LECTURE DELIVERED JUNE 13, 2012 No. 1220 | February 14, 2013

The 10th Anniversary of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Withdrawal

Abstract Kim R. Holmes, PhD The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Vice President of Foreign and Defense Key Points of 1972 prohibited the United States Policy Studies and Director of the and the Soviet Union from testing or Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis ■■ In 2002, the United States officially deploying national missile defense Institute for International Studies at withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic systems. Three months after 9/11, The Heritage Foundation Missile (ABM) Treaty after 30 President George W. Bush gave notice Looking around the room, I see years of being party to a treaty that legally prohibited the country from to Russia of the U.S. intent to withdraw as many people in the audience who protecting itself from ballistic mis- from the treaty. Ballistic missile were involved in overturning the sile attack. technology was proliferating at an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty ■■ By the last decade of its existence, alarming rate, and Washington did not as are up here on stage. I appreciate the ABM Treaty was not the cor- want to leave Americans vulnerable all of you coming here today. nerstone of arms control—it was to such attacks. Without being bound Ten years ago today, the U.S. the principal impediment to prog- by the treaty, engineers and scientists officially withdrew from the Anti- ress on arms control. could finally innovate, and they Ballistic Missile Treaty. It is some- ■■ While the U.S. now has the right have achieved significant advances thing many people—in this room, to deploy a robust missile defense in land- and sea-based defenses in and others long before the George W. system, the policies of the Obama the interim. On June 13, 2012, The Bush Administration—had advo- Administration have undermined Heritage Foundation invited nine cated. We at Heritage had long talked progress in protecting the nation national security experts to reflect on about it, dreamed of it, and worked to from the missile threats of Iran and the circumstances that led to the U.S. make it happen. Our work in missile North Korea. withdrawal from the treaty a decade defense goes back to the early 1980s, ■■ For the Obama Administration, earlier. and one of our first studies was our vulnerability is a choice—it is an well-known “High Frontier” report. element of its feckless pursuit of the “nuclear zero” agenda and Another notable effort was the 1995 its failed promotion of reset with This paper, in its entirety, can be found at report by our Missile Defense Study Russia. http://report.heritage.org/hl1220 Group, also known as Team B, which ■■ The U.S. must not repeat the mis- Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison specifically recommended that the Center for Foreign Policy Studies takes of the past by getting locked U.S. overturn the ABM Treaty. into arms control agreements that The Heritage Foundation We are here to celebrate the 10th 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE prevent self-defense. Washington, DC 20002 anniversary of this historic event. (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org In retrospect, when we look back, Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily people frankly thought we were out reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill of our minds to think we could ever before Congress. get out of this treaty. But many of lecture | NO. 1220 DELIVERED JUNE 13, 2012

us believed otherwise, and because and Senior Director for Counter- Our value-added is connecting the the Bush Administration had the Proliferation Strategy. lessons learned to the contemporary courage to take that step, we have Gentlemen, thank you for coming. strategic debate. made significant progress on missile Let me begin by recalling that, 10 defense ever since. Keynote Address 1 years and one day ago, the U.S. was To start this discussion, we have Ambassador Robert Joseph legally prohibited from protecting with us two distinguished gentle- Senior Scholar, National Institute our nation against ballistic missile men who were very involved in the for Public Policy, and former Under attack. Article I of the ABM Treaty decision to overturn the ABM Treaty. Secretary of State for Arms Control was very explicit, committing each Ambassador Robert Joseph was the and International Security of the two parties—the U.S. and the principal staff member on President It’s a pleasure to see so many of Soviet Union—“not to deploy ABM Bush’s National Security Council you here today. Our gathering has a systems for the defense of the territo- working on this issue. He also feeling of a reunion and a celebration. ry and not to provide a base for such played a key role in the creation of Let me thank the organizers here a defense.” This obligation, as we all the Proliferation Security Initiative at Heritage for the opportunity to know, translated into the doctrine of and the Global Initiative to Combat provide this stage setter for today’s mutual assured destruction, which Nuclear Terrorism. And, Bob was session, which marks the 10th anni- remained the bedrock of our national one of the key people working to versary of U.S. withdrawal from the strategic posture for three decades. convince Muammar Qadhafi to give ABM Treaty. However, despite the dire pre- up his weapons of mass destruction, It’s most appropriate that I’m dictions at the time, when we did which he did in 2003. doing this with my friend and col- withdraw from the treaty, the sky Bob Joseph also served as the league John Rood, who played a vital most definitely did not fall, and few President’s Special Envoy for Nuclear role in the outcome and with whom today would openly suggest a return Non-Proliferation, Undersecretary I worked side by side to achieve the to the condition of a legally man- of State for Arms Control and objective of our withdrawal. John dated vulnerability. Yet while we now International Security, and Special and I have been asked to address the have the right to develop and deploy Assistant to the President and lessons learned from our experience a robust missile defense system, the Senior Director for Proliferation in staffing President Bush as he led policies and programs of the Obama Strategy, Counter-Proliferation, and the U.S. withdrawal from the treaty Administration have undermined Homeland Defense on the National beginning in the very first days of progress, in my view, in protecting Security Council. Today he holds his Administration in January 2001 our nation from the emerging mis- the position of senior scholar at the until the formal withdrawal in June sile threats from countries like Iran National Institute for Public Policy. 2002. What I will do is highlight a and North Korea. For the Obama Joining him is John Rood, cur- number of lessons from that experi- Administration, vulnerability is a rently vice president for business ence that I believe remain relevant choice; it is an element of the feckless development at Raytheon. He also today, and then John will follow with pursuit of the “nuclear zero” agenda held numerous national secu- a further elaboration, especially on and its failed promotion of reset with rity positions in the government— the treaty’s negative impact on our Russia. I will return to this point. including at the State Department, ability to develop and deploy missile Let me start with the first les- Department of Defense, National defenses—not just against long-range son from our withdrawal. It’s an Security Council, CIA, and on the missile threats, but across the board. obvious one, but the obvious often Hill. John succeeded Bob Joseph I know that all of the panelists escapes those who work in the arms as Acting Undersecretary of State will add to this, especially when we control arena—and that is, that it for Arms Control and International hear from Alison Fortier and Mira is extremely difficult to extricate Security before being named the Ricardel about the progress we have ourselves from treaties that we Assistant Secretary of State for made since our withdrawal in both have ratified, even if those treaties International Security and Non- the ground-based mid-course system, contain supreme national inter- Proliferation. On the National as well as with Aegis. While both est clauses that permit such an Security Council, John served as John and I will draw from the past, action. Today in discussions about Special Assistant to the President, we intend to be forward-looking. the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,

2 lecture | NO. 1220 DELIVERED JUNE 13, 2012

which is often touted as an impor- missile attacks, and President Bush our intention to withdraw, Secretary tant step toward a nuclear-free world, offered the space-based Brilliant Powell publicly advocated that we we hear from arms control advocates Pebbles program as the U.S. contri- simply inform Moscow of the tests that we can simply abrogate the bution, the treaty persisted, preclud- that we intended to perform and stay treaty if in the future we determine ing the achievement of the objec- within the treaty. there is a need to test. tive of both the American and the This leads to the second lesson: Of course, all evidence is to the Russian presidents at the time. To succeed, we needed to win the contrary. The ABM Treaty was in intellectual debate, and for the ABM force from 1972 until 2002, and dur- To deny regimes such as those Treaty this meant de-mythologizing ing the last 15 years—the last half of in Pyongyang and Tehran the articles of faith that surrounded those three decades—three of four the treaty. John played the role of Presidents emphasized its negative the ability to blackmail and chief de-mythologizer from the effects on our national security and intimidate the U.S. in the future, day that he came on board at the expressed the desire to seek relief we needed to deploy defenses, National Security Council staff until from the constraints of the treaty. and to do so, we needed to the day of our withdrawal from the President Reagan criticized the treaty. The ABM Treaty, after all, withdraw from the ABM Treaty. treaty on both moral grounds as well was based on the counterintuitive as strategic grounds. His Strategic proposition that protecting the U.S. Defense Initiative was severely ham- Why did both Reagan and Bush from missile attack was actually det- pered by the basic prohibitions of the 41 fail? The answer is clear: because rimental to our security. The belief treaty on testing of mobile, maritime there were always arguments to the was, if the U.S. and the Soviet Union and space-based capabilities, includ- contrary and those arguments pre- did not deploy defenses, both would ing interceptors and sensors. While vailed. Withdrawal would mean that feel secure in their ability to destroy the interagency would at the time we would threaten progress in arms the other and therefore would not debate points of broad versus nar- control; the allies would never accept feel the need to build up their offen- row interpretation in an attempt to it; congressional supporters would sive nuclear forces. expand what we could and could not respond negatively; and on and on. Secretary of State Henry do in the area of research and devel- There never seemed to be a good Kissinger, at the time of the ratifi- opment, we stayed with the treaty time to withdraw from the treaty. cation debate, actually praised the at the expense of building effective It was only under the leadership of treaty by noting that it would give defenses. President George W. Bush that we did Soviet missiles a “free ride” to U.S. The first President Bush also withdraw. In his first year, he worked targets. Following ratification, the sought relief from the treaty, and effectively to achieve this goal, which corollary was also frequently heard, again without success. In his case, he saw as essential to protect our and that was if the U.S. would dare the most fundamental conditions country. To deny regimes such as to withdraw from the treaty, there had changed: the end of the Cold War, those in Pyongyang and Tehran the would certainly and automatically the dissolution of the Soviet Union, ability to blackmail and intimidate be an arms race. Well, in fact, and to our treaty partner, and most impor- us in the future by holding our cities the contrary, the signing of the ABM tant, the emergence of third country hostage, we needed to deploy defens- Treaty ushered in the Soviet Union’s missile threats. Yet the lawyers at es, and to do so, we needed to with- most ambitious expansion of nucle- the State Department and elsewhere draw from the ABM Treaty. ar forces, and as for withdrawal, were quick to assert that Russia was For the second President Bush, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s the successor to the ABM Treaty and the national security imperative of announcement of large force reduc- that the treaty remained in effect. deploying missile defense against tions on the day that we announced Never mind that Russia was not the rogue state proliferators prevailed our intention to withdraw put the Soviet Union, or that Moscow was over the arguments that had been stake through the heart of the no longer the enemy. Even when made by every Secretary of State arms race myth. In both cases, the President Yeltsin proposed, at the from George Shultz forward. As demonstrated truth was the exact United Nations, a global initiative late as November 2001, only weeks reverse of what treaty proponents calling for protection against all before President Bush announced had asserted.

