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The Relationship between Emir Fakhr-Eddin Al-Ma’ni II 1 and the local Palestinian leadership and the position of the 2 Ottoman Sultanate between (999-1043 H / 1590-1633 AD) 3 4 This paper tackles a very important period of Ottoman and Palestine 5 history. It focuses on a distinguished character; The Emir Fakhr-Eddin al-Ma’ni II. 6 He worked hard to establish a regional Emirate on the Ottoman state account. The 7 importance of this study emerges from the fact that few studies have tackled the 8 relationship between Emir Fakhr-Eddin II and the local Palestinian families and 9 leaders. It is also important in terms of explaining the actual motive, which 10 encouraged Emir Fakhr-Eddin II to put Palestine on the top of his political and 11 military agenda. This paper negates the adventurous nature of Emir’s behavior and 12 defers his extensive behavior in Palestine mainly to his ambition in establishing a 13 prestigious history to gain fame despite the shortage of facilities he had got. 14 15 Keywords: Fakhr-Eddin II, the local Palestinian leadership, the High Porte, the 16 battle of Anjar, the battle of Niha. 17 18 19 Introduction 20 21 The personality of the Lebanese Emir Fakhr-Eddin al-Ma’ni is 22 considered one of the figures that influenced the history of the Levant 23 during the Ottoman era, due to his ambitions to form an independent 24 emirate of his own and his family in Lebanon and abroad. Some 25 historians have tried to adopt stories that Fakhr-Eddin's expansion 26 projects in the Palestinian territories, in particular, were the result of the 27 expansion of his political and military influence in Lebanon. 28 About the references that paid attention to the details of Fakhr- 29 Eddin al-Ma’ni II campaigns on the Palestinian territories, some of them 30 elaborated on the motives of those campaigns and returned them to 31 sectarian motives in the first place, but the study in our hands denied 32 this and returned these motives for only partisan reasons. 33 34 - The importance of the study 35 The importance of the study stems from the fact that it deals with a 36 thorny and important topic at the same time, as it touched on the 37 tireless efforts undertaken by Emir Fakhr-Eddin al-Ma’ni II, to establish 38 an emirate of his own and his family during the Ottoman era. Although 39 he succeeded at first in establishing his emirate, he faced severe 40 hardship and confrontation from the Ottoman governor of Damascus 41

1 2020-4062-AJHIS one hand, and the local leaders in Palestine. from here; The importance 1 of this study stems from the shock caused by the ambitions of Fakhr- 2 Eddin II to the High Porte, who soon decided to eliminate him and his 3 ambitions. 4 5 - The methodology of the Study 6 7 The study relied on a combination of historical narration and 8 descriptive analysis, given their importance in communicating the idea 9 to the reader in a smooth, direct, and simplified manner, without 10 prejudice to other historical facts that took place outside Palestine, and 11 had political reactions that affected the Palestinian arena. The famous 12 battle of Anjar in 1623. 13 14 15 Preface 16 17 The interest of the Ottoman Sultan Selim I necessitated, after he 18 seized Damascus, the recognition of the leadership of the Lebanese 19 Emirs, such as Emir of Fakhr-Eddin al-Ma'ni I, ruler of al-Chouf 20 Mountain in Lebanon, after his participation with the Ottomans in the 21 battle of Marj Dabiq in 1516 (1), and made him the ruler of Lebanon from 22 Jaffa to Tripoli )2(, We must bear in mind a fact that cannot be ignored, 23 according to which the community in Lebanon had a political 24 sense of absolute intelligence, as a result of its presence in an area 25 where sectarian and political affiliations intersected. Lebanon, in its 26 small area, includes many different religious sects, and the Druze were 27 lost between religious independence and their Islamic affiliation. This 28 political sense made the Druze professors in Machiavellianism 29 (opportunism) throughout their history even long before the emergence 30 of the Venetian politicians (3). In the case of Emir Fakhr-Eddin I, Haider 31 al-Shihabi confirms this description, that he had not participated since 32 the first sight in the battle of Marj Dabiq. Rather, he preferred to remain 33

1. al-Shihabi (Haider) (1993), The History of Emir Haider al-Shihabi, commented on his footnotes: Dr. Maroun Raad, Vol. 3, : Nazeer Abboud House, p. 738. 2. Churchill (Charles) (1985), (ten years residency) 1842-1852, translated by Fendi Al-Sha'ar, Beirut: Dar al-Morouj for Printing, Publishing, and Distribution, p. 56. 3. Hitti (Philip) (1959), History of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, translated by Dr. Kamal al-Yazji, Vol. 2, Beirut: Dar al-Thaqafa, p. 279.

2 2020-4062-AJHIS neutral between the two warring parties (the Ottomans and the 1 Mamluks) until he saw who would be the victor, then he would enter 2 the fight on the side of the victorious party (4), to appear in the 3 appearance of the paramedic, and thus; get the price for his assistance. 4 Adel Ismail says Selim I had wisdom that made him agree that the 5 Druze ruled by Emirs among them, so Fakhr-Eddin I gave the al-Chouf 6 Emirate, which remained subject to the influence of the Ma'nis until the 7 seventeenth century (5). 8 Adel Ismail goes on to say: "While the rest of the Syrian and 9 Lebanese provinces in this era were given to foreign rulers" (6); however, 10 this statement lacks accuracy about Lebanon and Palestine, except 11 northern Syria. It is known that the Lebanese Valley of al-Taym was 12 ruled by the Shihabite family, al-Bekaa' was ruled by the Al-Harfoush 13 Shiite family, and Jabal Amel was ruled by several Shiite feudal 14 families. In Palestine, the feudal families were the ones to manage their 15 reins, even if they supported and aligned with the Ottoman authority. 16 Some confirm the correctness of this proposition; That only a few 17 cities and suburbs of the Levant fell under the authority of direct 18 Ottoman rule, as many areas, especially the mountainous regions, 19 remained under the rule of their inherited Emirs and sheiks, who, as 20 before, held confederations among themselves, and carried out 21 campaigns with their forces, and waged wars against each other. 22 Lebanon was at the beginning of the Ottoman era of the Levant, as an 23 autonomous emirate under the control of the Ma'ni family (7). 24 As is the case with the Emirs of Lebanon; The same approach was 25 followed by Sultan Selim I with the local leaderships in Palestine, which 26 have Bedouin and feudal foundations. The Ottoman authorities 27 balanced among these leaderships and used them as tools in 28 governance and in the conduct of local administrative affairs, and 29 Palestine was administratively affiliated with the mandate of 30 Damascus, and it was divided into five sanjaks or banners, which are 31

4. al-Shihabi, op. cit, p. 738. 5. Ismail (Adel) (1955), Histoire du Liban du XVII siècle à nos jours, vol.1, Le Liban au temps de Fakhr-Eddin II (1590-1633), Paris, p. 54. 6. Ibid. 7. Bazile (Constantine) (1985), Syria, and Palestine under Ottoman rule. Translated by Tariq Ma'sarani, Dar al-Taqadoum, Moscow 1989, p. 28; Lutsky (Vladimir) (1985), A History of the Modern Arab Countries, translated by Dr. Afifa Al- Bustani, review: Uri Roshin, 8th Edition, Beirut: Dar Al-Farabi, p. 14.

