A Roadmap for US Engagement with Colombia

Atlantic Council ADRIENNE ARSHT LATIN AMERICA CENTER

INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT A Roadmap for US Engagement with Colombia

CO-CHAIRS

Senator Roy Blunt Senator Ben Cardin (R-MO) (D-MD) The Atlantic Council promotes The nonpartisanArshtCenter began The Atlantic Council’s Adrienne ArshtLatin America Center isdedicated to broadening www.AtlanticCouncil.org. global challenges. fundamental nature ofdiscussions on May 2017 ISBN: 978-1-61977-412-4 Washington, DC20005 1030 15thStreet NW, 12th Floor Atlantic Council or reviews. Pleasedirect inquiriesto: quotations innews articles,critical articles, Atlantic Council, except inthecaseofbrief without permission inwritingfrom the transmitted inany form orby any means this publication may bereproduced or States. Allrightsreserved. Nopartof © 2017 The Atlantic Council oftheUnited For more information, pleasevisit Europe, theUnited States, andbeyond. that highlighttheregion’s potential as Latin Americaandto develop new ideas Latin America.Itisfocused onbringing a strategic andeconomic partnerfor and innovative policy recommendations and academicleadersto changethe awareness ofthetransformational political, in international affairs basedonthe central constructive leadershipandengagement operations inOctober 2013. in new political,corporate, civilsociety, economic, andsocialchangesthroughout role oftheAtlantic Community inmeeting

DIRECTORS CO-CHAIRS US Engagement withColombia A Roadmap for INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT Atlantic Council Peter Schechter (R-MO) Senator Roy Blunt Atlantic Council Jason Marczak (D-MD) Senator Ben Cardin

POLICY MAKERSSPEAKOUT will alsobuildonColombia’s role asastrategic partnerininternational affairs.” bia free trade agreement, withexciting new investment potential inrural areas. Peace “The US private sector shouldsee peace as an opportunity to build on the US-Colom- to establish peace intheirown fragile nations.” governance andsecurity, willbeviewed asamodelfor countries whoare struggling Colombia into apeaceful democracy. Inthefuture, itshistoric turnaround in has supported theColombian people andgovernment asthey have transformed “Plan Colombia isanexample ofavisionary, bipartisanstrategic framework that people ofColombia withtough, principleddiplomacy.” in Colombia will require asustained, strategic investment inthegovernment and “Investing inColombia pays dividendsfar beyond national borders. Advancing peace United States.” foundation for shared progress, durable peace, and lasting partnershipwiththe smart roadmap for Peace Colombia to helpdeepenthese gainsandbuildastrong thanks to theresilience oftheColombian people. Now, thetaskforce provides a of conflict has receded andanew era ofprosperity taken root. This success is “Plan Colombia helped facilitate Colombia’s remarkable transformation asalegacy financial andpoliticalsupport.” the past two decades.Now, peace building willrequire theinternational community’s “Colombia hasmadeimpressive economic, social,andsecuritytransformations in of theUS-Colombia Business Council. VICKI HOLLUB isChiefExecutive Officer of Occidental Petroleum Corporation andChair STEPHEN HADLEYserved asNational SecurityAdvisor underPresident George W. Bush. RUDY GIULIANIserved asMayor of New York Cityfrom 1994to 2001. Advisor for PresidentObama. Barack TONY BLINKENserved asUSDeputySecretary of State andDeputyNational Security and asUSPermanent Representative to theUnited Nations. SECRETARY MADELEINEALBRIGHTserved asUSSecretary of State from 1997 to 2001

a priorityasitiscriticalto thenational securityinterests oftheUnited States.” Hemisphere safer andmore prosperous. Ourrelationship withColombia must remain “Our partnershipwithColombia over thepast two decadeshasmadetheWestern paid offhandsomely.” the world —andthat isonemore way inwhichAmerica’s investment inColombia has now helpstrain andprepare securityforces elsewhere intheregion and throughout crime have given thecountry considerable securityexpertise. As aresult, Colombia ence inthat fightandinitscampaignsagainst theillegaldrug trade andorganized combating theFARC hasbeen asignificantmutualachievement. Colombia’s experi- “Colombia has longbeenastrategic partner for theUnited States, anditssuccess in ready to supportthisendeavor.” velopment Bank,incooperation withotherinternational financialinstitutions, stands with theNorthernTriangle countries) andhumanitarianrelief. The Inter-American De- other countries inareas suchascitizen security(witness theAlliance for Prosperity lombia, whichhasallowed, amongst others,for theGovernment ofColombia to assist force’s recommendations buildonthegenerous bipartisansupportgiven to PlanCo- destabilizing impactofsocialandpoliticalconflict inneighboring Venezuela. The task mentation inColombia, includingworking to counter risingcoca production andthe areas where collaboration withtheUnited States canhelpto ensure robust imple- such asagrowing politicalpolarization. This report describesseveral ofthosekey ments andgetaheadofrisksthat could undermine thebenefitsofagreement not immediate anditwillonly materialize ifthecountry isableto make criticalinvest- international allieslike theUnited States. InColombia’s casethepeace dividendis a numberofchallengesthat willrequire thecontinued cooperation oflongstanding “As itembarks ontheimplementation ofthePeace Agreement, Colombia willface and served asUSSecretary of State from 2001 to 2005. GENERAL COLIN POWELL isaretired four-star General in theUnited States Army and served asDirector of theCentral Intelligence Agency from 2011 to 2012. GENERAL DAVID PETRAEUS isaretired four-star General intheUnited States Army Ambassador of Colombia to theUnited States from 1998to 2005. LUIS ALBERTO MORENOisPresident of theInter-American Development andserved Bank as TABLE OFCONTENTS COLOMBIA PEACE ANDPROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS TASK FORCE CO THE SECRET BEHIND PLAN COLOMBIA — THE ROAD AHEAD — PEACE, DRUGS, ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND KEY ISSUES FOR US POLICY MAKERS CAN IT BE REPLICATED? ENDNOTES FOR US ENGAGEMENT IN COLOMBIA FROM THREAT TO OPPORTUNITY — THE STRATEGIC CASE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FOREWORD INTRODUCTION A Double-Edged Sword: Peace Implementation 14 What is at Stake? Key Issues for US Policy Makers 16 Why Peace Matters for the United States 16 Political Polarization 14 31 01 – 06 CHAIRS AND MEMBERS 03 30 12 24

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FOREWORD (R-MO) Senator Roy Blunt Colombia isembarking onanambitiouseffort while expanding itsfootprint inthe world. The States isestablishing its foreign policy priorities, T century ofarmedconflict between the govern- to buildpeace andconsolidate security at home the PlanColombia framework, ourcountries’ capabilities, andfuture imperatives. the Atlantic Council, we metinthe Capitol with Prosperity Task Force. Colombia’s Congress had assessment ofUSpolicy toward Colombia. After and principles,informed by arigorous ambassadors ofbothcountries, leadersofthe an impressive group ofseniorpolicy makers are manifest andextensive. for thefirst timeasthe Colombia Peace and from current andformer administrations, the evaluation ofourpast commitments, current implications for USnational securityinterests ment andtheRevolutionary ArmedForces of moment anew Administration intheUnited relationship isat adefiningmoment. At the very nearly two decadesofclosepartnershipunder believe ournation’s response to thesechal- private sector, andexperts from civilsociety lenges shouldbeguidedby America’s values just approved apeace accord endingover halfa This report strives to provide precisely suchan On December 8,2016, undertheauspices of challenges intheworld today. Asmem- bers oftheUnited States Senate we he United States faces awiderange of COLOMBIA PEACE ANDPROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT Colombia successful andapplythoselessons to Colombia (FARC) andthenewly elected United work. Membersofthetaskforce agreed that (D-MD) Senator Ben Cardin defining moment. our countries’ relationship isat a the PlanColombia framework, transformative partnershipunder After nearlytwo decadesof States President was beginningto puthisfor- changing timesandcurrent realities. The goal: to understand thefactors that madePlan tues ofcontinuity was insufficient. Weneeded of thetransformative impactofUSdiplomacy Plan Colombia provided acompelling example also knew that resting ourlaurels onthevir- able template for sustained, successful, and and foreign assistance, andremained aremark for Americantaxpayers. forge arebooted strategy tailored to secure U.S. erations, andbrought urgency andfocus to our events were prominent inthetaskforce’s delib- eign policy team inplace. interests andmaximize thereturn oninvestment bipartisan foreign policymaking. However, we The far-reaching implications ofboththese | A ROADMAP FOR USENGAGEMENT WITHCOLOMBIA - 1

FOREWORD

A view of Colombian capital Bogotá. Colombia is one of the United States closest allies.

Our report focuses on how the relationship and advancing these interests will require an with Colombia impacts the national security engaged United States that combines sustained, interests of the United States, and how those strategic investments in the government and interests can be advanced most effectively. As people of Colombia with tough, principled such, our report is directed primarily at US diplomacy. Third, that Colombia is one of our policy makers responsible for navigating the closest allies and investments in Colombia pay transition from Plan Colombia to its successor dividends far beyond national borders. These strategy, Peace Colombia. conclusions underpin the report that follows and The members of our task force reflected a our recommendations for US policy makers. diversity of backgrounds and perspectives. This is a moment of great promise for the Members differed at times on issues such as rapport between Colombia and the United counternarcotics strategy and their analysis of States. But as we navigate together through the peace accord. We agreed, however, on three new waters, our relationship will require atten- fundamental tenets. First, vital US interests— tion and skillful policymaking. We hope the work SEL/FLICKR security and the fight against drugs, regional of this task force will serve to underscore the Ä stability and geopolitics, democracy and human enduring U.S. stake in Colombian peace and rights, and American jobs—remain very much prosperity, and provide a roadmap for a new era

at stake in Colombia. Second, safeguarding of success in our engagement with Colombia. TR MARCELO

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transformation. the next phaseofColombia’s to maintainamajorstake in presented withtheopportunity Today, theUnited States is EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Colombia, avisionary strategic framework sus- 95 percent offundsfor thejointstrategy, the that hasalsosucceeded insafeguarding vital consolidated amutually beneficial relationship of bothpoliticalparties,countries have tained over almost two decadesby USleaders transformed Colombia from anation onthe drugs, andviolence. crime, Together, these US interests. Plan Colombia: Colombia achieved animpres- United States inthistransformation addsupto an importantUSforeign policy achievement of assistance, andintelligence sharingrole ofthe and theUSdecidedto embarkonafirm and peace, democracy. sive national consensus to buildstate capacity, never beensointertwined. Asaresult ofPlan political leadership, technical advice, military increasingly toan peacefulbrink andprosperous bipartisan commitment to combat organized A Two politicalrealities cametogether under Though Colombia contributed more than States andColombia first pledged to unite inthecauseoffriendship lmost two centuries after theUnited 1 thetwo nations’ destinies have COLOMBIA PEACE ANDPROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT American jobs,andadvancing USgeostrategic (FARC). The peace agreement aimsto address with theNational Liberation Army (ELN)are global proportions. Althoughfinalvictory still opportunity to maintainamajorstake inthenext cannot bedeclare —andColombia still hasto cultivation, andanuncertain peace process competing USglobalprioritiesat atimeof changing times.President Trump’s world vision, tion ofdusting offthePlan Colombia playbook. conclusion, however. Nor isitsimplyaques- the national securitybenefitsofits$10billion objectives withthecooperation ofalike-minded the Revolutionary ArmedForces ofColombia United States enviable opportunitiesto reap New realities demandanupdated strategy for Plan Colombia investment: sustaining thefight a strategic partnershipwithColombia offers the all factors that needto beconsidered inanew armed forces to confront threats to peace and against transnational organized crime, leverag- ambitious, ifpolarizing,peace accord with deal with a number of challenges, including deal withanumberofchallenges,including democracy ofincreasing international stature. standing by Colombia. shrinking budgets,resurgent Colombian coca strategic vision. security intheAmericasandaround theworld, ernment recently concluded anhistoric and increased coca cultivation —theUnited States ing theaccumulated expertise oftheColombian phase ofColombia’s transformation. Solidifying has madeitselfstronger andmore secure in harnessing Colombia’s growing market to create Today, theUnited States ispresented withthe Seizing theseopportunitiesisnotaforegone Perhaps most notably, theColombian gov | A ROADMAP FOR USENGAGEMENT WITHCOLOMBIA - 3

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Colombian government now faces the challenge of implementing a peace agreement with the FARC.

the root causes of the half-a-century conflict, To meet this challenge, a new framework — namely the stark economic inequalities, the Peace Colombia — has emerged to guide the rural-urban divide, and the historical exclusion next chapter of US-Colombia relations. To suc- of Afro-Colombians, indigenous people, women ceed, Peace Colombia must, like Plan Colombia, and poor farmers. The accord includes pro- be sustained, bipartisan, and adequately visions for full disarmament of the FARC and resourced. It must identify clear goals and meet renunciation of drug trafficking, reparations and benchmarks that demonstrate its value to US land restitution for more than 8 million victims taxpayers. And it must be narrowly tailored to and 7 million internally displaced people (IDPs). advance the vital US national security interests Applied robustly, the peace accord represents at stake in Colombia, starting with safeguarding an historic opportunity to extend state pres- Plan Colombia’s security and counter narcotics ence and democratic institutions throughout achievements. Colombia’s territory, with corresponding peace Support to Colombia should not be a blank dividends in security, stability, counter narcotics, check. To be politically sustainable, it must economic development, and measures to address provide a clear return on investment and the long-term roots of violent conflict that cost address key concerns of US policy makers. more than 220,000 lives. Applied poorly, the These concerns include: securing the Colombian agreement may sap government resources while government’s continued cooperation in the leaving gross war crimes unpunished and allow- fight against transnational organized crime at a ing new illegal armed groups to appropriate the time of record high Colombian coca cultivation 2 FARC’s territory and illicit activities. (188,000 hectares in 2016) as well as seizures; CANCILLERIA PERU/FLICKR DE