3 lecture | NO. 1220 DELIVERED JUNE 13, 2012

Other now-discredited myths that both foreign and domestic, of an to vulnerability, perhaps encouraged surrounded the ABM Treaty were arms control agreement banning the by the prospective budget impact of that defenses were too expensive militarization of space most often missile defenses. and that defenses would never work, seek only to prohibit the U.S. from The key for us was to exert control and as long as we stayed in the treaty, deploying interceptors in space on over the process and to do so imme- these were self-fulfilling proposi- the grounds that such a capability diately. If the new Administration tions because its provisions, and the would be “destabilizing,” unafford- was to succeed in achieving its goal U.S. compliance process, ensured able, and unachievable technical- before the bureaucratic antibodies that we could not develop effective ly—all familiar assertions from the asserted themselves, it was impera- defenses, or even maximize the the- past. They seem much less concerned tive to move quickly. That’s exactly ater defense capacities, out of con- about the buildup of anti-space capa- what we did: By mid-February the cern that they might possess what bilities by Russia, China, and others President had signed out presidential was called a theoretical capability that are the real threat to our ability guidance entitled “Transforming against long-range missiles. to operate in space. Deterrence” that provided the new Looking back, it was easier—I security framework in which the think far easier—to get the accep- President Obama’s comment defense of the homeland against tance from Russia of our with- to President Medvedev that small-scale missile attack was cen- drawal than it was from the die- tral. At the more operational level, hard treaty adherents at home and he would be more “flexible” and within days of assuming office, in allied countries who, in some on missile defense after the new talking points were sent out by cases, described the ABM Treaty U.S. presidential election is the White House to all departments as a “sacred document.” Perhaps yet another indication of and to all of our embassies; no longer this was because Moscow never would the ABM Treaty be the corner- the Administration’s intent really bought into the myths, and stone of strategic stability. Instead, it certainly did not buy into the sanc- to trade the defense of the was branded a relic of the Cold War. tity of the treaty itself. Russia, once U.S. homeland for a quixotic As you might suspect, it felt rather it concluded that we were serious nuclear zero. good writing those talking points about withdrawing from the treaty, and that presidential guidance, and accepted it. President Putin went so even better when the President far as to state on the very day that we The third lesson from the ABM signed them out. announced our intention to with- Treaty experience is the need to The fourth and final lesson from draw that the U.S. withdrawal was overcome the bureaucracy, which the ABM Treaty experience is that not a threat to Russia. under every Administration exerts bad ideas in Washington rarely go As for the true believers in a powerful influence over national away. If ever there was an example Congress, academia, and elsewhere, security policy and is generally of the power of a bad idea, it is the the theological adherence to the resistant to fundamental change. For ABM Treaty, which was based more, treaty prevailed until the bitter end. the ABM Treaty, this included the I believe, on intellectual arrogance It was only when the treaty went State Department and our embas- and ideology than on sound stra- away—almost unnoticed—that these sies abroad, which, whenever we tegic sense and the realities of the individuals and institutions went asked, reflected the arguments of threats that face our nation. Today, quiet; perhaps less because they were those who favored the treaty. This while there are no vocal advocates of convinced by the facts than they was not due to disloyalty to the new reinstituting the ABM Treaty, there were concerned about the potential Administration, I believe, but rather is an unmistakable creep backwards. embarrassment of continuing their to the prism through which they The Obama Administration is taking arguments. saw and evaluated the world. And us back to the era of vulnerability, to Not surprisingly, many of the State was not alone; after fighting the defenseless posture of the past. same myths that accompanied the for missile defenses in the 1960s, the This is reflected in positions taken ABM Treaty now pervade the debate uniformed military, up through the by supporters of the Administration over the use of space in the U.S. mis- hierarchy to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as by the President himself. sile defense architecture. Advocates, adopted the civilian-led commitment There are growing indications of a

4 lecture | NO. 1220 DELIVERED JUNE 13, 2012

willingness to negotiate a demar- vulnerable to their missiles for the had given six months’ notice under cation agreement with Russia, an sake of stability. What is surprising— the treaty’s terms, Article 15, that agreement that would define the I think disappointing is a better the U.S. would be leaving the treaty. technical boundaries between stra- word—is that we have apparently It was particularly memorable to me tegic and theater defenses. acceded. Missile defenses, especially because at that time I was a Director This proposal, which was strategic defenses, are clearly a lesser working under Bob Joseph at the tried and failed in the Clinton priority than the arms control agen- National Security Council and had Administration, would serve only da of the Obama Administration. the pleasure of watching President to impede the development of all Bush make that announcement in U.S. missile defense programs, Keynote Address 2 the Rose Garden of the White House. which can only perform effectively The Honorable John Rood I watched a tape of that announce- when there is an integrated layered Former Acting Under Secretary ment the other night and it really defense to protect the U.S. and our of State for Arms Control and brought back all the emotions that I friends and allies. Moreover, the International Security felt at that time. Obama Administration has spoken As I look around the room, it’s As I stood in the Rose Garden, against homeland defense, not in great to see so many folks that I’ve near the end of the President’s first its policy pronouncements, but in had the chance to work with over year in office, listening to him outline its funding of programs. Here, the the years on this particular topic. the reasons for U.S. withdrawal from Administration continues to under- Actually, it feels like a gathering of the treaty, I obviously recognized the fund the defense of the homeland the faithful back to church to work historical significance of the event while favoring capabilities seen on our long-held project. There are so and what that meant, and I felt very as less provocative or offensive to many people that played a role over confident it would usher in a new Moscow. a very long period of time in either era in which missile defenses would The imbalance is pronounced, supporting missile defense or trying eventually be deployed to protect with about four of every five dollars to undermine the bases for the treaty the U.S. I felt enormous pride and going to theater defenses, and with and arguing for a more rational satisfaction that day that the goal the cancellation of most programs defense policy that it would take me that I and many others had worked intended to provide capabilities quite a long time to recognize them so hard to achieve had finally come against future longer-range threats. all. I guess I could devote my whole to pass, but, frankly, mostly I felt Funding for the currently deployed remarks to testimonials, but suffice relieved and exhausted as I watched ground-based system in Alaska it to say that it’s great to be back with the reporters and cameramen rush and California has been dramati- everyone. into the White House Rose Garden— cally reduced, and the test program, I want to thank The Heritage which is a rather small place, not I believe, artificially constrained. Foundation for putting together this much larger than the size of this While we’re digging new silos, event and giving me the chance to room that we’re in today—and as they there is simply no money for more speak along with Bob Joseph. Before rushed in to set up their footstools interceptors. I begin my substantive remarks, I do and ladders to climb up to videotape Finally, the President’s off-mike feel the need to offer a brief disclaim- the ceremony and a handful of White comments to President Medvedev er that the views I’ll express are of House staff looked on, I really felt in March 2012 that he would be course my own, my personal views, great about what was going on. more “flexible” on missile defense and shouldn’t be associated with any That’s the way these modern following the U.S. presidential elec- organization that I’m affiliated with. announcements go in the age of tion provides yet another indica- When we look back at the ABM television. The hundreds of cheering tion of the Administration’s intent Treaty and I look back to 10 years people that you might see in a movie— to trade away the defense of the U.S. ago, more precisely to the date which they’re actually at home watching homeland in pursuit of its quixotic is most memorable to me, which on television as these events take quest for nuclear zero. Not surpris- is 10 years and six months ago on place. It had been a long slog to get to ingly, Russian leaders have dusted December 13, 2001—the day when that point, and many times I wasn’t off the old ABM Treaty line that President George W. Bush made the sure we would get there. As I stood we, the United States, must remain formal announcement that the U.S. there watching the President make

