How did Abduction Get Confused with Inference to the Best Explanation?
William H. B. Mcauliffe
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy, Volume 51, Number 3, Summer 2015, pp. 300-319 (Article)
Published by Indiana University Press
For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/608995
Access provided by University of Miami (7 Nov 2017 21:21 GMT) Abstract One of C. S. Peirce’s most misunderstood ideas is his notion of abduction, the process of generating and selecting hypotheses to test. Contemporary philosophers of science have falsely cited Peirce’s idea of abduction How did as a conceptual precursor to the modern notion of inference to the best explanation, Abduction a mode of inference used to decide which of competing explanations of a phenomenon to regard as true. Here, I examine how the Get Confused misunderstanding originated by exploring influential discussions of inference to the with Inference best explanation in the works of Gilbert Harman, Bas van Fraassen, Paul Thagard, to the Best and Peter Lipton. While all these authors either failed to cite, or incorrectly cited, Explanation? Peirce, I show that Thagard has noted a William H. B. Mcauliffe sense in which Peirce’s early work provides a precursor to the modern notion of inference to the best explanation. However, a careful reading of Peirce shows that “abduction” has never been a proper synonym for “in- ference to the best explanation.” So Peirce is not to blame for the misunderstanding. I conclude by defending the philosophic importance of abduction and demonstrat- ing how applying Peirce’s criteria for good abduction to debates in evolutionary theory can move the field forward.
Keywords: Charles Peirce, abduction, inference to the best explanation, adaptationism, group selection, induction.
1. Introduction Peirce believed that inquiry involves three types of reasoning—abduction, deduction, and induction. While Peirce’s beliefs about reasoning, especially abduction, changed over time, in his mature work the follow- ing picture of reasoning emerges: abduction
TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOCIETY Vol. 51, No. 3 ©2015 300 How did Abduction Get Confused with Inference to the Best Explanation? • William H. B. Mcauliffe 301 mak- 6 Peirce both Peirce 1 stage of inquiry, stage of inquiry, stage of inquiry. Readers Readers stage of inquiry. so far as I know no one so far as I know 4 His concept of abduction is concept of abduction His 2 Many philosophers believe IBE is integral to both scientific IBE is integral to philosophers believe Many 3 However, this cannot be the whole story. Influential accounts of Influential this cannot be the whole story. However, 5 In section 4, I will conclude the paper by summarizing my find- summarizing my section 4, I will conclude the paper by In In section 2, I will show that Peirce’s notion of abduction does not notion of that Peirce’s section 2, I will show In In section 3, I will investigate what may have led to the identifica- the to led have may what investigate will I 3, section In ings and suggesting an important but neglected reason for distinguish- ings and suggesting an important but neglected reason in concern major a is abduction of logic the IBE: and abduction ing ing it difficult to identify the origin of the misunderstanding. To get to of the misunderstanding. ing it difficult to identify the origin accounts prominent several the bottom of this muddle, I will analyze or abduction, to Peirce, of the best explanation that refer of inference led contemporary on IBE may have or both. These influential works IBE. as thing same the is abduction that falsely, believe, to philosophers simply of IBE are the popularizers whether reveal This analysis will also earlier citing passages in Peirce’s correctly sloppy or confused, or are similar to IBE. is described as a process in which abduction work generates and chooses hypotheses to test; deduction determines the en- the determines deduction to test; hypotheses chooses and generates ascertains induction a hypothesis; of tailments evidence the whether 1903). in question (CP 5.145, the hypothesis with accords inference to the best explanation have cited passages from Peirce’s work work Peirce’s cited passages from to the best explanation have inference that do not support abduction and IBE, a connection between and ordinary reasoning. But Peirce’s idea of abduction is quite different different idea of abduction is quite Peirce’s But and ordinary reasoning. of this misattribution I will trace the source this paper, IBE. In from consequences. its negative and explore a body of evidence. others given to choose one theory how over address at hy- as a method for arriving is best interpreted abduction Rather, infer- another way, to test. Put and selecting a hypothesis potheses to be the last ence to the best explanation is supposed tion of abduction with IBE. While other authors have already noted already have authors other While IBE. with abduction of tion abduction and IBE, between the difference whereas abduction corresponds to the first abduction corresponds whereas skim this section. familiar with this point may wish to identified abduction and coined the word. and abduction identified has investigated how the confusion began. One possible explanation I began. One the confusion how has investigated failed to sort is that philosophers have out shifts between will explore of abduction and his later statements. Peirce early statements Peirce’s his earlier views: everything “in almost rejected eventually I printed up hypothesis the beginning of this century or less mixed before I more philosophers Some 1910). 8.227, (CP induction” and abduction] [or his later abduction differs from on earlier work do note that Peirce’s work. one of the most original contributions he made to the study of reason- to the study of he made most original contributions one of the concept of Peirce’s the most poorly understood. is also one of ing. It has been distortedabduction contemporary by of science, philosophers of to a kind that it is a conceptual precursor who mistakenly claim (IBE), i.e., an infer- to the best explanation” called “inference inference ence to the truth phe- would best explain the given of a hypothesis if it nomenon. 