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Jerusalem, Gaza, , Nablus, and Lijun, in addition to Sanjaks Ajlun 1 and Karak with Shobak in eastern Jordan. )8( 2 To achieve security in Palestine, the Ottomans were keen to 3 increase its banners, due to a large number of local leaders there, and 4 most of them are of Bedouin origins and some of them are remnants of 5 the Mamluks, these banners would tighten control over these leaders, 6 or bring them closer to power by appointing them rulers over it. 7 Among the most famous local leaders who were attracted by the 8 Ottomans, Tarabay ibn Karaja, one of the leaders of Nablus, who 9 appointed him as an emir of the Lijun region. )9( 10 11 12 Fakhr II's Ambition to Form a Regional Emirate 13 14 Emir Qurqmas succeeded his father Emir Fakhr-Eddin I in power, 15 but he did not understand the lesson that his father had gone through, 16 and in turn, tried to achieve a regional political ambition in some areas 17 of Levant and Palestine, so he also paid his life as an Emir for his 18 adventure in 1585, in one of the Jazin caves in the slopes of Mount al- 19 Chouf. (10) 20 Fakhr-Eddin II assumed the reins of power in Mount Lebanon in 21 the year 1590, and he was eighteen years old at the time (11), and thus a 22 new page of the modern was opened. He was 23 characterized as a skilled politician, adept at loving intrigue, as he had 24 eyes in Astana and the palaces of the pashas and the role of followers, 25 sowing discord among his enemies, and to satisfy the Ottoman Sultan 26 with him, he paid huge sums to the state treasury, and shared with him 27 the war spoils (12). Fakhr-Eddin did not hesitate after that to steadily 28

8. Rafeq (Abdul-Karim) (1990), Palestine during the Ottoman era (1), The Palestinian Encyclopedia, Section 2, Special Studies, Vol. 2, Historical Studies, First Edition, pp. 698-699. 9. op. cit, pp. 700-702. 10. Anonymous author, Nuzhat Al-Zaman in the Incidents of Lebanon, Manuscript in the National Library in Paris, Arabe No. 1684, filo 17A-17B; Al-Shihabi, op. cit, p. 806; al-Hattouni (Mansour Tannous) (n.d.), A Brief History of the Kesrouan District, without publication data, pp. 60-61. 11. Swayyed (Yassin) (1985), The Military History of the Lebanese Provinces during the Era of the Two Emirates, Vol. 1, Beirut: The Arab Foundation for Studies, p. 153; Holt (P.M.) (1966), Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516-1922, New York: Cornell University Press, p. 115. 12. Lutsky, op. cit, pp. 35-36.

4 2020-4062-AJHIS rebuilding his family’s site in al-Chouf, and then managed to obtain an 1 unchallenged leadership over the whole of Mount Lebanon and the 2 neighboring provinces, and following his wise policy, he made the 3 rulers of the Wadi al-Taym family loyal to the Shihabite family. (13) 4 Before discussing how Fakhr-Eddin was able to establish a Ma'ni 5 sprawling emirate temporarily, we find it necessary to layout the 6 Lebanese and Palestinian political map, with its conflicting local forces 7 and allied blocs, so that we know the extent to which he succeeded in 8 establishing that emirate. In the region and the Lebanese Bekaa' 9 Valley, the Shiite Harfoush family (1591-1865) enjoyed semi-political 10 independence in their provinces. The influence of Harafsheh was not 11 limited to Bekaa'. Rather, they often interfered in the affairs of their 12 neighboring provinces (14), and in Jabal Amel, Shiite feudal houses also, 13 such as Bani Sa'b in al-Shuqif district, Bani Munkar in al-Shomer 14 district, and Bani al-Saghir in the country of Bishara, where they 15 also enjoyed self-rule under the leadership of their sheiks. )15( 16 In northern Lebanon, the Al-Sifa family of Kurdish origin ruled in 17 Tripoli, and the most famous of its rulers was Yusuf Pasha Sifa, who 18 was appointed by the Ottoman Sultanate as governor of Tripoli in 1579, 19 and he was famous for his extreme hostility to Fakhr-Eddin II, as their 20 hostility had a party connotation. Al-Sifa family were from Yemeni (16), 21 while the Ma'ni family was from Qaisi, although they were originally 22 Yemenis (17). Fakhr-Eddin managed to obtain his first victory over Yusef 23 Pasha Sifa in the Battle of Nahr al-Kalb in 1598, but he did not succeed 24 in acquiring Northern Territory for more than a year, because the 25 Ottomans were morally supporting Yusuf Pasha (18). In Palestine, local 26 leaderships witnessed the assumption of the reins of power by Fakhr- 27 Eddin II, as interests disputed between them and Fakhr-Eddin, due to 28

13. Holt, op. cit, p. 115. 14. al-Ma'louf (Issa Iskandar) (from Rabi` al-Awwal to Dhu al-Hijjah 1342 AH), “Al- Harafsheh Princes”, Al-Irfan Magazine, Volume 9, pp. 291-297. 15. al-Awrah (Ibrahim) (1936), History of the Wilayat of Suleiman Pasha al-Adil, published and commented on Constantine al-Pasha al-Mukhlesi, , 1936, p. 111; Charles-Roux (F.) (1928), Les Echelles des Syrie et de Palestine au XV 111 siècle, Paris, p. 207. 16. Lammens (S.J.) (1921), La Syrie précis Historique, vol. 2, Beyrouth, pp. 71-72; Holt, op. cit, p. 115. 17. al-Salibi (Kamal) (1969), History of Modern Lebanon, Second Edition, Beirut: Dar An-Nahar Publishing, pp. 34-35; al-Ma'louf (Issa Iskandar) (1966), History of Emir Fakhr-Eddin al-Ma'ni II, Second Edition, Beirut: Catholic Press Publications, p. 56. 18. al-Hattouni, op. cit, p.63.

5 2020-4062-AJHIS the latter's ambitions to seize their properties. In the region of al-Lijun, 1 the Al-Tarabay family had the sovereignty and leadership, and Emir 2 Ahmad ibn Tarabay (1571-1647) ruled for nearly half a century (1601- 3 1647) (19), And several battles took place between the two leaders, which 4 we will mention. 5 There is a family of Circassian origin whose leaders were rulers of 6 Nablus and Jerusalem, the Al-Farrukh family, and that family was the 7 link between the Al-Tarabay family in northern Palestine and the Al- 8 Rodwan family in the south (Gaza). Al-Farrukh family held the position 9 of the Shami Hajj Emirate for several years and cooperated with their 10 allies to prevent Fakhr-Eddin II from seizing Jerusalem as he had 11 planned for that, and they protected the pilgrims every year. Among 12 the most famous of the Al-Farrukh family, who responded to the 13 expansion of Fakhr-Eddin, Emir ibn Farrukh, who 14 assumed power after the death of his father, Emir Farrukh ibn 15 Abdullah, while on his way to Makkah at the head of the Shami Hajj 16 caravan. Muhammad had been isolated from Nablus several times, and 17 then he returned to it thanks to the support he received from the 18 Ottomans against his enemy, Emir Fakhr-Eddin, who sought to grant 19 the Nablus government to his sons and aides, and Muhammad ibn 20 Farrukh assumed the leadership of the Shami Hajj during most of the 21 period between 1622-1639, The date of his death. )20( 22 As for the third center of power in Palestine, the Al-Rodwan family 23 was the rulers of Gaza of Turkish origin who inherited the rule of the 24 Gaza Sanjak a few generations from the sixteenth century to the end of 25 the seventeenth century, that is, nearly a century and a half (21). The Al- 26 Rodwan family was the most prominent and strongest of the Emirs of 27 the tripartite alliance that joined them with the Al-Tarabay family and 28

19. The Palestinian Encyclopedia, General Section, Vol. 1, First Edition, Damascus: The Palestinian Encyclopedia, 1984, p. 100. 20. al-Mohibi (Muhammad aal-Amin) (1869), Kholaset al-Athar on Notables of the Eleventh Century, Vol. 1, Cairo, p. 187, Vol. 2, p. 417, and Vol. 3, p. 271; al-Khalidi al-Safadi (Ahmad bin Muhammad) (1969), Lebanon during the reign of Emir Fakhr- Eddin al-Ma'ni II, published by Dr. Asad Rostom and Fouad Afram al-Bustani, Beirut: Lebanese University Publications, p.102; al-Borini (al-Hassan bin Muhammad) (1959, 1966), Tarajim of notables from the sons of time, edited by Dr. Salah eddin al-Munjjid, Vol. 2, Damascus, p. 202, and Vol. 2, p. 289. 21. The Palestinian Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, p. 460; al-Moubayed (Selim Arafat) (2000), the endowment of Musa Pasha al-Rodwan in the year 1081 AH, Cairo: Ibn Sina Library for Publishing, Distribution, and Export, p. 19.