5 lecture | NO. 1220 DELIVERED JUNE 13, 2012

his remarks, I felt like our work was I recall asking him, on my first or At the State Department, the still not done. Under a plan that second day at work, about the phrase Assistant Secretary for Arms Control Bob Joseph and I had crafted, U.S. “move beyond the ABM Treaty”— and other senior officials in that officials were departing on planes which was prominent in the bureau were holdovers from the to go around the world to explain President’s remarks—what did that Clinton Administration, and were the significance of the President’s mean. I thought that was an inter- responsible for implementing a poli- announcement. In my case, I was esting formulation. Bob surprised cy during the Clinton presidency that departing later that day for China me by saying that was something we described the ABM Treaty as the and India to be a part of the delega- still needed to define. It was a broad cornerstone of strategic stability. Of tions explaining to those govern- formulation that had been chosen to course, the Clinton Administration ments why this decision had been capture a range of outcomes to allow had approached the Russians about a taken. continued progress in the missile three-phase plan to amend the ABM I’d never worked as hard in my defense program, but modification of Treaty for only those changes that entire life as I did that first year at the treaty, phased withdrawal, or the were needed at that point in order to the NSC. Knocking off early meant option that I favored, complete with- allow the U.S. missile defense pro- meeting my wife for a 9 p.m. dinner drawal from the treaty in accordance gram to progress. After agreement appointment. I’d somehow miracu- with Article 15, all fell under this idea on only those necessary changes, lously persuaded her that it would be of “moving beyond the ABM Treaty.” negotiations would immediately fine to put our toddler, my first child, commence on the next phase of the to bed at 11 p.m. because she was a Treaty opponents explained treaty modification, according to the toddler and could sleep as late as she that the ABM Treaty codified Clinton plan. wanted the next day, and at least this Secretary of Defense Donald way her father could see her for a a hostile relationship with Rumsfeld likened this approach little bit after he came home from the the Soviet Union that was no to “cutting off the tail of a dog an office each day. longer appropriate for the kind inch at a time, hoping it doesn’t I’d come to the National Security of relationship the U.S. wanted hurt as much.” Unsurprisingly, the Council staff three months after Russians saw little upside to agree- with Russia. President Bush had taken office when ing with the Clinton Administration Bob Joseph hired me to work on mis- on some changes to the treaty, only sile defense, the ABM Treaty, and There were some influential play- to be rewarded with more negotia- other counterproliferation issues. In ers in the Administration, such as tions on yet more changes. They also hindsight, it may have seemed like Secretary of State Colin Powell, who correctly judged that the Clinton a foregone conclusion to some that favored doing the minimum neces- Administration would ultimately not President Bush would make the deci- sary to adjust the treaty to allow only leave the treaty. We had a bureau- sion to have the U.S. leave the ABM those activities in the U.S. missile cracy, as Bob spoke of, in the govern- Treaty, but that certainly wasn’t defense program that had “bumped ment with 30 years of experience clear in early 2001 in the White up against the treaty”; that, until with the ABM Treaty that had condi- House compound. President Bush activities bumped up against the trea- tioned their ways of thinking, and in had just given his first major national ty, we would be content to live within most cases political appointees, like security address since being elect- it and we would try to manage this some of our speakers today—Doug ed President at National Defense friction of bumping up against the Feith and Steve Rademaker—hadn’t University in May, an address that treaty’s restrictions—or so that point yet been nominated and confirmed Bob worked heavily on. of view went. Those with this point by the Senate, and had therefore not I barely knew Bob when I came of view argued for postponing adjust- taken their posts in the early days of to work for him in that office, but ments to the treaty as long as possible, the Administration. quickly grew to have enormous and reaching understandings with I must say a few words about Bob’s respect for his intellect, for his com- Russia to allow continuation in the contribution. More than anyone mitment, and, frankly, the honor- near term of the U.S. missile defense in the Bush Administration, Bob able way that Bob always got things program, and perhaps to seek modest Joseph is responsible for seeing us accomplished in the Administration. amendments in the far term. through to have this day to celebrate

6 lecture | NO. 1220 DELIVERED JUNE 13, 2012

10 years on the successful with- a contemporary deterrence. Along the treaty rather than withdrawing drawal from the ABM Treaty. Bob with U.S. offensive forces, missile from it. was the architect of the plans to do defenses would be a key way how we I drafted a paper that examined that, he was the intellectual engine deterred hostile states armed with each article of the treaty. For those that drove the policy changes, and missiles from attacking or blackmail- unfamiliar with the ABM Treaty, from his perch at the White House ing the U.S. And we explained why it’s a very well-crafted document. It as a coordinator, and particularly at getting rid of a treaty that codified a was well done to achieve its purpose. that time with few political appoin- fundamentally hostile relationship Article 1 prohibits defense of each tees anywhere in the Administration, premised on maintaining the ability country’s territory or an individual that was the locus of control to destroy each other was not a good region. As modified in 1974, the U.S. under which the new President cornerstone for the kind of relation- had the ability to protect a missile could exert his authority over the ship we wanted to build with Russia. field in North Dakota, while the Administration. We did this in national strategy Soviet Union maintained the abil- Bob understood, and impressed documents, countless policy papers, ity to protect its capital of Moscow. on me, several of the keys that led talking points, press materials, Article 5 states that “each party to success in getting out of the ABM memoranda, and other documents. undertakes not to develop, test, or Treaty. First, was the need to control I recall that, at the end of my first deploy ABM systems or components the message from the White House year, I had enough in my safe, about which are sea-based, air-based, and to push change from the top five feet tall, of the things that Bob space-based or mobile land-based.” down. Second, the need to relentless- and I had personally authored, to fill Pretty comprehensive coverage. ly articulate and advocate a funda- the entire shelf. On a good day we Article 6 prohibited giving other mentally different policy approach would do five or six papers a day. It systems capabilities to counter bal- than what had existed for the last was really quite a publishing house at listic missiles. Article 9 said, “each three decades. And, third, to manage that time. party undertakes not to transfer to and think through all the details to other states and not to deploy outside give the President and other senior U.S. cooperation with allies its national territory ABM systems leaders confidence that we had a under the phased-adaptive or their components limited by the workable plan for getting out of the treaty.” So, cooperation with allies ABM Treaty. approach that the Obama was prevented. We explained why the world Administration developed When drafting this paper on had fundamentally changed since would not have been possible necessary changes to the treaty, I the treaty was signed in 1972; we with the ABM Treaty in place. focused on the minimum number of explained that the ABM Treaty changes. So, an example of a change codified a hostile relationship with in Article 1 would be: Instead of the Soviet Union that was no longer Yet, there was still a debate inside arguing that the treaty “prohibited” appropriate for the kind of relation- the Administration on how to pro- defense of your territory, the neces- ship we wanted with Russia and that ceed with the treaty. There were sary change would say that the treaty we didn’t want a relationship that turning points that could have made “permitted” defense of the national would continue to be premised on history different. For example, at territory of the United States. Article mutually assured destruction. We one point Bob asked me to draft a 9 would need to be changed from explained why the threats we faced paper for Condoleezza Rice, then the prohibiting cooperation in missile 10 years ago and continue to face National Security Advisor, which she defense transfers to other countries today from rogue states armed with had requested, about the changes to “permitting” such transfers and weapons of mass destruction and needed to amend the treaty to allow the stationing of systems outside ballistic missiles required us to have the missile defense program to pro- your national territory. Article 6 new capabilities like missile defenses. ceed to protect America. Now, Bob would need to be changed from pro- We explained how missile defens- and I were naturally very concerned, hibiting giving systems capabilities es were not destabilizing—this had as we thought she was receptive to to counter ballistic missiles to “per- been the mantra for 30 years—but, arguments that Secretary Powell was mitting” giving systems capabilities rather, stabilizing, as we required making at that point about amending to counter.

7 lecture | NO. 1220 DELIVERED JUNE 13, 2012

When we were done with the the Moscow Treaty to cut deployed how much progress we’ve made in paper, we noticed that a small num- strategic nuclear warheads in the U.S. the missile defense program since ber of word changes had the effect, and Russia by two-thirds, once again then. These things would not have unfortunately, of turning the treaty showing that the theory behind the been possible with the ABM Treaty on its head and making its provisions ABM Treaty was false, that the ABM in place; that’s just simply a fact. mean the opposite of their original Treaty did not prevent a massive Today we have a system includ- intent. In short, Bob and I argued arms race during the Cold War, and ing 30 ground-based interceptors that amending the treaty was simply one did not ensue after its demise— in Alaska, sensors around the world, not workable—a view that Dr. Rice even though The New York Times and a command and control system became persuaded of after read- and other critics said this was what to protect the U.S. territory from ing the paper. To my knowledge, she would happen. I’ve got a copy of The missile attack that would have been never again spoke of amending the New York Times editorial page from prohibited by Article 1 of the ABM treaty, because she simply deemed that day titled “An Invitation to an Treaty. We have a sea-based X-band it unworkable because it had been Arms Race.” Apparently the invita- radar and other X-band radars in properly crafted to achieve its pur- tion got lost in the mail on the way to Japan and Turkey and other sensors pose of preventing missile defenses. whoever the recipients were to be. deployed outside our national terri- There were other close calls, As Bob said, the Russians quickly tory that would have been prohibited such as when Secretary Powell suc- moved to put the ABM Treaty behind by the ABM Treaty. Our coopera- cessfully persuaded others in the us. I went with Under Secretary tion with allies under the phased- Administration to have Bob, John Bolton to Moscow very shortly after adaptive approach that the Obama Bolton, and J. D. Crouch brief the the end of the ABM Treaty, and our Administration developed would not deputy chief of the Russian general Russian interlocutor began the meet- have been possible with the ABM staff, General Yuri Baluyevsky, on ing by saying, “The ABM Treaty is Treaty in place. the activities envisioned in the U.S. behind us; let’s move on to other Our systems like THAAD are missile defense program to see if work,” and the Russians did quickly no longer dumbed down to prevent Russia could agree that in the near move on to other work. In the Doug them from violating the treaty’s term the treaty could be preserved Feith–Baluyevsky channel, which provisions on giving systems “capa- if Russia agreed that those planned had been a hotbed of discussions bilities to counter.” Perhaps most activities were not in violation of the about the treaty prior to its with- significant of all, as I say, the Obama treaty. drawal, afterwards other topics were Administration’s phased adaptive After hearing what was planned the dominant discussion items. The approach would not have been pos- by the U.S., General Baluyevsky said Russians did move on because they sible under the ABM Treaty. The that such activities would clearly vio- saw that the U.S. was serious about next version of the Standard Missile late the treaty, which was, of course, withdrawal, and they were prepared 3, called Block IIB, that is planned for true and the very point of the activ- to move on to other topics with us. deployment in Europe to protect the ity, and that Russia expected the U.S. Six months later, of course, the U.S. and Europe from ICBM attack to adhere to the treaty as long as we ABM Treaty withdrawal took effect would have been prohibited under were party. Eventually the debate on June 13, 2002, and one year after the ABM Treaty. was won inside the Administration, making the historic announce- But we have to be careful not to and President Bush made the deci- ment of the U.S. withdrawal from repeat the mistakes of the past and get sion to leave the treaty and we’ve the treaty, George W. Bush signed locked into arms control agreements never looked back—at least not until a National Security Presidential that would inappropriately prevent this event today when we celebrate Directive (NSPD) making a decision us from defending ourselves. We’ve 10 years of the demise of the ABM to deploy a missile defense system just come too far to go back to failed Treaty. to protect the U.S. and our allies for approaches based on dumbing down Russian President Putin made his the first time—NSPD 23, which Bob our defenses like speed limits on our own statement on December 13, 2001, and I had worked on, along with oth- interceptors or others that some in saying that U.S. withdrawal from the ers, of course. We’ve obviously come the arms control community favor. treaty did not threaten Russia’s secu- a long way since that time, and it’s Today is a day to celebrate how rity. We later reached agreement on tremendously gratifying to me to see far we’ve come and I think that that