302 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 51 Number 3 truth” (CP2.634, W 3:331,1878).Unlike induction,abduction does whichareput asaquestion,before totestits makingtheobservations thing elseinmind.He warns,“Thehypothesisshould bedistinctly sons toIBEplausible. Stated thisway, power makesexplanatory centralandcompari- therule ernor andnooneelse,soitisgiven great weight intheinference. canopy is taken as a central indicator of the presence of a Turkish gov - (CP 2.632, W 3:329–330,1878).In Peirce’s example,thehonorific tion against the qualities of the class of objects to which it might belong but ratheranimprecise weighing ofthequalities oftheobjectinques- because there isnoquantitative ratiofrom whichtomakeaninference, men holdingacanopyover hishead.It is aninduction“from qualities” a Turkish manisagovernor becausethiswouldexplainwhythere are supposition” (ibid.).For example, atouristin Turkey mightinferthat andthereupon generalrule, adoptthat that itwasacaseofcertain curious circumstance, which would be explained by the supposition over theirheads,thatall Turkish governors are honored thisway. all Turkish governors are honored hehasobserved withcanopiesheld example from Peirce, atouristin Turkey mightinferfrom thefactthat namely, ageneralizationaboutwholeclassofobjects. To borrow an 2.624, W 3:3261878).It isampliativelearned, inthatsomething new ofawholeclass” andinferthatthesamethingistrue thing istrue, (CP involved when “we generalize from a number of cases of which some- induction. The younger Peirce saw induction as the kind of inference (CP 6.145, W 8:151). 1892, Peirce thoughtofabductionasan“inductionfrom qualities” conflated abductionwithinduction(CP8.227). At leastaslate over thattime.His earlierstatements, ashehimselfnotedin1910, Peirce wrote onabductionover severalevolved decades,andhisviews 2. Peirce onAbduction phers shouldtakenote. that it has already investigated been fruitfully by some. More philoso- process forphilosopherstostudyand that abductionisaworthwhile instead amattertobestudiedby sociologistsofscience.Iamconfident philosophers biologyandpsychology.tious areas ofevolutionary Ithusargueagainst duction shouldbecarriedout.Iwillapplythisargumenttoconten- of sciencethatare stagnatingbecauseofdisagreements over how ab- by showing thatPeirce’s criteria for good abduction can advance areas science. Even here, however, there are indicationsthatPeirce really hassome- In contrast,“[h]ypothesis [orabduction]iswhere we findsome very Clarifying whatthismeansrequires understandingPeirce’s notionof 7 Here, ofabductioninscience Iwillelucidatetheimportance 8 whobelieve thatabductionisnotarationalprocess but How did Abduction Get Confused with Inference to the Best Explanation? • William H. B. Mcauliffe 303 operative; abduction merely suggests that some- abduction merely actually is operative; In Peirce’s later writings, abduction is clearly distinguished from in- from is clearly distinguished writings, abduction later Peirce’s In the on abduction emphasizes later work not all of Peirce’s However, not necessaryThe other guidelines are hypothesis to for selecting a in proposed, value of the thing “the The second consideration is duction. In 1903, he spelled out the three kinds of reasoning: abduc- of reasoning: kinds the three he spelled out 1903, In duction. about ideas His 2:205). EP 5.145, (CP induction and deduction, tion, draws necessary much changed—deduction still deduction had not changed his mind had Peirce hypothesis. However, consequences of a the well determines how and induction. Induction about abduction with the facts. This accord a hypothesis from consequences deduced evaluative. but rather strictly of induction is not ampliative, version newit is the “process conception of abduction, contrast, on Peirce’s In is the only logical operation of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It Peirce (CP 5.171, EP 2:216, 1903). any new idea” which introduces reason- of types these among the crucial summarizes differences nicely that be; induction shows that something must proves ing: “deduction something thing may be” (ibid.). described abduction as “the also Peirce of hypotheses. Rather, creation (CP 7.219, EP 2:106, 1901). Choos- of choosing a hypothesis” process can help people find the truthing well faster than chance guessing lay out crite- Peirce help choose well, To dead ends. or investigating 2:107–110, EP 7.220, (CP test to hypothesis which selecting for ria Sec- the hypothesis should be experimentally verifiable. 1901). First, should, if true,hypothesis These the question. ond, in facts the explain worthiness of necessarytwo guidelines are conditions of a hypothesis’s consideration. the likeli- increase economic considerations—they test, but rather are spelled out three Peirce quickly. hood that the truth will be found more First, time and money research. aspects of the economics of different but can be refuted should be conserved. a hypothesis is unlikely, If should as we should make testing it a priority, quickly if false, then we to test. inexpensive hypotheses that are itself” meant that scientists should (CP 7.220, EP 2:107, 1901). Peirce pay attention to signs indicating that a certain hypothesis is true. These - In and the “reasoned.” the “instinctive” two types, signs divide into themselves recommend “naturally those that are hypotheses stinctive because of value (CP 7.220, EP 2:108, 1901) and have to the mind” hypotheses the human capacity to devise plausible theories. “Reasoned” not infer the truth the not infer As it as a question. poses but rather of a hypothesis, - quali from an induction renamed later 2, Peirce in section show I will exhibits induction that is a species of which induction,” ties “abductory hypothesis poses a The idea that abduction of abduction. some qualities in his later theory remains as a question of abduction. 304 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 51 Number 3 leading guidesthatleadustooverlook hypotheses. potentiallyfertile overuberty securityinabductions,becauselikelihoodsare oftenmis- to bringaboutundiscovered (CP 8.384,1913).Peirce truths favored of abductionandrefers totheproductivity ofaprocess anditsability a process and“uberty,” to bring one to the truth, which is characteristic rity,” whichischaracteristicofinductionandrefers tothetendencyfor better disregarded.” Thisis related to Peirce’s distinctionbetween “secu- the reader “that solidlygrounded, likelihoodisfar unlessit bevery have background supportive evidence.However, Peirce quickly warned process repeats. The relative speedinessofthisprocess isunderwritten cal totestrelative torival hypotheses, highlylikely, etc.If not, thenthe mind. Then,thehypothesis isevaluated toseeifitistestable,economi- A hypothesis is first formed with the criteria for good abduction in to interpret Peirce abductionas a process istoview with multiplesteps. nomena that the scientist had not considered. The most charitable way hypothesis wouldnotbeabletoaccountforsomeaspect ofthephe- the criteriafortesting.For example,acolleaguemaypointoutthatthe there willmeet isnoguaranteethatthefirsthypothesesconstructed tion is,“after all,nothingbutguessing” (CP7.219,EP2:107,1901), ever, thatabductionneednotbeaprocess withonlyonestep. Asabduc- criteria. that theymeetcertain Rather, abductionisprincipled—hypotheses are formedinsuchaway that impliesthehypothesiswasformedonno rational grounds. this reading, hypothesisgenerationisnotpurely instinctual,atleastif 2:107, 1901).Peirce wasreferring tothecriteriamentionedabove. On thingafteritisconstructed” (CP7.220,EP done withtheconstructed which anythingoughttobediscovered istoconsiderwhatbe Peirce’s sentimentthat“the onlyway todiscover theprinciplesupon 42).Thisechoes problem ofchoosingagoodhypothesis” (1970,p. agoodhypothesisis,thus,analogoustothe problem ofconstructing The the trillionsofhypothesesthatmightbemadeonlyoneistrue. ing? K. T. Fann’s isthatthetwopossibilitiescollapseintoone:“of view shouldbealastresort. a mystery be discovered. Therefore, anyhypothesisthat renders theexplanandum ensures that,ifthephenomenonisexplicable,itsexplanationwillnever that willabsolutely stop inquiry” (CP 7.480, 1898)becausedoingso runs throughout Peirce’sruns work classes ofhypothesestowhichtheybelong.Finally, aguidelinethat easily interpretable,rule outentire andwhosefalsificationwould test hypothesesthatare relevant toawiderangeofphenomena,are esis’s relation to other possible investigations. It is preferable first to I believe Fann’s interpretation isplausible;Iwouldemphasize, how- Is abduction hypothesis- The third aspectoftheeconomy research concernsahypoth- generation 10 isthat“we mustnotmakehypotheses or a selection process for test- 9