4 COLOMBIA PEACE AND PROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT | A ROADMAP FOR US ENGAGEMENT WITH COLOMBIA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

demonstrating that the US-Colombia Trade Recognize that robust peace accord Promotion Agreement (TPA) benefits American 2 compliance and implementation is crit- workers; and ensuring that Colombia continues ical to US national security interests and re- to operate as a force for stability in a region still gional stability. Assistance and monitoring by prone to outbreaks of anti-American authoritar- US authorities can be decisive in helping Co- ianism. Catalytic US foreign assistance must be lombia meet concrete benchmarks, includ- combined with tough, principled diplomacy. ing expanded state presence in post-conflict The Colombia Peace and Prosperity Task areas, credible transitional justice processes Force set out to define how the Trump admin- and victims’ protections, and the verifiable istration and the United States Congress can disarmament, demobilization, and reincorpo- most effectively advance US national security, ration of former FARC members. These ac- economic, and geopolitical interests while tions are imperative to enhanced democratic supporting Colombia at an inflection point governance, rule of law, and to realizing a last- in its history. The task force concluded that ing peace. advancing US interests and consolidating Plan Colombia as a foreign policy success will require Put forward policies that expand US-Co- a strategy of sustained, principled engage- 3 lombia cooperation in order to achieve ment with the Colombian government and concrete victories against transnational crim- people. Therefore, this report aims to provide inal networks, including reducing coca cultiva- a roadmap for continued bilateral strategy and tion and trafficking, and other sources of vio- recommends that US policy makers take the lence such as human trafficking, illegal mining, following actions: and corruption. Recognize that achieving these security gains entails a joint effort and Establish Peace Colombia as the ongo- requires continued strengthening of the capac- 1 ing strategic framework for US policy, fully ity of the Colombian justice system. funding the strategy with a near-term assur- ance of resources to safeguard US interests in Deepen US commercial and economic the critical post-conflict period. This will main- 4 cooperation through Peace Colombia tain a sustained, bipartisan vision for US policy and the existing TPA framework to maximize toward Colombia that builds on the success of US business opportunities, spur Colombian Plan Colombia and addresses the areas where market expansion, reignite economic develop- improvement is necessary. ment, protect labor rights, and bolster job cre- ation in post-conflict and historically marginalized areas.

Advancing US interests and Expand the shared security portfolio in consolidating Plan Colombia 5 international hotspots where Colombian as a foreign policy success will military and peacebuilding expertise can play require a strategy of sustained, a pivotal role to advance US interests glob- principled engagement with ally. Deepen diplomatic coordination on the the Colombian government most urgent issues facing Latin America: dem- and people. ocratic institutions under assault, judicial corruption, and human rights abuses in Venezuela.

COLOMBIA PEACE AND PROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT | A ROADMAP FOR US ENGAGEMENT WITH COLOMBIA 5 “W — ifstill incomplete —victory for USnational 6 Armed Forces ofColombia (FARC), aMarxist- Americas there exists aclearandcompelling (1998–2002) initiated apeace process, during Congress now have anopportunityto consoli- INTRODUCTION with beingdeclared afailed state. which theFARC took advantage ofaseries gency, drugcartels, andadeepeconomic government hadgonetheextra milefor central government since the1960s,and control oftwo thirds ofitsterritory to compet- outcomes intheMiddleEast. Buthere inthe out militarydeployments andinconclusive channeling thenation’s frustration withdrawn- convinced USpolicy makers that theColombian concessions butcontinued itscriminal andter- United SelfDefense Forces ofColombia (AUC), Leninist insurgency that hadbeenfightingthe United States. Then-candidate Trump was a right-wing paramilitary umbrella organization In 1999, then-President Andrés Pastrana date that victory. security policy. The Trump administration and sometimes operating incollusion withgov ernment securityforces. ing terrorist organizations —theRevolutionary ity that ahemispherically, Colombia, hadlost rorist activities.Pastrana’s ill-fated negotiations recession, appeared illequippedto respond. leading producer ofcoca leaf,

The Colombian government, besetby insur- In 1999, theUnited States confronted thereal - COLOMBIA PEACE ANDPROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT Donald Trump ashecam- e don’twinanymore,” said paigned for president ofthe 3 Already theworld’s 4 Colombia flirted 5 - | A ROADMAP FOR USENGAGEMENT WITHCOLOMBIA Colombia emerged asarare feat inpolarized Colombia was bornin1999asapackage of groups well financed by theirinvolvement in guerrilla andparamilitary violence, andunder- than 2percent of thecost oftheIraq War over totaling $10billionover fifteen years —less this periodwas undeniable. With USsupport times: abipartisan,sustained foreign policy of refugees galvanized USleadersto protect threat posedby theFARC andotherguerrilla US security, geopolitical, commercial, andlaw administration alsorecognized that Colombia as well asCongress andtheexecutive, Plan assistance to helpColombia combat drugs, policy success. a bipartisan,sustained foreign rare feat inpolarized times: Plan Colombia emerged asa success. Colombia’s transformation during democratic institutions andtheruleoflaw. development, andto strengthen itsmilitaryand enforcement interests. Carefully balancingthe in thisfightandthepotential ofanoutflow interests andconcerns ofbothpoliticalparties peace. USleadersinCongress andtheClinton narco-trafficking. required assistance to confront thegrowing The possibility that Colombia mightfalter Over thenext decade andahalf, Plan

INTRODUCTION

the same period7 and less than 5 percent of the total expenditures on Plan Colombia — the Colombian government’s territorial control expanded and its democratic institutions became stronger. A liberal- ized economy quadrupled in size, poverty fell 55 percent, and homicides and kidnappings declined 56 percent and 90 percent, respectively.8 Perhaps most significantly — under a Former Colombian President Álvaro Uribe pushed for a “democratic security” “democratic security” strategy. strategy championed by former President Álvaro Uribe (2002–2010) with also soon-to-be a member of the Organisation President Juan Manuel Santos as his defense for Economic Co-operation and Development minister (2006–2009) — thousands of guerrilla (OECD), a major international stamp of approval fighters were demobilized, state power was for a country’s economic stewardship. projected to areas once abandoned to guerrilla The contrast with neighboring Venezuela operations, and the balance of forces between could not be more stark. Colombia is a model the government and the FARC steadily tilted for responsible global citizenship — open, inte- toward the government. Still, the humanitarian grated, democratic, increasingly prosperous, toll of a five decade-long war totaled 220,000 and committed to the rule of law — and for the lives, 8 million victims and some 7 million IDPs, benefits of partnership with the United States. the second highest in the world after Syria. Today, Colombia again finds itself at a cross- For the United States, the benefits of a stron- roads, as does the US-Colombia partnership. ger Colombia have extended beyond stabilizing Late last year, after four years of negotiations a hemispheric ally, disarming a hostile guerilla directed by President Juan Manuel Santos group, and attacking the cocaine trade at its (2010–present), the Colombian government root. Colombia is one of the United States’ most reached an historic agreement with the FARC consistent and capable hemispheric partners. to end Latin America’s longest running armed It collaborates on US diplomatic objectives at conflict. Colombia has transformed from a the United Nations on issues such as Ukraine, country ravaged by violence to one capable of Syria and North Korea, cooperates in the fight controlling its territory and advancing shared against transnational organized crime, provides interests with the United States. Our alignment an expanding market for US products and ranges from combating transnational organized services, and contributes security expertise to crime to promoting a peaceful, prosperous, and Central America, Afghanistan, several countries stable hemisphere.

CENTRO DEMOCRÁTICO/FLICKR CENTRO in Africa, and the United Nations. Colombia is

COLOMBIA PEACE AND PROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT | A ROADMAP FOR US ENGAGEMENT WITH COLOMBIA 7 INTRODUCTION

to help Colombia “win the peace.”10 its three pillars include: “1) consolidating and expanding progress on security and counter narcotics while reintegrating the FARC into society; 2) expanding state presence and institutions to strengthen the rule of law and rural economies, especially in former conflict areas; and 3) promoting justice and other essential services for conflict victims.”11 The United States has much to gain — but also much to lose — from the outcome of Colombia’s efforts to end a decades-long armed conflict while continuing to fight drug traffick- Anti-narcotics police work to uproot coca production. ing and transnational organized crime. The Trump administration has a unique opportunity to set its own direction around US engagement Still, Colombia faces significant challenges, with Colombia, creating a path forward that including a sharp rise in coca cultivation, builds on past successes while addressing areas attacks on social leaders and human rights where outcomes have fallen short. defenders, the need to implement a complex In this context, members of the Atlantic peace accord amid political polarization, and Council’s Colombia Peace and Prosperity Task the emergence of new illegal networks that Force — elected and appointed officials from benefit from drug trafficking, extortion, human both political parties and leaders from govern- trafficking, and illegal mining, and that seek to ment, business, and civil society — set out to co-opt FARC territory, members, and criminal provide independent analysis and recommen- enterprises.9 The Colombian government will dations regarding US policy toward Colombia at have to keep building its own capacities in a critical juncture: the first months of the Trump previously forgotten and marginalized areas, administration in the United States, and the largely populated by Afro-Colombian and start of the post-conflict period in Colombia. indigenous communities. The United States has The task force members believe, emphat- a direct stake in how Colombia resolves each of ically, that advancing US national security these challenges. interests and consolidating Plan Colombia as The United States has the opportunity to a foreign policy success — continuing to “win” maintain a major stake in the next phase of in Colombia and the Americas — will require a Colombia’s transformation, thus ensuring US strategy of sustained, principled engagement interests are protected in the process. The with the Colombian government and its people. Peace Colombia framework — a successor Peace accord implementation will be hard and strategy to Plan Colombia announced by at times unpopular, requiring painful sacrifices. President Barack Obama in February 2016 Nonetheless, the United States is uniquely posi- — opens the door for a new plan of engage- tioned to help support rigorous compliance ment. The strategy aims to consolidate Plan with the peace agreement, and in doing so to Colombia’s security gains and reinvigorate advance US interests and sustain Colombia’s counter narcotics efforts while providing a emergence as an increasingly important strate-

near-term surge in catalytic US assistance gic partner of the United States. MARTINEZ FERNANDO PHOTO/WILLIAM AP

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ways. But,itwillrequire more thanjust business States. Having accompanied Colombia inhard ENGAGEMENT INCOLOMBIA THE STRATEGIC CASE FOR US FROM THREAT TO OPPORTUNITY times, anengagedUnited States stands to profit challenges butto seize opportunities.Growing cultivation, ithasbecome asuccessful, entre- the ruleoflaw andcombating resurgent coca continued strengthening. While Colombia faces cultivation serve asareminder that progress is organized crime. Colombia’s past success and US geopoliticalinterests. Suchaninvestment, and transnational organized crime;enhanced as usual.What isneededarenewed long-term focused onfour areas: robust peace accord from Colombia’s emergence inanumberof detailed inthisreport’s recommendations, will strategic opportunities. economic cooperation; andcollaboration on economic, diplomatic, andgovernance capacity undeniable challenges,includingconsolidating implementation; security, counter narcotics, investment intheUS-Colombia partnership, income nations. institutions are increasingly strong, butneed in thefightagainst transnational networks of makes itanattractive partnerfor theUnited represents notjust achance to manageongoing become oneofLatin America’s first higher preneurial country that, inadecade, could well possible butnotinevitable. Colombia remains at more recent challengesin combating coca position theUnited States to seize anumberof A Today, astrong partnershipwithColombia The first opportunityis renewed momentum Colombia was created to protect US interests, Colombia’s democratic lmost two decadesafter Plan COLOMBIA PEACE ANDPROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT Colombia’s emergence asanimportantsecurity On balance, thistaskforce believes that the Colombian government hasthepoliticalwill Colombia. Butthisisonly possible ifthe will abideby theircommitment to terminate weaken theillicitdrugtrade inandbeyond organized crimeacross theAmericas,in the epicenter ofaglobalcocaine trade that fuels the agreements. the United States must closelymonitor the opportunities outweigh thedangers.Following tunity to disruptthebroader globaltraffickingof the United States withanunprecedented oppor- United States, andbeyond. Ronald Reagan’s admonitionto “trust butverify,” FARC’s commitment —asrequired by thepeace FARC territory andits illicitbusinesses (includ- Liberation Army (ELN)andsuccessors to illegal accords to ensure that bothFARC and govern- accord —to turnover assets andprovide full and resources to doso. Itmust quicklyinvest involvement inthelucrative drugtrade andsur- illicit drugs.Yet, partofthecontroversy over the information aboutcriminaloperations. in counter narcotics activities,andenforce the illegal mining), ing drugtrafficking, human and trafficking, in post-conflict areas, prevent theNational ment are complying withthespiritandletter of milestones intheimplementation ofthe peace render thefundsderived from criminalactivities. peace accord iswhethertheex-FARC leadership paramilitary armedgroups from seizingformer The peace accord presents aplatform to A second opportunityisto take advantage of Accomplishing theseobjectives would provide | A ROADMAP FOR USENGAGEMENT WITHCOLOMBIA 12 enlist former FARC members 9