8 lecture | NO. 1220 DELIVERED JUNE 13, 2012

progress is apparent to all. It’s fun to served all over the U.S. government. the position that the ABM Treaty take a moment to look back at some He’s worked in the White House, the remained in force despite the dis- of the lessons learned, and as Bob Department of State, the U.S. Senate solution of the Soviet Union, and a said, I think really winning that ideo- and House of Representatives, and number of lawyers and commen- logical debate, pursuing that message even the Peace Corps. He has worked tators took a contrary position—I effectively, and then capitalizing on as an Assistant Secretary of State among them—that the treaty lapsed the successes, are really some of the in three different bureaus in that when the Soviet Union ceased to lessons that are learned. It’s great to department, including the Bureau exist. have the chance to spend this time of Arms Control and the Bureau I was practicing law in the 1990s with you today and have the opportu- of International Security and Non- in a private law firm and a colleague, nity to talk to you. Proliferation, and he directed the George Miron, and I did a lengthy Proliferation Security Initiative analysis of the legal status of the Kim Holmes: during one of those stints. So he also ABM Treaty following the dissolu- On behalf of my colleagues here at knows quite a bit about fighting pro- tion of the Soviet Union. That legal The Heritage Foundation: I believe liferation and the battles that were analysis became the basis for a the country owes both of you a huge introduced by our first two speakers. lawsuit that we brought in federal debt of gratitude for what you did on Our last speaker of this panel district court representing 40 or so this issue. Thank you. will be Dr. Mark Groombridge, who Members of Congress, in the House works for Global Communications and Senate, challenging the Clinton Panel 1—Missile Defense in the right now and was a Senior Policy Administration’s assertion that the New Strategic Environment Advisor in the Department of ABM Treaty remained in force. The Steven Bucci, PhD (moderator) Commerce, but more directly to this court refused to rule on the chal- Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage subject, worked as an advisor to the lenge until further efforts were made Foundation Under Secretary of State for Arms by Administration officials and Our first speaker is the Honorable Control and International Security Members of Congress to resolve the Doug Feith. Doug is an old friend and was the Counselor and Chief issue in political channels. I think of mine; we both arrived at the of Staff for the U.S. ambassador to our argument had great power; it was Pentagon almost the same day in the United Nations in New York. He essentially that there’s a very long- July 2001, where he took over as has also worked at the CATO and standing principle of international the Under Secretary of Defense American Enterprise Institutes. law—one that makes a lot of common for Policy, a position most people Together these three gentlemen sense—that, if you have a treaty of a look at as the number three civilian will give us quite an overview of the political nature between two states person in the Pentagon—though he events of which we are celebrating and one of those states ceases to would probably correct me about the anniversary today. exist, the treaty lapses automatically. that—but his responsibilities were “Ceases to exist” is a much more such where he was the primary advi- The Honorable Douglas Feith important concept than simply sor to Secretary of Defense Donald Director, National Security Strategies “changes its government.” Scholars Rumsfeld and to the President for Center, Hudson Institute, and former of the history of Russia and the Defense Department–related inter- Under Secretary of Defense Soviet Union know that when Russia national issues. Doug had also served I want to join in the tribute paid to became the Soviet Union, Russia’s in the Reagan Administration on Bob Joseph by Under Secretary John international legal personality was the National Security Council and Rood as being really the central play- not extinguished. There was a politi- as a Deputy Assistant Secretary er in this enormous decision by the cal revolution and a change in the of Defense for Negotiations Policy. U.S. government to radically change name of the country, but it was the Doug has seen the development of its approach to the nuclear weapons same country. these issues from a very important threat by abrogating the ABM Treaty But when the Soviet Union, on position in the Pentagon where that and moving forward to develop mis- Christmas 1991, dissolved, it dis- capability was developed. sile defenses. solved pursuant to an agreement He will be followed by the The George H. W. Bush and among what was known as the Honorable Steven Rademaker, who’s Clinton Administrations both took Commonwealth of Independent

9 lecture | NO. 1220 DELIVERED JUNE 13, 2012

States. All of those states, including But here at The Heritage Wouldn’t it be better to save lives Russia under Yeltsin, agreed that the Foundation, I think it’s important to than to avenge them? Are we not Soviet Union ceased to exist and that point out that the idea that the ABM capable of demonstrating our none of those states was going to be Treaty was not a good, sound, sen- peaceful intentions by applying the successor to the Soviet Union. sible moral and practical basis for all our abilities and our ingenu- This was obviously of great impor- American policy had its roots in the ity to achieving a truly lasting tance to the non-Russian republics Reagan Administration, squarely stability? I think we are; indeed, who did not want Russia to assert during the Cold War. There were we must. ... later that it had the right to rein- important people in that era with corporate those republics into the whom I worked who certainly deserve What if free people could live Russian empire. a mention as having contributed to secure in the knowledge that Anyway, that was the basis of the developing understanding that we their security did not rest upon the legal analysis. But all that’s now needed to move away from the ABM the threat of instant U.S. retalia- of only minor historical interest. Treaty even during the Cold War. tion to deter a Soviet attack, that When I became Under Secretary of People like Frank Gaffney, whom I see we could intercept and destroy Defense for Policy, rather early on here, Richard Perle, Fred Iklé, Caspar strategic ballistic missiles before Secretary Rumsfeld informed me Weinberger—just to name the people they reached our own soil or that that the President was not going to that I worked with at the Pentagon of our allies? rely on any analysis that said that the during the Reagan Administration; treaty had lapsed by operation of law. and of course there were others. I think it’s crucial to pay atten- He was going to act as if the treaty It’s worth getting down to some tion to this to understand how deeply remained in force and America basics. People who were not alive moral, and serious, and practical the would withdraw from it according during those debates may be scratch- objections to the ABM Treaty were. to its own terms. Those terms, as we ing their heads asking, what is this Notice that what President Reagan heard from John Rood, were that issue really about? Why do people was talking about is that this concept either party had the right to with- think the renunciation of the ABM of mutual assured destruction, that draw with six months’ notice to the Treaty is important and why is supposedly was a contribution to other party, so it was in December it worth celebrating? I think the the stability of the balance of terror 2001 that President Bush formally best person to turn to for wisdom during the Cold War, was a concept notified Russia that the U.S. would on that score is Ronald Reagan, that was troubling morally and did withdraw six months later from the who explained in what was one of not serve the key practical interests treaty. the most famous speeches of his that the world had in maximizing What was the strategic analysis Administration what was wrong deterrence. He believed that if we that moved President Bush on this with the ABM Treaty. I’ll just read moved away from mutual assured decision? As we just heard from Bob you a few sentences from this terrific destruction toward the development Joseph and John Rood, the George W. speech that Ronald Reagan delivered, of defenses against ballistic missiles, Bush Administration officials chose his so-called Star Wars speech, on we could reduce the danger of nucle- to emphasize that the end of the Cold March 23, 1983: ar war, we could serve the interests War ended any rationale for the ABM of maximizing deterrence, and in the Treaty, which was of course pre- I’ve become more and more event that deterrence failed, serve mised on the deep hostility between deeply convinced that the human the extremely important interest of the parties to that treaty—the U.S. spirit must be capable of rising saving lives. and the Soviet Union. But let’s face it, above dealing with other nations This is the moral heart of the the rationale for the ABM Treaty was and human beings by threaten- issue that we’re talking about today dubious, not to say just flatly wrong, ing their existence. Feeling this and it’s the reason that people felt so even during the Cold War. One can way, I believe we must thorough- intensely about this. This was not a easily understand the political utility ly examine every opportunity for mere bureaucratic debate; it was not of President George W. Bush making reducing tensions and for intro- a mere debate over a weapons sys- his argument based on the end of the ducing greater stability into the tem. It was a debate about the most Cold War. strategic calculus on both sides. ... profound, serious, humane concerns