How did Abduction Get Confused with Inference to the Best Explanation? • William H. B. Mcauliffe 305 For example, literature example, literature For 11 and inferences drawn from from drawn inferences and On the same page he distin- On 12 ence to the best explanation’ or ence to the best explanation’ generation called ‘infer uthers identifies abduction with IBE. uthers identifies abduction with IBE. begin using “abduction” in a wider sense; rather, he rejected his rejected he rather, sense; wider a in “abduction” using begin not The confusion even extends to encyclopedias of philosophy. The of philosophy. extends to encyclopedias The confusion even (1995) entry on abduction in The Oxford Christopher Hookway’s does not have an entryPhilosophy does not have to Routledge Companion The on generation, Carr actually entitles its article of Philosophy on IBE Encyclopedia Stanford is similar to claims that induction 2011a). It (Douven “Abduction” - that induction is based on frequen abduction but that they differ in on explanatory abduction is based cies and statistics whereas consid- confused views on early, Peirce’s roughly to erations. This corresponds abduction. The article has a supplemental entry different exploring the 2011b). Of notion of abduction (Douven of Peirce’s interpretations this entry sources, read widely comes closest to clarifying the differ- and IBE. notion of abduction Peirce’s ences between for choos- describes abduction as a method Companion to Philosophy on goes IBE. It similarity to its notes and accept to hypothesis a ing in a wider sense used “abduction” to claim that later in his life Peirce Peirce But testing. for selection and generation hypothesis include to did those hypotheses.” Instead of identifying abduction with hypothesis- Instead those hypotheses.” guishes this kind of inference from the other two elements of scientific the other two elements of scientific from guishes this kind of inference hypothesis- “creative reasoning, 3. Contemporary Abduction and Philosophers of the contemporary review a above, evidence presented the Despite synonym for has become a that “abduction” on IBE reveals literature notion of science see Peirce’s philosophers suggesting that many “IBE,” articles IBE. The mistake is not limited to to of abduction as a precursor IBE, but has become common- the cogency of focused on evaluating of science. of philosophy place in many areas by humans’ innate ability to generate plausible hypotheses (CP 5.173, 5.173, (CP hypotheses plausible to generate ability innate humans’ by 1903). EP 2:217–218, ‘abductive inference’)” (2006), p. 356). inference’)” ‘abductive has accumulated over Jerry Fodor’s (2000) challenge to defenders of (2000) challenge to defenders Fodor’s Jerry over has accumulated in- Those viewthe computational to explain “abduction.” of the mind when to the best explanation” mean “inference in this discussion volved Carruthers, instance, seeks to explain for Peter they say “abduction.” capacity for “inference modular mind can house the a massively how the best to the truth that it provides ground of a hypothesis on the data (so- explanation of the abduction, but its entry on IBE refers to volume five of Peirce’s Col- Peirce’s of abduction, but its entry five to volume on IBE refers views about inference as an “important for Peirce’s source lected Papers or ‘hypothesis.’” to the best explanation, which he calls ‘abduction’ contains volume five as reference, 1998) This is a bewildering (Vogel earlier statements because they confused abduction with induction. 306 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 51 Number 3 cussion of the priest example that “the of a hypothesis first starting are evidence thatabductionisnotIBE!Peirce concluded from hisdis- but the example is from CP 6.525–6.526,1901. But these passages Thereabstains from sex,andso ison. again(1978, nop. 82) citation, a manispriestbecause the manspeaksLatin,dresses like apriest, work he has in mind. Thagard uses Peirce’s example of inferringthat attributions. There is, however, a clue about what passage in Peirce’s Descartes. in theworks ofPeirce, William Whewell, David Hartley, Leibniz,and explanation tobethe“best.” He claimsthatthere are precursors ofIBE is perhapstobecredited toC.S.Peirce” (van Fraassen 1980,p. 23) Harman as themodernadvocate ofIBE,buthealsonotesthat“the idea cisms ofIBEhave beenwidelydiscussedby philosophers. the locusclassicusofcharacterizationIBE.” (2002,p. 614) follows withPeirce’s onabduction” view andinstead“take Harman’s as he decides that he is “going toleave aside any attempt to connect what notionofIBE(2011),but notion ofabductionandthecontemporary abduction. For example,Psillos knows thedifference between Peirce’s the work ofphilosopherswhoknow thedifference between IBEand of The pervasiveness Harman’s version of abductionisevidenteven in meaning thattheequationofIBEwithabductionhasnofoundation. or notreferring toPeirce atall. man isreferring toPeirce’s earlierwritings,ortoPeirce’s laterwritings, Peirce or any other author. There isno wayto determine whether Har- ‘theoretical Harman doesnotrefer to induction.’” (Ibid., pp. 88–89) inference,’ ‘the method of elimination,’ ‘eliminative induction,’ and others have called ‘abduction,’ ‘the method of hypothesis,’ ‘hypothetic inference to the best explanation’ corresponds approximately to what equates IBEwithseveral termsthatPeirce usedforabduction:“‘The IBE, likeinduction,represents thefinalstepof reasoning. But Harman ofinferencean invalid rule oravalid specialcaseofIBE.Either way, He aimstoshow thatinductioniseither esis istrue.” (1965,p. 89) would anyother hypothesis, to theconclusionthatgiven hypoth- hypothesis wouldprovide a‘better’ explanationfortheevidencethan man. Harman definesIBEas“infer[ring],from thepremise thatagiven philosophers justifiablyconfused? Or istheirscholarshipjust sloppy? longer felttorequire argument. Where Are didtheconfusionstart? I willlatershow