6 2020-4062-AJHIS the Al-Farrukh family, where they faced Fakhr-Eddin and his plans, 1 and the most important of them that concerns us in this study, Hassan 2 ibn Ahmad Rodwan (1600-1644), because of his role in repelling the 3 danger of pride Debt. (22) 4 Whatever the case; several reasons called Fakhr-Eddin, upon 5 assuming the reins of power, to look beyond his capabilities available to 6 him and his family, including: 7 8 1. His ambition to establish Lebanon on a larger scale, and 9 consequently severing his last link with the Ottoman Sultanate. 10 2. Walk-in his emirate towards development and prosperity. )23( 11 3. His distinguished relationship with Christians, especially the 12 , after he felt uncomfortable with the policy of the Al- 13 Sifa family towards them, and this was an incentive for him to 14 give him the ability to achieve his aspirations for expansion. 15 4. The excesses of the Al-Sifa family and their detestation of the 16 rights of his family by attacking its properties and privileges. 17 5. His ambition to achieve the glories of his grandfather Fakhr- 18 Eddin I, which he could not complete because of his death. ()24( 19 6. His exploitation of the signs of weakness and slackness that 20 began to appear on the body of the Ottoman Sultanate, especially 21 when the non-Janissaries of peasants and craftsmen were 22 allowed to join the Janissary Corps after it was their monopoly. 23 (25) 24 After Fakhr-Eddin II began his rule over Mount Lebanon, he 25 received from the Ottoman Sultan Sanjaks Beirut and Sidon, and his 26 political ambition began to blaze in expanding his emirate, so the 27 Ottomans helped eliminate his enemy Emir Mansour ibn al-Fraikh, the 28 ruler of Bekaa', Nablus, Safed, and Ajlun, after the Ottoman authorities 29 feared in particular, the governor of Damascus Murad Pasha because of 30 the increase in his power and influence, so he was killed on December 31

22. The Palestinian Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, pp. 460-461. 23. Hitti, op. cit, Vol. 2, p. 327. 24. Churchill, op. cit, p.61. 25. Rafiq (Abdul-Karim) (1974), The Arabs and the Ottomans 1516-1916, First Edition, Damascus, p. 148; Awadh (Abdul-Aziz Muhammad) (1969), the Ottoman Administration in the Province of Syria 1864-1914, presented by Ahmad Ezzat Abdul- Karim, Cairo: Dar Al Ma'aref, p. 13.

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7, 1593 (26). Fakhr-Eddin also attacked his neighbor and the father of his 1 wife Yusuf Pasha Sifa, and after several battles, the most famous of 2 which was at Nahr al-Kalb in 1598 -as mentioned above -he managed to 3 temporarily control northern Lebanon. Soon after, the Al-Harfoush in 4 Baalbek, and the Bedouin leaders in the Bekaa' region and the southern 5 region up to Galilee, subjugated to him, taking advantage of Sultan 6 Ahmad's preoccupation with fighting the Hungarians in Europe, and 7 the Safavids in Persia. (27) 8 Although the Ottomans did not take a specific position on Fakhr- 9 Eddin after he harassed Yusuf Pasha, their main ally in Lebanon, they 10 quickly turned against him after his alliance with Ali Pasha Janbulad 11 (Jumblatt) (28), a member of the ruling Kurdish family in Kilis who had 12 usurped power in Aleppo in the year 1606, and this Ali Pasha was 13 opposed to Yusuf Pasha Sifa, the rival of Fakhr-Eddin, so when Ibn 14 Jumblatt was defeated by the Ottomans, Fakhr-Eddin preferred to find 15 an urgent settlement with the Ottomans, but time had come to him The 16 local rivalry between the Ma'ni family and Al-Sifa family had cost 17 Fakhr-Eddin entangling himself in participating in dangerous collision 18 with the rebels against Ottoman rule, which would cost him after losing 19 his emirate for some time. (29) 20 Palestine and the Regional Expansion Project of Fakhr-Eddin II 21 22 None of the researchers can read the importance of Palestine in the 23 expansion plan drawn up by Emir Fakhr-Eddin II except through the 24 angle of the Yemeni Qaisi conflict, which flared up even before the 25 Ottomans seized the Levant, this conflict that included a large area of 26 Lebanon and Palestine for the rule of the tribal system in them. 27

26. Al-Mohibi, op. cit, Vol. 4, pp. 426-428; al-Ghazzi (Najm-Eddin Muhammad ibn Badr Eddin): Lutf As-Sahar and Qatf As-Thamar from Trajem of the notables of the first class of the eleventh century, or the tail of the planets moving with the virtues of the dignitaries of the tenth hundred, manuscript found in al-Assad Library in Damascus, No. 3406, filo 212A-212B; al-Ansari (Sharaf Eddin ibn Musa), Nuzhat al- Khater and Bohjet al-Nazer, manuscript in al-Assad Library in Damascus, No. 7814, filo 117B-119B; al-Nimr (Ihsan), (1975), History of Mount Nablus and Balqa, Vol. 1, Second Edition, Nablus, pp. 32-33. 27. Hitti, op. cit, p. 327; al-Debs (Yusuf) (no date), History of Syria, revised and verified by Dr. Maroun Raad, Vol. 7, Beirut: Nazeer Abboud House, p. 152. 28. This family of Kurdish origin now resides in Lebanon, after the revolution of Ali Pasha Janbulad was eliminated and he was killed. It converted to the Druze creed after its members were Sunni Muslims. 29. al-Ghazzi, op. cit, filo 211A-211B; Hitti, op. cit, p. 327.

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Accordingly; The most prominent features that characterized the 1 society in the Lebanese provinces during the concerned era is the 2 division of this society in partisan, not sectarian so that families and 3 men from all sects meet in the Qaisi party as in the Yemeni party with 4 families and men from all sects without a sectarian contract or sectarian 5 sensitivities, and they were the only two parties that were known. In 6 that era, in other words, a single party included followers from 7 different sects, such as the Sunnis, al-Mutawila (Shiites), the Christian 8 Maronites, and the Druze (30). At the same time, the other party also 9 included followers of the same doctrines, and the bottom line was that 10 the individual’s loyalty was to the party he joined, not to the religious 11 sect to which he belonged. 12 As for Palestine, and due to the absence of deep sectarian 13 differences like that of Lebanon, and due to the religion of most of the 14 Arab tribes in it with Islam, especially the Sunni sect, the division was 15 divided into two parties as well and under the same name; Qaisi and 16 Yamani, but based on the first origins of those tribes. 17 Despite this social division, Emir Fakhr-Eddin and the concerned 18 people were able to prove their influence in (31) first, 19 and then in northern Palestine secondly, and some local Emirs in 20 Palestine had benefited from Fakhr-Eddin’s preoccupation in 21 strengthening himself to confront the successive governors of 22 Damascus and his traditional enemies, the Al-Sifa, They breathed a sigh 23 of relief as a result of the elimination of the rule of the Al-Fraikh family 24 who had previously expanded their influence on their expense, the 25 most famous of these Emirs was Ahmad ibn Rodwan, governor of 26 Gaza, who died in 1606-1607 (32), Hamdan ibn Qansuh, Emir of Ajlun 27 and Karak, and Tarabay ibn Karaja, the ruler of Lijun, who succeeded 28 him. After he died in 1601-1602, his son Ahmad (33), and Emir Farrukh 29 ibn Abdullah, ruler of Nablus and Jerusalem. )34( 30 Some attribute the reason for Ma'ni with the leadership of Fakhr- 31 Eddin to pay attention to the northern Palestine region, to the presence 32 of several social, tribal and sectarian ties between Ma'ni family and 33 some Palestinian Druze families living in Safed and some areas of the 34

30. Swayyed, op. cit, p. 77; Rafiq, op. cit, p 151. 31. Rafiq, op. cit, p. 151. 32. al-Mohibi, op. cit, Vol. 1, pp. 187-189. 33. op. cit, Vol. 1, p. 221; al-Borini, op. cit, Vol. 2, pp. 273-289. 34. al-Borini, op. cit, Vol. 1, p. 202, Vol. 2, p. 289.

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Galilee, as these ties had their role and impact in shaping the ambition 1 in question in Palestine. Consequently: in shaping the nature of the 2 political relationship that has linked - and still does - between the two 3 regions, and this is confirmed if we know that the leadership of the 4 Ma'ni family in Lebanon itself was often threatened by several strong 5 competitors, whether they were tribal competitors or other religious 6 sects. (35) 7 However, this aforementioned reason is not sufficient for a leader 8 of the size of Fakhr-Eddin to take care of the affairs of northern 9 Palestine, to launch several successive campaigns whose aim was to 10 seize all of Palestine, not just the northern part of it, and it is possible to 11 mention some points that destroy the idea from its foundations: 12 13 1. That fighting during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth 14 centuries was not for sectarian reasons; Rather, it is primarily 15 partisan, related to the struggle between the Qaisi and Yemeni 16 parties, and thus: not all Druze from Qaisi for Fakhr-Eddin to 17 support them There are Druze who belongs to the Yemeni party. 18 Al-Alam Eddin competitors for the Ma'ni family. Therefore, 19 Fakhr-Eddin himself could have entered into a conflict with a 20 Druze family other than his party affiliation, had his interests 21 contradicted theirs. 22 2. It is inconceivable that Fakhr-Eddin would mortgage his entire 23 political fate and sacrifice all of his gains in Lebanon for the sake 24 of several Druze families who live in the Palestinian Galilee, and 25 it is fundamentally unreasonable that he formulated his plans 26 and ambitions for the sake of those families only, especially if we 27 learned that the Druze community in northern Palestine was not 28 at that time vulnerable to danger, or any political blackmail from 29 other sects, as none of the historical sources reported contrary to 30 what we decided. 31 3. The political relationship that bound Lebanon and Palestine 32 during the era of Fakhr-Eddin is very different; In Lebanon, a 33 separatist revolutionary tried his best to separate Lebanon from 34 its Ottoman surroundings, and in Palestine local leaderships 35 completely loyal to the Ottoman authorities and obeyed their 36 orders. Fakhr-Eddin’s attempt to seize Palestine is nothing but a 37

35. al-Astal (Riyad Mahmoud) (2000), Modern and Contemporary History of Palestine, Second Edition, Gaza, p. 44.

