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Feminist Liberalism Feminist Liberalism Feminist Liberalism Susan Moller Okin & Martha C. Nussbaum Dr. Clea F. Rees [email protected] Centre for Lifelong Learning Cardiff University Autumn 2011 b Feminist Liberalism Outline Two Problems First Problem Second Problem Two Questions Feminist Challenges to Liberalism Public & Private Domains Justice vs. Care Feminist Accounts Okin & Nussbaum on Rawls Okin’s Humanist Justice Human Capabilities Approach Objections & Replies Glossary Workshop References b Feminist Liberalism Two Problems First Problem Two Problems First Problem I Rawls describes his theory of justice as part of ideal theory: I The real world as one of partial non-compliance with the principles of justice. I We need non-ideal theory for the real world. I Nozick’s utopia requires historical justice all the way back: I We need principle of rectification for complete theory of justice re. holdings. b Feminist Liberalism Two Problems First Problem Two Problems First Problem I How could/should we move from an existing society to one closer to the ideal? I Existing societies are unjust. I Various groups are less well situated as a result of past injustices. I Various groups experience ongoing injustice. discrimination/persecution on grounds of race, sex, skin colour, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, religion, conscience, caste, class, accent, language, handedness, height, hair colour, citizenship. b Feminist Liberalism Two Problems First Problem Two Problems First Problem The United States Supreme Court decided in 1976. that “an exclusion of pregnancy from a disability-benefits plan providing general coverage is not a gender-based discrimination at all.” (Okin 1989, 102) b Feminist Liberalism Two Problems Second Problem Two Problems Second Problem b Feminist Liberalism Two Problems Second Problem Two Problems Second Problem The United States Supreme Court decided in 1976. that “an exclusion of pregnancy from a disability-benefits plan providing general coverage is not a gender-based discrimination at all.” (Okin 1989, 102) b Feminist Liberalism Two Problems Second Problem Two Problems Second Problem I What would be ideal? I sex, skin colour, sexual orientation etc. treated like eye colour? i.e. colour-blind, sex-blind etc. I celebration of differences? i.e. disability, creed, age etc. treated like musical, sporting or artistic interests and aptitudes? I toleration of differences? i.e. class, race, gender etc. treated more like different political ideologies? b Feminist Liberalism Two Questions Two Questions 1 I Richard A. Wasserstrom asks : 1. What should we aim at? What would be ideal? 2. How should we get there? What strategies could move us from here to there? Which ones should we implement? e.g. Affirmative action might not be part of the ideal but it might be a justified and effective strategy from achieving the ideal given our starting point. 1. Wasserstrom 1979 b Feminist Liberalism Feminist Challenges to Liberalism Feminist Challenges to Liberalism I (An exclusive/primary) focus on justice reflects a masculine bias. I Liberalism conceives all persons as isolated/separate/self-sufficient individuals. Such individualism reflects the concerns of men, especially powerful men in dominant groups. No persons are truly self-sufficient. No person is even largely so throughout life. Many persons never attain even moderate self-sufficiency. I Liberalism reflects a (masculine) concern with abstract principles of justice. b Feminist Liberalism Feminist Challenges to Liberalism Feminist Challenges to Liberalism I Competent, able-bodied, mature, healthy, non-pregnant humans are interdependent. I Autonomous citizens do not spring forth from the Earth. I All humans are needy and spend their lives in various degrees of dependence on others. I Newborns, some sick persons, some persons with disabilities and some elderly persons are absolutely dependent on others. b Feminist Liberalism Feminist Challenges to Liberalism Public & Private Domains Feminist Challenges to Liberalism Public & Private Domains An Englishman’s home is his castle. b Feminist Liberalism Feminist Challenges to Liberalism Public & Private Domains Feminist Challenges to Liberalism Public & Private Domains Private Public Female Male Unpaid labour Paid labour Reproduction Production Affect/feeling/emotion Reason Non-voluntary Voluntary Mending/repair/care Rights/justice Trust Contract b Feminist Liberalism Feminist Challenges to Liberalism Justice vs. Care Feminist Challenges to Liberalism Justice vs. Care 2 I Carol Gilligan : I Men generally think of moral questions in terms of rights, justice etc. ) Justice I Women generally think of such questions in terms of relationships and connectedness over time etc. ) Care e.g. Responses to Heinz’s dilemma 2. Gilligan 1982 b Feminist Liberalism Feminist Challenges to Liberalism Justice vs. Care Feminist Challenges to Liberalism Justice vs. Care 3 I Caveats : I “Generally” means about 2 in 3. I On average, in this class expect: I approx. 