thatPeter Liptonmakesthesameerror. Peirce’s citing Paul Thagard. Like Harman, Thagard gives nocitationsestablishinganyofthese Another promising lineisthework ofBas van Fraassen, whosecriti- Most literature onIBEisbasedHarman’s contemporary work, The initialandmostinfluentialadvocate forIBEis Har- Gilbert The confusionhaspermeatedphilosophytothepointthatitisno later thoughtonabduction. Yet, themistakeisnotuncommon; 15 Thagard setsouttospecifywhatitmeansforan 13 He cites 14 , How did Abduction Get Confused with Inference to the Best Explanation? • William H. B. Mcauliffe 307 om the total pool of priest- om the total pool similar to abduction, but it is that are k” (CP 6.526, 1901), just as abduction is (CP 6.526, k” wor like traits the man has fr like traits the man ut there is no way of quantifying the weight to be given to to be given is no way of quantifying the weight ut there spelling out what makes an explanation the best, he published spelling out what makes an explanation paper that once Peirce had reformulated abduction he renamed abduction he renamed had reformulated paper that once Peirce How Thagard came to cite Peirce’s work as a precursor to IBE may as a precursor work Peirce’s to cite came Thagard How Peirce crucial that does note while he is that, omission Thagard’s But Peirce thought that abductory is similar to abduction in induction Peirce Later in the paragraph Peirce mentioned the priest example again mentioned the priest Peirce Later in the paragraph be key in understanding how IBE and abduction became confused. A IBE and abduction understanding how be key in - of Phi paper in the Journal the publication of Thagard’s before year losophy discus- journal (1977) arguing that Peirce’s an article in the present that his early notion of abduction is sion of the priest example shows unless it is construedproblematic as an early statement of IBE. Even in the early remember that even is true, conclusion assuming Thagard’s had in mind with abduction indicated that what he really Peirce years W 3:331, 1878), a was hypothesis generation and selection (CP 2.634, does not mention. point that Thagard as suggesting a hypothesis for testing, he does saw abduction eventually - of Philoso paper or in his Journal not note in either the Transactions phy not abduction. It is just a special case of induction. Insofar as abductory Insofar is just a special case of induction. not abduction. It came to the opposite conclusion as induction is similar to IBE, Peirce that induction is a special case of IBE. who believed Harman, like traits. B 7.219, EP 2:107, 1901). The lesson is that (CP but guessing” “nothing abductory induction has traits any one trait, as few readily observable necessaryany one trait, as few readily traits are or sufficient for being a priest. unlike most induction, abductory induction involves two ways. First, cer- “a qualities involves the various to weigh how Second, originality. tain element of guess- to distinguish induction based on quantifiable ratios from induction from based on quantifiable ratios to distinguish induction out if a person is used to figure traits. The latter is based on qualitative the person has the by testing whether is made a priest. The inference the man understands seeing if by say, usually have, traits that priests early notion of abduc- to Peirce’s this corresponds that Latin. Notice is an It induction.” “abductory an called this process Peirce tion. Here, weighing induction, it involves because, like a quantitative induction many priest- how and the entertainingand or with simple interrogation as a it, whether of to call I propose which step is an inferential of confidence, any degree abduction with was associating 1901). Peirce ” (CP 6.525, abduction construction,hypothesis truth with inferring the not of a hypothesis. testing that wrote Peirce 1901) 6.526, (CP paragraph following the In is true, that, if it observations in remarking made “consists a hypothesis . . .under certain certain to have conditions ought results and noting extending a certain favorable, confidence and, if they are . . . the results “induction.” called this process Peirce to the hypothesis.” 308 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 51 Number 3 has received muchattention. of Peter Lipton,whohaswritten anentire bookonIBE(2004) that anticipated themodernformofIBE. supposed thatabduction,notthemore induction, obscure abductory throughof sciencehave thesedifferences notsorted andinsteadhave of Peirce’s conceptsisinfacttheprecursor ofIBE.Other philosophers precursor forIBE,itisextremely misleadingtonotmakeexplicitwhich while itisnotinaccuratetocitePeirce fordescribingaconceptthatis induction,notabduction,whichisaprecursor ofIBE.Soabductory somewhere—probably inhisJournal ofPhilosophy paper—isthatitis pothesis generation.Thedistinctionthatheneededtomakeexplicit calling it“abduction” oncehehaddecidedthatitisamethodofhy- ally calledaninductionfrom qualities“hypothesis” butthathestarted only insinuatesinhisTransactions paperthattheyounger Peirce usu- an induction from qualities“abductory induction.” Thagard instead ambiguous. Peirce wrote: involves idea. comingupwithanew pointofinquiry,the starting nottheendingpoint,andthatabduction plation.” (Ibid.) So far Liptonhasprovided evidencethatabductionis suggestionbeforeputting togetherwhichflashesthenew ourcontem- is theideaofputtingtogetherwhatwe hadnever dreamed before of Peirce as“an it actofinsight,althoughextremely fallibleinsight. . . Perceptual judgmentistheradicalextensionofabductiondefined by duction toaperceptual judgment,whichis“the starting- ton citestelladifferent story. Peirce’s lecture begins by comparing ab- father ofabduction(andthus,supposedlyIBE);butthepassagesLip- Peirce,” citingCP5.180–5.189,1903.Peirce isacknowledged asthe model was developed underthename of ‘abduction’ by CharlesSanders hesaysthat“oneto 5.189).Elsewhere version ofthe (2000,p. 184), duction” (CP5.180–5.212,1903;Liptonpointsthereader especially He citesPeirce’sops. (2004,pp. 56–57) lecture “Pragmatism andAb- that Peirce’s andHanson’s are views precursors hedevel totheviews - pr emiss of all critical and controlled thinking.” (CP 5.181, EP 2:227) A final potential source examining is the work of confusion worth The passage Lipton thinks is crucial (CP5.189,EP2:231)ismoreThe passageLiptonthinksiscrucial Hence, there isreason tosuspect thatAistrue. But ifAwere Cwouldbeamatterofcourse, true, The surprisingfact,C,isobserved; form ofinference therefore isthis: supposed thatitwouldaccount forthefactsorsomeofthem.The the hypothesiscannotbeadmitted,even asahypothesis,unlessitbe conditions.Namely,just whatabductionis,—[is]subjecttocertain hypothesis,—which is operation of adopting an explanatory [T]he 16 In hisbookLipton brieflymentions point orfirst How did Abduction Get Confused with Inference to the Best Explanation? • William H. B. Mcauliffe 309 and the logic of abduction collapse into and the logic of abduction collapse 17 18 A