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kind of greed and eagerness to seize the property of others from 1 the local Emirs of Palestine. 2 4. It is not logically acceptable in the political and military 3 convention that the leadership of a family is often threatened by 4 several powerful competitors in a region, that this threat is 5 pushed from it by heading towards other regions to seize it. 6 Fakhr-Eddin is not so naive to involve himself in new problems., 7 as he is pushing his political fate and the future of his family 8 towards the abyss For, he who is exposed to internal problems in 9 his country must deal with and eliminate them before heading to 10 the invasion outside them. As the study will reveal; The times 11 when Fakhr-Eddin stripped his campaigns against Palestine and 12 east of the Jordan River, when his authority was strong after he 13 had defeated one of his rivals in Lebanon, or even over the 14 governor of Levant himself; However, most of his wars in 15 Palestine ended in his defeat. 16 17 Fakhr-Eddin's first concern for extending his sovereignty over 18 Palestine was after he seized the rich Bekaa' region, taking advantage of 19 the opportunity to eliminate its rulers from the Al-Fraikh family, so he 20 extended his influence from the Bekaa' to Safed in northern Palestine 21 (36). It is noticeable here that the extension of Fakhr-Eddin’s influence to 22 Safed was a result of his seizure of an area that was under the influence 23 of a feudal family (the Al-Fraikh family), whose rule extended from the 24 Bekaa' to Safed, Nablus, and Ajlun, or so to speak, he inherited the 25 properties of the Al-Fraikh family until Safed in the first stage. And not 26 because of his sectarian association with his Druze brothers in northern 27 Palestine. 28 Slowly, Fakhr-Eddin established his political position by skillfully 29 playing on the greed and disagreements of the elites of the Ottoman 30 rule, and the policy of "divide and rule" was one of the policies he 31 practiced with great precision. And even more regular than the 32 Ottomans themselves practiced, as his aides and agents in Astana were 33 quick to thwart and avoid any opposition from state officials with 34 exorbitant bribes (37), and he also deliberately formed a special army of 35 Sakkban, in addition to his followers from the Druze and Qaisi, and 36 fortified Castles in his area, and he made contacts with the “Midici 37

36. Rafiq, op. cit, p. 153. 37. Holt, op. cit, p. 116.

11 2020-4062-AJHIS family”, rulers of the Duchy of Tuscany in Florence, Italy, to obtain 1 military and technical assistance from them, in addition to activating 2 trade exchange between his emirate with them, especially the silk trade 3 that was flourishing in the al-Chouf region. )38( 4 Under these circumstances, northern Palestine at the beginning of 5 the seventeenth century was subject to the influence of the Ma'ni family 6 to a large extent. One of the most important goals of Fakhr-Eddin's 7 policy was to expand his sphere of influence beyond Mount Lebanon to 8 include other mountainous lands, especially Houran in Syria, Nablus, 9 and Ajlun in Palestine and east of the Jordan River, and these areas, like 10 Lebanon itself, were inhabited by troubled and rebellious people, and 11 the Ottoman authority over them was fragile. Fakhr-Eddin was able to 12 fabricate his agents among the heads and dignitaries of these regions 13 and support them against their competitors, which posed a direct 14 challenge to the successive Ottoman governors in Damascus after he 15 was able to threaten the Hajj route to Hijaz. Fakhr-Eddin generally 16 continued his northern policy steadily, so that he did not make himself 17 a persona non grata to the Ottoman authorities, but he moved in the 18 south with difficulty, trying as much as possible not to excite, and 19 drawing attention to the expansion he was doing. (39) 20 Fakhr-Eddin succeeded in appeasing the High Porte, and, with his 21 ingenuity and political acumen, he extracted a royal firman in 1603 22 which required him to take over all of Lebanon and the northern parts 23 of Palestine and possess it over the country of Safed, in exchange for his 24 pledge to the High Porte to provide the financial dues owed by him, in 25 addition to his promise to the Ottoman Sultan By sharing with him all 26 the money and spoils he gets in future wars. )40( 27 Some argue that this agreement allowed Fakhr-Eddin, albeit 28 indirectly, to extend his influence over the neighboring powers in 29 Palestine, even if these powers were appointed by and loyal to the High 30 Pope (41). However, this opinion completely contradicts the validity of 31 what was previously mentioned above. The fact that Fakhr-Eddin's 32 advance towards Palestine and its artificiality for the agents among its 33

38. al-Nimr, op. cit, Vol. 1, p. 33 Ismail, op. cit, pp. 77-78. 39. Holt, op. cit, p. 116. 40. al-Astal, op. cit, p. 48; al-Shihabi, op. cit, p. 812; Brockelman (Karl) (1998), History of the Islamic Peoples, translated by Nabih Amin Fares and Munir al- Baalbaki, 13th Edition, Beirut: Dar al-Alem lelmalayeen, p. 513. 41. al-Astal, op. cit, p. 48.

12 2020-4062-AJHIS leaders has aroused the ire of the Ottoman governors of Damascus, 1 given the direct threat that Fakhr-Eddin would pose in the event of his 2 success in his expansion project from a threat to the Shami pilgrimage 3 caravan, not to mention the interest of the Ottoman Sultan at that time 4 that requires stability of the situation Security in a sensitive region for 5 his sultanate, and it is considered one of its main joints, especially since 6 the Ottoman-Safavid conflict is still raging. 7 Soon, relations between Fakhr-Eddin and the Ottoman Sultanate 8 became tense after its peace with Austria in 1606 and its elimination of 9 the rebellion of Ali Pasha Janbulad - who was allied with Fakhr-Eddin - 10 in northern Syria the following year, so the governors of Damascus 11 were charged with confronting him for fear of extending his influence 12 and threatening him, and his threat to the main roads, in addition to the 13 Sultan’s fear that he would stab it in the back while it was busy in the 14 Safavid wars. )42( 15 Based on the above; The conflict in the Levant in general and in 16 Lebanon and Palestine, in particular, was not at that time sectarian, as 17 much as it was a competition over feudalism, power, influence, and 18 expansionist ambitions between the local forces divided into the Qaisi 19 and Yemeni parties. 20 To control the danger that Fakhr-Eddin posed to the influence of 21 the Ottomans in Palestine, and to limit his rising influence, the High 22 Porte appointed a new governor over Damascus in 1609, Ahmad Pasha 23 al-Hafiz, who made all his concern to resist Fakhr-Eddin. Ahmad Pasha 24 began his reign by stirring the hostile local Emirs against Fakhr-Eddin 25 against him. (43) 26 Ahmad Pasha al-Hafez encouraged the Al-Sifa family, the rulers of 27 Tripoli, and raised unrest on Fakhr-Eddin in Bekaa' and Ajlun regions, 28 which are under his control and influence, and he also tried to eliminate 29 Fakhr-Eddin's allies, such as Emir Younus al-Harfoush, governor of 30 Baalbek, and Emir Ahmad al-Shihabi, governor of Wadi al-Taym, but 31 he failed in his endeavor After Fakhr-Eddin sent help to them. This 32 failure of Ahmad Pasha prompted him to request a meeting with the 33 Grand Vizier Nasuh Pasha in Aleppo - who in turn was hostile to 34 Fakhr-Eddin - and to complain to him about Fakhr-Eddin's behavior. 35

42. Rafiq, op. cit, p. 163. 43. al-Maqari (Muhammad ibn Juma'a) (1949), The Pashas and the Judges in the Ottoman Era, compiled, verified and published: Dr. Salah Eddin Al-Munjjid, in the book: The Governors of Damascus in the Ottoman Era, Damascus, p. 29.