FROM THREAT TO OPPORTUNITY

Colombia’s exports have diversified far beyond the fruits and vegetables on display at this Bogotá market. exporter in areas of vital strategic interest (UN’s) chronically under resourced Department to the United States, particularly in Central of Peacekeeping Operations. America,13 Mexico, Afghanistan, and African Colombia has also moved to expand countries such as Nigeria, Kenya, and South cooperation with NATO. Currently, a NATO Africa.14 In 2013, for example, the US-Colombia “global partner” — the only one in Latin Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation America — Colombia recently opened talks on delivered 39 capacity-building activities in a cooperation agreement with NATO, one step four Central American countries, focused on short of full membership.20 Peace with the FARC areas such as asset forfeiture, investigations, and potentially the ELN should, in time, free the polygraphs, and interdiction.15 By 2016, this Colombian military to play a greatly expanded cooperation had expanded to include over 271 role on global security initiatives of interest to activities in six countries in Central America the United States. As the new United States and the Caribbean.16 Administration reviews its role in such activities, In addition, Colombia signaled its intention Colombia stands ready to boost its presence. to increase participation in United Nations Third, the Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA) peacekeeping missions with the signing of with Colombia — the fourth biggest market in a framework agreement in 2015. Colombia’s Latin America21 with an economy that grew an long-standing deployment of hundreds of average of 4.3 percent per year from 2007 to peacekeepers in the Sinai Peninsula,17 its short- 201522 — provides increasing opportunities for term commitment to send additional personnel US firms. US goods exports to Colombia totaled to Haiti and Guinea Bissau,18 and its medi- $13.1 billion in 2016, more than double the figure um-term plan to contribute up to 5,000 troops19 in 2005.23 Trade with Colombia supported an creates an opportunity for a high-capacity, estimated 77,000 American jobs in 2014, the last 24 US-trained military to help the United Nation’s year for which data was available. DASEINDESIGN/FLICKR

10 COLOMBIA PEACE AND PROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT | A ROADMAP FOR US ENGAGEMENT WITH COLOMBIA FROM THREAT TO OPPORTUNITY

Effective implementation of the peace accord supports a strong Organization of American and eventual accession to the OECD, once States. Colombia implements all market access and Of particular relevance is Colombia’s poten- labor rights requirements, will enhance invest- tially critical role in addressing the economic, ment opportunities for US businesses in areas governance, and humanitarian crisis in next-door such as infrastructure, the extractive sector, Venezuela. Colombia’s equities with Venezuela agriculture, and tourism. This will not be a small are broad and complex, including border secu- achievement. The OECD is an elite global club rity, migration, and the ELN peace negotiations. of countries that follow responsible economic Nonetheless, Colombia will have an essential policies. Only two Latin American countries role to play in responding to the deepening (Chile and Mexico) are currently members. humanitarian catastrophe in Venezuela, as well A recent study by Control Risks on Colombia’s as galvanizing a more forceful regional response peace dividend notes, for example, unexplored to President Nicolás Maduro’s attacks on human onshore oil potential in areas such as the rights, civil society, and democratic institutions Caguán-Putumayo Basin and immense mining and the devastation inflicted by food and medi- potential in zones previously off-limits to large cine shortages and violence. private sector projects. The Colombian gov- More broadly, the Colombian example is an ernment is investing in these areas. Expected undervalued source of soft power for the United infrastructure investments include $1 to $2.3 States and a powerful counter example to failed, billion to pave tertiary roads in 281 priority authoritarian, anti-American governments like municipalities and plans to modernize airports, Venezuela. The United States has a deep stake seaports, and railroads.25 The study also notes in Colombia’s continued progress. But success that local communities, empowered by the will depend in large part on meeting the chal- peace accord and Constitutional Court rulings, lenges and seizing on peace implementation will have a significant say in the development of to generate market-based sustainable growth, projects, necessitating strong community con- extend economic opportunity to the poor and sultation and corporate responsibility practices excluded, create jobs and social mobility, formal- by US firms seeking to do business.26 ize the economy and improve tax collection, and Finally, Colombia is today one of the United strengthen the rule of law to fight corruption, States’ most consistent diplomatic partners in crime, and violence.28 the Americas. State Department analyses of Led by a Nobel Peace Prize recipient and voting practices in the UN General Assembly carrying out a peace process that enjoys near show Colombia coincided with the US on 80 universal international support, Colombia’s percent of important votes in both 2014 and international standing has arguably never been 2015, the highest in Latin America for 2014 and higher than it is today. A close diplomatic second highest for 2015.27 Some key instances partner of the United States appears poised to where Colombia has backed the US on global become a more formidable regional and inter- challenges are Ukrainian territorial integrity and national player. At a moment of unprecedented human rights issues in North Korea and Syria. challenges on the global stage — and in a world Within the Americas, Colombia is a consistent, seemingly plagued by bad news — a deepening if not uniformly, like-minded voice on issues of partnership with an increasingly capable and democracy, human rights, trade, defense coop- democratic Colombia is of growing strategic eration, and the environment. Colombia was a value to the United States.

founding member of the Pacific Alliance and

COLOMBIA PEACE AND PROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT | A ROADMAP FOR US ENGAGEMENT WITH COLOMBIA 11 PLAN COLOMBIA THE SECRET BEHIND CAN ITBEREPLICATED? 12 vided PlanColombia afirmbipartisan foothold 2001, senior membersofbothpartieshadpro- Clinton administration, itwas strongly supported Colombia. At that time, Congressional leaders clear goals,andlongevity —ultimately funda- ted partnerachieving measurable results that taxpayer dollarswere well-invested inacommit- old-fashioned politicalcoaxing andcompromise, taking office the year after Plan Colombia was the Senate. of bothpartiesintheHouseand(especially) after year, were subjectto intense debate and and crucially, thestrong perception that US and visionaryleadersinbothparties,butalsoby and thenMajorityLeader Trent Lott (R–MS),and formidable today, butthechallenges were scrutiny. PlanColombia’s bipartisansupport, san supportfrom theoutset.Proposed by the strategy survived analmost immediate change ultimately approved withvotes from members initial adoptionandsubsequentrenewal, year in USnational securitystrategy. in administration. President George W. Bush, mental to itssuccess benefited USinterests. by high-mindednational securitypolicy making by thenHouseSpeaker DennisHastert (R–IL) born, embraced theplanaswell. By theendof perhaps even greater at theoutsetofPlan mitment to theUS-Colombia partnershipseem I

The obstacles to asustained, strategic com- Plan Colombia enjoyed significantbiparti- COLOMBIA PEACE ANDPROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT was hatched insomeidealized pre-parti- t istempting to believe that PlanColombia san Washington. Itwas not.The strategy’s 30 Itsfirst big test camewhenthe 29 — were madepossible

| A ROADMAP FOR USENGAGEMENT WITHCOLOMBIA What policy makers lacked inproof ofconcept, Colombia, aswell asa perception ofsteady suc- Colombia benefitted from consistently strong they overcame through ashared appreciation of to approve almost $1billioninUSassistance for cocktail, butsustaining ityear after year required on PlanColombia. cess. Crucially, Colombia would itselfcontribute on thewealthy to supplementthedefense US interests andawillingness to moldapolicy and alame-duckadministration, fresha off an uncertain partnerandanunproven strategy. additional ingredients. Most crucially, Plan and evolving on-the-ground realities. an estimated 95 percent ofthetotal expenditure from aparticularpoliticalcontext andlegislative unprecedented focus to thesecurityandcounter bruising impeachmentbattle, joinedtogether response to thedomestic politicalenvironment narcotics effort, even imposingaspecialtax leadership, politicalwill, andpolicy continuity in of PlanColombia. even greater at theoutset the challengeswere perhaps seem formidable today, but US-Colombia partnership strategic commitment to the The obstacles to asustained, Plan Colombia’s initialapproval benefitted 31 President Uribebrought

violence against humanrightsdefenders and 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 FIGURE 1. Source: securityassistance.org/colombia. troubling development involved theextrajudicial other vulnerable groups, orthecontinued forced controversy, mainlyfocused oncontinuing, well- to between 3.6and5million. civilian deaths andthesize oftheFARC were cut the endofUribe’s term in2010, bothwar-related to 2010 and$3.5billionfrom 2011 to 2015. Uribe’s first year inoffice (2002–2003), with and by 2004,theColombian police hadapres- attacks by theFARC, ELN, andparamilitar- about 25percent oftheirfighters inPresident army collusion withparamilitaries, targeted declined 47 percent between 2000 and2003, displacement ofmillionsvictims.Onedeeply —whether documented humanrightsconcerns from PlanColombia were notwithout ence inevery municipalityinthecountry. execution by themilitaryofthousands ies diminishingsignificantly. Coca cultivation innocent civiliansdisguisedascombat kills in half — though the number of IDPs ballooned in half—thoughthenumberofIDPsballooned results. By oneestimate, illegalarmedgroups lost budget. ’96 Still, thecounter Plan Colombia quickly began to show positive

’98 32 ’00

This taxtotaled $4.3billionfrom 2006 US Aidto Colombia COLOMBIA PEACE ANDPROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT

’02 Millions of nominal US dollars

Economic/Institutional Assistance Military/Police Assistance insurgency efforts stemming ’04

’06 ’08 35

’10

’12

34 ’14 33 By By

’16 — have proven effective, thoughnot foolproof, (so-called “false positives”). Inlightofthese violations. years were weighted heavily toward expensive the Colombian armed forces. Beginningin2008, concerns, afinalsource of Plan Colombia’s targeted individuals.” of theLeahy Law —avetting process to prevent organized crimeandhumanrightsviolations, turbulence to emerge asperhapstheforemost take encouragement from theexperience of confidence that the Colombian government is on investment for US taxpayers, andthe of hindsight—theknowledge that asustained tools for advancing adherence to international Plan Colombia expenditures duringtheearly Plan Colombia cameto bemore evenly balanced Restitution Law, provide opportunitiesto Afro- Plan Colombia, whichovercame similarpolitical and professionalize itsmilitaryandpolice, but funding for economic, institution building,and durability lay precisely initscapacityto adaptin funding from reaching humanrightsabusers descendant andindigenouscommunities, and strategy with cleargoalscanproduce areturn evolving Colombian andUSpolicy interests. establish aprogram to protect journalists, labor equally committed to thosegoals.Andthey can implement alandmarkVictims andLand it alsohelpedto “strengthen investigations of humanitarian ends(see Figure 1). between such“hard side”expenditures and military hardware andintelligence capabilitiesto response to circumstances ontheground and past twenty years. bipartisan foreign policy success story ofthe norms andaccountability for human rights leaders, human rights defenders, and other leaders, humanrightsdefenders, andother Today, USpolicy makers have theadvantage While itwas conceived asaholistic strategy, Human rightsconditionality andenforcement Plan Colombia allowed Colombia to expand | A ROADMAP FOR USENGAGEMENT WITHCOLOMBIA 37

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 36 38

“supporting efforts by theGovernment of Colom- 14 the enormouslyunpopular FARC. price paidfor anagreement with country deeplydividedover the The peace dealbeginslife withthe voted overwhelmingly to approve it. Colombia, inApril2016, theUSSenate adopt- Consistent withthebipartisan legacy ofPlan Political Polarization FOR USPOLICY MAKERS PEACE, DRUGS,ANDKEYISSUES THE ROAD AHEAD the negotiations, whileCongress hascontinued to the FARC inanational plebiscite —albeitby a critical juncture. To someextent, thesefault lines the fifteenth anniversary ofPlan Colombia and 60 percent abstention. and onDecember 1,theColombian Congress a new, “definitive” peace accord was announced, appropriate hundreds ofmillionsdollarsannual- a USspecialenvoy hadbeennamedto facilitate sus, should nothidegrowing fissures in Colombia. slender margin of50.2 to 49.8 percent withover enduring internal armedconflict.” ed by unanimousconsent aresolution marking itself. OnOctober 2,2016, theColombian people rejected thegovernment’s peace accord with reflect thefissures andpolarization in Colombia bia to pursuepeace andtheendofcountry’s ly inassistance.

Cracks beganto appearinthepolicy consen- COLOMBIA PEACE ANDPROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT 41 potentially complicating USsupportat a 40 But,supportintheUnited States 42 OnNovember 24, 2016, 39 Ayear earlier, | A ROADMAP FOR USENGAGEMENT WITHCOLOMBIA A Double-Edged Sword: Peace Implementation which directly impact US interests as well. Im will require sustained focus, funding, and politi trafficking and contribute tosolvingthedrug commitment to endany relationship withdrug tegration; 4)illicitdrugs,includingtheFARC’s the price paidfor anagreement withtheenor- tation — and, by extension, to objectives such cal commitment. Peace implementation will be Political polarization in Colombia presents a se FARC andotherconflict actors; and6)imple- FARC disarmament, demobilization, andrein - agreement comprised ofchapters on:1)rural as greater security, development, state pres dures for sanctioningseriousviolations ofhuman development; 2)politicalparticipation, including stitutional capacity of the Colombian state. expensive; estimates run from $27 billion to $90 ence, and institutionalization of the rule of law, into electoral politics;3)theendofconflict and negotiations withtheFARC, may have marked theformal conclusion of rious challenge to successful peace implemen mentation andverification oftheaccord. rights andinternational humanitarianlaw by the problem; 5)conflict victims,includingproce- mechanisms to facilitate theFARC’s transition begins life withthecountry deeplydividedover mously unpopularFARC. billion over ten years. plementing an agreement of great complexity The peace accord isa310-page, multi-faceted Congressional ratification ofthepeace accord 45 It will also stretch the in 44

butthepeace deal 46

------

THE ROAD AHEAD

Deep-seated hatred toward the FARC, as shown in this anti-FARC march in 2008, will make reconciliation a daunting task. .

The agreement commits the Colombian of continuing instability and conflict such as the government to stand up dozens of new drug trade, illegal armed groups, and targeted institutions, commissions, and plans in areas as political violence. varied as land distribution;47 rural infrastructure, The Colombian peace accord is far from per- health, and education;48 a national electoral fect, but it is the law of the land. While some task tribunal;49 reincorporating the FARC into civilian force members do not support the agreement, life;50 investigating and dismantling criminal working to implement it as effectively as possible organizations;51 security guarantees for political is now imperative. participation;52 crop substitution;53 drug abuse At its best, the accord is a blueprint for long- treatment;54 combating money laundering and term stability, broad-based prosperity, and social illicit financing;55 searching for the missing and inclusion, and a vehicle for safeguarding shared disappeared;56 removing land mines; truth seek- Colombian and US interests on counter narcotics ing;57 prosecuting war criminals;58 and monitoring and other issues. However, sustaining the level and verification of the peace accord.59 of investment and institutional commitment The peace accord deals not just with the me- required for adequate implementation — per- chanics of ending the fighting. It is a permanent haps by instituting a “peace tax” to replace ceasefire that lays out the steps for FARC disar- Colombia’s “war tax” — will be difficult without a mament and demobilization, the transition to a national consensus behind the peace accord and political movement, and so on. The agreement despite the 2017 tax reform. US support is a vital also addresses the root causes of the conflict, stamp of approval and an important signal to the particularly the long-standing absence of dem- Colombian political class regarding the impor- ocratic institutions and economic opportunity tance of overcoming polarization to work toward

MEDEA_MATERIAL/FLICKR in swaths of rural Colombia, as well as the seeds successful implementation.