defender of Lipton may object that I have moved too quickly moved that I have A defender of Lipton may object But close examination shows that the latter view the latter with the fit that not does shows examination close But that Lipton cites is same lecture the passage from another Finally, here, that Lipton’s defense of IBE does have something to say about defense of IBE does have that Lipton’s here, of IBE, hypotheses version in Lipton’s Indeed, the logic of discovery. the criterion for a con- for testing only if they meet can be considered of affairs, X, explanation, or an explanation why some state trastive That is, p. 73) Y, obtains. (2004, rather than some other state of affairs, those that for selection are the only hypotheses that can be considered Y such that point out what in the causal history from of X is different This is a necessary criterion Y. it makes sense that X is the case and not for abduction because for Lipton IBE is a matter of choosing the best oc- generation hypothesis So explanations. contrastive available the of to the best contras- in mind that an inference curs with the knowledge Lipton makes this later be conducted. However, explanation will tive passage as a whole. Peirce noted that a hypothesis cannot be accepted, cannot be noted that a hypothesis a whole. Peirce passage as facts. This qualification could explain the , unless it as a hypothesis even the adoption of a hypothesis as true.makes no sense for A hypothesis a scientist contrast, In to count as a hypothesis. need not be true merely constructmight mistakenly to explain a phenomenon but a hypothesis facts. That relevant it could not account for all the that fail to realize addition, In longer rank as a potential explanation. hypothesis can no compet- adjudicate between does not presented the form of inference potential explanations would, if true,ing hypotheses. All make the facts scientist which hypothesis the not tell that does course; but a matter of that the sci- argument concludes Peirce’s to adopt as true. That is why true. to suspect the hypothesis is A suspicion requires entist has reason this passage to interpret reason no is So, there empirical confirmation. as a method for adopting a viewed abduction as evidence that Peirce hypothesis as true. the explained how Peirce of Peirce. inconsistent with his interpretation logic of the pragmatic maxim - a hy adopting it Is “adopting.” by meant Peirce what turns on Much a hypothesis adopting or 7.239, 1901), (CP probation” “upon pothesis associating has a case for then Lipton means the latter, as true? Peirce If with IBE. abduction one logic. He explained that “pragmatism proposes a certain proposes maxim, “pragmatism explained that one logic. He needless any further rulewhich, if sound, must render as to the ad- hypotheses . . .missibility of hypotheses to rank as as explanations of (CP 5.196, EP 2:234, 1903) phenomena held as hopeful suggestions.” process is judges qualified hypotheses as suggestions. This Abduction cannot justifiably in- to the best explanation. A scientist not inference fer the truthsuggestion. Any of a hypothesis that is still just a hopeful be led would understand abduction Lipton to on philosopher relying astray. 310 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 51 Number 3 “abduction” interchangeably with“inference tothebestexplanation.” tion orhow itrelates toIBE;neitherdoesitexcuse thefactthatheuses of discovery does not show that he understood Peirce’s notion of abduc- Either way, themere factthatLiptontriestorelate IBEtothecontext this passagetoformtheabove argumentbutfailedtocredit Peirce. CP 5.189 as an early statement of IBE suggests that he may have used complete isolationfrom Peirce’s work. At best,thefactthatLiptoncites ofit.Furthermore,a constitutive part Liptonmakesthisargumentin argument inorder ofIBE,notto describe tociteanadditionalvirtue a transgression thatPeirce harsh condemnation: “whoever feltdeserves themeaning oftermsimpedeintellectualprogress,those whodistort does nothave ashared understandingoftheirsubjectmatter. Thus, enterprise, andameeting ofmindscannot occur ifthe community requires good,informative terminology. isacollective Also,inquiry EP 2:263–264,1903).He notedthatadvancement ofunderstanding Peirce seriously(CP2.220, himselftooktheethicsofterminology very used Peirce’s work togive IBEtheillusionofarespectable pedigree. philosophers ofsciencetooktheword, meaning,and assigneditanew meaning What happenedisthatPeirce defined “abduction” andthen duction”? Ithinkitismisleadingtosaythat“abduction” changedits cal matter?Themeaningofwords changeallthetime. Whynot “ab- that acareful expositionofhiswork would cause confusion. his notionofabductionover theyears, sincethere islittleindication I tentatively concludethatPeirce cannotbeblamedbecauseherefined have topoll philosophersofsciencetoseeifmyhypothesisholdswater. at theroot ofthismessisjustanabductionfornow. Someone would probably onlyfurthered theconfusion.Alas,my thesis that Thagard is Best Explanation isnow alsowidely read by philosophersofsciencehas tance withPeirce’s andHanson’s work. That Lipton’s Inference tothe van Fraassen’s work carefully butseemstohave onlyapassingacquain- seems especiallyplausiblewithrespect toLipton,whohasclearlyread IBE from reading TheScientific Imageand philosophers ofsciencehave pickeduptheconflationofabductionand is especiallywell- Most philosophersofscienceread van Fraassen, contemporary andhe highly visiblephilosophyjournalandwasalsocitedby van Fraassen. Peirce that was published in relationa ofan article to IBE was part of abductionandconcludedthatitwasreally IBE.Thagard’s nodto by Harman, gave an incomplete exposition on Peirce’s evolving notion with IBE.However, aplausibleexplanationisthatThagard, influenced gan neglectingtheproper role ofabductionandinsteadequatingit There isnoclearpicture ofhow somanyphilosophersofsciencebe- 4. Conclusion But isthisanythingmore thanquibblingaboutatrivialhistori- kno wn forhiscriticismsofIBE.So itisplausiblethat . This Laws andSymmetry 19 How did Abduction Get Confused with Inference to the Best Explanation? • William H. B. Mcauliffe 311 20 For example, Reichenbach writes, “the act of discovery [of of discovery act “the writes, Reichenbach example, For 21 Many of these reasons can be subsumed under what I believe is can be subsumed under what I believe of these reasons Many - abduction is im why important given reasons have authors Other Norwood Russell Hanson is one of the few Hanson philosophers of science Russell Norwood the gravest danger in the confusion of abduction with IBE: it results IBE: it results danger in the confusion of abduction with the gravest That is acceptable to of abduction being ignored. notion in Peirce’s of is a logic that there not believe many philosophers, because they do discovery. portant and should not be confused with IBE. Minnameier (2004) portant with IBE. Minnameier and should not be confused and IBE can abduction between distinguishing