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And among those who accompanied the governor in the 1 aforementioned interview, Emir Farrukh ibn Abdullah, who was 2 blessed by Nasuh Pasha in the Sanjaks of Nablus, Ajlun, and Karak, 3 instead of Hamdan ibn Qansuh (44), and the greatest leader, Sheik Amro 4 Sheik Arab al-Mafarajah, isolated from the country of Houran and gave 5 it to Sheik Rashid Sheik Arab al-Sardiya. He did not invite the two 6 isolated leaders to seek help and assistance from Fakhr-Eddin, but he 7 hesitated to help them and asked them to give him some time to settle 8 the matter with the Grand Vizier. )45( 9 It seems that Emir Fakhr-Eddin faced pressure from his entourage, 10 so he was forced to strip a military campaign that led to his son, Emir 11 Ali, who is fifteen years old. The entry of Ain Jalut in the country of 12 Ajlun, so Emir Hamdan ibn Qansuh returned to his previous work in 13 the Ajlun Sanjak. (46) 14 15 16 Emir Fakhr-Eddin II Escape to Tuscany and the Elimination of his 17 Separatist Efforts 18 19 Whereas time was not in favor of Fakhr-Eddin, after the forces 20 opposing him collided, not just to limit his influence; Rather, for the 21 judiciary established over him and his emirate, the Ottoman authorities 22 issued orders to Ahmad Pasha al-Hafiz to march on Fakhr-Eddin, and 23 the local Emirs joined him. Like Emir Farrukh, Emir Ahmad ibn 24 Tarabay, and Al-Sifa family, the Sultan supplied him with forces from 25 Aleppo and Anatolia, and a group of warships was sent to the Lebanese 26 coast, and the Ottoman forces overran Fakhr-Eddin. 27 When Fakhr-Eddin saw no power to confront the power of the 28 governor of the Levant and his party and saw the severity of his siege 29 of the fortified castle of al-Shuqif in southern Lebanon, and his sending 30 other forces against al-Chouf itself, the stronghold of Fakhr-Eddin, in 31 addition to the latter's certainty of the impotence of his allies and their 32

44. Khalidi Safadi, op. cit, pp. 7-8; al-Shihabi, op. cit, p. 817. Al-Khalidi al-Safadi and Haidar al-Shihabi were inconsistent in their mention of Ibn Qansuh, who was isolated from Ajlun and Karak Sometimes they mention that it is Hamdan ibn Qansuh, and other times they mention that it is Ahmad ibn Qansuh, and it is more likely that it is Hamdan. Because the two stories have settled later on Hamdan. 45. al-Khalidi Safadi, op. cit, pp. 8-9; al-Shihabi, op. cit, pp. 817-818. 46. al-Khalidi Safadi, op. cit, pp. 9-10; al-Shihabi, op. cit, pp. 818-820.

14 2020-4062-AJHIS indifference to him and his fate. At that time, he was forced to go to 1 Sidon, and from there he traveled by sea to Leghorn, one of the harbors 2 of the Italian Duchy of Tuscany, on September 1613, where he stayed 3 for five years with his friends from the "Medici". His son, Emir Ali, 4 succeeded him in al-Chouf Emirate with the help of his uncle Emir 5 Younus al-Ma'ni, and with this action, Fakhr-Eddin saved the 6 concerned emirate from collapse to remain at the disposal of his family. 7 (47) 8 As a result of the escape of Fakhr-Eddin to Italy, the Ottoman 9 Sultanate assigned to Safed Bustanji Hassan Pasha, in addition to Sidon, 10 Beirut, and Ghazir in1614, and the Sultanate also tried in the same year 11 to conduct a new administrative organization in the province of 12 Damascus, cutting off the Sidon, Beirut and Safed sub-regions And a 13 new province was formed from them, known as the Province of Sidon, 14 but this attempt did not succeed, so the Ottoman Sultanate turned away 15 from it and returned the new province to what it was in the past in 16 terms of its subordination to the province of Damascus . )48( 17 The temporary disappearance of Fakhr-Eddin from the Lebanese 18 arena did not diminish the flash of political meanings, as Emir Ali ibn 19 Fakhr-Eddin continued his father’s expansionist policy to restore what 20 had been lost, and took advantage of the opportunity to appoint a new 21 governor over Damascus, Nachanji Ahmad Pasha in 1617, so he asked 22 Sanjak Safed, as it was before his father's travel to Europe, so he issued 23 a royal firman with the report of the Sanjak of Safed, Sidon, Beirut and 24 Ghazir to Emir Ali. (49) 25 It seems that the local rulers of Palestine breathed a sigh of relief 26 during the five-year that Fakhr-Eddin spent in Europe, during which 27 they were relieved of the pressure he was exerting on them, and his son 28 Emir Ali was busy arranging his house from the inside. In any case, 29 during the period that Fakhr-Eddin spent in Europe, the situation in the 30 Ottoman Sultanate had begun to change in his favor, so his archenemy 31 Nasuh Pasha was dismissed from the great leadership, and Ahmad 32 Pasha al-Hafez, the governor of Damascus, left his position, and the 33

47. al-Khalidi Safadi, op. cit, pp. 15-16. al-Shihabi, op. cit, pp. 820-823; al-Debs, op. cit, Vol. 7, p. 154; al-Ma'louf, “Al- Harafsheh Princes", pp. 90-110. 48. al-Khalidi Safadi, op. cit, p.33; al-Bekhit (Muhammad Adnan) (September 1979), “From the Ottoman History of Haifa: A Study on the Conditions of the Levantine Coast,” Palestinian affairs, (94), p. 100. 49. al-Khalidi Safadi, op. cit, pp. 19-65; al-Shihabi, op. cit, pp. 823-851.

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Sultanate itself was engaged in its wars with the Safavids. Through his 1 advisor and Emir Younus Harfoush, Emir of Bekaa', he obtained a 2 pardon from the Ottoman Sultanate and returned to Lebanon in 1618. 3 )50( 4 It should be noted that the return of Fakhr-Eddin from Europe was 5 not directly to one of the Lebanese ports, such as Sidon or Beirut, but 6 rather the ship that carried him anchored in the Palestinian port of Acre 7 (51). A person may be confused about this behavior on the part of Fakhr- 8 Eddin, knowing in advance that Beirut and Sidon are under the 9 influence of his son Ali. Consequently, he can go down to one of these 10 two cities. The researcher believes that choosing Fakhr-Eddin for Acre 11 as the first spot he set foot on after his return from his voluntary exile 12 has a special symbolism for him, which shows the importance of 13 Palestine in his expansion project, whether it was before his departure 14 to Europe, or in his subsequent plans that he intended to start 15 implementing, this is from On the one hand, and the other hand; It 16 makes clear that Acre was at that time under the control of his son, 17 Emir Ali, and Fakhr-Eddin was certainly aware of this in advance. 18 To demonstrate the validity of what was previously mentioned; 19 Some historical sources reported that when Fakhr --Eddin came to Acre, 20 he asked who was ruling in that region, and his recipients told him that 21 his son Ali was the ruler there and that he is now touring the 22 Palestinian village of Abu Sinan to collect money from it, so he sent 23 Fakhr-Eddin to summon him (52). In fact, despite the assertion that the 24 port in which Fakhr-Eddin landed in Acre, it is unreasonable to believe 25 what was reported by al-Khalidi Safadi and Haidar al-Shihabi, 26 regarding Fakhr-Eddin's lack of knowledge of the ruler of Acre at the 27 time, which calls for confusion and confusion. Reason requires us to 28 confirm that he already knew this ruler before he set foot in his area of 29 influence for two reasons: 30 31 1. It is assumed that the return of Fakhr-Eddin from his voluntary 32 exile to the East took place in advance coordination with his 33 assistants, on top of them his son Ali. 34

50. Rafiq, op. cit, p. 164. 51. al-Khalidi Safadi, op. cit, p. 69; al-Shihabi, op. cit, p. 855. 52. al-Khalidi Safadi, op. cit, p. 69.

