Kon-Tiki Experiments Penultimate Version, forthcoming in Philosophy of Science Aaron Novick Department of Philosophy Purdue University
[email protected] Adrian M. Currie Department of Sociology, Philosophy, and Anthropology University of Exeter
[email protected] Eden W. McQueen Department of Biological Sciences University of Pittsburgh
[email protected] Nathan L. Brouwer Department of Biological Sciences University of Pittsburgh
[email protected] Acknowledgments For comments on drafts and presentations, the authors are grateful to Joseph McCaffrey, Raphael Scholl, Nora Boyd, Joshua Eisenthal, three anonymous reviewers for Philosophy of Science, members of a 2016 seminar at the University of Pittsburgh, and an audience at Vrije Universiteit Brussel. AC’s research was funded by a generous grant from the Templeton World Charity Foundation (no. 222637). 1 Kon-Tiki Experiments Abstract We identify a species of experiment—Kon-Tiki experiments—used to demonstrate the com- petence of a cause to produce a certain effect, and we examine their role in the historical sci- ences. We argue Kon-Tiki experiments are used to test middle-range theory, to test assump- tions within historical narratives, and to open new avenues of inquiry. We show how the re- sults of Kon-Tiki experiments are involved in projective (rather than consequentialist) infer- ences, and we argue (against Kyle Stanford) that reliance on projective inferences does not provide historical scientists with any special protection against the problem of unconceived alternatives. 2 1. The Voyage of Kon-Tiki In 1947, Thor Heyerdahl and a small crew set sail from Peru on a balsa raft, hoping to reach Rapa Nui (Easter Island).