COLOMBIA PEACE AND PROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT | A ROADMAP FOR US ENGAGEMENT WITH COLOMBIA 15 THE ROAD AHEAD

instability, undermining US law enforcement and national security interests. US policy — exercised through diplomacy, Poor peace implementation would foreign assistance, and soft or hard conditional- diminish any peace dividend and ity — must promote robust implementation. This impact US interests directly and is especially true in those areas of most tangible negatively. impact for US interests, greatest concern to US policy makers, and maximum propensity to pro- duce quick and visible benefits and benchmarks.

What is at Stake? Key Issues for US Policy makers Why Peace Matters for the Given the strong US stake in rigorous en- United States forcement of the peace accord, policy makers The partnership between the United States should pay particular attention to the follow- and Colombia is such that Colombia’s potential ing issues as metrics for serious and effective “peace dividend” — in security, counter narcot- peace implementation and areas requiring US ics, foreign investment, human rights, and long- diplomatic and programmatic engagement: term development and stability — will accrue to the United States as well. The reverse is also true: poor peace implementation would dimin- PRIORITY 1: DECREASE COCA ish any peace dividend and impact US inter- CULTIVATION ests directly and negatively. Peace in Colom- bia, to the extent it can be sustained over the After several years of decline, coca cultiva- long term, is a substantial benefit of the peace tion increased dramatically during the years of accord; however, it can only be attained if the the peace talks, with the area under cultivation Colombian state addresses current and future more than doubling between 2013 and 2016, ac- violations and complies with its commitments cording to the United States Office on National to develop and to extend security and services Drug Control Policy (ONDCP).60 ONDCP esti- to areas of past conflict. mates for 2016 indicate that coca cultivation Unsuccessful peace accord implementation rose 18 percent to 188,000 hectares, a record would represent a missed opportunity to build a high.61 Indisputably, Colombia is today once more inclusive, equitable, economically vibrant again the number one coca and cocaine pro- — and by extension less conflict-prone — soci- ducer in the world,62 though the Colombian ety. It could lead to either a formal break in government has been successful with other the process or, more likely, a gradual migration drug interdiction efforts. It seized 421 metric of disenchanted FARC members into new or tons of cocaine and cocaine base and destroyed existing criminal organizations. It would under- 4,613 cocaine base laboratories and 229 cocaine mine Colombian efforts to bring state presence hydrochloride (HCl) laboratories in 2016.63 and democratic institutions to areas of the As previously discussed, the counter nar- country long beyond the government’s reach. cotics mission was fundamental to both Plan And ultimately, it would permit the expansion of Colombia’s genesis and its longevity. Early in

new sources of organized crime, violence, and the strategy’s rollout, declining coca cultivation

16 COLOMBIA PEACE AND PROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT | A ROADMAP FOR US ENGAGEMENT WITH COLOMBIA THE ROAD AHEAD

provided a metric of the strategy’s effectiveness and a justification for its continuation. Coca cultivation rose again between 2005 and 2007 before declining sharply, and to this day Plan Colombia’s success as a state building and counterinsurgency strategy is more straightforward than its counter narcotics legacy. The recent dramatic increase in coca cultivation has led some to question whether Colombia has taken its eye off the ball and allowed the counter narcotics investments of Rural workers have joined eradication efforts in Taraza, Colombia. Plan Colombia to slip away. Of particular concern to US policy makers, spraying with glyphosate,67 but President Santos ONDCP has detected a recent slow rise in has continued to publicly reject a return to aerial cocaine use in the United States.64 This moment spraying, citing a Constitutional Court decision represents a unique opportunity for Colombia that may preclude it.68 and the United States to redouble their joint Quickly and permanently reversing the efforts on coca eradication. upward trend in coca cultivation in Colombia The US government and the United Nations is now imperative. US officials should urge it, Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) cite a effective peace accord implementation will number of explanations for increased coca cul- require it, and any significant US aid package is tivation, including the FARC urging farmers to unlikely to be politically sustainable without it. grow more coca (in anticipation of post-peace At the same time, US officials must acknowledge accord crop substitution benefits), the rising that the illicit drug trade is a shared responsibil- price of coca leaf, efforts by coca growers to ity, and one ultimately driven by demand. resist eradication, a declining Colombian manual Finding an enhanced, workable and effective eradication budget, and local factors affecting counter narcotics strategy should be a matter other cash crops, such as fuel shortages, local- of top priority. The strategy should focus on ized drought, and the general lack of alternative holistic alternative development programs — development activities.65 including crop substitution initiatives where Perhaps the explanation that has generated this is economically viable. This can only work the greatest discussion is President Santos’ deci- in areas where there is access to markets and sion, in May 2015, to halt aerial spraying of coca highways, and where security and technical fields after the World Health Organization found assistance is provided to the communities that the chemical employed, glyphosate, likely involved. If necessary, these programs should causes cancer in humans; the US Environmental be complemented by law enforcement and Protection Agency has determined that there is manual eradication. a lack of convincing evidence for this finding.66 Consistent with the peace accord, targeted

AP PHOTO/WILLIAM FERNANDO MARTINEZ FERNANDO PHOTO/WILLIAM AP A year later, Colombia reauthorized manual use of aerial eradication should only be an

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FIGURE 2. Coca Production in Colombia ganized crime would significantly undermine (1999-2016) public confidence and dent hopes for a secu- 200 Hectares (thousands) rity dividend in the country. Failures of verification during the paramilitary demobilization process of 2003 to 2006 led to precisely this sort of migration, sowing the seeds for the new, ille- 150 gal armed groups that today pose the biggest threat to security in Colombia.71 Beyond the immediate effort to disarm and 100 demobilize thousands of FARC members lies the longer-term challenge of keeping them away from a life of crime and violence. Colombia has demonstrated an impressive capacity to 50 reintegrate tens of thousands of former combatants into society.72 However, the government will need to combine the positive incentives of

0 reintegration programs with a demonstrated ’00 ’02 ’04 ’06 ’08 ’10 ’12 ’14 ’16 willingness and capacity to capture and punish Source: US Department of State, International Narcotics FARC members who return to crime, including Control Strategy Report by extraditing them to the United States.

option of last resort when other tools such as PRIORITY 3: ENFORCE ACCOUNTABILITY crop substitution and manual eradication have FOR CONFLICT-RELATED CRIMES proven unviable. Demobilized FARC members must be held to their peace accord commit- Punishing wartime atrocities by the FARC, state ment to become part of the coca solution actors, and other parties to the conflict was rather than the problem,69 including by turning perhaps the most complicated issue at the ne- over information on drug profits, methods, and gotiation table, and one of the most conten- collaborators, and by participating directly in tious away from it. Former President Uribe manual eradication efforts. called the agreement on transitional justice a “veiled amnesty”;73 Human Rights Watch termed it “agreeing to impunity.”74 Other re- PRIORITY 2: ENSURE FARC DISARMAMENT, spected legal scholars and human rights advo- DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION cates defended the agreement as a necessary compromise consistent with international law.75 Achieving the disarmament of the FARC, ac- The chief prosecutor of the International Crim- cording to the timeline laid out in the peace inal Court (ICC) has initially issued a guardedly accord,70 will be an important early test for positive statement on the peace accord.76 accord implementation. Properly executed, this US policy makers have a clear interest and process can convey a powerful message about stake in the peace deal’s resolution of account- the sincerity of the FARC’s commitment to ability issues. Congress regularly conditions A NACIONAL DE LOS COLOMBIANOS/FLICKR LOS DE NACIONAL A transition to civilian life. In contrast, widespread assistance to Colombia on punishing con- Í

migration of former FARC members into or- flict atrocities, and the US Senate called on POLIC

18 COLOMBIA PEACE AND PROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT | A ROADMAP FOR US ENGAGEMENT WITH COLOMBIA

violations onallsides. violations onallsides. Colombian governments stated publiclythat the Colombia to “holdaccountable perpetrators of Colombia to comply withtherecommenda - Commissioner for HumanRights.USlaw with jurisdictionto monitor thetransitional continue to stress consistently theneedfor the carrying outtaxingwork that benefitssociety their illicitassets andmake reparations to victims, of seriouscrimeshave theirmovements tightly of theSpecialPeace Tribunal. Ifthoseconvicted truth,” especiallyby thejudgesandprosecutors tional justice process willreside largely inthe tional humanitarianlaw andensure that they to participate inthequestioning ofdemobilized tions ofthespecialized international bodies Human Rights,andtheOffice oftheUNHigh Inter-American Commission andCourt of and to ensure accountability for humanrights and conflict victims—suchasmanual coca and ifColombians regularly seeimages ofthem are appropriately punished.” accountability. diplomatic and programmatic tools —includ- sitional justice agreement willgaincredibility. such as“effective restriction ofliberty”and“full serious violations ofhumanrightsandinterna- eradication orhumanitariandemining—thetran- enforcement officialsshouldseekpermission if thosewhofail to strictly comply are promptly interpretation andenforcement ofkey concepts ing technical assistance for transitional justice peace accord shouldcomply withinternational peace accord to comply withinternational law remanded backto theordinary justice system, restricted andcloselymonitored, ifthey declare bodies, fundingto supportvictims’ rights,and law andensure accountability for humanrights limited conditionality —to furtherthecauseof justice proceedings, includingtheICC, the The credibility anddurability ofthetransi- The United States shouldcontinue to urge For thisto happen,theUnited States must COLOMBIA PEACE ANDPROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT 79 78 Itmust alsoemploy both 77 The USand rights violations. ensure accountability for human with international law andto for thepeace accord to comply to stress consistently theneed The United States must continue violence inColombia, particularlytransnational years. Colombia’s homicide rate in 2016 was 25 per ORGANIZED CRIME cent lower than when peace negotiations organized crime, willdependinlarge parton can be sustained, it will represent a compelling today’s homicide rate is the lowest in forty the USmust alsokeep acloseeye onthe of thevictimsconflict front and center, operations inreturn for substantially reduced close the“fulltruth,” regarding theircriminal FARC members,whohave agreed to dis- a failure oftheprocess if demobilized fighters accountability for state actors andthird parties. fell over 75 percent. dropped over 30 percent and acts of terrorism successfully reintegrating FARC ex-combatants sentences. At thesame time, placingtherights ex-guerillas into criminalgroups. Itwould be PRIORITY 4: RULE OF LAW, AND TRANSNATIONAL into civilian life andlimiting themigration of nied the peace talks. began, aided by the ceasefire that accompa both Colombians and the broader region. measure of the concrete benefits of peace for Continued progress inreducing crimeand | A ROADMAP FOR USENGAGEMENT WITHCOLOMBIA 81 Over the same period, kidnappings FOCUS ON SECURITY, 82 80 If this downward trend In fact, at 25 per 100,000, THE ROAD AHEAD

- - 19

THE ROAD AHEAD

form or join armed groups that fill the vacuum to post-conflict areas.85 Backing Colombia’s left by the FARC and continue criminal activi- efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace with ties such as drug trafficking, extortion, human the ELN is critical if nascent talks advance. trafficking, and illegal mining.83 A decade ago, a The United States has unique capabilities to flawed paramilitary demobilization process gave contribute. Increasing the Colombian military’s birth to today’s new illegal armed groups, some- airlift capacity was a key component of Plan times referred to as BACRIM (bandas criminales). Colombia, and will be similarly important as the Both these groups and the ELN view the FARC’s national police assume greater responsibility demobilization as an opportunity to recruit sea- for combating illegal armed groups. The United soned warriors and expand their territory.84 States Agency for International Development This poses a huge risk across the hemisphere. (USAID) has a proven ability to support the Colombian criminal entities do not operate in a extension of democratic institutions, govern- silo; they are connected to transnational orga- ment services, and rule of law to former conflict nized crime networks that pose a threat to the areas, and can scale up these efforts with the United States. With rising tensions in Venezuela, required resources. the region faces an imminent challenge to con- The United States should also continue capaci- tain sources of illegality, in particular along the ty-building efforts to improve Colombia’s ability Colombia-Venezuela border. With the repres- to investigate and prosecute complex financial sion and human rights abuses, escalating crime, crimes. These include the laundering of money, and food shortages in Venezuela, Colombia will which derives primarily from Colombia’s illicit play a pivotal role in any eventual transition drug production, and illegal mining, which that occurs. continues to penetrate the economy.86 Assisting The United States can help ensure Colombia Colombia’s efforts to locate and repatriate has the law enforcement and military capacity any undeclared FARC assets should be a to be an important player in regional stability particular priority, and can help fund peace as well as pursue illegal groups and halt their implementation. transnational flow of resources. Severely disrupt- ing the narcotics trade is critical as is working to eviscerate human trafficking organizations, PRIORITY 5: PROMOTE INVESTMENT illegal mining flows, and money launder- AND ECONOMIC GROWTH ing schemes. Another priority is to support Colombia’s push to bring enhanced security as Delivering a measurable economic peace divi- well as development and democratic governance dend will be instrumental to maintaining investments in peace implementation and support from Colombia’s influential business leaders. Colombia’s finance minister and some econo- mists have predicted that peace could add ap- The United States can help proximately 1 percent per year to Colombia’s ensure Colombia has the law gross domestic product (GDP), a figure dis- enforcement and military capacity puted by others.87 to be an important player in A growing Colombian economy benefits the regional stability. United States by providing an expanding market for US goods and services. It also positions Colombia to invest more heavily in areas that

20 COLOMBIA PEACE AND PROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT | A ROADMAP FOR US ENGAGEMENT WITH COLOMBIA THE ROAD AHEAD

The town of Arauquita, on the border with Venezuela, is increasingly affected by the instability unleashed by the Maduro government.

directly impact US priorities, whether expand- Council, comprised of business leaders from ing counter narcotics operations, securing both countries,88 to stress the private sector’s former FARC territory, expanding state pres- importance to the success of peace implemen- ence and institutions to address the root causes tation, including by investing in post-conflict of crime and violence, dealing with the humani- areas and providing employment opportuni- tarian fallout from the situation in Venezuela, or ties for reintegrated former combatants. By exporting security expertise to Central America supporting the development of integrated and beyond. economic development plans for regions with As such, the United States has an interest in potential for growth and market expansion, the ensuring the proper functioning of the TPA in United States can provide opportunities for US both countries. It should also employ commer- companies in areas such as infrastructure, con- cial diplomacy tools to advance opportunities for struction, and agricultural inputs such as seeds, US firms and promote economic development in fertilizers, and machinery. Colombia, particularly in areas historically mar- The United States can also provide an even ginalized. At the same time, the United States playing field for American workers, encourage can help create economic opportunities in these responsible business conduct, and promote underdeveloped and post-conflict areas largely high standards for global commerce through populated by Afro-Colombian and indigenous enforcement of the Labor Action Plan, the US populations, women and poor farmers, through National Action Plan on Business and Human trade capacity building under the framework of Rights, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices the TPA and the US-Colombia Action Plan on Act (FCPA). Colombian participation should Racial and Ethnic Equality. be encouraged in the Extractive Industry The United States should work closely with Transparency Initiative and Voluntary Principles

KYLEEJOHNSON/FLICKR the recently formed US-Colombia Business on Security and Human Rights.