10 lecture | NO. 1220 DELIVERED JUNE 13, 2012

that underlie national security policy The United States will trans- things that I think could be justly deliberations. form its strategic planning from criticized, it’s important to point out Now, the George W. Bush an approach that’s been based that a lot of the fundamental argu- Administration’s strategic analysis almost exclusively on offensive ments about missile defense have was grounded in the nuclear pos- nuclear weapons to one that also been laid to rest. There is now con- ture review that we submitted to includes a range of non-nuclear sensus on the importance of develop- Congress in January 2002. As the and defense capabilities. In par- ing missile defenses. One can quibble Under Secretary, I was responsible ticular, because deterrence will about how to do it, which way to do for producing it, and the laboring function less predictably in the it, what’s the right architecture, but oar was in the hands of a really bril- future, the United States will the fundamental point that mis- liant colleague of mine, Keith Payne. need options to defend itself, its sile defenses contribute to stability, Less than a week after providing this allies, and friends against attacks contribute to better alliance rela- nuclear posture review to Congress, that cannot be deterred. tions, and are the more moral way to I testified about it before the Senate approach the risks of nuclear weap- Armed Services Committee. I’ll take The last piece of this testimony onry, I think that’s now established. I a minute to read one or two sentenc- that I gave in February of 2002 that I think that helps. It will help us as we es from that which will help explain want to highlight is: continue to have to deal with nuclear the strategic rationale that we put threats from countries like Iran and forward from the Pentagon to sup- We no longer consider a mutual North Korea. port the kind of thinking that was assured destruction [MAD] rela- being developed by Bob Joseph, John tionship with Russia the appro- History will smile on the Rood, and others at the White House: priate basis for calculating our decision by President George nuclear requirements. MAD is a W. Bush to withdraw from the The Cold War system of two com- strategic relationship appropri- peting blocs has been replaced by ate to enemies, to deep-seated ABM Treaty and put our entire a new system, one with a broad hostility, and distrust. Russia is nuclear posture on a saner, spectrum of potential opponents not our enemy and we look for- more moral, and more practical and threatening contingencies. ward to a new strategic frame- basis. The continuities of the past U.S.– work for our relations. Soviet relationship have been replaced by the unpredictability So there was a clear-cut repudia- In conclusion, I would simply say of potential opponents who are tion of MAD. While we didn’t tend to that I believe history will smile on motivated by goals and values highlight it at the time, it’s extremely the decision by President Bush to we often do not share nor well important to point out that the ratio- withdraw from the ABM Treaty and understand and who move in nale for the repudiation of MAD was put our entire nuclear posture on a directions we may not anticipate. the one spelled out by Ronald Reagan saner, more moral, and more practi- We no longer confront the severe decades before. cal basis. but relatively predictable threats Missile defenses used to be highly of the Cold War; instead, we’ve controversial. It is a happy develop- The Honorable Stephen entered an era of uncertainty and ment that they are less controversial Rademaker surprise. now—although the work is not over Principal, Podesta Group, and former in this area. It is interesting that Assistant Secretary of State for Arms In this testimony, I went on to say: when President Obama came in and Control, Nonproliferation brought into office a whole bunch of I, too, am privileged and hon- Instead of our past primary people who had been rather out- ored to be here with so many former reliance on nuclear forces for spoken in their criticism of missile friends and colleagues who worked deterrence, we will need a broad defense, they came around, when on this project at this commemo- array of nuclear, non-nuclear, they had real responsibility, to ration of a very important event. and defense capabilities for an understanding the importance of Like John Rood, I’m another one era of uncertainty and surprise. missile defense. While they’re doing of those people who was not in the

11 lecture | NO. 1220 DELIVERED JUNE 13, 2012

Bush Administration at the time former chairman Sam Nunn of the They were trying to come up with a this decision was made; I was on the Senate Armed Services Committee distinction that the Russians would staff of the House Foreign Affairs and by Joe Biden, who at that point accept that would permit theater Committee for almost 10 years prior was a senior Member of the Senate missile defense and essentially main- to the decision on ABM, and then I Committee on Foreign Relations. tain the ABM Treaty prohibition on joined the Bush Administration in There was some unbelievably over- strategic missile defense. the area of arms control. My perspec- heated rhetoric that came out of the Congress got very upset about tive therefore is really on what came Congress on this about the nation this and in the 1995 Defense before the decision, and I have some facing a constitutional crisis, the Authorization Act, it actually passed thoughts on what came after as well. usurpation by the executive branch a prohibition on demarcation agree- First, with regard to the before, of the prerogatives of the Senate. ments, and it provided characteris- as I said, I was at the House Foreign They were just not going to allow the tics of what it intended to prohibit. Affairs Committee and I was the Reagan Administration to adopt clev- The Clinton Administration sub- Chief Counsel to the committee, and er interpretations of the ABM Treaty sequently decided to stand this on so I was responsible for legal issues. that might permit the U.S. to defend its head and they basically adopted Any time I think of the ABM Treaty itself against the threat of missile the view—and even got the Justice I’m reminded of a saying they teach attack. Department to produce a legal opin- you in law school, which is that hard The Reagan Administration ion to the effect—that everything cases make bad law. I have to say, fought this battle. It was a political the Congress had not just prohibited, having watched the ABM Treaty battle. The Administration fought it had implicitly authorized. And over a long period of time, the ABM it for a couple years, and then the so anything not explicitly prohib- Treaty was a hard case and it made a Iran-Contra scandal came along ited was authorized and therefore lot of bad law. I think, actually, that and the political balance of power it was legally permissible to imple- people on the other side of the issue in Washington shifted, and in about ment demarcation agreements that from us in this room would agree 1987 the Reagan Administration were not prohibited. The Clinton with that in a lot of ways. backed down. To me that’s interest- Administration didn’t need congres- The first example of bad law ing background because the same sional approval to do this—in fact, it that they would cite was during people who became so indignant argued that the congressional prohi- the Reagan Administration. This is about the Reagan Administration’s bition amounted to authority for the ancient history now, but there was a alleged legal back flips to try to Administration to amend the ABM huge debate here in Washington over live with the ABM Treaty became Treaty. It was a preposterous over- the so-called broad versus narrow responsible for committing their reach by the Clinton Administration. interpretation of the ABM Treaty. own legal back flips during the The Administration only backed Essentially, what that was about Clinton Administration. down thanks to the efforts of two was that the Reagan Administration There were two of them in par- people who are not here today: and its legal adviser at the State ticular that I was involved in combat- Chris Williams, who worked for the Department, Abraham Sofaer, came ing as a congressional staffer, and I’ll Senate Majority Leader during this up with a legal interpretation of talk about both of them. The first was time, and Marshall Billingsley, who the ABM Treaty designed to allow a big debate we had about so-called worked for Chairman Jesse Helms the U.S. to research and develop demarcation agreements that the of the Foreign Relations Committee. and potentially deploy some mis- Clinton Administration wanted to Williams and Billingsley basically sile defense technologies that could negotiate. These were essentially to got their bosses to take the position defend our nation, notwithstanding distinguish theater missile defense in 1997 that the Chemical Weapons the ABM Treaty. Basically Sofaer from strategic missile defense, and, Convention would not be approved came up with some clever theories of course, it was their theory that by the U.S. Senate unless the about how this could be done consis- theater missile defense was good, Administration backed down on this tent with the treaty with regard to defending deployed troops or a small preauthorization argument that it certain advanced technologies. area, but you couldn’t defend the had concocted. The Administration There was an incredible back- entire nation; that was strategic mis- decided the Chemical Weapons lash in the U.S. Congress, led by sile defense and that was a big threat. Convention was pretty important