3.3 men to prefer justice; I approx. 1.7 men to prefer care; I approx. 8 women to prefer care; I approx. 4 women to prefer justice. I Further caveats: 4 I Gilligan’s later work : I Both sexes can use both perspectives. I “Prefer” means “use first/use unprompted”. I Others have raised doubts about Gilligan’s results, their interpretation and implications. 3. Gilligan 1982 4. Gilligan 1987 b Feminist Liberalism Feminist Accounts Feminist Accounts Susan Moller Martha C. Virginia Claudia Okin Nussbaum Held Card 1946–2004 1747– b Feminist Liberalism Feminist Accounts Feminist Accounts Identify problems in liberalism Problems are fatal? No Yes (Traditional) liberalism has adequate resources? e.g. Card? Held? Yes No e.g. Okin e.g. Nussbaum b Feminist Liberalism Feminist Accounts Okin & Nussbaum on Rawls Feminist Accounts Okin & Nussbaum on Rawls I Rawls: I Family is part of basic structure. I Okin & Nussbaum: I Rawls’s theory: I pays too little attention to family; I is insufficiently critical of existing family structures; I is too ready to relegate family life to the “private” sphere. b Feminist Liberalism Feminist Accounts Okin & Nussbaum on Rawls Feminist Accounts Okin & Nussbaum on Rawls I Nussbaum: I Rawlls says the family is part of the basic structure but treats it as a voluntary association. But the family is largely non-voluntary. I Rawls treats the Western, nuclear family as “quasi-natural”. But the nuclear family is a local, contemporary phenomenon. But family structure is significantly determined by the state. b Feminist Liberalism Feminist Accounts Okin’s Humanist Justice Feminist Accounts Okin’s Humanist Justice I There is a tension between freedom & justice. I Rawls’s position is rich enough to address feminist concerns. I Need to rethink implications of original position & veil. I Need to address implications of past & present injustices. I Two models for a more just family: 1. Genderless family. 2. Gendered family with protection for vulnerable members. I Genderless family as the more just model: 1. more just to women; ) humanist justice. 2. increases equality of opportunity for all children; 3. better for raising citizens with a sense of justice. I Genderless family key to genderless society. I Genderless family as key to just society. I Inappropriate to impose genderless families. I Protecting vulnerable individuals in gendered families essential. b Feminist Liberalism Feminist Accounts Human Capabilities Approach Feminist Accounts Human Capabilities Approach I Nussbaum: I There is a tension between freedom & justice. I Existing liberalism as only partially defensible. I Need reconceive liberalism on a new basis. ) Human capabilities approach: I List primary social goods in terms of human capabilities. I Reconceive persons “as both capable and needy” (79). I Abandon contractualism. I Just institutions as those which best facilitate development of basic capabilities of all citizens. I Proposed account as: I maintaining “central role for choice and liberty” (79); I abandoning traditional, liberal (“Kantian”) view of persons; I adopting capable/needy (“Aristotelian”) concept of persons. b Feminist Liberalism Feminist Accounts Objections & Replies Feminist Accounts Objections & Replies Discussion of prompt 5: b Feminist Liberalism Glossary Workshop Glossary Workshop I Handout on writing your entry I Personalised — you need the correct one for your entry! I Check notes regarding inclusion in class glossary I Note terms available for cross-referencing I Kymlicka/Wolff available to consult I Find relevant partner(s) I Start: I Drafting I Discussing I Asking questions Remember your audience! b Feminist Liberalism shrink References Gilligan, Carol. 1982. In a different voice: psychological theory and women’s development. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. ———. 1987. Moral orientation and moral development. In Women and moral theory, ed. Feder Eva Kittay and Diana Tietjens Meyers, 19–33. New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield. Wasserstrom, Richard A. 1977. Racism, sexism, and preferential treatment. UCLA Law Review (Feb.): 581–615. ———. 1979. Racism and sexism. In Philosophy and women, ed. Sharon Bishop and Marjorie Weinzweig, 5–20. The Wadsworth Series in Social Philosophy. Belmont, California: Wadsworth. Excerpted from Wasserstrom (1977) with renumbered footnotes, isbn: 0534006094. b.
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