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FARC’s territory and illicit profit making — the most powerful criminal gang, the Clan del Golfo or Los Urabeños, is report- edly offering former FARC fighters salaries of $600 per month — community leaders and social activists in rural areas are often the ones to speak out and put up resistance, putting them in harm’s way.93 The international community in Colombia, including the United States Embassy, has reacted strongly to the attacks on human rights defenders, notably through an initiative called Ambassadors with Palm oil extraction is another source of economic activity in the countryside. Defenders (Embajadores con Defensores) designed to bring visibility to the work of human PRIORITY 6: PROTECT TARGETED rights advocates and call for prompt investiga- COMMUNITIES AND INDIVIDUALS tions of attacks against them.94 In addition, the National Unit for Protection (Unidad Nacional In December 2016, thirty-seven members of de Protección), a Colombian agency designed the US House of Representatives sent a letter to provide various forms of protection to at-risk to Secretary of State John Kerry expressing civil-society leaders, should continue to receive deep concern about the escalation of killings special technical assistance and funds. and assaults on human rights defenders, LGBT The peace accord with the FARC anticipates and women activists, labor leaders, and other the risk of violence against peace advocates social leaders in Colombia.89 A few days ear- and former FARC members, including by con- lier, the office of the UN High Commissioner for templating US support for the newly created Human Rights in Colombia had expressed sim- National Commission on Security Guarantees ilar alarm, noting that it had recorded fifty-two (Comisión Nacional de Garantías de Seguridad) murders of human rights defenders in the first and the Special Investigation Unit (Unidad eleven months of the year, particularly in rural Especial de Investigación).95 This is of particular areas.90 The Washington Post reported that importance to avoid repeating the story of the only a handful of suspects had been arrested, political party Union Patriotica in the late 1980s but that shadowy right-wing militias were and 1990s, when paramilitary agents systemati- thought to be responsible.91 cally killed demobilized left-wing guerillas. Increasing gender-based violence against UN Security Council resolutions, including women, in particular, has been identified by the Resolution 1325, reaffirm the important role of UN as a serious obstacle to lasting and stable women in post-conflict reconstruction and stress 92 peace. As illegal groups try to co-opt the the importance of their equal participation and VILLALON CENTER/CARLOS SOLIDARITY

22 COLOMBIA PEACE AND PROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT | A ROADMAP FOR US ENGAGEMENT WITH COLOMBIA

The United States shouldvoice strong sup- The peace accord includes a series of mea Colombian citizens. Colombians harbor deep misgivings about the Colombians harbordeepmisgivingsaboutthe Sergio Jaramillo identified this provision as the and beyond. are advanced inthehemisphere United States ensure jointinterests relationship withColombia canthe Only by maintainingaclose one generating the greatest resistance among the plebiscite, High Commissioner for Peace tion from illegal armed insurgency to legal po the House — in the Colombian Congresses to the FARC’s eventual political movement a min FARC’s impactontheColombian bodypolitics, FARC’s entry into politics represented a Cu National Unitfor Protection, andproviding the Defenders initiative, constantly supportingthe and other “no” campaigners claim that the assistance contemplated inthepeace accord. full involvement inallefforts for themainte- sures designed to facilitate the FARC’s transi PARTICIPATION PRIORITY 7: imum of ten seats — five in the Senate, five in nance andpromotion ofpeace andsecurity. have notabandonedtheirpoliticalagenda.Many ban-Venezuelan Trojan horse. participate actively intheAmbassadors with port for suchparticipation whilecontinuing to be elected in 2018 and 2022. litical party. Most contentiously, it guarantees The FARC leaders have madeclearthat they COLOMBIA PEACE ANDPROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT FACILITATE POLITICAL 98 Former President Uribe 97 99 One week before - - 96 -

- - Colombia cantheUnited States ensure joint will have onthisandfuture peace processes. gations underthepeace accord andmeetthe terrorist organization andasasignificant foreign toward Colombia. The United States hastools occupy theColombian presidency. —as“no”campaignershave warned —that a tial the illicitsupportthey have received from two decades. criteria for delisting, however, USpolicy makers core USinterests andinvestments are at stake. consequence would beasteady reduction inUS toward Colombia. The riskoffailing to forge con- confront USleadersasthey craft future strategy United States shouldbeinnorushto delist the FARC before thestrict criteria for suchastep acterized US policy toward Colombia for almost aim to demonstrate, common senseconsensus are met.IfandwhentheFARC fulfilltheirobli- for opposingtheFARC’s tacticsandcriminality, former guerrillaorapoliticalallycould oneday due consideration oftheimpactsuchadecision facing USpolicy maker andthechoices that will should beprepared to applythelaw, takinginto support andengagementat ajuncture where sensus isnotsomuchabreakdown inbilateral extent suchsentimentsshouldinfluence policy exhaustive, provide anotionofthepriorities including theFARC’s designations asaforeign is achievable andwould maintainthelong-term interests are advanced inthehemisphere and narcotics trafficker undertheKingpin Act. regimes inCubaandVenezuela, orthepoten- bipartisan strategic perspective that haschar- beyond. As therecommendations that follow relations orawilddeviation instrategy, butmore likely arelative paralysis inpolicy making. The The question for USpolicy makers isto what These policy issues, thoughby nomeans Only by maintainingacloserelationship with | A ROADMAP FOR USENGAGEMENT WITHCOLOMBIA THE ROAD AHEAD 100 The The 23

T 24 Colombia onsecurityandearliersuccess on Colombia matters to theUnited States, what we while theUnited States hasachieved success, States to partnerwithanincreasingly pros - Second, they seekto reverse abacksliding,and States Congress canadvance US national secu- RECOMMENDATIONS TASK FORCE compliance with,thepeace accord. Finally, our to achieve robust implementation of, andstrict counter narcotics. Third, therecommendations on investment for UStaxpayers. continuity isnottheanswer. Astrategy reboot concerns of bothRepublicans and Democrats. can besustained over timeandaddresses core can learnfrom thesuccesses ofPlanColombia, on ouranalysis, reflected inthis report, ofwhy appropriately resourced strategic vision that and how theUnited States canbest safeguard for new timesisrequired to maximize thereturn foreign policy achievement thoughwithcounter four broad objectives. First, they seekto rep- ensure that Colombia hasthetools necessary identify areas where catalytic USassistance can its interests andsustain atradition ofbipartisan in thecountry’s history. mutual economic andgeopoliticalinterests. perous and capableColombia to advance our recommendations aimto positiontheUnited re-establish thehard-won progress ofPlan narcotics success still pending,namelyan policy makingonColombia. Ourpremise isthat best supportingColombia at adefiningmoment rity, economic, andgeopoliticalinterests while licate thefactors that madePlanColombia a The Task Force’s recommendations pursue The recommendations that follow are based

COLOMBIA PEACE ANDPROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT the Trump administration andtheUnited Force setoutto discuss anddefinehow he Colombia Peace andProsperity Task

| A ROADMAP FOR USENGAGEMENT WITHCOLOMBIA 1 Force recommends USpolicy makers take the following actions: on investment for UStaxpayers. is required to maximize thereturn A strategy reboot for new times success of Plan Colombia and addresses the areas where improvement is necessary. ance of resources to safeguard US interests in the critical post-conflict period. This will policy toward Colombia that builds on the maintain a sustained, bipartisan vision for US funding the strategy with a near-term assur •

The Colombia Peace andProsperity Task year, an estimate of the commitments and ex It should also be complemented with contri Use the $392 million fiscal year (FY) 2017 ap achieve a peace dividend. Such assistance dination plan with other international donors. implement the peace agreement, and a coor imize US national security interests, and ing plan that describes uses of funds by fiscal butions by the Department of Defense. ments in security and counter narcotics, max baseline to protect Plan Colombia’s invest propriation for assistance to Colombia as a penditures of the Colombian Government to must be accompanied by a multi-year spend Establish Peace Colombia as the ongo ing strategic framework for US policy, fully

- -

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RECOMMENDATIONS

OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro in Colombia in 2015. Peace accord compliance is crucial to regional security.

The US should use diplomatic and program- Recognize that robust peace accord matic engagement to help enforce peace 2 compliance and implementation is crit- accord implementation. ical to US national security interests and re- • Focus Peace Colombia assistance on unique, gional stability. Assistance and monitoring by catalytic US support for Colombia’s efforts to US authorities are necessary to help Colom- “win the peace” by successfully establishing a bia meet concrete benchmarks, including ex- state presence, democratic institutions, and panded state presence in post-conflict areas, new economic opportunities in post-conflict credible transitional justice processes and vic- areas, and combating the transnational crim- tims’ protections, and the verifiable disarma- inal organizations that will inevitably seek to ment, demobilization, and reincorporation of fill the security vacuum left by the FARC. former FARC members. These actions are im- • The funding burden should be shared by en- perative to enhanced democratic governance, gaging and coordinating with other support- rule of law, and to realizing a lasting peace. ers of Colombia’s peace and prosperity such • Technical assistance should be provided to as the United Nations, the Organization of prevent other armed and criminal groups from American States (OAS), the international fi- appropriating FARC territory. This will require nancial institutions (particularly the Interna- supporting the timely and verifiable disarma- tional Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and ment, demobilization, and reincorporation of the Inter-American Development Bank), the former FARC members, and scaling up efforts US–Colombia Business Council, and other to quickly bolster state presence, democratic major bilateral and multilateral donors such as institutions, and investment in areas most im- the European Union and Norway. pacted by the conflict. Put pressure on Colom- bia to make headway in these areas if momen-

OAS/FLICKR tum lags.

COLOMBIA PEACE AND PROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT | A ROADMAP FOR US ENGAGEMENT WITH COLOMBIA 25 RECOMMENDATIONS

Lasting peace includes reparations to minorities such as the indigenous people who inhabit this village..

• Security and economic development in of State certifies and reports to the Commit- post-conflict areas should be strengthened tees on Appropriations on the independence of by continuing to partner with Norway to lead the Peace Tribunal, its attention to the victim’s the Colombia Global Demining Initiative. Seek rights and the sentences it carries out for per- continued United Nations Security Council petrators of gross human rights violations on all support for the UN Special Political Mission to sides. The Task Force encourages Congress to Colombia. encourage the administration to strictly apply • Credible transitional justice processes should such measures. be promulgated for FARC combatants and • Maintain support for the Victims Unit and Land state actors to ensure meaningful justice for the Restitution Unit in order to continue build- worst conflict-related crimes and glean maxi- ing Colombia’s capacity to provide reparations mum information for ongoing law enforcement to conflict victims, particularly those most im- efforts. Continue to call for compliance with na- pacted by the conflict such as women, Afro-Co- tional and international legal and human rights lombian and indigenous communities, and IDPs. obligations, providing technical assistance for • The protection of human rights defenders and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (Jurisdic- peace advocates is essential in safeguarding cion Especial para la Paz), and tying congres- the peace process from potential spoilers. The sional conditionality to Colombia’s compliance United States must contribute to this effort by in- with such standards on an achievable timeline. stitutionalizing the Ambassadors with Defenders In fact, 20 percent of the funds appropriated for program, continuing to support the National Unit FY17 under the Foreign Military Financing Pro- for Protection, and delivering the technical assis-

gram may be obligated only if the Secretary tance contemplated in the peace accord. WILLIAM NEUHEISEL/FLICKR

26 COLOMBIA PEACE AND PROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT | A ROADMAP FOR US ENGAGEMENT WITH COLOMBIA

3 concrete victories against transnational crimi tion and trafficking, and other sources of vio these security gains entails a joint effort and and corruption. Recognize that achieving nal networks, including reducing coca cultiva pacity of the Colombian justice system. requires continued strengthening of the ca lence such as human trafficking, illegal mining, • • •