12 lecture | NO. 1220 DELIVERED JUNE 13, 2012

to it, and Sandy Berger, the National hands simultaneously. I’m particu- International Relations Committee, Security Advisor, finally sent a letter larly proud of this chapter because and Senator Jesse Helms. It said, If to Trent Lott, the Majority Leader, I think it was a good example of you can’t identify some other coun- saying, Okay, without prejudice to congressional oversight essentially try that’s also party to this treaty, our legal arguments, we promise we unraveling an overreach by the U.S. then we’re just going to have to will not implement the demarcation Administration. Frankly, I think conclude that this treaty no longer agreements without Senate advice what Congress did during that period exists, because a treaty can’t have and consent to those agreements. On helped unravel the treaty itself. just one party. Then, President that basis, the Chemical Weapons One of the most amusing things Clinton thought about it for a couple Convention was later approved by I ever did in government was to of months and wrote back and said, the Senate. Then subsequently we embark on an exchange of letters Well, you’re right, and so, a change passed legislation, part of something with President Clinton about the of position: We now think it’s crystal called the European Security Act, ABM Treaty. This exchange of let- clear that Russia is a party, and we which actually made it illegal for the ters really laid the groundwork for think maybe Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Administration to proceed on the some legal work that Doug Feith Belarus are also parties, but we don’t basis of that theory if it ever decided did subsequently. The first ques- really have to decide that and we’re to pull back the Sandy Berger letter. tion we asked the President was not sure, and you ought to ratify That was a pretty dramatic okay, you claim there’s this treaty this memorandum of understand- fight that we had in the mid-’90s, that the U.S. is a party to—we have ing (MOU) on succession that we’ve and this was followed quickly by a to live up to this treaty—who else is negotiated to settle this area of the similar fight over what the Clinton a party to this treaty? What other law. Administration called multilateral- countries? This was actually a very Then we wrote back again: This ization. This was the effort of that complex legal question and it took is very interesting; you’re saying Administration to answer the ques- the Administration six months Russia’s a party, but you’re saying tion of who was our treaty partner in to figure out what its answer was. maybe these other countries too, the ABM Treaty. The Administration The Administration finally wrote so let’s talk about that. If maybe faced a serious problem. The Soviet back, the letter signed by President Ukraine is party to the ABM Treaty Union had collapsed, so who was our Clinton. It said basically, It’s unset- with the U.S., then what kind of trea- treaty partner? Initially, the Clinton tled who the treaty partners are, and ty is this? Have we multilateralized it Administration took the position that’s why it’s so critically important automatically? Or do we have a series that there was automatic succession that the Senate give its advice and of bilateral treaties between the U.S. of four countries, but then there were consent to the multilateralization and each of these countries? Because some problems trying to figure out agreements that we negotiated. the ABM Treaty had some specific how that would work, so it eventually provisions, such as each party is retreated and said, Okay, maybe we By the last decade of its permitted to defend its capital with need to sign an agreement with those existence, the ABM Treaty was 100 missile defense interceptors. Can four countries—Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine defend its capital with 100 Ukraine, and Belarus. But it claimed not the cornerstone of arms interceptors, while Russia is doing that agreement was not a change to control, it was the principal the same for Moscow? That would be the treaty, and so it was not going to impediment to progress on arms quite a strange way to really change send that to the Senate for its advice control. the bargain from the point of view of and consent. the U.S. Is that what happened? We Congress objected to both sent that letter to the President. parts of that. It objected first to That was not a very satisfac- At that point the members of the notion that this could be done tory answer, so we wrote back again the Administration gave up. They without advice and consent, and and said, You can’t really have a just never responded. The ques- many Members of Congress also treaty with just one party. There tions became too hard. It was about objected to the notion that multilat- has to be mutuality of obligations. this point that people like Doug got eralization of the treaty was a good The second letter was co-signed by involved and started looking into thing. So, we had two fights on our Benjamin Gilman, chair of the House these questions more seriously, and

13 lecture | NO. 1220 DELIVERED JUNE 13, 2012

Doug produced a memorandum of unable to even answer the question failure of START II and the failure of law basically asserting that the ABM of who the treaty partners were in the Clinton Administration’s efforts Treaty had died upon the collapse of the absence of Senate approval of to negotiate START III are attribut- the Soviet Union; there was no suc- multilateralization. It was quite a able to their desperate effort to keep cessor at all. mess that these guys walked in to the ABM Treaty alive and the politi- There’s this other rogue organiza- deal with on day one, which I believe cal gridlock that resulted from that. tion, called The Heritage Foundation, probably made the task of ending it It was only once the Bush that commissioned a study on the a little bit easier, because even the Administration eliminated the ABM same issue by David Rivkin—he did Russians had to recognize that this Treaty that strategic arms control legal work parallel to what Doug treaty had become a crippled legal was able to go forward. Five months did—and John Norton Moore at the instrument by the beginning of the after the announcement of termi- University of Virginia did a third Bush Administration. nation, the Bush Administration study of this issue. A lot of scholar- When I joined the Bush concluded the Moscow Treaty, which ship was done, all reaching the con- Administration, I became responsi- was the first arms control treaty clusion that, in fact, the treaty had ble for arms control. I realize this is a between the U.S. and Russia in already died because there were no room full of people that by and large nine and a half years, and it pro- parties to it on the other side. probably aren’t fond of arms control, vided for a two-thirds reduction in The political battle between but I can’t help commenting on the deployed strategic forces. The New Congress and the President over mul- notion that the ABM Treaty was the York Times editorialized about how tilateralization got resolved because, cornerstone of strategic stability, a new arms race was inevitable, but similar to what had happened with which was, of course, the main argu- in retrospect it’s quite clear that the the demarcation agreements, the ment that its supporters made for obstacle to progress on arms control Senate took the position that it decades. The notion was that without was the ABM Treaty, not the threat wouldn’t ratify the Conventional the ABM Treaty, arms control would of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) collapse and we would face a new Treaty (the Flank Agreement)— arms race. Mark Groombridge which was another important If you look back on it, it’s quite Vice President, Global Communicators, arms control agreement that came clear that people that made that and former Advisor to the Under up—unless the Administration argument had it exactly backwards. Secretary of State for Arms Control backed down on multilateraliza- By the last decade of its existence, I’m going to give a view from tion and agreed that the MOU would the ABM Treaty was not the corner- the trenches, if you will, because have to be approved by the Senate. stone of arms control, it was actually it was my job, when I was working Eventually, the Administration the principal impediment to prog- for Under Secretary John Bolton, to agreed to that, and of course there ress on arms control. It’s no mystery deploy essentially a lot of the argu- was zero chance the Senate was ever why in eight years President Clinton ments that John Rood and Bob going to approve the multilateraliza- and his Administration were unable Joseph had crafted, and implement tion MOU. to produce an arms control agree- them in the State Department, which As a result of all this effort and the ment. By contrast, the first Bush was not necessarily the easiest task, legal scholarship of people like Doug Administration, which came before, as I think most of us here would Feith, when the Bush Administration produced two strategic arms con- agree. But I do want to also take away took office, it inherited from the trol agreements with the Russians, from this experience a few lessons, Clinton Administration a legal hash, START I and START II. building a little bit on some of Bob’s a treaty that a lot of people contend- Clinton, of course, tried to nego- earlier comments about what that ed was no longer in force; that if it tiate START III. He was not able means for the present day as well. was in force, it needed to be multi- to do that, nor was he able to bring The first sort of lesson learned, as lateralized, but of course that was into force START II. Even though least that was instilled in me very not going to happen because there the U.S. Senate approved entry into clearly, is that personnel is policy. was no way the Senate was going to force of START II, the Russian Duma It had to be top-down from Bob approve the multilateralization. And, wouldn’t go forward, and it all had to and John to the State Department the Clinton Administration proved do with the ABM Treaty. Both the because it was very, very clear that

14 lecture | NO. 1220 DELIVERED JUNE 13, 2012

the State Department was not going equities” arguments: Once the myths didn’t really have much of a response to come up with this idea on its own. about arms control were pretty well to that one either. Fortunately we And so I think a testament to both debunked by this stream of papers were able to deploy the stream of Bob and John is: They are Exhibit coming from the White House, we talking points in the argument, and I A in the argument that personnel then had to confront the regional think the history of the last 10 years is policy, and it’s not just you need bureaus on other equities—Russia has clearly shown that all arguments political appointees, you need, frank- won’t cooperate with us on coun- against ballistic missile defense have ly, the right kind of political appoin- terterrorism, or the Chinese aren’t been essentially proven false. tees and the ones who are really going to like this for whatever reason. What was interesting from my going to do the legwork. All of those arguments proved to be perspective, for the first term I The second point I would make, false, obviously. I mean, China will was primarily John Bolton’s advi- then, is that you have to get the pro- cooperate with us on counterterror- sor on Asia, so most of the work cess right. I kind of chuckled when ism when it’s in China’s interest to do I did focused on Asian countries. John Rood was saying he had a safe so. It has nothing to do with the ABM Interestingly, we did actually full of documents basically debunk- Treaty. find some allies within the State ing all the various myths and argu- Department. I had never heard the ments about it. It was important to As we rightly celebrate the word “deliverable” before I joined do that because John Bolton isn’t demise of the ABM Treaty, we the State Department, but the State known for being terribly chit-chatty, Department loves deliverables. but he did sit me down the first day I need to remain vigilant and Whenever there’s a meeting with the got there and said, “Mark, if there’s wary of those who would President or a high-level official, we one thing I want to instill in you, essentially roll back the gains have to deliver some type of good. In it’s: Get the process right. Because we have made. essence, that meant that in terms of that way people are forced to engage cooperating with other countries on you on substance”—and that was missile defense, we had deliverables absolutely one of the most impor- So it was important, then, to have to give them. That helped a lot in the tant things I learned, not just with this slew of arguments, and I hope Japan context and Doug did a lot of respect to this argument or the ABM they’re archived someday—I don’t work in the India context helping— context, but also with many other know if you still save them, John, or Defense Department policy in many arguments as well. where they are—hopefully at some ways was the driving force on some It really was critical, then, to point they’ll be in a time capsule. of the cooperative efforts with India, have that safe full of documents The argument about the arms race and the State Department loved that we could deploy, and one of the was proven false. The argument that some parts, other parts not so much. techniques that we in the trenches it will not work, “they’ll just develop That’s a tale for a different time. would use was: No, this is from the decoys and fool the system,” that was In any case, the alliance-build- White House (we wouldn’t say the also proven false. ing aspects of missile defense have NSC, we’d say this is from the White And then the third argument is proven to be quite important, and House). Because occasionally, the the one that the State Department even at that time there were some State Department would rejoinder would constantly make that still groups within the State Department back to us that, well, the President boggles my mind. It said: Well, care- that were at least receptive to this is just one man. They actually used ful what you ask for, because if you do when they felt that, Ah, now we have that line once in a meeting with me. develop a successful missile defense something we can deliver to Tokyo in But then they would come up with a system, then they’ll just produce the context of some type of summit. slew of arguments, too, saying, well, suitcase bombs or something like My final point would be—I real- if the President understood the full that; they’ll use other means to ly want to reinforce a point Bob context, he wouldn’t have arrived at attack us. To which the argument made—that the battle isn’t over. this particular decision. was: Well, so in the absence of mis- There are still concerns. Consider Some of the constant argu- sile defense, then, we’ll just let them Kim Holmes’s point about the ments that we always heard at the develop a ballistic missile capability Wiki leaks and about the Obama State Department were the “other and get a free ride in that way. State Administration perhaps being