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2. Had he not known that his son Ali was the de facto ruler of Acre, 1 he would not have undertaken this matter for fear that it would 2 fall into the hands of his enemies, the local leaders of Palestine. 3 4 What al-Khalidi Safadi and Haidar al-Shihabi reported is nothing 5 more than an exaggeration to show the pride of religion in the 6 appearance of a strong leader who does not fear the misfortune of his 7 enemies, and returns to recover the possessions that he lost before. 8 Fakhr-Eddin, upon his return from Europe, began to consolidate his 9 power again (53). and some of his opponents placated him and sent him 10 gifts (54). Fakhr-Eddin is accused of starting to work actively and eagerly 11 to achieve his old goals, following the old method that he had followed 12 before (55). in 1618, the Ottomans isolated Emir Ahmad ibn Hamdan ibn 13 Qansuh from Ajlun Sanjak, and they also isolated Sheik Amro from the 14 sheikdom of Houran, and they took their place, Ibn Qalawun, who is of 15 Turkish origin, and Sheik Rashid and the two deposed Emirs were 16 forced to seek help from Fakhr-Eddin to restore them to their posts. He 17 succeeded in obtaining a decree from the High Porte in this regard in 18 Shawwal of the same year (56). 19 Later, events followed dramatically, between ebbs and flows 20 between local powers, claiming each of them owns the sanjak. Emir 21 Ahmad ibn Qansuh succeeded in obtaining a decision to return to the 22 Sanjak of Ajlun, but the Pasha of Damascus did not implement it due to 23 the date of the departure of the Shami Hajj convoy, and he feared that 24 Emir Bashir and Sheik Rashid would be isolated at that time so as not to 25 disrupt the caravan, which is the same position that Fakhr-Eddin took 26 With him when he sought his help, and Fakhr-Eddin was trying as 27 much as possible to disrupt Emir Ahmad ibn Qansuh's receipt of Ajlun 28 Sanjak, in the hope of granting it to his son Emir, Hussein. )57( 29 Emir Ahmad ibn Qansuh went to the homes of Emir Ahmad ibn 30 Tarabay again, seeking to settle in it, and during his stay with ibn 31 Tarabay, he was attacked by his uncle Emir Bashir, so ibn Tarabay was 32 annoyed by that deed, and he wrote to Fakhr-Eddin asking him to help 33 Ahmad ibn Qansuh to restore his Sanjak. It seems that Fakhr-Eddin had 34

53. Rafiq, op. cit, p. 164. 54. al-Khalidi Safadi, op. cit, pp. 69-70. 55. Holt, op. cit, p. 117. 56. al-Khalidi Safadi, op. cit, pp. 84-87; al-Shihabi, op. cit, pp. 863-864. 57. al-Khalidi Safadi, op. cit, p. 112.

17 2020-4062-AJHIS given up on the arrival of a firman from Astana by granting him the 1 Sanjak Ajlun to his son Hussein, so he feared the presence of enemies 2 close to his areas of influence, and he decided to help Ahmad ibn 3 Qansuh, and he detached a campaign in 1621 against Emir Bashir, 4 which included Emir Qassim ibn Emir Ali al-Shihabi and Emir Tarabay, 5 son of Emir Ahmad ibn Tarabay when Emir Bashir heard of the arrival 6 of the aforementioned alliance to the Majama' 'Bridge, he fled with 7 Sheikh Rashid, and Ahmad ibn Qansuh recovered the Sanjak Ajlun, 8 who later - in recognition of his goodness - rented the western valley 9 area of Bisan to Emir Ali ibn Fakhr-Eddin. (58) 10 Fakhr-Eddin's strength became so tyrannical that the governor of 11 Damascus granted him the Ajlun Sanjak in the name of his son Emir 12 Hussein after he had completely despaired of obtaining it. It seems that 13 Emir Ahmad ibn Qansuh accepted this matter compulsively. )59( 14 Fakhr-Eddin continued to support his associates in Palestine and 15 east of the Jordan River, especially since disputes had returned to the 16 surface between Emir Ahmad ibn Tarabay and Fakhr-Eddin in 1622 17 when the first supported Emir Younus al-Harfoush in his struggle 18 against Fakhr-Eddin, and when ibn Tarabay felt the ambitions of Fakhr- 19 Eddin Expansionism, despite ibn Tarabay's attempts to reform between 20 Sheik Assi, one of the sheiks of Nablus and Mustafa Ketkhda, one of 21 Fakhr-Eddin's aides, and his success in stopping the fighting between 22 them. ibn Tarabay also extended his rule over the countries of Ajlun, 23 Irbid, and Nablus, and gave the ruling on them to sheiks loyal to him in 24 the neighboring regions. Fakhr-Eddin was forced to attack the lands 25 under the rule of Ahmad ibn Tarabay and seized the Haifa tower and 26 ordered the burning of the villages of Carmel, and in the face of this 27 devastating invasion, Ibn Tarabay and Emir Bashir ibn Qansuh moved 28 towards the al-Auja River on the borders of Gaza.)60( 29 Fakhr-Eddin tried to advance south to catch up with ibn Tarabay 30 and was able to win a temporary victory until a violent battle took place 31 in which the Arabs of al-Mafarajah took part in the side of Fakhr-Eddin 32 and the Arabs of Sawalmeh on the side of ibn Tarabay. They even 33 pursued the remnants of Fakhr-Eddin’s army and inflicted many 34

58. Ibid., pp. 113-116; al-Shihabi, op. cit, pp. 877-878. 59. al-Khalidi Safadi, op. cit, pp. 117-120; Holt, op. cit, p. 117. 60. al-Shihabi, op. cit, pp. 885-890; al-Dabbagh (Mustafa Murad) (1991), Our Country, Palestine, Section 2, Vol. 3, in the Home of Nablus (2), Kafr Qara': Dar Al- Huda, p.40.

18 2020-4062-AJHIS casualties on it, despite the attempts of historian al-Khalidi Safadi to 1 downplay this victory. (61) 2 At a time when Fakhr-Eddin’s possessions in Lebanon were 3 threatened by Yusuf Pasha Sifa, and Emir Younus al-Harfoush, who 4 began attacking them, taking advantage of Fakhr-Eddin’s lack of 5 presence, the latter decided to return to face the new situation. 6 Meanwhile, Emir Ali ibn Tarabay, the brother of Emir Ahmad, raided 7 the coast of Acre, and on his way back to his country, he passed by 8 Haifa and collided with one of Fakhr-Eddin’s associates, Nassouh 9 Balukbashi, so he killed him and his remaining aides took refuge in 10 Haifa Tower and then fled by sea to Acre, as Ahmad's attacks 11 continued. ibn Tarabay against the followers of Fakhr-Eddin, especially 12 in the village of Kafr Kanna. )62( 13 The increase in Fakhr-Eddin's power led to the alarm of Mustafa 14 Pasha, the governor of Damascus, who worked on an alliance with 15 Emir Younus al-Harfoush, and Yusuf Pasha Sifa to overthrow their 16 rival. Fakhr-Eddin succeeded at first, by laving heavy bribes on the 17 entourage of the High Porte in Astana, to prevent interference from the 18 central government, and also to establish his ownership of Safed, 19 Nablus and Ajlun. (63) 20 However, the High Port’s moderate policy towards Fakhr-Eddin 21 did not last long in his favor, as the latter restored his ties with the 22 government of Tuscany and allowed its merchants to land in its ports. 23 At that time, the High Porte granted permission to the governor of 24 Damascus and his allies to attack Fakhr-Eddin to limit his role, and in 25 this context, a famous battle took place in the modern history of 26 Lebanon, which was the battle of Anjar in 1623, during which Mustafa 27 Pasha was defeated and captured, while his allies were defeated and 28 their remnants completely dispersed, then The Pasha was released - 29 through a delegation of Damascus scholars - who was later forced to 30 recognize Fakhr-Eddin’s authority and property, and thus his influence 31 reached its peak. )64( 32 The battle of Anjar was a milestone in the history of Fakhr-Eddin II. 33 Al-Sifa family finally accepted absolute submission to his authority and 34 the provision of money to him after he seized Akkar and demolished its 35

61. al-Khalidi Safadi, op. cit, pp. 139-141; al-Shihabi, op. cit, pp. 890-892. 62. al-Khalidi Safadi, op. cit, p. 142. 63. Holt, op. cit, pp. 117-118. 64. al-Nimr, op. cit, Vol. 1, pp. 39-40.