argues that correctly - science, such as re on central issues in philosophy of lead to progress virtuesalism and epistemic Campos (2011) sensibly like unification. with abduction confuses IBE with abduction equating that concludes account of IBE includes masks the fact that Lipton’s induction and also Along similar lines, Paavola induction. and abduction both of elements that brushing(2006) points out under the rug abduction of in favor in- of instances of successful interpretations IBE can lead to skewed antiseptic procedures that discovery Semmelweis’s such as Ignaz quiry, to move (2008) wishes infections. McKaughan puerperal can prevent hy- generating of either process a as abduction of interpretations past abduction them and instead to focus on how potheses or evaluating worthy of pursuit a hypothesis is. Other leads to judgments about how the utility of also made insightful points about philosophers have of abduction. notion Peirce’s deliberately uses a word or other symbol in any other sense than that than that sense in any other symbol or other a word uses deliberately a commits creator sole rightful its it by upon was conferred which the treat to others the of duty the becomes it . . .offence and shameful 2:265, 1903). In (CP 2.224, EP contempt and indignation” act with - with re right on target are worries about terminology Peirce’s my view, mess contemporaryspect to the of abduction. made have philosophers who have demonstrated how the logic of abduction plays a prominent the logic of abduction plays a prominent how demonstrated who have case careful Hanson argued through practice. in actual scientific role in physics that abduction is a ratio- works studies of groundbreaking being based on the abductions in physics, far from Many nal process. existing data and the pitfalls of on clues from whims of scientists, rely hypotheses] escapes logical analysis; there are no logical rules . . . are there hypotheses] escapes logical analysis; that logi- the not is it But genius. a of function creative the over take would all he can do is to analyze task to account for scientific discoveries; cian’s (1951, facts and a theory given to him.” between presented the relation mistake logical making a not is scientist a add, might I Further, p. 231) the (unnecessary) not following guidelines for abduction. However, by is notion of logic is not limited to formal logic. Peirce’s notion Peirce’s was referring Reichenbach If inquiry. encompassing all aspects of wider, is not part abduction But of logic. to formal logic, then he was correct: epistemic consid- bypasses genius” if he was implying that the “creative said nothing to support he had that claim. erations completely, 312 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 51 Number 3 This debatepreoccupies notjustscientistsbutalsophilosophers. are adaptationistexplanationsformanydistinctpsychological traits. psychologiststhe commonassumptionamongevolutionary thatthere directions. For example,somephilosophersofscienceare skepticalof understandinganddonotdriveduce littlenew research new intofertile not to ignore non- that theadaptationistsmayhave theedgehere. While itisimportant adaptationists oftensuggestwrong answers. tive problems thattraits have evolved tosolve correctly. Consequently, standard adaptationismisnotproperly equippedtoidentifytheadap- potheses should be formed andselected. helping researchers go beyond unproductive debates about how hy- teria forgoodabductioninmindcanimprove scientificpractice by ofarationalinquirer’spart toolkit,butalsothatkeepingPeirce’s cri- existing theories.Iwouldarguethatnotonlyisabductionacentral some Darwinian scientistsprioritize adaptivesome Darwinian such asStephen Jay Gould andRichard (1979),arguethat Lewontin only tenableexplanationofcomplexbiologicaltraits,otherscientists, Pinker andPaul Bloom (1990,p. 708) promote naturalselectionasthe hypothesizing abouttheoriginofatrait. While psychologists Steven able debateabouthow centralarole naturalselectionshouldplayin teria canhelpactualscientistsdotheirwork. First, there isconsider - examine twocasesindetailorder tomakeclearhow Peirce’s cri- there is heated debate about how to form and select hypotheses. I will hypothesisis. ofpursuitacertain worthy Mc clear wayoftesting hypotheses:demonstrate thatthetraitinquestion ing whyithasthefeatures ithas.Moreover, adaptationismprovides a elucidating theselective pressures thatledtoitsfixation andexplain- insightinto the naturenew ofeachcomplexpsychological traitby both teststoanswer suggestsfew thisquestion. and thetheory behavior isthewayitratherthansomeother leftlargelyopen, ing processes toexplainanenormousarrayofbehavior. Why human derstanding ofhumanpsychology, foritis lefttovague, generallearn- likely, itpaintsableak picture forthosewhowishtogain aricherun- rological changes, andbrainplasticity. Even ifthishypothesisismore are merely the consequence ofhumans’ increased brainsize, smallneu- ous. Consequently, they propose instead thatmostof humans’ traits many adaptive hypothesestobehighlyspeculative andunparsimoni- While these skeptics are notagainstadaptationism adaptive hypotheses.Paul Griffiths (1996)disagrees. Dennett (1995)fiercely defendsadoptinga“blithe” attitudetoward Peirce’s preference over foruberty securityinabductionsuggests For psychology biologyand evolutionary instance,inevolutionary A thoroughly adaptationistapproach, ontheother hand,canprovide Kaughan ’s more generalfocusonusingabductiontoassesshow adaptiv e hypotheses, such hypotheses usually pro- 22 This is a logical offshoot of 23 hypothesestoohighly. 24 per se, theyfind He claimsthat
Daniel 25
How did Abduction Get Confused with Inference to the Best Explanation? • William H. B. Mcauliffe 313 32 This debate 30 e explanations human cooperation, adaptiv is the importance se- of group 27 Those who defend individual se- 31 These explanations all assume that natu- These explanations all assume that 29 - mecha claim that standard researchers Some 28 eciprocity or benefitting genetic relatives, can also relatives, or benefitting genetic eciprocity elatives. r By gaining insight into the specific selective agents that agents that selective into the specific gaining insight By 26 The problem is that the evidence adduced so far by both sides the evidence adduced so far is that The problem Another debate that never seems to go away among evolutionaryamong away go to seems never that debate Another can be interpreted differently depending on one’s prior theoretical prior theoretical depending on one’s differently can be interpreted is about not just which theory the data, but which kind better explains point theorists selection theoryof furtherGroup be should investigated. theoryselection individual that cooperation of instances to apparently figur- that conclude they inadequacy this on based and explain, cannot human cooperation produced selection could have group ing out how is the most fruitful way to proceed. lection accounts of cooperation