istikamet, (j) In Siratel). -
National Strategies and Policies for Digital Identity Management in OECD Countries”, OECD Digital Economy Papers, No
Please cite this paper as: OECD (2011-03-31), “National Strategies and Policies for Digital Identity Management in OECD Countries”, OECD Digital Economy Papers, No. 177, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kgdzvn5rfs2-en OECD Digital Economy Papers No. 177 National Strategies and Policies for Digital Identity Management in OECD Countries OECD Unclassified DSTI/ICCP/REG(2010)3/FINAL Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 31-Mar-2011 ___________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________ English - Or. English DIRECTORATE FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY COMMITTEE FOR INFORMATION, COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS POLICY Unclassified DSTI/ICCP/REG(2010)3/FINAL Working Party on Information Security and Privacy NATIONAL STRATEGIES AND POLICIES FOR DIGITAL IDENTITY MANAGEMENT IN OECD COUNTRIES English - Or. English JT03299393 Document complet disponible sur OLIS dans son format d'origine Complete document available on OLIS in its original format DSTI/ICCP/REG(2010)3/FINAL FOREWORD This report is based on responses to the Questionnaire on National Strategies and Policies for Digital Identity Management (IdM) in OECD Countries circulated to the delegations of the OECD Working Party on Information Security and Privacy (WPISP) and to the OECD Senior Network of e-government Officials between December 2009 and June 2010 (Annex III). The report includes a detailed analysis, a list of references, country summaries (Annex I) and a contribution by the Internet Technical Advisory Committee (ITAC) (Annex II). It has been developed by the Secretariat (Laurent Bernat of the Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry) with expert input from Nick Mansfield, consultant to the OECD.