Darfur in Perspective
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DARFUR IN PERSPECTIVE i ii Darfur in Perspective DR DAVID HOILE European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council iii First Published March 2005 by The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council 1 Northumberland Avenue London WC2N 5BW Second, revised edition published January 2006 Telephone: 020 7872 5434 Telefax: 020 7753 2848 E-mail: [email protected] website: www.espac.org Copyright © David Hoile 2005 The moral right of David Hoile to be identified as the author or this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of the author, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organisation. ISBN 1-903545-40-4 Printed and bound by T J International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall, UK iv CONTENTS Map of Sudan showing Darfur vii Map of Sudan viii Abbreviations ix Introduction 1 Chapter One The Causes of the Darfur Crisis 11 Chapter Two The Darfur Peace Process 32 Chapter Three Humanitarian Aid Access in Darfur 79 Chapter Four Allegations of Genocide in Darfur 97 Chapter Five The “Janjaweed” and Darfur 115 Chapter Six The Media, Sensationalism and Irresponsibility 128 Chapter Seven Darfur, Human Rights and Hypocrisy 153 Chapter Eight The Darfur Road-map 173 Appendix One Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict In Darfur 180 Appendix Two The April 2005 Ndjamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur 183 Appendix Three The May 2004 Agreement with the Sudanese Parties on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment ofObservers in the Darfur 187 v Darfur in Perspective Appendix Four Protocol between the Government of the Sudan (GOS), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on the Enhancement of the Security Situation in Darfur in Accordance with the N’djamena Agreement 192 Appendix Five Protocol Between The Government of the Sudan (GOS), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on the Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur 197 Appendix Six Joint Communique between the Government of Sudan and the United Nations on the Occasion of the Visit of the Secretary General to Sudan 202 Appendix Seven Government Legislative Measures On Darfur 205 Appendix Eight Joint Communique from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs on the Facilitation of Humanitarian Access to Darfur 207 Appendix Nine The Sudan Government Vision for a Peaceful Solution in Darfur 209 Bibliography 215 Notes 217 Index 271 vi Map of Sudan showing Darfur vii Map of Sudan viii ABBREVIATIONS AU African Union BBC British Broadcasting Corporation CNN Cable Network News DOP Declaration of Principles ECHO European Union Aid Office EU European Union GOAL Irish Humanitarian Organisation GOS Government of Sudan HAC Humanitarian Aid Commission ICG International Crisis Group IDP Internally Displaced Person JEM Justice and Equality Movement JIM Joint Implementation Mechanism MSF Médecins sans Frontières NCP National Congress Party NIF National Islamic Front NMRD National Movement for Reform and Development OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OLS Operation Lifeline Sudan PANA Pan African News Agency PC Popular Congress PDF Popular Defence Force SLA Sudan Liberation Army SLM Sudan Liberation Movement SMC Sudan Media Center SNMEM Sudan National Movement for the Eradication of Marginalisation SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army SUNA Sudan News Agency UN United Nations UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund USAID United States Agency for International Development WFP World Food Programme ix ABOUT THE AUTHOR Dr David Hoile is a public affairs consultant specialising in African affairs. He has studied Sudanese affairs for ten years and is the author of Images of Sudan: Case Studies in Propaganda and Misrepresentation (2003) and Farce Majeure: The Clinton Administration’s Sudan Policy 1993-2000 (2000) and editor of The Search for Peace in the Sudan: A Chronology of the Sudanese Peace Process 1989- 2001 (2002). He is the author or editor of a number of other publications on African affairs, including Mozambique A Nation in Crisis (1989) and Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment (1994). Dr Hoile is also a Research Professor at the University of Nyala in Darfur, and a Visiting Professor at the Institute of African-Asian Studies and the Department of Political Science at the University of Khartoum. x Introduction The war that has been fought in Darfur over the past three years has been a humanitarian disaster. The violence is said to have amounted to “a demographic catastrophe”.1 Hundreds of villages have been destroyed and tens of thousands of people may have died as a direct or indirect result of the conflict. Many more have become internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Darfur, or refugees in Chad. The United Nations’ Darfur Humanitarian Profile, published in September 2005, estimated