point to group selection’s conceptual selection’s lection accounts of cooperation point to group in knowledge. to yield any advances difficulties and its failure nisms that have been successful in explaining non- nisms that have explain human cooperation. mechanisms such as r is heritable and a human universal (or nearly so), and then see if the see if the and then so), (or nearly universal a human and is heritable hy- to the logic inherent adaptive to the conforms of the trait nature ques- research on progress exciting has yielded This approach pothesis. an adaptationist before dead in the water that were tions of psychology race encode the humans automatically applied, e.g., why was approach hand pheexperience the hot and why people - encounter, of those they nomenon. shaped the behavior of human ancestors, adaptationism provides much much provides of human ancestors, adaptationism shaped the behavior fertile does attrib- hypotheses than more and many deeper knowledge general ability to adapt behavior to the brain’s uting much of human non- It seems that on the fly. to its circumstances biologists and philosophers of biology biologists and philosophers should be a last resort, as in many cases they stall progress. as in many cases they stall should be a last resort, ral selection is acting differentially on the survival and reproductive on the survivalreproductive ral selection is acting differentially and success of individuals who bear certainof these theories alleles. Call all of high level that humans’ believe individual selection theories. Others incurring net that individuals are cooperation with strangers indicates must be explained in some way that fitness costs and that cooperation cooperative that more believe can incorporate this fact. These authors individuals whose fitness is decreasing— having more groups—despite so that cooperation is selected for groups, outcompete less cooperative of forms, selection theories take a variety These group level. at the group while selected, are the group e.g., some suggest that genes that benefit them an others assert hold give that cultural norms that some groups those norms. that do not have edge on competing groups lection, especially in explaining cooperative traits. Traits that benefit Traits traits. in explaining cooperative lection, especially evolutionaryan the to puzzle are benefactor the to cost a at others a incur to benefactor the causes benefits those providing that extent in the study of This puzzle has been especially salient net fitness cost. - of coopera high level unique in their cooperation in humans, who are tion with non- 314 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 51 Number 3 tirely different kindofexplanation(e.g.,individualselectiontheory). researchers outanen- todesignteststhatdonotagoodjobofruling ingeneral)has led it falls under(e.g., group selection theory of theory ratherthanthetype (e.g.,culturalgroup selection)inparticular a theory dence isdecisive. Part oftheissueisthatchoosingtotestoneversion of and neithersideseemstobeableconvincetheotherthattheirevi- commitments. are bestseenasquestions thataddress therequirements forabduction. explanation?” and“what theoriesare, even in principle,untestable?,” questions in the philosophy of science, “what constitutes a scientific scientific practicewould never get offthe ground. Thus,twoclassic explain thefactsinquestion.Otherwise, hypotheses thatwould,iftrue, pects ofgoodabductionare necessary. Scientistsmustformonlytestable and continuewritingaboutothertopics,likeIBE? tinue todismissthestudyofabductionasmerely asociologicalmatter Should otherphilosophersofsciencefollow suit?Or shouldtheycon- does show philosophy. thatabductionisalively topicincontemporary is ofphilosophers’ discussionsofscience?). to these debates (inthesescientistictimes,whoistosaywhatthevalue Neitherimportant. isthefactthatphilosophersofsciencecontribute move thingsalongisnotevidencethatabductionphilosophically basis canobjectthatthemere factthatgoodabductionhelpsscientists ate hypothesesmoving forward. clear whichkindofhigher- were doneforallareas of thestudyofhumancooperation,itwouldbe individual selectiontheorieswere borneout.If critical testsofthissort tion theorieswere whereas supported, allofthepredictions uniqueto turns outthatnoneofthepredictions thatwere uniquetogroup selec- diverge from predictions commontoallindividualselection theories.It in suchawaythatallgroup selectiontheoriesmakepredictions that to debatesabouthumancooperation.Theexperiments were designed bases ofpunishmentandreputation, twophenomenathatare central and developed aningeniouspairofstudiestoexaminetheevolutionary canbetested. type oftheory withinthegeneral out,thenindividualversions ofthetheory is ruled rectly againstindividual- more quicklyiftheyfirsttestedgroup selectiontheoriesingeneraldi- outanentirethat canrule classofhypotheses.Research wouldproceed to adhere tooneofPeirce’s criteriaforgoodabduction:testhypotheses of theirtheoretical commitments.Thatis,these researchers are failing is correct donotbother first todemonstrate thetruth type of theory Researchers already convincedontheoretical grounds thatacertain I believe abduction hasphilosophicalvalue. For example,someas- A philosopherofsciencewhodoubtsthatabduction hasarational Max Krasnow andhiscolleagues(2012)tookthePeircean route 33 The debate has been going on for at least thirty years, Thedebatehasbeengoingonforatleastthirty lev lev el theories in general. Once a type of theory el theoriesingeneral.Once atypeoftheory el theory researchers shouldusetogener- el theory 35 But thisphenomenon 34
How did Abduction Get Confused with Inference to the Best Explanation? • William H. B. Mcauliffe 315 This 37 That is, if the if is, That 36 University of Miami University [email protected] Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Psychology and the Persistent Evolutionary 38 REFERENCES Philosophers who doubt that abduction is within the scope of the scope within the is that abduction doubt who Philosophers - distinct concepts, they could be com and IBE are While abduction 251–277. , MIT Press. Nature for Human Quest If I am correct that abduction is supported rational consider- by I am correct If In short, and abduction clear IBE between keeping the distinction In scientific method overlook an important point: just as there are super - are important an overlook as there point: just method scientific when done practices that, scientific erogatory are there acts in ethics, have scientists Once being strictly necessary. good despite not are well, follow not do that predictions deduce not must they theories, testable prin- bad evidence. In based on or accept theories the theories from only necessary the the reaching are those ciple, (eventually) to steps philosophy of science does not just that realized Peirce truth. However, the general of formal logic, but rather is to an application boil down are truth the out find There can world. people the about