To combat the threat from new illegal armed 20 percent of the funds appropriated under Committees on Appropriations that the gov Strategic Security Dialogue (HLSSD), and reg International Narcotics Control and Law En government on specific benchmarks to mea groups, transnational organized crime, and il trafficking and money-laundering networks. the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commis the cocaine supply and demand chains, from to the levels of the early 2010s. Work through to reduce coca cultivation levels back at least that combines support for the Colombian Pursuant to the FY 2017 Appropriations Act, Push for an enhanced, comprehensive and po actionable information on transnational drug fessions by demobilized FARC members for fects and coordination with other countries in forcement may be obligated only if the Sec sion, when officially launched. Leverage con sure progress on counter narcotics. Incorpo ernment of Colombia has established and is ular diplomatic, military, and law enforce ics strategy that uses all means at its disposal implementing a counter narcotics strategy to rate lessons learned, including on balloon ef ment exchanges. Agree with the Colombian bilateral mechanisms such as the High-Level presidential and cabinet-level engagement, mining, support a comprehensive strategy retary of State certifies and reports to the reduce illicit drug cultivation and production. litically sustainable Colombian counter narcot licit activities such as extortion and illegal Put forwardPut policies that expand US-Co lombia cooperation in order to achieve COLOMBIA PEACE ANDPROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT -

------strategy. Colombian counter narcotics and politicallysustainable for anenhanced, comprehensive The United States shouldpush • •

Treasury, and US law enforcement to crack Verify that Colombia has the technical capac financial networks. Strengthen internal con with economic opportunities for former who are subject to pending or potential indict combatants and vulnerable communities in of the independent press and civil society to trols and accountability mechanisms in secu campaigns, and undeclared FARC assets and olation of the terms of the peace accord. Police and a potential new rural police force, Ensure that US justice is served — particularly as it advances accountability of ex-FARC guer security services, particularly the National down on these illicit schemes. This is neces dering, corruption, illicit financing of political sary to repatriate illegal assets, to invest in ity and resources to investigate money laun rity services to screen for corruption and col post-conflict areas. partment of Justice, US Department of the report corruption. Coordinate with the US De reparations to victims. post-conflict areas, and to effectively make be extradited if involved in similar crimes in vi ments, with the understanding that they could rillas. US officials should continue to make Co lusion with criminal groups, and the capacity lombian counterparts aware of individuals | A ROADMAP FOR USENGAGEMENT WITHCOLOMBIA RECOMMENDATIONS

------27 - - - - -

compliance of labor rights and addressing existing labor rights violations.

The United States can advance Expand the shared security portfolio in stability and licit rural economies 5 international hotspots where Colombian in Colombia while creating business military and peacebuilding expertise can play opportunities for US infrastructure a pivotal role to advance US interests globally. and agricultural firms. Deepen diplomatic coordination on the most urgent issue facing Latin America: democratic institutions under assault, judicial corruption, Deepen US commercial and economic and human rights abuses in Venezuela. 4 cooperation through Peace Colombia • Leverage Colombia’s acquired security exper- and the existing TPA framework to maximize tise, while reducing costs for the United States, US business opportunities, spur Colombian through efforts such as continued and ex- market expansion, reignite economic develop- panded Colombian cooperation on security in ment, protect labor rights, and bolster job cre- Central America, the Caribbean, Afghanistan, ation in post-conflict and historically margin- and Africa. Expand on its growing cooperation alized areas. with NATO and UN Peacekeeping Operations. • Maximize US private sector engagement and Consider designating Colombia a major non- opportunities in Colombia by leveraging the NATO ally. Trade Promotion Agreement, the commercial • Advance US regional and global priorities, diplomacy and export promotion tools of the double down on working with Colombia to US government, and the US-Colombia Busi- support hemispheric defense and security co- ness Council. Continue to support Colombia’s operation, global anticorruption, regional eco- OECD accession while encouraging full com- nomic cooperation (including through the pliance with OECD and TPA market access re- Pacific Alliance), and the Sustainable Develop- quirements, and at the same time keeping ment Goals. Revitalize the High-Level Partner- close attention on how these economic tools ship Dialogue as a vehicle for concrete bilateral and platforms can benefit vulnerable popula- and multilateral cooperation with meaning- tions such as women, Afro-Colombians and in- ful deliverables, rather than an exchange of digenous peoples. talking points. • Advance stability and licit rural economies in • Collaborate to address the crisis in Venezuela Colombia while creating business opportu- and work closely to mobilize a hemispheric re- nities for US infrastructure and agricultural sponse to violations of inter-American democ- equipment and services firms. Promote sus- racy and human rights norms and to manage tainable livelihoods in post-conflict areas and any humanitarian emergency stemming from the development of the Colombian agricultural Venezuela’s violence and economic crisis. sector by engaging in trade capacity building Jointly affirm that any solution to the crisis in and supporting rural infrastructure improve- Venezuela should be peaceful, constitutional, ments such as tertiary roads, including through and democratic, and must include freeing of public private partnerships. Encourage the political prisoners, restoring institutions, and multilateral development banks to provide co- protecting human rights. ordinated support for post-conflict development in Colombia. All the while ensuring strict

28 COLOMBIA PEACE AND PROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT | A ROADMAP FOR US ENGAGEMENT WITH COLOMBIA

THEY AREAFFILIATED TO. DISCLAIMER: TASK FORCE CO-CHAIRS AND MEMBERS Bank Inter-American Development to the US; Senior Advisor Former Ambassador of Colombia Ambassador Carolina Barco US Department of State for the Colombian Peace Process Affairs; Former US Special Envoy State for Western Hemisphere Former Assistant Secretary of Ambassador Bernard Aronson Woodrown Wilson Center Director, Latin America Program Cynthia Arnson The AES Corporation Officer Stakeholder and Sustainability Vice-President and Global Chief Scarlett Alvarez MEMBERS Center, Atlantic Council Adrienne Arsht Latin America Growth Initiative, Director, Latin America Economic Jason Marczak Center, Atlantic Council Adrienne Arsht Latin America Strategic Initiatives and Director, Senior Vice President for Peter Schechter DIRECTORS US Senator (D-MD) The Honorable Benjamin Cardin US Senator (R-MO) The Honorable Roy Blunt CO-CHAIRS TASK FORCE MEMBERSENDORSED THEREPORT INTHEIRINDIVIDUAL CAPACITY ANDNOT THAT OFTHEINSTITUTIONS COLOMBIA PEACE ANDPROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT McLarty Associates Chairman and Co-founder Staff under President Clinton; Former White House Chief of Thomas F. McLarty, III Pfizer Professional Relations, Director, Advocacy and Mia Masten International Monetary Fund Executive Director, Colombia, Tomás González Gelbard International Consulting President and Law Enforcement Affairs; State for International Narcotics Former Assistant Secretary of Ambassador Robert Gelbard US Representative (D-AZ-7) The Honorable Ruben Gallego International Republican Institute Chief Operations Officer Western Hemisphere Affairs; W. Bush and Senior Director for Assistant to President George Committee; Former Special the Senate Foreign Relations Former Professional Staff of Daniel W. Fisk McLarty Associates Partner, Intelligence Officer; Managing Retired Career Military Stephen Donehoo Security US Department of Homeland Former Advisor to the President Deputy Homeland Security The Honorable Rand Beers | A ROADMAP FOR USENGAGEMENT WITHCOLOMBIA

Covington & Burling LLP International Advisor under President Obama; Senior (Western Hemisphere Affairs) Assistant Secretary of State Security Affairs; Former US President Clinton for National Former Special Assistant to Ambassador Arturo Valenzuela Inter-American Dialogue President Michael Shifter Pfizer Government Affairs Director, International Catherine Robinson McKinsey Global Institute Partner Jaana Remes The Coca Communications Vice President AffairsPublic and Ángela Maria Zuluaga de Colombia Federación Nacional de Cafeteros Inc., North America subsidiary of Colombian Coffee Federation, President, Juan Esteban Orduz US Representative (R-CA-22) The Honorable Devin Nunes American Enterprise Institute Affairs; Visiting Fellow, State for Western Hemisphere Former Assistant Secretary of Ambassador Roger Noriega US Representative (D-NY-5) The Honorable Gregory Meeks

Cola Company 29

Thank you to the members of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center team Jiménez, assistant director, was an instrumental force and the key lead behind this 30 Arsht Center report, as well as Sam Aman and James Kimer for their development ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like to thank the many people who were critical in creating this task vision of the task force and the report, provided invaluable expertise and support WE EXTEND A SPECIAL THANKS who worked tirelessly to convene the task force and whose passion for lasting which the work of this task force would not have been possible. Our thanks, as well, the Atlantic Council who provided invaluable research and logistical support. the unwavering cooperation of our co-chairs and provided important reflections of the digital strategy supporting this report. to Ambassador Robert Gelbard, the original architect of the vision of this task force. For decisive input, thorough research and the original drafting of this report we Nicolás Castex, Mae Louise Flato, Lesser, Gabriel and Nicolás Jiménez — interns at Benjamin Cardin (D–MD) for their leadership as co-chairs of this task force. It was Most importantly, we thank our task force members for their passion, commitment, and comments. a true pleasure and honor to work with them and to see how successful bipartisan and foremost, we would like to thank Senator Roy Blunt (R–MO) and Senator deeply thank Michael Camilleri. For her precise editorial assistance and good- force and who provided support and insight over the course of the last year. First spirited flexibility, we thank Susan J. Cavan, Atlantic Council editor. We would also efforts come to fruition. In addition, we are deeply grateful to those who ensured expertise, and leadership. Their unwavering commitment to the region and many ideas helped to guide the work of the task force. meetings and communications with the parties involved. Our gratitude as well to negotiating this bipartisan product, and coordinated the multiple task force project from start to finish. She was a knowledge partner steering the strategic peace in Colombia is reflected in the pages of this report. Andrea Saldarriaga like to extend our thanks to Donald Partyka for his unique design of yet another

COLOMBIA PEACE ANDPROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT to Adrienne Arsht for her generous support, without | A ROADMAP FOR USENGAGEMENT WITHCOLOMBIA

3 4 1 2 7 5 ENDNOTES 6 “Remarks by President ObamaandPresident Terrorist Organizations,” https://www.state.gov/j/ct/ America andtheRepublic ofGran Colombia, Americas Quarterly , Summer2012, http://www. 17/items/generalconventio00unitrich/ 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ www.scribd.com/document/341880734/ October 3,1824, https://ia601406.us.archive.org/ Government of Colombia would, anddid,provide Colombia” has become shorthandfor wide-ranging ONDCP-Data-on-Cocaine-Cultivation-and- Cultivation inColombia,” March 14,2017, https:// the great majorityofresources. the-press-office/2016/02/05/ Santos ofColombia at PlanColombia Reception,” generalconventio00unitrich.pdf. US cooperation withColombia to assist that Reception,” 2016, https://obamawhitehouse. Production-in-Colombia. Releases Data onCocaine Production and “General Convention ofPeace, Amity, Navigation, UNODC, “The Globalization ofCrime,” 2010, Michael Shifter, “PlanColombia: ARetrospective,” The White House, “Remarks by President Obama Office of National Drug Control Policy, “ONDCP US State Department,“Designated Foreign and Commerce,” between theUnited States of actually abroader planfor theeconomic and americasquarterly.org/node/3787. While “Plan archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/05/ and President Santos ofColombia at PlanColombia data-and-analysis/tocta/4.Cocaine.pdf. security recovery ofthecountry inwhichthe country incombating drugs,guerrillaviolence, and colombia-plan-colombia. colombia-plan-colombia. related institutional andsocialproblems, itwas chapter 4,https://www.unodc.org/documents/ remarks-president-obama-and-president-santos- remarks-president-obama-and-president-santos- rls/other/des/123085.htm; The White House, Congressional Research Service, “The Cost ofIraq, Afghanistan, andOtherGlobalWar onTerror COLOMBIA PEACE ANDPROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT

10 9 8 “nationally disjointed criminal structures, withhigh | with theviolentinfringementofcivilrights.” A2012 (bandas criminales), are organized drug trafficking Colombia’s New IllegalArmedGroups: Lessons Colombia Police estimated thesegroups to have Colombian Defense Ministry definesthemas from aSurrender,” (2012) https://d2071andvip0wj. Colombia -ANew Era ofPartnership between the See also, Jeremy McDermott,“BACRIM andtheir the county. International CrisisGroup, “Dismantling International CrisisGroup report noted the May 2,2014, http://www.insightcrime.org/ gov/the-press-office/2016/02/05/remarks- United States andColombia,” 2016, https:// Reception,” 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives. President Santos ofColombia at PlanColombia The White House, “Remarks by President Obamaand New illegalarmedgroups, alsoreferred asBACRIM demobilization process underPresident Uribe. The investigations/bacrim-and-their-position-in- illegal-armed-groups-lessons-from-a-surrender.pdf. cloudfront.net/041-dismantling-colombia-s-new- over 4,800membersin167 municipalities,andto corrupting, intimidating and armedpower that organizations that emerged from theparamilitary colombia-underworld. position inColombia’s Underworld, InsightCrime, represent thebiggest threat to citizen securityin have combined theproduction andsaleofdrugs plan-colombia; The White House. “Fact Sheet:Peace president-obama-and-president-santos-colombia- See MiguelSilva, Path to Peace and Prosperity: The A ROADMAP FOR USENGAGEMENT WITHCOLOMBIA Colombian Miracle Atlantic Council, 2015, http:// Operations Since 9/11” (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/ to pursuepeace andtheendofcountry’s United States supportfor Colombia at the15th United States Senate, “S.Res.368 -Aresolution anniversary ofPlanColombia,” 2016, https://www. congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate- enduring internal armedconflict and recognizing supporting efforts by theGovernment of Colombia resolution/368/text. crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf. publications.atlanticcouncil.org/colombia-miracle//;