that just below 3.4 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance, 47 percent of whom constituted resident populations: “The number of IDPs continues to slightly decline as new verifications are carried out, and has dropped below 1.8 million for the first time since February 2005. While there are reports of IDPs returning to farm their land, it remains uncertain whether this is a permanent phenomenon. Overall, it can be expected that the number of IDPs will remain largely unvaried until the preparation of the next agricultural season, in early 2006.”2 In its September 2005 report, the UN noted that “Crop forecasts for the coming harvest indicate an 80 percent improvement compared to last season. In total 51% of households are now cultivating against 35% in 2004. The good conditions also enabled some IDPs who settled close to their areas of origin to temporarily move back to their area and cultivate.”3 As of September 2005 there were 184 fixed health centres in Darfur with an additional 36 mobile centres. Fourteen primary health care centres were opened from May to August 2005: “75% of accessible hospitals had been rehabilitated, providing free access to 70% of the IDPs and conflict affected population.”4 Much of this had been possible because of a ceasefire – albeit one repeatedly violated – that has been in place since 2004. As of January 2005 the humanitarian crisis had started to ease. In its 2004 year-end report, the Office of the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Co-ordinator for the Sudan, reported that the 90-day humanitarian action plan, from June to August 2004, had been a success. It further reported that “by 31 1 Darfur in Perspective December 2004 the humanitarian situation for most of the 2.2 million people affected is stabilized…The catastrophic mortality figures predicted by some quarters have not materialised”.5 The United Nations reported that a June 2005 mortality survey showed that “the crude mortality rate was 0.8 deaths per 10,000 people per day in all three states of Darfur.” This was “below the critical threshold of one death per 10,000 people per day. A year earlier, a similar survey showed crude mortality rates three times higher.”6 This improvement was because of an unprecedented effort by the international community, UN agencies and non-governmental organisations. The UN reported that the number of aid workers had increased from 200 in March 2004 to 8,500 by the end of 2004.7 The UN confirmed that in September 2005 the number of humanitarian workers in Darfur had grown further to around 13,500 and that they were working for 81 NGOs and 13 UN agencies.8 In January 2005, the World Health Organisation confirmed that food and health access, water supply and sanitation services were making a significant difference in addressing the crisis.9 All these achievements were subsequently endangered by an escalation in rebel ceasefire violations, including attacks on aid workers, humanitarian convoys and government forces. The BBC noted that “after eight months of relative calm and improving security, the situation in Darfur is deteriorating once again. Banditry and attacks on aid convoys are increasing and the finger of blame is being firmly pointed at the SLA, Darfur’s main rebel movement…The African Union said the rebels’ provocative banditry and lack of cooperation was casting doubt over their commitment to negotiations.”10 The rebels subsequently also murdered several African Union peacekeepers.11 At the end of January 2005, the United Nations International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur reported back to the UN Secretary-General, stating that while there had been serious violations of human rights in the course of the war in Darfur, allegations of genocide were unfounded.12 Following on from recommendations made by the UN Commission, the UN Security Council called upon the International Criminal Court to investigate human rights abuses in Darfur.13 The Sudanese national commission of inquiry into human rights violations in Darfur also published its report in January 2005. Established by presidential decree and chaired by a former chief justice of Sudan, the commission visited Darfur on several occasions and spent several months taking 2 Introduction evidence from hundreds of witnesses. The national commission also found that there was no evidence to support allegations of genocide in Darfur. The commission found that there had been grave violations of human rights and recommended the establishment of a judicial commission to investigate, indict and try those responsible for crimes in Darfur. It also recommended the setting up of compensation and administrative commissions to assist with reconciliation within Darfur.14 African Union-sponsored peace talks have made some progress with the signing of several humanitarian and ceasefire protocols including a declaration of principles – signed eventually in July 2005 – outlining the framework for a political settlement of the conflict.