19 2020-4062-AJHIS castle, and extended his influence northward to the borders of Antioch 1 (65). As for the situation in Palestine, it was completely different, as the 2 local Emirs there refused to submit to his authority, so Ahmad ibn 3 Tarabay attacked in the same year his associates Fakhr-Eddin who took 4 over the Palestinian sanjaks and the eastern Jordan River and Houran, 5 and seized the property of Emir Ahmad ibn Qansuh, the governor of 6 Ajlun, and Sheik Hussein ibn Amro, the governor of Houran, and gave 7 their sanjaks to Emir Bashir, the uncle of Ahmad ibn Qansuh, and Sheik 8 Rashid, but Fakhr-Eddin was not surrendered to the de facto matter. 9 Rather, he helped his aides to recover their properties later. (66) 10 Fakhr-Eddin managed to acquire al-Salt Castle and appointed it as 11 his deputy. He also seized Nablus and isolated Muhammad ibn 12 Farrukh from it. The matter of Fakhr-Eddin reached its full extent after 13 he acquired to his son Emir Mansour the Sanjak of al-Lijun, including 14 the city of Jenin, the main center of the Al-Tarabay family, which was 15 not accepted by Emir Ahmad ibn Tarabay. His reaction was that he 16 formed a coalition of Arabs of Sawalmeh, the cavalry of Nablus, the 17 countries of Ajlun and al-Ghor, led by Muhammad ibn Farrukh and the 18 Arabs of Gaza who are under the authority of Hassan Pasha Rodwan, 19 the governor of Gaza, to attack Fakhr-Eddin's allies from the Arabs of 20 al-Mafarajah, as well as attacking the coasts of Acre and plundering and 21 sabotaging them, and the battles between the two sides continued 22 Sparring. The Arab tribes under the command of ibn Tarabay and his 23 supporters proved tough in resistance against Fakhr-Eddin and his 24 forces from the mercenary Sukmaniya, especially in the battle that took 25 place at the al-Auja River near Jaffa in 1623, in which ibn Tarabay won 26 and took back the city of Jenin, and inflicted many losses on his 27 opponent's army. )67(. 28 Ahmad ibn Tarabay’s attacks on Emir Fakhr-Eddin’s properties 29 continued and destroyed them. He seized the village of Abu Sinan 30 belonging to the Sanjak of Acre and achieved several victories that 31 stunned Fakhr-Eddin and his son Emir Ali, and since the costs of 32 fighting were exorbitant for the two warring parties, they decided to 33 coexist and open a new page of peaceful reconciliation, or What is 34 termed in contemporary history as the Cold War, and negotiations were 35

65. Rafiq, op. cit, p. 165; Churchill, op. cit, p. 77. 66. al-Khalidi Safadi, op. cit, pp. 177, 183-184; al-Shihabi, op. cit, pp. 910-911. 67. al-Khalidi Safadi, op. cit, pp. 184-194; al-Mohibi, op. cit, Vol. 1, pp. 221-222, Vol. 3, p. 267, Vol. 4, p. 295.

20 2020-4062-AJHIS held between the two parties that resulted in peace in Shawwal of the 1 same year, one of the most important conditions of which is for Fakhr- 2 Eddin’s forces to withdraw from Haifa and its tower after its 3 demolition, and for ibn Tarabay to prevent his Arabs from destroying 4 the country of Safed, which belongs to Fakhr-Eddin, He also pledges to 5 secure the road between Safed and Haritha, and Fakhr-Eddin 6 abandoned Mount Nablus to ibn Tarabay and recognized the extension 7 of his authority to Haifa, and thus none of the two sides is exposed to 8 the other. (68) 9 It seems that the troubles that Fakhr-Eddin faced in Palestine and 10 its east increased later. In the same year, the fortresses of al-Salt and 11 Ajlun were exposed to a tremendous danger on the part of Emir Bashir 12 ibn Qansuh after he imposed a suffocating siege on them, and he called 13 upon those in charge of its order to hand them over to him. And when 14 Emir Bashir was aware that Fakhr-Eddin would not let him be content 15 with the gains he had obtained, he sent a request for reconciliation with 16 him, and after discussions that took place between the two parties, they 17 agreed that Emir Bashir would be the governor of the Sanjak of Ajlun 18 and a representative of Emir Hussein ibn Fakhr-Eddin. )69( 19 By the year 1624, the matter had stabilized for Fakhr-Eddin in 20 Palestine and its surroundings after being certain of the continuation of 21 the bonds of affection, his good relationship with Emir Ahmad ibn 22 Tarabay and Bashir ibn Qansuh, the retention of his son Emir Ali of the 23 strategic Sanjak of Safed, and the death of his traditional rival Yusuf 24 Basha Sifa (70). This placed the Ottomans in a difficult position that they 25 could not face due to their preoccupation at the time with fighting the 26 Safavids. Therefore, Sultan Murad IV was forced to recognize the 27 authority of Fakhr-Eddin and granted him a firman and a ruler 28 according to him over the land of Arabistan from the borders of Aleppo 29 to Jerusalem, and he also granted him the title of Sultan of al-bar (Dry 30 ground from the ground) - which his grandfather Fakhr-Eddin I had 31 previously held - provided that he provided the Miri money to the 32 Sultanate’s treasury, and He maintains security in his area, this 33 important Firman that Fakhr-Eddin obtained in exchange for what he 34 paid from the dear and high price. (71) 35

68. al-Khalidi Safadi, op. cit, pp. 196-198; al-Shihabi, op. cit, pp. 916-917. 69. al-Khalidi Safadi, op. cit, pp. 201-204; al-Shihabi, op. cit, pp. 918-920. 70. al- Khalidi Safadi, op. cit, pp. 205-206. 71. op. cit, p. 242; al-Hattouni, op. cit, p. 76.

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The policy of reconciliation between Fakhr-Eddin and Ahmad ibn 1 Tarabay lasted for about ten years, but tension returned between them 2 in 1633, when Emir Ali ibn Fakhr-Eddin incited Arabs al-Wahidat 3 against Al-Tarabay family, and it seems that Fakhr-Eddin was aware of 4 what his son did. With the help of Emir Muhammad ibn Farrukh, he 5 attacked and plundered the country of Safed affiliated with Emir Ali, 6 and the governor of Damascus, Ahmad Pasha Koçak, had played a 7 suspicious role in fueling tension between the local forces again, which 8 led to the death of Emir Ali ibn Fakhr-Eddin (72). 9 Fakhr-Eddin felt that the hour of decisive action between him and 10 the Ottoman authorities had come, so he began to reinforce his 11 defenses, building a fortress in the area between Aleppo and Antioch, 12 and another fortress in Qab Elias in Bekaa', and Baniyas in the south, 13 and Palmyra is still known by his name, Sultan Murad IV issued an 14 order to Ahmad Pasha Kucuk in 1633, to go to fight Fakhr-Eddin, which 15 led to the defeat of Fakhr-Eddin and his hiding in Niha Castle A few 16 months ago, then he moved to a fortified cave near until the 17 Ottomans finally managed to arrest him and send him to Astana as a 18 prisoner, and then execute him there on April 13, 1635. (73) 19 In this context, it is also worth noting several factors that pushed 20 the local princes in Palestine to alienate Fakhr-Eddin's control over 21 them, including: )74( 22 23 1. Their deep sense that he was competing with them for 24 supremacy or tribal leadership, and wanted to impose the 25 supremacy of his tribe over them, at a time when they felt that 26 they were neither less competent than him nor weaker than a 27 tribal fanatic. 28 2. They were aware of the reality of his expansionist ambitions and 29 intentions towards their sanjaks of annexation and control. 30 3. The successive governors of Damascus did not want to surrender 31 to Fakhr-Eddin’s desires and ambitions in their governorate 32 easily. This position prompted them to coordinate with the rulers 33 of the banner under their influence, to carry out military action to 34

72. al-Khalidi Safadi, op. cit, pp. 245-247. 73. see al-Mohibi, op. cit, Vol. 1, pp. 385-388, Vol. 3, pp. 267-268; Anonymous author, op. cit, filo 23b; Holt, op. cit, pp. 118-119. 74. al-Astal, op. cit, pp. 48-50.