how of study truth,the seeking of ways worse ignoring and and better objectively finding the truth of actually the value rather than downplays abduction seeking it indefinitely. the can help scientists avoid instance, good abduction For plimentary. IBE. invoking when objection lot” bad the of “best 103 (2), Synthese Explanation,” to the Loveliest 1995, “Inference Eric, Barnes, Minds: J., 2005, Adapting David Buller, ations, then Peirce’s criteria are also worth evaluating in philosophy. For For also worth in philosophy. evaluating criteria are ations, then Peirce’s for suggest- and Colin McGinn Fodor Jerry criticizes example, Dennett ing that consciousness is a mystery cannot solve. that humans set of hypotheses in consideration probably does not include the truethe include not does probably consideration in hypotheses of set explanations is not jus- of those choosing the “best” explanation, then then lines of inquiry, But if scientists only pursued promising tified. bad from IBE salvage to how out figure to need not would philosophers good lots. often have lots, because scientists would more will strengthen scholarship on Peirce, on abduction, and on IBE. on scholarship on Peirce, will strengthen starting a useful discussions of scientific place for are writings Peirce’s the pursuit of a line especially in suggesting what justifies reasoning, will justify about abduction, however, said Peirce Nothing of inquiry. to the best explanation. inference criticism only has force if there is a sound case against positing that is a sound case against positing that if there criticism only has force out Figuring mysterious. the phenomenon in question is inherently (CP 1.135, not block the way of inquiry” maxim “do whether Peirce’s - criti us decide whether Dennett’s EP 2:48, 1898) is sound can help justified. cisms are 316 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 51 Number 3 Kurzban, Robert, John Tooby, andLedaCosmides,2001,“CanRaceBe Erased? 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Abduction” in Peirce’s writings is synonymous with “hypothesis” (CP ee thediscussionofGilbert Harman, Paul Thagard, and Peter Liptonin Thagar Ther See, forexample,Psillos 1996andOkasha 2000. The “ H S or a further argumentforthispreference,or afurther seePeirce’s “An Essaytoward or example, see Reichenbach 1951, p. 231; Popper 1959, p. 20n. See Fann eferences toCPare toPeirce’s Collected Papers arman 1965, p. 89. Advocates differ onthe details,such as of the rule arman 1965, p. 89. innameier 2004;Campos2011.See alsoMcKaughan 2008,whichdoes ee Haack ofhow 2014foranoverview thisargument permeatesseveral owever, asonereferee has correctly pointedout,thismistakeisnotcom- e is,however, evidencethatvan Fraassen correctly understandsPeirce’s massive modularitythesis” statesthatthemindiscomposedofmany ent version ofthisargumentwasmadeforcefully by Norwood Rus- d, doctoral dissertation, Universityd, doctoral dissertation, of Toronto, 1977; Thagard independent par ts thateacharose through naturalselectionto Adaptation and Natural Selection: A Critique 17(4), Behavioral andBrain Sciences (1931–1958) andare inthe How did Abduction Get Confused with Inference to the Best Explanation? • William H. B. Mcauliffe 319 confirmed, wever, does strongly suggest that the decision does strongly wever, is rational. So against philosophers of science who against philosophers is rational. So and thus was easily accessible and perhaps perhaps and accessible easily was thus and Philosophy of Journal will show, many philosophers have contributed to debates in science debates in to contributed have philosophers many will show, est et al. 2008. ere is a statement of the pragmatic maxim: “Consider what effects which “Consider what effects pragmatic maxim: is a statement of the ere otice that Griffiths calls an adaptationist inference to the best explana- best the to inference an adaptationist calls Griffiths that otice y “adaptive” I mean that the trait in question spread by natural selection, by that the trait in question spread I mean y “adaptive” or example, Lipton titles chapter 7 of the second edition of his book titles chapter 7 of the second edition or example, Lipton ee, for example, Barnes 1995, which responds to the first (1991) edition edition (1991) first the to responds which 1995, Barnes example, for ee, nterestingly, it does seem as though Lipton learned Peirce’s actual notion actual notion Peirce’s it does seem as though Lipton learned nterestingly, van Fraassen 1989, pp. 142–143. Fraassen van 1995, pp. 381–383. Dennett for helpful comments on this paper. Haack I am grateful to Susan Ellis and Ketelaar 2002. and Ketelaar Ellis The debate in general, ho Pinker 2012. Pinker 2003. and Fischbacher Fehr 2002. and Gächter Fehr et al. 2011. example, see Delton For N 2000. 2005; Fodor Buller 2009. and Barrett Wilke et al. 2001; Kurzban 1994. Sober and Wilson 2008 and Williams E.g., see 2003. and Fischbacher Fehr As I B I F 1998. Khachab 2013; Hintikka El note 8. See H S W
37. 38. 35. 36. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 20. 23. 24. 19. 21. 22. 17. 18. 16. using it to generate hypotheses to choose one theory over another to test may be defended on rational grounds. grounds. another to test may be defended on rational to choose one theory over a metatheory for example, have they can use to justify their hy- Adaptationists, that the appearance of complex design in biological traits can be potheses, namely, metatheorythe Assuming selection. natural of only product the well- is abduction to the whims of scientists, abduction is supported rational by reduce considerations. tion “the ‘adaptationist abduction’” (1996, p. 521). abduction’” ‘adaptationist tion “the making the trait an “adaptation.” “Adaptationism” is an approach to the life sci- the life to approach is an “Adaptationism” an “adaptation.” trait the making and maintenance of complex biological ences that attempts to explain the origin ap- this adopt who Those selection. natural of byproducts or products as traits “adaptationists.” are proach “Bayesian Abduction.” “Bayesian are that they without explicitly acknowledging to choose hypotheses about how urged the differ- who have discussing criteria for good abduction. Philosophers this point. not stressed abduction and IBE have ence between of abduction near the end of his life. See the acknowledgments section of Campos Campos section of the acknowledgments See of his life. the end near of abduction 2011. of Lipton’s book. of Lipton’s might conceivably have practical bearings we conceive the object of our concep- the object conceive we practical bearings have might conceivably our conception of effects is the whole of these our conception Then, tion to have. to maxim this of application The 1878). 3:266, W 5.402, (CP object” the of the from hypothesis construction the explanandum follows elucidates whether hypothesis, a necessary condition for good abduction. published in the in published read. widely