32 18 17 16 15 13 14 11 12 ENDNOTES

“Dismantling Colombia’s New IllegalArmedGroups: “Colombia’s Urabeños Recruiting Dissidents from COLOMBIA PEACE ANDPROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT 26, 2017, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/ 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/ 2016/02/04/fact-sheet-peace-colombia-new-era- www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-success-story-in- Contributors,” http://mfo.org/en/contingents. Control Strategy Report, Vol. I,March 2017, 135, O’Hanlon, “The Success Story inColombia,” On file with authors. On filewithauthors. from-a-surrender.pdf. fact-sheet-peace-colombia-new-era-partnership- the FARC Peace Process,” InsightCrime,January International Times Documentary, New York Times, Peace-Keeping Missions,” 2015, http:// Brookings Institution, September 24, 2013, https:// Lessons from aSurrender,” (2012), https:// Multinational Force andObservers, “MFO Troop Colombia Reports, “Colombia to Take Part inUN New Era ofPartnership between theUnited States Deadly Peace inColombia asFARC Disarms,” USDepartmentofState, International Narcotics The White House, “Fact Sheet:The United States See General David Petraeus (Ret.) andMichaelE. Information provided by Government ofColombia. The White House, “Fact Sheet:Peace Colombia —A See Toby Muse, Federico Rios,andBen Laffin,“A archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/19/fact- and Colombia,” 2014, https://obamawhitehouse. organization/268025.pdf. colombiareports.com/ archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/04/ and Colombia,” 2016, https://obamawhitehouse. americas/100000004819711/a-deadly-peace-in- https://www.state.gov/documents/ sheet-united-states-and-colombia. d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/041-dismantling- colombia-s-new-illegal-armed-groups-lessons- colombia-urabenos-recruiting-dissidents-farc- colombia/. peace-process; International CrisisGroup, colombia-as-farc-disarms.html; Tristan Clavel, between-united-states-and obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/ partnership-between-united-states-and.

| A ROADMAP FOR USENGAGEMENT WITHCOLOMBIA 19 21 23 22 20 25 24 27 26 “Colombia firmaunacuerdo para participarenlas “Tensions RiseasColombia Turns to NATO,” The Times, December 28,2016, https://www.thetimes. Venezuela/4031482772513/; GideonLong, Venezuela,” December 26,2016, http://www.upi. 2014/06/19/fact-sheet-united-states-and- wradio.com.co/noticias/actualidad/colombia-firma- Colombia. On file with authors. Colombia. Onfilewithauthors. Colombia,” 2017, http://www. Colombia-to-start-talks-with-NATO-angering- Purchasing Power Parity. Providing for Peacekeeping, “Peacekeeping Profile: United States andColombia,” 2014, https:// Report,” 2017. The White House, “Fact Sheet:The New Era ofPartnership between theUnited States December 13,2016, 9. Department, “Voting Practices intheUnited United Nations 2014,” https://www.state.gov/ According to Gross Domestic Product at Information provided by theGovernment of USTR, “2017 Trade Policy Agenda and2016 Annual The White House, “Fact Sheet:Peace Colombia -A UPI, “Colombia to start talkswithNATO, angering Control Risks,“Colombia: The Peace Dividend,” USTR, “Colombia,” https://ustr.gov/countries- US State Department,“Voting Practices inthe Control Risks,“Colombia: The Peace Dividend,” 5,11. archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/04/fact- and Colombia,” 2016, https://obamawhitehouse. un-acuerdo-para-participar-en-las-misiones-de- co.uk/article/tensions-rise-as-colombia-turns-to- colombia-take-part-un-peace-keeping-missions/; documents/organization/245163.pdf; USState obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/ sheet-peace-colombia-new-era-partnership- nato-s7fm9snmc. com/Top_News/World-News/2016/12/26/ misiones depazlaONU,” 2015, http://www. peacekeeping-country-profile-colombia/; EFE, providingforpeacekeeping.org/2016/06/23/ paz-de-la-onu/20150127/nota/2605397.aspx. colombia. between-united-states-and. regions/americas/colombia.

30 31 32 29 28

“Colombia AidBillNearsApproval,” Washington - ANew Era ofPartnership between theUnited York Times, June22,2000, http://www.nytimes. Approves $1Billionto AidColombian Military,” New Americas Quarterly, Summer2012, http://www. www.ciponline.org/research/html/plan-colombia- Colombia: A Retrospective,” AmericasQuarterly, Colombia: The Debate inCongress” 2000, https:// Grassroots CapitalismSucceed Where Populism Has Post States andColombia,” 2016, https:// Summer 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/ to-aid-colombia-military.html; Karen DeYoung, the-debate-in-congress-2000; EricSchmitt,“Senate the-free-market-moment-making-grassroots- McLean, “Backfrom theBrink:Evaluation Progress Michael Shifter, “PlanColombia: ARetrospective,” Failed,” 2016, 2.http://www.aei.org/publication/ Fernández, “The Free Market Moment:Making Nations 2015,” https://www.state.gov/documents/ New Era ofPartnership between theUnited States Evaluation Progress inColombia, 1999-2007,” 12. See The White House, “Fact Sheet:Peace Colombia See Roger F. NoriegaandAndrés Martínez- legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/071112- See IngridVacius andAdam Isacson,“Plan The White House, “Fact Sheet:Peace Colombia -A DeShazo, Primiani,andMcLean, “Backfrom theBrink: americasquarterly.org/node/3787. and Colombia,” 2016, https://obamawhitehouse. archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/04/fact- in Colombia, 1999-2007,” CSIS,November 2007, com/wp-srv/WPcap/2000-06/22/091r-062200-idx. com/2000/06/22/world/senate-approves-1-billion- office/2016/02/04/fact-sheet-peace-colombia- obamawhitehouse.archive.gov/the-press- organization/260322.pdf. capitalism-succeed-where-populism-has-failed/. backfromthebrink-web.pdf; MichaelShifter, “Plan https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/ html; Peter DeShazo, Tanya Primiani,andPhillip new-era-partnership-between-united-states-and; sheet-peace-colombia-new-era-partnership- node/3787. between-united-states-and. , June22,2000, http://www.washingtonpost. COLOMBIA PEACE ANDPROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT

34 33 36 35 37 38

.9c351bea46d0; Petraeus (Ret.) andMichaelE. Americas Quarterly, Summer2012, http://www. American Intervention Again,” Washington Post, Assistance: Issue Overview,” 2014, https://fas.org/ vetting process uncovers credible evidence that an washington-learned-to-love-latin-american- with USlaw andpolicy. This obligation to vet Colombia. Onfilewithauthors. Colombia: How Washington Learned to Love Latin O’Hanlon, “The Success Story inColombia.” foreign securityforces canbefound insection620M forces, aswell asDepartment ofDefense training September 18,2016, https://www.washingtonpost. See alsoCongressional Research Service, “’Leahy State Department,“Leahy Law,” https://www. gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/wha/154499.htm. Rights Practices: Colombia,” 2011, https://www.state. Department, “2010 Country Reports onHuman Evaluation Progress inColombia, 1999-2007,” 13. Failures,” 2016, https://www.wola.org/files/1602_ Plan Colombia: Learning from itsSuccesses and government vets USassistance to foreign security Law’ HumanRightsProvisions andSecurity New Era ofPartnership between theUnited States DeShazo, Primiani,andMcLean, “Backfrom theBrink: Information provided by theGovernment of Washington Office on Latin America,“15of Years MichaelShifter, “PlanColombia: ARetrospective,” The White House, “Fact Sheet:Peace Colombia -A americasquarterly.org/node/3787; USState Leahy law vetting isaprocess through whichtheUS archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/04/fact- and Colombia,” 2016, https://obamawhitehouse. intervention-again/2016/09/18/ddaeae1c-3199-4ea3- com/world/the_americas/plan-colombia-how- individual orunithascommitted agross violation of plancol/content.php?id=us_aid; NickMiroff, “Plan sgp/crs/row/R43361.pdf. of theForeign Assistance Act of1961 (FAA). US committed gross humanrightsabuses. When the sheet-peace-colombia-new-era-partnership- 8d0f-69ee1cbda589_story.html?utm_term= humanrights.gov/dyn/issues/leahy-vetting.html. human rights,USassistance iswithheld,consistent programs, to ensure that recipients have not between-united-states-and. | A ROADMAP FOR USENGAGEMENT WITHCOLOMBIA ENDNOTES

34 39 40 41 42 43 44 ENDNOTES

“No” enFallido Acuerdo con lasFARC,” Diariode “Corte Constitucional Avala elFast Track yla “Colombia Peace DealisDefeated, Leaving aNation American Intervention Again.” ARCHIVO/ARCHIVO-16772391-0.pdf; 16772050. www.eltiempo.com/contenido/politica/justicia/ COLOMBIA PEACE ANDPROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT Colombia: How Washington Learned to Love Latin October 2,2016, http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/ farc-n4106041. to pursuepeace andtheendofcountry’s fast-track-y-la-refrendacion-en-el-congreso-310856; El Tiempo, “Corte apruebael‘fast track’ para 52, Sentencia C-699/16, December 13,2016, http:// United States supportfor Colombia at the15th Failures,” 2016, https://www.wola.org/files/1602_ Refrendación enelCongreso,” 2016, http://www. See Washington Office on Latin America,“15 Years United States Senate, “S.Res.368 -Aresolution Daniel Castropé, “UribePideRespaldo deEE.UU. al Julia Symmes Cobb andNicholasCasey, Corte Constitucional deColombia, Comunicado No. anniversary ofPlanColombia,” 2016, https://www. BBC,“Cómo lavictoria del‘No’ enelplebiscito aprueba-el-fast-track-para-nuevo-acuerdo-de-paz/ abstencion-en-el-plebiscito-por-la-paz/16716874. congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate- enduring internal armedconflict and recognizing supporting efforts by theGovernment of Colombia diariolasamericas.com/america-latina/uribe-pide- of PlanColombia: Learning from itsSuccesses and resolution/368/text. del plebiscito fuelamayor absenciónen22años,” implementar elacuerdo depaz,” 2016, http://www. plancol/content.php?id=us_aid; NickMiroff, “Plan in Shock,” New York Times, October 2,2016, eltiempo.com/politica/justicia/corte-constitucional- elheraldo.co/politica/corte-constitucional-avala-el- colombia-peace-deal-defeat.html; respaldo-eeuu-al-no-fallido-acuerdo-las- proceso-de-paz/ https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/03/world/ confirma al expresidente Álvaro Uribe como el http://www.bbc.com/mundo/ hombre clave para elfuturo deColombia,” 2016, las Americas,October 23,2016, http://www. El Tiempo , “La El Heraldo,

| A ROADMAP FOR USENGAGEMENT WITHCOLOMBIA 46 45 47 48 49 “Winning thePeace: Paying for Colombia’s Peace verdadabierta.com/procesos-de-paz/farc/6420- 26, 2016, https://usceconreview.com/2016/10/26/a- 24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf. 24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf, p.14. winning-the-peace-paying-for-colombias-peace- 24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf, 24-26. 24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf, 52. farc. SeealsoAlex Vainberg, “A timefor peace, a See World Bank,http://data.worldbank.org/ time-for-peace-a-time-for-debt-the-cost-of- time for debt:The Cost ofColombian Deal,” 2016, http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2016/09/22/ Reconstruction,” USCEconomics Review, October November 24, 2016, http://www. La Construcción deUnaPaz Estable yDuradera, November 24, 2016, http://www. La Construcción deUnaPaz Estable yDuradera, Acuerdo Finalpara laTerminación delConflictoy Verdad Abierta,“Cuánto dinero requiere el las FARC ylasdivisionessetrasladan alas November 24, 2016, http://www. La Construcción deUnaPaz Estable yDuradera, Acuerdo Finalpara laTerminación delConflictoy November 24, 2016, http://www. La Construcción deUnaPaz Estable yDuradera, acuerdo depazcon lasFARC?” 2016, http://www. altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y- Acuerdo Finalpara laTerminación delConflictoy deal/. Colombia’s 2015 GDPwas US$292 billion. altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y- Acuerdo Finalpara laTerminación delConflictoy country/colombia. colombian-reconstruction/; Matthew Taylor, cuanto-dinero-requiere-el-acuerdo-de-paz-con-las- el Congreso apruebaelnuevo acuerdo depazcon mundo/noticias-america-latina-38165978. presidenciales de2018,” 2016, http://www.bbc.com/ noticias-america-latina-37543628; BBC,“Colombia: altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y- conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/ altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y- conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/ conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/ conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/

50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf, 72. 24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf, 80, 82. 24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf, 87. 24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf, 102. 24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf, 117. 24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf, 121-122. 24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf, 139. November 24, 2016, http://www. La Construcción deUnaPaz Estable yDuradera, November 24, 2016, http://www. La Construcción deUnaPaz Estable yDuradera, November 24, 2016, http://www. La Construcción deUnaPaz Estable yDuradera, November 24, 2016, http://www. La Construcción deUnaPaz Estable yDuradera, Acuerdo Finalpara laTerminación delConflictoy November 24, 2016, http://www. La Construcción deUnaPaz Estable yDuradera, Acuerdo Finalpara laTerminación delConflictoy November 24, 2016, http://www. La Construcción deUnaPaz Estable yDuradera, Acuerdo Finalpara laTerminación delConflictoy November 24, 2016, http://www. La Construcción deUnaPaz Estable yDuradera, Acuerdo Finalpara laTerminación delConflictoy November 24, 2016, http://www. La Construcción deUnaPaz Estable yDuradera, altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y- Acuerdo Finalpara laTerminación delConflictoy altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y- Acuerdo Finalpara laTerminación delConflictoy altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y- Acuerdo Finalpara laTerminación delConflictoy altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y- Acuerdo Finalpara laTerminación delConflictoy altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y- conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/ altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y- conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/ altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y- conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/ conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/ conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/ conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/ conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/ COLOMBIA PEACE ANDPROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT