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limit its influence and change the political situation that is 1 imposed on them. 2 3 4 Conclusion 5 6 In the conclusion of this study, we can consider some results, 7 including: 8 9 1. Fakhr-Eddin's al-Ma’ni II ambition to establish a regional emirate 10 whose leader was not a result of chance, or the result of the 11 political accumulations that made the Levant in general, and 12 Lebanon and Palestine in particular, a hotbed for many local 13 rulers who each ruled a particular region, but this ambition He 14 was primarily due to the ambitious plans of his predecessors. 15 2. The main and direct reason for Fakhr-Eddin's interest in 16 expanding Palestine is not primarily due to sectarian motives, 17 but rather purely partisan reasons, especially the conflict 18 between the two main parties in the Levant; Qaisi and Yamani. 19 3. Fakhr-Eddin II's intervention in Ottoman Palestine was for 20 purely personal goals and not for a supreme national interest. 21 4. The personality of Fakhr-Eddin II was not his behavior 22 indicating an adventurous trend, but rather the actions of an 23 ambitious man whose actions were marred by many ambitions 24 to build a self-glory that he would perpetuate in historical 25 records. And a man with such characteristics is difficult for him 26 to gamble with his future and expansionist political project amid 27 an adventure that may succeed and often fail, and what Fakhr- 28 Eddin believes is that he was slow in making decisions, so he 29 achieved many successes. 30 5. The return of Fakhr-Eddin from Europe - his voluntary exile - 31 and his choice of the port of Acre, to be the first place in the East 32 to set foot on his feet, has a symbolic special for him, which 33 shows the importance of Palestine in his expansion project, 34 whether it was before his departure to Europe, or in his 35 subsequent plans that he intended Getting started. 36 6. That the battle of Anjar in 1623 was a milestone in the history of 37 Fakhr-Eddin. The local rulers of Lebanon and those loyal to the 38 Ottoman authorities subsequently submitted to his influence, 39

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and his attempts to obtain the largest possible gains in the 1 Palestinian sanjaks increased. 2 7. The relationship between Fakhr-Eddin and the Palestinian local 3 leaderships did not go together. It always clashes between the 4 two sides attracted by tides; Although these leaderships achieved 5 many victories over Fakhr-Eddin, as for some of the gains the 6 latter achieved in Palestine; Rather, it is due to his wise policy 7 sometimes and not to his military power through his agents in 8 Astana, where he lavished huge sums on them to make it easier 9 for him to buy positions and appoint him to some sanjaks in 10 Palestine and east of the Jordan River. 11 12 13 Study sources and references 14 15 First: the manuscripts 16 17 Al-Ghazzi (Najm-Eddin Muhammad ibn Badr Eddin): Lutf As-Sahar and Qatf 18 As-Thamar from Trajem of the notables of the first class of the eleventh 19 century, or the tail of the planets moving with the virtues of the 20 dignitaries of the tenth hundred, manuscript found in al-Assad Library in 21 Damascus, No. 3406. 22 Al-Ansari (Sharaf Eddin Bin Musa), Nuzhat al-Khater and Bohjet al-Nazer, 23 manuscript in al-Assad Library in Damascus, No. 7814. 24 The Anonymous author, Nuzhat Al-Zaman in the Incidents of Lebanon, 25 Manuscript in the National Library in Paris, Arabe No. 1684. 26 27 Second: references and translated references 28 29 Al-Astal (Riyad Mahmoud) (2000), Modern and Contemporary History of 30 Palestine, Second Edition, Gaza. 31 Al-Awrah (Ibrahim) (1936), History of the Wilayat of Suleiman Pasha al-Adil, 32 published and commented on Constantine al-Pasha al-Mukhlesi, Sidon. 33 Al-Bekhit (Muhammad Adnan) (September 1979), “From the Ottoman History 34 of Haifa: A Study on the Conditions of the Levantine Coast,” Palestinian 35 affairs, (94). 36 Al-Borini (al-Hassan bin Muhammad) (1959, 1966), Tarajim of notables from 37 the sons of time, edited by Dr. Salah Eddin al-Munjjid, Vol. 2, Damascus. 38 Al-Dabbagh (Mustafa Murad) (1991), Our Country, Palestine, Section 2, Vols. 39 3, 3, in the Home of Nablus (2), Kafr Qara': Dar Al-Huda. 40

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Al-Debs (Yusuf) (no date), History of Syria, revised and verified by Dr. 1 Maroun Raad, Vol. 7, Beirut: Nazeer Abboud House. 2 Al-Hattouni (Mansour Tannous) (n.d.), A Brief History of the Kesrouan 3 District, without publication data. 4 Al-Khalidi al-Safadi (Ahmad bin Muhammad) (1969), Lebanon during the 5 reign of Emir Fakhr-Eddin al-Ma'ni II, published by Dr. Asad Rostom and 6 Fouad Afram al-Bustani, Beirut: Lebanese University Publications, 7 Al-Ma'louf (Issa Iskandar) (1908), Dawani al-Qatouf fi Tarikh Al-Ma'louf, 8 Zahle. 9 Al-Ma'louf (Issa Iskandar) (1966), History of Emir Fakhr-Eddin al-Ma'ani II, 10 Second Edition, Beirut: Catholic Press Publications. 11 Al-Ma'louf (Issa Iskandar) (from Rabi` al-Awwal to Dhu al-Hijjah 1342 AH), 12 “Al- Harafsheh Princes”, Al-Irfan Magazine, Volume 9. 13 Al-Maqari (Muhammad bin Juma'a) (1949), The Pashas and the Judges in the 14 Ottoman Era, compiled, verified, and published: Dr. Salah Eddin Al- 15 Munjjid, in the book: The Governors of Damascus in the Ottoman Era, 16 Damascus. 17 Al-Mohibi (Muhammad aal-Amin) (1869), Kholaset al-Athar on Notables of 18 the Eleventh Century, Vol. 1, Cairo. 19 Al-Moubayed (Selim Arafat) (2000), the endowment of Musa Pasha al- 20 Rodwan in the year 1081 AH, Cairo: Ibn Sina Library for Publishing, 21 Distribution, and Export. 22 Al-Nimr (Ihsan), (1975), History of Mount Nablus and Balqa, Vol. 1, Second 23 Edition, Nablus. 24 Al-Sabbagh (Layla) (1989), European Communities in the Levant in the 25 Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, Vol. 1, Beirut. 26 Al-Salibi (Kamal) (1969), History of Modern Lebanon, Second Edition, Beirut: 27 Dar An-Nahar Publishing. 28 Al-Shihabi (Haider) (1993), The History of Prince Haider al-Shihabi, 29 commented on his footnotes: Dr. Maroun Raad, Vol. 3, Beirut: Nazeer 30 Abboud House. 31 Awadh (Abdul-Aziz Muhammad) (1969), the Ottoman Administration in the 32 Province of Syria 1864-1914, presented by Ahmad Ezzat Abdul-Karim, 33 Cairo: Dar Al Ma'aref. 34 Bazile (Constantine) (1989), Syria, and Palestine under Ottoman rule. 35 Translated by Tariq Ma'sarani, Dar al-Taqadoum, Moscow. 36 Brockelman (Karl) (1998), History of the Islamic Peoples, translated by Nabih 37 Amin Fares and Munir al-Baalbaki, 13th Edition, Beirut: Dar al-Alem 38 lelmalayeen. 39 Churchill (Charles) (1985), Mount Lebanon (ten years residency) 1842-1852, 40 translated by Fendi Al-Sha'ar, Beirut: Dar al-Morouj for Printing, 41 Publishing, and Distribution. 42

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Hitti (Philip) (1959), History of Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine, translated by 1 Dr. Kamal al-Yazji, Vol. 2, Beirut: Dar al-Thaqafa. 2 Lutsky (Vladimir) (1985), A History of the Modern Arab Countries, translated 3 by Dr. Afifa Al-Bustani, review: Uri Roshin, 8th Edition, Beirut: Dar Al- 4 Farabi. 5 Rafiq (Abdul-Karim) (1974), The Arabs and the Ottomans 1516-1916, First 6 Edition, Damascus. 7 Rafeq (Abdul-Karim) (1990), Palestine during the Ottoman era (1), The 8 Palestinian Encyclopedia, Section 2, Special Studies, Vol. 2, Historical 9 Studies, First Edition, Beirut. 10 Swayyed (Yassin) (1985), The Military History of the Lebanese Provinces 11 during the Era of the Two Emirates, Vol. 1, Beirut: The Arab Foundation 12 for Studies. 13 The Palestinian Encyclopedia, General Section, Vol. 1, 3, First Edition, 14 Damascus: The Palestinian Encyclopedia, 1984. 15 16 Third: Foreign References 17 18 Charles-Roux (F.) (1928), Les Echelles des Syrie et de Palestine au XV 111 19 siècle, Paris. 20 Holt (P.M.) (1966), Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516-1922, New York: 21 Cornell University Press. 22 Ismail (Adel) (1955), Histoire du Liban du XVII siècle à nos jours, vol.1, Le 23 Liban au temps de Fakhr-eddin II (1590-1633), Paris. 24 Lammens (S.J.) (1921), La Syrie précis Historique, vol. 2, Beyrouth. 25

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