15 lecture | NO. 1220 DELIVERED JUNE 13, 2012

receptive to some form of new ABM possible and has made it a real- Reagan Administration, which is Treaty. It still stuns me that some ity. Our panelists today are emi- where I got my start in the execu- within the arms control community, nently qualified to speak to the tive branch. I’d like to thank The after North Korea’s failed missile test wonders that the industry has been Heritage Foundation for bringing us a couple months ago, took the view able to provide for missile defense together on this occasion, because that: Well, this shows that we don’t architecture. a lot has happened over the last 10 really need missile defense because it Mira Ricardel is the vice presi- years, and we should take the time wouldn’t really work against Russia dent of business development at to look back and appreciate all the or China anyway. And North Korea Boeing Strategic Missile and Defense challenges that we’ve faced across can’t even get a missile off the ground, Systems, which delivers ICBM sup- the board. I’m going to talk a little so why should we even bother with port and conventional strike and bit about what industry did, even missile defense because it’s so gro- integrated missile defense solutions. though, as I was recalling with tesquely expensive. Mira has had a distinguished career Doug Feith earlier, I was actually in The point is that, as we are rightly in the development of the country’s Moscow with him and J. D. Crouch celebrating the demise of the ABM national security programs and on September 11, talking about mis- Treaty here today, we still need to policies, serving as acting Assistant sile defense cooperation with the remain vigilant and wary of those Secretary of Defense for International Russians. A great deal has happened who would essentially roll back the Security Policy. She was awarded in the past 10 years. gains we have made, and essentially the Department of Defense Medal We heard a lot this afternoon try to reinstate the views of the old for Distinguished Public Service on about the ABM Treaty prohibiting world, which clearly have proven not July 14, 2005. During Mira’s career, homeland defense. In 1998, Boeing to work. she also served as the Foreign and became the lead system integrator Defense Policy Advisor to Senate for the national missile defense test Panel 2—What the Industry Can Republican leader and presiden- bed, which was the precursor to the Do tial candidate Bob Dole. Prior to Ground-based Midcourse Defense Rebeccah Heinrichs (moderator) her time on Capitol Hill, Mira was (GMD) system. At that time, due to Visiting Fellow, The Heritage Deputy Director of Congressional the treaty, you could only test in a Foundation Affairs at the U.S. Arms Control and limited way, and program activities The next panel is particularly Disarmament Agency. received oversight from the Pentagon important to the discussion of mis- Alison Fortier is vice president and an interagency compliance review sile defense, 10 years since the with- of missile defense at Lockheed process—which was quite onerous. drawal of the ABM Treaty. When Martin’s Washington operations. For those of you who were there and President Reagan announced his She joined Lockheed in 1996. Alison had to sign off on it—Bob Joseph was desire to build a comprehensive mis- is a former Special Assistant to the at the State Department, I believe, sile defense system, he was criticized. President and Senior Director for at that time—you know that every The news media in one instance Legislative Affairs at the National single test activity was scrutinized criticized him for “raising the Security Council, and was Director for whether it would lead to realistic remote possibility of a sci-fi defense of Congressional Affairs at the U.S. or effective missile defenses. And, of against Soviet missiles.” But in 2001, Arms Control and Disarmament course, deployment was prohibited. President Bush said, “We recognize Agency. Alison began her career in So, things changed dramati- the technological difficulties we face Washington, D.C. as a professional cally when the President put out and we look forward to the challenge. staff member of the House Foreign his National Security Presidential Our nation will assign the best peo- Affairs Committee. Directive 23 on December 16, 2002. ple to this critical task; we will deploy It was very clear that the intent of missile defenses to strengthen global Mira Ricardel the President was to deploy missile security and stability.” Vice President, Business Development, defense capabilities to defend the National leaders have made Strategic Missile and Defense Systems, homeland by 2004. When you think missile defense a national security The Boeing Company about it, that was a two-year goal, necessity, but it has been industry One little-known connection is a challenging goal, and we took it that has proven that it is technically that Alison was my first boss in the seriously.

16 lecture | NO. 1220 DELIVERED JUNE 13, 2012

So today what do we have? part of the defense industrial base. Vandenberg for another interceptor Today, our nation is defended by the One of the things we maybe haven’t site. Ground-based Midcourse System. appreciated is that when indus- Today, you can see that the GMD Today, GMD is the only defense try was brought into this—missile is an important element of the entire against long-range ballistic-missile defense being such a massive under- ballistic missile defense system, attack. It provides 24/7, 365-days- taking—we developed capabilities from sensors, to command and a-year coverage. We, Boeing, are the deep across the country, across control. We heard earlier a little bit industry team leader, and as you’ll many different companies. We have about the SBX radar, and some of the see, it’s a large industry team with created a genuine core competency other radars that we integrate, as a great deal of capability. There are within the defense industry with well as truly advanced technology interceptors, radars, command and respect to missile defense, which is that is being used and is constantly control systems that span much of something that we’ve done in a very improving and evolving. the globe, and, we use hit-to-kill short time, going from a technology, technology— which is one of those test-bed environment, and theater There is recognition around sensitive technologies that has been defenses to the massive, geographi- the world that it’s not just the discussed by some in the context of cally distributed GMD system. Just how we might cooperate with Russia. look at some of the major GMD sites U.S. that needs missile defenses; There’s been some of that in the news across the country. other advanced militaries raising serious concerns. We have Now, a little bit about how we got recognize that they need them, interceptors, in Fort Greely, Alaska, here. Alaska was clearly geographi- as well. and at Vandenberg Air Force Base, cally the right place to have an inter- California. ceptor complex, but it was a remote A few facts in terms of the com- location and a very harsh environ- Now, one of the other things that plexity of the system and its geo- ment—the coastline so large, the came out of the ABM Treaty was graphic distribution: The software seismic activity and extreme tem- the opportunity to expand interna- lines of code are massive. There are peratures. The government made the tional cooperation. Certainly a lot components located across 11 time decision, for reasons of physics and of that has gone on; a lot has gone zones, seven different sensor systems geometry, that Alaska was where we into building missile defense coop- that are integrated with two distrib- were going to, and so we did. With a eration up with different countries. uted fire control centers. I mentioned team of over 300 subcontractors, we Another benefit for industry is to be the launch complexes in Alaska delivered a missile field on sched- able to share technology and work and California. There’s been exten- ule in under two and a half years, in with other countries. If you look at sive international cooperation with 2004. some of the Missile Defense Agency’s respect to the GMD system, as well; If you look at some of the infra- international partners, withdrawal we have a radar in Thule, Greenland, structure, it is really impressive that from the ABM Treaty was not an for example. In fact, John Rood and I the site could be built in that short a action that isolated the U.S. You can spent some time in Denmark talking time. There was really nothing there. see that a number of countries want- about upgrading that radar during In just two and a half years we were ed to participate with their indus- the Bush Administration—a suc- placing initial interceptors. Of course, tries, too, and in fact, if you look at cessful negotiation. There is also the you can’t build the whole year around, the annual international conference Fylingdales radar in the U.K.; we had so that was also another challenge, on missile defense sponsored by the the support from the British early on and yet we did this on schedule. American Institute of Aeronautics to use that as part of the GMD sys- By 2004, we met the presidential and Astronautics (AIAA) and the tem. And, of course, as with any sys- directive. We had our first intercep- Missile Defense Agency, they include tem, it’s constantly evolving through tors and Missile Field 1, as well as about 20 countries. flight tests and intercept tests, and the Beale and Cobra Dane upgraded In fact, this year, Lockheed had we expect the program and the sys- early-warning radars on line; we the privilege of hosting it in Berlin; tem to continue to evolve over time. had integrated the Aegis system as a Boeing was the industry sponsor This is just to give you a snapshot. sensor. Additionally, we had begun last year in Copenhagen. A lot of Missile defense involves a significant 24/7 operations and preparations at companies from many different