58 59 60 61 62 63 | year_-new-unodc-report.html. year: new UNODCreport,” 2016, https://www.unodc. year_-new-unodc-report.html. year: new UNODCreport,” 2016, https://www.unodc. 24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf, 130. 24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf, 143. 24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf, 60. www.scribd.com/document/341880734/ONDCP- www.scribd.com/document/341880734/ONDCP- Colombia increase almost 40percent over one Colombia. SeealsoUNODC,“Coca crops in Cultivation inColombia,” March 14,2017, https:// Colombia increase almost 40percent over one Colombia. See alsoUNODC,“Coca crops in Cultivation inColombia,” March 14,2017, https:// Control Strategy Report, Vol. I,March 2017, 132-136, November 24, 2016, http://www. La Construcción deUnaPaz Estable yDuradera, November 24, 2016, http://www. La Construcción deUnaPaz Estable yDuradera, Data-on-Cocaine-Cultivation-and-Production-in- Releases Data onCocaine Production and Data-on-Cocaine-Cultivation-and-Production-in- Releases Data onCocaine Production and Acuerdo Finalpara laTerminación delConflictoy Acuerdo Finalpara laTerminación delConflictoy altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y- Office of National Drug Control Policy, “ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy, “ONDCP altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y- Infobae, “ONU:Colombia eselmayor productor de altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y- USDepartmentofState, International Narcotics conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/ america/america-latina/2016/07/09/onu-colombia- conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/ conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/ colombia-increases-almost-40-per-cent-over-one- org/unodc/en/frontpage/2016/July/coca-crop-incolombia-increases-almost-40-per-cent-over-one- org/unodc/en/frontpage/2016/July/coca-crop-in- cocaina delmundo,” 2016, http://www.infobae.com/ organization/268025.pdf. es-el-mayor-productor-de-cocaina-del-mundo/. https://www.state.gov/documents/ A ROADMAP FOR USENGAGEMENT WITHCOLOMBIA

ENDNOTES

70 36 ENDNOTES 65 66 64 67 69 68

York Times, May 14,2015, https://www.nytimes. COLOMBIA PEACE ANDPROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT 2Fcard&utm_term=.0d20478a5c85. Officeof 2016/05/05/colombia/1462412622_636433.html. 2016, http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/ 24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf, 101. Cultivating More Coca thanBolivia,Peru Combined: Control Strategy Report, Vol. I,March 2017, 132-136, Cultivation-and-Production-in-Colombia. Colombia,” March 14,2017, https://www.scribd.com/ Colombia’s coca boommightbewhy,” Washington Spraying ofCrops Usedto Make Cocaine,” New September 12,2016, http://src.bna.com/iE2; William Issue Paper: Evaluation ofCarcinogenic Potential,” UN,” Data onCocaine Production andCultivation in National DrugControl Policy, “ONDCPReleases Post, March 4,2017, https://www.washingtonpost. Neuman, “DefyingUS,Colombia HaltsAerial November 24, 2016, http://www. La Construcción deUnaPaz Estable yDuradera, November 24, 2016, http://www. La Construcción deUnaPaz Estable yDuradera, U.S. DepartmentofState, International Narcotics SeeEnvironmental Protection Agency, “Glyphosate NickMiroff, “American cocaine useis way up. Sally Palomino, “Colombia autoriza laerradicación Acuerdo Finalpara laTerminación delConflictoy Semana, “Santos descartareanudar fumigación Acuerdo Finalpara laTerminación delConflictoy aerea-contra-cultivos-ilicitos/492632. aérea contra cultivos ilícitos,” 2016, http://www. document/341880734/ONDCP-Data-on-Cocaine- altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y- us-backed-spraying-of-illegal-coca-crops.html. insightcrime.org/news-analysis/colombia-cultivating- organization/268025.pdf; MimiYagoub, “Colombia de cultivos ilicítos con glifosato,” ElPaís, May 5, coca-boom-is-showing-up-on-u-s-streets/?hpid= com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/04/colombias- https://www.state.gov/documents/ com/2015/05/15/world/americas/colombia-halts- more-coca-than-bolivia-peru-combined-un. hp_hp-cards_mhp-card-world%3Ahomepage% semana.com/nacion/articulo/ juan-manuel-santos-descarta-reanudar-fumigacion- conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/ Insight Crime,July12,2016, http://www.

A ROADMAP FOR USENGAGEMENT WITHCOLOMBIA See 71 72 See 78 73 75 74 77 76

“Colombia esunlídercadavez másimportante: Tiempo, September 21,2016; JulioSánchez Cristo, 17, 2015, http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia- 24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf, 67-68. Colombia haTerminado’: Santos ante laONU,” El firma-del-acuerdo-de-paz/453151. Colombia –People’s Army, 2016, https://www. Colombia andtheRevolutionary ArmedForces of to pursuepeace andtheendofcountry’s the peace negotiations between theGovernment of Impunity,” 2015, https://www.hrw.org/ Barack Obama,” ElTiempo , January24, 2016, http:// United States supportfor Colombia at the15th gustavo-gallon. Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda,ontheconclusion of Posible,” See, e.g., ElTiempo, “’Hoy Anuncioqueguerra en las FARC,” 2016, http://www.semana.com/nacion/ Semana, “Los 10Duros Dardos deUribealaFirma United States Senate, “S.Res.368 -Aresolution International CriminalCourt, Statement ofICC See, e.g., Rodrigo Uprimny, “Justicia Imperfecta, Paz Human RightsWatch, “Colombia: Agreeing to altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y- la-justicia-internacional-no-exige-pena-de-prision- articulo/reintegracion-de-las-farc-despues-de-la- anniversary ofPlanColombia,” 2016, https://www. articulo/declaraciones-de-alvaro-uribe-sobre-la-firma- conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/ de laPaz,” 2016, http://www.semana.com/nacion/ de-la-paz-entre-el-gobierno-y-las-farc/495653. organized-crime-news/auc-profile. congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate- enduring internal armedconflict and recognizing supporting efforts by theGovernment of Colombia icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=160901-otp- resolution/368/text. stat-colombia. elespectador.com/pais/ exige penadeprisión,” 2016, http://colombia2020. elespectador.com/opinion/justicia-imperfecta-paz- posible; news/2015/12/22/colombia-agreeing-impunity. Insight Crime,“AUC,” Last updated November Semana, “ElEspinosoCaminopara reintegrar a El Espectador,“Lajusticia internacional no El Espectador,2015, http://www.

79 80 81 82 “Readout ofVice President Biden’s Meetingwith “Readout ofVice President Biden’s Meetingwith White House, “Remarks by President Obamaand Availability withColombian President JuanManuel www.eltiempo.com/mundo/ee-uu-y-canada/ with authors. Colombian President JuanManuelSantos,” Santos,” February 5,2016, https://2009-2017.state. gov/secretary/remarks/2016/02/252226.htm; The Reception,” 2016, https://obamawhitehouse. President Santos ofColombia at PlanColombia December 2,2016, https://obamawhitehouse. President JuanManuelSantos ofColombia,” February 5,2016, https://2009-2017.state.gov/ Department ofState, “Press Availability with Reception,” 2016, https://obamawhitehouse. President Santos ofColombia at PlanColombia House, “Remarks by President Obamaand December 2,2016, https://obamawhitehouse. President JuanManuelSantos ofColombia,” Desarrollo,” April2017, onfilewithauthors. See, e.g., JulioSánchez Cristo, “Colombia esunlíder archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/05/ Washington Office on Latin America, “5 ways Ministerio deHaciendaColombia, “Economía y archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/02/ Ministerio deHaciendaColombia, “Seguridad archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/05/ archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/02/ analysis/5-ways-supporting-peace-colombia- colombia-plan-colombia; The White House, remarks-president-obama-and-president-santos- obama/16490277; USDepartmentofState, “Press entrevista-de-julio-sanchez-cristo-a-barack- cada vez másimportante: Barack Obama”;US secretary/remarks/2016/02/252226.htm; The White juan-manuel-santos. readout-vice-president-bidens-meeting-president- interests,” https://www.wola.org/ colombia-plan-colombia; The White House, remarks-president-obama-and-president-santos- supporting peace inColombia benefitsUS juan-manuel-santos. readout-vice-president-bidens-meeting-president- benefits-u-s-interests/. como motor delDesarrollo,” March 2017, onfile COLOMBIA PEACE ANDPROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT

84 83 85 87 86 88

“Ministro deHaciendacree queColombia podrá | Afghanistan to integrate militaryandcivilianefforts 2017, inThe Star, https://www.thestar.com/news/ world/2017/01/27/after-colombian-peace-deal- www.lainformacion.com/economia-negocios-y- Quarterly, Fall 2014, http://www.americasquarterly. Criminal Gangs moveCriminal Gangs to replace rebels incoca Control Strategy Report, Vol. II,March 2017, 67-69, See also, Jeremy McDermott,“BACRIM andtheir Surrender,” (2012) https://d2071andvip0wj. Colombia-concretar-OCDE_0_922109246.html. finanzas/economia-general/Ministro-Hacienda- Colombia Advisory Council,” December 2,2016, the Negotiations: How Reconstruction Teams Can to bringsecurityanddevelopment to post-conflict Skeptic’s View onthePeace Dividend,” Americas growing-regions.html. growing regions,” Associated Press, January27, New IllegalArmedGroups: Lessons from a Build aStronger Peace inColombia,” PRISM,2015, Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) modelfrom Peace Process,” Fall 2014, http://www. International CrisisGroup, “DismantlingColombia’s Joshua Goodman,,“After Colombian Peace Deal, U.S. CEOsParticipate inFirst Meeting ofU.S.- For adiscussion ofthepotential for adaptingthe Americas Quarterly, “Ask theExperts:Colombia US DepartmentofState, International Narcotics Embassy ofColumbia intheUS,“Colombian and areas inColombia, seeAgustin E.Dominguez, “After americasquarterly.org/content/ask-experts- criminal-gangs-move-to-replace-rebels-in-coca- illegal-armed-groups-lessons-from-a-surrender.pdf. cloudfront.net/041-dismantling-colombia-s-new- advisory-counc/919053194861110; position inColombia’s Underworld.” organization/268024.pdf. https://www.state.gov/documents/ prism_5-4/After%20Negotiations.pdf. http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/ concretar ingreso aOECDen2017,” 2016, http:// org/content/skeptics-view-peace-dividend; AFP, colombian-peace-process; Alberto Bernal, A colombia-in-washington-dc/colombian-and-us-ceosparticipate-in-first-meeting-of-us-colombia- https://www.facebook.com/notes/embassy-of- A ROADMAP FOR USENGAGEMENT WITHCOLOMBIA World Trade

ENDNOTES

38 ENDNOTES 91 90 92 93 94 89

COLOMBIA PEACE ANDPROSPERITY TASK FORCE REPORT Violence inColombia, Work to Protect Human violence-in. 2016, https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/new-us- 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 2017, http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/ 2016, http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/ Online, “New U.S.-Colombia business advisory worldviews/wp/2017/03/02/a-worrisome-number- for HumanRights,“Preocupación poraumento de the_americas/the-frightening-issue-that-could- for-colombias-peace-prospects/?utm_term=. term=.9d2467d12d47. Sociales,” 2016 http://colombia2020.elespectador. Internacional Alertasobre Asesinatos aLíderes Rights Defenders, 2016, http://mcgovern.house.gov/ Lawmakers Urge Secretary Kerry to Condemn December 2,2016, http://www.hchr.org.co/publico/ Destroy Colombia’s Peace Deal,” Washington Post, Congressman JimMcGovern, “McGovern, House Peace Prospects,” Washington Post, March 2,2017, Nick Miroff, “The Frightening Issue that Could la violenciaencontra delíderes, lideresas, Office in ColombiaoftheUNHigh Commissioner lawmakers-urge-secretary-kerry-to-condemn- El Espectador,“’Hay queponerunalto ala Nick Miroff, “A Worrisome Number for Colombia’s lideres/476325; Semana, “Lasentidasúplicadelosembajadores,” council aimsto strengthen trade ties,” December 7, defensores ypoblaciónquehabitazonas rurales,” strengthen-trade-ties. colombia-business-advisory-council-aims- destroy-colombias-peace-deal/2017/01/02/3e0a7fec- comunicados/2016/comunicados2016. php3?cod=49&cat=101. media-center/press-releases/mcgovern-house- c304-11e6-92e8-c07f4f671da4_story.html?utm_ impunidad’: ONUMujeres enColombia,” April12, derechos-humanos-embajadores-piden-proteger-a- mujeres-en-colombia-articulo-689097. nacional/hay-que-poner-un-alto-la-impunidad-onu- sobre-asesinatos-lideres-sociales. com/justicia/comunidad-internacional-alerta- be1a28a8d957. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ El Espectador,“Comunidad

A ROADMAP FOR USENGAGEMENT WITHCOLOMBIA 100 95 96 97 98 99 11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf, 215. 11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf, Colombia’s 71. www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/declaraciones- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/WPS%20SRES1325%20.pdf. Congress has102 senators and166representatives. Organizations,” https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/ Castrochavismo,” 2016, http://lasillavacia.com/ Espectador, September 25,2016, http://www. November 24, 2016, http://www. La Construcción deUnaPaz Estable yDuradera, November 24, 2016, http://www. La Construcción deUnaPaz Estable yDuradera, gobierno-y-las-farc/495653. Dardos deUribealaFirmaPaz,” 2016, http:// Acuerdo Finalpara laTerminación delConflictoy UNSecurityCouncil, Resolution 1325(2000), Acuerdo Finalpara laTerminación delConflictoy altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y- Cecilia Orozco Tascón, “Plebiscito: literalmente una US State Department,“Designated Foreign Terrorist La SillaVacia, “Los Temores delNo:4.El altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y- conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/24- cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- decisión devidaomuerte’: Sergio Jaramillo,” El http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/ de-alvaro-uribe-sobre-la-firma-de-la-paz-entre-el- conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/24- other/des/123085.htm. castrochavismo-58133; elespectador.com/entrevista-de-cecilia-orozco/ historia/los-temores-del-no-4-el- muerte-s-articulo-656718. plebiscito-literalmente-una-decision-de-vida-o- Semana, “Los 10Duros

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