17 lecture | NO. 1220 DELIVERED JUNE 13, 2012

countries were represented, reflect- appreciated. One of the reasons we basing of sensors and shooters, and ing that there’s a great deal of inter- could deploy a national system so further limits on information-shar- est in evolving technology and quickly was because there was true ing among different systems. capabilities to meet the proliferating alignment across the U.S. govern- Today, we are able to maximize threat. There is recognition around ment and across industry. We had the probability of intercept through the world that it’s not just the U.S. clarity of direction, and we heard engagement coordination, sensor that needs missile defenses; other from the legal panel of how some- netting, and the higher velocity and advanced militaries recognize that times things that seem so clear can divert abilities of interceptors. In they need them, as well. That’s what be completely convoluted if certain particular, I’m going to talk about we’re seeing with that kind of partici- legal arguments take hold. There this as it relates to Aegis ballistic pation at conferences and in indus- was a clear alignment whether it was missile defense. As John Rood men- trial and government-to-government the legal folks in the interagency, tioned, Article 5 of the ABM Treaty partnerships. the acquisition plan, the policy, the prohibited the development, testing, One of the things we’re proud funding, congressional support and and deployment of sea-based anti- of at the Boeing Company is being then industry capability. So all these ballistic-missile systems or compo- part of the Arrow weapon system, things brought together really made nents. So, in effect, under the ABM which is the national missile defense it possible for us to build a national Treaty there would have been no system for Israel. Together with missile defense system in record Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD). Israel Aerospace Industries, we have time, and to improve it, and now 10 Instead, 10 years later, we have 23 co-produced and co-developed the years later we have the protection U.S. Navy Aegis BMD ships that are Arrow II interceptor and are now that we have today. deployed, three more ships are in co-developing and co-producing the process, and there is a plan to have Arrow III interceptor for the govern- Alison Fortier up to 32 ships by 2014. So this is quite ment of Israel. Israel is in a situa- Vice President, Missile Defense, a capability. tion where layered missile defenses Lockheed Martin Corporation In addition to the ships with the are essential, and they’re deployed. It has been fascinating to hear Aegis BMD weapon system and radar, There’s a lot we can learn from the Bob Joseph, John Rood, Doug Feith, there are more than 120 SM-3 inter- Israelis in terms of how to do things and Steve Rademaker discuss their ceptors deployed. We have created, very quickly, very affordably, and involvement in bringing the ABM over these past 10 years, a missile with the right attitude toward test- Treaty to an end. The insights that defense capability that is globally ing. You test to learn. When they they provided about the issues that deployed and effective. I’d like to say have a test that doesn’t go well, they they had to address, as well as the that Aegis ballistic missile defense just go back at it, and fix it; they don’t process and the communication of a is a successful, proven system with have the kind of political situation new policy, shows that it was quite a a track record of 23 intercepts out that we sometimes have where a fight but—more importantly—quite of 28 tests. We have seen the prac- failed test can mean a cancelled an achievement. It is good to be part tical benefits of having the system program. Their government is fully of the 10th anniversary commemora- deployed. For example, when North committed to continued deployment tion of the United States withdrawal Korea decides to launch ballistic mis- of missile defenses. from the ABM Treaty. siles that have the effect of raising I think as we look back, despite all I am going to give an industry great anxiety in the Pacific region, the naysayers, missile defense tech- perspective of what the ABM Treaty U.S. Aegis BMD ships and Japanese nology was never really the issue. It withdrawal has meant for missile Aegis BMD ships have deployed to wasn’t about “could America develop defense over the past 10 years. I the region to defend the population the capability?” I think it was really will focus on Aegis ballistic mis- and territory of friends and allies, as a policy question. We have cover- sile defense. It is certainly true that well as of the United States. age today of the U.S. against limited within the last 10 years, missile We also now have two Aegis BMD ballistic missile attack because of defense has moved well beyond the ships deployed in the Mediterranean. the decisions the government made. constraints of the ABM Treaty with The Obama Administration made But I think there are also some les- its limit of one radar and one missile a commitment, as part of the first sons here that may not really be fully field, its prohibition on the forward phase of the phased-adaptive

18 lecture | NO. 1220 DELIVERED JUNE 13, 2012

approach architecture, to have test was with the first-generation security. However, the ABM Treaty one Aegis BMD ship in the Aegis BMD weapon system and the termed international cooperation Mediterranean in 2011. The first first-generation SM-3 interceptor. It on missile defense “circumvention.” one, the USS Monterrey, deployed on demonstrated what is referred to as Article 9 and Agreed Statement E schedule; it was relieved by the USS launch on remote. In FTM-15, we prohibited the transfer of ABM sys- The Sullivans, and now the USS Vella actually took fire-control quality tems, components, or blueprints to Gulf has relieved The Sullivans. And, data from a land-based X-band radar other states. What we consider today there is the good news story of the to provide information of sufficient to be close cooperation was not per- Aegis BMD ship, the USS Cole, which quality to the Aegis BMD weapon mitted under the ABM Treaty. This many of you may remember as badly system in order that the missile, the prohibition would have included the damaged by a terrorist attack. The SM-3 interceptor, could be launched transfer of Aegis BMD capability to Cole was repaired; it is now deployed before the organic sensor onboard Japan. Fortunately, Japan does have in the Mediterranean as an Aegis the ship acquired the target to be four Aegis BMD ships. The SM-3 IIA, BMD ship. intercepted. that is part of the Aegis system, is a Now, why is this important? It’s joint development program between Under the ABM Treaty, there extremely important because the United States and Japanese indus- would have been no Aegis farther away you can see a threat, the try; it’s a 50–50 share. The U.S. Aegis greater probability of a kill. It gives ships and the Japanese Aegis ships ballistic missile defense. you the opportunity for shoot-look- communicate together, cooperate shoot; you can fire, if you need to, during international concern over In looking at the ABM Treaty multiple interceptors; you can assess actions by North Korea and deploy and the limits that it placed on whether you’ve intercepted with for mutual benefit. missile defense and on Aegis bal- the first and then decide whether Other cooperative missile defense listic missile defense in particular, to fire additional interceptors. So programs include United States it is important to recognize that it something as simple as this, mak- efforts with Israel. The Israeli was not just interceptors that were ing an existing system more effec- cooperative programs are playing a limited, it was also sensors. The tive, was precluded under the ABM big role today in helping Israel deal Agreed Statement D stated that a Treaty. And eventually we will go with what is a very dangerous situa- sensor system that would be used beyond launch on remote to engage tion in the Middle East. In addition, to provide coverage beyond the field on remote in follow-on tests. We will there is also a great deal of interna- of view of the single ground-based actually conduct an intercept based tional interest in the Terminal High radar at the single ABM site, which on off-board sensors. Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) was to have been in an ICBM field in This initial test last year was with system. The United Arab Emirates is the United States, would be illegal a land-based sensor. But the hope the first international customer for unless specifically permitted. We’ve is to integrate space-based sensors, THAAD; there will be others. Again, heard today about some of the dif- whether it’s the space-based infrared these nations will be able to defend ficulties of trying to negotiate what system (SBIRS) or other space-based themselves, and the United States was permitted and what was not sensors, such as the system that is doesn’t always have to be the first to permitted. So, some of the sensor currently being developed by the respond. netting that is part of the overall Missile Defense Agency, the preci- One of the other issues that I’d ballistic missile defense system sion-tracking space system (PTSS). like to mention in terms of the ABM architecture today would most cer- The plan is to incorporate space- Treaty is that only one ground-based tainly not have been allowed under based sensors into not just the Aegis interceptor (GMD) site was permit- the ABM Treaty. system but into the overall ballistic ted and that was at Grand Forks. Of We are actually moving toward a missile defense system. course, today we have two GMD sites, system based on any sensor to any Mira, in her presentation, referred one in Alaska and one in California. shooter. That’s the ideal. One exam- to the issue of “circumvention.” We But now we will not only have the ple of that was the successful Aegis- assume that we will cooperate with GMD sites, we are going to have the BMD intercept test known as FTM 15 our allies on issues of great mutual land-based Aegis Ashore sites as that occurred on April 15, 2011. This importance and issues of mutual well. The first one will be at Kauai in

19 lecture | NO. 1220 DELIVERED JUNE 13, 2012

Hawaii at the Pacific Missile Range important missile defense test rang- missiles in Iran and North Korea Facility (PMRF); the second one will es we have today—not only for Aegis, of the range that could threaten be in Romania in 2015; the third site but also for THAAD. the United States homeland. The will be in Poland in 2018. So we will We talked a little about demarca- fact that the United States has not have five land-based sites to help tion earlier. When you look through been under the constraint of the defend both our allies and the United the language of the demarcation ABM Treaty these past 10 years has States. As part of the fourth phase of agreements, it was very precise. It allowed us to proceed with devel- the phased-adaptive approach, the precluded any ballistic missile oping defenses for the continental SM-3 IIB will be in Poland. Poland is interceptor with a velocity exceed- United States, which, as many of the right geographic location for the ing three kilometers per second that our speakers noted this morning, is physics in order to intercept an ICBM was intended to defend against bal- something that is absolutely critical. threat from Iran headed toward the listic missiles with velocities exceed- I would say in closing, that the U.S. East Coast. The SM-3 IIB is slat- ing five kilometers per second and bottom line of the ABM Treaty and ed to be deployed around 2020. This a range greater than 3,500 kilome- its restrictions was flatly to prohibit is an extremely important aspect for ters. In other words, it precluded the deploying a defense of the entire the development of missile defense. development of any defense against United States. Yet, this is today a I also found—I thought this was ICBMs. In fact, 3,500 would even be realistic goal. We have GMD, we have very interesting—that under the considered an intermediate-range the Aegis system, and with the SM-3 ABM Treaty, the U.S. had to declare ballistic missile (IRBM) class threat. IIB that is currently under concept test ranges, and we only had two In FTM-15, which I mentioned ear- development, we will have an impor- declared test ranges, one at White lier, Aegis BMD did test against a tant underlay for the defense of Sands, New Mexico, and the other threat-representative target that had the East Coast of the United States at Kwajalein Island. An ABM com- a range greater than 3,500 kilome- as well as a sea-based ICBM killer ponent could not be located at other ters. That test would not have been capability. This latter has been the test ranges without prior agree- possible were we still under the ABM missing link in U.S. missile defenses ment by Moscow, so this would have Treaty. for a long time. It will give us great precluded not only an Aegis Ashore I suppose that 15 to 20 years ago, capability to meet new and emerg- site at PMRF, but it also would have it was impossible to foresee that ing threats that we might not assume precluded the test facility at PMRF, today we would be approaching the will exist 10 to 20 years from now. which is one of the busiest and most time when there would exist ballistic

20